Diplomacy & Crisis News

Summary and Key Points: Lockheed Martin has delivered the first F-16 Block 70 aircraft to Slovakia, marking a significant step in modernizing the Slovak Air Force. This delivery is part of a total order of 14 advanced multirole fighters, with the remaining aircraft set to arrive by 2025. The F-16 Block 70, equipped with advanced avionics, extended structural service life, and enhanced safety features like the Automatic Ground Collision Avoidance System, represents a substantial upgrade for Slovakia's defense capabilities.

-Lockheed Martin, facing high demand for the F-16, plans to increase production, ensuring continued delivery to NATO allies and other international customers.

-This move underscores the strategic importance of the F-16 in bolstering NATO's collective defense and enhancing global security.

On Monday, aerospace giant Lockheed Martin announced that the first F-16 Block 70 aircraft had arrived in the Slovak Republic. It was one of five modernized F-16 Fighting Falcons produced for the Central European nation, while the remaining four aircraft will likely arrive later this year.

Nine additional aircraft are now being produced for the Slovak Air Force, and all 14 of the all-weather multirole fighters are on track to be delivered to the NATO member state by the end of 2025.

"Slovakia is at the forefront of adopting Europe's most advanced 4th Generation fighter, the F-16 Block 70. These jets not only represent a stronger alliance between Slovakia, the United States, and NATO allies, but also equip the Slovak Air Force with advanced capabilities to face 21st Century Security challenges," said OJ Sanchez, vice president and general manager of the Integrated Fighter Group at Lockheed Martin.

"As Slovakia has now joined the ranks of nations operating the F-16, a benchmark NATO fighter, they bolster their defense capabilities and readiness for NATO operations," added Sanchez.

The nine aircraft in production are just a tiny fraction of the orders that Lockheed Martin has received, and it was last week that Sanchez also told reporters that the company expects the production lines will remain operational for years to come.

Earlier this year, Edwards Air Force Base (AFB), California, hosted a celebration of the Fight Falcon, to mark the 50th anniversary of the aircraft's maiden flight – which occurred in January 1974. In those five decades, the F-16 has established itself as the most popular Western fighter in its class, and it continues to serve 28 nations around the world. The proven warbird hasn't gotten older; it has also gotten better.

The F-16, which originated under the Lightweight Fighter (LWF) program for the United States Air Force, has been produced in 138 different configurations from the prototype to its latest production models. Successive changes have seen the addition of improved cockpit technologies, enhanced avionics, sensors, and weapons – while great effort has been made to ensure the fighter is more reliable and easier to maintain.

The latest F-16s have an increased range and payload, advanced infrared sensors, and laser targeting devices, while it has improved survivability thanks to more advanced electronic warfare sensors and sophisticated decoys.

According to a report from Breaking Defense, Lockheed Martin is currently facing a backlog of 128 planes but it plans to double production next year to a rate of 48 aircraft annually. Even at that pace, the production lines at its facility in Greenville, South Carolina will remain operational through the end of the decade.

"We see clear opportunity towards about 300 new export F-16 aircraft sales," Sanchez told reporters. "We are obviously working closely through the FMS process [for NATO ally Turkey] and we are excited to be talking to Thailand and the Philippines."

Sanchez added the production line will continue to run "to provide those capabilities as long as the demand exists."

Other current NATO operators include Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Greece, Poland, Portugal and Turkey.

According to Lockheed Martin, the F-16 Block 70 jets are equipped with the Northrop Grumman APG-83 AESA Radar, and advanced avionics that increase the capabilities of the Fighting Falcon. In addition, the structural service life has been extended to 12,000 hours, while critical safety features including the Automatic Ground Collision Avoidance System (Auto GCAS) have been incorporated in the airframe. That has proved to be a true lifesaver, as it has saved 13 aviators in a dozen incidents.

Earlier this month, Lockheed Martin delivered the 4,600th F-16 Fighting Falcon, and while the aircraft is no longer being acquired by the U.S. Air Force, Lockheed Martin continues to build the F-16 for foreign customers around the world – and it remains the most successful, combat-proven multi-role jet fighter ever produced.

Given that it shows no signs of slowing down, it is possible more than 5,000 Fighting Falcons could be hatched before the F-16 finally flies off into the sunset.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

All images are Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points: Russia's tank stockpile is approaching a critical point of depletion, with recent reports indicating that even Cold War-era T-54/55 tanks are being deployed to the frontlines in Ukraine. Videos show these tanks being transported from storage facilities near Moscow, highlighting the severe strain on Russia's modern tank reserves, including the T-72 and T-90 models.

-With over 83,500 T-54/55 tanks produced in the Soviet Union and additional units built in Poland and Czechoslovakia, these aging platforms are now being used for artillery roles and direct combat, despite their limited effectiveness against modern tanks.

-This move underscores the desperate measures Russia is taking to sustain its war efforts, as its tank reserves may be entirely depleted by next year.

Earlier this month, news circulated that the Russian military could reach a "critical point of depletion" on the stocks of its old tanks by next year. The Kremlin has been refurbishing many older armored vehicles that have spent years in storage – and which, on paper, bolstered the size of the Russian Army's tank force.

A recent report from The Economist further suggested the storage facilities could be close to empty, at least of vehicles that could be serviceable, and it now appears that one of the last major caches of Cold War tanks may be on the way to Ukraine. Since last year, the Kremlin has replenished its losses of modern main battle tanks (MBTs) – including the T-72 and T-90 models – by pulling older platforms from the storage facilities.

Videos circulated on social media showing a column of T-54/55 series tanks loaded on trains spotted at the Uzunovo railway station, approximately 150km (93 miles) south of Moscow, and purported to be headed to the frontlines.

"Russia is deploying even more ancient T-54 tanks. The prototype of this tank has been developed in 1945. It is another obvious indicator that Russia is running out of hardware and diving deeper into its storages," the open-source military intelligence analyst Tendar posted on X, the social media platform formerly known as Twitter.

As noted by the Defence Blog, the T-54, which was a direct evolution of the iconic T-34 and first prototyped at the Nizhny Tagil tank plant in late 1945, "became the backbone of the Soviet and Warsaw Pact armored units from the late 1950s." It was upgraded as the T-55, and together the T-54/55 series became one of the most-produced tanks to date.

"These tanks, despite their age, are being used in a variety of roles on the battlefield," a defense analyst told Defence Blog earlier this month. "Initially, they were repurposed for artillery roles, firing from concealed positions. Now, they're increasingly engaged in direct combat roles."

More than 83,500 T-54/55 tanks were produced in the Soviet Unit, while Poland and Czechoslovakia also manufactured an additional combined 21,000 of the tanks. The platform saw service around the world in conflicts in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. It was designed for a war in Europe, where it is now being employed – albeit not likely in a way its designers expected.

Russia has lost thousands of tanks in the now more than two and a half long year war in Ukraine, and it has resorted to deploying old platforms, pulled from storage, to address the losses. The improved T-55 was considered evenly matched with the U.S. Army's M48 "Patton" tank, but it would seem ill-suited in a fight against modern MBTs, including even Ukraine's T-72s from the later stages of the Cold War.

However, not even the Kremlin is so desperate to simply send the T-54/55 into mass armored assaults. Rather, as Army Recognition reported, the tanks have "primarily been used as 100mm self-propelled guns, providing indirect fire support from concealed positions akin to artillery," but it added, "Nevertheless, these tanks are also being employed to assault Ukrainian positions, functioning as both tanks and troop transports in a manner similar to tactics used during the Second World War."

Questions continue to be raised, whether the deployment of the older tanks reflects the "scarcity of modern equipment or a deliberate strategy to preserve advanced resources" for another sector, or a planned attack. The reality is that is probably a mix of the two. Russia simply can't replace the loss of modern tanks, and the T-54/55 series tanks are now necessary for use in secondary roles.

Regardless of how the older platform will be employed, one thing is certain, Russia's stockpiles of tanks are being depleted and at this rate, those storage facilities may be empty by this time next year!

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Creative Commons. 

Since August 2021, all Central Asian republics have been, in one way or another, contending with Taliban rule in Afghanistan. While treading cautiously, each Central Asian government faces a host of major challenges related to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA). 

While no Central Asian state has formally recognized the Taliban, all Central Asian republics have, to varying degrees, engaged the IEA and unofficially recognized Afghanistan’s only de facto government. Tajikistan sits on the far end of this spectrum as the most firmly anti-Taliban Central Asian country.

President Emomali Rahmon’s government believes that the IEA constitutes an illegitimate regime. Tajikistan sees the IEA as a grave threat to its national interests and regional security. There appears to be no reason to expect any thaw in Dushanbe’s relationship with the Taliban.

The former Soviet republic has vowed not to formally recognize the Taliban because it was “formed through oppression.” Tajikistan is the Central Asian republic that has given the greatest support to Afghanistan’s anti-Taliban forces, as was also the case during the Taliban’s first time in power (1996–2001) with the Northern Alliance. Tajikistan has hosted the National Resistance Front (NFR), a military alliance comprised of former Northern Alliance members who remain loyal to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Mohammad Zahir Aghbar, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s ambassador to Tajikistan, still runs the Afghan embassy in Dushanbe. This diplomatic mission in Tajikistan has been a focal point of anti-Taliban activity.

Ethnicity is an important factor. While the Taliban is mostly Pashtun-dominated, Afghan Tajiks played a leading role in the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. Its past leader, Ahmad Shah Massoud, was a Tajik. His son, Ahmad Massoud Jr., and the former vice president in the Ashraf Ghani government, Amrullah Saleh, who is also an ethnic Tajik, reportedly spent much of their time in Dushanbe working against the IEA. For political purposes, the government in Dushanbe feels the need to show sympathy for ethnic Tajiks in Afghanistan, at least to some degree.

Ideological dynamics are also relevant. While all Central Asian states are staunchly secular, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have taken a mostly pragmatic approach to relations with the IEA. In contrast, Tajikistan sees any political engagement with the Taliban as a threat to its rigidly implemented secularism.

“With most of the regional countries including the Central Asian countries preferring to do business with the Taliban, Tajikistan finds itself as the odd man out in pursuing such a policy. However, at the same time, it has possibly emerged as the lone theater for keeping the anti-Taliban resistance forces alive. Many of the unknown sources of support for these groups could have been routed through Tajikistan,” according to Shanthie Mariet D’Souza, a Fulbright-Nehru Visiting Chair at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst School of Public Policy.

“Thus, Tajikistan’s policies may have been useful for countries and actors who still hope for the establishment of an inclusive government in Afghanistan or even pressurizing the Taliban to change its policies in some ways,” she added.

Border Security and Violent Extremism

Of all Central Asian countries, Tajikistan has the longest border with Afghanistan, and the government in Dushanbe has long perceived grave security threats from Afghanistan. This brings us to Jamaat Ansarullah (JA).

Founded in 2010, JA is a group made up of Tajik extremists who seek to oust Tajikistan’s ultra-secular government. The organization recruits its members from within Afghanistan and Tajikistan. Banned in Tajikistan, JA has a record of waging attacks inside the Central Asian country. Shortly before the collapse of Ghani’s government, the Taliban put JA “partially in charge” of securing Afghanistan’s 843-mile border with Tajikistan. Although the IEA denies harboring any armed group that threatens the security of any Central Asian country, authorities in Dushanbe reject that claim.

Beyond questions surrounding JA, there are other ways in which Dushanbe sees the Taliban regime as a direct threat to peace and stability in Tajikistan. “Pro-Taliban social media channels are also highly critical of the Tajikistan government and operate Tajik-language social media channels,” explained Adam Rousselle, an editor and contributor at Militant Wire.

“There are also concerns over cross-border narcotics trafficking into Tajikistan, which has risen despite Taliban efforts to stamp out the trade elsewhere in the country. It is possible that JA is engaged in drug trafficking into Tajikistan as well,” he added.

Within this context, it was understandable why Tajikistan beefed up security along its border with Afghanistan in the period just before the Taliban retook power in August 2021.

Mutual Lack of Inclusivity

The Taliban’s exclusion of Tajiks from governance is problematic from the perspective of Dushanbe. This is both for nationalist and security reasons. Authorities in Tajikistan believe that the Taliban’s marginalization of ethnic Tajiks risks pushing more of them toward violent extremist groups, chiefly Islamic State–Khorasan Province (ISKP), which would pose a security threat to Dushanbe.

“The reason why Tajikistan is taking the matter of the seclusion and discrimination of ethnic Tajiks in Afghanistan seriously, is because Tajikistan fears that if discriminated ethnic Tajiks of Afghanistan do not find sympathy and support from Tajikistan or from NRF inside Tajikistan, then these ethnic Tajiks of Afghanistan may increasingly join ISKP to settle their score with Taliban,” Ahmad Sayer Daudzai, the former Afghan ambassador to the UAE, told these authors.

“There is plenty of evidence that ISKP has been recruiting non-Pashtun fighters from ethnic minorities of Afghanistan, especially from urban areas, as these non-Pashtun youth have ethnic grievances with the Pashtun Taliban movement and can find a platform with the non-ethnic ISKP,” added the former Afghan diplomat.

However, calls for inclusivity coming from Dushanbe clash with the reality of Rahmon’s authoritarian government, which tolerates no opposition, even of a moderate Islamist hue. This stance violates the terms of the 1997 UN-brokered Tajik Peace Accord that ended the country’s vicious five-year civil war. The government cracks down harshly on outward signs of Islamic piety. Authorities recently imposed new restrictions on the wearing of hijabs in public. Such measures fuel violent extremism and push Tajik citizens toward ISKP—a significant concern not only for the Taliban but also for many other countries that have suffered from its terrorism, including Russia and Turkey.

Pragmatic Engagement

Although Tajikistan’s formal position is that the IEA is illegitimate, and Dushanbe opposes the idea of countries recognizing the Taliban, the Central Asian state has had no choice but pragmatic accommodation when it comes to the realities of post-U.S. Afghanistan. Tajikistan’s government has made efforts to work with the Taliban in cross-border economic relations and the struggle against ISKP.

“Tajikistan never stopped providing electricity to Afghanistan, even after the Taliban retook power, despite the non-recognition of their regime, and the fact that Afghanistan was in debt to pay for this electricity supply. Last February though, Afghanistan finally cleared the debt. Quite paradoxically, the representatives of the two national electricity companies met a few times since the summer of 2021 to renew partnerships and even agree on an additional supply of electricity and potentially extend transmission lines,” said Mélanie Sadozaï, postdoctoral research associate at the University of Regensburg.

“In addition to these meetings and agreements, the border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan, which was closed [in] February 2020, reopened in September 2023 to allow some cross-border markets to operate. Officials in Tajikistan have not denied these activities and have declared publicly that while their political position towards the Taliban [hasn’t] changed, they would support economic and trade relations for the benefits of both countries,” she told these authors.

Intelligence services of the government of Tajikistan and the IEA have also had meetings to discuss the ISKP threat, even if little information is publicly available about such engagement. Whether the shared threat perception of ISKP is enough to bring about a better relationship between Dushanbe and the Islamist rulers in Kabul is unclear, but experts have their doubts. This is primarily due to the lingering JA issue that appears set to ensure that Tajikistan-Taliban relations remain extremely negative.

“The threat posed by the ISKP could provoke security cooperation between the Dushanbe and the Taliban, but for this to happen, there would need to be a dramatic reduction in the threat JA poses to Tajikistan. Whether the Taliban exerts enough authority over JA to achieve this is unclear and until this happens, meaningful cooperation between the two countries seems unlikely,” commented Rousselle.

Throughout the foreseeable future, Tajikistan-Taliban relations will probably remain largely frosty. Pragmatic engagement on trade and the growing acceptance of the reality of IEA rule in Afghanistan by Tajikistan’s Central Asian neighbors, as well as important external partners, such as Russia, China, and Iran, may ease some friction. But the vexing questions about security, ideology, and nationalism will continue to bedevil the Tajikistan-Taliban relationship.

Eldar Mamedov is a Brussels-based foreign policy expert. He has degrees from the University of Latvia and the Diplomatic School in Madrid, Spain. He has worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia and as a diplomat in Latvian embassies in Washington and Madrid. Since 2009, Mamedov has served as a political advisor for the social-democrats in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament (EP) and is in charge of the EP delegations for inter-parliamentary relations with Iran, Iraq, and the Arabian Peninsula. Find him on X: @EldarMamedov4

Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics, an Adjunct Assistant Professor at Georgetown University, and an Adjunct Fellow at the American Security Project. He is a frequent contributor to Al Jazeera, Gulf International Forum, The New Arab, Responsible Statecraft, Stimson Center, and Amwaj.Media. Throughout Mr. Cafiero’s career, he has consulted many public and private sector entities, briefed diplomats of various countries on Gulf affairs, and worked as a subject matter expert for multinational law firms. Mr. Cafiero holds an M.A. in International Relations from the University of San Diego. Find him on X: @GiorgioCafiero.

Image: DeniskaPhotoGuide / Shutterstock.com.

Summary and Key Points: Washington must prioritize deterrence, especially with a reliable, long-range strategic stealth bombing capability. The B-21 Raider is poised to be the most sophisticated bomber ever built, intended to replace the aging B-2 Spirit.

-The U.S. Air Force aims to acquire many B-21s to enhance capabilities and strengthen deterrence, although budget constraints may limit numbers.

-The B-21 is essential for maintaining America’s nuclear triad and deterrence against near-peer rivals like China and Russia. In an era where nuclear warfare is a growing threat, cutting the B-21 program would severely compromise U.S. national defense.

With the world order we know it tending toward collapse, Washington must ready itself to survive in a world that is decidedly anti-American. 

Deterrence is one key plank in that survival strategy. Sadly, as I recently told an audience at the Heritage Foundation, “deterrence is dead.” Restoring deterrence must be a leading priority for the next president, and a primary element of any deterrence strategy is having a reliable, long-range strategic stealth bombing capability. America’s existing stealth bombers, such as the B-2 Spirit, are aging and need to be replaced. 

Hence, the creation of the B-21 Raider. 

The new B-21 will likely be the most sophisticated bomber ever built. The U.S. Air Force wants a lot of these bad boys (they’ll be lucky if they even get 100) to replace the B-2, increase capabilities, and strengthen deterrence. Yet Congress is understandably balking at this program. Sure, it’s an awesome suite of technologies, and if it all goes to plan, it’ll advance America’s manned stealth bombing capabilities significantly. 

On the other hand, however, America appears to be on the brink of some kind of debt crisis. Interest payments on the national debt have already surpassed annual defense spending for the first time. So the Pentagon is not going to be able to justify the kind of expenditures it has for the last 80 years. This is why the Senate's proposed National Defense Authorization Act slashes funding for the Navy’s sixth-generation F/A-XX carrier warplane by some 90%. It’s why the Air Force’s Next Generation Air Dominance fighter program is in jeopardy.       

The B-21 is subject to the same realities. But unlike a sixth-generation warplane, which would be redundant and costly, America actually needs a reliable long-range stealth strike capability. With the B-2s aging out of service, unless the B-21 Raiders are given the approval they need – and are built in a timely and reliable manner – the United States will lack the stealth strike capabilities it has become accustomed to for the last several decades. 

Without this cornerstone of U.S. national defense, America’s ability to deter near-peer rivals such as China or Russia will suffer. 

The B-21 is described as a “nuclear-capable, penetrating strike stealth bomber” that “will be a component of a larger family of systems for conventional Long Range Strike, including intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, electronic attack, communication and other capabilities.” According to the Air Force’s official description, this warbird will be able to “accommodate manned or unmanned operations. Additionally, it will be able to employ a broad mix of stand-off and direct-attack munitions.”

My colleague Harrison Kass has argued that “were the B-21 to be canceled, were the U.S. left without a stealth bomber option, [America’s] nuclear triad would be compromised.” 

We are living in an age where the prospect of nuclear warfare is more prevalent than it has been in decades. 

The United States, because of bureaucratic inertia, refuses to design and deploy the kind of space-based weapons defenses needed to protect the homeland from these strikes. What’s more, America’s nuclear weapons arsenal is in dire need of modernization, and possibly expansion. The nuclear triad puts redundancies in place.

The long-range stealth bomber is a key component of that triad. The B-21 will be it, unless Congress chooses to cut the program before it even takes wing. In this current environment, removing America’s long-range stealth strike capabilities is a really bad idea—even if the price tag is high for the B-21.

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. 

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)

Summary and Key Points: At the Farnborough International Airshow 2024, the UK, Italy, and Japan unveiled a new concept model of their multinational sixth-generation fighter, the centerpiece of the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP). The updated design features a pure delta panform and larger wingspan to enhance aerodynamics.

-The fighter emphasizes speed, range, and payload over traditional dogfighting roles. Engineers from BAE Systems, Leonardo, and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries are collaboratively developing the aircraft, which is set to enter service in the mid-2030s.

-Despite earlier concerns, the UK's new Labour government supports the program, ensuring its continued progress. The GCAP aims to create an advanced, interoperable fighter jet with intelligent weapon systems and next-generation radar, capable of processing 10,000 times more data than current systems.

At this week's Farnborough International Airshow 2024, the UK, Italy, and Japan unveiled a new concept model of the multinational next-generation fighter that is expected to be the centerpiece of the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP). The new concept artwork for the future sixth-generation fighter highlighted its emphasis on speed, range, and payload – over a traditional dogfighting role.

As described by international military analyst firm Janes, the fighter features "a pure delta panform in place of the previously touted modified delta."

"In the 18 months since the launch of the GCAP, we've been working closely with our industrial partners in Italy and Japan under the collaboration agreement, and also with the three governments, to understand and align requirements for a next-generation combat aircraft," said Herman Claesen, managing director, Future Combat Air Systems, for lead UK company on the project BAE Systems. "The new model … shows notable progress in the design and concepting of this future fighter jet. We'll continue to test and evolve the design, as we move closer towards the next phase of the programme."

The new concept model is on display this week at the UK's largest airshow, also emphasized how the design has evolved. In addition to the delta panform, the aircraft features a larger wingspan than previous concepts, including those of the UK's Tempest. The changes were meant to improve the aerodynamics of the future combat aircraft.

"Engineers from across BAE Systems, Leonardo and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries are working together under a collaboration agreement on the design and development of the future combat aircraft using a range of innovative digital tools and techniques, including computer based modelling and virtual reality to evolve the aircraft’s design during its concepting phase," the companies said in a joint statement.

Though the design of the sixth-generation fighter has evolved, the timeline hasn't changed. The companies stated that the aircraft is still on track to enter service in the mid-2035s. The goal of the GCAP is still to develop an advanced, interoperable, adaptable, and connected fighter jet. It has also been touted to be equipped with "an intelligent weapons system, a software-driven interactive cockpit, integrated sensors and a powerful next generation radar" that can provide "10,000 times more data than the current systems."

There had been speculation that GCAP may not have the same level of support from the UK's new Labour government, but that doesn't seem to be the case.

"We are heading towards 2025 at pace," Claesen told Janes in Farnborough. "In readiness for 2025 to take on the international design and development contract, we have been working at phenomenal pace, and the key message is that pace has continued absolutely since the last time we got together [at Farnborough 2022], whether it is from a government point of view or whether it's from an industry point of view."

The UK and Italy's Tempest program merged with the Japanese F-X project. In December 2022, the UK, Japan, and Italy signed an international treaty to collaborate on the development of an advanced front-line fighter. Though the name has changed, the goal has not.

Tempest was initiated to develop a replacement for the Eurofighter Typhoon, which is operated by both the Royal Air Force (RAF) and the Italian Air Force, while the F-X program was jumpstarted to produce an aircraft to replace the aging Japanese F-2 fighters. It is further worth noting that all three nations have adopted the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II multirole fifth-generation stealth fighter – but appeared to be looking towards a sixth-generation combat aircraft.

"The pace of the programme is extraordinary, building on a solid foundation and industrial legacy in each country and government-led partnership. Since the treaty was signed in December 2023, the programme has seen strong commitment from each partner. Each brings different, but complementary, qualities and requirements. We are now working closely together to exchange knowledge, address common challenges, and achieve common goals," added Guglielmo Maviglia, chief GCAP Officer at Leonardo.

It would seem among the sixth-generation fighter programs, GCAP may be the one that will supercruise its way to service – and while it may incorporate the latest stealth technology, the efforts to develop this aircraft aren't being hidden from view.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

All images are Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. Image are from when the GCAP program was called Tempest. 

Summary and Key Points: The UK Ministry of Defence, in collaboration with Raytheon UK, the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl), and Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S), has successfully tested a high-energy laser weapon system (HELWS) integrated onto a British Army Wolfhound armored combat vehicle.

-Conducted at the Dstl range in Porton Down, this marks the first time a portable laser weapon has been fired from a land vehicle in the UK. Designed to counter unmanned aerial systems (UAS), the HELWS has already proven its effectiveness by downing over 400 targets in tests.

-This development is part of the UK's Land Laser Directed Energy Weapon (LDEW) Demonstrator program and aims to enhance the British Army's capabilities in countering drone threats. The next phase involves further testing and familiarization for British Army soldiers.

Numerous military aircraft have been described as "bomb trucks" for their ability to carry massive loads of ordnance. The UK Ministry of Defence has sought to create a different type of truck – namely a laser truck of the ground-based wheeled variety. This week, Raytheon UK, Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl), and Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) announced the successful test of Raytheon's High-Energy Laser Weapon System (HELWS), which was integrated onto a British Army Wolfhound armored combat vehicle.

The test was conducted at the Dstl range in Porton Down in southwest England, where the HELWS was fired at full power. Described as a "major leap forward in the UK Ministry of Defence's Land Laser Directed Energy Weapon (LDEW) Demonstrator" program, it marked the first time that any portable laser weapon was fired from a land vehicle in the UK.

Though directed energy weapons (DEW), including high-energy lasers, have been in the works for some time now, the role has evolved since Russia's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine more than two and a half years ago. Small unmanned aerial systems (UAS) have put into question the role of the tank on the modern battlefield, as the lumbering behemoths have been destroyed by loitering munitions – so-called kamikaze drones – as well as with other UAS that have literally dropped ordnance on the tanks.

"The increasing prevalence, proliferation and evolution of drone warfare makes the rapid adoption of counter-UAS technologies ever more important," Raytheon UK said in a statement on Monday. It further noted that the new variant of the HELWS had been designed to defeat NATO class 1 drones, while remaining compatible with current air defense platforms that include radar, command and control, and other systems. That ensures that the lasers could readily be deployed with air-to-air missiles, Close-in Weapons Systems (CIWS), and other air defenses.

"We have proven that the Raytheon high energy laser weapon system can track and engage targets whilst mounted on a vehicle," explained James Gray, chief executive and managing director of Raytheon UK. "The speed at which this capability was delivered is only possible due to the hard work of our British SME partners, coupled with the operationally proven technology developed by Raytheon."

The HELWS is already certified for use in combat with U.S. military forces, and the 300kW-class platform was developed as part of the U.S. Department of Defense's (DoD's) High Energy Laser Scaling Initiative (HELSI) program, which sought to create a high-performance DEW. It has logged more than 40,000 testing hours and successfully downed more than 400 targets. It has already been deployed overseas.

The vehicle-based HELWS will undergo additional testing in the UK, and the next phase will call upon British Army soldiers to be familiarized with the platform.

"The joint working between Dstl, DE&S, and industry has enabled rapid evolution of this laser demonstrator. The successful testing of this high-powered laser weapon marks a pivotal moment in our ongoing efforts to enhance the future operational capabilities of the British Army," said Matt Cork, Dstl Programme Lead. "This technology offers a precise, powerful and cost-effective means to defeat aerial threats, ensuring greater protection for our forces."

The British Army isn't alone in developing a laser.

Earlier this year, the UK's Royal Navy announced that it was testing the DragonFire, a line-of-sight laser-directed energy weapon (LDEW) that could potentially engage targets at the speed of light. In addition to its extreme accuracy, the DragonFire's intense beam can cut through a target – including a drone or missile – leading to its structural failure.

The platform is also highly cost-effective compared to other air defense systems, costing only around £10 per shot. As previously reported, tests of the platform have been underway at the MoD's Hebrides Range, located off the coast of Scotland. The Royal Navy hopes to deploy the platform by 2027.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

All images are Creative Commons. 

The stated aim of the Biden administration’s policy on Ukraine has been to achieve the defeat of Russia, and to this end, it provided assistance to Ukraine. It did not undertake any serious diplomatic initiative with Russia and Ukraine on a negotiated settlement. Vice President Harris may, of course, adjust that policy if the Democratic Party nominates her and wins the elections in November. As of now, it appears that she will likely continue Biden’s policy. 

If the Trump-Vance ticket prevails, there is likely to be a push for serious negotiations toward a diplomatic settlement. The time between now and the election, as well as the transition to the new administration, should be utilized to begin discussing potential settlement options and modalities, as well as their prospects and implications for Ukraine, Russia, Europe, and the United States.

A Trump administration may become both a catalyst and an opportunity for a Ukraine settlement. Both President Trump and Senator Vance have consistently called for such a settlement and have expressed doubts that U.S. and European assistance to Ukraine and economic pressure on Russia can realistically bring about Ukraine’s victory in the war. Both have been concerned about the level of U.S. assistance and have argued that European powers should carry the predominant burden since the conflict is “in their neighborhood.” 

Senator Vance has made an additional argument. He has argued that given the U.S. military capabilities, including our industrial base, the priority should be to focus on the threat from China and that the effort in Ukraine diverts resources needed to deal with Beijing’s vital challenge.

Nor would it be unreasonable for Trump to conclude that the situation on the ground in both Ukraine and Russia provides an opportunity for a political settlement. Victory is not imminent for either side. Ukraine’s resistance has been heroic but has come at the cost of enormous casualties. War fatigue among the populace, if it has not set in already, is inevitable. President Zelensky faced significant challenges in his mobilization effort. The country has suffered mortal blows to its energy and power grid, and there are electricity and fuel shortages due to Russian attacks on refineries. The coming winter is likely to be particularly harsh.

However, while Ukraine may not have the military capability to evict Russian forces from its territory, it has had some military success in liberating areas once occupied by Russia. It now has more weapons, including weapons capable of striking Russian soil, and it has the green light from its allies to deploy those at least selectively. Ukraine has inflicted damage on the battlefield and inside Russia. Kiev also produces more weapons at home and has economic and security commitments from several countries, including the United States. Ukraine, with support from its partners, can continue the war for the foreseeable future.

Russia has important advantages in the war, but for them, too, the cost of the ongoing conflict has been high. Russia has sustained more casualties than those on the Ukrainian side. Many young, technologically skilled Russians have left the country. Ukrainian drones have attacked Russia’s infrastructure. The war is now within Russia itself, making Russians more alert to the conflict. The war has also damaged Russian relations with much of the international community, and the costs of sanctions imposed on it have been significant, including the loss of a large part of its formerly lucrative energy market.

Internationally, the war has made Russia dependent on China, North Korea, and Iran. There is a long history of Sino-Russian mutual rivalry. While both have resented the U.S. power position after its success in the Cold War, they have different long-term objectives. Putin is an advocate of multipolarity, with Russia as one of the poles. China’s long-term objective is global preeminence, with Russia at best as a junior partner. Moscow believes that better relations with the West, especially the United States, could serve its interests. However, that is highly unlikely to occur without an acceptable ending to the Ukraine war.

The war has also strengthened rather than weakened NATO. The alliance has expanded in the last two years and is spending more on defense. If Trump is elected, allies will come under pressure to spend even more. Prospects for Russian victory against Ukraine in the foreseeable future are uncertain at best.

Russia will face a crucial additional risk if Trump is elected. If Putin does not respond positively to a peace initiative offered by the newly elected American President, he will undermine prospects for any improvement in relations. It may also have other unforeseen consequences, such as removing any limitations on Ukrainian use of American weapons and pushing against Russian interests in other regions, including North Korea and Iran.

The same goes for Ukraine. Since American diplomatic and material support is critical to the ongoing conflict, whatever America advocates will have significant weight. If President Zelensky obstructs a Trump negotiation initiative, the United States might reverse the permission given by the Biden administration for the use of American weapons against certain areas of Russia or make future aid conditional on cooperation.

Will these factors produce an opportunity for a peace settlement? I believe they will, though it will not be easy, and success is not assured. Any peace initiative will have to deal with four critical issues and bridge some very significant differences between the parties and other stakeholders.

1. Territory. Territory is obviously a critical issue, and the two sides are far apart on it. Ukraine wants the return of all territories occupied by Russia since 2014, including Crimea and Donbas. Based on his recent peace proposal, Putin—who alone will decide for Russia what is acceptable or not—is publicly demanding that Ukraine turn over to Russia even more territory than it currently occupies. Based on a recent opinion poll, the vast majority of Ukrainians, some 83 percent, reject the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from the Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts, as demanded by Putin. During the presidential debate in June, President Trump characterized Putin’s proposal as unacceptable.

One option that some experts believe might work is the following: a) Russian forces pull back to areas Moscow controlled before the start of the 2022 war, i.e., Crimea and parts of Donetsk and Luhansk. b) Ukraine agrees not to use force to liberate these areas but to seek the resolution of their ultimate future through negotiation and peaceful means only. c.) the remaining areas of Ukraine now occupied by Russia will be administered by a UNSC-mandated administration (a kind of protectorate) for ten years or so. At the end of that period, an internationally administered referendum would determine whether the people of these areas choose to rejoin Ukraine, join Russia, or have another option.

2. A robust security guarantee for Ukraine. A legitimate question of the Ukrainian leadership is that, after an agreement and a ceasefire, what is to deter and prevent Putin sometime later, say two years or more, having regrouped and enhanced his military capabilities, to push into the UN-administered areas and the rest of Ukraine to continue his goal of subjugation? This Ukrainian concern is not without cause, as Moscow has followed this method before.

In the negotiations between Ukraine and Russia in Istanbul in 2022, the option under consideration was Ukraine’s permanent neutrality along with a security guarantee by guarantor states consisting of the United States, Great Britain, China, Russia, France, Belarus, and Turkey. The draft text noted that EU membership was not inconsistent with permanent neutrality (Austria being evidence of that). 

Since then, Ukraine has been seeking NATO membership and NATO guarantees. At the recent NATO summit in Washington, the alliance stated that Ukraine’s path to NATO membership was “irreversible.” However, several NATO members have serious reservations about such an outcome. Russia regards Ukraine’s membership as a threat to its national security. Ukraine and the alliance might be willing to consider some defined buffer zones and distances that NATO and Russian combat forces shall maintain from the Ukraine-Russia border. 

One other option is likely to appeal to a future Trump administration: the EU provides guarantees by signing a security treaty with Ukraine, a future member of the entity. Given the limited security capabilities of the EU, that commitment to Ukraine’s security could be supplemented with a commitment by Europe’s two nuclear powers: France and the United Kingdom. In other words, both nations would commit to regard an attack on Ukraine’s post-settlement territory as an attack on themselves, to which they would respond accordingly. Of course, there could be alternative European permutations. Nonetheless, while these options might be appealing to Washington, Europeans are likely reluctant to accept this responsibility alone.

There is also the option of a U.S.-Ukraine defense treaty of the kind we are considering with Saudi Arabia. This year, the United States signed a bilateral security agreement with Ukraine aimed at enhancing defense cooperation, not a defense treaty. The Biden administration was not prepared to go that far, and given President Trump’s and Senator Vance’s statements, a bilateral defense treaty of that kind would be unlikely on their watch.

3. Ukraine’s reconstruction. Ukraine has suffered colossal damage. On the basis of geography and because of Ukraine’s projected EU membership, Europe is the natural lead for the massive reconstruction effort that will be required. Additionally, although the American private sector has already shown signs of interest—and here, we may expect a Trump administration to excel—a key negotiating point should be Russia’s contribution to Ukraine’s reconstruction, given the enormity and brutality of the destruction they caused. As part of the settlement of the conflict, in the discussion of the future of sanctions against Russia, a portion of the frozen Russian assets might be allocated to reconstruction.

4. Russia’s diplomatic standing. For Russia, an essential motivation in agreeing to any Ukrainian settlement will be the benefits of future relations with the West and particularly with the United States. Russian diplomats consistently complain that “because of Ukraine,” the United States has refused to engage in discussion of critical matters such as the Middle East, Europe’s security architecture, and nuclear, missile, cyber, and space issues. Some may find this surprising. Consequently, we must understand and not underestimate the extent to which Russia’s leadership still values relations with the United States. They have signaled that in exchange for an agreed-upon road map for better mutual relations, they would be more flexible on terms for a settlement in Ukraine. A future Trump administration should play this card astutely.

The United States has significant leverage over both Russia and Ukraine. A new administration has an opportunity to use that leverage effectively. The discussion, analysis, and debate on settlement options and how best to pursue them should start now. 

Zalmay Khalilzad is the former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. Follow him on X: @realzalmayMK.

Image: Drop of Light / Shutterstock.com.

Summary and Key Points: The U.S. Air Force’s Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program is facing competition from Russia's S-70 Okhotnik-B, a highly autonomous combat UAV developed by Sukhoi. First tasked in 2011 and with prototypes visible by 2017, the S-70 shares components with the Su-57 fighter, including internal weapons bays.

-The UAV can carry 2.8 tons of munitions, reach speeds over 620 mph, and features stealth technologies.

-Initially expected to enter production in 2024, the timeline may be delayed due to the war in Ukraine. The S-70’s capabilities highlight its role in the global race for sixth-generation air dominance.

The U.S. Air Force’s Next Generation Air Dominance program, or NGAD, has plenty of competition. It will not be the only sixth-generation fighter platform in the skies. Beijing and Moscow are fielding their own respective next-gen fighters, and the race is on to get there first. 

Like the Air Force’s NGAD, Russia’s planned sixth-generation fighter jet is expected to fly alongside a fleet of highly autonomous unmanned aerial vehicles. Referred to in the U.S. as “drone wingmen,” these sophisticated airframes provide a lower-cost, unmanned option to accompany the manned aircraft. Russian manufacturer Sukhoi is developing the S-70 Okhotnik-B combat UAV to fulfill this role. 

An Overview of the S-70’s Origins

Russia’s Defense Ministry first tasked engineers at Sukhoi with creating a new UAV system in 2011. The first prototype was seen in 2017, when the drone’s flying wing configuration was showcased. One year later, the S-70 carried out its first series of tests and was reportedly capable of reaching a top speed of 200 kilometers per hour in a speed and stop trial. 

While Moscow refers to the S-70 “Hunter B” UAV as a sixth-generation platform that can penetrate outer space, the aircraft’s exact specs have not been confirmed. The S-70 is partly derived from its Mikoyan Skat predecessor and possesses several key components of the Sukhoi Su-57 fighter. 

Between 2018 and 2022, Russian state-run media outlets reported that Hunter-B prototypes were being constructed at the Novosibirsk Chkalov Aviation Plant. They are believed to feature enhancements to onboard radio-electronic equipment and structural elements. 

The S-70 was supposed to enter serial production in 2024, but the war in Ukraine may have pushed back this timeline.

The S-70 in Its “Wingman” Role

As mentioned previously, the Hunter-B should share several components with Moscow’s Su-57 fighter. Specifically, the aircraft is believed to feature similar internal weapons bays, meaning it will use the same beyond-visual-range weaponry. 

The S-70’s real prowess will come from its armaments. The drone is expected haul a vast array of ordnance, including 250 caliber and 500 caliber bombs. According to Army Recognition, the UAV will also be able to carry unguided bombs weighing up to 1,000 kilograms, in addition to a range of air-to-surface and air-to-air missiles. In total, the drone can carry up to 2.8 tons of munitions in its two internal weapons bays. 

Powered by the same AL-21 jet engine that drives the Su-27 fighter jet, the Hunter-B is capable of reaching speeds in excess of 620 miles per hour, according to Army Recognition:

“The drone can autonomously perform complex missions, including takeoff and landing, making it a formidable asset in modern warfare. Its ability to carry various types of munitions, from precision bombs to air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles, enhances its versatility on the battlefield. It also features stealth technologies, including a flat nozzle design that improves its radar invisibility, a critical factor in its effectiveness.”

Other Specs and Capabilities

Russia state-media outlets report the S-70 weighs roughly 20 tons, with a wingspan of 14 meters. Although this is smaller than the Su-57, the difference is minimal. 

In 2023, The War Zone published a report analyzing video footage released by Moscow that shows a reporter walking across the wing of a Su-57 positioned next to an S-70 drone.The aircraft appear roughly the same size. 

As detailed by the article, the new drone is “covered in various intakes and exhausts, as well as antennas, and a forward-facing camera system under the central part of the forward fuselage.” The UAV reportedly features electro-optical targeting, as well as radio and other reconnaissance equipment. 

Considering shortages amid Russia’s ongoing Ukraine invasion, this sophisticated drone might not see combat any time soon. But it is an important entry in the race to field the next generation of aerial combat platforms.

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. 

Image Credit: Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points: China has completed the construction of a bridge over Pangong Tso, a high-altitude lake near the disputed Line of Actual Control (LAC) between China and India. The bridge, located at the narrowest part of the lake, will significantly reduce travel time for Chinese forces, potentially facilitating quicker deployment of their Type 15 light tanks to the LAC.

-This development has heightened tensions between the two nuclear powers, especially after a prolonged standoff in the region. In response, India has unveiled its new Zorawar light tank, designed for rapid deployment and high-altitude operations.

-The tank features a 105mm main gun, AI capabilities, and amphibious functions, positioning India to better defend its interests in the rugged terrain of the LAC.

Beijing has more than its fair share of what could rightfully be described as "troubled waters" – and those include the Taiwanese Strait and the South China Sea, each a potential flashpoint for a war with its neighbors. However, far from the Western Pacific is Pangong Tso or Pangong Lake – an endorheic lake in the eastern Ladakh Valley that is near the disputed Line of Actual Control (LAC) between China and India.

Located 13,862 feet above sea level, it is one of the highest-altitude lakes in the world, while it is 134 km (83 miles) long, which also makes among the largest lakes in Asia. Though noted for its scenic beauty, its remoteness means few actually can ever see it – and it doesn't generally receive a lot of international attention.

Yet, it could be a flashpoint for a war between China and India, especially as the former just completed construction on a controversial infrastructure project.

It was reported this week that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has finished construction on a bridge at the narrowest part of Pangong Tso in Khurnak, connecting the north and south banks of the lake.

Construction of the 400-meter-long, 8-meter-wide bridge began in late 2021, following a months-long standoff between Indian and Chinese forces near the LAC. The bridge will allow for PLA forces to move directly north-south and troops coming from the Khurnak Fort could see their travel times cut from 12 hours to three to four hours, while it will cut down a 180 km (111 mile) loop from the Khurnak to the south banks.

"The bridge will also add a new route connecting Khurnak Fort and surrounding facilities with the PLA's largest base in the vicinity, at Rutog," the Center for Strategic & International Studies reported.

The bridge at Pangong could also allow the Chinese military to quickly deploy its Type 15 light tank to the disputed LAC should fighting break out between the two nuclear powers. The tank, which first entered service in 2018, is noted for being armed with a fully stabilized 105mm rifled main gun, a robust armor package, and CRBN (Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) protection typically found in larger MBTs.

Both sides have increasingly fortified their positions along the 2,100-mile-long LAC, while also developing platforms that are well-suited to the rugged, high-altitude terrain.

It was earlier this month that India announced 25-ton Zorawar light tank has entered service. Named after the 19th-century Dogra General Zorawar Singh, who led military operations in Ladakh and Western Tibet, the Zorawar was jointly developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and private vendor Larsen & Toubro (L&T). The quick development and fielding of the tank is noteworthy as the Indian Army only issued a Request for Information (RFI) in 2021 calling for a new tank that weighed less than 25 tonnes, yet had a margin of 10 percent and the same firepower as a regular MBT.

It would appear that the tank more than met the requirements, and arrived just as China has increased its ability to more quickly deploy its forces near the LAC.

The Zorawar is armed with a 105mm main gun, while it is also artificial intelligence-enabled, and further fitted with an active protection system that includes tactical drones to provide situational awareness and loitering munition capability. In addition, the light tank was designed to be air transportable for rapid deployment, but it can also operate from high-altitude areas to island territories. It features amphibious capabilities that could allow it to ford any deep streams and rivers in the region, while it can traverse steep climbs.

The new tank was unveiled to the media for the first time on July 6 at the company's production facility in Hazira, Gujarat. Manu Pubby, senior editor for the Indian-based Economic Times shared photos of the tank on X, the social media platform formerly known as Twitter. It is noted to have a lower profile and lower center of gravity than the far larger 50 to 60-ton T-72s and T-90s.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points: The USS Massachusetts (BB-2), commissioned in 1896, is often considered the worst battleship in U.S. Navy history due to its numerous design flaws and operational issues. This Indiana-class battleship (as seen below) suffered from severe stability problems, making it difficult for the crew to operate its guns effectively.

-Its propulsion system was unreliable, frequently breaking down and requiring repairs. The ship's armament, including four 13-inch guns, was poorly balanced, causing it to list severely when fired.

-Despite participating in notable actions during the Spanish-American War and the Boxer Rebellion, the USS Massachusetts' fundamental design flaws rendered it largely ineffective in combat, earning it a dubious place in naval history.

For decades, the U.S. Navy billed itself as holding the greatest battleship fleet in the world. Indeed, before the events of the Pacific Theater of the Second World War, the American Navy could lean heavily on its marvelous designs for battleships, as well as its industrial capacity to produce those battleships. 

But even great navies miss their mark every so often. One such missed mark for the U.S. Navy’s battleship design and engineering team was USS Massachusetts (BB-2).

Commissioned in 1896, this Indiana-class battleship stands out as one of the most poorly designed and underperforming battleships in the history of the Navy. The vessel suffered from a series of design flaws and operational issues that left it ineffective in combat. Despite these facts, it had a relatively long history, serving in the Spanish-American War and being a key part of the international fleet that was assembled to respond to the Boxer Rebellion in colonial China. 

One of the most significant problems with USS Massachusetts was its lack of stability. The ship’s hull was not properly balanced. It had a tendency to roll excessively even in moderate seas. Under these conditions, the crew had difficulty operating the ship’s guns effectively, as the constant rolling often made it nearly impossible to aim accurately. 

A battleship that is fundamentally incapable of targeting its enemies seems like a pretty bad battleship, if you ask me!

Another major flaw in the design of Massachusetts was its propulsion system. Equipped with two vertical, triple-expansion steam engines, these systems were prone to breakdowns and malfunctions. This meant that the ship often had difficulty maintaining its top speed, and it was frequently forced to return to port for repairs.

In terms of armaments, USS Massachusetts was equipped with four 13-inch guns, which were the largest guns available at the time of its construction. Again, though, there were balancing issues, this time with the guns themselves. And because these guns were improperly balanced, the weight of these weapons caused the ship to list severely when they were fired. 

Bottom line: Massachusetts was an incredibly unreliable weapons platform in combat.

This boat had a displacement of 10,288 long tons and was not only equipped with 13-inch guns, but also had eight 8-inch guns, four 6-inch guns, twenty 6-pounders, six 1-pounders, and two 18-inch torpedo tubes. Massachusetts had a length of 350 feet, 11 inches, and a beam of 69 feet, 3 inches, as well as a draft of 27 feet. She had a top cruising speed of 15 knots, or 17 miles per hour, and carried a complement of 473 officers and men.

The ship saw action during the Spanish-American War that proved to be historic. On May 31, 1898, USS Massachusetts along with USS Iowa (BB-4) and USS New Orleans, bombarded forts at the entrance to Santiago de Cuba. They also engaged the Spanish cruiser Cristobal Colon, forcing it to retreat into Santiago’s inner harbor.

On July 4, 1898, Massachusetts returned to Santiago, Cuba, and helped USS Texas force the Spanish cruiser Reina Mercedes to beach and surrender.

These actions were part of larger naval operations during the Spanish-American War that saw the U.S. Navy successfully blockade the Spanish fleet in Santiago and ultimately secure victory in the conflict.

A couple of years later, during the Boxer Rebellion in colonial China, USS Massachusetts was deployed as part of an international naval force to protect foreign interests and to relieve the siege of the Legation Quarter in Beijing. On June 17, 1900, Massachusetts, along with other American ships, was ordered to proceed to Taku, China, to support the international relief expedition. 

Despite this service, Massachusetts stands out as one of the worst-designed and worst-performing battleships in the history of the United States Navy. Its numerous flaws, including its lack of stability, unreliable propulsion system, and poorly balanced armament, rendered it largely ineffective in combat.

Author Experience and Expertise: Brandon J. Weichert

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. 

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