Diplomacy & Crisis News

After decades of uneasy ties, China can no longer deny that India is a real threat.

En bombardant Gaza durant cinquante jours, les Israéliens ont provoqué des dégâts sans équivalent depuis 1967, avec plus de deux mille morts, dont cinq cents enfants. Dans le même temps, en Cisjordanie, l'Autorité palestinienne maintient sa coopération sécuritaire avec l'armée d'occupation, malgré (...) / Israël, Palestine, Proche-Orient, Conflit israélo-arabe, État, Inégalités, Sécurité, Parti politique, Pauvreté, Police, Politique, Réfugiés, Violence, Palestine (Cisjordanie), Chômage, Répression, Colonisation, Conflit israélo-palestinien, Relations bilatérales - 2014/10

A group of transgender women in Mexico City has been telling the UN how despite living with discrimination and the threat of physical violence, they have managed to help others in a poor neighbourhood of the Mexican capital during the COVID-19 crisis.

With much of the world in lockdown again, here are some of this year’s highlights to help you pass the time.

The United States was already fighting with China for influence at global organizations, but the pandemic made everything worse.

From Afghanistan to Mexico, and from Belarus to Cambodia, here’s the best photojournalism from a year that felt like a decade.

United Nations agencies and humanitarian partners have called on authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina to act urgently to help hundreds of migrants, stranded and without shelter, amid freezing winter temperatures. 

Children all over the world have had their education severely disrupted this year, as schools struggle to cope with repeated closures and re-openings, and the transition, if it’s even an option, to online schooling. Disadvantaged children, however, have been worst-hit by the emergency measures. In part three of our look back at the effect that COVID-19 has had on the world, we focus on the education crisis provoked by the pandemic.

The coziness between Washington and Big Tech is over.

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’hiver 2020-2021 de Politique étrangère (n° 4/2020). Antoine Maire propose une analyse de l’ouvrage d’Alicia Campi, Mongolia’s Foreign Policy (Lynne Rienner, 2019, 352 pages).

Cet ouvrage a l’intérêt d’offrir une vision exhaustive des actions de politique étrangère mises en œuvre par la Mongolie après la révolution démocratique de l’hiver 1989-1990. Cette révolution fait office de charnière. Elle a vu le pays passer du socialisme à la démocratie et à l’économie de marché. Elle a in fine permis aux autorités locales de rompre avec l’alignement sur les positions soviétiques qui a caractérisé la diplomatie mongole pendant l’essentiel du xxe siècle. Cette révolution a ouvert la voie à la mise en œuvre d’une politique étrangère autonome, affirmant l’indépendance et la souveraineté de la Mongolie dans un contexte marqué par son enclavement géographique entre la Chine et la Russie.

L’auteur présente la stratégie mongole d’intégration régionale ainsi que les relations nouées par le pays avec ses partenaires. À cet égard, la réflexion développée sur la politique mongole de soft power constitue une contribution originale, qui mérite d’être saluée. L’ouvrage éclaire également le glissement sémantique connu par le concept de « troisième voisin », pierre angulaire de la stratégie internationale de diversification des partenaires de la Mongolie, et qui a conduit les autorités à élargir son champ d’application. Il met ainsi en lumière une diplomatie mongole proactive, qui entend répondre à un monde en évolution rapide. Alicia Campi propose un concept pour résumer cette stratégie flexible et opportuniste : la « stratégie du loup ». Cette pratique résulterait selon elle d’une mentalité nationale profondément marquée par le pastoralisme nomade, mode de vie qui est encore celui de près d’un tiers de la population en Mongolie.

Si l’ouvrage offre une vision exhaustive des initiatives mises en œuvre par les autorités mongoles en matière de politique étrangère, celle-ci aurait mérité d’être complétée par une étude des conditions d’élaboration de cette dernière. Cette absence laisse à penser que la politique étrangère mongole résulte d’un acteur unitaire et rationnel, l’État, escamotant les débats et tensions que suscite la formulation de cette politique dans le champ politique local. Une analyse des controverses générées par le projet de statut de neutralité permanente, ou la position mongole dans l’Organisation de coopération de Shanghai aurait permis d’illustrer utilement ce point.

L’auteur choisit explicitement de ne pas aborder les évolutions politiques internes, mais ce parti pris limite la portée de l’analyse. L’étude de certains moments cathartiques, par exemple la négociation de grands contrats miniers, en offre un exemple puisqu’elle est uniquement menée à l’aune du concept de « stratégie du loup ». Ce choix occulte mécaniquement les dissensions qui apparaissent lors de ces moments entre les acteurs mongols et la diversité des alliances qu’ils sont amenés à nouer avec des partenaires étrangers.

La lecture de l’ouvrage d’Alicia Campi n’en demeure pas moins stimulante. Outre une synthèse inédite de la diplomatie de la Mongolie depuis 1990, il offre de nombreux exemples de la manière dont un « petit pays » est en mesure d’exister sur la scène internationale. Il permet ainsi de dépasser, s’il en était encore besoin, le postulat selon lequel la politique étrangère de ces États se résumerait à un simple alignement sur la puissance dominante. L’ouvrage illustre au contraire la spécificité et l’ingéniosité des stratégies qu’ils déploient sur la scène internationale.

Antoine Maire

>> S’abonner à Politique étrangère <<

A Peruvian biologist and inventor who is turning wind into water has been named as a winner of an annual UN environmental award.

Weihuan Zhou, Lisa Toohey

Trade, Pacific

Australia won't take China's barley tarriffs on the chin. 

Australia is reportedly ready to initiate its first litigation against China at the World Trade Organisation.

China has this year taken punitive action against imports of Australian coal, wine, beef, lobster and barley.

It is the five-year 80.5% barley tariff China imposed in May that Australia will take to the World Trade Organisation. More than half of all Australian barley exports in 2019 were sold to China, worth about A$600 million a year to Australian farmers.

Chinese authorities began an anti-dumping investigation into Australian barley in November 2018. Anti-dumping trade rules are meant to protect local producers from unfair competition from “dumped” imported goods.

Dumping occurs where a firm sells goods in an overseas market at a price lower than the normal value of the goods. China calculated the normal value of barley using “best information available” on the grounds that Australian producers and exporters failed to provide all information Chinese investigators requested.

The barley tariff will last for five years unless Chinese investigators initiate a review and decide to extend it beyond 2025.

What can Australia hope to achieve from a WTO dispute?

Not a quick and easy win. A formal resolution will likely take years. But it plants a seed, starting a structured process for dialogue. This is an important step in the right direction.

A lengthy process

WTO litigation is no quick fix. There is a set process that moves through three phases – consultation, adjudication and compliance.

The standard timetable would ideally have disputes move through consultation and adjudication within a year. In reality it often take several years, particularly if appeals or compliance actions are involved.

The timetable schedules 60 days for the first stage of negotiations, though these can take many more months. That’s worthwhile if it leads to a resolution. But given the tensions between China and Australia, a quick resolution looks remote.

The adjudication process typically involves a decision by a WTO panel followed by an appeal to the organisation’s Appellate Body.

A WTO panel is meant to issue its decision within nine months of its establishment, but it usually takes much more time. If the panel’s decision is appealed, the Appellate Body is meant to make its decisions within 90 days, but nor is this time frame met in many cases.

Once a WTO decision is final, it is up to the losing party to comply with the ruling. That may include a request for time to make the necessary changes. In practice, this can take six to 15 months.

Appeals blockage

One complication is the current non-functioning WTO appeals process. Appointing judges to the WTO’s Appellate Body requires agreement from all WTO member nations. US obstruction of new appointments has reduced the number of judges to zero, and the Appellate Body requires three judges to hear appeals.

This paralysis has created a major loophole, enabling an “appeal into the void” to block unfavourable rulings.

In light of this, the 27 European Union nations and 22 other WTO members – including both China and Australia – have signed on to a temporary appeals process known as the “multi-party interim appeal arbitration arrangement” (MPIA).

Given China’s commitment to the WTO and its dispute settlement system, there is no reason to anticipate it snubbing interim arrangements if an appeal arises. But the appeal process is also likely to take just as long as the Appellate Body procedure.

No guaranteed win

Federal Trade Minister Simon Birmingham has expressed confidence in Australia’s “strong case” but victory against China is not assured.

China’s tariff on Australian barley comprises an “anti-dumping duty” of 73.6% and a “countervailing duty” of 6.9%. Anti-dumping and countervailing calculations are highly technical. Whether China’s barley tariff has violated WTO rules will require detailed examination of its methodology.

A key challenge to the Chinese methodology is that it largely disregarded information on domestic sales by Australian barley producers and used data from Australian sales to Egypt.

The WTO has found China’s use of similar methods in several past disputes breached WTO rules. But every case depends on very specific facts. The past rulings against China do not necessarily predict the result here.

 

No compensation

Even if Australia is successful, a “win” isn’t total.

The WTO system is designed to make states change their ways. It is not designed to compensate those harmed by illegal trade measures. In other words, an Australian win may require China only to remove the tariff, not compensate those who paid more or lost revenue as a result.

There is also a risk that China could simply initiate a re-investigation of the barley tariff, which might lead to a decision to impose duties very similar to the original ones. In some past disputes, it took China five years or longer to remove duties.

So even if the World Trade Organisation rules in favour of Australia, this might not lead to the tariff’s end before its current expiry date in 2025.

Still the best option

Despite all this, the World Trade Organisation is Australia’s best step.

The WTO is not perfect, but it is now a tested and respected mechanism to resolve trade disputes.

WTO litigation also compels the disputing parties to enter into consultations – and talking is something Australia’s officials have had difficulty having with their Chinese counterparts.

China might drag its heels in other ways, but it can be expected to respect the WTO’s procedural rules and enter into these negotiations. Those talks could help repair communication channels better than missives through social media and press conferences.

Litigation the new normal

In commencing a formal dispute, Australia also sends a firm but dignified message – that it is willing to use international rules and procedures to solve grievances.

WTO litigation is a normal feature of trade relations between countries. Even close allies bring disputes against one another – such as New Zealand’s case against Australia’s restrictions on New Zealand apples, or Australia’s case against Canadian restrictions on imported wines in liquor stores.

China and Australia badly need a relationship reset. Meeting in a rules-based forum with structured processes for dialogue can do no harm.

Weihuan Zhou, Senior Lecturer and member of Herbert Smith Freehills CIBEL Centre, Faculty of Law, UNSW Sydney, UNSW and Lisa Toohey, Professor of Law, University of Newcastle

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Image: Reuters

David Axe

Security, Americas

For every sailor who’s not in a submarine, submarines are real scary.

Here's What You Need To Remember: Everyone fears aircraft carriers - but aircraft carriers fear submarines.

A photo taken in 2016 depicting an American nuclear-powered submarine poking its periscope above the waves—within shooting distance of a British aircraft carrier during a war game—is a useful reminder of one of the most important truths of naval warfare.

For every sailor who’s not in a submarine, submarines are real scary.

Stealthy and heavily-armed, subs are by far the most powerful naval vessels in the world for full-scale warfare—and arguably the best way to sink those more obvious icons of naval power, aircraft carriers.

The public may not fully appreciate submarines’ lopsided combat advantage, but the world’s leading navies sure do. Today Chinese, Russian and American submarines, among others, are busy sneaking up on, tracking and practicing sinking rival fleets’ flattops.

The provocative photo, see here, depicts the masts of the U.S. Navy attack submarine USS Dallas near the carrier HMS Illustrious during a naval exercise in the Gulf of Oman on Oct. 3, 2013. Six warships including Dallas and Illustrious conducted an anti-submarine-warfare exercise that saw Dallas stalking Illustrious while British and American surface warships and helicopters attempted to locate and “sink” the undersea vessel.

Neither navy has published the results of the exercise, so it’s not clear whether Dallas got close enough in the course of the war game to simulate firing Mark-48 torpedoes at the flattop, which at 22,000 tons displacement is one of the largest ships in Royal Navy service.

But there are good reasons to assume the 7,000-ton Dallas did succeed in pretend-sinking Illustrious. In 2007 HMCS Corner Brook, a diesel-electric submarine of the Canadian navy, sneaked up on Illustrious during an exercise in the Atlantic.

To prove they could have sunk the carrier, Corner Brook’s crew snapped a photo through the periscope—and the Canadian navy helpfully published it.“The picture represents hard evidence that the submarine was well within attack parameters and would have been successful in an attack,” boasted Cmdr. Luc Cassivi, commander of the Canadian submarine division.

Corner Brook, a former British submarine displacing only 2,400 tons, is no more capable than Dallas—and probably much less so once crew training is taken into account. American submariners spend far more time at sea than their Canadian counterparts.

Dallas and Corner Brook scored their simulated carrier kills against allied warships in the context of a scripted exercise. But many other close encounters between subs and flattops have occurred between rival nations deep at sea, in a usually bloodless duel that is nevertheless deadly serious.

To prepare its submarines to hunt and sink American aircraft carriers in some future World War III, during the Cold War the Soviet navy ordered its hundreds of sub captains to get as close as possible to U.S. flattops … and stay there. The U.S. Navy routinely surrounds its multi-billion-dollar carriers with escorts including surface ships and submarines, but the defensive screen is not impenetrable.

In 1974 a Soviet Il-38 patrol plane spotted what was later described as the carrier USS Nimitz and its escorts off the U.S. East Coast. The ship’s identity is in doubt, as in 1974 the brand-new Nimitz was in the water at a Virginia shipyard and still being worked on.

Whichever carrier it was, Soviet commanders instructed an attack submarine to track the flattop and its escorts. “Three days we [followed] Nimitz [sic],” navigator Pavel Borodulkin told Tom Briggs, an American who visited Russia decades later.

Borodulkin implied that the sub spent much of the time at a depth of 120 feet. As for being detected … “We did not worry,” Borodulkin said, explaining that American sonar was not optimized for detecting a target moving on the same course and speed as the vessel doing the searching.

“Our stealth was high,” Borodulkin said. To prove his claims, the navigator gave Briggs the above blurry photo of a flattop, snapped through the Soviet sub’s periscope.

That wasn’t the only NATO carrier the Soviets tailed. In 1984 a Victor-class Soviet submarine played cat and mouse with the flattop USS Kitty Hawk off the Korean Peninsula. The Americans lost track of the Victor and, in the dead of night, the 80,000-ton carrier actually collided with the 5,000-ton sub.

“I felt the ship shudder violently and, going to the starboard side, I could see two periscopes and the upper part of a submarine moving away,” Kitty Hawk Capt. Dave Rogers told The Sydney Morning Herald. A Japanese patrol plane later spotted the apparently damaged Victor limping away at three knots.

In November the same year Illustrious, then a young vessel, passed within 500 yards of a Soviet Tango-class submarine during a Royal Navy exercise off the Scottish coast, according to The Robesonian newspaper.

When the Soviets introduced their own small aircraft carriers in the mid-1970s, British and American subs no doubt watched them as closely as Soviet undersea boats followed NATO flattops. But there were no public accounts of Western subs getting caught doing so until 2007, when a Russian newspaper reported that warships escorting the carrier Admiral Kuznetsov in the Atlantic pursued an unspecified submarine for half an hour.

The snooping sub reportedly got away by deploying self-propelled decoys.

After the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, the Russian submarine force shrank considerably and, for a few years at least, was much less aggressive. The Russian carrier fleet declined to a single vessel, the Admiral Kuznetsov.

American attention gradually shifted east to the Pacific, where in the early 2000s China had launched a massive naval rearmament program that included refurbishing a former Soviet carrier, a sister ship of the Admiral Kuznetsov that was renamed Liaoning in Chinese service.

In addition to their new flattop, the Chinese built several new submarines per year on average, soon boasting a fleet of some 60 undersea boats—about as numerous as American subs.

Not nearly as large, advanced or active as U.S. subs, the Chinese boats were at a huge disadvantage. Beijing’s subs struggled to gather intelligence and develop wartime tactics. They enjoyed at least one dramatic success in October 2006, when a Chinese Song-class diesel-electric attack submarine quietly surfaced within nine miles of Kitty Hawk in the waters between Japan and Taiwan.

The Song-class vessel, displacing 2,200 tons, was close enough to hit the Kitty Hawk with a torpedo. None of the carrier’s roughly dozen escorting warships detected the Song until it breached the surface. American officers were flabbergasted.

“This could well have escalated into something that was very unforeseen,” said Adm. Bill Fallon, then commander of U.S. Pacific forces.

But it’s apparent that China is more scared of American submarines than the Americans are scared of Chinese boats. In 2012 Liaoning was finally ready to set sail from the Dalian shipyard. As Beijing’s only carrier facing a fleet of 10 American flattops, Liaoning was widely expected to stage from China’s most modern naval base on Hainan Island in the south, near Taiwan and Vietnam.

Instead Beijing announced the 70,000-ton carrier would be heading north to Qingdao. The apparent reason was that the area around Qingdao was already home to a squadron of Song-class submarines plus Type 091 nuclear subs. Those vessels are the best defense China possesses against the American and Japanese subs that will undoubtedly hound Liaoning every time she leaves port, practicing to sink the carrier in the event of war.

Doing, in other words, what submarines do best.

This article first appeared several years ago.

Image: Reuters.

Robert W. Merry

Politics, Americas

Can Biden craft a trade policy that keeps overseas markets open to U.S. goods while protecting the interests of working-class Americans devastated by past unfair practices by American trading partners, particularly China?

THE MOST pressing imperative facing the incoming president, Joe Biden, is to pacify the ongoing and increasingly tense civil conflict between America’s coastal elites, who are liberal and globalist in outlook, and the nationalist/traditionalist folks of the heartland, who feel beleaguered by those elites. In order to do this, he will have to build a governing coalition that starts with a large segment of his Democratic base but also seeks to draw in more moderate elements of the opposition. If he tries to govern strictly from the Left, as his party will want, the civil conflict will continue and deepen, Biden’s government will seize up, and he will fail.

Donald Trump’s strong popular-vote showing, along with the outcomes in congressional balloting and state-legislative races, makes clear that American politics continues to reside on a knife’s edge of political parity and mutual hostility. There will be no wave of popular support of the kind that Franklin Roosevelt could summon after his strong 1932 election, or that Ronald Reagan commanded after 1980. If Biden is to succeed he must generate his own wave through the delicate art of governing.

Will he do it? Not clear. Can he succeed even if he tries to do it? Less clear. The president-elect’s party, still traumatized by the very emergence of Trump, will want Biden to govern as if the incumbent’s defeat on November 3 places the country back where it was before the vulgar billionaire crashed the political scene four years ago. That would mean policies and pronouncements denoting the party’s continuing view of Trump supporters as “deplorables.”

But Trump, for all of his limitations as a national leader, transformed the American political landscape by bringing new issues and new sensibilities to the Republican Party and the nation, and things aren’t going back to where they were when the party was led by the likes of Jeb Bush. That’s a reality Biden needs to absorb.

Consider, for example, the issue of immigration, the most incendiary of the cultural conflicts facing the country. Many Trump supporters believe the Democratic establishment favors relatively open borders as a means of transforming the essence of America in ways they oppose. And Democratic liberals consider resistance to their broad migrant hospitality to be a form of racism. This divide contributes significantly to the civil strains roiling America, and it’s difficult to see how Biden can bridge this gap and fashion a moderate consensus that can capture the center and neutralize the high-voltage passions emanating from the extreme wings of both parties.

Most likely he won’t try but will instead employ his executive authority to foster and encourage greater immigration flows, thus perpetuating the tensions and anxieties generated by the issue. 

Similar questions surround other major domestic matters. Can he craft a trade policy that keeps overseas markets open to U.S. goods while protecting the interests of working-class Americans devastated by past unfair practices by American trading partners, particularly China? Can he piece together a health-care system that expands coverage without introducing widespread inconvenience (such as rationing) for those seeking medical attention? And can he reconcile economic-growth imperatives with the importance of fiscal responsibility?

On foreign policy, Biden faces one issue that dwarfs all others, and that is China. The People’s Republic, a major global competitor in the realm of economic power, now seeks geopolitical dominance in East Asia (through naval power) and what the famous early-twentieth-century British geographer Halford Mackinder called the Eurasian Heartland (through infrastructure dominance and possibly, in the future, land power). America must decide if it will accept these surges of power—particularly in East Asia, as the realization of China’s ambitions there would mean that America eventually would be kicked out of the region. But Chinese dominance of the Eurasian Heartland carries other global hazards, since China then would be positioned to threaten Western Europe and Russia.

Some suggest that, given these developments, war between America and China is inevitable. Perhaps, but not necessarily. Through deft and imaginative diplomacy, and the building of alliance coalitions to bolster U.S. influence in the region, the country could signal its seriousness and perhaps foster a peaceful, though uneasy, accommodation with China.

This also suggests that the United States must clear the decks of its own geopolitical thinking so as to not get distracted from the primary challenge through counterproductive diplomatic and military actions elsewhere around the world. The country thus should extricate itself from “forever wars” in the Middle East and from unnecessary tensions with Russia and India, two nations that have been traditional Chinese adversaries.

But the challenge here is fearsome and the requirements of diplomacy daunting. Is Biden up to it? Judging from some of his past statements on China, this would seem to be an open question. “They’re not bad folks, folks,” he said early in the campaign. “But guess what? They’re ... not competition for us.”

That’s a remarkable statement from the former chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. American foreign policy today should begin with an understanding that they are competition for us and see themselves as such. Then we can get to the question of how we should deal with that fundamental reality.

Robert W. Merry, former President of Congressional Quarterly and Editor of The National Interest, is the author most recently of President McKinley: Architect of the American Century (Simon & Schuster).

Image: Reuters.

Patrick Mendis, Antonina Luszczykiewicz

China, Asia

For the United States to counterbalance an increasingly assertive China, President Biden has to push the India policy envelope conceived by the Trump administration while championing America’s founding values of freedom and democracy.

President Donald Trump’s “America First” ethos has permanently aligned India within the United States’ overarching Indo-Pacific strategy. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s unique personal chemistry with Trump has resulted in a pivotal geostrategic calculus to challenge the rise of restless China.

It is no coincidence that President-elect Joe Biden selected Senator Kamala Harris—a descendant of Indian heritage—as his running mate. But, even with Vice President-elect Harris, the Biden White House will still face great challenges to overcome Modi’s Hindu nationalist politics and Trump’s white evangelical-Christian nativism when confronting China.

The Trump White House discounted human rights and the rights of ethnic minorities at home and abroad, especially of Tibetans and Uyghurs in China as well as Muslims in Indian Kashmir. Yet, his evangelical-led administration has still used India as a counterweight to China by pursuing its Indo-Pacific strategy with Australia and Japan. Like with the Taiwan policy, the incoming Biden White House’s National Security Council will have no choice but to continue with Trump’s India policy in its battle with China, especially on the restructuring of global supply chains in the Sino-American “trade war” and the tech cold war.

Setting the Stage

To set a lasting foundation for U.S.-India relations, President Trump dispatched his top national security officials to New Delhi in late October 2020. The White House decision for the concurrent visit of Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and then-Defense Secretary Mark Esper had significant salience. The visit took place just a few days ahead of the U.S. presidential election and during a pandemic that both the most powerful and largest democracies are failing to control, leaving no doubts about the Trump administration’s perception of the importance of American engagement with India.

It was Pompeo’s fourth visit to India as secretary of state and the third in the U.S.-India 2+2 ministerial dialogue as part of the broader Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad). His latest trip was most significant given that Pompeo was accompanied by Defense Secretary Esper in a scheduled meeting with their counterparts: India’s Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar and Defense Minister Rajnath Singh.  

As members of the Quad with Australia and Japan, the United States and India have now signed the last of four foundational accords—the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) for Geospatial and Intelligence Cooperation—to solidify their bilateral military ties and to access exceptionally accurate geospatial data, high-end defense technology, and classified satellite data on military-related issues. With the BECA agreement, the other three accords form the basis of the U.S.-India defense cooperation framework:

- General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) in 2002 

-The Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) in 2016  

-The Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) in 2018 

The BECA agreement will be crucial for India given its June 2020 deadly border clashes with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army forces in the disputed Himalayan Galwan river valley in Ladakh and the previous Doklam valley standoff in the India-China-Bhutan trijunction border area. Under the agreement, the U.S. military will provide advanced navigational and avionic hardware in addition to sharing geospatial intelligence with India to deter Chinese transgressions into the Indian-claimed territories.

The Indian alliance with the Quad has now been solidified under a broad military pact. In protest, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi characterized the Quad’s goal to build an “Indo-Pacific NATO” in a strategy that harkens back to the Cold War. In 2018, however, Wang dismissed the Quad and the Indo-Pacific (instead of Asia-Pacific) alliance as an “attention-grabbing idea” that would “dissipate like ocean foam.” Despite his rhetoric, the evidence suggests an emergence of a new NATO-like Indo-Pacific alliance triggered largely by the recent Sino-Indian border confrontations in the Himalayan Ladakh region.

Beijing’s Strategic Miscalculations

The deaths of twenty Indian soldiers—together with an unconfirmed number on the Chinese side—in the Himalayan border skirmish were the first recorded casualties since 1975. The Modi government retaliated by banning over one hundred Chinese apps—such as WeChat and TikTok—for which India was supposed to become the biggest foreign market. In doing so, the Indian government renounced the 1988 breakthrough in which economic and cultural relations between India and China were to be developed irrespective of the ongoing border dispute. The Trump White House could not have been more pleased to secure India as a willing partner of the American trade and tech wars against China.

It is no secret that in recent years India and the United States have worked closely on tightening military, economic, and diplomatic cooperation. The cooperation began to accelerate with the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Treaty signed in 2008. After more than a decade of negotiations, the 2020 BECA agreement will now allow India and the United States to share satellite and mapping data for better accuracy of their missiles and drones—and for better surveillance against China and its “all-weather friend” Pakistan. With unanimous support from U.S. Congress, the longest-negotiated BECA accord is the final part of four military agreements between India and the United States that would fortify their military partnership to galvanize the Quad operations in the Indian Ocean and beyond.

Without directly stating that the U.S.-India alliance is aimed primarily at counterbalancing the influences of China, Pompeo remarked at the 2+2 ministerial dialogue in New Delhi that “we have a lot to discuss today: our cooperation on the pandemic that originated in Wuhan, to confronting the Chinese Communist Party’s threats to security and freedom, to promoting peace and stability throughout the region.” From his evangelical-Christian perspective, atheist-China is not the elephant in the room anymore, but the enemy of Christian America—openly pointing a finger at Beijing. While the Trump administration’s core values of nationalistic white supremacy have criticized China for its human rights abuses, it remains consciously blind to the treatment of Muslims in Kashmir by the Hindu nationalist government and the human rights abuses of Hispanic and Muslim immigrants in America, to name a few.

The Hedge Against the Biden Factor

Regardless of the significance of these values and agreements, some questions related to timing remain. Why did President Trump send his top national security officials only a few days ahead of the presidential election when the loss of his presidency was a possibility? Why didn’t India follow the “wait-and-watch” strategy until the U.S. election results were clarified?

The geopolitical context of Pompeo’s visit suggests it is a long-lasting strategy to limit the United States in its approaches to both China and India—and to ensure it will be continued regardless of who occupies the White House. Like the appointment of conservative judges to the U.S. Supreme Court for a lasting legacy, it is clear that Trump’s trade and tech wars with China will be inevitable and irreversible, regardless of President Biden’s intentions. Initiatives such as the Quad and the Indo-Pacific strategy confirm that the Biden administration has no choice but to counterbalance—or even isolate or possibly decouple with China—not just in economic but also in political domains.

In the prevailing domestic political perspectives, Pompeo’s visit to India was yet another occasion to use the “China threat” rhetoric and anti-Chinese sentiments in the presidential campaign to galvanize their voter base for years to come. From accusations of spreading the “Chinese virus” to presenting China as an economic bandit, Trump has been trying to mobilize his supporters while deflecting blame for the pandemic. His continued legacy—with a voter base of some 74 million, compared with 81 million who voted for President-elect Joe Biden—suggests that his style of American politics will not stop at the edges of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Having raised “huge sums of money from his loyal supporters,” his post-presidency will provide Trump with “tremendous flexibility” to advance his ambitions and to exploit his foreign policy initiates by advocating his success with conservative-evangelical voters and windfalls from the military-industrial complex (with his policies on armed sales to Saudi Arabia, Israel, Taiwan, India, and others).

Nonetheless, President-elect Biden will most certainly need to welcome Indian Prime Minister Modi’s iconic bear-hug, a symbol of his “personal diplomacy,” as well as the mutually beneficial nature of an evolved bilateral relationship.

Goodbye to Non-aligned Nonsense

With its new U.S. military alliance, India has finally removed the mask of “non-aligned” foreign policy which it has nominally employed since independence in 1947. During the Cold War, the so-called non-alignment was supposed to give India the flexibility to maneuver in its relations between the United States and the former Soviet Union. However, recent border tensions and China’s increasingly bold attempts at interfering in India’s internal affairs make it impossible for New Delhi to keep the facade of neutrality. As British Prime Minister Boris Johnson plans to visit India in January 2021 in his bid to transform the G7 group into a Democracy 10 (D-10) with Australia, South Korea, and India, the new democratic alliance would pave a way for the Biden administration to lead in combating authoritarian regimes and challenging China.

Yet in comparison to Secretary Pompeo and other Trump officials who openly call China an enemy, Indian leaders still seem much more restrained in their rhetoric. Although neither Jaishankar nor Singh called a spade a spade, the Indian government’s anti-Chinese motivations cannot be doubted anymore, despite some joint China-India soft power projects in recent years.

India seems ready to secure its Himalayan borders through an international alliance—the first military alliance aimed at protecting its boundary that New Delhi has joined openly in post-independence history. There is no doubt that a NATO-like Asian democratic “coalition of willing” countries or a global “D-10” grouping will have far-reaching implications for the Indian subcontinent and U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy. 

For the United States to counterbalance an increasingly assertive China, President Biden has to push the India policy envelope conceived by the Trump administration while championing America’s founding values of freedom and democracy. By upholding these values on the world stage, Biden would at least be remembered as an authentic U.S. president who re-established the American narrative as the “shining city upon a hill” for the rest to emulate. 

Dr. Patrick Mendis, a former American diplomat and a military professor in the NATO and Pacific Commands, is a distinguished visiting professor of global affairs at the National Chengchi University and a distinguished visiting scholar at the Taiwan Center for Security Studies in Taipei. 

Dr. Antonina Luszczykiewicz, a specialist in political and cultural history of China and India at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow, Poland is currently a visiting research scholar at Tamkang University in Taipei. Both are Taiwan fellows of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Republic of China. The views expressed in this analysis neither represent the official positions of the current or past institutional affiliations nor the respective governments.  

Image: Reuters.

David Kennedy

Coronavirus,

Why it matters that the coronavirus is changing – and what this means for vaccine effectiveness.

A new variant of SARS-CoV-2 is spreading rapidly in the United Kingdom, with over 1,400 cases since September. SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, generally accumulates mutations slowly over time, but this new variant had accumulated many mutations quickly.

If this new version of the virus is here to stay, as it appears to be, what does that mean? Will this new version of the virus replace the old one? Will it be easier to catch? And, most important, will the current vaccines still be effective?

This interests me because I am an evolutionary microbiologist who studies the link between the transmission and evolution of infectious diseases. In particular, I spend a lot of time considering the effects of vaccines on pathogen evolution and the effects of pathogen evolution on the impact of vaccines.

What is the new SARS-CoV-2 mutant that has emerged?

The new version of SARS-CoV-2 – named the B.1.1.7 lineage – is spreading in the U.K. and possibly beyond. The differences between the old and new virus include 23 mutations in the virus’s genetic code that have altered four viral proteins.

Eight of these 23 mutations affect the spike protein. This matters because the spike protein enables the virus to enter human cells, and it is a key target of our immune response, both in fighting off the virus during infection and in protecting us from disease following vaccination with the Pfizer and Moderna vaccines.

If the changes to the spike protein help the virus enter human cells more easily, then the virus could be transmitted from person to person more readily.

These mutations may also alter how well the host’s immune system combats the virus, potentially reducing the efficacy of the current vaccines.

What is different about this new version of SARS-CoV-2?

Samples of the new virus isolated from patients suggest that this variant has been increasing in relative frequency over the past three months.

The increase in frequency is concerning, as it suggests – but does not prove – that the B.1.1.7 isolates of SARS-CoV-2 are more transmissible than the original virus. Some have estimated that the new virus may be up to 70% more transmissible than the old virus. While these estimates are consistent with the data, it is entirely too early to make a definitive conclusion.

If this increase in transmissibility is confirmed, it might be due to of the mutations in the spike protein allows it to bind more tightly to the ACE2 receptor, which provides a gateway for the virus to enter human cells.

But it might also be due to any of the other changes to the virus.

Is it more dangerous? If so, why?

If the new version, B.1.1.7, is indeed more transmissible than the old virus, it will be more dangerous in the sense that it will make more people sick.

However, I am not aware of good evidence that there is any difference in severity of disease caused by the new version of this virus compared with the older one. That said, with so few known cases, it may still be too early to say.

Will the Pfizer and Moderna vaccines still be effective against this new strain?

Both the Pfizer and Moderna vaccines work by training our immune systems to recognize a specific version of the viral spike protein. The version of the spike protein used by the vaccines was designed to match that of the old virus, not that of the B.1.1.7 virus. This means that the vaccines might become less effective than expected should this new virus spread widely.

Vaccine-virus mismatch is an ongoing challenge for scientists charged with developing the seasonal flu vaccine. But even with a virus-vaccine mismatch, the flu vaccine reduces the likelihood, and the severity, of disease.

The question is therefore not whether the vaccines will be effective, but rather how effective they will be. The severity of the mismatch matters, but the only way to determine its impact in this case is through scientific study, and to my knowledge, no data on that has yet been collected. In other words, it’s too early to say whether and how this new variant will influence the overall effectiveness of the Pfizer and Moderna vaccines.

Should people still get the new mRNA vaccine?

The appearance of this new B.1.1.7 makes it even more important that people get vaccinated as soon as possible.

If this new version is more transmissible, or if the vaccine is less effective because of a virus-vaccine mismatch, more people will need to be vaccinated to achieve herd immunity and get this disease under control.

Moreover, we now have proof that the spike protein of SARS-CoV-2 can change drastically in a short time, and so it is critical that we get the virus under control to prevent it from evolving further and completely undermining vaccination efforts.

David Kennedy, Assistant Professor of Biology, Penn State

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Image: Reuters

Phil Zuckerman

Politics, The Americas

In this last election, the emerging influence of secular voters was felt not only at the presidential level, but also on many down-ballot issues.

The voting patterns of religious groups in the U.S. have been scrutinized since the presidential election for evidence of shifting allegiances among the faithful. Many have wondered if a boost in Catholic support was behind Biden’s win or if a dip in support among evangelicals helped doom Trump.

But much less attention has been paid to one of the largest growing demographics among the U.S. electorate, one that has increased from around 5% of Americans to over 23% in the last 50 years: “Nones” – that is, the nonreligious.

I am a scholar of secularism in the U.S., and my focus is on the social and cultural presence of secular people – nonreligious people such as atheists, agnostics, humanists, freethinkers and those who simply don’t identify with any religion. They are an increasingly significant presence in American society, one which inevitably spills into the political arena.

In this last election, the emerging influence of secular voters was felt not only at the presidential level, but also on many down-ballot issues.

The new ‘values voters’

For years, both scholars and pundits have referred to the political impact of “values voters” in America. What that designation generally refers to are religious men and women whose scripturally based values coagulate around issues such as opposing marriage equality and women’s reproductive autonomy.

But dubbing such religious voters as “values voters” is a real semantic bamboozle. While it is true that many religious Americans maintain certain values that motivate their voting behavior, it is also very much the case that secular Americans also maintain their own strongly held values. My research suggests they vote on these values with just as much motivation as the religious.

Sex education

This played out in November in a number of ballot initiatives that have flown under the national media radar.

Voters in Washington state, for example, passed Referendum 90, which requires that students receive sex education in all public schools. This was the first time that such a measure was ever on a state ballot, and it passed with ease – thanks, in part, to the significant number of nonreligious voters in the Pacific Northwest.

The fact is, Washington is one of the least religious states in the union. Well over a third of all Washingtonians do not affiliate with any religion, more than a third never pray and almost 40% never attend religious services.

The referendum’s passing was helped by the fact that nonreligious adults tend to value comprehensive sex education. Numerous studies have found that secular Americans are significantly more likely to support comprehensive sex education in school. In his research, sociologist Mark Regnerus found that secular parents were generally much more comfortable – and more likely – to have open and frank conversations with their children about safe sex than religious parents.

Drugs policy

Meanwhile, voters in Oregon – another Pacific Northwestern state that contains one of the most secular populations in the country – passed Measure 110, the first ever statewide law to decriminalize the possession and personal use of drugs.

This aligns with research showing that nonreligious Americans are much more likely to support the decriminalization of drugs than their religious peers. For instance, a 2016 study from Christian polling firm Barna found that 66% of evangelicals believe that all drugs should be illegal as did 43% of other Christians, but only 17% of Americans with no religious faith held such a view.

Science at the ballot box

Secular people are generally more trusting of scientific empiricism, and various studies have shown that the nonreligious are more likely to accept the evidence behind human-generated climate change. This translates to support for politicians and policies that take climate change seriously.

It may also have factored in to the success of a November ballot measure in Denver, Colorado, to fund programs that eliminate greenhouse gases, fight air pollution and actively adapt to climate change. The ballot passed with over 62% of the vote – and it is of note that Denver is one of the most secular cities in the nation.

Meanwhile voters in California – another area of relative secularity – passed Proposition 14 supporting the funding of stem cell research, the state being one of only a handful that has a publicly funded program. Pew studies have repeatedly found that secular Americans are far more likely than religious Americans to support stem cell research.

Values versus values

On issues that the religious right has held some sway in recent years, there is evidence of a counterbalance among secular “value voters.”

For example, while the religious have been more likely to oppose same-sex marriage, secular Americans are more likely to support it, and by significant margins. A recent Pew study found that 79% of secular Americans are supportive, compared to 66% of white mainline Protestants, 61% of Catholics, 44% of Black Protestants and 29% of white evangelicals.

There are many additional values that are prominent among secular Americans. For example, the U.S. Secular Survey of 2020 – the largest survey of nonreligious Americans ever conducted, with nearly 34,000 participants – found strong support for safeguarding the separation of church and state.

Other studies have found that secular Americans strongly support women’s reproductive rights, women working in the paid labor force, the DACA program, death with dignity and opposition to the death penalty.

Secular surge

According to Eastern Illinois University professor Ryan Burge’s data analysis, around 80% of atheists and agnostics and 70% of those who described their religion as “nothing in particular” voted for Biden.

This may have been decisive. As Professor Burge argues, “it’s completely fair to say that these shifts generated a two percentage-point swing for Biden nationwide. There were five states where the gap between the candidates was less than two percentage points (Georgia, Arizona, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania and North Carolina). Four of those five went for the Biden – and the nones were between 28% and 37% of the population in those key states.”

As this past election has shown, secular values are not only alive and well, but they are more pronounced than ever. It is also noteworthy that more openly nonreligious candidates were elected to public office than ever before. According to an analysis by the atheist author and activist Hemant Mehta, not only did every member of the secular Congressional Freethought Caucus win reelection, but 10 state senators who are openly secular – that is, they have made it publicly known that they are nonreligious – were voted into office, up from seven two years ago. There is now an all-time high of 45 openly secular state representatives nationwide, according to Mehta’s analysis. Every one of them is a Democrat.

Religious voters will certainly continue to vote their values – and for politicians that express similar views. But so, I argue, will secular voters.

Phil Zuckerman, Professor of Sociology and Secular Studies, Pitzer College

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Image: Reuters

Lana Dbeibo

Coronavirus,

All your questions answered by a medical professional. 

I fully support the use of vaccines, but I worry about possible long-term side effects with the new vaccines. How can anyone say with any confidence there will be no long-term consequences with vaccines that have been developed so rapidly?

There are reasons the vaccines were developed rapidly: First, the production started before the end of phase 3 clinical trials. Second, there was a lot of interest in volunteering for the trials that tested the vaccines’ effectiveness, which expedited the process. Researchers often wait many months and sometimes even years to get people to volunteer to be part of trials.

Last, there was a lot of disease in the community which made it faster to see whether the vaccine was effective. The coronavirus has caused disease in millions of people in the U.S. alone, while Ebola and Zika viruses, while extremely serious, affected far fewer.

I worry much more about the long-term effects of the virus, which can be very debilitating and start soon after the infection. We have not seen reports of major effects of the vaccine in the past few months that it was studied; if there were major effects, I believe we should have started to see them by now. This could can change, however, and scientists would update recommendations accordingly.

My husband is 72 and undergoing chemo treatment for metastasized cancer in his lymph nodes. So far, treatment is showing shrinkage of tumors and no new spread. I’m 73. Should I get the vaccine?

There are two issues to address here. First, there is a question of whether someone who has been vaccinated could spread the disease to someone else. There is very limited data on whether the vaccine effectively limits spread of the disease, but we are waiting on studies to answer this question.

The second issue you raise is about people with compromised immune systems and whether they should get the vaccine. While the efficacy of the COVID-19 vaccines was not studied in immunocompromised people, the danger of COVID-19 to patients with a weaker immune system like your husband’s is very high. Because the benefit may exceed the risk, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention did not list being immunocompromised as a contraindication to receive the COVID vaccine. Please consult with your physician to have a conversation about this.

I have rheumatoid/psoriatic arthritis. I am taking the biologic Actemra and Solu Medrol as an infusion, monthly. I also take methotrexate twice a week. Is the vaccine considered safe for people with compromised immune systems?

The answer to this is very similar to the answer above. The CDC did not list having a weakened immune system as a reason not to get the vaccine, or what we doctors call a contraindication. Still, it is important for you to talk to your physician about your particular case.

My 22-year-old son had a reaction to the MMR vaccine when he was approximately 6 years old. He ran a fever for several days and developed the bleeding disorder ITP within a month or two after receiving the MMR vaccine. Should he be concerned about receiving the coronavirus vaccine?

Having any type of allergy other than anaphylaxis, which is a severe and sometimes life-threatening allergic reaction, to vaccines or components of the COVID vaccine is not a contraindication to receive the COVID vaccine. Everyone who receives either one of the drugs that have received emergency use authorization will be monitored for 15-30 minutes in the clinic after the vaccine dose because serious reactions will happen in the first few minutes after the vaccine is given.

At age 7 or 8, I received tetanus antitoxin (horse serum) and quickly lost consciousness for about four days. Subsequently, I remember having hives a few times in childhood and mild asthma until I was about 25. I do not now have significant allergies. I have had several cardiac procedures, including open thoracotomy for mitral and aortic bovine valve replacement in 2010 and a “Watchman” procedure. I have a pacemaker and daily take Metoprolol, Torsemide and penicillin g (after two episodes of endocarditis. Also a hemicolectomy for cancer. No problem with flu shots. Generally I am feeling better than I have in the past several years. I drive without difficulty. Should I get the vaccine?

My answer here would be similar to one answered above – having any allergy other than anaphylaxis to vaccines or components of the COVID vaccine is not a contraindication to receive the COVID vaccine. Similarly, having asthma or seasonal allergies is not a contraindication. I would recommend you consult with your doctor for specifics related to your other health issues.

And remember that scientific observations of the vaccine are ongoing. The CDC, FDA and other government agencies will update the public on significant changes if they occur.

Lana Dbeibo, Assistant professor of clinical medicine, Indiana University School of Medicine

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Image: Reuters

Kris Osborn

U.S. Special Operations Forces,

A new U.S. maritime strategy tries to focus U.S. special ops forces for a very different future: great power war. 

They use night vision and high-speed maneuver to launch small targeted boat attacks under cover of darkness, swim underwater for long distances to approach enemy shores, conduct clandestine reconnaissance operations and confront enemy fire amid hostage rescue or high-value target attack missions… to site just a few of the high-risk, high-casualty missions expected of Naval and Marine Corps Special Operations Forces preparing for major maritime warfare. 

Given the last several decades of U.S. military war campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, many are likely to regard Special Operations Forces such as Navy SEALs or Special Naval Warfare units as primarily focused upon and experienced in counterinsurgency missions. While such a thought would indeed be accurate when it comes to the SOF mission envelope, war planners also see Special Operators as increasingly vital when it comes to the possibility of major-power maritime conflict as well. 

This reality may in large measure be why a new U.S. Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard strategy document carves out a special place to highlight maritime Special Operations Forces as fundamental to the Navy’s pivot toward major power warfare. 

“Naval special operations forces help prepare the operational environment in contested and denied areas. Their skills and access enable the Naval Service to insulate vulnerable partners and maneuver naval forces inside of contested areas,” the strategy, called Advantage at Sea .. Prevailing With Integrated All Domain Naval Power, states. 

Marines even operate something called a MEUSOC, or Marine Expeditionary Unit, Special Operations Capable, to support specific kinds of smaller, more targeted yet vital intelligence, rescue or attack missions. 

Perhaps a small group of Special Operations capable Marines need to drop in behind enemy lines to gather intelligence or even conduct clandestine hit-and-run attack missions otherwise not possible. 

These are factors why a number of large Navy platforms are specifically engineered to support, transport and enable Special Operations Missions. Littoral Combat Ship mission packages, for instance, incorporate 11-meter rigid, inflatable boats, small watercraft often used by SOF for high-speed transport, rescue missions, maritime casualty evacuations or small, covert, highly surgical targeted attack operations. 

Virginia-class attack submarines are also now engineered with a specific mind to supporting SOF missions; Block III Virginias, for instance, many of which are now operational, are built with what is called a Lock Out Trunk, an designated, separated area within the sub that can house small groups forces then fill up with water to enable SOF divers to quietly swim out of the submarine for stealthy reconnaissance or attack missions without needing to surface. This kind of innovation, which makes a certain kind of stealthy force insertion much more realistic and likely to favor success, seeks to leverage the training benefits and warfare skills unique to Special Operations Forces. 

Kris Osborn is the defense editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.

Warfare History Network

History, Americas

Antiseptic techniques were not yet in practice, and contaminated instruments and non-sterile conditions resulted in many wound infections.

Here's What You Need To Remember: Friendly fire was the direct cause of Jackson's death; an erroneous medical diagnosis helped. However, given what we know now about medicine, most historians agree that it is unlikely that the doctors could have done much to help him.

Following his greatest victory, at the Battle of Chancellorsville on May 2, 1863, Confederate Lt. Gen. Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson was scouting ahead of the lines with members of his staff when tragedy struck. In the pitch blackness of the early-spring evening, Jackson and his men were mistaken for Union cavalry and fired upon by their own side. Jackson sustained a severe wound to his upper left arm, necessitating amputation. Upon hearing the news, victorious General Robert E. Lee remarked, “He has lost his left arm, but I have lost my right.” Lee’s words proved prophetic. Eight days after the amputation, Jackson was dead.

It was a loss the Confederacy could ill afford. Before Chancellorsville, Jackson had enjoyed the fortuitous combination of personal skill as a commander, the ineptitude of his opponents, and the good luck that often follows such a combination. He had begun the Civil War as an unknown professor at Virginia Military Institute in Lexington, Virginia, after having distinguished himself during the Mexican War 15 years earlier. Fresh out of the United States Military Academy at West Point, where he had graduated a hard-won 17th in a class of 59, Jackson had earned two brevets for gallantry as an artillery officer during the Mexican War. By the end of the war, he had become a brevet major at the age of 24. He resigned his commission in 1852 to take the position of professor of artillery tactics and natural philosophy at VMI.

Jackson Volunteers for War

Jackson was commissioned a colonel of volunteers in April 1861 and promoted to brigadier general two months later. He won fame at the Battle of First Manassas on July 21, 1861, where his staunch defense of Henry Hill earned him the memorable nickname “Stonewall.” He was promoted to major general in October and appointed commander of all Confederate forces in the Shenandoah Valley the following month.

In the subsequent Shenandoah Valley campaign, Jackson fought a masterful series of battles against a greatly superior Union force. In doing so, his men prevented the reinforcement of Maj. Gen. George McClellan during McClellan’s drive on Richmond, probably saving the Confederate capital. After being repulsed at Kernstown, Jackson outmaneuvered and defeated enemy forces at Front Royal, Cross Keys, and Port Republic between May 23 and June 9, 1862. His campaign, long regarded by military historians as a tactical masterpiece, proved him to be a fearless and aggressive commander, a brilliant tactician, and a master of rapid maneuver. He summarized his approach to generalship as “always mystify, mislead and surprise the enemy.” This strategy also applied to his own subordinates, who were rarely informed of Jackson’s plans beforehand. Jackson consulted only with Robert E. Lee.

Jackson rejoined Lee in driving McClellan from the peninsula during the Seven Days’ Battles between June 26 and July 2. Jackson next destroyed Maj. Gen. John Pope’s supply depot at Manassas Junction on August 27 and repulsed Pope’s counterattack at Groveton the next day. He contributed substantially to Lee’s crushing victory over Pope at Second Manassas on August 29-30. During the invasion of Maryland, Jackson won added distinction at the Battle of Antietam. Despite the Confederate defeat, he was promoted to lieutenant general the following month. At the Battle of Fredericksburg in December 1862, Jackson commanded the right flank in another devastating defeat of Union forces, this time led by Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside.

A Grievous Wound

Jackson’s brilliant flanking move at Chancellorsville helped Lee reverse the tide of seeming Union victory and shatter the forces of the new enemy commander, Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker. It would be Jackson’s last hurrah. After sustaining a gunshot wound to his upper left arm and a minor wound to his right hand, Jackson left the battlefield supported by two aides. He was then placed on a litter. One of the litter-bearers was shot, causing the general to be thrown painfully to the ground. Jackson was lifted back onto the litter and carried a few hundred yards to the rear, where the 27-year-old medical director of the II Corps, Dr. Hunter McGuire, examined his wounds. “I hope you are not badly hurt, General,” he said. “I am badly injured,” Jackson responded forthrightly. “I fear I am dying. I am glad you have come. I think the wound in my shoulder is still bleeding.”

McGuire observed that Jackson’s clothes were saturated with blood and saw that the wound to the left arm indeed was still bleeding. He applied compression to an artery and called for a light to examine the wound more closely. He found that the bandage had slipped and adjusted it to stop the hemorrhage. McGuire also found that Jackson’s hands were cold, his skin was clammy, and his face and lips were pale—all classic signs of hemorrhagic shock. Jackson, however, admitted no discomfort. He was given morphine and whiskey nonetheless—despite being a lifelong teetotaler—and was removed to a nearby field hospital.

Immediate Surgery

At the hospital, McGuire determined that immediate surgery was necessary. When he informed Jackson, the general replied, “Yes, certainly, Dr. McGuire, do for me whatever you think best.” Chloroform was administered and Jackson murmured, “What an infinite blessing,” as he slipped into unconsciousness. McGuire first extracted a round ball that had lodged under the skin at the back of Jackson’s right hand. It had entered the palm and fractured two bones. Next, McGuire wrote, “The left arm was then amputated, about two inches below the shoulder, very rapidly, and with slight loss of blood, the ordinary circular operation having been made.”

Amputations accounted for approximately 75 percent of all operations during the Civil War. Antiseptic techniques were not yet in practice, and contaminated instruments and non-sterile conditions resulted in many wound infections. Nevertheless, prompt amputations undoubtedly saved many lives by converting traumatic wounds into surgical procedures to improve patient survivability. During the war, surgeons found that amputations performed within 48 hours of an injury were twice as likely to be successful as those performed later. Union records reveal a total of 5,540 upper-arm amputations, from which 1,273 amputees died from complications—a fatality rate of 23 percent.

Jackson tolerated the surgery well despite his earlier significant blood loss. At 3:30 the following morning, Major Alexander “Sandie” Pendleton arrived at the hospital to obtain orders for Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart, Jackson’s replacement as corps commander. Jackson attempted unsuccessfully to respond. “He tried to think,” reported Pendleton. “He contracted his brow, set his mouth, and for some moments appeared to exert every effort to concentrate his thoughts. For a moment we thought he had succeeded, for his nostril dilated, his eye flashed its own fire, and his thin lip quivered again, but it was just for a moment. Presently he relaxed again, and very feebly, and oh so sadly, he answered, ‘I don’t know. I can’t tell. Say to General Stuart that he must do what he thinks best.”

An Uneven Recovery

Jackson then slept for several hours and appeared to be free of pain when he awoke. At 10 am, however, he experienced a severe and sudden episode of pain in his right side and called for McGuire. Jackson assumed that he had injured his side when he struck a stone or stump during his fall from the litter the night before. McGuire made a careful examination and concluded, “No evidence of injury could be discovered by examination; the skin was not broken or bruised, and the lung performed, as far as I could tell, its proper function.” The pain soon abated.

By 8 pm, the pain had disappeared and Jackson seemed to be doing well. The following day, fearing Jackson’s capture by nearby Federals, Lee ordered McGuire to remove his patient to Guiney Station, 27 miles away. Early the next morning the ambulance set out, and Jackson seemed to tolerate the transfer well. Later in the day he became nauseated and asked that a wet towel be placed on his abdomen. Upon arrival, he felt well enough to take bread and tea.

The house where Jackson was to convalesce already contained several other wounded soldiers, including several with cases of highly contagious erysipelas, a skin infection caused by the bacteria streptococcus. McGuire would not allow Jackson to be exposed to the infection and found him a small building on the grounds that had been used as an office. The general slept well that night and awoke to eat a hearty breakfast.

McGuire dressed Jackson’s wounds and found them to be healing well without signs of infection. Jackson seemed satisfied with his progress and inquired how long it would be before he could return to the field. At 1 am, however, he suffered another bout of nausea and asked a servant to reapply a wet towel to his abdomen.

Jackson did not want to disturb the exhausted McGuire, who awoke to find his patient complaining again of pain in his right side. After examination, McGuire reluctantly concluded that Jackson had “pleuro-pneumonia of the right chest,” presumably secondary to the fall from the litter. The doctor speculated, “Contusion of the lung, with extravasion of blood in the chest, was probably produced by the fall referred to, and the loss of blood prevented any ill effects until reaction had been well established, and then inflammation ensued.”

Making a Diagnosis

On Thursday, May 7, Jackson’s wife, Anna, arrived with their five-month-old daughter, Julia. The sight of her husband’s mangled body and his difficulty breathing alarmed Anna, who said Jackson’s condition “wrung my soul with such grief and anguish as it had never before experienced. He looked like a dying man.” Upon seeing Anna, Jackson smiled and said, “I am very glad to see you looking so bright,” before falling back asleep. When he awoke and saw the look of concern on her face, he said, “My darling, you must cheer up and not wear a long face. I love cheerfulness and brightness in a sickroom.” For his sake, Anna tried to display a happy countenance, but her despair continued to grow.

McGuire had requested the assistance of Dr. Samuel B. Morrison, who arrived late that afternoon. Morrison was a medical school classmate of McGuire’s and a relative of Anna’s. He had treated Jackson before the war and was recognized by the general when he arrived. “There is an old familiar face,” said Jackson, although Morrison was actually five years younger. Morrison was unconvinced that Jackson’s labored breathing and pain in the side were due to pneumonia. He favored a diagnosis of prostration, or complete physical collapse.

Some accounts maintain that Jackson had been ill with a respiratory tract infection prior to the Battle of Chancellorsville, pointing to the fact that he was wearing his raincoat on a warm day owing to chills. However, none of the eight physicians who attended him in the last week of his life mentioned this history or described any sign or symptoms suggesting a preexisting infection. McGuire and Morrison conferred and decided to send to Richmond for Dr. David Tucker, a leading authority on pneumonia. In the meantime, McGuire requested that two other surgeons, Robert J. Breckinridge and John Phillip Smith, join the medical team.

Jackson was restless throughout Thursday night, calling out various orders to his men. “A.P. Hill, prepare for action!” he shouted on one occasion. “Pass the infantry to the front!” he commanded, as well as “Tell Major Hawks to send forward provisions for the troops!”

The four physicians carefully examined Jackson the next morning. The wounds were suppurating, but seemed to be healing normally. There was little they could do, however, to relieve Jackson’s persistent shortness of breath and chest pain. He seemed to be growing weaker by the hour. After another restless night, Tucker arrived from Richmond on the morning of May 9 and confirmed McGuire’s original diagnosis of pneumonia. He recommended cupping. Hot glasses were applied to the afflicted area to “draw the blood.”

“I am not Afraid to Die”

Jackson continued to decline, fading in and out of consciousness. When he awoke in the afternoon and saw several surgeons standing around his bed, he said, “I see from the number of physicians that you think my condition dangerous, but I thank God, if it is His will, that I am ready to go. I am not afraid to die.” Following another difficult night, the general awoke on Sunday, May 10, completely exhausted. It was apparent to everyone that he could not last the day. Anna broke down sobbing and told Jackson that there was no hope for his recovery. Jackson called for McGuire and said, “Doctor, Anna informs me that you have told her I am to die today. Is it so?” McGuire replied that there was nothing further the doctors could do. Jackson paused, then responded, “Very good, very good. It is all right.”

After brief visits from little Julia and Major Pendleton, Jackson lapsed into a coma. He awoke shortly before 3:15 pm and spoke his final, enigmatic words: “Let us cross over the river and rest under the shade of the trees.”

The Diagnosis in Retrospect

While McGuire and the other attending physicians all agreed that pneumonia was the cause of Jackson’s death, modern-day analysis raised the more likely possibility of pulmonary embolism. The source of the so-called pleuro-pneumonia was presumed to be a lung contusion incurred during Jackson’s fall from the litter. However, from the distance of a few feet at most, the ribs would have absorbed most of the force of the fall, protecting the underlying lung. There would also have been external evidence of trauma such as bruising in an injury serious enough to result in a lung contusion. Neither McGuire nor the other physicians found any evidence of such trauma.

Pleuro-pneumonia is a medical term that is rarely used today. Pleurisy occurs when inflammation involves the pleura, or outer surface, of the lung. Pleuritic chest pain often accompanies pneumonia, thus the term pleuro-pneumonia. Sir William Osler’s 1892 edition of his classic textbook, The Principles and Practice of Medicine, states: “Pneumonia is a self-limited disease, and runs its course uninfluenced in any way by medicine. It can neither be aborted nor cut short by any means at our command.” Osler went on to say that “the first distressing system is usually pain in the side, which may be relieved by local depletion—by cupping or leeching.” Such treatment was used unsuccessfully on Jackson.

According to the thinking of the day, Jackson’s clinical presentation fit with pneumonia. His physicians cannot be faulted for their diagnosis or treatment, although it should be noted that 19th-century physicians were adept at eliciting the subtle physical signs of pneumonia, such as hearing a cracking sound in the lungs with a stethoscope or finding dullness to percussion of the chest. Neither of these classic signs of pneumonia was found by any of Jackson’s doctors.

In terminal pneumonia, the clinical course typically goes from bad to worse. But in Jackson’s illness, there were two distinct, sudden episodes of deterioration. These occurred on May 3 and May 6, and both were described as being associated with the onset of acute chest pain, shortness of breath, fatigue, and perhaps fever. These symptoms are consistent with pulmonary emboli, which are blood clots traveling to the lungs. Among the numerous complications following amputation of an extremity are nonhealing of the stump, infection, and thromboembolism, or the formation of a blood clot within a large vein. According to McGuire, Jackson’s wound appeared to be healing properly and infection did not seem significant.

It is known today that an amputee is at significant risk for venous thromboembolism and pulmonary embolism. Immobilization of the patient following surgery can allow the blood to pool and clot within the veins. More dangerous is the formation of clots in the large veins that are tied off during amputation. The tying off of the veins, or ligation, leads to stagnation of blood in the veins, which leads in turn to a thrombus, or clot, which can then travel to the lungs and kill the patient.

Even with today’s advanced technology, it is estimated that as many as half of all pulmonary emboli go undetected by physicians. The current treatment and prevention of thromboembolism is accomplished by the use of blood-thinning agents such as Heparin and Lovenox. Although Stonewall Jackson’s death was unpreventable, given the state of medicine at the time, it is more likely that he died from thromboembolism as a direct consequence of his wound and amputation, than from the indirect cause of pneumonia.

This article by J.D. Haines first appeared at the Warfare History Network.

Image: Wikimedia Commons.