Diplomacy & Crisis News

A rising coalition of adversarial states opposing the United States’ international leadership has rendered it indispensable for Washington to secure the allegiance of non-aligned middle powers. These countries will not be irresistibly drawn to alliances with the United States, and, indeed, may be tempted by the allure of revisionist adversaries who insist that Washington’s reputation is degrading and that it has systematically deceived its partners for its own benefit.

American adversaries seek to replace unipolarity with a multipolar world that ostensibly equalizes sovereignty and power among states. The revisionist appeal of the “democratization of international relations,” as phrased by the joint statement between China and Russia during their February 2022 summit, is especially compelling for middle powers aiming to maximize their influence in global institutions.

However, while hedging middle powers aspire to expand their influence by elevating themselves to the same level as today’s predominant great powers, America's primary adversaries envision the gradual implementation of global multipolarity—a world defined by several spheres of regional unipolarity that undermine the sovereignty of today’s middle powers. American grand strategy should, therefore, emphasize the dangers of global multipolarity to pivotal middle powers, and act as a balancing force to uphold the rules-based international order while denying adversaries the potential to form regional unipolarities.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, former Russian minister of foreign affairs Yevgeny Primakov inspired the formulation of the Primakov Doctrine, a doctrine that advocates for a multipolar world order in which Russia and other non-Western powers play a major role in world affairs. Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov has embraced the term and its execution, which supports the Kremlin’s decision to undertake a series of aggressive actions in its regional proximities, such as the invasion of Georgia in 2008 and the annexation of Crimea in 2014.

Subsequent Russian strategic documents have highlighted the importance of Moscow’s role in upholding a multipolar order. Russia’s 2020 National Security Strategy highlights “changes in the structure of the world order” that the Kremlin can exploit, and the 2023 Russian Foreign Policy Concept emphasizes Moscow’s “historically unique mission aimed at maintaining a global balance of power and building a multipolar international system.”

These efforts ultimately boil down to a re-consolidation of Russia’s former Soviet hegemony whereby Moscow’s neighbors are inextricably tied politically and economically to the Kremlin. The Eurasian Economic Union (EEU)—composed of Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia with Uzbekistan, Cuba, and Armenia as observers—explicitly describes itself as an “international organization for regional economic integration.” This seemingly paradoxical definition underscores the tension between obtaining global recognition and advocating for alliances to be limited to the regional level. Russian president Vladimir Putin is simultaneously pursuing both goals as he aims to include Asian regional hubs in the alliance, therefore expanding its international reach while keeping Russia at the head of the regional institution.

Beijing’s grand strategy similarly focuses on facilitating a multipolar distribution of power. In an address to the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), former CCP general secretary Hu Jintao urged for what he referred to as the “Community of Common Destiny for Mankind,” arguing that the international system is undergoing “profound and complex changes” and that the “global trend toward multipolarity and economic globalization is deepening.” This community has since been used as a political slogan by the CCP to characterize the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) declared foreign policy, one that proclaims China’s unique role in reshaping the international order to align with its own worldview. Building on this notion, Chinese president Xi Jinping further reaffirmed the PRC’s role in accommodating the so-called “multi-polarization in the world,” in a speech delivered to the Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference, urging its members to “pay attention to the trend of in-depth adjustment of relations between major powers.”

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) mirrors the EEU but lifts the concept of international regionalism to a more ambitious level. One of the BRI’s key promises is to “creat[e] opportunities for regional economic and trade integration” while pushing “developing countries [to] international division of labor and cooperation.” Beijing reaps the most benefit from exploitative development projects if the countries it aids become accustomed to pecking from China’s hand and are disincentivized from creating their own autonomous regional spheres of influence.

The recent Saudi-Iranian “truce” brokered by the Chinese government is an example of Beijing’s attempt to orchestrate international diplomacy by leveraging Iran and Saudi Arabia’s regional ambitions. As a part of a broader campaign to bolster its influence in Riyadh and Tehran’s foreign policies, Beijing has stepped in to assume the role of a regional power broker, recreating a hub-and-spoke dynamic in the Middle East that would foster a reliance on China to resolve regional disputes.

Saudi Arabia, a traditional U.S. ally, has chosen to pursue rapprochement with Iran as a safer alternative to outsourcing its security guarantees to the United States, which Riyadh began to perceive as increasingly unreliable in the context of a shifting global balance of power. Recognizing the insecurities brought by American disengagement from the region, Riyadh’s fear of abandonment, coupled with evidence of decline in American primacy, has led it to embrace the idea of inevitable global multipolarity.

India has the most to lose from China’s strategy of advancing unipolarity at the regional level. Its defense spending is the second highest in the region (behind China), it has an enormous stake in maintaining existing trade flows in the Indo-Pacific, and it has already outpaced China demographically. Accordingly, in its 2019 National Security Strategy, the Indian government dedicated an entire section to “achieving a secure neighborhood” after extensively discussing nationalism and sectarianism in its opening—an indication of India’s understanding that regional conflicts like those which embroiled the Middle East at the turn of the twenty-first century are best solved by afflicted peoples rather than outside powers.

In the document, India expresses hope that its “economic growth can be a driver for greater prosperity in South Asia and lead to enhanced regional cooperation” in response to China’s “growing assertiveness” and “debt trap” in the Indo-Pacific (emphasis added). If China truly wanted a multipolar world, India would be equally represented on the global stage, yet this clearly does not align with the CCP’s goals.

In greater Eurasia, Turkey was also faced with a decision regarding whether it should follow the traditional path of Western alignment or autonomously pursue its own national objectives. Ankara chose the latter, proactively asserting its own regional ambitions in its geographical peripheries. Such efforts are demonstrated by Ankara’s foreign policy in the Syrian Civil War, during which it has maintained an unrelenting military presence in the Idlib Province, provided military assistance to Azerbaijan in its war in Nagorno-Karabakh, and deployed foreign mercenaries to provide air and weapons support on behalf of the Government of National Accord in the Second Libyan Civil War. In addition to these efforts, Ankara, acknowledging the lack of Western support in its geopolitical priorities, has executed a delicate balancing act with Moscow to secure tacit approval in its political dealings. In return, it has accommodated Moscow's vision and rhetoric of global multipolarity.

To middle powers like India, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, the concept of a “multipolar world” presents an enticing prospect in their bid for enhanced political and economic influence, especially in the context of rising competition between great powers. As declared by the members of BRICS—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—today’s revisionist great powers have “reaffirmed their intent to move towards a multipolar system, based on the principles of sovereign equality, trust, and indivisible security.” For pivotal middle powers that do not consider their national interest adequately fulfilled within the confines of the U.S.-led, rules-based international order, such principles are likely to elicit, at the very least, passive acquiescence and, at the most, active alignment and support.

Therefore, Washington now bears the task of articulating the perils of global multipolarity to pivotal middle powers without displaying signs of hubris. In undertaking this endeavor, American delegations traveling abroad should counter the revisionist narrative that the so-called “multipolar world” would yield more prosperity and sovereignty for middle and minor powers on a regional scale. Moreover, State Department and White House officials need to assert that the prevailing Western-led distribution of power not only fosters greater stability and prosperity than its global multipolar alternative, but more effectively upholds the principles of sovereignty and self-determination for middle and minor powers by providing incentives and alternatives for security and development tailored to each country’s national interest. 

During talks with representatives from neutral states, American officials should highlight how initiatives like China’s BRI and the Russian-led EEU are attempts to partition the world into spheres of regional unipolarity with Beijing and Moscow at the top of each. An international system in which the United States is relegated to reduced oversight of North America while China and Russia extract disproportionate benefit from unbalanced regional alliances in the name of “sovereign equality” is dangerous for middle powers.

Such efforts would open new opportunities for Washington to deepen cooperation with existing hedging powers, and would likely dissuade middle powers from developing irreversible dependencies on Beijing and Moscow. Ultimately, whether the West prevails in its new great game against its geopolitical adversaries depends on the alignment of pivotal, often neutral powers. The existential challenge posed to American leadership by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the economic rise of China—both of which threaten the post-WWII international order—has made it urgent to counter the narrative of multipolar diplomacy and secure the support of middle powers.

Axel de Vernou is a junior at Yale University studying Global Affairs and History with a Certificate of Advanced Language Study in Russian. He is a Research Assistant at the Yorktown Institute.

Will Kielm is a recent graduate of the University of Michigan with a degree in Public Policy with a focus in International Relations Theory and U.S. Grand Strategy from the Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy.

Image: Wikimedia Commons.

After Russia invaded Ukaine in February 2022, the United States quickly learned that many of the governments which Washington regarded as allies, partners, or potential partners would not meet American expectations. While many Western governments have joined the United States in sanctioning Russia and arming Ukraine, many others—especially (but not only) those in the Global South—have not done so. Indeed, many have continued to buy Russian oil and trade with Moscow, thus helping support the Russian war effort.

Divergences between the United States and its allies, though, did not just begin with the Ukraine war. Several of America’s allies have been cooperating with some of its adversaries, including Iran, Russia, and China. Western countries bought Russian oil and gas not just before the start of the Russia-Ukraine war, but even after it. There are several countries that have been actively trading with Iran—including the United Arab Emirates (UAE), whose leaders have decried what Emiratis describe as insufficient American protection against Tehran. And not only have many countries throughout the world been unwilling to join either the Trump or Biden administrations in imposing economic sanctions on China, but America’s own robust trade with China has continued, even if through third countries.

This, however, is not a new problem. Indeed, America has had difficulties managing its allies ever since it has had allies. The list includes America’s being at odds with Britian, France, and Israel during the 1956 Suez crisis with Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Egypt; Washington’s difficult relations with French president Charles de Gaulle in the 1960s; Washington’s efforts to navigate the animosity between NATO allies Greece and Turkey, which have been ongoing since before both joined NATO; opposition from France and Germany in particular to the U.S.-led intervention in Iraq that began in 2003; and Israeli and Saudi opposition to the Obama administration working with Britain, France, and Germany (as well as Russia and China) to achieve the 2015 Iranian nuclear accord. Many other such instances could be mentioned.

Whether the problem of so many of America’s allies and partners being at odds with Washington and/or too cozy with America’s adversaries is worse now than before is debatable. What is certain, though, is that it is a very serious problem for the United States today. The real question is: What, if anything, can Washington do about it?

The Contemporary Relevance of Lord Palmerston

The United States, of course, is not the first global great power to experience this problem. It was one that the British Empire also faced even in its heyday in the nineteenth century. One of the leading British statesmen wrestling with it was Lord Palmerston (Henry John Temple, 3rd Viscount Palmerston), who was the dominant figure in shaping British foreign policy from 1830 until his death while serving as prime minister in 1865. It was Palmerston who famously said, “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.” In the same speech to Parliament on March 1, 1848, during which he uttered this dictum, Palmerston set forth several guiding principles about how a great power should conduct foreign policy generally but especially when dealing with allies that do not support it. American foreign policymakers would do well to adopt similar principles.

First, though, something must briefly be said about the context in which Palmerston made his 1848 speech to Parliament. The year 1848 was one of great revolutionary upheaval throughout Europe. It was also a time when conflict and change had been occurring in many other parts of the world, including Asia, the Middle East, and North America. Like now, aggressive Russian military action was a serious concern. On February 23, 1848, another member of parliament—Thomas Anstey—gave a long speech criticizing Palmerston’s policies during his previous stints as foreign secretary (1830-34, 1835-41) as well as his then current one beginning in 1846. Basically, Anstey accused Palmerston of not having done enough to support Britain’s allies or to thwart its adversaries—the type of criticisms that have frequently been leveled against recent American administrations.

It was in response to Anstey’s criticisms that almerston delivered his March speech, which lasted over five hours. Much of it was a detailed refutation of Anstey’s criticisms about Palmerston’s policies regarding a host of events that would take far too long to describe and which many would not see as relevant to America’s contemporary foreign policy concerns. But over the course of the speech, Palmerston made three observations about foreign policy which are particularly relevant to several American foreign policy concerns now.

Alliances Are Not about Friendship but Common Interests

In his speech, Palmerston observed, “As to the romantic notion that nations or Governments are much or permanently influenced by friendships, and God knows what, why, I say that those who maintain those romantic notions, and apply the intercourse of individuals to the intercourse of nations, are indulging in a vain dream. The only thing which makes one Government follow the advice and yield to the counsels of another, is the hope of benefit to accrue from adopting it, or the fear of the consequences of opposing it.”

The modern-day lesson from this which Americans need to draw is that while many governments may genuinely admire the United States for being democratic, they cooperate with the United States in order to get something that they value from it in return—including protection from common enemies. Authoritarian governments, of course, do not need to admire American democracy at all to cooperate with it when they see their interests as being served by doing so. Presidents, cabinet secretaries, and other top foreign policymakers who believe that their own ability to befriend and maintain good relations with foreign leaders are fooling themselves if they think this is the basis of America’s alliances and partnerships. Common interests—which are usually not identical, but convergent—are what underly alliances and partnerships. And what governments see as being in their interests can change.

Don’t Let Allies Determine Our Policies

Later in his speech, Palmerston declared, “I hold with respect to alliances, that England is a Power sufficiently strong, sufficiently powerful, to steer her own course, and not to tie herself as an unnecessary appendage to the policy of any other Government.”

The lesson here is clear: while weaker powers may not be able to avoid going along with the policies of their great power partners, weaker allies must not be allowed to define or limit the foreign policies of great powers. Allowing them to do so risks both involving great powers in conflicts that are more in their allies’ interests than their own, on the one hand, and foregoing opportunities at rapprochements with adversaries that their weaker allies are fearful of on the other. Some of America’s allies—especially those in the Middle East—have seemed to believe that they can or should have a veto over American foreign policy in certain parts of the world. But just as they do not hesitate to pursue their own interests even when these are at odds with America’s, Washington should pursue its own interests even when those interests appear (often incorrectly) to allied governments as being at odds with theirs.

But Be Tolerant When Allies and Partners Disagree with Us

At the end of his speech, Palmerston noted, “When we find other countries marching in the same course, and pursuing the same objects as ourselves, we consider them as our friends, and we think for the moment that we are on the most cordial footing; when we find other countries that take a different view, and thwart us in the object we pursue, it is our duty to make allowance for the different manner in which they may follow out the same objects. It is our duty not to pass too harsh a judgment upon others, because they do not exactly see things in the same light as we see...”

The lesson here is that when allies and partners do not fall in line with U.S. policies (as many have not with regard to Ukraine and Russia), it is important for the United States to exercise tolerance. While many in Washington had gotten used to the idea of India, for example, being a quasi-ally as a result of common concerns about China and membership in the “Quad,” its unwillingness to condemn Russian actions and its buying huge quantities of Russian oil have been disappointing. It is important to understand, though, that the Indian military still relies mainly on Soviet/Russian arms and that India is far more concerned about what it sees as threats from China and Pakistan to itself than Russian actions against Ukraine. Just as India has not let America’s past cooperation with its adversary Pakistan prevent New Delhi from cooperating with Washington now on Asian security issues, the United States should not let India’s cooperation with Russia at present do so either.

While many in the United States seem to adhere to the idea that other countries are either eternal friends or perpetual enemies, many of America’s own allies instead follow the Palmerstonian principle of prioritizing their interests over friendship with the United States. Washington can and should adopt the same approach—not to “teach them a lesson,” but because this approach is sensible. Like its allies, the United States should not refrain from cooperating with its adversaries when Washington deems this to be in American interests. At the same time, the United States should exercise forbearance when its allies do not go along with it even on some important issues so long as there are other important ones where joint cooperation can continue or be achieved. America, in short, needs to pursue a Palmerstonian foreign policy which avoids seeing the world in terms of eternal allies and perpetual enemies, but focuses instead on identifying and reassessing where American interests converge and diverge with those of other governments going forward.

Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics at the George Mason University Schar School of Policy and Government, and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. He has contributed numerous articles to The National Interest.

Image: Shutterstock.

Ahead of the August 13 primary, it had been a given that Argentina was moving to the political Right as all of the major presidential candidates were more conservative than the leftist/populist Kirchners, Nestor and Cristina, and their followers, who had governed for the bulk of the last twenty years. However, this shift to the Right now appears to be more of a lurch, with libertarian economist and media personality Javier Milei gaining over 30 percent of the vote, more than 10 percent above what polls had predicted, making him the largest vote-getter among those running.

The Far Right Comes on Strong

Argentina’s primary system has two functions. When multiple candidates from different parties run under the same slate in a coalition it determines who will carry its banner into the general election (scheduled this year for October 22), and if necessary, the runoff between the top two candidates (scheduled for November 19). For those who, like Milei, run unopposed on their own slate, it is a measure of their popularity, and doing well in the primary can give a candidate a real boost ahead of the general election.

Milei ran under the rubric of his own “Freedom Advances” party, taking 30.04 percent of the total vote. The slate with the next highest total, 28.28 percent, was “Together for Change,” the principal opposition grouping which is an alliance of the old-line Radical Civic Union, the traditional party of Argentina’s middle class, and Republican Proposal, a newer formation which under Mauricio Macri had held the presidency from 2015 until 2019, when the Peronists returned to power.

Of the two leading figures running to head the “Together for Change” ticket, the more conservative figure, former Security Minister Patricia Bullrich, came in ahead, beating Buenos Aires mayor Horacio Rodríguez Larreta, 16.98 to 11.30 percent—another indication of a rightward trend in the current political cycle.

The other slate, “Union for the Fatherland,” which groups the major factions among the Peronists together with some independents, came in third with 27.27 percent. The Peronists coalesced around Economy Minister Sergio Massa, a pragmatic figure, rather than anyone associated with the leftist/populist wing led by former President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, in the hope that this would put them closer to the electorate’s current views.

Massa had hoped to gain a boost by getting at least 30 percent of the votes and being the largest single vote-getter. But with the economy in an abysmal state, this was not to be. He only received 21.40 percent with 5.87 percent going to social activist Juan Grabois, who ran as a token representative of the left wing of Peronism but has pledged to support Massa in the general election.

Who is Javier Milei?

Milei’s background is decidedly different from that of his rivals, all career politicians. An economist with graduate degrees from local universities, his work includes acting as a consultant to one of Argentina’s magnates. However, he is best known as a television personality, espousing the libertarian gospel of a limited “watchman” state which eschews the spending on social welfare that has been a tenet of Argentine policy for the last century.

His flagship issue is the replacement of Argentine’s much-devalued peso with the U.S. dollar and the concomitant abolition of the central bank. He has called for a massive shrinkage of public employment, as well as the privatization of state-owned enterprises, and has shown an affinity for conservative recipes such as replacing public schools, medical services, etc., with vouchers and other market-oriented incentives.

Although his message is primarily economic he has taken some hard Right stances on other issues. These include opposing abortion, which was legalized in Argentina only recently, giving a free hand to the police, and loosening controls on private ownership of guns. He is a climate change skeptic. At the same time, he takes libertarian positions regarding gender and sexuality.

Milei’s allure, however, has been less his program’s specifics and more his persona and rhetoric. With an unruly mop of hair, thick sideburns, and a penchant for leather jackets, he projects a rock star image. He has derided Argentina’s political establishment, both Peronist and opposition, as a corrupt, intransigent “caste.”

Once considered a fringe figure, he has capitalized on frustration with a political and economic system that clearly is not working. His support seemingly comes from those in the middle class who want stronger medicine than then the traditional opposition has provided. This includes younger voters (Argentines can vote from age sixteen) and, more notably, elements of the working class that previously supported the leftist/populist approach and the now somewhat tattered cult of personality of the Kirchners.

Milei has major weaknesses, of course. His genuine political experience consists of only a term as a deputy in Argentina’s congress. He has spoken publicly of his conflicts with his father, his experience with psychotherapy, and his sexual history. His inner circle is small and his chief advisor is his sister, who is distrusted by many who otherwise support him. His temper can flare up when pressed.

While his “throw the bums out” rhetoric rather than his program or his skill set has seemingly driven him to become a serious contender, he himself rejects the assertion that he is just a protest candidate benefiting from the “voto bronca” (the vote of anger). He argues that if voters just wanted to register their unhappiness they could just as easily have voted for candidates on the far Left (which exists both within and outside of Peronism) and that his libertarian message is in fact getting through to voters.

But Can He Win?

As one of three top candidates each commanding a bit less than a third of the vote, and with the wind of his primary success at his back, a Milei victory is perfectly plausible; if he repeats his primary results, he will be one of the two candidates to emerge from the first round of the general election, leaving the outcome of a second round as anyone’s guess.

Of course, he may stumble. Argentine politics is volatile and large swings in voter support are not unknown. His fitness for high office will come under scrutiny as well as his extreme positions, such as a recent statement that he would break relations with China “because it is communist” and that MERCOSUR, a regional trade bloc, should be “eliminated.” The “Together for Change” coalition’s Patricia Bullrich may come across to many as a safer, though still extremely conservative candidate. However, she has gone through a bruising primary, which may in fact have driven many opposition-minded voters into Milei’s arms, and it is not clear how unified her coalition is at this point.

As for Sergio Massa, though burdened with defending Argentina’s dismal economic state, his coalition came in only slightly behind Bullrich’s. We can expect that he will run against Milei’s plans to brutally dismantle Argentina’s welfare state. Still, with the economy powdering away, it is by no means impossible that Peronism, once dominant, even hegemonic, might not even make it to a second round.

Contemplating a Milei Presidency

Given that Milei’s election must be viewed as a distinct possibility, the question arises as to what his administration would look like. In the aftermath of his primary success, he is not backing away from his signature issue of dollarization and abolition of the central bank. (His chief economic advisor, has, however, said that dollarization would be a gradual, multi-step process.) And he has recently stated that he would be even tougher in implementing an adjustment than the IMF is demanding.

For this and his other big plans, he would need legislative approval. Even if a relatively conservative Congress is elected, he would likely need the votes of members of the “Together for Change” coalition, many of whom may not be disposed to go as far as he proposes. He has suggested that if necessary he would resort to provisions in Argentina’s constitution that allow for referenda. However, the circumstances under which these are permitted are limited, and any referendum which he would call might be non-binding, useful only as a tool of persuasion.

The one Argentine president for whom Milei has expressed admiration is Carlos Menem, whose policies when in office (1989–1999) included a fixed exchange rate, with the peso linked to the dollar, and a privatization policy that was aggressive though flawed by corruption. Former President Macri has also reached out to Milei following the primary (though he still is supporting Bullrich). We thus could conceivably see a Milei administration staffed at least in part by former Macri officials and perhaps even a few from the more distant Menem administration such as the University of Chicago-educated former economy minister Roque Fernández, a Milei adviser.

Rough Sailing Ahead

Uncertainty has long characterized Argentina in the eyes of investors and the outcome of the primary has only increased it. This has become manifested in the country’s volatile foreign exchange rate, which was jolted by the unexpected primary result. In the face of pressure on the peso, Economy Minister and presidential candidate Massa announced on August 14 a general devaluation from 287 to 350 per dollar—something he had hoped to avoid until after the general election, at least, while the Central Bank raised the benchmark interest rate by 21 percent to 118 percent. The devaluation came as the informal or “blue” rate, 420 pesos per dollar only four months ago, but steadily rising since then, skyrocketed to 790 per dollar, before settling somewhat lower.

With the devaluation about to work its way through what is already a high inflation economy, Argentina is likely to see further price increases and demands for hikes in wages and welfare benefits to at least partially compensate for them. Together with what is sure to be a high-decibel campaign, we may see strikes and protests in a country where massive demonstrations are common.

While Milei, Bullrich, and Massa scramble for votes, even as the economy spins out of control, leaving Argentines to struggle from one day to the next, it will be a real challenge for the country to get to October’s general election and the probable runoff in November without a complete economic, political and social meltdown. The actual inauguration, on December 10, and with it, what could be vast policy changes, seems far off indeed.

Richard M. Sanders is Senior Fellow, Western Hemisphere at the Center for the National Interest. He is also a Global Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. A former member of the Senior Foreign Service of the U.S. Department of State, he has served as the Director of the Office of Brazilian and Southern Cone Affairs and at embassies throughout Latin America.

Image: Shutterstock.

Millions of citizens cast their ballots over the weekend in Spain, marking an end to five years of left-wing rule in Europe’s sixth-largest economy. Alberto Núñez Feijóo led the center-right People’s Party (PP) to victory in tightly contested snap elections, defeating Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez’s Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE). The elections were highly scrutinized on the continent and beyond, with many anticipating a decisive conservative triumph in line with Europe’s recent right-wing tilt. However, the PP failed to achieve an absolute majority, and Sanchez’s political career isn’t over yet, with arduous coalition negotiations on the horizon. As uncertainty and deadlock consume the country, Spain’s political drama is set to continue.

Before analyzing Sunday’s results and what lies ahead, a closer examination of Spain’s fractured political landscape sheds light on the current situation. Since the end of the Franco regime in 1975, two main parties have dominated the Spanish legislature, the center-left social democratic PSOE, and the center-right Christian-democratic PP. However, the political landscape fragmented during the 2015-16 general elections and the rise of the far-left populist party Podemos. With neither party able to secure an absolute majority, this shift bolstered the influence of minor parties, who leverage their positions as potential coalition partners to gain concessions and impact future policy decisions.

One such party that gained prominence is Vox, a far-right populist group predicated on Spanish nationalism and associated with anti-immigration postures. In the 2019 elections, Vox won 52 seats, fostering a concern that any future PP-led government would require a coalition with the party.

Since becoming Prime Minister in June 2018, Mr. Sánchez pushed his party’s (PSOE) progressive agenda in a coalition with several center and far-left parties. His ascent to power reflected a decline in support for the scandal-ridden PP at the time, specifically the Gürtel case and subsequent motion of no confidence that ousted the conservative government. Despite Mr. Sánchez’s relatively effective governance and solid economic record, the PP has gradually improved its image and rebuilt support. Led by Alberto Núñez Feijóo, the PP trounced the PSOE in May’s regional and municipal elections, taking control in nine of the twelve jurisdictions that voted. In response to his party’s lackluster performance, Sánchez called for snap elections in a significant gamble, aiming to replicate his success in 2019 and outmaneuver Feijóo before the PP could capitalize on its momentum.

In another example of the polarization engulfing the West, Sunday was the culmination of a nasty campaign season characterized by mudslinging and personal attacks. While Sánchez’s socialists added two additional seats from 2019, 122 in total, the PP increased their seat tally from 89 to 136. In the lower chamber of Spain’s parliament (Congress of Deputies), which has 350 seats, a party needs at least 176 seats to form a government. As neither the PP nor PSOE comes close to this number, Sánchez and Feijóo need support from minor parties to reach the threshold.

Traditionally, the leader of the party with the most seats, the PP, in this case, becomes Prime Minister. However, the populist Vox party, considered the PP’s likely coalition partner, suffered a shocking setback. Vox lost half its seats on Sunday, reduced to 33 from the previous 52 gained in the 2019 elections. As the PP and Vox together lack the votes required to form a government, Sánchez’s political career has a new lease of life

In accordance with the Spanish Constitution, Feijóo and Sánchez will convene with King Felipe VI in the forthcoming weeks to present their cases. Subsequently, the king will propose the candidate for Prime Minister whom he believes has the most parliamentary support. Feijóo will argue that the next Prime Minster should come from the party with the most seats, as is the historical precedent. On the other hand, Sánchez must convince the King that he has sufficient support from minor parties, ideally with commitments from their leaders. However, because several parties in his 2019 coalition lost their legislative seats, Sánchez needs to strategize a new alliance. This entails intense negotiations with the far-left Sumar and pro-independence Catalan and Basque parties, who will demand concessions in return. As stated by the party leader of Together for Catalonia, “ We will not make Pedro Sánchez president in exchange for nothing.”

Once the King decides, the chosen candidate undergoes a parliamentary vote, which requires an absolute majority of 176 votes for approval. Spain will likely hold a fresh election if the candidate falls short of the threshold. After a failed investiture vote, the constitution obliges the king to dissolve the legislature within two months, with a new election mandated 54 days after its dissolution. Consequently, Sánchez would act as caretaker Prime Minister with limited legislative powers during this period.

As the leaders navigate uncertainty, Spain might not have its next Prime Minister until 2024. The dysfunction comes as Spain assumes the EU’s rotating presidency, and the forthcoming outcomes will have implications for the country’s political trajectory and the broader European landscape. However, Vox’s disappointing performance is a setback for right-wing populism in Europe, following recent victories in Italy and Germany. Regardless, Spain cannot afford a period of prolonged political turbulence as the country continues to grapple with the aftermath of the European debt crisis and pandemic-related downturn. With comparatively lower living standards than most Western European nations, timely action and a cohesive approach are crucial if Spain hopes to rebuild its economy and ensure a brighter future for its citizens.

As losses of Advanced Equipment Mounts, the images will be used to shift morale on the battlefield in Ukraine – A Leopard 2A4 image shows a damaged tank, it is unsure if this image shows losses due to Russian Army actions.

Inflation related to food prices are hitting almost every economy in the world, stressing local citizens in countries where the support for defending Ukraine is the highest. The end of the Grain Deal between Ukraine and Russia ended, and without a pause, Russia sent missiles into the Odessa Region targeting grain reserves meant for export out of Ukraine. While Turkey and other countries seeking to extend the Grain Deal push for another agreement, the change in atmosphere and strategy from Russia may not encourage Russia into another agreement. While the lack of grain exports will directly affect countries like Egypt, the indirect effect on food inflation for NATO allies may be the intended effect Russia wishes to have on citizens of those countries.

It is a well known tactic that when combating Western countries, the long game often wears out their population. The pressures the Governments of the day have to endure when convincing a relatively safe and well off population into a war footing almost never extends past a few short years. Losses and change to the daily lives of Americans and other NATO countries not in proximity to the conflict is heavily influenced by the cost to their daily deeds and added frustrations in accomplishing the same tasks as they did outside of a war footing. Fuel prices in many of these colder countries affect the price of everything, and even when fuel prices drop, policies that increase the cost of food do nothing more but stress the incomes of local populations. Policies to diminish more money leaving the economy and reducing local taxes are as important as military aid in supporting your ally.

Some countries have sought to publicize greatly the amount of money and support given to Ukraine, while using the war as a catalyst for explaining difficulties with food and fuel prices to their population. Some of the same Governments will intentionally promote support for the war while increasing local taxes and costs of fuel and food several times over, even ignoring displacing Covid debts incurred by municipalities a few short years ago. Officials in some cases refuse supporting for their own major cities in reducing severe crime and poverty crises while sending their tax dollars outside of the country. Such actions will destroy any support for help abroad as their cities quickly deteriorate due to lack of funding and Government fuelled inflationary taxes.

While energy sales can bring money back into an economy to help with Covid funding losses, the greater strategic nature of using energy to bolster allies like Germany and Japan against Russia and its allies have a major effect on defunding Russia’s arms industry. If Ukraine’s allies intend for it to win as much territory back as possible, they have to make sure that Russia is unable to fund the creation of more weapons to put onto the field. Displacing Russian Oil and Gas is the only strategy that can reduce the income from Russia’s oil reserves. Most countries not aligned in the conflict will support their country by purchasing the most affordable and easy to obtain energy reserves. Countries like Japan, that are strategic allies, and Germany, who are bearing the brunt of much of the costs and supply of weapons, require low cost energy to keep their populations content and warm so they can endure a longer fight with a healthy population. Displacing Russia’s energy income might be the most important tactic the West could use to win in the long run, while keeping support constant among citizens in NATO ally countries. To this day, there has been little movement by NATO’s allies with large energy reserves in displacing Russian oil and gas. The claim is that Russia is now producing several T-90M tanks per month, and have organised and stabilized weapons to the front line, a line that has become very difficult to break.

While little is being done past funding more ammo hungry air defence systems in countering low cost drones, more and more funds are being promoted as being sent to fight in Ukraine. Losing the image of strength in the united fight for Ukraine has a massive effect on the morale and outcome of the war. Support for the war came at the sight of Russian armour being decimated like fireworks outside of Ukraine’s cities, and gave hope to Ukraine’s allies that the war can be won. Russia was always looking for an opportunity to turn the media images against Western support for the war, and they might have had this opportunity presented by Ukraine’s allies themselves.

Russia was able to use low cost drones to diminish the number of advanced anti-air missiles defending Ukraine, to the point that some in NATO have even stated they are running out of ammo. At no point was there a massive cost saving action taken by NATO in destroying the manufacturing facilities of the drones. Such an action would have saved many innocent lives, billions in spending, and kept advanced missiles at the ready for more deadly future threats.

While promoting billions upon billions of military support to Ukraine, some NATO soldiers were sent to Europe with no food being provided to them, putting them in personal debt just to obtain proper meals. Others were not provided even basic safety equipment, meaning they had to buy their own, preventing them from participating in exercises. A NATO member even refused, in the middle of the largest NATO conflict in their history, to contribute even the minimum amount of spending while claiming they gave the most directly to Ukraine without it being the case. Using funding announcements to Ukraine while underfunding the actual soldiers is not how you support an ally, nor assist them in winning their conflict. All it does is sour support for the war even further.

As Russia made an error in 2022 by assuming that Ukraine’s generational defensive posture would have been easy to dismantle in short time, the losses of NATO’s almost invincible equipment during Ukraine’s Counter-Offensive has been used by Russia to help them reclaim back of some their reputation as a powerful military force. It should have always been assumed that the loss of Leopard 2 or other highly regarded NATO equipment should have been expected, and would have been used to make Western powers look weak during their attack. Trying to assault a defended line is very difficult, and will certainly lead to many losses, along with images of burning tanks being used as part of the media war against Ukraine. Russia was likely very content in obtaining images of the best equipment in the world falling to their Soviet era artillery barrages, and have used those images as much as possible over the last few weeks. Less information about the Counter-Offensive is now being shared because of the losses, and populations in NATO countries are feeling the daily pressures without the images of victories on their screens weekly. Inflation, taxes and morale will hurt Ukraine more and more as the war goes on, and Russia will take any opportunity to displace support for Ukraine when it is made available by opposing Governments.

According to an article published in the Russian media titled “Visa with a trick,” this year, the International Olympic Committee is banning Russians from partaking in the 2024 Olympic Games in Paris unless they are ideologically opposed to the war in the Ukraine, act under a neutral flag, and have nothing to do with the Russian security agencies. This comes after countries like the Czech Republic banned Russian athletes from partaking in sporting events in their borders and Russian tennis player Vera Zvonareva was barred recently from Poland.  

By taking such a strong stance against Russian athletes, the international community has demonstrated that they care to punish Russia for the crimes against humanity that they have committed in the Ukraine.   Russia also is a country that systematically represses gays, another action which should prompt from them to be penalized by the International Olympic Committee.   In Russia, it is illegal to promote same-sex relations or suggest that it is normal to be gay, according to legislation put forward by Russian President Vladimir Putin last year.

According to Human Rights Watch, “The new laws significantly broaden the scope of a 2013 law which banned the dissemination of LGBTQ-related information to minors. The new iteration extends the ban on promoting such information to adults as well.”   However, Russia is not the only country that represses gays and yet there are many anti-gay countries which are partaking in the International Olympic Games, without anyone batting an eye.

One of these countries is Iran.   Iran is a country where being gay is punishable by death.  Up to 6,000 gays have been executed in Iran since 1979.   Iran’s President Ebrahim Raisi also made homophobic remarks on his recent trip to Uganda: “The West today is trying to promote the idea of homosexuality and by promoting homosexuality, they are trying to end the generation of human beings.”  He referred to homosexuality as “one of the dirtiest issues.”

Another country which represses gays that is partaking in the Olympic Games is Yemen.   According to the 1994 Yemenite penal code, married men in the Arab country can be sentenced to death by stoning for homosexual intercourse. Unmarried men face whipping or one year in prison in the war-torn country. Women face up to seven years in prison for being lesbian.

Pakistan is another country that criminalizes gay conduct, with men potentially receiving life imprisonment for gay intercourse, yet the Asian country is participating in the upcoming Olympic Games.  Ifti Nasim, a Pakistani gay poet, within the past year was forced to flee his homeland and move to the United States, after surviving an assassination attempt.   This past year, Pakistan’s first transgender TV anchor also survived an assassination attempt as well.    However, Pakistan is treated at the Olympic Games like a normal country.

The Palestinian Authority is another anti-gay dictatorship that is partaking in the Olympic Games, even though there was a Palestinian gay man who was awaiting asylum in another country last year who was beheaded in Hebron for the crime of being gay.  “We, as Arab LGBT people, are viewed as trash by the Arab-Palestinian society. We are dead in their eyes,” a Palestinian gay man reported.  As a result, countless Palestinian gay men try to flee to Israel, as their lives are constantly in danger in the Palestinian Authority.  

While it is commendable that Russia, an anti-gay country, is getting penalized for the crime of being gay, countries like Iran, Yemen, Pakistan and entities like the Palestinian Authority should receive similar treatment.  Countries and entities that endanger the lives of gay people should not be permitted to partake in the Olympic Games.       

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Les organisations recourant à la violence armée nées en Europe dans les années 1970 disparaissaient l'une après l'autre, mais le 17-Novembre (17-N) grec demeurait. La hantise d'un terrorisme venu d'ailleurs succédait aux « années de plomb » imposées par des groupes autochtones (Fraction armée rouge en (...) / Grèce, Justice, Terrorisme - 2003/05

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Foreign Affairs magazine published an insightful piece in its most recent issue, titled “An Unwinnable War: Washington Needs an Endgame in Ukraine.” Written by RAND Corporation senior political scientist Samuel Charap, it is well argued and presents a number of reasonable proposals that prioritize a diplomatic end to the Ukraine War. Three examples—the Korean armistice, U.S.-Israeli security arrangements, and the Bosnia Contact Group—are drawn upon in order to suggest a roadmap to ceasing hostilities.

A number of responses were subsequently published in Foreign Affairs online. All take aim with Charap’s assessment that neither side currently holds the capabilities to achieve ultimate victory, defined in this context as establishing control over the disputed territory in Ukraine. Rather, they contend that Ukraine’s triumph is simply a matter of providing more—and deadlier—Western weaponry. Each argument also rests upon the assumption of a tottering Putin regime. They all cite the Prigozhin mutiny (it is mentioned a total of six separate times throughout the various responses) as irrefutable evidence of a latent contingent of discontented Russians that can and will eventually be mobilized to topple the current government.

The most extreme perspective comes from Dmytro Natalukha, Chair of the Committee for Economic Affairs of the Parliament of Ukraine and a member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Natalukha claims that leaving any territory occupied by Russia will allow Moscow to subsequently use that land as a launch pad for future attacks to capture the rest of the country, as he claims it did after the Minsk agreements of 2014 and 2015—although he conveniently ignores the fact that it was both Moscow and Kiev who consistently failed to implement the terms of both the Minsk Protocol and Minsk II. Ukraine, Natalukha argues, must therefore wage war until all occupied land is seized back from Russia. What is more, the return of the eastern oblasts and Crimea must then be followed by forcible regime change in Moscow and the installation of a Western-approved leader. This will ensure that “post-Putin Russia will have the consent of Ukraine.”

“Ukraine and its allies must aim to make Russia less anti-Western. Regardless of what happens at the negotiating table, therefore, Putin cannot remain in power,” states Natalukha. He subsequently believes that the civilized world should reach a consensus on confronting Russian leadership, “as they did on Slobodan Milosevic in Yugoslavia, Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and Bashar al-Assad in Syria”—examples that should make any honest assessor of U.S. foreign policy in the past thirty years since. The final step after total Russian collapse and the installation of a puppet government would then be to demilitarize the country and destroy its state media i.e., its “propaganda machine.”

 

The ostensibly less severe proposals also support the contention that Russian armed forces will inevitably be crushed under the weight of well-armed Ukrainian resolve. Alina Polyakova and Daniel Fried are firm in the conviction that all that stands in the way of total victory is a lack of F-16s and long-range missiles. Early battlefield successes around Kiev, Kharkiv, and Kherson, are cited as proof of endemic Russian weakness. The authors also believe that, with the requested weaponry, Ukraine would be able to seize territory in the eastern oblasts. This will obstruct Moscow’s land bridge to Crimea, and “force Russia into an untenable position.” But the likelihood of Russian leadership abating rather than escalating its war effort once the naval base at Sevastopol is under threat of sustained artillery fire is a roll of the dice. The consequences of losing that bet could be catastrophic. Nonetheless, Angela Stent also reassures readers that the risks are worth it. She suggests that Moscow’s war machine is buckling under the weight of its own incompetence, while Kiev is on the cusp of turning a strategic corner. Ukrainian forces remain upbeat in a “battle for national survival”; meanwhile, “Russian troop morale is dwindling”—an assessment that by its nature is one of bias and unreliable speculation.

The eventual ouster of Putin is implicitly assumed in each of the arguments. Polyakova and Fried bring up Russian military losses going back nearly two centuries, all the way to the 1853 Crimean War. “Each defeat provoked domestic stress and upheaval,” the implication being that the same fate awaits the current regime upon its defeat in Ukraine. The Prigozhin mutiny is presented as evidence of pervasive “stress in the Russian ruling circles.” Stent also believes that “Putin’s grip on Russia” is weakening. The key to knocking down the Kremlin house of cards is thus “more and better Western weapons.” While any or all of these contentions may be true, no respondent addresses the very real possibility that an individual as equally committed—or perhaps more committed—to the objectives laid out at the beginning of the war might take power in Moscow upon Putin’s (potentially bloody) departure.

But most importantly, all of the responses fail to address the prospect that Kiev’s counteroffensive could fail to achieve its strategic aims even with Western arms. Ukrainian battlefield invincibility is assumed as an indisputable matter of historical necessity. They ignore the fact that Russian armed forces continue to secure important victories, inching their way westward while inflicting heavy Ukrainian casualties. Instead, all of Moscow’s strategic and tactical successes are handwaved away. Polyakova and Fried claim without explanation that the seizure of territory in the “Bahkmut [sic] offensive has deepened [Putin’s] costly mess.”

Nor do they address the fact that Russian armed forces have of late been very successful in destroying and capturing Western equipment, including the much-vaunted Leopard tank and Bradley fighting vehicle. Moscow also retains control of the skies, a situation that a limited number of F-16s without enough pilots who possess the requisite training will not change. Likewise, a longer war defined by increasing escalation favors both the military-industrial capacity of Russia as well as the much larger resource pool of human capital that it can draw from. The only way to counter this latter fact may eventually be for other nations’ military forces to begin engaging in the fight directly. Natalukha would undoubtedly be in favor of such a prospect, and it seems that the other commentators may be as well.

The hate for the Putin regime that seems to undergird the Western foreign policy establishment is very likely genuine and deep-seated; however, its authenticity does not make it a premise upon which to construct a realistic path for bringing the bloodshed in Ukraine to an end. Charap acknowledges this point and proposes that the U.S. form a governmental group to focus on exploring diplomatic pathways to peace. “There is not a single official in the U.S. government whose full-time job is conflict diplomacy,” he rightly laments. What is needed is a “regular channel of communication regarding the war that includes Ukraine, U.S. allies, and Russia.”

This is undoubtedly the correct approach. Negotiations for a sustainable peace are necessary not merely to de-escalate the situation and avoid a potentially larger conflagration, but perhaps most importantly to stop the wanton death and destruction currently befalling the citizens of Ukraine. As impolitic as it may be to currently say, it should also be our desire to stop Russian lives from needlessly being lost as well.

However, the responses to Charap form a litany of excuses for not engaging with Moscow. Something like the Korean armistice is discounted because North Korea does not occupy any of South Korea’s territory; the Israel situation is not feasible because Tel Aviv possesses nuclear weapons; the example of the Balkan Contact Group is inapplicable because one could do business with the Yeltsin administration.

But Charap presents these as cases to draw lessons from, not as exact models to copy. They illustrate how to adapt means in unique situations to reach the same end: a viable peace agreement amid hostile parties that is reached by way of a negotiated settlement.

The issue at the center of the disagreement is that the respondents do not believe that such an end can be reached unless it proceeds from total Ukrainian victory and the destruction of the current Russian regime. The reason for this is presented as a matter of fact: Russia can simply no longer be treated as a real nation-state. As articulated by Stent, any negotiation with Moscow is impossible because they are liars, and an armistice will inevitably be a “temporary solution while Russia regroups and plans its next attack.” Such a conclusion obviously leads the international community to an impasse in which the only way out is through.

Charap replies in kind to the various responses offered to his original piece. The central premise upon which he bases his rebuttal is straightforward: “My critics seem to see diplomacy as a synonym for surrender rather than as an important tool of statecraft.” This is correct, but understanding the argument behind why his critics view a peace settlement as capitulation is even more important. Russia (with Putin as anthropomorphized regression) has broken the rules-based order in a manner that undermines the end of history thesis. The implication of not rectifying this violation would be to implicitly acknowledge that the world is returning to balance of power geopolitics. This is a sin that cannot be forgiven. For that reason, nothing less than a total Russian collapse is an acceptable outcome to the war.

Unfortunately, this seems to be the mindset of not only those experts and diplomats responding to Charap’s sensible argument, but the Western foreign policy establishment more broadly.

Dominick Sansone is a Ph.D. student at the Hillsdale College Van Andel Graduate School of Statesmanship. Previously a Fulbright recipient to Bulgaria, his writing on politics in the Black Sea region has been published by The National Interest, the Euromaidan Press, The American Conservative, and RealClear Defense, among other publications. He also previously wrote as a contributing columnist focusing on Russia-China relations at The Epoch Times.

Image: Shutterstock.

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