Diplomacy & Crisis News

Kris Osborn

Security, Americas

Improved sensor and communications connectivity will mean that fighter jets and soldiers can better share real-time targeting information.

The Army and the Air Force are planning a series of upcoming joint-service talks for the specific purpose of charting a collaborative, mutually beneficial attack network to better connect air and ground domains to one another in war. 

“We have a concept called Multi-Domain Operation which is our contribution, but it is really a contribution to the Joint All Domain Command and Control fight. What we want to do is come together as a team and take some of the things we are working on and some of the things they are working on and see to make sure that we converge together,” Gen. James McConville, Chief of Staff of the Army, told reporters during the service’s Project Convergence 2020 live fire experiment at Yuma Proving Grounds, Arizona.

Simply put, McConville explained that he wanted the Army to join and align with the Air Force’s ongoing JADC2 effort, explaining that some of their service’s transformational technology can bring great tactical benefit to the Air Force, and vice versa. 

“They have a great program going with Joint All Domain Command and Control and we want to be part of that. When you think about the things we provide to the joint fight, such as Long-Range Precision Fires which will enable us to penetrate Anti-Access/Area-Denial capabilities which the Air Force is concerned about,” he said. 

The mention of Long-Range Precision Fires, and its relevance to the Air Force is quite significant, as the Army is now testing Extended Range Cannon Artillery weapons able to reach 70km and a new Precision Strike Missile that can attack from 500km. The massive distances enabled by these weapons offer Army ground forces new tactical opportunities to attack and destroy enemy air defenses from land. This new ability obviously helps the Air Force as their planes try to close in on hostile areas. 

The Air Force’s JADC2 program, and multi-service connectivity, is specifically cited in a recent essay written by the Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Charles Brown. His “Change or Lose” document calls for greater air-land-sea combat connectivity and challenges the service to fully embrace and execute key changes needed to outpace major power rivals. 

McConville and Brown will have a lot to talk about, because Senior Air Force developers are also moving quickly to facilitate Joint All Domain Command and Control program to better connect sensors and weapons between the services and decrease “sensor to shooter” time. Part of this involves Air Force work on a next-generation battle command technology called Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS), a networking-focused effort to link platforms, weapons and sensors to one another across a vast array of “meshed” or interwoven combat nodes. The concept is to connect unmanned systems, platform-mounted sensors, large weapons systems and IT-databases to one another in real-time with increasing speed. This kind of interoperability is, according to Air Force leaders, intended to serve as the foundation for the Air Force’s contribution to JADC2. 

At the moment, some ground, sea and air sensors are what could be called more “stovepiped,” meaning they are separate and less able to share combat-sensitive data in real-time. Addressing this challenge is exactly the kind of “change” the Air Force document is calling for, given that much greater levels of multi-domain networking will be necessary should there be a major-power warfare scenario. Current long-range enemy sensors are increasingly able to span across domains with extended ranges, requiring a need for America to improve its own multi-domain defenses. 

Some of the Army’s emerging programs, McConville said, are specifically engineered to better support the joint fight and enable cross-domain operations between the services. 

“We are going to have Air and Missile Defense Capabilities that they will be very concerned about because it is how they protect their bases. We will combine sensors and shooters together to all be part of the same team,” he added. 

These comments bring the Army’s Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS) network of missile defense radar and weapons nodes. The program, which recently completed several successful tests, is intended to network an entire sphere of otherwise disconnected sensor nodes to establish a continuous target track on incoming enemy weapons. This means sharing data between otherwise disconnected forward-positioned radar systems and massively decreasing the sensor-to-shooter window. With more complete information quickly at their fingertips, commanders will have more time with which to defend against attacks. Drawing upon IBCS-generated connectivity, the Army recently shot down two incoming maneuvering cruise missile targets by connecting its PATRIOT missile radar to a forward operating Sentinel radar to share data. Commanders had more time with which to make key defensive decisions and succeeded in destroying the fast-moving threats with interceptors. 

In fact, the IBCS system has successfully connected with an Air Force F-35 stealth fighter jet, a level of interoperability which was further demonstrated recently during Project Convergence 2020 at Yuma Proving Grounds, Arizona.

McConville mentioned expressing enthusiasm about this recent experiment in Yuma through which Army ground soldiers were able to exchange targeting specifics with overhead Marine Corps F-35B jet fighters.

“The fact that the F-35 can speak to the soldiers on the ground and the fact that we have a system that will determine what the best shooter is from multiple sensors is going to make the joint force much more capable,” McConville said. 

Interestingly, McConville finished his remarks with somewhat of a philosophical point, explaining that the entire thrust of the Army’s massive modernization transformation, which of course includes the massive acceleration of attack, is intended to prevent war. 

“It all gets back to deterrence and it all gets back to really peace through strength,” he said. 

Kris Osborn is Defense Editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University. 

Image: Reuters

Selon le gouvernement, la pandémie et le report de soins ont permis aux complémentaires santé de faire des économies. Il annonce donc une taxe, que les mutuelles promettent de répercuter dans leurs tarifs. Lesquels affichent déjà une hausse de 4 à 5 % en 2020. En conséquence, les bas revenus (...) / Santé, Société, Finance, Capitalisme, Inégalités, Protection sociale - 2020/10

Kris Osborn

Security, Americas

The Chinese telecom industry has close ties to the Chinese government—an entity long-known to make various attempts at espionage using technological infiltration into foreign markets.

The U.S. Federal Communications Commission is proposing to strip forty-five of the seventy-five megahertz of spectrum reserved for a special “safety band” to ensure safe-clear communication between first-responder vehicles, standard passenger vehicles and traffic controls at busy intersections, a move that has many U.S. government officials concerned about the possibility of Chinese technological and economic interference in the United States, given that the idea would move huge portions of the reserved “safety band” to unlicensed wifi operators.

“Losing the spectrum would make the U.S. less safe. The lack of a Safety Band for connected automated vehicles would compromise readiness from inside the U.S.,” a senior U.S. official told the National Interest.

Losing that much spectrum would require substantial modifications to the existing Safety Band and present potentially unintended security risks such as “opening the door to nefarious Chinese technology that was not inserted before,” the official explained.

Chinese interference is of particular concern for a number of specific reasons, not the least of which is the well-known reality that the communist country seeks to expand its global influence and control through investments in technology and regional economic interests.

China’s cyber espionage and efforts to infiltrate the U.S. industry, and technology, in particular, are well known and well documented. Integrating Chinese components and technologies into greater areas of the U.S. economy and telecommunications infrastructure naturally introduces risks of hacking, jamming, interference or other possible nefarious activities. Navigational systems and communications networks could, in the event of a crisis of any kind, be subverted by Chinese intruders seeking to impede U.S. operations. 

Chinese industrial espionage, particularly in the defense sector, is by no means unprecedented. For example, Chinese cyber espionage appears to have informed the reasons why China’s Wing Loong drone very closely resembles America’s MQ-9 Reaper, according to a 2014 commission report known as the 2014 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review.

“U.S. cybersecurity company FireEye in September 2013 exposed an extensive PLA cyber espionage campaign targeting top aerospace and defense firms for information on U.S. drone technology,” the report states.

The 2013 Congressional report cites a 2012 Defense Science Board report which warns against Chinese defense-oriented cyber espionage, expressing concern that DoD might not be “prepared to defend against this threat.” The report goes on to cite the Defense Science Board report’s findings published in a 2013 Washington Post report stating that twenty-four “U.S. weapon system designs the board determined were accessed by (Chinese) cyber intruders.”

The Chinese telecom industry, the official explained, also has very “close ties to the Chinese government,” an entity long-known to make various attempts at espionage using technological infiltration into foreign markets. This can take the form of computer chips built for U.S. technical systems or even weapons, interference, or intrusions into global satellite markets, cyber espionage through commercial information and technology systems or more simple efforts to dominate or take over technical standards allowing for the insertion of Chinese technologies. 

“It is very difficult to make sure you only get secure things into the supply chain. Safety-critical systems are going to be threatened by China and, quite possibly, Chinese economically-driven espionage. This could disrupt U.S. traffic and safety communication. Accidents could happen at an alarming rate, and the loss of the Safety Band would also interfere with military radar test ranges,” the official said.

Kris Osborn is the defense editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.

Image: Reuters

The special economic zones are meant to quietly bring countries together before more public realignments. But do they?

Daniel Lyons

Politics, Americas

There is a real need to approach Section 230 reform thoughtfully and carefully. Simply unleashing the trial lawyers is neither.

As my AEI colleague Mark Jamison discussed yesterday, there is significant buzz on both ends of the political spectrum to reform Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, the cornerstone of internet law. Last week, Sen. Josh Hawley (R-MO) argued that the best way to stop Big Tech censorship is to weaken Section 230’s protections and unleash the trial lawyers on Silicon Valley; in his words, “let Americans sue!” As a law professor, I should perhaps be excited by the new job opportunities Hawley wishes to create for our graduates. But there are reasons to be skeptical of this move to shift tech oversight from Congress to the courtroom.

Section 230: Shield, not sword

Section 230 provides two important protections for internet-based companies. Section 230(c)(1) offers “posting immunity”: It assures that companies such as Facebook are not held liable for material that their users post online. Section 230(c)(2) also provides “takedown immunity”: It insulates companies from liability for removing user content that the company, in good faith, determines is objectionable. Together, these provisions give internet-based companies near-plenary authority to manage user-generated content, which shaped the social media revolution.

Conservatives like Hawley argue that many companies take advantage of this protection to tilt the political landscape by suppressing right-of-center viewpoints. Many conservative proposals, such as the White House’s National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) petition, would correct this perceived bias by limiting “takedown immunity.” NTIA would limit the categories of material that could be deemed “objectionable” and would define “good faith” to exclude entities that favor certain viewpoints.

Sue for what?

But limiting a company’s “takedown immunity” would not, by itself, permit aggrieved keyboard warriors to file suit. While Section 230 reform might remove a company’s legal shield, plaintiffs still need a sword. What law is violated by removing user-generated content?

There are a few contenders, but none are particularly strong. One could argue breach of contract: Removing a post violates the agreement between the user and the platform. But all major platforms reserve the right to edit content in their terms of service, making this claim a nonstarter. Others have argued that takedowns violate the user’s free speech rights. But with limited exceptions, the First Amendment prohibits only government interference with speech and does not bind private parties.

Perhaps one could bring an unfair or deceptive conduct claim if a company has promised to be politically neutral. But generally, these claims are difficult to bring, which is why companies rarely invoke “takedown immunity”: A recent review of 500 Section 230 cases by the Internet Association found only 19 involving Section 230(c)(2). (It also explains why Big Tech has little to fear from most proposals to reform takedown immunity.)

Hawley’s proposal: Beating shields into swords

This is where the Hawley bill differs from many other proposals on the right: It modifies posting immunity, not takedown immunity. In order to receive the protection of Section 230(c)(1), large edge providers must promise to design and operate their service in good faith. “Good faith” means “act[ing] with an honest belief and purpose” and “observ[ing] fair dealing standards,” and is violated by “intentionally selective enforcement” of the terms of service, including takedowns. Violation of this promise would allow the affected user to sue for $5000 or actual damages, whichever is more.

Hawley’s bill thus incentivizes companies to give users the sword that has thus far eluded plaintiffs. To receive posting immunity, companies must voluntarily agree to be sued by users who feel targeted for “intentionally selective enforcement” of the company’s terms. Unlike takedown immunity, posting immunity is critically important to modern platforms. Facebook, Twitter, and comment threads would operate differently if the host could be sued for a user’s defamatory speech or conduct. Hawley’s bill thus requires platforms to pick their poison: either allow users to sue for takedowns, or risk liability for user posts.

Setting aside potential constitutionality concerns, this bill represents a field day for trial lawyers. Terms like “honest belief,” “fair dealing,” and “intentionally selective enforcement” are not self-defining and will be litigated. Even if platforms win most cases, the litigation costs eviscerate one of the key benefits of Section 230, which is escaping at the motion to dismiss stage before costly discovery begins. With the possibility of a $5000 payoff for every user who feels slighted, platforms face the prospect of death by a thousand paper cuts.

Perhaps Hawley doesn’t mind. He is no friend of Big Tech and has broken from GOP colleagues on tort reform before. But the tech sector has been a beacon of American strength on the world stage, provoking jealousy from European and Chinese regulators. These companies help connect millions of Americans daily, which is especially valuable during the present pandemic. Dr. Jamison is right about the need to approach Section 230 reform thoughtfully and carefully. Simply unleashing the trial lawyers is neither.

This article first appeared at the American Enterprise Institute.

Image: Reuters.

William Jeynes

Politics, Asia

Diplomatic vists and new understandings with Japan, India, the UAE and Bahrain are all a part of the plan.

President Trump has taken keen notice of North Korean Supreme Leader, Kim Jong-un, as well as his “chief underwriter,” China. The dictator’s belligerent and provocative behavior, particularly his development of nuclear weapons, has caused Mr. Trump to develop an international strategy that has largely gone under the radar of the mainstream media. Nevertheless, the strategy is clearly apparent if one chooses to look at the evidence. President Trump has chosen to surround North Korea and China with a ring of nations that over time is likely to develop into a new emerging alliance.

For example, if most Americans were asked which international leader has President Trump met the most times during his administration, most would guess a European or North American leader. However, the answer is actually the former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a Washington D.C.-based foreign affairs and public policy think tank, “no foreign leader has ties with Trump than Abe.” In fact, they visited twenty times, had thirty-two phone calls and played five rounds of golf. This is a huge pivot from past decades, when the American commander in chief directed the most attention toward its allies in Europe and North America.

To be sure, Japan’s alarm over Kim Jong-un’s bellicose missile launches have caused the United States and Japan to enhance the closeness of their relationship. Recently, North Korea’s blowing up of the South Korean liaison office effectively ended peace talks with South Korea. Moreover, Kim Yo-Jong’s (Kim Jong-un’s sister) reference to South Korea as an “enemy” only made Japan more aware of the volatility of the Korean peninsula. China’s clandestine behavior along several dimensions that has greatly facilitated its economic rise, has only added a sense of urgency to the United States and Japan seeking greater ties.

During the last few years, President Trump has made similar moves toward establishing a better relationship with India. Granted, there has been a gradual trend toward better relations between the United States and India for roughly fifteen years. However, President Trump and Prime Minister Narendra Modi have taken note of China’s penetration of the policy-making decisions of various to South Pacific islands, Hong Kong crack downs, and its ongoing border disputes with India.

Therefore, President Trump and Prime Minister Modi have reached what many are calling a “strategic convergence.” President Trump’s visit to India in February, 2020, just before the coronavirus pandemic became such an overriding issue, should be understood in this context. It was indubitably symbolic of the enriched bilateral relationship that has emerged, because the two leaders view the threat of a more aggressive China, radical Islam, and rogue North Korea in similar ways. With this scenario in mind, an increased level of defense cooperation and intelligence sharing seems reasonable. President Trump’s attempt to develop closer strategic ties with India has paid off well. India’s foreign ministry describes the relationship between Trump and Modi as one of “friendship,” “mutual esteem,” and “exceptional warmth.” Those are very strong words that are a tribute to President Trump’s pivot toward surrounding China and the rogue state of North Korea.

The third part of the emerging triad of new emerging alliance are the moderate Arab states including the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. Although Saudi Arabia and Oman, other Arab moderate states, have not yet formally normalized their relations with Israel, Israel and Saudi Arabia have shared some degree of military intelligence on their common enemy, Iran. Once again, there is a growing cognizance of the threat posed by the capricious nations of North Korea and Iran and that China is their chief “underwriter.”

The Trump policy of “surrounding North Korea and China” appears all the wiser, because of what the Washington Post perceives as South Korea’s “quiet leaning toward Beijing.” The above trends in building stronger Asian and Middle Eastern alliances will likely remain in place no matter who wins the U.S. presidential election. As a result, ultimately, a trend may emerge in which President Trump may well be heralded for his international accomplishments, as much as his domestic ones.

William Jeynes is a Professor at California State University at Long Beach and a Senior Fellow at the Witherspoon Institute at Princeton.

Image: Reuters.

Biden shouldn’t be tempted by business as usual with Beijing.

Erik Khzmalyan, Armen Sahakyan

Security, Europe

Washington’s indecisiveness to contain Ankara’s belligerence runs the risk of entrapping the United States in never-ending conflicts that Turkey is facilitating.

With barely any mention of foreign policy, the first 2020 U.S. presidential debate further crystalized the argument that America is dangerously distracted from world affairs. Both the Democratic and GOP party leaders are preoccupied with the upcoming elections that promise to be one of the most contested in U.S. history. This political distraction is made worse by the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, shifting much of the national discourse towards domestic affairs.

With thousands dead due to the pandemic, nations across the globe are forced to refocus the often-scarce resources to avert collapsing health care systems. For this reason, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres urged an international ceasefire to instead tackle “the true fight of our lives.”

Meanwhile, NATO-member Turkey is running loose, creating major headaches for Washington. Recent discussions surrounding Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s visit to Greece regarding the relocation of U.S. strategic assets from Incirlik Air Base to Crete do show some waning patience with Ankara, yet even if realized this may be too little too late. 

Left unchecked, Ankara’s destabilizing rampage threatens to set off the geopolitical ticking bomb stretching from the Eastern Mediterranean to North Africa to the greater Near East. 

Having usurped much of the state power following the alleged 2016 coup d’etat attempt, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been trying to realize his neo-Ottoman dreams. 

First, by brazenly accusing the United States of orchestrating the coup, Erdogan has lately intensified his aggressive posturing vis-a-vis Israel, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and other pro-Western Arab states with the goal to establish himself as the new legitimate leader of the Sunni world.

Domestically, he used the coup as an excuse to initiate a nationwide elimination of political opponents, shutdown of the media, and arrest of academics and business owners to cement his one-person rule. 

Facing little to no consequences for its meddling in Syria, Libya, and other hotspots, Ankara has now turned its eyes to the South Caucasus. 

Turkey’s unprecedented direct, large-scale military involvement in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict marks the cross of a rubicon. With this tipping of scales in the regional power balance, it remains yet to be seen how chips fall along the nexus of Russian, Turkish, and Iranian interests.  

Azerbaijan’s September 27 large-scale invasion of Artsakh (Armenian historic toponym for Nagorno-Karabakh) in conjunction with Erdogan’s transfer of 4,000 Islamist terrorists from Syria to Azerbaijan as well as Turkey’s use of American-made weaponry including F-16 fighter jets, mark the biggest flareup of the conflict since the signing of trilateral ceasefire agreement in 1994.  

The United States has significant leverage to restrain Turkey. By putting a leash on Erdogan’s rogue adventurism, Washington can deescalate the situation to prevent the conflict from devolving into a total quagmire, which is exactly what Ankara is trying to achieve. 

The growing Washington consensus is that the days of Turkey as a reliable partner willing to bandwagon with the United States are over. Erdogan’s fervent anti-Americanism and overall disdain for the West have de facto turned Turkey into a regional pariah.

Once an alliance of like-minded nations, Ankara has devalued NATO, compelling many to question the raison d'etre of the organization altogether. After all, Turkey has done nothing but complicate America’s counterinsurgency operations in the Middle East, such as by supporting terrorist factions affiliated with ISIS and Al Qaeda. 

Washington’s indecisiveness to contain Ankara’s belligerence runs the risk of entrapping the United States in never-ending conflicts that Turkey is facilitating. 

A good starting point would be parting with illusions that Erdogan’s Turkey will eventually abandon the damaging behavior and become the democratic state that everyone hoped for.  

Having sacrificed the long-term regional stability at the expense of short-term political expediency, Washington has willingly closed its eyes on Ankara’s backslide in human rights, solidification of autocracy, and an ever-apparent divergent foreign policy.

In an increasingly repressive region, America should first and foremost defend Armenia’s vibrant democracy as a beacon of freedom. 

Additionally, the United States should hold Ankara and Baku’s hostile regimes responsible through diplomatic isolation, targeted sanctions, and arms embargo. 

Without facing consequences, the violent aggression perpetuated by these regimes will go unabated, harming U.S. and NATO interests in the region. America must act now.

Erik Khzmalyan is a geopolitical analyst based in Washington, DC. He holds an MA in Statecraft and National Security Affairs from the Institute of World Politics.

Armen V. Sahakyan serves as the executive director of the Armenian National Committee of America – Western Region.

Image: Reuters.

Seth J. Frantzman

Security,

The Iron Dome system and other aspects of Israel’s unique air-defense system are getting more attention in a world that has more drone and rocket threats and where conflicts and tension are growing from Asia to the Caucuses.

In a historic ceremony, the Israeli Ministry of Defense delivered the first of Israel’s famed Iron Dome batteries to the U.S. Army on Wednesday. The ceremony was conducted in northern Israel as the air-defense system developed by Israel’s Rafael Advanced Defense Systems was officially provided to the United States. The system will still need to be flown back to the United States or transported to another U.S. facility in the future.  

Oshkosh trucks, designed to carry the Iron Dome system were flown from the United States to Israel in September on the giant Ukrainian Antonov plane. Israel’s Ministry of Defense said that the Israel Missile Defense Organization (IMDO), in the Directorate of Defense R&D (DDR&D), of the Israel Ministry of Defense, “delivered the first of two Iron Dome Defense System batteries to the U.S. Army. On this occasion, a symbolic event was held at the Iron Dome production line of defense contractor, Rafael Advanced Systems.” 

Israel’s top brass and executives from Rafael were on hand for the event. Defense Minister Benny Gantz emphasized that the Iron Dome is part of Israel’s unique multi-layered air-defense system. It is the lower tier. The United States has supported Israel’s various air-defense missile systems such as Arrow and David’s Sling for many years. “The Iron Dome system . . . reflects the strength of the Israeli defense establishment. As a result of the effectiveness of this system, many deaths were prevented on the home front of southern Israel, and it has a significant impact on the battlefield. I am proud that this advanced system will also protect U.S. Army troops. This is an extraordinary achievement for both the Ministry of Defense and for Israel’s excellent defense industries,” Gantz said.

Gantz is the leader of Israel’s second-largest political party called Blue and White and a former Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces. He went to the United States in late September to meet his counterpart, Mark Esper. Israel wants to make sure it maintains its qualitative military edge amid the new deal with the United Arab Emirates. Israel may want new airplanes and helicopters to maintain its capabilities. “Among other things, we discussed procurement and information sharing in the field of technology. The completion of this agreement serves as further proof that the defense alliance [between the United States and Israel], is based on common values and interests, which are stronger than ever,” Gantz said. 

In addition to Gantz, the ceremony included the Minister of Economy, Amir Peretz, Head of the DDR&D, Dr. Dani Gold, Head of the IMDO, Moshe Patel Rafael Chairman, Uzi Landau, and Rafael CEO, Yoav Har-Even. The coronavirus pandemic and Israel’s lockdown appeared to have prevented a high-level U.S. delegation from attending. The Iron Dome battery was unveiled at the ceremony.

The Iron Dome battery has been of interest to the United States for years. It could help fulfill the needs of short-range air-defense, called SHORAD. It would have been helpful in Iraq against the constant attacks by pro-Iranian groups using 107-millimeter rockets. However, procurement processes are slow. Rafael partners with Raytheon in the United States on the Iron Dome system. “The first battery was delivered in record time, and the second battery will be delivered in the near future within the framework of the agreement. These batteries will be employed in the defense of US troops against a variety of ballistic and aerial threats,” Israel’s Ministry of Defense says.

The system has been credited with twenty-four hundred interceptions of enemy threats. Rafael Executive Vice President and Head of Rafael's Air and Missile Defense Division, Pini Yungman noted that the United States and Israel began this Iron Dome relationship with a series of tests and demonstrations in the ‘White Sands’ testing field in the United States. “To date, we have conducted three demonstrations and intercepted targets chosen by the U.S. Army for the Iron Dome system,” Yungman said. 

The Iron Dome system and other aspects of Israel’s unique air-defense system are getting more attention in a world that has more drone and rocket threats and where conflicts and tension are growing from Asia to the Caucuses. Israel’s defense systems are regulated for export by strict guidelines and programs that are linked to U.S. support or joint efforts are particularly sensitive. Recently Czech Republic expressed interest in acquiring Rafael’s Spyder air defense, a system of missiles that is also a short-range air-defense system. Czech also acquired the Israel Aerospace Industries MMR radar that is made by Elta, a subsidiary of IAI. Together the unique radar, missiles and defense systems Israel has put in place makes the country uniquely capable of detecting and defending against missile, drone and other types of threats.

Seth J. Frantzman is a Jerusalem-based journalist who holds a Ph.D. from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He is the executive director of the Middle East Center for Reporting and Analysis and a writing fellow at Middle East Forum. He is the author of After ISIS: America, Iran and the Struggle for the Middle East (forthcoming Gefen Publishing). Follow him on Twitter at @sfrantzman.

Image: Reuters

Mohammed Ayoob

Security, Europe

There are too many external fingers in this Caucasus pie and unless this fire is doused quickly it has the potential to turn into a major regional conflict.

The latest flare-up in fighting between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces that began in July and escalated in mid-September comes closest to the full-scale conflict that ensued between them in the late 1980s and early 1990s as the Soviet Union was disintegrating. It was centred on Nagorno-Karabakh, a predominantly Armenian enclave situated within the boundaries of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic that formed a part of the Soviet Union from 1922 until 1991 when Azerbaijan declared independence. The conflict was triggered by the attempt on the part of the Armenian leadership in Nagorno-Karabakh to break away from Azerbaijan and join Armenia, which also emerged as an independent state following the Soviet Union’s demise.

The war ended with a ceasefire in May 1994 at the cost of 30,000 dead and hundreds of thousands rendered homeless. It not only left Nagorno-Karabakh as a de facto independent polity ethnically cleansed of its Azerbaijani minority but also additional Azerbaijani territory surrounding the enclave under Armenian control.

Observers attributed the Armenian victory to Russian military support that turned the tide against Azerbaijan. Despite the efforts of the Minsk group chaired by Russia, France and the United States to broker an agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the future of Nagorno-Karabakh, the dispute has continued to fester for a quarter of a century with occasional bursts of limited armed conflict, the most serious before the latest one occurring in 2016.

The Armenian antagonism toward Turks—and Azerbaijanis are Turkic people with close cultural ties to Turkey—runs deep. The mass displacement and death of Armenians in Anatolia during World War I as a consequence of part of the Armenian population siding with Russia intensified anti-Turkish feelings among Armenians. This ethnically based resentment was channelled also against neighbouring Azerbaijani Turks.

This interethnic hostility was exacerbated by Moscow’s policy towards the Caucasus and Central Asia that deliberately aimed at creating tensions between neighbouring ethnic groups in non-Russian, especially Muslim, parts of the USSR. This policy, first developed under Stalin, was aimed at preventing the emergence of coordinated resistance in these regions against Moscow’s heavy-handed rule, including the Russification of the non-Russian population.

Central Asia abounds in examples of this policy. Minority ethnic groups are strewn throughout Central Asian states as a result of incorporation of enclaves of such groups within ethnically defined and denominated states. Nagorno-Karabakh’s inclusion within Azerbaijan was one example of deliberate mixing of hostile ethnicities in the Caucasus with the same goal in mind.

The lid was kept on Armenian–Azerbaijani hostility, especially in Nagorno-Karabakh, as long as both Azerbaijan and Armenia formed part of the Soviet Union. However, with the disintegration of the USSR, interethnic antagonism resurfaced with greater vigour, leading to the war between the two countries that lasted until 1994.

It’s not clear why the conflict has reignited now after having been dormant for more than two decades. There’s speculation that it could have as much to do with internal challenges to both regimes that have prompted them to create nationalist xenophobia to divert the anger of their populations.

Both sides have blamed each other for starting the fighting, which has now spread beyond the Azerbaijani border with Nagorno-Karabakh to the international boundary between the two countries. The president of Azerbaijan and the prime minister of Armenia have rejected suggestions of talks to bring the conflict to a close despite such calls by the United Nations, Russia and the United States.

The conflict has raised concerns about the stability of the South Caucasus region since major pipelines carrying oil and gas to world markets traverse this area. The South Caucasus Pipeline, also known as Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum Pipeline, carries natural gas from the Shah Deniz gas field in the Azerbaijan sector of the Caspian Sea to Turkey. It runs parallel to the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil pipeline that carries oil from the Azeri–Chirag–Deepwater Gunashli field and condensate from Shah Deniz across Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey to the Ceyhan marine terminal on the Turkish Mediterranean coast. Crude oil from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan is also transported via this pipeline.

Equally, if not more, alarming is the danger that if the confrontation escalates it may draw in external powers, Turkey and Russia in particular, that would widen the scope of the conflict. Turkey has traditionally been a staunch supporter of Azerbaijan and condemned Armenia in no uncertain terms for beginning the conflict when fighting broke out in September. Russia considers Armenia a strategic ally, supported it militarily in earlier bouts of fighting with Azerbaijan and is treaty-bound to come to Armenia’s defence if the war spreads beyond Nagorno-Karabakh across the international frontier. But, it also considers Azerbaijan a strategic partner and has supplied arms to Baku. Russia will therefore have a major problem on its hands if the conflict escalates. Moreover, if Russia and Turkey line up on opposite sides of this conflict it will greatly harm Russia’s attempt to woo Turkey away from NATO, especially since the two countries are already supporting opposing camps in Libya and Syria.

Israel and Iran also have stakes in the conflict. Israel is a major supplier of arms to Azerbaijan, and Iran, despite its attempt to appear neutral, has long supported Armenia. Both Iran and Azerbaijan are Shia but Azerbaijan’s irredentist claim after independence on the northern Iranian provinces of East and West Azerbaijan has more than neutralised their religious affinity.

There are too many external fingers in this Caucasus pie and unless this fire is doused quickly it has the potential to turn into a major regional conflict.

Mohammed Ayoob is Distinguished Professor Emeritus of International Relations at Michigan State University.

This article first appeared at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

Image: Reuters.

On September 27, fighting broke out between the militaries of Armenia and Azerbaijan. Domestic and international political factors militate against compromise.

Auteur de l’article « Le COVID-19, accélérateur de la post-mondialisation », paru dans le numéro d’automne de Politique étrangère (3/2020), Norbert Gaillard, docteur en économie et consultant indépendant, répond à 3 questions en exclusivité pour politique-etrangere.com.

1) Dans votre article, vous expliquez que le COVID-19 précipite l’ère de la post-mondialisation. En quoi cette nouvelle ère se différencie-t-elle de la précédente ?

La mondialisation présupposait une relative confiance entre États et impliquait une forte interdépendance. Elle a été le fruit d’un consensus sur le mode de développement économique le plus adéquat pour élever durablement le niveau de croissance (le célèbre « Consensus de Washington »). L’idée dominante était que les économies devaient « s’ouvrir » et exploiter leurs avantages comparatifs. Tout d’abord, s’ouvrir commercialement, c’est-à-dire accroître les exportations autant que possible et éviter les mesures protectionnistes. Ensuite, s’ouvrir financièrement et attirer les investisseurs étrangers.

Si on examine ces 30 années de mondialisation, on peut établir plusieurs constats. Premièrement, les grandes puissances économiques ont accepté la complémentarité et l’interdépendance. Deuxièmement, la plupart des pays émergents ont joué le jeu en renonçant aux nationalisations, très répandues jusque dans les années 1970. Troisièmement, la signature de crédit de ces mêmes pays s’est globalement améliorée car ils ont su maîtriser leur endettement, dompter l’inflation et emprunter de plus en plus dans leur propre devise. Quatrièmement, les principales crises survenues entre 1991 et 2019 ont été le résultat de surchauffes économiques, dues à des spirales spéculatives et d’endettement (crise asiatique de 1997, débâcle des subprimes en 2007-2008), ou des choix d’ouverture économique forcenée sans véritable réforme structurelle (banqueroutes argentine et grecque de 2001-2002 et 2010-2012). Ces chocs n’ont pu être contenus que par des efforts de coopération entre Fonds monétaire international (FMI), gouvernements du G7, banquiers centraux et créanciers internationaux.

La pandémie du COVID-19 a malheureusement servi de double révélateur. Elle a montré les carences des vieux pays industrialisés en matière médicale et technologique. Plus grave, on s’est aperçu que des partenaires économiques aussi incontournables que la Chine et les États-Unis, du moins sous l’égide de Donald Trump, instrumentalisaient la crise sanitaire à des fins politiques.

C’est ici que l’on bascule dans ce que j’appelle la post-mondialisation, à savoir une logique d’interdépendance élevée en matière économique, commerciale, migratoire et technologique seulement entre des États (et leurs entreprises) dont les intérêts stratégiques et géopolitiques sont convergents, voire compatibles. Ce nouveau paradigme reflète une prise de conscience et préfigure un retour partiel à la Realpolitik. La mondialisation est difficile à poursuivre lorsque, pour certains États et gouvernements, le développement économique n’est pas une fin en soi mais bel et bien un moyen permettant d’étendre son influence politique.

Avec la post-mondialisation, la méfiance est malheureusement de rigueur. Le premier critère d’investissement à l’étranger pourrait bien devenir la compatibilité des valeurs du pays récipiendaire avec celles du pays exportateur de capitaux. Ensuite seulement seront pris en compte les critères traditionnels (coût de la main-d’œuvre, fiscalité, croissance du marché, etc.). Dans ce nouveau contexte, on devrait voir apparaître des systèmes d’alliances et d’interdépendances plus complexes. Avec la post-mondialisation, ce sont aussi les principes de la coopération internationale qui risquent d’être menacés, surtout avec la rivalité sino-américaine en toile de fond.

2) Justement, en quoi la rivalité entre Washington et Pékin a-t-elle remis en cause et fragilisé les principes libéraux fondateurs de la mondialisation ?

Le modèle de capitalisme chinois n’a évidemment jamais été libéral. Quant au modèle de capitalisme financier américain, il n’a cessé de s’éloigner des principes libéraux. En fait, les deux pays sont engagés depuis les années 1990 dans une course effrénée à la croissance économique. Ces fuites en avant comportent plusieurs points communs. Premièrement, une même volonté d’éviter une appréciation excessive de la devise nationale vis-à-vis des monnaies des principaux partenaires (Europe et Japon). Deuxièmement, un soutien étatique aux entreprises, via des mesures protectionnistes (typiquement des barrières non tarifaires), des subventions et des renflouements (lors des crises financières). Troisièmement, l’encouragement à la constitution de grandes firmes multinationales. Aux États-Unis, les fusions-acquisitions fondées sur des effets de levier (fort endettement) ont pris le relais des politiques antitrust en vigueur jusque dans les années 1970. En Chine, c’est l’État lui-même qui fixe les priorités économiques et favorise l’émergence de grands groupes en situation de position dominante.

Durant plus de 25 ans, la relation sino-américaine a été décrite comme un partenariat gagnant-gagnant : les États-Unis importaient massivement des biens chinois tandis que la Chine achetait des Bons du Trésor américains. Ce pseudo-équilibre n’était que provisoire. Le creusement du déficit commercial américain s’est accompagné d’une désindustrialisation insupportable. Ce n’est pas un hasard si plusieurs États subissant de plein fouet la concurrence industrielle chinoise (Iowa, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvanie et Wisconsin) sont tombés dans le giron républicain lors de l’élection présidentielle de 2016. Les électeurs ont été sensibles au discours protectionniste et anti-chinois de Donald Trump. Ensuite, la politique monétaire accommodante de la banque centrale américaine s’est traduite par l’achat massif de Bons du Trésor, ce qui a réduit la dépendance à l’égard des créanciers étrangers (dont la Chine) et laissé les coudées franches à Washington pour critiquer de plus en plus ouvertement Pékin. Enfin, la stratégie de l’Empire du Milieu s’est avérée de plus en plus expansionniste et anti-américaine.

Après avoir eu tendance à pérenniser une mondialisation faussement libérale durant les années 1990 et 2000, la relation entre les deux grandes puissances s’est crispée et a abouti, sous la présidence de Donald Trump, à une rivalité inquiétante. Les États-Unis ont fini par payer la négligence et la naïveté de leurs dirigeants qui ont laissé filer les déficits et cru qu’ils pouvaient continuer à délocaliser en Chine, pays peu scrupuleux en matière de respect des règles de libre-échange et des droits de propriété.

Les tensions actuelles conduisent les États-Unis à opter pour une politique qui va à l’encontre de la doxa libérale. Par exemple, les mesures de rétorsion contre TikTok s’apparentent à une nationalisation rampante. C’est à peine croyable dans le temple du capitalisme. Les États-Unis sont restés passifs trop longtemps et tendent à surréagir aujourd’hui.

3) Quelle place l’Europe peut-elle occuper dans ce nouvel ordre international ?

L’Union européenne représente plus de 17 % du PIB mondial et 30 % du commercial mondial de biens et de services. Son premier client est les États-Unis et son premier fournisseur la Chine. À cette interdépendance commerciale s’ajoutent cependant des formes de dépendances problématiques. Par exemple, l’Europe et ses entreprises doivent composer avec l’extraterritorialité du droit américain et le rôle clé du dollar. Le Vieux Continent est aussi largement tributaire de la Chine en matière industrielle et technologique.

Que faire ? Je pense qu’il serait illusoire et inefficace de vouloir regagner une pseudo-souveraineté dans tous les domaines. Il faut cibler les secteurs qui méritent un regain d’investissement ou requièrent des rapatriements de capitaux. On peut imaginer un « système dual ». Là où les intérêts vitaux et régaliens sont en jeu, il faut restaurer une forme de souveraineté à l’échelle du continent. C’est le cas par exemple en matière technologique. Des coopérations renforcées et des synergies entre groupes européens devraient alors être autorisées. Dans les autres cas, c’est différent. Lorsque les chaînes de valeur sont directement ou indirectement menacées par des politiques néo-mercantilistes, comme on l’observe en Chine, des relocalisations sont à envisager mais elles doivent demeurer réalistes. Lorsque les investissements directs à l’étranger ont été essentiellement motivés par des coûts salariaux bas, les unités de production ne peuvent être relocalisées que dans d’autres États émergents. Il faut dès lors choisir des pays dont les systèmes politiques sont proches ou au moins restent compatibles avec le système de valeurs européennes. Dans ce cadre-là, l’Amérique latine et l’Inde ont une carte à jouer.

Un autre sujet primordial pour l’Europe est de s’assurer que les entreprises étrangères investissant dans l’Union ne bénéficient pas d’aide ou de subvention excessive de la part de leur État d’origine. La Commission européenne a commencé à se pencher sur cette question des distorsions de concurrence. L’objectif doit être clair : il faut réduire l’accès au marché unique aux firmes qui violent les principes de base de la concurrence. Il faut également les empêcher d’obtenir des aides communautaires, de candidater à des appels d’offres et de racheter des entreprises européennes. Pour cela, l’Europe doit exiger plus de transparence. Inévitablement, un dilemme risque de se poser entre libre circulation des capitaux et concurrence non faussée. Je pense que c’est ce second principe qui doit prévaloir. Néanmoins, la gouvernance de l’Union européenne n’est pas de nature à simplifier la résolution de ce problème. En effet, certains États membres sont depuis trop longtemps complaisants et peu regardants sur les flux financiers et les investissements entrants. La Commission et les États membres les plus déterminés devront, comme souvent, se montrer persuasifs.

Interview de Norbert Gaillard, réalisée le 1er octobre 2020.

Deterring genocides, armed conflicts and other atrocious crimes supports sustainable development says the President of the UN-backed International Criminal Court (ICC) Chile Eboe-Osuji.

By putting diplomacy in the lead, the United States can address its discord with Iran and calibrate a smart and clear-eyed policy for the Middle East.

Article publié dans The Conversation

Emmanuel Macron se rend de nouveau à Beyrouth ce lundi 31 août. Sa première visite pour témoigner de l’amitié de la France au pays du cèdre datait du jeudi 6 août, juste après l'explosion sur le port de Beyrouth, un drame de plus dans « ce pays bien-aimé », pour reprendre les mots du journaliste Jean‑Dominique Merchet.

Un drame qui fait la « une » des médias français et qui émeut, comme tous les drames traversés par le Liban. Pourquoi le Liban nous touche-t-il à ce point ?

Les liens historiques de la France avec ce pays sont connus : « Le Liban c’est la famille de la France », résume le ministre des Affaires Étrangères Jean‑Yves le Drian. « Une évidence qui s’impose, parce que c’est le Liban, parce que c’est la France », dit le président français à son arrivée.

Un intérêt français ancien

Son intérêt pour le pays n’est pas nouveau. Il l’a marqué dès sa campagne électorale par une visite en janvier 2017, puis ses équipes diplomatiques ou les nominations importantes (à la tête de la DGSE par exemple) ont compté plusieurs diplomates anciennement en poste à Beyrouth.

Mais au-delà des mots, la double impuissance occidentale et libanaise a ramené depuis longtemps les émotions à une nostalgie dépitée, plutôt que d’en faire des moteurs pour l’action. « Aidez-nous à vous aider, bon sang ! », lançait, il y a peu, le même Jean‑Yves Le Drian, résigné, à un pays plongé dans une crise multiple.

« Pauvre Liban », Pity the Nation, ouvrage de Robert Fisk, 1990. Wikimedia, CC BY

On se souvient de l’ouvrage du journaliste britannique Robert Fisk sur la guerre civile libanaise, Pity the Nation, paru en 1990. Trente ans plus tard, on n’en finit toujours pas d’avoir pitié du « pauvre Liban ». Est-il enfin possible, cette fois, d’aller plus loin ?

L’émotion est vive aujourd’hui, encore faut-il en décrypter les ressorts : le Liban émeut pour des raisons romantiques sans doute nobles, mais il conviendrait d’être capable de traduire cette émotion politiquement et avec efficacité, ce qui jusqu’à présent n’a pas été le cas.

Que peut faire la France désormais, face aux grands « prédateurs » internationaux qui ne manqueront pas de suivre le « martyr » de Beyrouth avec intérêt ? Quels espoirs reste-t-il de promouvoir une certaine idée du Liban, et laquelle exactement ?

La violence du Liban

Les événements libanais remontent immédiatement au plus haut niveau des médias et de la décision politique en France. « On peut réveiller un président de la République en pleine nuit pour le Liban », nous confiait un diplomate français dans une discussion antérieure à l’explosion de Beyrouth. Il y a des raisons géopolitiques à cela.

La France connaît la violence du Liban : elle en a elle-même payé le prix avec l’assassinat de son ambassadeur Louis Delamare en 1981, l’attentat contre le quartier général des troupes françaises en 1983, ou plusieurs prises d’otages (dont le chercheur Michel Seurat ne revint jamais).

Un laboratoire permanent des rapports de force régionaux

Le pays reste par ailleurs un laboratoire permanent des rapports de force régionaux, comme l’a montré Bernard Rougier dans ses travaux (Le jihad au quotidien, 2004 ; L’oumma en fragments. Contrôler le sunnisme au Liban, 2011).

A l’inverse d’autres puissances qui voient le Liban comme un paramètre de l’enjeu syrien, Paris a tendance à voir la Syrie comme un paramètre (omniprésent) de l’enjeu libanais.

Au-delà de ce Liban qui compte régulièrement de nombreux ministres avec la double nationalité franco-libanaise, il y a la Méditerranée et le monde arabe, ce double voisinage stratégique crucial.

Il y a aussi les raisons affectives mais rationnelles. Si les Libanais restent proches de la France, cela signifie aussi que la France garde, grâce à eux, un peu d’influence ou au moins de visibilité en Méditerranée orientale.

Une influence française au Proche-Orient

Le Liban renvoie également à la question des chrétiens d’Orient, qui préoccupe Paris. D’autres puissances régionales ou partis libanais comme le Hezbollah n’ont pas manqué d’accuser la France et sa vision d’un Liban uniquement chrétien.

L’argument ne tient pas : on n’a jamais autant critiqué l’amitié franco-libanaise que lorsqu’elle était incarnée par Jacques Chirac et Rafic Hariri,lequel était… sunnite.

Le président Jacques Chirac en conversation avec le Premier Ministre libanais Rafic Hariri au palais de l’Elysée à Paris, le 28 septembre 1996. Pierre Verdy/AFP

En revanche, cette question est perçue comme légitime à Paris, non pas au nom du communautarisme mais à l’inverse, de l’universalisme : la France, estime-t-on, n’a pas à se cacher de défendre les minorités opprimées. Elle défend donc les chrétiens d’Orient aujourd’hui maltraités, comme elle a défendu les Kosovars musulmans à la fin des années 1990, ou les Rohingyas plus tard.

Le pouvoir de l’émotion
Lire la suite dans The Conversation

Nearly 140 asylum seekers were relocated from Greece to Germany on Wednesday through a European Commission-funded initiative that has relocated more than 1,000 people so far this year alone, three UN agencies have reported. 

The UN Secretary-General on Wednesday called for all nations to provide further urgently needed funds – the equivalent of the total spent on cigarettes worldwide every two weeks – on behalf of global COVID-19 vaccine efforts to ensure that everyone, everywhere, gets protection from the virus. 

Amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, the world is reckoning with the disproportionate and severe impact that the virus has wrought on the “health…rights and well being” of older persons, the UN chief has said, marking the international day highlighting their issues.

Contre l'avis des organisations de salariés et d'employeurs, le président de la République s'entête à vouloir réformer le système de retraite. Sous prétexte d'uniformisation, le modèle proposé, entérinant un recul du départ à taux plein, risque de conduire à un appauvrissement pour une majorité. / (...) / Retraites, Protection sociale, France, Solidarité, Société, Inégalités - 2020/10

Delegations from Libya’s warring sides meeting in Egypt have concluded two days of security and military talks in efforts towards a lasting ceasefire, the UN political mission for the country, UNSMIL, has reported.