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Some years ago, a marketing campaign for Dos Equis beer profiled a (made-up) personality, a suave gentleman whom it termed “the most interesting man in the world.” No one would call Javier Milei suave, but the tousled-haired, vulgarity-spouting President of Argentina may indeed be the most interesting man on the global scene, at least in international conservative circles.

Milei, an economist and media personality with hardcore libertarian principles, is seeking to wrench Argentina away from its longstanding commitment to big government, to which he attributes its decades of economic and social decay. While this would seem enough to keep any president busy, Milei has found time to travel the world, preaching his gospel in locales ranging from the suites of Silicon Valley tech lords to the conferences of Europe’s hard-right political parties all while engaging in tit-for-tat name-calling with Spain’s socialist prime minister.

He has stressed his strong support for the United States, Israel, and Ukraine, positions which put him at odds with most of Latin America’s other leaders. Prior to gaining office, he harshly criticized China, the Vatican, and Brazil. However, he has subsequently backed off, at least as regards the first two, displaying a measure of pragmatism that co-exists with his propensity for ideological combat. However, the evident personal antagonism between him and Brazilian President Lula da Silva has made managing relations with this key neighbor difficult.

On the Road

Despite the immensity of the challenges he faces in trying to change Argentina’s direction, Milei has set aside considerable time for international travel. Much has been devoted to seeking high-profile venues to promote his libertarian economics. He has met with the heads of Apple, Google, Meta, and OpenAI, as well as with Elon Musk, where the two “agreed on the need to free markets and to defend the ideas of freedom.”

He seems particularly welcome at conferences of international business leaders and of conservative activists. His first overseas trip was to the World Economic Forum at Davos, where he decried socialism as a “danger” to the Western world and described businessmen as “heroes” while also selling his reform plans for Argentina. His reception was such that according to the Financial Times, “the global business elite is infatuated” with him.

He followed up his Davos trip by participating in the annual Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) in Maryland on February 24, at which he was hugged by former President Donald Trump. Also present was another Latin American president inspiring global interest on the Right, El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele, as well as one of former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro’s sons, and Santiago Abascal, leader of Spain’s hard-right Vox political party.

Indeed, Spain, governed by Socialist Pedro Sánchez, seems to bring out Milei’s most combative instincts, as seen in a series of harsh exchanges with his Spanish opponents. On May 19, he participated in a mass rally in Madrid organized by Vox ahead of the European parliamentary elections. Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and Italy’s Giorgia Meloni also spoke (by video).

In his speech, Milei, in addition to accusing Sánchez of bringing “poverty and death” to Spain, denounced the Spanish prime minister’s wife as corrupt (she is embroiled in a scandal in which her husband has vigorously defended her). This came after Spain’s transport minister had suggested that Milei might have “ingested substances” during his campaign. The minister later apologized.

But whatever the provocation may have been, Milei’s personal attack on Spain’s leader while visiting his country did not go unanswered. The Sánchez government demanded that Milei treat Spain with respect and withdrew its ambassador in Buenos Aires, a move which Milei termed “arrogant.” On June 21, Milei returned to Spain to receive an award from Isabel Díaz Ayuso, the head of Madrid’s regional government and a leading figure in the conservative People’s Party. He used the opportunity to once again denounce Sanchez for his alleged ignorance of economics.

Some Pragmatism

While Milei has clearly delighted in his fight with Spain’s Sánchez, he has had to swallow hard and mend relations with some leaders with whom he has picked ideological fights in the past. While campaigning, he had said that he would not foster relations with China, merely leaving it to Argentina’s businessmen to decide if they wanted to trade with it. Early in his presidency, he insisted on Argentine authorities inspecting a Chinese deep space tracking station in the southern state of Neuquén, which had been installed during Cristina Kirchner’s administration.

However, quiet diplomacy appears to have improved relations, and critically, China, from which Argentina has borrowed extensively, appears willing to continue to roll over Argentina’s huge debt to it. There, however, are reports of a political price that Milei may have to pay in the form of an official visit to China, which is now being discussed—hardly the destination of first choice for a libertarian.

Pope Francis was another target of Milei’s pre-presidential criticism. Milei described the pontiff as a “filthy leftist.” The Pope, of course, is an Argentine and former archbishop of Buenos Aires, where he was a major figure in national life. He maintains a lively interest in his home country and often meets with leading Argentine personalities in Rome.

Since taking office, Milei has ceased his direct criticism of Pope Francis and, in fact, briefly met with him while in Rome for ceremonies marking the canonization of an Argentine saint. Similarly, the Pope avoided criticizing Milei by name. However, he has made clear his concern for Argentina’s poor, making oblique but easily understood criticisms of Milei’s policies. 

For now, however, Milei and the Pope maintain an uneasy coexistence. Francis has, on multiple occasions, expressed his desire to visit his homeland. However, given his extensive schedule of other travel, he does not seem likely to visit in the near future, something which is probably a relief to Milei.

Milei’s administration had made some effort to get along with Brazil despite the fact that he had previously called its current president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, a “communist” and “corrupt.” Also, during Brazil’s presidential campaign, he had made clear his support for right-wing then-President Jair Bolsonaro. Lula returned the favor by endorsing Peronist candidate Sergio Massa.

But Brazil is a key trading partner, and until recently, at least, Milei had kept his head down regarding Argentina’s huge neighbor. He retained as ambassador Daniel Scioli, a senior Peronist figure appointed to the job by his predecessor Alberto Fernández, and after Scioli resigned to join Milei’s cabinet, he named a senior career diplomat as his successor. Foreign Minister Diana Mondino has met with her Brazilian counterpart as well.

However, the two presidents seem incapable of overcoming the bad blood between them. Ahead of the July 8 Mercosur summit in Paraguay, Lula said that he felt that Milei still owed him an apology for his earlier remarks. It appeared that Milei would not rise to the bait, but ultimately, he responded that he had said nothing for which he needed to apologize, as his statements had been true, and that Lula had an “inflated ego.” Then, Milei decided that he would not participate in the summit and that Mondino would go in his place. 

And adding fuel to the fire, Milei accepted an invitation to speak at a “CPAC Brazil” event on January 6–7, where former President Bolsonaro also spoke. While Milei described Bolsonaro as a victim of “judicial persecution,” he avoided directly attacking Lula, avoiding a crisis like that with Spain. But for now, the chill in bilateral relations at the presidential level means they will continue to be conducted at the ministerial level and below.

Love for America (and Israel and Ukraine as well)

Milei has explicitly said that his priority is a geopolitical alignment with the United States and Israel. Such an explicit commitment puts him at odds with the broad tradition of Argentine foreign policy, which has historically been characterized by distance from and suspicion of the United States. This shift was displayed at the June 15–16 conference in Switzerland on a peace process for Ukraine, where Argentina signed the declaration looking towards peace on the basis of maintaining Ukraine’s territorial integrity. This contrasted, for example, with the stance of Brazil, which attended the conference as an observer but refused to sign the declaration. 

Earlier, he had declined an offer to join the BRICS+ grouping (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, in addition to potential new members such as Iran and Saudi Arabia). He has also expressed interest in Argentina becoming a “Global Partner” of NATO, a status that, while not creating any obligations, would make Argentina eligible to participate in training, exercises, and consultative meetings. 

Milei has shown unqualified support for Israel in its military operation in Gaza following the Hamas attack of October 7. This has contrasted with the view of most Latin American governments, which have generally insisted on an immediate ceasefire, and in the case of some, such as Chile, Colombia, and Brazil, have withdrawn their ambassadors in Tel Aviv. 

Milei’s commitment to Israel, however, goes beyond a desire to stay in tune with the United States. Although remaining a nominal Catholic, he is fascinated by Judaism and has studied with an Argentine rabbi whom he has since named his ambassador to Israel. Of course, the fact that Israel has a right-wing prime minister in Benjamin Netanyahu creates a bond. Milei visited Israel in February and was warmly received there.

The U.S. administration has been, in turn, generally supportive of Milei since he came to office, despite the fact that he had earlier dismissed President Biden as a “moderate socialist. But a socialist” (Milei’s definition of socialism often seems to embrace anyone who does not subscribe to his minimalist view of government). Biden called Milei to congratulate him on his victory, and Secretary of State Blinken has visited Argentina. When the head of U.S. Southern Command came to Argentina, Milei accompanied on her internal travel, underscoring his desire for a “strategic alliance.”

The bilateral relationship has stayed on an even keel despite the fact that prior to his election, Milei had displayed an affinity for President Trump. Trump, in turn, had effusively congratulated him on his victory, claiming it as a sign of global support for his approach to governance. The rapprochement between the Biden and Milei administrations may be in part due to Milei’s helpful positions on global issues, especially as support from other Latin American countries has often been wanting. 

But it may largely derive from the reality that it is in the U.S. interest that Milei succeeds in reviving Argentina’s economy or, at a minimum, that he avoids a crisis that would require direct American engagement. Argentina also needs the United States, the largest shareholder in the International Monetary Fund, which is massively indebted and from which it will likely seek fresh funds at some point. The Biden administration has sent senior Treasury and Commerce Department officials to Argentina for consultations and has been supportive of his painful economic reform plan.

Global Speechmaking Vs. Domestic Governance

Milei’s embrace by the global Right is, in some ways, a misreading of the man. He is a true believer in libertarian thought and passionate about economics, a subject in which he has graduate degrees from Argentine universities. The issues that currently animate the American and European Rights hold little interest to him. He does not speak of the dangers of immigration, which is not an issue in Argentina. In fact, the country faces the opposite problem, with large numbers emigrating in the face of a chronic economic crisis. Ironically, many venture to Spain, which they apparently do not find to be quite the hellscape Milei sees. 

Also, the protectionism prominent in current rightist discourse, from Trump to Le Pen, is alien to the libertarianism that Milei avows—indeed, boosting exports and attracting foreign investment figure into his plans for economic revival. And while he has taken hardline positions on crime and abortion, he rarely speaks on these issues.

His passion is shrinking the state. He has spoken admiringly of Margaret Thatcher, who is hardly a beloved figure in Argentina, where the Falklands War is remembered bitterly. His affection for the United States seems based on seeing it principally as a bulwark against global leftism. He views European social democracy through the lens of Argentina’s experience with Peronism despite the fact that the latter was a unique movement with roots also in militarism, Catholic social doctrine, and pre-World War II European fascism. This may be the ultimate source of his rather silly spat with Spain’s prime minister.

In the end, Milei will be judged by his performance in reversing Argentina’s decline. At this point, he has had some success in cutting spending and taming inflation at the price of a recession. He enjoys significant popular support for now and has been able to brush off concerns, such as those of Pope Francis, about his policies’ effects on the poor. The recent passage of legislation giving him greater authority to implement his economic plans has been an important short-term victory for him.

However, the question of whether he can engender a sustained recovery that attracts investment, creates jobs, and reduces poverty is still wide open. Meanwhile, as he wrestles with these issues, he will likely continue to take breaks to accept invitations to speak at international conferences at which he can denounce socialism and evangelize for libertarianism.

Richard M. Sanders is Senior Fellow, Western Hemisphere at the Center for the National Interest. A former member of the Senior Foreign Service of the U.S. Department of State, he served as Argentina desk officer, 1997–99, and as Director of the Office of Brazilian and Southern Cone Affairs, 2010–13.

Image: Lev Radin / Shutterstock.com.

While Washington is hosting a NATO Summit to demonstrate Western resolve, Russia and China convened a summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Kazakhstan. In an increasingly polarized world, “middle powers” such as Kazakhstan face a growing challenge to preserve their independence and avoid being drawn into an unwanted foreign orbit. Western governments can help the country and the rest of Central Asia to navigate these stormy international waters through a closer practical engagement with emerging regional players.

At the same time, the U.S. needs to realize these countries dwell in difficult regions. At the SCO summit in Astana on July 3 and 4, Kazakhstan relinquished its year-long chairmanship to China. While the SCO is widely viewed as Beijing and Moscow’s attempt to pull members away from the West, Kazakhstan used its membership and leadership in the SCO and other intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) to consolidate Central Asian resilience to outside pressures.

Kazakhstan does not have the luxury of a NATO security umbrella to defend its security. Instead, it protects its national interests through a multi-vector policy pioneered thirty years ago after its independence from the Soviet Union. This is accomplished by not aligning too closely with any single state, balancing its international connections, and engaging with numerous multilateral groups, including the SCO, the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE), the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA).

As a founding member of the SCO, Kazakhstan has tabled various initiatives, including an agreement on settling border issues and accords to combat terrorism. The current SCO agenda promotes cultural cooperation, environmental protection, and digital connectivity. Kazakhstan also pursues the “Nurly Zhol” infrastructure development program, which involves extensive railroad and highway construction to advance regional trade and investment, thus promoting greater economic integration in Central Asia.

Astana undertakes an activist approach within several IGOs as an essential component of its foreign policy. It chaired the OSCE, which involved all European and post-Soviet states. It signed the core OSCE documents, such as the Helsinki Final Act, committing the country to respect human rights, the self-determination of nations, and inter-state cooperation. It is also a recognized leader in nuclear disarmament since it has relinquished its nuclear weapons and closed the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site. The OSCE provides a valuable format for more intensive Western diplomatic and practical cooperation with all the Central Asian capitals by coordinating future initiatives that strengthen the region’s prominence, whether in nuclear security, environmental protection, or counterterrorism.

Kazakhstan chaired the OSCE in 2010 as the first post-Soviet and Central Asian country to do so. That year, the OSCE summit adopted the Astana Declaration and introduced the concept of “Eurasian security” for the post-Soviet independent states. Kazakhstan has participated in programs to strengthen border security, counter cybercrime, improve water resource management, and encourage public participation in governance. Additionally, Astana works closely with the OSCE to empower women in social, political, and economic life, including law enforcement and the judicial system. Programs for gender equality are another important arena for closer Western involvement.

Astana is at the forefront of developing cooperation between Turkic-speaking states, which is becoming a valuable regional counterbalance to Russian and Chinese influence. Several formats exist to unite Turkic countries, including the International Organization of Turkic Culture. Kazakhstan launched the Cooperation Council of Turkic-speaking States, became a full-fledged international organization, and was renamed the OTS in November 2021. The OTS also includes Turkey, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. 

Among OTS’s priorities is the development of transportation networks. The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), or the Middle Corridor, is designed to give the region greater economic clout by installing a regulatory and legal framework for the free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor. The OTS also contains a cultural and educational dimension, with Astana committed to developing a unified alphabet for Turkic countries and preparing common textbooks on history, geography, and literature. The United States and the EU need to engage much more effectively with the OTS and help raise its international stature as a contributor to regional security. A similar approach toward the CICA can broaden the partnership for security beyond the Turkic states.

The United States and EU members can benefit from enhanced diplomatic engagement with Kazakhstan and Central Asia through the OSCE and CICA. Keeping Central Asia a nuclear-free zone is important to keep tensions down. More dialogue and cooperation with the Organization of Turkic States is also needed as the Turkic world’s self-awareness is growing, including in countering religious extremism, environment, and education. Finally, just as Austria and Switzerland played a key role in reducing tensions during the Cold War, today’s global antagonists can meet in Kazakhstan on neutral grounds, as they used to do in Vienna and Lausanne in the last century. Coordination on nuclear security and the environment is crucial even as tensions are rising around Taiwan and Ukraine.

Kazakhstan is seeking greater Western involvement in all diplomatic, economic, and social domains while maintaining amicable relations with China and Russia. By actively participating in multiple IGOs together with its Central Asian neighbors, Astana exerts leverage and punches above its weight. Nonetheless, while bordering two major powers with regional ambitions, Central Asia can better enhance its security and resilience by engaging the West.

Janusz Bugajski is a Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation and author of Failed State: A Guide to Russia’s Rupture and the upcoming book Pivotal Poland: Europe’s Rising Power. Follow him on X: @JBugajski.

Image: Jane Peimer / Shutterstock.com.

Summary and Key Points: The CVA-58, a proposed U.S. Navy supercarrier designed for strategic nuclear bombing, was canceled in 1949 amidst intense inter-service rivalry and budget cuts. Dubbed USS United States, the carrier was intended to operate heavy bombers from its massive deck.

-The project faced opposition, leading to the "Revolt of the Admirals" and significant political turmoil. Ultimately, the cancellation proved fortuitous as advancements in aircraft technology allowed existing carriers to fulfill nuclear roles.

-The controversy highlighted the evolving nature of military strategy and the importance of adaptability in defense planning. The CVA-58's design influenced future supercarriers, demonstrating the complex interplay between innovation and practicality in military procurement.

The 'Revolt of the Admirals' and the Cancelled Supercarrier CVA-58

In the wake of the mushroom clouds that blossomed over the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it swiftly dawned on political and military leaders across the globe that warfare between superpowers would never again be the same. But what exactly were the implications of nuclear weapons when it came to planning military force structure?

In the United States, it was assumed that nuclear weapons would be widely employed in future conflicts, rendering conventional land armies and fleets at sea irrelevant. The newly formed Air Force particularly argued that carrier task forces and armored divisions were practically obsolete when (ostensibly) just a few air-dropped nuclear bombs could annihilate them in one fell swoop.

The Air Force touted it soon-to-be operational fleet of ten-thousand-mile-range B-36 Peacemaker nuclear bombers as the only vital war-winning weapon of the nuclear age. This logic resonated conveniently with the postwar political program mandating sharp cuts to U.S. defense spending and force structure—which the Air Force naturally argued should fall upon the Army and Navy.

The Army responded by devising “Pentomic Divisions” organized for nuclear battlefields, with weapons ranging from nuclear-armed howitzers and rocket artillery to bazooka-like Davy Crockett recoilless guns. The Navy, meanwhile, sought to find a way to integrate nuclear bombs into its carrier air wings. However, early nuclear bombs were simply too heavy for World War II-era carrier-based aircraft.

In 1945, the Navy began commissioning three larger forty-five-thousand-ton Midway-class carriers which incorporated armored flight decks for added survivability. The decks were swiftly modified to angular, effectively lengthened configuration for jet operations. Neptune P2V-C3 maritime patrol planes converted into nuclear bombers could take off from Midway-class carriers using rocket-pods but would have no way landing on the carrier deck.

Therefore, the Navy decided it needed huge supercarriers from which it could operate its own fifty-ton strategic bombers. These would displace over 40 percent more than the Midway at sixty-eight thousand tons, and measure 12 percent longer at 330-meters. In July 1948, Defense Secretary James Forrestal approved plans for five such carriers, the first named USS United States with hull number CVA-58.

The naval heavy bombers (which didn’t exist yet) were expected to have such wide wings that naval architects decided that CVA-58 would have a completely flush deck without the standard “island” superstructure carrying a radar and flight control tower. Instead, the carrier would feature side-mounted telescoping smokestacks that could be raised should smoke impeded flight operations, and a similarly retractable wheelhouse that could be extended to observe navigation and flight operations.

The ship’s air wings would include twelve to eighteen heavy bombers that would mostly remain parked on the flight deck, exposed to the elements. Four side-mounted elevators would ferry forty to fifty-four jet fighters between the hangar and flight deck to escort the bombers. Eight nuclear bombs per heavy bomber would also be stowed in the hangar. The combined ship’s company and airwing would total 5,500 personnel.

The carrier’s oddly-shaped deck included four steam catapults—two for use by bombers, and two axial “waist” catapults.

Because the ship would be effectively blind without an elevated radar and control tower, a separate cruiser was intended to serve as the carrier’s “eyes.” Nonetheless, CVA-58 still incorporated eight 5-inch guns for air defense, and dozens of rapid-fire short-range cannons.

The “Revolt of the Admirals”

Though theoretically capable of contributing to conventional strike and sea control missions, the heavy bomber-equipped CVA-58 was clearly an attempt by the Navy to duplicate the Air Force’s strategic nuclear strike capabilities.

This put giant crosshairs on the program during an era of sharp defense cuts. After all, deploying strategic bombers at sea was many times more expensive than basing them on land.

Following his reelection in November 1948, President Harry Truman replaced Forrestal—a naval aviator in World War I, and former secretary of the Navy—with Louis Johnson, who had fewer qualms about enforcing defense spending cuts.

In April 1949, just five days after CVA-58’s fifteen-ton keel was laid down in Newport News, Virginia, Johnson canceled the mega-carrier. He also began advocating the dissolution of the Marine Corps, starting by transferring its aviation assets to the Air Force.

This upset the Navy bigwigs so much that Navy Secretary John Sullivan resigned, and numerous admirals began openly opposing the termination of a project they viewed as essential to validating their branch’s existence in the nuclear age.

This “Revolt of the Admirals” developed into a crisis in civil-military relations, as the Navy’s top brass defied the authority of their civilian commander-in-chief and resorted to covert methods in an attempt to influence public opinion. The Op-23 naval intelligence unit formed by Adm. Louis Denfeld secretly circulated a memo called the Worth Paper alleging that Johnson had corrupt motivations due to being a former director of Convair, manufacturer of B-36 bombers, which were also claimed to be deficient.

The bitter inter-service rivalry, and the utility of land-based bombers versus carriers, was publicly litigated in congressional hearings. The Army also piled on against the Navy, and public opinion turned against the sea-warfare branch as Op-23’s activities were revealed.

As Gen. Douglas MacArthur would later discover, Truman had no qualms about squashing military leaders that questioned his authority. His new secretary of the Navy, Francis Matthews, torpedoed the career of several admirals that spoke against the CVA-58’s termination despite an earlier promise that those testifying before Congress would be spared retaliation.

The irony of this tempest in a teacup, which resulted in the political martyrdom of many senior Navy leaders, was how misguided both sides swiftly proved to be.

In June 1950 the Korean War broke out, and the U.S. found itself desperately short of the necessary conventional land, air and sea forces. U.S. aircraft carriers and their onboard jet fighters soon bore the brunt of the initial fighting, and continued to play a major role until the end of the conflict.

And the Air Force’s vaunted B-36s? They never dropped a single bomb in anger—fortunately, as they were only intended for use in apocalyptic nuclear conflicts.

It turned out that plenty of wars were liable to be fought without resorting to weapons of mass destruction.

However, the Navy also had cause to count itself fortunate that the CVA-58 had been canceled. That’s because in just a few years the size of tactical nuclear weapons rapidly decreased, while high-thrust jet engines enabled hauling of heavier and heavier loads. By 1950, nuclear-capable AJ-1 Savage hybrid jet/turboprop bombers were operational on Midway-class carriers, starting with the USS Franklin Roosevelt.

These were soon followed by nuclear-capable capable A-3 Sky Warrior and A-5 Vigilante bombers, A-6 and A-7 attack planes, and even multirole fighters like the F-4 Phantom II. Carriers with these aircraft were far more flexible than a CVA-58 full of B-36 wannabees ever could have been. Arguably, by the 1960s the Navy’s ballistic missile submarines would amount to scarier strategic nuclear weapons than any aircraft-based delivery system.

The schematics for CVA-58 nonetheless informed the Navy’s first supercarriers, named rather appropriately the Forrestal-class, laid down during the Korean War. But the heavy-bomber carrying United States remains notable as the supercarrier the Navy absolutely thought it needed—but which with literally just a couple years more hindsight it discovered it truly could do without.

About the Author

Sébastien Roblin holds a master’s degree in conflict resolution from Georgetown University and served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China. He has also worked in education, editing, and refugee resettlement in France and the United States. He currently writes on security and military history for War Is Boring. This article is being republished due to reader interest. 

All images are Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points: The U.S. Air Force's B-21 Raider program is advancing amidst the global race to develop sixth-generation stealth bombers. While the B-2 Spirit, B-52 Stratofortress, and B-1 Lancer remain formidable, the B-21's timely introduction is essential for maintaining long-range strike capabilities. But can the B-21 Raider overcome what some consider possible future cost issues? 

-Recent negotiations have reduced the per-unit cost, making the Raider more economically viable.

-Designed to be undetectable and equipped with modular systems for future upgrades, the B-21 is crucial for U.S. national security.

-As China and Russia advance their bomber programs, the Raider's development ensures the U.S. retains a strategic edge in aerial warfare.

U.S. B-21 Raider: Reducing Costs Amidst Global Stealth Bomber Race

The race to produce the world’s first sixth-generation stealth bomber is on. As the United States moves to introduce its B-21 Raider, China and Russia continue to develop their H-20 and PAK-DA programs. 

The United States has long fielded superior bombers. The B-2 Spirit, B-52 Stratofortress, and B-1 Lancer are still lethal aircraft, providing the U.S. Air Force with long-range strike and deterrence capabilities. But the Raider’s timely introduction is crucial, and while some analysts argue that the B-21 program is too expensive to justify, the new bomber is worth the high price tag.

Cost is Decreasing

Following negotiations between the Air Force and manufacturer Northrop Grumman, the per-unit cost of the B-21 Raider has gone down. This was first reported back several months ago. 

The service’s secretary, Frank Kendall, told the Senate Appropriations subcommittee months ago that the cost decline indicates negotiations are headed in the right direction. The Raider program was expected to cost roughly $692 million per unit in 2022 when the bomber debuted. While the Air Force has yet to announce the specific decrease in price, the service has said that lower costs will not mean lower procurement rates.

While this news is positive for Raider advocates, Northrop has yet to comment on Kendall’s remarks. The manufacturer reported a hefty charge on the Raider program toward the end of 2023, citing increased production costs and other economic disruptions. Kendall has warned that “[I]’ve seen programs get into trouble because there was too much focus on the platform and not enough on all the things that are necessary to support it,” adding that “hopefully, we will have avoided that in the case of the B-21.”

Around this time, the Pentagon’s undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment, William LaPlante, said that the Raider would be produced at an intentionally low rate in case of looming budgetary cuts. He also noted that lessons learned from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program brought about new measures to ensure lower costs and a smoother production process.

What We Know About the B-21 Raider Program

The Raider is designed to be the Air Force’s intelligence collection platform, battle manager, and interceptor aircraft. In 2022, the Raider was officially unveiled at Northrop’s production facilities in Palmdale, California.

Smaller than its Spirit predecessor, the B-21 will be more difficult for enemy aircraft and radar to detect—an essential attribute.

The new bomber is also expected to incorporate modular systems that will enable upgrades to the airframe as new technologies emerge—similar to the F-35 Lightning II.

Regardless of the Raider’s final price tag, this new bomber fleet is essential to U.S. national security. Its timely introduction is crucial, considering the progress Beijing has made toward its own H-20 stealth bomber. As U.S. defense secretary Lloyd Austin said during the unveiling of the Raider: “America’s defense will always be rooted in deterring conflict. So we are again making it plain to any potential foe that the risk and the cost of aggression far outweigh any conceivable gains.”

About the Author: Maya Carlin

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin.

All images are Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Many U.S. allies expressed gratitude for the president’s friendship and support.

Les différents lieux indiqués sur cette carte sont explorés dans les articles de ce numéro de Manière de voir. / Monde, Infrastructures, Transports - Espace et territoire / Monde, Infrastructures, Transports - Espace et territoire

A conversation with Timothy Naftali.

A region in name only.

To temper Beijing’s ambitions, Washington should threaten to share weapons with Japan and South Korea.

The Italian Parliament in Rome recently hosted a conference entitled “The Peace Project in Ukraine” to discuss the various options for resolving the Ukraine conflict and ending the suffering of the civilian population there.    This follows Pope Francis proclaiming, “We must have the courage to negotiate.”   Monsignor Fabrizio Turriziani Colonna, Judicial Vicar of the Catholics of Armenia, Georgia, Russia and Eastern Europe, continued; “Negotiation is never surrender.  It requires courage.  Achieving peace entails making sacrifices.  Relinquishing personal principals or specific rights in favor of broader, universal ones.” 

He called for there to be action to start direct negotiations between Russia and the Ukraine: “The Pope stated that in order to achieve peace, we must construct a bridge.  But to construct a bridge, we must sacrifice something.  In Christian culture, there is ultimately no such thing as a just war.   It may be acknowledged that a war could be inevitable.  However, it can never be termed as just.  A peace project can only succeed through dialogue, creating a bridge where opposing positions can converge, albeit requiring concessions for the greater good.”  

Manel Msalmi, President of the European Association for the Defense of Minorities andan  advocate of women’s rights, discussed the plight of women and children in the Ukraine and the grave losses caused by the war, as well as the need to focus on the education of young people who have not been learning for four years. She mentioned that the Swiss talks have not brought a solution because Ukraine and Russia need to be brought to the negotiating table through mediators. Saudi Arabia and some other countries are already trying to bring Ukraine and Russia together. However, she believes “it would be more effective if Europe were to lead this process, as the conflict is being fought on European soil”. She also mentioned a threat of this spiraling out of control into a nuclear war.

Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of Infrastructure Tullio Ferrante stated that “the establishment of a permanent dialogue with all members of the international community is crucial, as a just peace can only be achieved while preserving the territorial integrity of Ukraine. At the same time, it is essential to continue humanitarian support funded by military and reconstruction operations for Ukraine”.

Professor Jeffrey Sachs from Columbia University pointed out the economic impact of the war on Europe and the world and emphasized the need to avoid an escalation and talk about peace. “The EU must not accept Putin’s terms, but must be prepared to negotiate,” he said. Sachs also explained that the expansion of NATO could be a mistake for the West and that it will be wise to have countries with neutral status between NATO and Russia instead of on two sides of one border. In his opinion, the Italian people are characterized by their independent thinking, which is why he expects them to think about negotiating peace with Russia.

Member of the Chamber of Deputies Francesco Maria Rubano, Senator Francesco Silvestro and Magistrate Catello Maresca also pointed out the terrible consequences of the ongoing war and the need to establish peace. Despite the different views on the right way to end the war, the participants declared their intention to bring peace and stability to Europe.

 

An attempted assassination of Trump is part of a global trend.

To avoid a spiral of violence, America must help stabilize the greater Horn of Africa.

En remplaçant la distance par le temps, on fait apparaître une France redessinée par le chemin de fer au cours du XIXe siècle. À l'époque des diligences, le (long) temps de trajet pour gagner les villes les plus périphériques était quasiment proportionnel à la distance à vol d'oiseau : la carte (...) / France, Transports, Ville, Région, Service public - Espace et territoire

/ Europe, Transports, Région, Services - Espace et territoire / Europe, Transports, Région, Services - Espace et territoire

/ France, Transports, Service public, Région - Espace et territoire / France, Transports, Service public, Région - Espace et territoire

The Supreme Court eliminated the last remaining checks on executive power.