Michael Peck
F-35, Europe
The country's new £10 million hypersonics program will thrust Britain into the hypersonic race that is currently dominated by the U.S., Russia and China.Here's What You Need to Know: There is more to developing a hypersonic aircraft than sticking a new engine in an old airframe.
Can an F-35 be turned into a hypersonic aircraft?
News last month that Britain is boosting its hypersonic weapons program didn’t come as a surprise. Many other nations are doing it.
What caught everyone’s attention was that there are plans to rework the jet engines on the 1990s Eurofighter Typhoon—which propel the aircraft to Mach 2—into hypersonic engines that could achieve Mach 5 or faster.
Which naturally led to a question: can existing fourth- and fifth-generation fighters—which operate at speeds of around Mach 2 or less—become Mach 5 speed demons?
The technology in question is the Sabre engine from British firm Reaction Engines. Sabre aims to combine the advantages of both conventional jet engines with rocket engines. Ground tests have shown that demonstrated that the engine is capable of flying faster than Mach 3, according to Defense News.
“SABRE’s unique feature is a precooler which reduces the temperature of the incoming compressed air,” explains British defense site Forces.com. “This means the engine does not need to cope with extreme temperatures which requires special materials.”
“At high altitudes, it is a rocket, but, at lower altitudes, it works like a jet engine - sucking in and compressing air.”
One option that the RAF is considering for development of hypersonic engines is to add pre-cooler technology to the EJ-200 gas turbine engine that currently powers the Typhoon.
Alas, that isn’t the same as sticking a hypersonic engine on an older fighter.
“You shouldn’t read into that we are somehow going to achieve a hypersonic Typhoon,” said Air Chief Marshal Stephen Hillier.
There is more to developing a hypersonic aircraft than sticking a new engine in an old airframe. To turn a fourth- or fifth-generation aircraft, such as the F-16 or F-35, would invoke a variety of airframe, aerodynamic and avionics issues.
Instead, Britain’s new £10 million ($12.2 million) hypersonics program will be used to thrust Britain into the hypersonic race that is currently dominated by the U.S., Russia and China. For example, hypersonic research is expected to bear fruit in engine development for the Tempest, Britain’s planned sixth-generation fighter.
With 80 percent of Western fighters expected to be fourth-generation for the foreseeable future, hypersonic missiles are a way to keep older jets relevant. “We are working with some other people to see whether we can generate a Mach 5 capability in four years,” said Air Vice Marshal Simon Rochelle, chief of air staff capability. “There will be others pursuing higher and fast speeds … but much beyond that speed you start to change the chemical properties, the physical properties and metallic properties within the actual weapon system.”
“Part of the reason for rapidly developing high-speed weapons was to enable those aircraft to maintain their edge," Rochelle said. “There is a challenge and competition now going on at range, at speed, at pace and we have to mobilize ourselves to be ready to take that on.”
In other words, hypersonic engines won’t turn a Typhoon, F-15 or F-22 into a Mach 5 jet. Instead, hypersonic missiles will do the work. It’s the same approach that allows sixty-year-old B-52s to remain formidable weapons, by arming them with smart bombs. The platform remains the same, but the payload is updated as technology advances.
Michael Peck is a contributing writer for the National Interest. He can be found on Twitter and Facebook.
This article first appeared in 2019.
Image: Reuters
Sebastien Roblin
Security,
If the Cold War went hot, F-84s would have brought nuclear war to European skies.Here's What You Need to Remember: Thunderjets stationed in Europe, meanwhile, became the first single-engine aircraft modified to deliver a nuclear weapon—the 1,680-pound Mark 7 nuclear bomber with an adjustable yield as high as 61 kilotons. To avoid getting caught in the apocalyptic blast, the Thunderjet employed a Low Altitude Bombing System to semi-accurately “toss” their nuclear payload while climbing, then bank sharply to the side as the deadly warhead arced away.
In 1944, Alexander Kartveli, designer of the legendary Republic P-47 Thunderbolt fighter, began working on a jet-powered successor. Kartveli’s tubby-looking “Jug” proved a tough, hard-hitting ground attack plane and a fast, far-flying escort fighter in World War II. Unable to cram a turbojet in the Thunderbolt airframe, the Georgian engineer drafted a clean-sheet design dubbed the XP-84 Thunderjet with a J-35 turbojet spanning the fuselage from the intake in the nose to the tailpipe, with fuel stored in wingtip tanks.
Though a prototype briefly set a national speed record in 1946, early model Thunderjets (re-designated F-84s) required excessive maintenance and proved unstable due to weak wing spars for the thick wings and shaky wingtip fuel tanks. The Pentagon nearly canceled the jet prematurely when Republic finally introduced the F-84D model addressing the most glaring flaws by introducing sturdier wing spars, revised fuel tanks, a functioning ejection seat and a more powerful J-35A-17 engine.
Like the P-47, the Thunderjet was a “heavy”-feeling plane with high takeoff and landing speeds. It required longer mile-long runways and was less maneuverable than the Air Force’s earlier F-80 Shooting Star jet fighter. However, the F-84 was faster at 610 miles per hour, had a greater range of 800 miles, and was a hard-hitting and stable gun platform: in addition to its six extra-fast-firing M3 .50 caliber, it could lug thirty-two five-inch high-velocity rockets or two tons of bombs. Once the early models’ flaws were corrected, the Thunderjet also proved highly maintainable, its guts designed for easy access to mechanics.
However, Karteveli’s design used traditional straight rather than swept wings, which delay the formation of shockwaves when approaching supersonic speeds. This left the Thunderjet slower and less agile than the near-contemporary swept-wing F-86 Sabre and the Soviet MiG-15, which could attain speeds of around 680 miles per hour
Six months into the Korean War in December 1950, F-84Es of the 27th Fighter Escort Wing were dispatched to Taegu Air Base in South Korea to escort four-engine B-29 strategic bombers on raids targeting the Chinese border with North Korea. The F-84E model was lengthened fifteen inches to carry additional fuel and incorporated a radar-assisted gunsight
Thunderjets first encountered MiGs on January 21, 1952, when eight F-84s raiding Chongchan bridge were bounced by two flights of MiG-15s which shot an F-84 down. A MiG was claimed in return, but Soviet records reveal no corresponding losses. Two days later, F-84s and B-29s launched a massive raid targeting the airfield at Pyongyang. The MiGs, which excelled at high altitudes, were forced to dogfight strafing Thunderjets on the deck; three Communist jets were shot down and two more crippled.
However, thereafter the faster MiG-15s mostly engaged F-84s at high altitudes while escorting B-29s, repeatedly breaking through screens of up to fifty to 100 Thunderjets to ravage the B-29s they were escorting.
Henceforth, the UN forces in Korea switched heavy bombers to less-accurate night raids. F-86s focused on the MiG threat, while F-84s were relegated to ground attack missions, their tremendous firepower unleashed to strike frontline troops, blast rear-area depots, artillery batteries and convoys, cover helicopter search-and-rescue operations, and bombard key infrastructure targets. Over the course of the war, Thunderjets flew 86,000 missions and dropped 61,000 tons of bombs and napalm canisters—by one tally, accounting for 60 percent of ground targets destroyed by the U.S. Air Force during the war. The F-84’s robustness proved an asset, allowing it to survive punishing hits from heavy communist flak.
In June 1952, eighty-four Thunderjets obliterated 90 percent of the Sui-ho Dam complex, knocking out electricity throughout all of North Korea for two weeks. However, the raid, intended to pressure North Korean peace negotiators, backfired—inspiring anti-war opposition in the British parliament while conversely causing hawks in the U.S. to complain that the raid should have taken place sooner.
Nonetheless, in 1953, F-84s were hammering dams at Toksan and Chasan—causing huge floods that swamped bridges, railway lines and roads, and badly damaged crops. By then, the final F-84G model had arrived in theater, bringing with it an uprated J-35 engine and revolutionary new in-flight refueling capability. F-84s could connect their wingtip tanks to a probe trailed by a KB-29 tanker, allowing them to fly missions over Korea from bases in Japan.
Of 335 F-84Ds, Es and Gs lost to all causes during the Korean War, at least 135 were destroyed by flak. U.S. records claim a further 18 were shot down by MiGs, while Soviet and Chinese fliers claimed 65. A side-by-side comparison of loss records (broken down here) suggests a number closer to twenty-five F-84s lost in aerial combat (including a “maneuver kill,” two crashes due to battle-damage and one incident of mutual mid-air collision) in exchange for seven to eight MiGs.
But F-84s and MiG-15s continued to battle on other fronts of the Cold War. On March 10, 1953, a MiG-15 encountered a two-ship F-84 patrol apparently straying into Czech airspace near Merklin. Czech pilot Jaroslav Šrámek told an interviewer:
They banked sharply and flew off at full throttle. But because the MIG 15s were better the F-84s we were able to turn easily and manoeuvre into a position where I could fire a warning shot. The warning shot hit his backup tank on the right-hand side. Fuel started escaping from it. He tried to escape to the south. In view of the fact that I was higher than him I was able to catch him easily and my second round disabled him. After firing the shot I saw flames coming from his craft so I stopped and headed home."
Pilot Warren Brown ejected, and his crashed jet was found ten miles into the German side of the border.
The Republic of China Air Force received 246 F-84Gs which clashed repeatedly with their communist counterparts over the Taiwan Strait. In a series four 4-on-4 engagements in 1955 and 1956, ROCAF Thunderjets claimed five MiG-15 for no loss, though two Thunderjets were shot down in smaller-scale dogfights, and a third was lost to flak. However, on July 29, 1958, newer, ultra-maneuverable MiG-17s bounced four F-84s and shot down two over Nan’ao island, helping trigger the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis.
Of three-thousand F-84Gs built, Washington transferred over 200 each to Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Norway and even Communist Yugoslavia as part of the MDAP military assistance program. Particularly prolific operators included France (335) and Turkey (489), while Iran, the Netherlands and Thailand received smaller numbers.
F-84Gs became the first fighter operated by the Air Force’s Thunderbirds aerobatics in 1953. Thunderjets stationed in Europe, meanwhile, became the first single-engine aircraft modified to deliver a nuclear weapon—the 1,680-pound Mark 7 nuclear bomber with an adjustable yield as high as 61 kilotons. To avoid getting caught in the apocalyptic blast, the Thunderjet employed a Low Altitude Bombing System to semi-accurately “toss” their nuclear payload while climbing, then bank sharply to the side as the deadly warhead arced away.
The sturdy and steady F-84 also served as a platform to test new concepts—most importantly pioneering aerial refueling of jet fighters. But some of the ideas didn’t exactly pan out. An attempt to modify the F-84 to be towed behinds the B-29s it was meant to escort (and this extend range by saving fuel) ended in a deadly collision. F-84s were also tested with rocket-boosters so that they could perform “zero-length” takeoffs from truck trailers should a nuclear war destroy all the airfields.
By 1954, the superior swept-wing F-84F Thunderstreak model entered service, largely replacing the Thunderjet and also spawning the RF-84F Thunderflash photo-reconnaissance model, with intakes in the wing roots instead of the nose. Powered by a more powerful but finicky J65 turbojet, the Thunderstreak could attain speeds just shy of 700 miles per hour.
By the late 1950s, the Air Force began retiring all models of the F-84 in favor of the supersonic F-100 Super Sabre and F-105 Thunderchief, though F-84s served in Air National Guard units until 1970 and Portuguese Thunderjets saw action in a colonial war in Angola until 1974. The last Thunderflash was finally retired by the Greek Air Force in 1991—a long career for a tough jet that had seemed outdated nearly as soon as it entered service.
Sébastien Roblin holds a master’s degree in conflict resolution from Georgetown University and served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China. He has also worked in education, editing, and refugee resettlement in France and the United States. He currently writes on security and military history for War Is Boring. This article first appeared in 2019.
Image: Wikipedia.
Michael Rubin
North Korea,
There is no magic formula to success on North Korea, but certain strategies are guaranteed to fail. Relying on Beijing’s good offices both encourage China to play a double game.Speaking at a press conference last week during his and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s visit to South Korea, Secretary of State Antony Blinken urged renewed diplomacy and highlighted the role he hoped China could play. “China has a critical role to play in working to convince North Korea to pursue denuclearization. China has a unique relationship with North Korea. Virtually all of North Korea’s economic relationships, its trade go – are with or go through China, so it has tremendous influence. And I think it has a shared interest in making sure that we do something about North Korea’s nuclear program and about the increasingly dangerous ballistic missile program,” Blinken said, adding, “I would hope that whatever happens going forward, China will use that influence effectively to work on moving North Korea to denuclearization.”
In theory, Blinken’s comments make sense. In reality, they are naïve. Simply put, Blinken sees the here and now, but appears ignorant of those who came before him and also sought to work through Beijing in order to compel North Korea’s denuclearization. It is history I explored in Dancing with the Devil, a study of past diplomacy with rogue regimes.
The story begins on October 8, 1983, when Chinese diplomats passed the American embassy in Beijing a North Korean message expressing Pyongyang’s willingness to participate in tripartite talks. Amidst Reagan’s military build-up in South Korea, the North Korean leadership had decided to put aside its objection to South Korean participation that had been the basis for its rejection of President Jimmy Carter’s offer to mediate talks.
Optimism about North Korean sincerity was short-lived, as the next day North Korean agents sought to assassinate President Chun Doo Hwan and much of his cabinet during a visit to Burma. After the bombing, Reagan’s attitude toward North Korea diplomacy cooled. In January 1984, however, Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang passed a North Korean message to Reagan again endorsing three-way talks between the Koreas and the United States. The offer was a transparent effort by Pyongyang and Beijing to enable North Korea to escape consequences for its actions, and successful. Diplomats seek talks and are willing to put the past behind in order to avoid making history an impediment. Once again, however, North Korea was insincere. In November 1987, two North Korean agents bombed Korean Air flight 858 en route from Baghdad to Seoul, killing 115. Pyongyang’s goal was to undermine the legitimacy Seoul would receive by hosting the Olympics.
After the Olympics ended, South Korean President Roh Tae Woo announced that Seoul would end its policy of trying to isolate the north. The White House embraced the ideas and the State Department called it “a major—indeed historic—reversal of traditional” South Korean policy. For diplomats, a fresh approach could not come quickly enough. In 1980, a spy satellite spotted construction of a nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, about 60 miles north of Pyongyang. Four years later, satellites detected craters suggesting North Korea was experimenting with detonators used in nuclear bombs.
Whereas Reagan had kept concerns about Yongbyon secret to keep surprise attack an option, his former vice president and successor George H.W. Bush put diplomacy front and center. Secretary of State James Baker explained, “Our diplomatic strategy was designed to build international pressure against North Korea to force them to live up to their agreements.” Diplomacy continued throughout the elder Bush’s term. On December 18, 1991, South Korean leader Roh Tae-woo announced that U.S. forces had completed removing its tactical nuclear arsenal from South Korea. Just over a week later, North Korea agreed to sign the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treary safeguards agreement and permit inspections of Yongbyon. Over the next several weeks, North and South Korean officials signed a North-South Denuclearization Declaration in which the two Koreas foreswore plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment, and agreed not to test, manufacture, produce, possess, deploy, or use nuclear weapons. Both sides also agreed to inspections by a joint commission. Initially, it looked like Bush had found the magic formula. Baker chalked Pyongyang’s acquiescence to patient diplomacy. “American diplomacy [was] directly responsible for an end to six years of intransigence by the North,” he wrote in his memoirs.
But, while Baker congratulated himself, both Pyongyang and their benefactors in Beijing recognized Baker was desperate and concluded they could get more out of the Americans by keeping conflict alive rather and extracting more concessions. PAs North Korea defied the Denuclearization Deal, President Bill Clinton sought to leverage Beijing’s influence on Pyongyang. The problem here, however, was that Beijing was not altruistic; its cooperation came at a price. That price was to dilute demands on North Korea by watering down Security Council’s condemnation to the point of irrelevancy. China also deep-sixed Security Council action after North Korea announced that it would remove irradiated fuel rods from Yongbyon, a process that would both eliminate evidence about Pyongyang’s intentions and enable North Korea to separate plutonium.
And, as the 1994 Agreed Framework began to come apart at the seams, China’s rulers recognized they could milk the United States in exchange for the theater of keeping North Korea under control. The George W. Bush administration sought to trade “actions for actions” as it gave Pyongyang greater food aid in exchange for keeping its reactor offline. When critics such as John Bolton suggested that rewarding North Korea for defiance would incentivize bad behavior, the National Security Council argued that its dealings were different since China was now onboard. Even if China were more compliant, however, such willingness to play diplomatic ball came at a huge cost. In the waning weeks of his administration, Clinton had waived missile-proliferation sanctions on China in exchange for a Chinese promise not to proliferate technology. Chinese companies then proceeded to sell sensitive technology to Iran.
At the heart of successive State Department’s self-delusions about China was a misreading of Chinese interests: South Korean intellectuals repeatedly warned Foggy Bottom that China’s obsession with North Korean stability and Beijing’s desire to use North Korea as a buffer conflicted with both U.S. (and South Korean) interests.
Back to Blinken: The proposal to work through China to constrain and control North Korea might have made sense had successive administrations not repeatedly tried it and each time, dating back to Reagan four decades ago, failed. History did not begin with Biden’s inauguration. The United States never has a tabula rasa. There is no magic formula to success on North Korea, but certain strategies are guaranteed to fail. Relying on Beijing’s good offices both encourage China to play a double game, encouraging the occasional crisis to reap its own rewards, and enables Beijing to use the North Korea issue to drive a wedge between Washington and its chief regional allies: South Korea and Japan.
Michael Rubin is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, where he specializes in Iran, Turkey, and the broader Middle East. He also regularly teaches classes at sea about Middle East conflicts, culture, terrorism, and the Horn of Africa to deployed US Navy and Marine units.
Paul Richard Huard
World War II Weapons,
The final verdict on the T-34 perhaps is less glowing than the legend that the Soviets weaved around the tank, but the T-34 tipped the balance in favor of the USSR when it came to armored battle and that's what matters.Here's What You Need to Remember: Iconic Russian tank wasn’t revolutionary, but it could blow Panzers to Hell.
The T-34 in the hands of determined Soviet tankers routed the Germans at Kursk, the greatest tank battle of all time.
The T-34 was “undeniably revolutionary, but it was not the first in anything except how to combine thick sloped armor with a diesel engine, wide tracks and a big, relatively powerful gun,” Belcourt said. “They had all been done before, but never together.”
On June 22, 1941, Nazi Germany launched Operation Barbarossa, a massive attack on the Soviet Union that was the largest invasion in history.
More than three million German soldiers, 150 divisions and 3,000 tanks comprised three mammoth army groups that created a front more than 1,800 miles long.
The Germans expected to face an inferior enemy—the Slavs whom Adolph Hitler called untermenschen. Giddy from victories in Poland and France, Hitler and many in his military high command believed it was the destiny of Germany to invade Russia. “The end of the Jewish domination in Russia will also be the end of Russia as a state,” Hitler announced in his manifesto Mein Kampf.
For months Germans won victory after resounding victory. But then the attack stalled—and the appearance of a new Soviet tank stunned the Wehrmacht.
It was the T-34. The new armored vehicle had an excellent 76-millimeter gun and thick sloped armor and cruised at more than 35 miles per hour. It possessed many advanced design features for the time—and it could blow German Panzers to Hell.
The T-34 had its problems—something we often forgotten when discussing a tank with a legendary reputation. The shortfalls included bad visibility for the crew and shoddy Soviet workmanship.
“They were good, but they were not miracle weapons and they had their faults,” writes Philip Kaplan in Rolling Thunder: A Century of Tank Warfare. “But the T-34, for all its faults, is now often referred to by tank experts and historians as possibly the best tank of the war.”
World War II German Field Marshall Ewald Von Kleist was more succinct. “The finest tank in the world,” is how he described the T-34.
The origins of the T-34 are simple enough. The Red Army sought a replacement for the BT-7 cavalry tank, which was fast-moving and lightly armored for use in maneuver warfare. It also had Christie suspension, one reason for the tank’s increased speed.
But during a 1938-to-1939 border war with Japan, the BT-7 fared poorly. Even with a low-powered gun, Japanese Type 95 tanks easily destroyed the BT-7s. Tank attack crews also assaulted the BT-7s with Molotov cocktails, reducing the Soviet tank to a flaming wreck when ignited gasoline dripped through chinks between poorly welded armor into the tank’s engine compartment.
The T-34 was the solution. It kept the Christie suspension, replaced the gasoline engine with a V-2 34 V12 diesel power plant and offered the crew speeds that were 10 miles per hour faster than the German Panzer III or Panzer IV.
Furthermore, the T-34’s high-velocity gun was capable of killing any tank in the world at the time.
“In 1941 when Hitler launched Barbarossa, the tank was indisputably the best in the world,” Jason Belcourt, a veteran of the U.S. Army who served in the armor branch, told War Is Boring. “The combination of sloped armor, big gun, good speed and good maneuverability was so much better than anything the Germans had on tracks.”
By mid-1941, the USSR had more than 22,000 tanks—more tanks than all the armies of the world combined, and four times the number of tanks in the German arsenal.
By the end of the war, the Soviet Union had produced nearly 60,000 T-34 tanks—proving the point that quantity does have a quality all of its own.
At first, the Germans were at a loss when it came to countering the threat the T-34 posed. The Germans’ standard anti-tank guns, the 37-millimeter Kwk36 and the 50-millimeter Kwk 38, couldn’t put a dent in the Soviet tank with a shot to its front.
That left the Germans with a limited set of tactics. German tankers could attempt flank shots with their guns. The Wehrmacht could lay mines. Soldiers risked their lives in close assaults employing satchel charges and Molotov cocktails.
In what could be called an act of desperation, the Germans even used modified 88-millimeter anti-aircraft guns to stop attacking T-34s with direct fire.
But the Russians never had enough trained crews for the tanks the Red Army fielded. The Soviets wasted the T-34 and its crews in vast numbers.
By the time the Soviets trained enough crews to man the T-34s, the Germans had tanks with high-velocity guns and better anti-tank weapons like the Panzerfaust, a recoilless anti-tank weapon with a high-explosive warhead.
But the Russians always had more T-34s than the Germans had Panzers or Tigers.
“Where the tank was decisive was in the battle of production,” Belcourt said. “From June 1941 until the end of the war, the Soviets were always producing a tank that was often good and never worse than adequate.”
The final verdict on the T-34 perhaps is less glowing than the legend that the Soviets weaved around the tank—but is still complimentary. The T-34 tipped the balance in favor of the USSR when it came to armored battle; mass production of the tank outmatched anything the Germans could do when it came to manufacturing.
The T-34 in the hands of determined Soviet tankers routed the Germans at Kursk, the greatest tank battle of all time.
The T-34 was “undeniably revolutionary, but it was not the first in anything except how to combine thick sloped armor with a diesel engine, wide tracks and a big, relatively powerful gun,” Belcourt said. “They had all been done before, but never together.”
This first appeared in WarIsBoring here.
Image Credit: Creative Commons.
Sebastien Roblin
Military History, Pacific
America knows how to build really good, long-lasting warships. The USS Midway is a case in point.Here's What You Need To Remember: The Midways arrived just as the Navy was exploring how to adapt to the dawning jet- and nuclear-age, and served faithfully throughout the Cold War era.
On March 20, 1945 the shipyard in Newport News, Virginia launched what would remain for a decade the largest warship on the planet. Named USS Midway after the decisive World War II carrier battle, she would be commissioned September 8 just a few weeks after the Japanese surrender.
Few of the over four-thousand-man complement departing on Midway’s first patrol could have imagined that same ship—admittedly, in drastically modified form—would be sailing into combat forty-six years later, her deck laden with supersonic jet fighters.
Midway was joined a month later by New York-built sistership USS Franklin D. Roosevelt (or ‘Rosey’), the first U.S. carrier to be named after a former U.S. president. The last ship of the class, USS Coral Sea, was launched in 1947.
The Midway-class was meant to be a "beefier battle carrier" compared to the twenty-four Essex-class carriers that entered service in the latter half of World War II. Naval engineers particularly sought to introduce an armored flight deck. British carriers with armored decks proved more resilient and quicker to recover from dive bombing and kamikaze attacks that crippled U.S. flattops. But armored flight decks were also considerably heavier, limiting deck size and number of aircraft carried.
The American engineers went big to get both deck armor and more planes. The Midway measured longer than three football fields and could carry an unprecedented 130 aircraft: four squadrons of gull-winged Corsair fighters and three of Helldiver bombers. Three-and-a-half inches of armor plating protected her flight deck, while eighteen five-inch 52-caliber guns were mounted to blast attacking aircraft from afar. Sixty-eight rapid-firing 40-millimeter and 20-millimeter cannons provided close protection.
The ships could attain 33 knots powered by twelve boilers turning four Westinghouse steam turbines, but consumed 100,000 gallons of fuel daily, necessitating refueling every three days.
Indeed, the Midway-class’s sheer size caused numerous problems. 130 aircraft proved too many to effectively coordinate, so their air wings were downsized back to 100. Their huge crews made life onboard especially crowded. And the carrier’ great weight left them riding low in the water, causing excessive seawater to slosh on deck and flood gunwells. The unwieldy vessels tended to plow through waves rather than riding above them—once resulting in one of Midway’s aircraft elevators being torn off during a storm.
The Midways arrived just as the Navy was exploring how to adapt to the dawning jet- and nuclear-age. In 1946, an XFD-1 Phantom jet landed on the Roosevelt’s deck, the first ever planned jet-powered landing on a carrier. A year later, the Midway test-launched a Nazi V-2 ballistic missile off her deck, the first such large rocket fired from a moving ship. Then in 1949, a P2V Privateer patrol plane carrying a 5-ton bomb load took off from the deck of Coral Sea boosted by JATO rocket packs—proving that a nuclear-capable aircraft could be based on a carrier. The following year, the Roosevelt became the first carrier to carry nuclear weapons.
Landing fast and heavy jets remained a major challenge, as demonstrated in a famous 1951 recording of an F9F Panther on the Midway striking the ramp while landing, slicing the front of the fuselage from the plane and sending it rolling down the deck. Amazingly, pilot George Chamberlain survived.
Safer, sustainable jet operations required a larger flight deck. In the mid-1950s, the Midways underwent SC-110 refits replacing their “strait” decks with a longer “angled” configuration incorporating additional steam catapults, increasing deck size and displacement considerably. The formerly open hangar deck below was enclosed, and new radars, a “mirror” landing system, and strengthened elevators to lift heavier aircraft were installed.
The class missed action over Korea, though Midway did assist in evacuating thousands of Chinese Nationalists in the wake of the Battle of Yijiangshan island. The three Midway-class carriers finally saw combat in Vietnam, by which time two-seat F-4B Phantom II fighters capable of flying twice the speed of sound were catapulting off their flight decks.
On June 17, 1965, two Phantoms from VF-21 detected bogeys” on radar, in an engagement described in Peter Davie’s U.S. Navy Phantom Units of the Vietnam War.
The Phantoms carried radar-guided AIM-7D Sparrow missiles which had a long minimum range—but were required to visually identify enemies before firing! Pilots Louis Page and David Batson used a tactic in which one Phantom charged towards the incoming jets, causing them to pull away and reveal their profile—four MiG-17s, slower but highly maneuverable Soviet-built jets. Batson and Page’s Sparrow missiles each splashed a MiG. A third was destroyed after its engines sucked in debris from its wingmates.
A year later on June 20, 1966, four Midway-based A-1H Skyraiders, old-fashioned piston-engine ground attack planes, was on a search-and-rescue mission when they were warned of two approaching MiG-17s. The Skyraiders flew in circles hugging the side of a mountain for cover. The MiGs swooped down spitting cannon shells at the lead Skyraider—but the two A-1s behind him pulled up and raked the jets with 20-millimeter cannons, shooting one down in one of the unlikelier kills of the conflict.
The Coral Sea, which was officially adopted by the city of San Francisco, also saw extensive action over Vietnam, though not all of her crew were happy about it. Some famously circulated a petition opposing the war, and three hundred participated in a peace march.
The two carriers remained involved to the very end, however. In 1972, aircraft from Midway and Coral Sea mined Haiphong harbor and blasted a North Vietnamese land offensive—measures which ostensibly pressured Hanoi into the ceasefire at the Paris peace conferences. Then on January 12, 1973, an F-4J based on the Midway shot down another MiG-17 in the last air-to-air kill of the Vietnam War.
That same year, the Coral Sea ferried Phantom jet fighters to Israel during the Yom Kippur war and Midway became the first U.S. carrier to have its home port deployed overseas to Japan, reducing operating costs and keeping sailors’ families closer.
The carriers were involved in additional adventures. When the government of South Vietnam fell in 1975, helicopters from the Midway and Coral Sea rescued over 3,000 Vietnamese fleeing northern troops. Famously, Vietnamese Major Buang flew to the Midway in a dinky O-1 observation plane with his wife and five children crowded inside, and dropped a message indicating he wanted to land. As the O-1 circled overhead, Captain Larry Chamber tossed helicopters overboard to make room and turned the ship into the wind. Finally, Buang landed the overloaded Cessna to the applause of the crew (see a recording here).
Coral Sea subsequently dispatched A-7 and F-4N jets to attack Khmer Rouge forces and recovered helicopters carrying U.S. Marines during the disastrous Mayaguez hostage-rescue operation.
By then, the Midways were growing long in the tooth, lacking the deck space for new F-14 Tomcat interceptors and S-3 Viking anti-submarine jets. This led to the decommissioning of the Roosevelt in 1977. On her final cruise, she experimentally carried the Marine Harrier jump jets of VMA-231.
Meanwhile, the Midway’s decks were further expanded until they resembled a weird jigsaw puzzle piece, though the Coral Sea retained a “straighter” configuration. Their carriers gun batteries were replaced with Sea Sparrow missile launchers and automated Phalanx close-in-weapon systems.
The Reagan administration’s military buildup kept the aging carriers on duty through 1980s, flying older F-4S Phantoms and A-7 Corsairs. However, they also received brand-new FA-18 Hornet multi-role jets with modern avionics that could land on shorter flight decks.
FA-18s from the Coral Sea repeatedly intercepted Libyan MiGs over the Mediterranean. Finally in 1986, they flew the Hornet’s first combat mission, using a HARM radar-homing missile to destroy an S-200 surface-to-air missile battery in Sirte, Libya, in retaliation for a terrorist attack in Berlin. The Midway, meanwhile received new hull blisters designed to stabilize her.
The Coral Sea, nicknamed “Ageless Warrior,” was finally retired in 1990 and scrapped in Baltimore. But the Midway, despite an unsuccessful hull-blister upgrade that actually worsened the “Rock’n Roll” carrier’s long-running instability and a deadly explosive accident in 1990, still had one more war left in in her. Deployed in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, she launched 3,339 combat sorties. Her A-6E Intruder jets were amongst the first to hit Iraqi targets in the conflict, and her helicopters even liberated a Kuwaiti island.
Finally, on April 11, 1992—forty-seven years after she had been launched—the Midway was decommissioned. Today she serves as a museum ship in San Diego.
As the Midway-class carriers expanded in size they never entirely shed their early design flaws. Yet they repeatedly adapted to new technological paradigms and rendered history-making service for nearly a half-century—a record any ship designer would envy.
Sébastien Roblin holds a master’s degree in conflict resolution from Georgetown University and served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China. He has also worked in education, editing, and refugee resettlement in France and the United States. He currently writes on security and military history for War Is Boring.
This first appeared in April 2019 and is bring reprinted due to reader interest.
Peter Suciu
F-15EX,
The first of the United States Air Force's Boeing F-15EX fighters arrived at Eglin Air Force Base (AFB), Florida earlier this month. Touted by the defense contractor to be a cost-effective aircraft for the service, the F-15EX is set to undergo combined developmental and operational tests.The first of the United States Air Force's Boeing F-15EX fighters arrived at Eglin Air Force Base (AFB), Florida earlier this month. Touted by the defense contractor to be a cost-effective aircraft for the service, the F-15EX is set to undergo combined developmental and operational tests.
As part of the National Defense Strategy, the Air Force is required to purchase seventy-two combat aircraft per year, and the upgraded F-15EX has been seen as the best way to meet those goals. Last year, the Air Force awarded Boeing a $1.2 billion production contract to build and deliver eight F-15EX aircraft, with two arriving this year followed by an additional six in 2023. All will be deployed to Elgin AFB.
The Air Force could eventually receive a total of 144 F-15EX aircraft.
"It's a special day for the base and our mission," said Brig. Gen. Scott Cain, 96th Test Wing commander. "We’re very proud to be part of the next evolution of this historic aircraft. I look forward to seeing this unique test collaboration prepare the F-15EX for the warfighter."
The newly arrived aircraft bears its unit insignia EX1 marked with "ET" from the 96th TW’s, 40th Flight Test Squadron. The next aircraft, EX2, which is scheduled to arrive next month, will display the "OT" tail flash to represent the 53rd Wing’s 85th Test and Evaluation Squadron.
The aim of integrated testing, which will begin in the coming weeks, will be to ensure the EX is delivered to a potential warfighter as soon as possible, while further ensuring the aircraft meets its test objectives. Eglin AFB's testers will allow the teams to identify any system issues early on, so they can be addressed before the F-15EX's increased production and delivery to the squadrons.
The Operational Flight Program Combined Test Force, or OFP CTF, at Eglin AFB will manage test planning and oversee all the groundwork for the EX's test program, the Air Force announced.
“Combining these test capabilities on day one of flight test helps ensure F-15EX is ready to execute on air tasking order day one. We’re confident that along with our OFP CTF partners running test management, we will provide that capability faster to the warfighter than ever before,” said Lt. Col. Richard Turner, 40th FLTS commander, who flew the new EX to Eglin AFB.
The two-seat fighter with U.S.-only capabilities was developed as a next-generation variant of the combat-tested, 1980s-era F-15 fighter. It is still a fourth-generation aircraft, but its developers have highlighted the fact that the plane's new adapted technologies and upgradeability make it a viable, lethal, high-threat environment-capable attack platform. The F-15 has already subsequently evolved to encompass more roles, most notably with the deployment of the F-15E Strike Eagle in 1989, when it saw the addition of substantial air-to-ground capability, including a second cockpit for a weapons systems operator.
Additionally, the new F-15EXs are likely to remain flying for decades to come, while the Air Force has estimated F-15EX fighter shares about 70 percent of parts with the current F-15Cs and F-15Es that they will be replacing. Not only are the original production lines in St. Louis still in place, but the training facilities, maintenance depots, and other infrastructure can also be be readily shifted to F-15EX support.
Boeing also noted, "F-15EX requires no new logistics chains, training squadrons, infrastructure modification, program officers or even weapons integration. Units converting to F-15EX can transition within weeks or months, not years, or receiving new aircraft."
Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He regularly writes about military small arms, and is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com.
Peter Suciu
Gun Control,
Harris refused to directly answer and instead suggested that the only way any move couldn't be overturned by a future president was for Congress to pass any gun control legislation, which President Biden could sign into law.Since the March 22 shooting at a grocery store in Boulder, Colorado that left ten people dead including a police officer, there has been speculation that President Joe Biden would take executive action if the Senate remains unable to pass any new gun control measures. However, Vice President Kamala Harris has indicated that the president is unlikely to make such a move at this time.
In an interview with "CBS This Morning" on Wednesday, the vice president called upon Congress to move to pass new gun control legislation.
"It is time for Congress to act," Harris said.
"And stop with the false choices," she added. "This is not about getting rid of the Second Amendment. It's simply about saying we need reasonable gun safety laws. There is no reason why we have assault weapons on the streets of a civil society. They are weapons of war. They are designed to kill a lot of people quickly."
Harris also urged the Senate – where she could cast a deciding vote in a tie – to approve two bills that were recently passed by the House of Representatives. This included the Bipartisan Background, which if passed would require new background check requirements for all gun transfers including those conducted by private parties; and the Enhanced Background Checks Act to close the so-called "Charleston loophole." The latter bill provides that if the current national background check system is not immediately able to determine if a buyer is able to legally obtain a firearm, and the FBI does not conduct an investigation within three days, the seller is allowed to proceed with a sale. The bill extends the initial background check review period to ten days.
"The point here is, Congress needs to act, and on the House side, they did," Harris told CBS News' Gayle King. "There are two bills which the president is prepared to sign. And so we need the Senate to act."
As it currently stands, however – with the Senate split 50-50 and West Virginia Democrat Sen. Joe Manchin opposed to the House bills – it is unlikely either will be approved by the Senate. King asked the vice president if in such a case, President Biden would instead use executive action.
Harris refused to directly answer and instead suggested that the only way any move couldn't be overturned by a future president was for Congress to pass any gun control legislation, which President Biden could sign into law.
"If the Congress acts, then it becomes law," said Vice President Harris. "And that is what we have lacked, that is what has been missing. We need universal background checks. You know various states have done it but there's no universal approach to this. We should first expect the United States Congress to act. I’m not willing to give up on what we must do."
Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He regularly writes about military small arms, and is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com.
Peter Suciu
China South China Sea,
The Chinese military is using the South China Sea to collect data on ongoing construction activities, to improve naval weapons and underwater communications. More importantly, what it learns in the region can be used to help the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) prepare for a future conflict in the region.Beijing's expansion to the highly contested South China Sea has been about securing access to the region's vast natural resources including oil and gas. It holds an estimated 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 11 billion barrels of oil in proved and probable reserves, with much more potentially undiscovered; but there is also an abundance of near-shore placer minerals including titaniferous magnetite, zircon, monazite, tin, gold, and chromite.
Additionally, the region is home to a wealth of fisheries and remains a vital trade route in the Pacific Rim.
China has staked its claim to those resources via its militarized outposts in the Spratly Islands while it further expanded its reach in the Paracel chain via manmade islands.
According to a report from Radio Free Asia, Beijing isn't just interested in the abundant natural resources – which of course it most certainly is – but there is also what has been described as the South China Sea's "most valuable but least visible resource: data."
The Chinese military is using the South China Sea to collect data on ongoing construction activities, to improve naval weapons and underwater communications. More importantly, what it learns in the region can be used to help the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) prepare for a future conflict in the region. It can better understand how to conduct an amphibious landing in the region, but also how to conduct operations in an "ocean battlespace environment."
Those are the warnings from Ryan Martinson, professor of the U.S. Naval War College's China Maritime Studies Institute.
"China needs to collect this information because it is used to build and improve models for how these elements of the ocean battlespace environment change under particular circumstances," Martinson told Radio Free Asia.
Data gathered from Beijing's remote outposts can be used to aid the PLAN in the region, and that can help it prepare for a conflict with the United States or a regional adversary. This includes greater understanding of the tides, currents, wave height, temperature, wind and even salinity – all of which are subject to change.
"Being able to forecast these changes is very important to the PLAN because these elements directly affect naval operations, everything from basic navigation to weapons employment to ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance)," Martinson told BenarNews in January, during its report that China had reclaimed additional territory o the northern side of Woody Island.
That has been Beijing's main base in the Paracel Islands, which has been fortified against erosion.
These efforts to understand the region in such detail isn't actually new. Soon after China occupied Woody Island – the largest of the Paracel chain – in the 1950s, it established a meteorological station. Beijing has not made this study a secret. In May 2012, Chinese state media reported that PLAN meteorologists have measured factors such as wind direction, wind speed, temperature and tides every two hours every day for the past 30 years.
"Tides are an especially important factor in amphibious operations," said Martinson. "If you are trying to land on an island or bring a ship close to an island, you need to know how tides affect the water depth around the island at any given time."
This is something that Allied planners knew quite well in the lead up to the D-Day landings in Normandy, France during World War II. The difference now is that Beijing is studying the tides and so much more to ensure it isn't caught off guard in a potential conflict.
Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He regularly writes about military small arms, and is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com.
Mark Episkopos
Russian Air Force, Eurasia
MAKS has long been a prime venue for Russian aircraft exporters to advertise their products to prospective foreign clients.The 2021 edition of the biennial MAKS—Russian for “International Aviation and Space Show”—will be held at Zhukovsky International Airport, located on the outskirts of Moscow, from July 20–25.
MAKS has long been a prime venue for Russian aircraft exporters to advertise their products to prospective foreign clients. During MAKS 2019, Russian president Vladimir Putin treated Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to an ice cream cone while the two discussed prospective fighter import options. Erdogan was shown Russia’s Su-35 air superiority fighter, but the real prize for the Kremlin was the export version of Russia’s Su-57 fifth-generation fighter. Both the Su-35 and Su-57 are highly likely to make an appearance at this year’s show, with the Kremlin ramping up its efforts to negotiate a slew of export contracts for the latter. Russian officials have not identified the states currently engaging in Su-57 import talks, but the ranks of those who previously expressed interest include Algeria, India, and Turkey.
Although much of the exhibition will inevitably consist of current Russian aviation staples, leading manufacturers are reportedly planning a few surprises. Russian defense giant Rostec’s press office told reporters that it plans to show a “fundamentally new” aircraft. “We would like to present as vividly as possible all the achievements of Russia in both military and civilian aviation, including prospective models of aircraft, helicopters, engines, and other equipment, [including] advanced on-board systems,” Rostec’s press statement read. “There are also plans for new products, in particular, we will show a fundamentally new aircraft.”
It was reported late last year that Russia’s aircraft industry is working on a light, affordable next-generation fighter to complement the Su-57 and upcoming MiG-41 stealth interceptor, but there is currently no indication that any such aircraft will be unveiled at MAKS 2021. Still, at least one of Rostec’s “fundamentally new” products has already been confirmed by Russian officials. Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov told reporters earlier this week that Rostec will unveil the “world’s first” aircraft with an electric engine at MAKS 2021: "This is the thing we were working on jointly with the Foundation for Advanced Research Projects, an electric plane based on the principles of superconductivity," Borisov told reporters. The Su-30SM2, an advanced variant of the Su-30 air superiority fighter equipped with an upgraded N035 Irbis radar, AL-41F1S engines, and new weapons options, is likewise slated to make an appearance.
Dozens of other countries are expected to participate in the upcoming air show, though their planned contributions remain largely unclear. "Representatives of more than 40 countries from almost all continents, first of all Russia’s EAEU (Eurasian Economic Union) partners, of course, have expressed intention to participate in MAKS-2021," according to a press statement released by Russian Industry and Trade Minister Denis Manturov. “Moreover, foreign partners, despite the coronavirus pandemic, have announced plans to show their recent advances and send official delegations to participate in the show," Manturov added in his statement.
Mark Episkopos is a national security reporter for the National Interest.
Image: Reuters
Co-auteur de l’article « Diplomatie chinoise : de l' »esprit combattant » au « loup guerrier » » paru dans le numéro de printemps de Politique étrangère (n°1/2021), Marc Julienne, chercheur au Centre Asie de l’Ifri, répond à trois questions en exclusivité pour politique-etrangere.com.
À quoi renvoient les concepts chinois de l’« esprit combattant » et du « loup guerrier » ?
« L’esprit combattant » est une formule promue par Xi Jinping lui-même. Dans un discours de 2019 devant l’École centrale du Parti, il avait exhorté les cadres du Parti à développer leur « esprit combattant » pour défendre l’image et les intérêts de la Chine partout dans le monde. La formule s’applique particulièrement aux diplomates qui sont considérés comme les soldats de la « guerre diplomatique » que livre la Chine à l’Occident. Considérant que la meilleure défense est l’attaque, les diplomates sont encouragés à « oser combattre » sur tous les fronts : dans la diplomatie, dans les médias, sur les réseaux sociaux.
Le « loup guerrier » est finalement la manifestation de cet esprit combattant chez de nombreux diplomates chinois. L’expression trouve racine dans le blockbuster chinois, Wolf Warrior 2, sorti en 2017, dans lequel un ancien militaire chinois porte secours à des compatriotes en Afrique menacés par des mercenaires occidentaux. L’expression est donc rapidement devenue très populaire dans les premiers mois de la crise du COVID-19, pour désigner les diplomates extrêmement virulents et agressifs contre toute mise en cause de la responsabilité de la Chine dans la pandémie. C’est pourquoi l’expression « loups guerriers » a connu une large médiatisation à travers le monde. Certains observateurs chinois ont cherché à discréditer l’appellation vue comme péjorative, d’autres l’ont revendiquée avec une certaine fierté. Ce qu’il est important de comprendre, au-delà de la formule, c’est que l’attitude nouvelle des diplomates chinois – assez anti-diplomatique finalement – résulte de directives politiques émanant du plus haut niveau du Parti communiste chinois. Cette stratégie qui découle de la « pensée diplomatique de Xi Jinping » semble toutefois être plus coûteuse que bénéfique eu égard à la dégradation substantielle de l’image de la Chine dans le monde ces derniers mois. Mais l’objectif essentiel semble être de montrer une Chine puissante et sûre d’elle.
En quoi la stratégie de communication sous Xi Jinping rompt-elle avec celle de ses prédécesseurs ?
Depuis la fin des années 1970 et l’arrivée au pouvoir de Deng Xiaoping, la diplomatie chinoise a été dominée par l’approche du « profil bas » et la maxime « cacher ses talents en attendant son heure ». Au fur et à mesure de sa montée en puissance, la Chine a cherché à affirmer sa place sur la scène internationale. Dans les années 2000, le slogan consacré était « l’émergence pacifique ». Peu à peu Pékin a mis de côté le « profil bas » et a exhibé les nouveaux atours de sa puissance, par le biais des Jeux olympiques de 2008, par exemple, ou de l’Exposition universelle de Shanghai en 2010, et, dans le domaine sécuritaire, de la participation à la lutte contre la piraterie dans l’océan Indien.
Xi Jinping a nettement accéléré cette tendance. Dès son arrivée au pouvoir, il a exigé une innovation dans les méthodes de propagande extérieures, afin de reconquérir le « droit de parole international » de la Chine, considéré comme perdu ou interdit par l’Occident. Il a ainsi renforcé le contrôle du Parti sur les médias et encouragé leur développement à l’international. On pense en particulier à la chaîne de télévision CGTN et à l’agence de presse Xinhua, deux des principaux médias d’État. Dans le discours extérieur promu par Xi Jinping aujourd’hui, il y a aussi la volonté de présenter la Chine comme une grande puissance, sur un pied d’égalité avec les États-Unis. Elle entend ainsi peser de tout son poids dans la gouvernance internationale et œuvre en faveur d’un système davantage à son image, quitte à réformer certains principes acquis comme la définition des droits de l’Homme (entérinée dans la déclaration universelle de 1948). Cette approche correspond en tout point à une vision réaliste des relations internationales, dans laquelle la puissance permet d’imposer sa volonté aux autres. On pourrait même trouver certaines similarités avec la politique internationale des États-Unis depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale, à la différence capitale des valeurs promues… L’approche chinoise du droit de la mer en est l’une des plus évidentes démonstrations quand Pékin entend s’octroyer des « droits historiques » sur des espaces maritimes réglementés par la Convention de Montego Bay.
Pourquoi peut-on dire que la nouvelle diplomatie chinoise est-elle « décomplexée » ?
La diplomatie chinoise semble en effet suffisamment décomplexée pour ne plus accorder autant d’importance que par le passé à son image et sa réputation. Alors que Pékin s’efforçait résolument à bâtir son soft power depuis le début des années 2000, il apparaît désormais que la séduction et l’attraction ne sont plus à l’ordre du jour. Il s’agit maintenant d’exhiber une posture de grande puissance qui exonérerait la Chine d’une certaine bienséance diplomatique, à en croire les nouvelles pratiques et attitudes de nombreux diplomates, ceux-là même qualifiés de « loups guerriers ».
Désormais, lorsque Pékin fait face à des critiques ou à un désaccord, c’est le rapport de force et l’intimidation qui priment immédiatement. On dispose de nombreux exemples de menaces proférées par des ambassadeurs et diplomates à l’encontre de gouvernements et d’entreprises, si les intérêts de la République populaire de Chine (RPC) ne sont pas respectés. Nous citons dans l’article les exemples de la Suède, de l’Allemagne, de la République tchèque et de la France, d’autres encore, tels que la Corée du Sud, l’Australie, le Canada sont tout aussi illustratifs.
La diplomatie chinoise est également décomplexée quant aux vecteurs de communication qu’elle utilise. Auparavant très discrets et surtout cantonnés aux canaux diplomatiques officiels, les diplomates chinois s’expriment désormais volontiers dans les médias du pays hôte, ainsi que sur les réseaux sociaux, y compris et surtout ceux qui sont censurés en Chine. Cette pratique n’est en rien exceptionnelle tant les réseaux sont devenus une arène à part entière de la politique internationale, depuis qu’un président américain a fait de Twitter son outil de communication privilégié, prévalant même sur la diplomatie officielle. Toutefois, les médias traditionnels et les réseaux sociaux sont utilisés par un nombre croissant de diplomates chinois comme des vecteurs d’influence, de critiques agressives, voire de désinformation. Les exemples sont nombreux concernant l’origine et la gestion du COVID-19, le Xinjiang, Hong Kong ou encore Taïwan. Que les autorités de Pékin aient des critiques à formuler quant aux positionnements de certains gouvernements, parlementaires, chercheurs ou médias occidentaux est légitime en soi. Cependant, le discours agressif de nombreux diplomates a pour conséquence de court-circuiter les pratiques diplomatiques conventionnelles et impose aux gouvernements de répondre tout autant de fermeté. Ainsi, on peut craindre que cette nouvelle diplomatie chinoise décomplexée n’alimente un engrenage de tensions politiques, aux antipodes de la mission première et essentielle de la diplomatie : le dialogue et la négociation.
Accédez à l’article de Marc Julienne et Sophie Hanck ici.
Retrouvez le sommaire du numéro 1/2021 de Politique étrangère ici.