Diplomacy & Crisis News

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The two powers can jointly aid poorer countries.

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On Monday, Lebanon’s Riad Salameh finally concluded his final six-year term as governor of the Bank of Lebanon after thirty years of office. After months of speculation on whether he would bow out, his deputy, Wassim Mansouri, announced Monday that he will assume responsibility over monetary policy until the appointment of a new governor. Widely viewed by the Lebanese as representative of the oligarchy that destroyed the country’s banking system and robbed them of their savings, Salameh leaves his post and Lebanon in financial ruin.

He was once hailed as the architect of Lebanon’s economic revival in the 2000s, shielding the economy from the disastrous effects of the 2008 financial crisis. Now, his reputation has fallen far from its original pedestal. There is little to say in the former governor’s defense. Mr. Salameh has been summoned multiple times by European courts in France and Germany on accusations of money laundering, tax evasion, and embezzlement. He is also under investigation at home for similar charges. However, the chances of the political class continuing to protect him from legal ramifications are high. On all accounts, he has failed to appear before a courtroom. The former governor denies all wrongdoings and vows to appeal.

Salameh was appointed governor in 1993 under the late Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, who was tasked with rebuilding Beirut and Lebanon after its fifteen years of civil war (1975–1990). As head of Banque du Liban (BDL), he was responsible for attracting foreign investment for reconstruction projects, building economic confidence, and strengthening the banking sector. Billions of dollars flowed through Lebanon, creating a boom in infrastructure development, and service activities like tourism and banking flourished. A widely shared illusion of good times reigned supreme. But under the veil of this newfound “prosperity,” Lebanon’s national debt rapidly compounded, reaching over 100 billion dollars in 2021 (500 percent of its GDP).

Lebanon’s debt soon created a financial crisis in 2019, leading to record inflation and the impoverishment of two-thirds of the country’s population. The same year saw Lebanese people from all walks of life descend on Martyr’s Square in downtown Beirut. Shouting “All of them means all of them,” the demonstrators expressed their desire to oust the politicians they blamed for failing to avert the economic collapse.

People in Lebanon demand better living standards after inflation sent them into free fall. The situation has become so desperate that some resorted to breaking into banks to reclaim their own money. Two weeks ago, a man entered a Byblos bank branch in the Beirut suburb of Sin el Fil. He raised his fist in the air while sitting on a table for the media to observe. The man shouted, “Beirut, rise up…revolution,” in reference to the 2019 protests. Despite the man’s appeal, mass demonstrations have largely ceased as people found ways to cope with the changing economic conditions.

By some metrics, Lebanon’s economy is improving. This summer may be a profitable one as two million tourists and expatriates flock to Beirut. Nightclubs, bars, restaurants, and tourist sites are, once again, alive and well. Ten billion dollars in foreign investment may fuel the service and leisure sectors. Nonetheless, wages are still low, and commodity prices are high. The state is non-existent as the government remains in a caretaker formation.

Today’s situation is bleak for most Lebanese, as the currency plummets to a 98 percent low against the dollar. Some independent members of Parliament spoke to The National Interest about what should be the appropriate measures taken against Salameh.

Deputy Najat Saliba said, “this person broke the law many times and should be in jail.” Her parliamentary colleague, Mark Daou blames Salameh personally for the crisis: “He was the key architect and should be held accountable for the financial meltdown.”

Most Lebanese would agree that Mr. Salameh is responsible for the country’s economic failings. But his failure was also that of the broader political class, which presided over a grotesque national debt while doing nothing to alleviate it. Hence, the slogan “all of them means all of them” remains relevant today. A good leader leaves their institution and country in a better place than where they found it. Judging by this metric, Riad Salameh failed in his job, but the failure was not his alone.

Adnan Nasser is an independent foreign policy analyst and journalist with a focus on Middle East affairs. Follow him on Twitter @Adnansoutlook29.

Image: Shutterstock.

Why should a coup in one of the world’s poorest countries be a serious concern for the United States?

On July 25th, members of the special unit of Niger’s presidential guards detained President Mohamed Bazoum, prompting an outpouring of condemnation from leaders around the world.

Hours later, a group of soldiers appeared on national television, claiming to have overthrown the current government. They suspended all government institutions, closed land and air borders, and instituted a nationwide curfew.

General Omar Tchiani, commander of the presidential guards, appointed himself as the leader of the country’s new military government. While little is known about Tchiani and his motivations for the coup, there have been several rumors that Bazoum was preparing to fire him. Interestingly enough, Tchiani allegedly led the unit that successfully prevented a coup in Niger two years ago when a military unit tried to seize the presidential palace days before Bazoum was sworn into office. 

Sadly, the military takeover in Niger is just the latest in a succession of African coups that have contributed to rising instability and the spread of jihadist groups. Since 2020, the continent has seen a total of seven military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Chad, and Sudan. In many cases, the most senior military leaders have not led these regime changes. Instead, colonels in command of elite presidential guards or special forces units have seized power. In at least five cases, coup leaders have even received training at U.S. military institutions. 

And while the spate of coups is worrying, the latest in Niger is particularly concerning. Niger has avoided a violent overthrow in recent years and maintained a relatively healthy democracy in an increasingly unstable West Africa. Since entering office—during the country’s first peaceful transition of power since gaining independence in 1960—Bazoum has been one of the most reliable U.S. allies in the region and has even avoided deepening cooperation with Moscow. Underscoring the importance of the U.S.-Niger relationship, Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited Niger earlier this year, praising Bazoum's government and announcing $150 million in new economic aid. However, with his removal, the status of Niger’s relationship with the West is imperiled, and it is unclear when or if Niger will return to a democratic government. The imminent departure of American embassy staff and European nationals is not a reassuring sign.

Militarily, Niger has acted as a critical base for Western forces fighting Al Qaeda and Islamic State-linked groups in both the Sahel and Lake Chad region. Currently, there are over 1,000 U.S. service personnel and an estimated 1,500 French forces in-country. Many were transferred to Niger after withdrawal from other African nations that cut ties with Western security partners. Moreover, the U.S. has used bases in Niger to operate drones for counterterrorism missions throughout the Sahel region. While the status of these American and French forces is still undetermined, losing Niger as a base of operations in West Africa would be a major blow to the fight against jihadist groups.

But perhaps the most concerning outcome of the coup could be a deepening of Russia’s footprint on the African continent through its Wagner paramilitary outfit. Shortly after the coup, Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin purportedly celebrated the coup on an affiliated Telegram channel, describing it as a long overdue liberation from colonizers, and appeared to offer his mercenary group’s services.

While many have questioned the future of Wagner in Africa after Prigozhin’s attempted coup in Moscow, the force’s footprint—and therefore Russia’s influence—is largely unchanged. Prigozhin has even met with Russian president Vladimir Putin and was seen rubbing elbows with African leaders at this week’s Africa-Russia summit in St Petersburg. So, with Wagner’s presence on the continent seemingly secure, Prigozhin could easily replicate his Mali and Central African Republic (CAR) operations in Niger by offering security and counterterrorism support in exchange for mining rights to Niger’s rich natural resources.

If there’s any lesson for Washington to learn from Bazoum’s ouster, it is that even close Western partners like Niger are vulnerable to political instability. Providing security assistance is not enough. Washington must provide broader support to address the root causes of unrest in these countries, or else risk a much more costly outcome: jihadist groups and Russia leveraging the instability for their own purposes.

Emily Milliken is the Senior Vice President and Lead Analyst at Askari Associates, LLC.

Image: Shutterstock. 

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China used the HQ-7 “Crotale” outside of a stadium as protection during the 2008 Olympics.

While there are some that claim that China has been supplying some arms to Russia during its battle with Ukraine, the official position of China is to appear as a neutral party in the conflict. This is mostly to avoid sanctions or other actions against their economy by Western nations as China is heavily dependent on trade with the West. China, who has tried to expand their military equipment exports past a few of its neighbours, has now reached the point of being able to export advanced weapons systems. While some categories would do well in an export markets, others are tied to licensed or copied technology from Russia, Europe and the United States, which limits the ability to independently export the equipment.

Supplying both sides of the conflict might be advantageous for China. While China is openly seeking opportunities to be seen as a diplomatic force in the world over the last few months, favouring one side’s needs in the conflict in Ukraine may limit a critical narrative against China. With so many supply issues in NATO countries, China might do well if it can be shown to be assisting NATO allies with much needed shortages.

While Chinese munitions and systems may find their way to Russia, China would also be able to sell defensive systems to NATO and Ukraine without causing too much damage in its relationship with Russia. Offensive weapons may sever ties with one side or the other, but as the conflict escalates and becomes more desperate, more supplies would be requested and less restrictions would probably come in the medium term. This can be seen with the recent introduction of Cluster munitions by NATO into the conflict.

Regarding aircraft sales, China may not be able to depend on sales of its fighters and attack aircraft past sales to Russia. While there is little demand at the moment because Russia has not lost many aircraft, the nature of jets is often offensive and may sour relations with NATO. Licensing of sales of China’s aircraft like the JF-17 and J-10 is also hindered by the fact that they use the engines of the MIG-29 and SU-27 respectively. Any sales of these planes would need consent from the engine’s country of origin, which is Russia. While newer J-10s have a Chinese made engine, the export market would likely not involve NATO allies geared towards the battle in Ukraine as they have yet to send Western planes into the conflict.

The number of tanks being destroyed in the war in Ukraine has broken records several times over. With the Offensive taking place, many NATO tanks will also fall victim to the assault. China will likely end up with one of the largest reserves of semi-modern and modern main battle tanks in the world, and may be interested in selling their ZTZ-99 tanks to either side. The ZTZ-99 is as capable as a modernised T-72, the most well used tank in the field in Ukraine, but uses many Western components and is a mixture of NATO and Russian technology. While this offensive weapon would cause problems for China’s relations with the West and Russia, desperate sides may overlook politics in acquiring advanced weapons after a long period of conflict.

China has a similar heavy artillery focused strategy as Russia, and they produced Russian equivalents of many of the Soviet artillery systems. Russia’s 2S3 Akatsiya cannon was married to China’s Type 83, and their more modern PLZ05 shares much of the same cannon components as the Russian 2S19 MSTA. This means that much of the Soviet and Russian munitions work with both Chinese systems, along with older systems like their PLZ89, equivalent of the 2S1 Gvozdika seeing a lot of action being used by both side in Ukraine. Any side that would be able to obtain large quantities of Soviet munition capable artillery systems would gain a huge advantage. This is also why sales of such equipment with create a diplomatic rift with either side of the conflict, and would likely not be sold.

Air defense may be the best option for China to sell to either side in the conflict. Being mostly defensive weapons, systems like the PGZ95, tantamount to a very modern ZSU-23-4 Shilka, or the PGZ09, China’s own Gepard, may be used effectively against drones and lead to many innocent lives saved. Older missile systems like the HQ-7B, similar to a modernised Cold War era French Crotale, could deter attacks by Russian aircraft and may be able to shoot down some drones. A S-300 equivalent, the HQ-9, would be able to act as a long range air defence deterrent but would likely cost either side pilots if used. China’s HQ-17, a version of the Russian TOR-M1, would be a very capable mid range defender of any base or power plant threatened by missiles or planes. Such systems are usually paired with anti-air cannons like the PGZ95 and PGZ09 to defend from multiple threats.

Anti-air systems allow for the aggressors to choose whether or not they want to risk entering a specific zone of conflict and are used in many cases to deter attacks on civilians targets and infrastructure. While extremely dangerous if used improperly, it can be used to limit innocent casualties and de-escalate a conflict where honour and revenge fuels much of the responses from either side.

While the best outcome of the conflict is a hopeful de-escalation by both sides, there does not seem to be signs of this occurring in the near future. With shortages on both sides, there will likely be a mass move to add more weapons to the battlefield until distant achievements are met. China’s self interest may play into this global conflict in 2023, but the best move is clearly to not get involved. China depends on exported oil and gas as well as the international grain supply now being short coming out of Ukraine. If offensive weapons are found to be of Chinese origin, a big diplomatic rift may occur with China and NATO, or even Russia. China’s balancing act may include weapons sales, but it would be under the conditions of scarce supply by either side of the conflict and the sale of more defensive systems, especially if capable of protecting civilian targets.

Bola Tinubu’s new role as ECOWAS chair, and the coup in Niger, present an opportunity for a foreign-policy reset.

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