Diplomacy & Crisis News

TNI Staff

Security,

Situational awareness.

Here's What You Need To Remember: The Israelis’ massive situational awareness advantage given the capability of the Iron Vision system will give Tel Aviv’s seasoned tank crews a decisive advantage over the T-14 or any other Russian tank until Moscow develops an equivalent capability. In armored warfare, the crew that sees the enemy first almost always wins.

With its ongoing campaign in Syria proving to be a useful live-fire operational test and evaluation process for its latest weapons, it is perhaps not inconceivable that the Kremlin might eventually deploy the T-14 Armata main battle tank to that war-torn country.

The Russians are currently building 20 prototypes of the new tank and could build as many as 100 of the new vehicles for the Kremlin’s elite Taman Division. If the Kremlin did deploy some number of T-14s to Syria for operational evaluations under genuine combat conditions, there is a possibility the machines could face off against Israeli Merkava tanks if Tel Aviv chose to make a ground incursion into Syria.

The latest Israeli Merkava IVm Windbreaker is an excellent tank that is equipped with the Trophy active protection system (APS), Tzayad battlefield management system and advanced survivability features such as modular armor. Moreover, the Merkava IV will likely continue to improve—perhaps incorporating a revolutionary feature in the form of the Elbit Iron Vision helmet-mounted display system, which would allow crew members to “see” the world outside the tank via a series of external cameras without opening the vehicles’ hatches. The system, which provides unprecedented situational awareness, was tested in 2017 but it is not clear when it will be fielded—but it will be soon. Israel is the first to develop such technology, but Russia could eventually field similar hardware.

“The discussion among experts now revolves mainly around the question of whether the commander lacks the necessary overview when sitting in the tank or whether TV cameras and electro-optical aiming devices can actually provide the same information as the optical aiming devices and observation equipment on the current generation of battle tanks,” Captain Stefan Bühler, graduate engineer at the University of Applied Sciences, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Officer at the NBC-KAMIR Competence Center for the Swiss Armed Forces and Commander of Tank Squadron 12/1,wrote. “A look into the sky provides the (technical) answer: the pilot of an F-35 can look through the aircraft with his head-up display – a computer generates a virtual 3D world from the video signals from the cameras mounted all around, which is then faded into his optics depending on the pilot’s direction of vision. With such technology, as offered by the Israeli company ELBIT Systems under the name ‘Iron Vision’ for use on armored vehicles, the commander of a T-14 could see even more than the commander of a battle tank with a manned turret.”

The T-14, by comparison to the Israeli machine, also features advanced protection systems—possibly more advanced in some regards than that of the Merkava—but also features an unmanned turret. The Russian vehicle also offers excellent mobility—and its faster and far more agile than the comparative huge Israeli machine, which weighs 65 tons and has 1500hp engine.

“The T-14 has the same power output as the Leopard 2 or the M1 Abrams, however, with a combat weight of 48 tons, it is 20% lighter, resulting in a specific output of 31.3 hp/T (22.9 kW/T). In comparison its western counterparts with 24 hp/T (17.6 kW/T), this new vehicle is extremely agile,” Bühler wrote. “The T-14’s tracks are narrower in the current version compared to the Leopard 2 or the M1 Abrams, however, due to the significantly lower combat weight, wide tracks are also not absolutely necessary: the specific ground pressure will be about the same compared to the western counterparts.”

Further, given its combination of active protection systems, reactive armor and passive laminated armor, the T-14 could possibly offer better protection for its crew than a comparable tank such as the Merkava, which is a more survivable machine than either the Leopard 2 or Abrams. Bühler argues that the Armata’s unmanned turret offers some survivability advantages over manned turret designs. “Based on all these considerations, it must be assumed that the T-14 Armata offers the crew a higher overall level of protection than its western counterparts, despite its significantly lower combat weight,” Bühler wrote.

In terms of sensors and situational awareness, the Israelis almost certainly retain a massive advantage over the Russian T-14. However, Bühler notes that sensors are a problem for all tanks. “Compared to older optical systems, video cameras and electro-optical scopes are neither more nor less vulnerable to enemy fire or splintering. Optics are, and will remain, the Achilles’ heel of a battle tank, including the T-14,” Bühler wrote.

The disadvantage of the Armata’s unmanned turret is situational awareness. The commander cannot pop his head out of the vehicle to maximize to see. That problem could be solved by technology such as Iron Vision, but it is not clear that the Russians have that technology. It is certain that Moscow does not have such technology installed on the current versions of the T-14, but it could eventually as Bühler notes. The Israelis’ massive situational awareness advantage given the capability of the Iron Vision system will give Tel Aviv’s seasoned tank crews a decisive advantage over the T-14 or any other Russian tank until Moscow develops an equivalent capability. In armored warfare, the crew that sees the enemy first almost always wins.

This article first appeared in 2018 and is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Wikimedia Commons.

Robert Beckhusen

Security, Europe

It was a failure.

Key Point: The Object 279 was never more than a prototype.

In a war that never happened, formations of heavy and rather odd-looking Soviet tanks would have powered through atomic explosions in breakthrough attacks into West Germany.

Enter the Object 279 tank, a curious oddity from the late 1950s which was obsolete — despite its design principles deliberately reflecting the fear of a nuclear battlefield — by the time it was produced.

It was certainly not a success, as the Soviet Union only manufactured a handful of prototypes.

But the fact that it appeared at all is indicative of an obsession among a small number of Red Army military planners dating back to World War II. As the Nazis and Soviets battled for hegemony, both sides fielded increasingly heavier tanks — with bigger guns — which could absorb fire while destroying their heavily-armored enemies at long range.

Medium tanks, such as the legendary T-34, would ultimately pioneer the main battle tanks which armies deploy today. However, the Kremlin continued building thousands of heavy tanks into the 1960s until Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev effectively put a stop to it.

The Object 279 was part of this tradition.

The Object 279’s most visible features include the sharp, saucer-shaped chassis and four distinct, enormous tracks. The latter was to give the 60-ton tank more traction in difficult or soft terrain, always a problem for heavier tanks prone to bogging down. A 1,000-horsepower engine powered the beast.

The design’s obvious downside? One could only imagine the difficulty repairing the two inner tracks running underneath the chassis’ belly, let alone the complex transmission. Equally bizarre is the shape of the chassis to protect the vehicle and its four crew members from shock waves generated by an exploding nuclear bomb.

The Object 279 came with serious armor — 319 millimeters thick in the turret and 269 millimeters at the thickest point in the hull, significantly greater than the far more widespread T-72 which entered service in the 1970s.

An impressive, stabilized 130-millimeter rifled cannon and 14.5-millimeter machine gun rounded out the turret.

But the quad-tracked juggernaut’s technical specifications are somewhat moot, as the prototypes came at the worst possible time.

Back up. During World War II, the Soviets refined their heavy tank designs, culminating in the IS-2 — an intimidating and impressive vehicle which entered service in 1944. IS-2s most notably spearheaded the Red Army assault into Berlin, blasting German Tiger tanks and reducing fortified positions into rubble.

The success of the IS-2 was never replicated again in a Soviet heavy tank. A follow-up, the IS-3, was a nightmare to maintain and underwent near constant upgrades to resolve numerous design problems in the welding and wheel bearings.

“Even in 1946 a committee was formed to fix the problems of what had become the flagship Soviet tank, and to prevent Western intelligence agencies from finding out how bad the tank really was,” Stephen Sewell wrote in a 2002 edition of Armor magazine.

“Militarily the IS-3 offered little more than propaganda value, as it was an embarrassment and seldom offered to Soviet allies.”

When the IS-3 did find itself outside the USSR, it rarely saw combat. Protesters during the 1956 Hungarian uprising destroyed a few, and the Israelis annihilated dozens of them in Egyptian service in 1967.

The IS-4 hardly fared better, and another tank called the T-10 endured a torturous development period as capable medium tanks such as the T-55 and the soon-to-come T-64 competed for budget dollars.

In reality, classic heavy tanks stopped making sense by the mid-1950s. Speedy, maneuverable and reliable tanks — with new high-powered guns — would win the wars of the future. Devastating guided missiles capable of punching through heavy armor had also begun entering service.

Khrushchev, who loved missiles, had enough of the Soviet army’s penchant for heavy tanks.

“If tanks were going to remain, they must fire missiles and use a drum-canister inside the tank for storage. [Tank designer L.N.] Kartsev argued that this was a dumb idea, and that the USSR was more likely to need gun tanks than missiles,” Sewell wrote, referencing a 1960 conversation between the two men.

“While he and Khrushchev argued, it was apparent that Khrushchev was listening to him. But after seeing the old-fashioned T-10, Khrushchev was adamant: no more heavy tanks.”

The Object 279 died with them. But in an irony which its designers would have appreciated, today’s main battle tanks — what were once medium tanks — have grown a lot heavier.

This first appeared in WarIsBoring here.

Image: Wikimedia Commons

Stephen Silver

Technology, Americas

For months, no usual production took place for new movies or TV shows. The only handful of exceptions were shows that were filmed overseas or shows that are animated or otherwise produced in a method that’s not live action. Therefore, there’s going to be a dearth of live action TV shows on networks and cable channels as soon as this fall. Could such delays affect the subscriber count of the most popular streaming service, Netflix? One analyst believes so.

It hasn’t quite happened yet, but a content crunch is on the way, when it comes to movies and TV shows, as a result of coronavirus.

For months, no usual production took place for new movies or TV shows. The only handful of exceptions were shows that were filmed overseas or shows that are animated or otherwise produced in a method that’s not live action. Therefore, there’s going to be a dearth of live action TV shows on networks and cable channels as soon as this fall.

Could such delays affect the subscriber count of the most popular streaming service, Netflix? One analyst believes so.

Michael Pachter, media analyst with Wedbush Securities, as cited by Media Play News, said in a recent note that Netflix is likely to soon begin losing subscribers, if there’s not a return to normalcy soon.

“We suspect that this phenomenon has already begun and led to the company’s lackluster guidance for Q3 net sub additions,” Pachter wrote in an August 24 note, as cited by Media Play. “Once the pace of its delivery of new content begins to wane, we expect Netflix to see higher churn and much slower subscriber growth.”

There are reasons to believe, however, that Netflix is in good position to weather the coronavirus storm. The company has a massive amount of original content on its docket, and is in better position, if necessary, to spread its offerings over a longer period of time.

In addition, as pointed out in the note by Pachter, Netflix has the option of purchasing movies from Hollywood studios, who are both hungry for revenue and not able to release the movies in theaters, in order to add to their original content war chest.

Netflix has already done this with “The Trial of the Chicago 7,” a movie directed by “The West Wing” creator Aaron Sorki. That movie was set for theatrical release by Paramount, but Netflix acquired it and will release on it service in October. However, as Pachter also noted, Netflix’s competitors, such as Apple TV+ and HBO Max, have also been in the market for such acquisitions.

Netflix, at the end of the second quarter, said that it added twenty-two million subscribers in the first half of the year, although its earnings missed. The company said in its shareholder letter for the quarter that “our main business priority is to restart our productions safely and in a manner consistent with local health and safety standards to ensure that our members can enjoy a diverse range of high quality new content,” and that its strategy for doing so would differ from country to country and region to region. The company has reportedly resumed some productions overseas.

Meanwhile, Netflix has several high-profile movies, including Charlie Kaufman’s “I’m Thinking of Ending Things,” the entire “Back to the Future” trilogy, and the two most recent “Muppets” movies, becoming available in the month of September.

Stephen Silver, a technology writer for The National Interest, is a journalist, essayist and film critic, who is also a contributor to Philly Voice, Philadelphia Weekly, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Living Life Fearless, Backstage magazine, Broad Street Review and Splice Today. The co-founder of the Philadelphia Film Critics Circle, Stephen lives in suburban Philadelphia with his wife and two sons. Follow him on Twitter at @StephenSilver.

Image: Reuters

Rachel Bucchino

Economics, Americas

But would those making below that number see their taxes remain steady?

Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden and his running mate Senator Kamala Harris (D-California) appeared in their first joint interview, with the former vice president saying everyone should pay “their fair share” and that he will raise taxes on Americans who make more than $400,000 if elected in November.

“I will raise taxes for anybody making over $400,000,” Biden said in an interview with ABC’s anchor David Muir that aired Sunday. “Let me tell you why I’m going to do it. It’s about time they start paying a fair share of the economic responsibility we have. The very wealthy should pay a fair share—corporations should pay a fair share.”

Biden also said businesses that bring in “close to a trillion dollars and pay no tax at all” will see a tax hike.

Tax proposals have growing importance for the upcoming election, as the coronavirus pandemic triggered an economic crisis, leaving more than thirty million Americans unemployed.

When Biden noted that he’d raise taxes on businesses, Muir questioned this policy, as most businesses have shuttered or struggled financially because of the impacts of the pandemic. 

“Is it smart to tax businesses while you’re trying to recover?” Muir asked.

“It’s smart to tax businesses that in fact are making excessive amounts of money and paying no taxes,” Biden responded.

Although Biden has towered in national polls over President Donald Trump, some polls have revealed greater favorability and confidence in Trump’s handling of the economy. The president has warned in the past that Biden’s tax policy would create the “biggest tax increase in history.”

In the interview, Biden emphasized that small businesses or individuals who make $400,000 per year or less won’t experience any new taxes.

“We have to provide them with the ability to reopen. We have to provide more help for them, not less help,” he said.

Biden’s tax policies would boost tax revenue by about $3.8 trillion over the next 10 years, according to an economic analysis conducted by the Tax Foundation. The Foundation noted, however, the spike in taxes would only bring in about $3.2 trillion in actuality “when accounting for macroeconomic feedback effects.”

Rachel Bucchino is a reporter at the National Interest. Her work has appeared in The Washington Post, U.S. News & World Report and The Hill.

Image: Reuters

Peter Suciu

Security, Eurasia

The fifth-generation multi-role fighter was designed by United Aircraft Corporation as an aerial platform to destroy all types of air, ground and naval targets. And it might come with an impressive new feature. 

The combat capabilities of Russia’s Su-57 fifth-generation fighter have been compared to the United States Air Force’s F-22 Raptor. The Russian aircraft’s speed and armament could allow it to respond quickly to potential threats—and if necessary back out just as quickly from fights it cannot win. But now the Su-57 could have another advantage: a remotely piloted mode that could enable the advanced fighter to be operated safely away from potentially hostile skies. 

“Indeed, we are considering the options of the remotely piloted mode on many platforms and, of course, such work is being carried out on the Su-57,” Yuri Slyusar, CEO of the United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) told the Zvezda TV Channel on Monday as reported by state media.  

The fifth-generation multi-role fighter was designed by UAC as an aerial platform to destroy all types of air, ground and naval targets. Much like the American-built F-22 Raptor or F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the Su-57 fighter jet features stealth technology—in this case from the broad use of composite materials, while the aircraft is also capable of supersonic cruising speed and is equipped with an advanced onboard radio-electronic system that includes a powerful onboard computer. That computer has been described as a second pilot, but how it might be used remotely is still unclear. Another innovation is the armament that is placed inside the airframe’s fuselage. 

The Su-57 also features a radar system that is spread across its body. Russia’s aircraft is the only fighter in the world to feature this “Directed Infrared Countermeasure System” (DIRCM), which also includes a missile-spoofing turret that was designed to protect the fighter from infrared-guided missiles. However, analysts have questioned exactly how effective the system could be for a fighter as it has primarily only been used on transports and helicopters and never has been placed on the ventral side of an aircraft.

Since the Su-57 first took to the skies in January 2010, it has been shown to combine the functions of an attack plane and a fighter jet while the use of the composite materials and its innovative technologies along with aerodynamic configuration has ensured that it would have a low level of radar and infrared signature. In theory, this should make for quite the adversary in the skies—more so given that the plane’s armament could include hypersonic missiles.

However, in practice, the Su-57 has been plagued with problems during its development and by some accounts, the plane underperformed when it was deployed to Syria for field testing. In fact, last month Russian military chief of the general staff Valery Gerasimov only confirmed that the aircraft had even been deployed to Syria and said little about its performance, so that is hardly a rousing endorsement of the aircraft’s capabilities. 

The bigger problem is that Russia likely won’t receive the Su-57 in any significant numbers—at least not any time soon. Perhaps a total of four will be handed over to the Russian military this year. That is a far cry short of the seventy-six-plane order and at just four planes per year (if Russia can even maintain that many), it could take three to four years to form a single squadron. That begs the question as to why a remote control option would even be necessary—it certainly isn’t an issue of shortage of pilots as much as fewer than required aircraft at this point. 

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com. 

Image: Reuters

As threats continue to evolve online, U.S. Cyber Command will remain ready to defend the United States in the years ahead.

Erica Weintraub Austin, Porismita Borah

Health, Americas

Collectively, by turning around those who believe otherwise, we can save lives.

An estimated 24,000 to 62,000 people died from the flu in the United States during the 2019-20 flu season. And that was a relatively mild flu season, which typically starts in October and peaks between December and February.

The latest computer model predicts 300,000 deaths from COVID-19 by Dec. 1.

With the advent of flu season, and COVID-19 cases rising, a public health disaster even worse than what we’re now experiencing could occur this fall and winter. Two very dangerous respiratory diseases could be circulating at once.

This will put the general population at risk as well as the millions of people who have pre-existing conditions. Hospitals and health care workers would likely be overwhelmed again.

We are scholars from the Edward R. Murrow Center for Media & Health Promotion Research at Washington State University. As we see it, the only way out of the reopening and reclosing cycles is to convince people to get the flu vaccine in early fall – and then the COVID-19 vaccine when it’s available. Right now, up to 20 COVID-19 vaccine candidates are already in human trials. Chances seem good that at least one will be available for distribution in 2021.

But recent studies suggest that 35% might not want to get a COVID vaccine, and fewer than half received a flu vaccine for the 2019-2020 season.

Getting Coverage

To arrest the pandemic’s spread, perhaps 70% to 80% of the population must opt in and get the vaccine. They also need the flu shot to avoid co-infection which complicates diagnosis and treatment.

Achieving herd immunity is a steep climb. We conducted a national online survey, with 1,264 participants, between June 22 and July 18. We found that only 56% of adults said they were likely or extremely likely to get the COVID-19 vaccine. Westerners were most accepting (64%), followed by Midwesterners (58%), with Southerners (53%) and Northeasterners (50%) least likely.

Anti-vaxxers, promoting unlikely scenarios and outright falsehoods about vaccine risks, are not helping.

With all this in mind, we would like to share some myths and truths about how to increase rates of vaccinations.

Facts Don’t Convince People

People who support vaccination sometimes believe their own set of myths, which actually may stand in the way of getting people vaccinated. One such myth is that people respond to facts and that vaccine hesitancy can be overcome by facts.

That is not necessarily true. Actually, knowledge alone rarely convinces people to change behavior. Most decisions are informed – or misinformed – by emotions: confidence, threat, empathy and worry are four of them.

Another myth is that people can easily separate accurate information from the inaccurate. This is not always true, either. With so much misinformation and disinformation out there, people are often overconfident about their ability to discern good from bad. Our research during the H1N1 epidemic showed that overconfidence can lead to faulty conclusions that increase risk.

Also, it’s not always true that people are motivated to get accurate information to protect themselves and their loved ones. People are often too busy to parse information, especially on complicated subjects. They instead rely on shortcuts, often looking for consistency with their own attitudes, social media endorsements and accessibility.

And, to complicate matters, people will sometimes disregard additional fact checking that contradicts their political beliefs.

Assuming that people who get the flu vaccine will also get the COVID-19 vaccine is a mistake, too.

In our survey, 52% of respondents said they got a flu or other vaccine in the past year, but only 64% of those who got a vaccine in the past year said they were somewhat or extremely likely to get the COVID-19 vaccine. On the other hand, 47% who did not get a recent vaccine said they were somewhat or extremely likely to get the COVID-19 vaccine.

Ways that Do Help

Here are five things you can do to encourage your family, friends and neighbors to vaccinate and to seek out reliable information:

1. Help them discern trustworthy news outlets from the rest. Is the outlet clearly identified? Does it have a good reputation? Does it present verifiable evidence to back up claims? It is hard to know whether a site is advancing a political agenda but check the “about” or “sponsors” type of links in the menu on the homepage to gain a bit more information. People should be particularly suspicious if the source makes absolutist claims or evokes stereotypes. An anger-provoking headline on social media might be nothing more than manipulative clickbait, intended to sell a product or profit in some way from a reader’s attention.

2. Make trustworthy news sources accessible and consistent by putting them on your social media feeds. Community service centers are a good one. Partner with opinion leaders people already trust. Our survey respondents viewed local news and local health departments more useful than other outlets, although favorite sources vary with their age and political orientation.

3. Provide clear, consistent, relevant reasons to get the vaccines. Don’t forget the power of empathy. Our survey says only 49% thought a COVID-19 vaccine would help them, but 65% believed it would help protect other people. Avoid the temptation to use scare tactics and keep in mind that negatively framed messages sometimes backfire.

4. Remember that skepticism about vaccines did not happen overnight or entirely without cause. Research shows that mistrust of news media compromises confidence in vaccination. Many are also skeptical of Big Pharma for promoting drugs of questionable quality. The government must too overcome mistrust based on past questionable tactics, including “vaccine squads” targeting African Americans and immigrants. Honesty about past mistakes or current side effects is important. Some information about vaccines, widely disseminated in the past, were later revealed to be wrong. Although the evidence for the efficacy of vaccines is overwhelming, any missteps on this subject breed mistrust. One recent example: Two major studies about COVID-19 treatments were ultimately retracted.

5. Let them know that science is the answer, but it requires patience to get it right. Scientific progress is made gradually, with course corrections that are common until they build to consensus.

And emphasize the things we are certain of: The pandemic is not going away by itself. Not all news outlets are the same. Both flu and COVID-19 shots are necessary. And vaccines work. Collectively, by turning around those who believe otherwise, we can save lives.

Erica Weintraub Austin, Professor and Director, Edward R. Murrow Center for Media & Health Promotion Research, Washington State University and Porismita Borah, Associate Professor, Washington State University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Image: Reuters

Daniel R. DePetris

Security, Asia

It loooks likely to be the same old story all over again.

Editor’s Note: As Election Day rapidly approaches, and with it, a potential change of presidential administration, the Center for the National Interest’s Korean Studies team decided to ask dozens of the world’s top experts a simple question: If Joe Biden wins come November, what do you expect his North Korea policy to look like? The below piece is an answer to that question. Please click here to see even more perspectives on this important topic.

U.S. policy on North Korea across multiple Democratic and Republican administrations has rested on three central pillars: (1) North Korea can under no circumstances be recognized or treated as a nuclear weapons state; (2) over time, economic pressure will eventually bring the Kim dynasty to the negotiating table; and (3) Pyongyang’s denuclearization is the sine qua non of success. From everything we know about Joe Biden and his nearly half-century long career in Washington, none of the basic parameters are likely to change.

Every president enters the Oval Office thinking he can close the North Korea nuclear file for good. President George W. Bush and his national security team frowned upon the Clinton administration’s diplomacy with Pyongyang and perceived it to be weak and unprincipled. Over time, Bush realized that isolating the North with economic and diplomatic sanctions was producing zero policy benefits for the United States and spent his second term as a deeply active participant in the Six Party Talks process. But eight years later, President Bush left office with Washington’s North Korea policy in worse shape than when he came in.

This trend continued with presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump. During his opening months, Obama promised a new era of U.S. diplomatic engagement with long-time adversaries. Trump, a showman if there ever was one, sold himself as the master negotiator who would personally make great deals for the United States and solve problems no other U.S. president had the intelligence or talent to solve. In both cases, North Korea was at the top of the list, and in both cases, Obama and Trump wound up disappointed. Obama largely gave up on diplomacy with Pyongyang after the 2011 Leap Day Deal collapsed in less than a month. Trump, despite three in-person meetings with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and an unknown number of letters exchanged, largely lost interest in the endeavor as election season approached.

If Biden prevails in November, he will inherit a North Korea problem that is the product of three decades of failed U.S. policy. If comments during his long tenure in the Senate or his remarks during the 2020 Democratic presidential primary are any indication, Biden’s North Korea policy will be a highly traditionalist one. North Korea’s complete and verifiable denuclearization will remain the top U.S. policy objective on the Korean Peninsula. Economic sanctions on the North will likely increase as the Biden administration tries to poke and prod China and Russia into fully implementing the various U.N. Security Council Resolutions already on the books. Joint U.S.-South Korean military drills will return on schedule, which will heighten Pyongyang’s sense of vulnerability and perhaps enable Kim to meet the moment with some long-range missile tests of his own. The Biden State Department will devote a significant amount of time trying to impress upon Beijing the necessity of cracking down on ship-to-ship transfers, border smuggling, and whatever other sanctions violations the Chinese and North Koreans have perfected. None of it will be particularly effective. Any North Korea policy that depends on Beijing’s cooperation is a policy that is pre-set to deflate into irrelevance, particularly so when China and the U.S. are already at each other’s throats over a wide range of issues.

As for direct U.S.-North Korea diplomacy? Well, don’t expect any Biden-Kim summits anytime soon, if ever. Dialogue will be attached to a series of conditions the North Koreans will have to meet beforehand, including but not limited to showing some good faith to the international community that they are willing to abide by prior denuclearization commitments.

I can only hope that a potential Biden administration proves this assessment wrong. Otherwise, the U.S. might as well prepare for another four years of the same old story.

Daniel R. DePetris is a columnist at the Washington Examiner and a contributor to the National Interest.

Image: Reuters

Priya Sethi

Security, Asia

ROK forces must also be prepared to provide humanitarian assistance and emergency relief.

Here's What You Need To Remember: U.S. forces will be crucial in enabling international humanitarian agencies to enter affected areas and in providing protection for aid operations. Located miles from the Military Demarcation Line, U.S. forces are able to mobilize immediately to stage and support humanitarian relief operations. They maintain the airlift and aerial reconnaissance capabilities to quickly assess affected areas and to provide immediate, large-scale delivery of supplies.

Speculation on the eventuality of a North Korean government collapse has fueled analysts and policy makers for years. From the famine and economic crisis in the 1990s to recent political purges within the Kim Jong-un government, the potential for collapse always seems to be around the corner. Regardless of how changes take place on the peninsula, North Korea’s entrenched security structures, humanitarian complexities and depleted infrastructure will induce significant instability challenges for regional actors. As calls to support unification and prepare for contingency of an unexpected collapse continue, it is an opportune time for U.S. forces, located on the Korean peninsula, to help the ROK (Republic of Korea) military prepare for stabilization and humanitarian relief efforts.

U.S. forces should leverage their operational experience from recent military campaigns and its unique relationship within the ROK-U.S. Alliance to provide capacity building and security assistance in stability operations, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration and humanitarian assistance. Strengthening capacity and coordination now will propel ROK military planning from a demand-driven response to an informed, supply-led posture in confronting anticipated instability challenges.

Stability Academy

The ROK military has roughly 500,000 active-duty troops and can activate hundreds of thousands of reserve soldiers. This additional manpower forms Stabilization units that mobilize in support of the active duty troops and homeland defense. However, ROK Stabilization units consist mostly of reservists with limited combat and stability training with which to manage and mitigate against potential drivers of instability. To effectively plan and prepare for instability, U.S. forces should establish training opportunities in which both ROK reservists and active-duty military attend in either peacetime or in conflict conditions to exercise the skills and training needed.

An annual stability operations training for reservists would focus on further developing infantry and artillery skills to enhance their capability in managing combat threats while stabilizing an area. In addition, building expertise and specialty skills in critical stability tasks such as medical training, water and sanitation, and disaster relief would mitigate capability gaps and build a stronger cadre of forces dedicated to stabilization efforts. By using the personnel and facilities already available in South Korea, U.S. forces can utilize and expand integrated training camps, simulations and tabletop exercises for ROK units to develop and build response strategies and capabilities.

Another opportunity U.S. forces should consider is developing a rapid deployment academy for mobilized stabilization divisions preparing to engage in a collapse or conflict environment. U.S. forces could add on to the ROK units’ predeployment training to encourage a greater emphasis on stability operations and civil affairs, building off the U.S. operational experience from recent campaigns. This military-to-military engagement gives the U.S. forces on the peninsula a significant training opportunity to build the capacity of their ROK counterparts.

Security Assistance

A critical area of U.S. security assistance will likely be assisting ROK-led efforts in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of NK forces. In a conflict scenario, NK generals and military elite will be the primary actors to establish control or encourage factional fighting, influencing the potential for insurgency or resistance. Co-opting NK military leaders and security forces not only thwarts a potential driver of insurgency, but also indicates to the rest of the population a willingness by elites to participate in demobilization. The ROK-U.S. Alliance should work to develop a standards-based methodology and doctrine for DDR activities to ensure a successfully coordinated program across military and civilian sectors. The U.S. can assist their ROK counterparts to develop tactics, techniques and procedures that meet established objectives and end-states in disarming or demobilizing North Korea’s military. U.S. forces can assist in building disarmament facilities and weapons caches to disarm the NK security forces, and work with ROK forces to secure political prisoners and elites in accordance with joint and combined doctrinal procedures. The United States can also support the ROK government in establishing incentives and amnesty programs for former combatants and the professional community of scientists, doctors and engineers to encourage participation in demobilization and reintegration.

In addition, U.S. forces can provide liaison teams and partnering units to support the ROK military conduct key stabilization tasks, such as engineering and short-term infrastructure repair. U.S. security assistance can provide expertise to ROK engineer units to prepare for route clearance and construction missions, and set the conditions for critical infrastructure repair, such as roads, bridges and power distribution centers. A major initial operation for the ROK government will involve restoring fuel and electricity services and distributing power generation systems to population centers. U.S. engineer units should partner with ROK units now to plan effectively and to build the capabilities to execute such initial repair efforts.

Humanitarian Relief

ROK forces must also be prepared to provide humanitarian assistance and emergency relief. The U.S. can assist by providing advisory support to build capacity in disaster relief delivery and crisis planning. The U.S. should encourage the ROK government and private sector to build greater stockpiles of portable water, medical supplies, food rations and temporary shelters that the military can reach upon for immediate distribution. In addition, the Korean Integrated Humanitarian Coordination Cell (KIHAC), established to coordinate humanitarian relief activities, should be better integrated with the ROK military and interagency to ensure a synchronized response. U.S. forces can utilize its Civil-Military Operational Cell (CMOC) security assessment and planning capabilities to influence KIHAC integration with government and nongovernmental organizations.

Additionally, U.S. forces will be crucial in enabling international humanitarian agencies to enter affected areas and in providing protection for aid operations. Located miles from the Military Demarcation Line, U.S. forces are able to mobilize immediately to stage and support humanitarian relief operations. They maintain the airlift and aerial reconnaissance capabilities to quickly assess affected areas and to provide immediate, large-scale delivery of supplies. Similar to the military’s plans and models for receiving and integrating troops and equipment, U.S. forces should use their logistics and sustainment hubs to facilitate and secure the delivery and transport of humanitarian aid to ROK military posts. Taking advantage of U.S. staging points and movement networks allows for a more effective and efficient supply distribution and forward movement of international aid agencies.

The Korean peninsula is a ripe environment for U.S. forces to support preparation for instability challenges. Its strategic position and enduring relationship with the South Korean military and government provides opportunities to advise, train and assist the ROK military. While speculation will continue on how collapse or unification scenarios may take place, the recommendations and planning considerations here can strengthen the capacity of the ROK military and offer solutions to more effectively employ U.S. forces against future needs.

Priya Sethi is a civilian defense consultant, currently working in Seoul, South Korea as a U.S. Army planner. This first appeared several years ago. 

Image: Reuters.

Stephen Silver

Technology,

The politics are tricky and it might not be Apple itself that makes them.

It’s occasionally been a point of contention, especially during the Trump era and its fitful trade war with China, that Apple continues to mostly make and assemble its products in China. It’s also often led to confusion—especially last November, when President Trump joined with Apple CEO Tim Cook to visit a plant in Texas, which the president implied was both an Apple manufacturing facility, and newly open as a result of his administration’s policy. Neither was true, as the plant was neither new, nor an Apple-owned facility, although Mac Pro computers are produced at the Flex-owned company, and Apple had opened an office complex in the Austin area.

Now, there are rumors that Apple products may be made in North America, although not in the United States, and once again, not by Apple itself.

Reuters reported on Monday that two Chinese companies that work on Apple products, Foxconn and Pegatron, are considering building factories in Mexico. And Foxconn, per the report, would use the new facility to make iPhones for Apple.

The report added that there had been “no sign of Apple’s direct involvement in the plan yet,” and such a move would not be “Apple” building iPhones in Mexico. A decision is expected later this year, and it’s not clear if the plan would be affected by an election loss by President Trump, and the likely changes in trade policies that would follow under a new administration.

These possible company plans are under consideration, per the report, because “the U.S.-China trade war and coronavirus pandemic prompt firms to reexamine global supply chains.” It’s part of a concept called “nearshoring,” in which manufacturing by U.S. companies still takes place outside of the country, but closer to home, rather than overseas.

Any changes would likely be years out. This year’s iPhone manufacturing timeline has been closely watched by analysts and other Apple observers, as fears have continued that Apple’s iPhone line could be delayed due to the coronavirus. Apple admitted, on its most recent earnings call, that this year’s iPhones will arrive a few weeks later than usual, which likely places their release somewhere in the month of October.

Foxconn already has five factories throughout Mexico, although it has never made iPhones in that country. Foxconn made a controversial deal a few years ago in which they agreed to build a factory in Wisconsin, in exchange for massive government subsidies. However, the plans have been repeatedly delayed, and the project is not expected to bring about the promised number of jobs for the Southeastern Wisconsin region.

Stephen Silver, a technology writer for The National Interest, is a journalist, essayist and film critic, who is also a contributor to Philly Voice, Philadelphia Weekly, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Living Life Fearless, Backstage magazine, Broad Street Review and Splice Today. The co-founder of the Philadelphia Film Critics Circle, Stephen lives in suburban Philadelphia with his wife and two sons. Follow him on Twitter at @StephenSilver.

Image: Reuters

Ethen Kim Lieser

Health, World

What happens if people also get the coronavirus?

These days, most Americans are inundated with up-to-the-minute data detailing the horrific effects of the novel coronavirus.

But what often gets ignored amid this ongoing pandemic is that the flu season is right around the corner—which can be a lethal virus in its own right.

More than eight months into the global pandemic, roughly 810,000 deaths have been reported due to the coronavirus, according to the latest data from Johns Hopkins University.

That indeed is a substantial figure, but what current data show is that the seasonal flu also has the potential to be extremely deadly.

In a 2017 collaborative study by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and global health partners, between 291,000 and 646,000 people worldwide die from influenza-related respiratory illnesses each year.

These figures are considerably higher than the World Health Organization’s previous estimates of 250,000 to 500,000 deaths.

In the United States, on average, between nine and forty-five million Americans catch the flu each year, which leads to anywhere between 12,000 to 61,000 deaths. According to the CDC, between October 2019 and April 2020, there were an estimated thirty-nine to fifty-six million influenza infections and 24,000 to 62,000 fatalities.

“These findings remind us of the seriousness of flu and that flu prevention should really be a global priority,” Dr. Joe Bresee, associate director for global health in CDC’s Influenza Division, said in a news release.

The highest flu mortality rates are witnessed in the world’s poorest regions and among older adults. People aged seventy-five years and older and those living in sub-Saharan African countries experienced the highest number of fatalities, followed by individuals residing in Eastern Mediterranean and Southeast Asian countries.

Despite the WHO’s recommendation to utilize flu-vaccination programs to help protect people in high-risk populations, few developing countries have the resources or capacity to manufacture and distribute such vaccines.

“This work adds to a growing global understanding of the burden of influenza and populations at highest risk,” CDC researcher Danielle Iuliano said in a news release. “It builds the evidence base for influenza vaccination programs in other countries.”

In the United States, where flu-vaccination programs are widely available, fewer than half of adults and about 60% of children typically get the flu shot each year, according to CDC’s 2018-2019 data.

The shot’s effectiveness ranges from 20% to 60% each season—depending on the types of strains circulating. The available vaccines are aimed at preventing at least three different strains of the virus, and most cover four. Last year’s formulation was estimated to be about 45% effective in preventing the flu overall, with about a 55% effectiveness in children.

In preparation for a potentially dangerous one-two punch of flu cases and coronavirus infections, the four manufacturers of U.S. flu vaccines have already confirmed that they will ship roughly 200 million doses across the United States this year—which is 19% higher than last season.

Ethen Kim Lieser is a Minneapolis-based Science and Tech Editor who has held posts at Google, The Korea Herald, Lincoln Journal Star, AsianWeek and Arirang TV. Follow or contact him on LinkedIn.

Image: Reuters

Ahsan Butt

Security, Asia

But if the two countries are interested, there are a few viable solutions to the decades-old conflict.

Last week, a senior Indian national security reporter dropped a bombshell that, at first glance, should have turned more heads. The story revealed “persistent” rumors in New Delhi of a secret diplomatic backchannel currently underway between India and Pakistan. The speculation is that these talks, purportedly involving senior officials holed up in Washington and London, have included discussions on everything from “the fate of Kashmir” to “the future of Afghanistan”. 

The report was instructive for several reasons, not least its author. Praveen Swami’s chumminess with the Indian security establishment has been scrutinized in the past, but in this instance, his cozy relationship with the military brass adds credibility to the claims. In all likelihood, this report is not coming from nowhere. If nothing else, it could be a senior leader in the BJP government or security apparatus publicly musing or floating the possibility to gauge the idea’s reception.  

Any news that portends warmer ties between India and Pakistan or progress on a Kashmir settlement should be welcomed. That said, the same pathologies that have doomed past efforts at rapprochement in South Asia still exist. Without excising those, peacebuilding in the region will always be a precarious enterprise, a Jenga-like structure vulnerable to the diplomatic equivalent of someone breathing too hard.

Hardliners in Pakistan and India 

Casual observers of South Asia may be surprised by just how often India and Pakistan embark on a process of normalizing ties. There has been at least one such attempt in each of the last four decades: between Zia-ul-Haq and Rajiv Gandhi (1980s), Nawaz Sharif and Atal Behari Vajpayee (1990s), Manmohan Singh with both Pervez Musharraf and briefly Asif Ali Zardari (2000s), and Nawaz Sharif and Narendra Modi (2010s). More than one of these efforts has involved detailed negotiations over Kashmir. 

The cynic might interject that such fleeting optimism only serves to intersperse insurgencies, terrorist attacks, and threats of nuclear war. True enough. But it bears repeating that, under the right circumstances, the leaderships of India and Pakistan are not impervious to the seductive scent of a landmark peace deal or treaty.  

Yet each of those attempts failed, and handily at that. The reasons were predictable: hardliners on both sides scuttling painstaking progress, unwilling to expend political capital and risk their domestic standing, reputations, and careers.   

In Pakistan, the main problem has been the security establishment. Tellingly, even hawkish Pakistani generals, from Zia to Musharraf to now (reportedly) Bajwa, have shown that they are not, in principle, against deal-making with India. Rather, what they object to is deals negotiated by civilians.

Over the past two decades, the army and intelligence services have upended, undercut, and undermined the efforts of elected politicians to thaw relations not once (1999), not twice (2008), but thrice (2016). Having arrogated to itself the role of national custodian, the security establishment does not trust politicians to represent Pakistan with India. Each time the hapless civilian leaders dare to do so, like clockwork, a major terrorist attack or act of war on Indian soil happens to take place.  

In India, the issue has not been one specific actor, but a wider ideology: nationalism, a powerful and pernicious force. Indian nationalists often protest that they hardly give the time of day to Pakistan and have bigger fish to fry.  

But their western neighbor remains a resonant symbol that evokes suspicion, mistrust, and contempt from the Indian body politic, security establishment, and society writ-large, with the notable exception of the south and, perhaps, the northeast. “Pakistan,” both as a word and as an idea, is used as a rhetorical cudgel across the political spectrum: right-wingers will tell their opponents to “go to Pakistan” while liberals will urge their opponents to not turn India into a “Hindu Pakistan.” Even amongst sophisticated Indian observers, the understanding of Pakistan and Pakistani society remains largely a caricature.

The Last Best Chance? 

The mid-2000s serve to highlight the severe costs that these two dynamics impose on South Asia. It was an opportune time for negotiation: the United States was deeply involved in the region and had leverage and credibility with both parties. The pair’s nuclear tests were almost a decade old, sufficient time for decisionmakers to adjust to new geostrategic realities. Each government wished to pursue an accommodationist course. The Mumbai terror attacks, which poisoned the idea of cooperating with Pakistan for a generous swathe of the Indian intelligentsia and policymaking community, had not yet occurred.

Sure enough, in 2006, Pakistan and India came tantalizingly close to demilitarizing the Siachen glacier—the highest, coldest, and most punishing battlefield in the world, occupied by Indian and Pakistani troops since the early 1980s. At the last minute, according to a book by India’s former Foreign Secretary, M. K. Narayanan (the Indian National Security Advisor) and Gen. J. J. Singh (the Army Chief) lobbied against the deal, dashing hopes of an agreement.  

Worse followed in 2007. Back-channel talks, having taken place over several years in locations such as Bangkok, Dubai, and London between emissaries from Manmohan Singh and Pervez Musharraf, were so advanced that the two had “come to semicolons” in a draft agreement on Kashmir. A visit by the Indian prime minister to Pakistan to announce the deal, and begin its implementation, was in the works. But Musharraf, a dictator who rose to power in a coup, began to lose his grip on the country and responded as all authoritarians are wont to do: desperation and force. By the end of the year, he was no longer Army Chief. By the next year, he was out of public life altogether.

The year 2006 showed that the ugly image of Pakistan in India’s collective strategic thinking can be self-defeating. The year 2007 showed that Pakistani military leaders will seldom enjoy the broad-based and institutionalized political support that freely and fairly elected governments are built on. When mired in sensitive diplomacy, such support can be worth its weight in gold.  

Kashmir Today 

A far cry from the mid-2000s, the noxious atmosphere in South Asia today is hardly facilitative of constructive dialog. Barely eighteen months ago, India and Pakistan flew fighter jets into each other’s airspace for the first time since 1971. Exactly a year ago, Modi’s BJP government executed a suffocating clampdown on Kashmir. Since then, Imran Khan has referred to Modi’s regime as “fascist” and likened Modi to Hitler, while Indian leaders and security officials have spoken of designs to annex Pakistani Kashmir.  

Under such conditions, an inclination to despair may seem natural. In truth, objective conditions show the advisability of talking on Kashmir.  

From Pakistan’s perspective, the conflict has exacted an enormous toll: blowback from the militarization and Islamization of its foreign policy in the form of a deadly insurgency that brought the state to its knees, pariah status in major global capitals for its sponsorship of terrorism, and economic ruin impelled by avaricious defense budgets.  

Meanwhile, India’s hardball strategy under Modi, both on Kashmir and the region more generally, has largely failed. Domestically, space for mainstream politics in the Valley has essentially vanished, recruitment of homegrown militants continues unabated, and the Kashmiri street remains bitterly angry. Regionally, New Delhi’s ties with Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka have deteriorated. Most importantly, its aggressive behavior last August invited retaliation from China, boxing it into a crisis where India has few palatable options.  

International Relations research suggests that leaders of regional rivals tend to bury the past only when it serves some larger geopolitical purpose and helps solidify their domestic rule. The good news is that these are exactly the conditions that obtain in India and Pakistan today. The bad news is the two governments may not see it that way and certainly evince little indication that they are prepared to make tough concessions on territory, terrorism, and trade.  

If India and Pakistan are interested, however, then there are viable solutions to the Kashmir conflict. The near-settlement under Musharraf and Manmohan—which calls for (1) demilitarization and (2) self-governance for the entire historical state of Jammu and Kashmir, (3) free movement of people and goods across the border, and (4) joint management of Kashmir by Indians, Pakistanis, and Kashmiris—is a sound departure point.  

From Kosovo to the Cook Islands, from Gibraltar to Monaco, it is evident that sovereignty in international politics is layered and nuanced, not a simple binary of independent statehood or bust. Whether India and Pakistan can operate with sufficient boldness and deftness within that maneuverability is, of course, another question entirely.

The Payoff  

Though Kashmir grabs the headlines, it is in many ways a distraction from the fundamental social and political challenges facing Indian and Pakistani citizens both: abysmally low standards of living and climate change.  

Nationalist Indians gloat about their economy being the fifth largest in the world but in the UN Human Development Index, which accounts for health, education, and per capita wealth, India ranks in the bottom third of countries (129th to be exact). India lags tiny war-torn Latin American countries like Guatemala and El Salvador and only narrowly edges poor sub-Saharan African states like Namibia and the Congo.

Nationalist Pakistanis brag about being the only nuclear power in the Muslim world but their HDI ranking is even worse: 152nd, eclipsed by Zimbabwe, Cameroon, and Angola—not to mention every other country in the region, including Nepal (147), Myanmar (145), Bangladesh (135), India (129), and Sri Lanka (71).

Meanwhile, South Asia as a whole is poised to be the region most devastated by climate change. The World Bank has estimated that eight hundred million people could face “sharply diminished living conditions” by 2050. Those on social media will note the poignant irony in Lahoris and Delhiites tweeting the same complaints about the quality of the air they breathe, a telling synchronicity: joint problems require joint solutions.

The Most Dysfunctional Region in the World 

South Asia is, by far, the most geopolitically dysfunctional part of the globe. The abject juxtaposition of nuclear weapons and grinding poverty is emblematic of the priorities of its governments. The subcontinent has the least dense network of regional institutions anywhere. While East Asia has the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Europe has the EU and NATO, Africa has the African Union, and the Americas have Mercosur and NAFTA—or whatever Donald Trump is calling it these days—South Asia has nothing comparable.  

Even when other countries are mired in troubled relations, as in northeast Asia, they manage to compartmentalize. Notwithstanding their tensions, China is Japan’s biggest trading partner; Japan is China’s third-biggest. Even in regions deeply divided by religion, nationalism, and history, as in the Middle East, a number of Israel’s Arab neighbors have either signed peace treaties with it (Egypt, Jordan) or not-so-surreptitiously signaled benign neutrality (Saudi Arabia).  

Last year, Ethiopia’s leader won the Nobel Peace Prize for a peace deal with Eritrea in a conflict that is, or was, as long-lasting as that between India and Pakistan. Argentinians and Brazilians talk a good game, especially when it comes to football, but ultimately, they enjoy supremely warm ties: no country sends more tourists to Brazil than Argentina and vice versa, Brazil is the biggest source of tourism to Argentina.  

In almost every region the world over, the free movement of goods, families, tourists, students, pilgrims, musical bands, sports teams, ideas, films, and books is a banal, quotidian fact of life. The governments of India and Pakistan owe their citizens, and those of Kashmir, an explanation of why such a reality is uniquely alien to them.

Ahsan Butt is an Associate Professor at the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University and a nonresident fellow at the Stimson Center. He is the author of Secession and Security: Explaining State Strategy Against Separatists. He tweets @ahsanib.

Image: Reuters

Stephen Silver

Technology, Americas

You will want to keep your subscription for these.

The fall of 2020 is upon us, and while not as many Americans are stuck at home at this point as they were in the spring, those with kids at home might need a break. And for those that do- there’s plenty of new stuff coming to Netflix in the month of September.

• The “Back to the Future” trilogy (September 1.) The “Back to the Future” movies are one of those things that gets traded frequently among streaming services, and all three movies, directed by Robert Zemeckis and starring Michael J. Fox and Christopher Lloyd, hit Netflix again at the start of September.
   
• “Glory” (September 1.) Director Edward Zwick’s 1989 film, starring Denzel Washington and dealing with the first black regiment in the Civil War, hits Netflix at the start of the month after long being unavailable on streaming services.
   
• “Grease” (September 1.) “Grease” is the word, as the famous 1978 musical that starred John Travolta and Olivia Newton-John comes to Netflix.
   
• “The Muppets” and “Muppets Most Wanted” (September 1.) The Muppets may be a Disney property, but for some reason the two most recent big-screen Muppets movies are heading to Netflix in September, after they were previously on Disney+.
   
• “Love, Guaranteed” (September 3.) The star of “She’s All That,” Rachael Lee Cook, resurfaces in this Netflix romantic comedy, co-starring Damon Wayans Jr., is about a lawyer representing a client who sues a dating website that had guaranteed love.
   
• “I’m Thinking of Ending Things” (September 4.) Netflix has snagged the latest movie from writer/director Charlie Kaufman, who wrote “Being John Malkovich” and “Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind,” and directed “Synecdoche, New York” and “Anomalisa.” The new film, based on the novel by Iain Reid, is described as a psychological thriller, and it stars Jesse Plemons, Jessie Buckley, Toni Collette and David Thewlis.
   
• “Cuties” (September 9.) This film was already the subject of a huge controversy over its poster, but the movie, directed by Maïmouna Doucouré, has drawn some positive advanced buzz. “Cuties” is a French film, which debuted at Sundance back in January, about a Senegalese Muslim girl who joins a twerking dance crew.
   
• “Challenger: The Final Flight (September 16.) The latest high-profile space project looks back at the Challenger disaster from 1986, in the form of a docuseries.
   
• "The Devil All the Time” (September 16.) Another psychological thriller, directed by Antonio Campos, stars Batman, Spider-man AND the Winter Soldier. That means Robert Pattinson, Tom Holland and Sebastian Stan, along with Riley Keough and Jason Clarke.
   
• “Ratched” (September 18.) The latest Netflix series from the prolific Ryan Murphy looks at the backstory of the Nurse Ratched character from “One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest,” starring Murphy perennial Sarah Paulson as the title character.

Stephen Silver, a technology writer for The National Interest, is a journalist, essayist and film critic, who is also a contributor to Philly Voice, Philadelphia Weekly, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Living Life Fearless, Backstage magazine, Broad Street Review and Splice Today. The co-founder of the Philadelphia Film Critics Circle, Stephen lives in suburban Philadelphia with his wife and two sons. Follow him on Twitter at @StephenSilver.

Image: Reuters

Stephen Silver

Technology,

Apple just keeps on winning.

The global market for smartwatches, despite the pandemic, posted 20% revenue growth in the first half of 2020, even as shipments remained flat. In addition, Apple now holds more than 50% of the global market share in the category. 

That’s according to new research released this week by Counterpoint Research, which found that the smartwatch category is growing, contrary to the smartphone category and other markets which have suffered during the coronavirus pandemic. 

Around forty-two million smartwatches were shipped in the first half of the year, around the world with the U.S. and Europe posting single-digit gains while other markets, including India, saw larger ones. 

“Apple continued to dominate the smartwatch market both in volume and value. Apple captured a record half of the market in terms of revenue due to strong demand for the Apple Watch S5 models,” Sujeong Lim, a Counterpoint senior analyst, said in the announcement. 

Apple now holds 51.4% of the global market in terms of revenue, with Garmin second at 9.4%, Samsung third with 7.2%, and Imho fifth with 5.1%. Apple’s% in the first half of 2019 was just 43.2%, and at that point, Samsung was second and Garmin was third. 

Google’s wearOS is the second most popular smartphone operating system, behind Apple’s watchOS. Counterpoint also said that cellular-equipped smartwatches are becoming more popular, now accounting for about one in four of global smartwatches shipped. 

“Huawei benefitted from significant demand for its smartwatches, especially the Watch GT2 series in Asian markets. Garmin, the second-largest brand in terms of revenue globally, continued to make strides cornering the sports enthusiast and athlete market,” Neil Shah, Counterpoint’s vice president of research, said in the announcement. 

“The brand saw healthy demand (+31% YoY) for its Forerunner and Fenix line, making up one of the broadest portfolios of smartwatches in the market. Europe and North America remain the key markets for Garmin.”

Garmin was once best known in the United States for standalone car GPS devices, a category that largely disappeared with the advent of smartphones. And Chinese-made Huawei products, of course, are not allowed in the United States. 

Apple, which unveiled the latest watchOS software earlier this summer at its “virtual” World Wide Developers Conference, is expected to release the newest Apple Watch this fall, while the rumor mill has indicated that perhaps the company is eying the release of a cheaper “Apple Watch SE.” 

Samsung, meanwhile, unveiled its latest smartwatch, the Galaxy Watch 3, at its Unpacked event on August 5. That device, which can take ECG and blood pressure readings, will cost around $400. 

Stephen Silver, a technology writer for The National Interest, is a journalist, essayist and film critic, who is also a contributor to Philly Voice, Philadelphia Weekly, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Living Life Fearless, Backstage magazine, Broad Street Review and Splice Today. The co-founder of the Philadelphia Film Critics Circle, Stephen lives in suburban Philadelphia with his wife and two sons. Follow him on Twitter at @StephenSilver.

 Image: Reuters

Ethen Kim Lieser

Environment, World

Can the planet recover from such rapid change?

A total of twenty-eight trillion tons of ice have disappeared from the surface of the Earth since 1994, according to U.K. scientists who analyzed satellite surveys of the planet’s poles, mountains and glaciers.

Scientists from Leeds and Edinburgh universities and University College London, whose findings were published in the journal Cryosphere Discussions, described the ice loss between 1994 and 2017 as “staggering.”

“There can be little doubt that the vast majority of Earth’s ice loss is a direct consequence of climate warming,” the team stated in the review paper.

There is now potential for the melting glaciers and ice sheets to cause sea levels to rise dramatically—perhaps even as high as three feet by the end of the century.

“To put that in context, every centimeter of sea-level rise means about a million people will be displaced from their low-lying homelands,” Andy Shepherd, director of Leeds University’s Center for Polar Observation and Modelling, told The Guardian.

The scientists also noted that the rapid rate of ice melt is seriously reducing the planet’s ability to reflect solar radiation back into space. With less white ice, the dark sea and exposed soil are absorbing more heat, which can further increase overall temperatures.

“In the past, researchers have studied individual areas—such as the Antarctic or Greenland—where ice is melting. But this is the first time anyone has looked at all the ice that is disappearing from the entire planet,” Shepherd said.

“What we have found has stunned us.”

Team member Tom Slater from Leeds University tried to put the massive ice loss into perspective.

“To put the losses we’ve already experienced into context, 28 trillion tons of ice would cover the entire surface of the U.K. with a sheet of frozen water that is 100 meters thick,” he told The Guardian. “It’s just mind-blowing.”

The team’s findings match up well with the recent worst-case-scenario predictions set forth by the United Nation’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change—though they could be on the conservative side, according to a peer-reviewed study published in the journal Climate Atmospheric Science.

That paper offered an even grimmer forecast, in which by the year 2300, ice sheets covering West Antarctica and Greenland will have shed trillions of tons of mass. In this catastrophic scenario, sea levels could swell by more than sixteen feet, which would redraw the globe’s coastlines.

Combined, Greenland and West Antarctica hold enough ice to lift oceans by about forty-three feet. In contrast, the much more stable East Antarctica has enough ice to potentially have a 160-foot impact.

Today, about 770 million people, or about 10% of the global population, live on high-risk land that is less than sixteen feet above the high-tide line.

Ethen Kim Lieser is a Minneapolis-based Science and Tech Editor who has held posts at Google, The Korea Herald, Lincoln Journal Star, AsianWeek and Arirang TV. Follow or contact him on LinkedIn.

Image: Reuters

A new report by UN Women reveals that the COVID-19 crisis has intensified gender-based violence around the world: “The report observes that lockdowns and quarantine measures placed by many countries mean that millions of women are confined with their abusers, with limited options for seeking help and support.”   However, in the Muslim world, even before the pandemic, gender-based violence such as honor crimes, female gentile mutilation, rape and domestic violence was already an extremely big issue since it was extremely widespread.  Nevertheless, the coronavirus pandemic has transformed a giant issue into an epidemic of its own right, from Turkey and Iran to Bangladesh and Pakistan.  

Sadly, even though this is the situation, Turkey is considering pulling out of the Istanbul Agreement on women’s rights.  To add insult to injury, according to Ahval, Yeni Aki columnist Abdurrahman Dilipak called individuals that support the international conventions related to violence against women “prostitutes.” The AKP’s Women’s Branch reportedly filed an official complaint against Dilipak and he was also condemned by 26 different NGOs.   Turkish researcher Bartu Eken explained, “Abdurrahman Dilipak is a writer who is loved in Islamist circles in Turkey. But he is not particularly liked by the supporters of the Nationalist Movement Party, an unofficial ally of the Justice and Development Party.  He is also not liked by some Justice and Development Party supporters,”

“His discourses can sometimes be very harsh, and sometimes they are taken as absurd,” he added.  “CHP, which is the Kemalist party, is also positioned against Dilipak. The Peoples’ Democratic Party also approaches it antiphrastically.  I think Abdurrahman Dilipak has no direct impact on politics. Even sources close to the government do not agree with him.  Of course, the CHP and Turkish women reacted negatively to this rhetoric, but it is possible to say that he did not create much of an agenda.”   Nevertheless, former Israel Consul General Eli Shaked does believe the very fact that the Turkish government is mulling pulling out of the Istanbul Convention is a concern in itself, especially from a European perspective, even if the Turkish government does not agree with Dilipak: “This is another layer of conflict and tension and disagreement between Turkey and the rest of the developed world.  It seems that Erdogan does not take seriously what the world is saying about him or against him.”

However, women in Iran are not fairing much better amid the pandemic.  Iranian political theorist Reza Parchizadeh proclaimed, “Under the Islamist regime, the coronavirus pandemic has affected women in Iran in a special way.  The predefined social roles for women put them at higher risk for getting the coronavirus in Iran.”   Simultaneously, numerous media reports have confirmed that domestic violence and child abuse has risen in Iran amid the pandemic to epidemic proportions. 

At the same time, Iranian human rights activist Manel Msalmi proclaimed that the situation is even worse for Ahwaz and other minority women, especially if they happen to be political prisoners: “Several Ahwazi and Iranian women were detained recently in Sepidar prison and most of them were labor rights activists just like Sepideh Gholian, who was tortured and humiliated in prison.   The prison is overcrowded, so there is a high risk that the coronavirus will spread rapidly.  There were forced confessions and psychological pressure.   The human rights conditions during the pandemic are extremely inhumane.  The international community and women’s rights activists should act to support women in Iran, who are not only tortured in prison but who are also exposed to the coronavirus and threatened by the regime.”

“In light of the coronavirus, the suffering of Ahwazi women has increased immensely,” she proclaimed.  “Due to the existence of employment discrimination based upon their ethnicity, many Ahwazi women are forced to work in beauty salons, as sellers in the market and event halls for that is one of the few fields open to them.   However, after the implementation of the curfew, these shops and venues were forced to close down, but they are still obligated to pay all business expenses, including renting the stores and venues.  Ahwazi women are treated this way because they possess a female Arab identity that the regime wishes to eradicate.”   

During the last lockdown in the South Asian country, Bangladesh Mahila Parishad, a women’s rights group, reported that the plight of Bangladeshi women was getting worse by the day: “The lockdown has made women and children more vulnerable to domestic violence and abuse as many of them are confined to their homes with no outside support. Women were tortured physically, mentally, faced financial restrictions from their husbands, and there was increase in the number of marital rape incidents.”  Once the lockdown was eased, Shipan Kumer Basu, President of the World Hindu Struggle Committee, noted that domestic violence continued to rise unabetted and there was also an increase in the number of rapes.  He emphasized that Hindu women suffered the most torture in Bangladesh, for they faced not only repression at home but also from their Muslim neighbors: “Our women have no freedom in today’s Bangladesh and are tortured because they are Hindu.”\

Similarly, the United Nations reported: “In Pakistan, mental health professionals providing online therapy sessions also report that they have seen a rise in the cases of domestic abuse in the wake of the COVID 19 lockdown in Pakistan. ‘Domestic abuse has already been a haunting problem in Pakistan; more cases are surfacing in this time of anxiety and depression for all.’ A pandemic deepens economic and social stress coupled with restricted movement and social isolation measures, increasing gender-based violence exponentially. Evidence suggests that financial, domestic and health pressures during the lockdown increase domestic abuse and other forms of gender-based violence. Pakistan is no exception where incidents of domestic violence have been occurring at an alarming rate. ‘In a developing country like Pakistan with already very low indicators of socio- economic development, an epidemic is likely to further compound pre-existing gender inequalities.’” 

Although Pakistan has lifted their coronavirus lockdown, Basu noted that gender-based violence continues in the country at a high rate unabetted: “90 percent of Pakistani women have experienced some sort of domestic violence at home.  47% of married women in Pakistan have experienced sexual abuse, particularly marital rape.  One third of girls between age 15 and 19 are also exposed to physical abuse in Pakistan.  The conditions created by the pandemic only make this situation worse, given that these women and girls have even less support in an age of social distancing than they would have gotten before the pandemic.   In a country like Pakistan, such support was always minimal and most women and girls that are abused do not even bother reporting these incidents, yet the pandemic transformed these horrific conditions into something even worse.”          

The post Op-Ed: Repression of women increases in Muslim world amid the pandemic appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Au renoncement du gouvernement français à la plupart de ses engagements économiques et sociaux répond comme en écho la mobilisation des forces conservatrices contre la loi sur le « mariage pour tous ». Doit-on pour autant conclure à une droitisation de la société ? / France, Démocratie, Économie, (...) / France, Démocratie, Économie, Extrême droite, Histoire, Idéologie, Immigrés, Nationalisme, Parti politique, Politique, Société, Sondage d'opinion - 2013/03

En Afrique du Sud, les signes de fragilisation se multiplient. En vue de l'élection présidentielle de 2014, la crise sociale n'a de cesse d'agiter la nation arc-en-ciel. / Afrique du Sud, Conflit, Développement, Histoire, Mouvement de contestation, Parti politique, Pauvreté, Politique, (...) / Afrique du Sud, Conflit, Développement, Histoire, Mouvement de contestation, Parti politique, Pauvreté, Politique, Syndicalisme, Travail, Violence, Apartheid, Chômage, Crise économique, Corruption - 2013/03

La rédaction de Politique étrangère vous offre à (re)lire des textes qui ont marqué l’histoire de la revue. Nous vous proposons aujourd’hui un article de Jacques Lambert, intitulé « La naissance au Brésil d’une nouvelle puissance mondiale », et publié dans le numéro 2/1946 de Politique étrangère.

La littérature française sur le Brésil est abondante et de haute qualité ; il est facile, à travers cette littérature, de suivre l’évolution du Brésil et d’en mesurer les progrès. Périodiquement, des Français ont dressé de ce pays de véritables inventaires. Pour le Brésil impérial, qui reste, dans une grande mesure, un Brésil colonial, il n’est rien de plus précis que les récits de voyage publiés par Saint-Hilaire dans la première moitié du XIXe siècle. En 1 909, Pierre Denis trace, dans Le Brésil du XXe siècle, le portrait scrupuleusement exact d’un grand pays agricole dont la prospérité fragile est encore liée a l’exportation du café. En 1941, enfin, René Courtin, dans Le Problème de la civilisation économique au Brésil, décrit un Brésil complexe et hésitant, difficile à juger, dans lequel l’industrie prend une place fort importante, sans toutefois être déjà prépondérante.

Mais ces facilités de documentation — il en existe d’équivalentes en langue anglaise — n’empêchent point l’observateur étranger d’être déconcerté par les problèmes brésiliens ; si bien que l’on connaisse le Brésil, on s’en fait généralement, plutôt qu’une image d’ensemble, une série d’images confuses et souvent contradictoires.

Une longue éducation, qu’il prend pour une expérience, habitue l’Européen à diviser les pays dans lesquels s’est poursuivie l’expansion de sa race en deux catégories et en deux catégories seulement : des pays neufs d’une part, et des colonies d’exploitation, d’autre part, et, de chacune de ces deux catégories, il se fait une image très précise.

Les pays neufs sont des pays de peuplement, dont les Etats-Unis de l’Amérique du nord fournissent le type le plus achevé ; devenant très vite indépendants de leurs métropoles, aussi bien politiquement qu’économiquement, ces pays neufs sont la terre par excellence du progrès social et se caractérisent par les niveaux de vie élevés de leur population ; ce sont des boutures semblables aux métropoles d’où elles sont issues, mais souvent plus robustes.

Les colonies d’exploitation offrent des traits bien différents : les Européens y rencontrent des populations indigènes installées qu’ils ne peuvent assimiler et dont les cultures résistent obstinément au changement : ce sont des pays à niveau de vie bas et, qu’ils soient dépendants de la souveraineté d’un autre pays ou qu’ils soient politiquement indépendants, ils paraissent destinés à demeurer longtemps les appendices de cultures plus riches et plus complètes, ou bien à végéter dans l’isolement.

Si l’unité du développement argentin conduit à ranger sans hésitation la République Argentine dans la première catégorie et à lui prédire, toutes proportions gardées, le même avenir qu’aux pays neufs anglo-saxons, la complexité de la structure brésilienne fait hésiter à classer le Brésil dans l’une ou l’autre catégorie et rend toute prédiction fort difficile.

La complexité du Brésil

Si l’on peut mesurer les progrès de la République Argentine à l’étalon des États-Unis, le Brésil ne se conforme point à cet étalon. Il n’est pas aussi simple: dans les traits originaux, mais confus et même contradictoires, qu’il présente à l’observateur, il est difficile de retrouver les schémas auxquels on est habitué et de prévoir l’avenir qui s’ébauche. Intimement mélangés aux traits caractéristiques du pays neuf, on trouve les traits également caractéristiques du vieux pays colonial, et un jugement, à peine formé, doit être aussitôt modifié ou qualifié.

Ce n’est pas que les étrangers qui ont été mis en contact avec le Brésil ne soient d’abord frappés par les caractères habituels de pays neuf prospère que leur présente le Brésil et par les progrès économiques et sociaux qu’ils y constatent à chaque voyage.

Comment pourrait-il en être autrement, puisque leur contact avec le Brésil s’établit généralement à Rio-de- Janeiro et se poursuit dans la ville et l’État de Saint-Paul ? Ils se trouvent en présence de grandes et belles villes modernes, d’une activité débordante. Rio ou Saint-Paul, comme l’ont été Chicago ou Détroit, sont de perpétuels chantiers de construction et, si le développement rapide de la ville ne les rendait toujours insuffisants pour une population qui croît plus vite qu’on ne peut la loger et la transporter, les logements et les services publics se présenteraient dans des conditions très supérieures à celles qui prévalent dans la majeure partie des villes européennes. Hygiène, transports, bibliothèques, écoles, tout est moderne, efficace et sans cesse renouvelé par un progrès rapide.

Ceux qui ne sont point sortis de ces villes et des campagnes qui les entourent — parfois à de très grandes distances, comme sur le plateau pauliste — sont surpris et souvent indignés qu’en présence de faits semblables on puisse hésiter à porter sur le Brésil le même jugement que sur la République Argentine et à lui prédire la prospérité plus grande encore que lui promettent son territoire, sa richesse et sa population. Parmi ceux qui ne connaissent ainsi qu’un des aspects du Brésil, il est d’ailleurs tout autant de Brésiliens que d’étrangers. Dans leur Brésil, tous les traits caractéristiques du pays neuf sont évidents : perpétuelle mobilité, énergie, activité et foi illimitée dans l’avenir.

Mais, par delà les campagnes paulistes, il est un intérieur immense et varié, dont une très grande partie, parfois même toute proche, comme dans l’État de Rio-de-Janeiro, offre un tableau bien différent. On se trouve transporté dans une autre société dont les valeurs ne sont pas les mêmes, ou dans un autre siècle.

Des populations nombreuses sont restées endormies dans un sommeil colonial, tantôt trop dispersées et isolées, tantôt très denses, dans un isolement largement volontaire, qui paraît facile à rompre. Colons misé’ râbles des fazendas décadentes, abandonnés, après l’émancipation des esclaves, sur des terres épuisées qu’ils savent mal exploiter, mais qu’ils ne veulent pas quitter, propriétaires lentement ruinés, qui aiment leur vie facile et médiocre, pionniers égarés, immobilisés sur des défrichements sans avenir, tous végètent en économie familiale fermée ou dans le cadre décrépit de domaines semi-féodaux et conservent des techniques médiévales ou même pré-colombiennes ; tous demeurent étrangers à la prospérité et au mouvement de l’autre Brésil.

Dans ces régions, laissées en dehors du progrès ou à peine effleurées par lui, la structure sociale et l’état économique paraissent à peine changés depuis que Saint-Hilaire, au début du siècle dernier, les parcourait à longueur de journée dans ces chars à bœufs dont les roues pleines grincent encore à quelques heures de Rio-de-Janeiro ; le voyageur peut y retrouver à chaque pas l’image du Brésil qu’en ont laissée les gravures de Debret.

A côté du pays neuf, c’est un vieux pays colonial que l’on trouve ainsi au Brésil ; le pays tropical immobile vers lequel on voudrait s’évader d’une civilisation trop instable et trop active. L’image du pays neuf a été tout d’abord saisissante, mais cette population coloniale attardée est si nombreuse et occupé un si vaste territoire qu’on peut bien se demander quelle est des deux images du Brésil, celle qu’il faut choisir. […]

>> Lire la suite de l’article sur Persée <<

En août 2012, à Bogotá, le président Juan Manuel Santos annonçait l'ouverture de négociations de paix avec les FARC en présence de représentants du patronat, mais pas du mouvement social. Pourra-t-on mettre fin au conflit armé sans entendre les revendications qui lui ont donné naissance, il y a plus de (...) / Amérique latine, Colombie, Agriculture, Armée, Conflit, Guérilla, Inégalités, Mouvement de contestation, Violence, Socialisme, Répression - 2013/02