Diplomacy & Crisis News

Summary and Key Points: France is building its first new aircraft carrier in decades, the PANG (Porte-Avions Nouvelle Génération), designed to replace the aging Charles De Gaulle. Set to be one of the largest carriers globally, the PANG will boast an impressive airwing and advanced defenses.

-However, given France's current economic challenges and strategic needs, investing in such a colossal project seems misguided.

-France's real threats lie in Russia and the Greater Middle East, where cheaper, unmanned underwater vehicles, submarines, and advanced technologies like hypersonic weapons and military space capabilities would be more effective.

-The PANG may symbolize power, but it doesn’t address France's strategic priorities.

France’s New PANG Aircraft Carrier is a Bad Idea

France is the most recent medium-sized power to pursue building a massive nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. Under the acronym of PANG, which means “Porte-Avions Nouvelle Génération,” France is building its first new indigenous aircraft carrier in decades. 

It is designed to replace the aging French carrier Charles De Gaulle. The French Navy intends to create one of the largest warships ever built by France.

An Unnecessary Expenditure for France

With a length of 310 meters and a width of 85 meters at its widest point, the PANG will be one of the largest aircraft carriers in the world. She’ll displace approximately 75,000 tons, which is far larger than the Charles De Gaulle, which displaces 42,000 tons. 

Never mind that the French, with their current economic woes and domestic political instability, are unlikely to actually build this monstrosity. Egos must be stroked. And the French must remind everyone that, many centuries ago, they were a dominant imperial power. 

The French Navy plans on building only one PANG aircraft carrier, which will also serve as the flagship of the French fleet. It will undoubtedly be interoperable with the wider NATO naval capability. 

PANG’s Airwing

PANG’s airwing will be substantial, with the carrier expected to carry up to 30 new-generation maritime variants of France’s New Generation Fighter aircraft and remote carrier vehicles, all of which are part of the Future Combat System, or FCAS. As I’ve written elsewhere, Europe’s FCAS is the most promising of the sixth-generation warplane systems being developed by the world’s great powers, if only because of the many countries burden-sharing to build this system. 

Besides these new systems, the PANG will host an undisclosed number of Dassault Rafale M multi-role fighter aircraft, E-2D Hawkeye airborne early warning and control aircraft, various helicopters, and other unmanned aerial vehicles.

Specifications of the PANG Aircraft Carrier

France’s proposed PANG carrier will have a crew of around 2,000 personnel, including aircraft engineers to undertake repairs onboard that would normally be done by the manufacturer. 

PANG is expected to be delivered to the French Navy in 2037 and will be made operational by the French Navy a year later, at which point the ancient Charles De Gaulle will be retired from service. 

According to specifications, the PANG will be equipped with advanced defenses, including the SeaFire radar system and a variety of satellite communication systems. The carrier will also have a catapult-assisted take-off but arrested recovery (CATOBAR) system, which will allow the onboard aircraft to launch from the deck using electromagnetic catapults, and to land using arresting wires. 

As for her weapons, the PANG will be armed with a variety of advanced missiles, including the Aster 15 and Aster 30 surface-to-air missiles, the Exocet MM40 Block 3 anti-ship missile, and the SCALP naval cruise missile. The carrier will have a range of other defensive systems, including the Sylver A50 vertical launch system. 

A Fundamental Mismatch of Resources and Needs

It's true that the PANG represents a significant leap forward for the French Navy. If constructed according to her designs and the preferred timeline, the PANG carrier will provide a powerful and versatile platform for projecting sea-based airpower across the globe. 

Of course, to what end is a question that few in Paris apparently dare to ask. 

Even more so than Britain, France is a European power. Its problem set and the threats it currently faces derive from Russia to the east and the Greater Middle East to the south.

Sure, an aircraft carrier can help deal with terrorism issues in the Greater Middle East, but what can it do against Russia? 

More important, as evidenced by the French experience fighting in Mali, no amount of firepower will assist the French in winning back North Africa. It goes deeper than mere firepower. Their problems in that part of the world are cultural, historical, and ideological. 

As a medium power, France should instead be focused on building their fleet of cheaper, unmanned underwater vehicles, as well as submarines and possibly destroyers. And if Paris really wanted to get ahead of the rest of the advanced militaries of the world, they’d focus on military space issues as well as developing hypersonic weapons capabilities. 

An aircraft carrier, like the proposed PANG, may make them feel like a great power again. But it won’t actually make France a great power again. 

Author Experience and Expertise: Brandon J. Weichert

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. 

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)

Summary and Key Points: Britain's Vanguard-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, commissioned in the 1990s to replace the Polaris-equipped Resolution-class, are crucial for maintaining the country's continuous at-sea deterrent (CASD) posture.

-Despite their impressive capabilities, these subs have faced controversies, including collisions and maintenance issues. Britain's strategic vision and post-industrial challenges have compounded these problems, raising concerns about the fleet's sustainability.

-With the first Dreadnought-class replacement not expected until the 2030s, the Vanguard-class subs must remain operational longer than intended, highlighting the need for a clearer defense strategy and increased investment in submarine capabilities.

The Struggles and Strengths of Britain's Vanguard-Class Nuclear Submarines

Although a medium-sized power, Britain is a nuclear weapons-armed state. A key component of Britain’s nuclear capabilities is the Vanguard-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) operated by the British Royal Navy. 

There are only four Vanguard-class subs in operation today, and they were designed initially in the 1980s to replace the aging Polaris-equipped Resolution-class nuclear submarines that defined the British Royal Navy throughout the Cold War. 

The first Vanguard-class submarine, HMS Vanguard, was commissioned in 1993. 

Some Interesting Points

These subs were constructed by Vickers Shipbuilding and Engineering (now BAE systems) at the Barrow-in-Furness Shipyard in Cumbria, England. They were designed to carry the Trident II/D5 missile, a submarine-launched ballistic missile capable of delivering multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles. Each Vanguard-class submarine can carry up to 16 Trident II missiles with multiple nukes on top. 

They are legendary mass killing machines.

The Vanguard-class sub is powered by a single Rolls-Royce PWR 2 nuclear reactor, providing virtually unlimited range and endurance. They can accommodate a crew of 135 officers and sailors. These subs are designed to operate for extended periods at sea, maintaining a continuous at-sea deterrent (CASD) posture that is vital for Britain’s national defense. 

A Vanguard-class SSBN displaces 14,900 tons and, when submerged, can displace 15,900 tons. Such a boat has a length of 491 feet, 10 inches, a beam of 42 feet, and a draught of 39 feet, four inches. 

Currently, all four Vanguard-class SSBNs are in service with the Royal Navy. 

Vanguard-class Complications

While these submarines are impressive, they have suffered through controversy. About a decade ago, poor seamanship led a Vanguard-class submarine to crash into an allied French submarine underwater. Similarly, another incident occurred in which a bad depth measurement nearly led to one of these boats sinking with all hands. Thankfully, a secondary depth finder gave an accurate reading of the ship’s true depth, allowing for the crew to correct and save the ship. 

Britain is also struggling with an identity crisis. 

On the one hand, they have their imperial legacy. On the other, Britain is not an imperial superpower anymore. Further, they are no longer part of the supranational European Union. They have become a small, independent country that needs to better define its overall strategic objectives. 

Submarines are expensive. In fact, modern militaries are expensive. Britain is struggling, like so many other Western nations, to maintain a reliable fighting force. This is partly because of limits of resources and bad leadership. It’s also because Britain is much smaller than other countries and is inherently limited.

Britain’s Post-Industrial Mistakes Catch Up with Them

Beyond that, Britain is a post-industrial country. It has difficulty sustaining physical platforms that are highly complex and require gobs of money to build and maintain. There are several woes afflicting the Vanguard-class submarine fleet. These problems include complications in Britain’s ability to maintain these boats and refit them as needed. The Vanguards are old and require expensive maintenance and refit schedules to remain in fighting shape. 

For example, HMS Vanguard recently returned to service in the Royal Navy after a seven-year-long refit – a refit significantly longer than originally planned. Thus, concerns have arisen from British leaders about the availability of the fleet and ability to maintain CASD.

The Royal Navy is invested in building the Dreadnought-class SSBN as a replacement for the Vanguard class. But the first vessel in the class, HMS Dreadnought, is not expected to enter service until the 2030s, meaning Vanguard-class subs will need to remain operational for several more years, probably longer than their designers ever intended.

General Decline

Also at issue is a decline in the quality of the Royal Navy sailors. Because of increased operational tempo (and not having enough of these units on hand), reports have surfaced over recent years about significant declines in crew well-being and morale aboard these SSBNs. Indeed, one of Britain’s Vanguard-class subs recently returned from a record-breaking tour of over half a year at sea, raising questions about the sustainability of such deployments.

Overall, significant capabilities gaps have formed in Britain’s undersea fleet. Not only with the Vanguard class, but also with Astute-class attack submarines. 

If British leaders had a cogent vision for what they wanted British military power to achieve, they would find a way to build submarines in greater numbers, which is what they need. But British leadership still thinks they’re running an empire. The elite in London’s government clearly believe that their military can do everything, everywhere, all at once. But, they are wrong. And Britain’s submarine force is showing dangerous signs of decline as a result of this faulty thinking. 

Author Experience and Expertise: Brandon J. Weichert

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. 

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)

Summary and Key Points: China boasts about its anti-ship missiles, nicknamed carrier killers, but sinking a U.S. aircraft carrier is no easy feat. The USS America, a conventionally powered Kitty Hawk-class carrier, demonstrated incredible resilience during explosive tests almost a decade after its 1996 retirement.

-Despite sustained simulated attacks meant to mimic wartime conditions, it took four weeks before the America was finally scuttled.

-This exercise revealed the carrier’s robust design and ability to withstand significant damage.

-Lessons learned from the USS America’s endurance have informed the design of future carriers, like the Gerald R. Ford-class, underscoring the complexity of sinking these formidable vessels.

USS America: The Carrier That Showed Why Sinking a U.S. Supercarrier is No Easy Task

China lauds its anti-ship missiles that are nicknamed carrier killers, but just how difficult is it to sink U.S. aircraft carriers?

The USS America is a case in point. The America had a distinguished service history since its commissioning in 1965. The flat-top was retired in 1996 and the Navy wanted to know how a carrier would react to explosions that would simulate an attack. During explosive tests almost ten years later it took four weeks to the carrier before America was finally scuttled. So, this action showed that the America could take a punch and not go down easily.

Let’s take a look at why the carrier was so resilient: 

USS America: An Exemplary Service Record

The USS America was a non-nuclear conventionally powered carrier of the Kitty Hawk supercarrier class. The America was a mainstay during the Vietnam war with three deployments in theater and later patrolled the Persian Gulf and saw action during Operation Desert Storm. The America had a nose for difficult jobs having been deployed off the coasts of Libya, Iraq, Haiti, and Bosnia during its service history.

Big and Dangerous

The vessel displaced 83,573 tons. It had four hangar elevators. These serviced 79-aircraft. The air wing was made up of fighters, bombers, and anti-submarine airplanes such as F-4 Phantoms, A-6 Intruders, A-7 Corsair IIs, and SP-2 Neptunes.

Air Defense Was Effective

The America had a full complement of air defenses including radars and sensors that at the time of the Vietnam War were of advanced quality. It also carried surface-to-air missiles and a close-in weapons systems for better protection and survivability from any bogeys that made it past the main air defenses.

USS America: No Pilots Lost Over Vietnam

The USS America had an excellent record during Vietnam. Amazingly, it lost zero pilots while flying 10,500 sorties and dropping over 11,000 pounds of bombs.

Enviable Record in the Middle East

During the 1980s under President Ronald Reagan, the America saw more combat off the coast of Libya. By then it carried F-14 Tomcats and was engaged in battle with Libyan surface-to-air missiles and small ships which it destroyed or damaged. 

But Middle East service for the America was not complete. The carrier sent 3,000 sorties to attack Iraqi positions during the First Gulf War. After the war, the America sent its aircraft to patrol the no-fly zone over Iraq.

Simulated Battle Testing

In 1996, the USS America was decommissioned. Rather than converting it into a museum, the Navy selected it for testing in 2005 to study how huge ships would cope with explosions on board and respond to the flooding that took place after.  

Dario Leone of the Aviation Geek Club unearthed this quote on Quora about the America from mechanical engineer Blake Horner that is quite telling: “[T]he whole point of the tests was to make future carriers more survivable, as well as see how warships reacted to underwater explosion and damage. Clearly, after taking a beating for four weeks, they can survive a LOT due to just their sheer bulk. But at the same time, the tests were not meant to truly sink her immediately. Thus, there was no ‘shoot to kill’ mindset of the naval officers conducting the test, versus the whole point of attacking enemy battleships was to sink them,” Horner said.

The USS America was thus the largest ship in the U.S. Navy to ever sink. The evaluators learned that a double-hulled ship of its size was difficult to destroy. They concluded, according to Horner, that missiles would have to penetrate deeply through numerous rooms and empty spaces to mortally wound a large carrier. These lessons helped the Navy design future carriers such as the Gerald R. Ford-class.

Now, the USS America, after a notable 30-year service record, is at the bottom of the sea between Charleston, South Carolina, and Bermuda.

About the Author: Dr. Brent M. Eastwood

Brent M. Eastwood, PhD, is the author of Humans, Machines, and Data: Future Trends in Warfare. He is an Emerging Threats expert and former U.S. Army Infantry officer. You can follow him on Twitter @BMEastwood.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

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En juillet, l'Australie et la Nouvelle-Zélande ont participé à Washington au sommet de l'Alliance atlantique. Wellington envisage même la conclusion d'un nouveau partenariat avec celle-ci. Il s'agirait de contenir la Chine qui, de son côté, soigne ses relations avec les îles Salomon ou Kiribati. Dans (...) / Pacifique, Géopolitique, Océanie, Australie, Chine - 2024/08

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On July 26, 2024, in Vientiane, Laos, the foreign ministers from the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and India will meet, marking a significant landmark in their relationship. This gathering highlights the increasing significance of their partnership and emphasizes India’s role in enhancing its connections with ASEAN countries while maintaining ASEAN centrality in the Indo-Pacific region.

The relationship between India and ASEAN is not new. Both regions have interacted for centuries. These relations have been well established and upgraded in the last few decades. The ASEAN-India Strategic Partnership is setting the course for integration in trade, security, and investment and establishing educational and cultural exchanges.

The year 2024 has seen a major transformation in the Indo-Pacific region’s geopolitics. China’s rise in the region and its assertive behavior in the South China Sea have triggered regional tensions, underlining the imperative for a rule-based order. In light of this, the ASEAN centrality cannot be dismissed since it is the primary driver for regional dialogue and cooperation.

India has varied interests in the Indo-Pacific region. In terms of economics, ASEAN is one of India’s most important trading partners, with bilateral trade between the two reaching over $100 billion. Strategically, the organization is an extremely significant area for India’s Act East Policy (AEP), Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI), and Security and Growth for all in the Region (SAGAR).

It should be emphasized that in order to enhance its relationship with ASEAN and support ASEAN centrality, India needs to focus on a number of key areas. India must increase trade and investment among the member states of ASEAN. For instance, it can take part in ASEAN digital transformation efforts and other infrastructure projects like the ASEAN-India Connectivity Plan. 

Considering the Indo-Pacific geographical area, collaboration between India and ASEAN members regarding the protection of their sea lanes is needed. Joint naval exercises, sharing intelligence, and initiatives aimed at capacity building can contribute to regional security and stability. 

Building cultural bridges with others and nurturing people-to-people relations create a sound basis for long-term cooperation. This may involve exchange programs in education, tourism drives, or even cultural festivals to enhance communication as well as build goodwill. 

When it comes to climate change, India’s role is crucial since it can actively and fully participate in addressing issues within the region. A shared commitment to sustainability can be built through joint investments in renewable energy sources, natural disaster prevention projects, and environmental preservation activities done together with neighbors.

With the world moving towards the age of new technology, India also has a chance to form alliances with ASEAN countries to help push innovation and digitalization. Programs of joint research and development, technology transfers, and the organization of capacity-building programs can be used to drive economic growth and development. For instance, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) will enter into collaborative agreements with the central banks of four ASEAN Countries—Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, and Thailand—to enable the retail purposes of cross-border payments.

Maintaining ASEAN Centrality

ASEAN’s centrality is essential in maintaining a balanced and inclusive regional system in the Indo-Pacific. In order to support this principle, India must interact with ASEAN-led mechanisms such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting with Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and the United States (ADMM+). This would enable India to help build regional norms and address common challenges through its participation in those platforms. India should also advocate for an Indo-Pacific region that is multipolar and dominated by no one power. This means facilitating dialogue and cooperation between every stakeholder in the region, including the United States, China, EU, Japan, and Australia. India has pledged to maintain a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific, which accords with the ASEAN vision of centrality.

Economic Integration and Connectivity

India should prioritize deepening economic ties that benefit all stakeholders via open discussions. India’s exit from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in 2019 owing to trade imbalances and threats to local industries should guide her in striking a more balanced deal. 

Connectivity plays a crucial role in boosting regional trade and links for further cooperation. India’s involvement in projects such as the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway (IMT) and the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project (KMTTP) will aid this. In addition, India, being part of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), can link South Asia and Southeast Asia, enhancing wider cooperation beyond the economic sphere.

Defense and Security Cooperation

The South China Sea remains a point of conflict for U.S.-China competition, with ramifications for regional safety. ASEAN’s precepts are echoed in India’s position on freedom of navigation and its allegiance to international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). By carrying out joint naval exercises, port visits, and capacity-building programs with ASEAN navies, India can contribute both to maritime security and to a rule-based order.

India’s defense exports, such as BrahMos missiles to the Philippines and possibly other ASEAN countries, show that it has what it takes to support regional defense needs. Expanding defense cooperation agreements and offering technical assistance and training will help strengthen the defense capabilities of these nations in ASEAN, thereby enhancing security within this region.

Soft power and cultural diplomacy

India’s strong basis for soft power diplomacy lies in its historical and cultural relations with South East Asia. Buddhism, Hinduism, and other shared aspects of culture can create deeper people-to-people bonds. Joint efforts like the re-establishment of Nalanda University in India and making ASEAN countries have cultural centers encourage educational exchange and trade.

Additionally, by offering scholarships and academic programs to students from ASEAN, India can instill in them an appreciation of Indian culture and traditions. India is undertaking a number of initiatives to foster closer ties with the ASEAN member countries through the ASEAN-India Youth Summit, ASEAN-India Artists’ Camps, and ASEAN-India Music Festival. Moreover, there is also a significant Indian diaspora in Southeast Asia, which acts as a bridge to link cultural and economic ties between the two regions.

Balancing the Chessboard

The U.S.-China rivalry presents a tightrope walk. India has to deftly handle its relations with both superpowers in line with the neutrality and the regional stability objectives of ASEAN. This is because it stands for an ASEAN where India can gain the confidence and trust of Southeast Asian countries. India’s association with ASEAN is more than a geopolitical move—it is a crucial precondition for peace and prosperity in the region.

Today’s ASEAN-India Foreign Ministers Meeting will provide a useful occasion to reaffirm and expand the partnership between India and ASEAN. As India commemorates a decade of its AEP, it has transformed itself from a mere instrument to engage with East and South East Asia to anchor and linchpin its approach to the Indo-Pacific region. By focusing on cooperation, maritime security, cultural ties, sustainable development, and technological partnership, India can play a vital role in further strengthening its engagement with the organization and its constituent nations. While the region steers through rough waters, India’s proactive and constructive approach toward ASEAN will be the key to instilling peace, stability, and shared prosperity.

Dr. Shristi Pukhrem, currently serving as a Deputy Director (Academics & Research) at India Foundation, holds a Doctorate from the School of International Studies (SIS), Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. She is a JRF (Junior Research Fellow) in Political Science awarded by the University Grants Commission, Government of India. Formerly employed as a Researcher at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA), New Delhi, Dr. Pukhrem’s research areas cover India-ASEAN relations, India’s bilateral relations with the South-East Asian Countries, the Act-East Policy with a larger focus on the Indo-Pacific region.

Image: StockSolution / Shutterstock.com.

To stop the growing crisis in the country’s east, the West must pressure Rwanda.

The United States can reinforce restraint.

Summary and Key Points: The HALO Trust is utilizing artificial intelligence to enhance landmine detection in Ukraine, the world's largest minefield. Supported by a $4 million grant from Amazon Web Services, HALO employs AI to analyze drone-captured imagery, drastically reducing analysis time from days to hours.

-Ukraine’s extensive surface-laid mines make drone detection effective, aiding HALO's mission to clear mines faster and safer.

-With 542 drone flights and 11 terabytes of data already collected, HALO aims to deploy this AI tool by year-end, offering a model for global mine clearance efforts, including in challenging terrains like Colombia.

AI Technology Boosts Mine Detection Efforts in Ukraine

In the third year of its war of self-defense against an invading Russia, Ukraine has developed a reputation as a laboratory for battlefield innovation, from the way it employs drones and drone countermeasures to how it uses artillery. And close to the fight in eastern Ukraine, a nongovernment organization is employing artificial intelligence in a pilot program that may have life-saving implications for the entire world.

The HALO Trust, which has been working to clear mines from conflict zones for more than three decades, is applying AI to imagery captured by aerial drones to develop reliable identification profiles for landmines hidden within the terrain. Its work is partly enabled by Amazon Web Services (AWS), which gave the organization a $4 million grant in June to support secure storage of the vast amounts of data needed to build the profiles. 

The location of the pilot program is deliberate. As of this year, Ukraine is considered the world’s largest minefield, with as many as two million mines scattered across the land and potentially as much as a third of the country requiring demining for safe habitation. As Vox explains, in a conflict, potentially fatal landmines result in a couple of ways: First, artillery, which has been a land weapon of choice on both sides of the fight, can leave behind active and unstable shells, known as unexploded ordnance, or UXO. Second, anti-tank and anti-personnel mines are placed deliberately to kill combatants on foot or in armored vehicles – and these pressure-triggered devices are just as much a threat to the civilian population as to the military.

“As a very general point with Ukraine quickly becoming one of the most contaminated countries in the world, it’s the place where this technology can have the most impact,” Matthew Abercrombie, research and development officer at The HALO Trust, told Sandboxx News. “Even if we had all the resources in the world, it would still take a huge amount of time and effort to clear what’s being reported as the level of contamination. So anything we can do to narrow that down will have a huge impact on our ability to get the job done,” he added.

But there’s another reason, too, that Ukraine makes sense as a test bed for AI-based mine clearance, Abercrombie said. In the current conflict, a significant amount of placed mines are being laid on the surface of the ground, rather than dug into the ground. That allows the RGB cameras on the large commercial drones flown by The HALO Trust to capture their shape and characteristics. While the organization hopes to build in multispectral imaging eventually, which would help them capture evidence not visible to the naked eye, Ukraine offers a straightforward mine detection challenge.

As of late June, the organization had completed 542 drone flights totaling 11 terabytes of data, according to a published announcement. Flights have already been taking place for more than a year, Abercrombie told Sandboxx News, and the information they yield represents an overwhelming workload to human analysts. The information the organization collects is secure and not shared with other military or civil entities; the mine-clearing that follows identification is conducted largely by HALO’s 1,200 staff in Ukraine.

“It very quickly became apparent that the bottleneck is being able to analyze the imagery in time to make it useful,” he added.

And there is a very clear time element: according to Jennifer Hyman, head of communications for HALO, the greatest number of civilian casualties from landmines typically take place as displaced residents try to return to their homes. The technology the organization is hoping to develop, she said, would also significantly accelerate the ability to spot human activity and signs of damage, providing insights on areas that are safer for human movement and return.

“Drone imagery covering maybe a couple of hectares would take a human analyst maybe two days to trawl through and identify,” Abercrombie said. “Whereas our best estimates for the machine learning models is that it could be [done] on the order of an hour.”

Training the AI to identify mines as well as a human analyst will take time and vast quantities of imagery – thousands of images of a single variant of anti-tank or anti-personnel mine, for example. Complicating matters, human rights observers have said Russia and Ukraine are using at least 13 different kinds of each kind of mine.

However, despite the size of the information collection task, HALO plans to have a first version of an AI mine-detection tool ready for distribution to its staff in Ukraine by the end of the year, according to Abercrombie. They’re also already looking ahead, to employing this technology in other minefields around the globe – places like Colombia, where mountainous terrain makes drone imagery a far more accessible option than human in-person identification.

Troublingly, Russia’s activity in Ukraine may create even more spaces for organizations like HALO to operate in: The Washington Post reported that some neighboring European countries, seeking to harden their own defenses, have been considering a return to using the cheap and deadly devices.

About the Author: 

Hope Hodge Seck is an award-winning investigative and enterprise reporter who has been covering military issues since 2009. She is the former managing editor for Military.com.

This article was first published by Sandboxx News.

Summary and Key Points: The Russian Tupolev Tu-95 "Bear" bomber, with its turbo-prop engines, has been a cornerstone of Soviet and Russian air power since its introduction in 1956. Designed for long-range missions, it boasts an operating range exceeding 8,000 miles.

-Despite its age, the Tu-95 remains relevant, capable of carrying nuclear cruise missiles and serving as an electronic surveillance platform. It continues to patrol near American and European borders, including recent activities near Alaska and Ukraine.

-With an expected service life extending to 2040, the Tu-95 is a testament to enduring Soviet engineering, remaining a versatile and strategic asset for Russia.

The Tu-95 'Bear': Russia’s Long-Range Missile Truck

Russia’s Tupolev Tu-95 “Bear” bomber may not look like much. In fact, its turbo-prop engines are an early Cold War-harkening anachronism. But the aging Tu-95 is commonly understood to be the most capable bomber the Soviet Union ever produced.

Designing the Bear

While the turbo-prop engines look more like something you’d find on a regional puddle-jumper, rather than a great power’s nuclear bomber, the old-school engines served a very specific purpose. Of course Soviet designers could have installed turbojet engines on their Tu-95 – but the Soviets wanted a jet that could strike deep into enemy territory, with a minimum range of 6,200 miles. The turbo-prop engine enables such a vast operating range. Once installed, the Tu-95’s turbo-prop engines permitted an operating range in excess of 8,000 miles, meaning the Soviet bomber could fly back and forth across the continental U.S. about three times without needing to refuel.

The Tu-95 entered the Soviet air force in 1956, and it continues to serve today, almost 70 years later. This forces comparisons to the long-serving B-52 Stratofortress, an American bomber of similar vintage. The Tu-95, like the B-52, is still relevant. It even saw action in 2015 against ISIS, and it is expected to remain in service until at least 2040, meaning the airframe could hit the 100-year-in-service mark.

Although the Tu-95 was built as a bomber, the airframe has often been used as an electronic surveillance platform, adding value for cash-strapped Soviet/Russian forces hoping to get as much versatility as possible out of their fleet. 

Of course, the Tu-95 is also outfitted as a proper bomber. The K variant can deploy the Russian Kh-20 nuclear cruise missile, meaning the Tu-95 has both the range and ability to deliver nuclear ordnance to American soil, assuming the non-stealth airframe could penetrate American air defenses.

To be clear, the Tu-95 could not penetrate American air defense systems, nor indeed any modern air defense system, and it would not survive against modern interceptor aircraft. The Tu-95 is a 70-year-old platform, after all, and no match for 21st-century systems.

“But that’s where the ability to fire cruise missiles plays such a vital role,” Brandon J. Weichert wrote. “[The Tu-95 is] basically long-range missile trucks that can engage enemies at a distance, negating the efficacy of air defenses and the threat of intercepts.”

Tu-95: Still Flying Today

The Tu-95 has routinely pestered American and European forces, slinking up to borders and patrolling overlapping areas of interest. The Tu-95 often loiters around the Alaskan coastline, not far from Russia’s easternmost borders. In 2014, a Tu-95 flew to within 50 miles of California’s coastline, forcing the U.S. Air Force to initiate a proper intercept. 

The Tu-95 is also active in Ukraine, fitting in nicely alongside the rest of the Russian equipment – much of which is terribly outdated, yet still capable of performing adequately enough. Expect the 55 still-flying Tu-95s to remain in service for as long as Russian mechanics can keep the bombers airworthy.

About the Author: Harrison Kass 

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

All images are Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points: Russia is advancing its efforts to counter the American B-2 Spirit stealth bomber by developing the Tupolev PAK DA. This new stealth bomber aims to give Russia a strategic edge similar to that of the B-2, with the capability to carry nuclear payloads.

-The PAK-DA, designed in a flying-wing style to enhance stealth, is nearing prototype completion, with plans for up to six more units.

-While the PAK-DA represents a significant step for Russia in stealth technology, it remains behind the U.S., which continues to lead with its fleet of stealth bombers and fifth-generation fighters.

Russia Advances PAK DA Stealth Bomber to Counter U.S. B-2 Spirit

When the B-2 Spirit was introduced, the flying-wing bomber forced America’s opponents to make defensive adjustments. The B-2 offered an entirely new strategic element. It was the first aircraft that had both stealth technology and the ability to carry a nuclear payload, meaning in essence that the B-2 could end worlds without ever being detected.

The Russians were especially concerned about the B-2, worried that the stealth bomber would be used for deep penetration missions against Moscow or St. Petersburg. Accordingly, Russia was eager to introduce a peer aircraft, something that could help mitigate the advantage the B-2 gave the Americans. 

Decades later, Russia is finally building an answer to the B-2 Spirit: the Tupolev PAK-DA, a stealth bomber capable of carrying a nuclear payload.

Prototype on the Way

Tupolev is understood to be nearly finished with a PAK DA prototype aircraft. The company intends to build up to six more aircraft. If Tupolev can pull off the PAK DA, Russia would become just the second nation, behind the U.S., to introduce a stealth bomber. Even China, whose military capabilities have been improving at a rapid clip, has yet to introduce a stealth bomber, although the Xi’an H-20 is currently under development.

Russia is no stranger to aerospace accomplishments. It is arguably the second most accomplished nation with respect to aerospace (and astrospace) engineering. But in the realm of stealth, the Russians have never come close to matching American capabilities. The U.S. has not only led the way on stealth technology, but has stood head and shoulders above the rest since introducing the F-117 Nighthawk and B-2 Spirit about three decades ago.

Today, the U.S. commands a fleet of stealthy fifth-generation fighters, the F-35 Lightning II and the F-22 Raptor. The B-21 Raider, a new flying-wing stealth bomber slated to replace the B-2 within the next decade, is undergoing flight tests.

All told, the Americans are about a full generation ahead of the Russians (and Chinese) on stealth bombers. Both Russia and China are rushing to catch up, but designing a stealth bomber is much easier than producing or fielding a legitimate, undetectable bomber. Intelligence suggests that Russia is closer to completing the PAK-DA than the Chinese are to completing the H-20, but with the program so obscured from public view, who really knows. 

Very little is known indeed about the PAK DA. What we do know is that the airframe has been crafted in the same flying-wing style as the B-2 and B-21, so we can expect the PAK DA to have a low radar cross section and to cruise at subsonic speeds. Again, easier said than done. The Russians are not known for their stealth accomplishments; their only stealth fighter, the Su-57, is rated as the worst stealth performer of all existing stealth aircraft.

The PAK DA is slated to enter mass production before 2027, but that feels like wishful thinking. Russia has a history of slow weapons program rollouts, and the ongoing war of attrition in Ukraine is burning through resources and industrial capacities that might otherwise be used to produce a stealth aircraft. 

About the Author: Harrison Kass 

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

Image Credit: Creative Commons. 

The region’s worst typhoon this season leaves mass flooding, shipwrecks, and a potentially devastating oil spill in its wake.

Since gaining independence in 1991, the Central Asian states have again forged steadily growing ties with China. These ties advanced significantly in 2013 when Xi Jinping formally announced the Silk Road Economic Belt—part of the Belt and Road Initiative—in Kazakhstan. China's expanding presence in the region, however, has raised new concerns among neighboring countries over economic, political, and cultural sovereignty. In light of Xi Jinping’s recent visit to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's annual meeting in Astana and an official visit to Tajikistan, three experts will review the evolving dynamics of these relationships.

On July 25, the Center for the National Interest hosted the fifth in a monthly series of expert discussions organized by the Center’s Central Asia Connectivity Project.

—Elizabeth Wishnick is a Senior Research Scientist in the China and Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Division at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) and a Senior Research Scholar at the Weatherhead East Asian Institute at Columbia University. She was a tenured professor of Political Science at Montclair State University from 2005-2024. Dr. Wishnick has dual regional expertise on China and Russia and is an expert on Chinese foreign policy, Sino-Russian relations, Northeast Asian and Central Asian security, and Arctic geopolitics. She received a PhD in Political Science from Columbia University, an MA in Russian and East European Studies from Yale University, and a BA from Barnard College. She speaks Mandarin, Russian, and French.

—Brian Carlson is Research Professor of Indo-Pacific Security Studies at the China Landpower Studies Center of the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College. Previously, he served as head of the global security team at the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zürich and, prior to that, as a postdoctoral fellow and researcher at RAND Corporation. Dr. Carlson holds a PhD in International Relations from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His research focuses primarily on China-Russia relations. He speaks Chinese and Russian.

—Temur Umarov is a Fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, specializing in Central Asian countries’ domestic and foreign policies, as well as China’s relations with Russia and Central Asian neighbors. A native of Uzbekistan, Umarov holds degrees in China studies and international relations from the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration and the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO). He holds an MA in world economics from the University of International Business and Economics (Beijing). He speaks Chinese, Russian, Tajik, and Uzbek.

Andrew Kuchins, Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, moderated the discussion.

Image: Khikmatilla Ubaydullaev / Shutterstock.com. 

Editor’s Note: The Red Cell series is published in collaboration with the Stimson Center. Drawing upon the legacy of the CIA’s Red Cell—established following the September 11 attacks to avoid similar analytic failures in the future—the project works to challenge assumptions, misperceptions, and groupthink with a view to encouraging alternative approaches to America’s foreign and national security policy challenges. For more information about the Stimson Center’s Red Cell Project, see here.

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Red Cell

Digital trade—the movement of data across borders—is the fastest-growing segment of global trade today. When data moves freely, the capacity to innovate and generate economic value expands, turbocharging growth. Nonetheless, American politicians have become increasingly wary of the digital economy, the vast power of Big Tech, and the free-market orthodoxy enabling its rise. The Biden administration has taken this shift in the zeitgeist to a new level by repudiating the market-oriented model of governance for digital trade—even at the cost of diminishing American leadership and fragmenting the global economy.

The United States has long championed protecting the free flow of data, limiting data localization, and safeguarding source code from forced disclosure. These core principles are enshrined in the United States-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement (USMCA), ratified by Congress, and in the United States-Japan Digital Trade Agreement (USJDTA). They once informed the U.S. position on digital governance at the World Trade Organization (WTO). Not anymore.

President Joe Biden reversed decades of U.S. policy last year when his trade representative, Katherine Tai, stopped supporting these principles in Geneva and paused negotiations on the digital chapter of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). U.S. officials wanted “policy space” for domestic regulation. This approach sounds reasonable, but it is unfounded because “policy space” is built into such agreements. Trade-phobia is a partial explanation at best. Democrats in swing states reportedly feared being branded as job-outsourcing globalists in the general election, even though the Republican administration of former President Donald Trump negotiated the USMCA and the USJDTA and tabled a paper at the WTO echoing the old policy line. The Biden team could have done the same, relying on the legal precedent of a ratified USMCA and decades of policy precedent. They had zero precedent to reverse course. So why did they take such a drastic step, and what are the consequences for the United States and the global economy? 

A Reversal Rooted in Biden’s New Washington Consensus

Biden believes historic levels of corporate concentration and the digital revolution itself are “drivers” of economic inequality, weakening democracies. A “fairer” America and a fairer global economic order thus require state intervention. Biden’s new Washington consensus demands that the United States leave its laissez-faire comfort zone and let the government redirect domestic investment, channel innovation, and fight unchecked corporate power using an expansive interpretation of antitrust law and a whole-of-government competition policy. In the bullseye is “Big Tech,” which Democrats and many Republicans agree is too powerful. Biden hired what the New York Times called the most aggressive antitrust team in decades at the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) with a roadmap for rewriting the rules of American capitalism.

The team put digital matters at the center of their efforts, arguing that the digital economy enables unprecedented levels of monopoly power and new ways of abusing it. The worldwide connectivity of digital platforms makes this a global challenge. Cheered by progressives in Congress, they focused on IPEF’s digital trade chapter to further those efforts. In October 2023, prior to the annual gathering of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation leaders Biden was to host in San Francisco, his team paused negotiations, deprioritizing U.S. digital leadership in Asia and undermining part of Washington’s approach to technology rivalry with China. The digital reversal at the WTO followed. A U.S. official cited the right to “regulate in the public interest” and the need to “address anticompetitive behavior in the digital economy.”

“Bigness” Is Bad Again

Biden’s antitrust team is not wrong to consider how competition presents itself in the digital era. For many decades, antitrust laws have protected consumers from economic harm through the application of the consumer welfare standard, which considers alleged monopolistic behavior in terms of the impact on price, innovation, and quality. It is reasonable to consider whether digital platforms have changed the architecture of market power such that antitrust enforcement should address it. The U.S. trade representative is also not wrong to assert that digital trade is about more than just “trade rules.” The digital world engages social and political concerns, as well as concerns over national security, geopolitics, privacy, as well as consumer and labor rights. With the rise of artificial intelligence, it has to wrestle with crucial moral, ethical, and philosophical questions. 

Nonetheless, the administration’s starting point is that “bigness” itself is harmful because it allows companies to exert force over how the market operates and facilitates other social and political harms. The idea is not new or unique to the digital era. It originated during the Industrial Revolution when corporate trusts in oil, sugar, tobacco, steel, and railroads used exclusionary practices to crush competitors. In the 1890s, “bigness” became equated with monopolism and “immoral and injurious” pursuits, according to Senator John Sherman, author of the Sherman Antitrust Act, suggesting a broad definition of harm. That view persisted until the 1970s with the rise of the consumer welfare standard, the intellectual underpinnings for which were laid at the University of Chicago by Judge Robert Bork and adopted by the Supreme Court in 1979. The Biden administration wants to deemphasize reliance on analysis in enforcing antitrust laws. As a former Biden antitrust advisor explained, massive economic power can translate into massive political power, undermining democracy and threatening free speech and privacy. The administration wants to capture all these aspects of harm under an antitrust silver bullet rather than rely on other policy tools. 

This suggests that antitrust laws could be used to break up U.S. technology giants because they have too much political power or to protect small firms, even if they are inefficient. More importantly, the assumption that “bigness” is almost unequivocally harmful is disproven by the fact that it also arises because consumers simply like a firm’s products and services. For instance, they like ordering products from Amazon and receiving them quickly. Some corporate concentration also boosts innovation and employment, according to recent research. “Bigness” might even be a necessary condition for innovation and lower prices, some argue. Research and development are expensive. Moreover, sacrificing the benefits of economies of scale and scope to consumers in order to address harm to other groups creates more problems. After all, everyone is a consumer.

Edging Closer to the EU

The administration is kicking America’s market-oriented model of digital governance to the curb and warming up to the rights-driven model of the European Union (EU). The concept of “bigness” as a potential indicator of current or future economic, social, and political harms, for example, lies at the heart of the EU’s designation of Big Tech as “gatekeepers” of the digital world under the Digital Markets Act (DMA). The act changes antitrust from law enforcement to preemptive regulatory compliance, as the Biden team is also attempting to do. Thus far, Big Tech has not exited the EU market but is adapting to the DMA. 

The perspectives of the administration and the EU have converged. The FTC chair, Lina Khan, reportedly praised the DMA for addressing markets controlled by “digital gatekeepers.” U.S. trade representative Katherine Tai has not only extolled regulation as the EU’s “superpower,” but also, in defending the right to regulate in the public interest, has said that even if foreign governments target U.S. corporate giants, the United States should not object because, from a tax perspective, they may not be “American” after all. This is a shocking statement from a U.S. official, but it reflects the mood among some politicians on both sides of the aisle. 

The progressives pushing for these changes believe the United States should not enter into trade agreements, including on digital issues, that could tie Congress’ hands on possible future legislation. They want to enact legislation resembling what the EU is doing, but they do not have the votes to do so. Although both parties want more regulation and strong antitrust enforcement to rein in Big Tech, the members of each party disagree on methods—one of the reasons the United States has no federal privacy laws. Furthermore, taking free things away from consumers is always a political error. Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo made that point in February 2023 when she warned that banning TikTok would “lose every voter under 35 forever.”

That said, a growing cohort of younger Republicans are fans of the Biden approach because they think big business imposes a “woke” political agenda on the country. The Heritage Foundation’s blueprint for the FTC under a second Trump administration channels Biden’s arguments about unchecked corporate concentration undermining democracy. Should Trump win in November, given his past activism on antitrust and belief that Big Tech is biased against conservatives, he may continue the Biden policies and force Republicans to fall in line. 

For now, the administration is content to free-ride on Brussels’ activism while designating the DMA a barrier to trade on paper and claiming that its hands are tied on digital trade until Congress acts on digital policy. In fact, the administration is not only fine with the EU reining in Big Tech but also more comfortable than it should be with letting Europe set global rules. That explains the administration’s complacency toward serious bipartisan accusations that the president has ceded global economic leadership with his reversal on digital trade policy.

The Consequences for the United States and the Global Economy

Even if Washington no longer seeks to foster the conditions conducive to the expansion of American corporations abroad, the U.S. government should not support foreign governments in curbing their ability to do so. The EU is going after the most valuable businesses in the U.S. economy, and its targeting of Big Tech in the short run benefits China. The DMA designated only one of its technology titans, ByteDance. Eventually, more Chinese digital platforms will be subject to EU regulations, but by that time, they will have a foothold in the EU market. As for the EU model of governance, there is a reason Europeans “use an American search engine, shop on an American e-commerce site, thumb American phones, and scroll through American social media feeds.” The EU is apparently unwilling or unable to address the need for both innovation and regulation at the same time. 

The U.S. trade representative implies that the administration’s digital reversal does not put America’s global leadership at risk because China’s model of state control over data flows is unappealing to most. Nonetheless, regional digital economy agreements and trade agreements with digital chapters dot the global landscape, but they do not all conform with each other. If trade is resilient to U.S. withdrawal, so is the business of setting the rules and norms governing it. 

The alternative to a global framework for digital rules is a “Splinternet” and balkanized digital trade. All nations would then make things that could only be sold in limited markets abroad. That is a recipe for shrinking, not growing, the middle class. 

Keeping America’s technological edge sharper than its competitors requires constantly running against the best in the business, no matter what corner of the globe they hail from. Ring-fencing American technology companies into the highly regulated, democracies-only global order the administration prefers will incentivize imitation over innovation.   

Unfortunately, the U.S. path is set—regardless of who wins the White House in November. That is the ultimate irony: an approach aimed in part at changing the political climate at home, growing the middle class, and forcing the political marketplace to reward the center rather than the extremes will do the exact opposite. Washington needs to reconsider its direction of travel before the rest of the world makes other plans.

Ferial Ara Saeed is the Founder of Telegraph Strategies LLC, a consulting firm with deep experience in economic, foreign policy, and national security issues. She is also a former senior U.S. diplomat with extensive experience in Northeast Asia and the Middle East. At the State Department, she has served as Deputy U.S. Coordinator for information and communications technology policy, as an advisor to the Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs on Asia economic policy, and she has played key roles in negotiating landmark trade agreements with China and Japan. Follow her on X: @TelStratLLC.

Image: Salma Bashir / Shutterstock.com. 

The geopolitics of Formula 1, daring women journalists of the Vietnam War, and other page-turners for the beach.

A growing chorus of establishment pundits and policymakers have taken to branding anyone who calls for prioritizing diplomacy over force in U.S. foreign policy as “isolationist.”  

In official Washington, labeling an analyst, advocate, or organization isolationist is essentially an effort to convince the public at large that they are naive, and therefore not to be taken seriously. But recent history suggests that the “military first” (and second and third) approach favored by the Washington establishment is in fact the stance that is the most naive.

The direct U.S. wars of this century, including those in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, have done more harm than good, consuming vast quantities of blood and treasure in the process— $8 trillion and hundreds of thousands of lives, not to mention millions of displaced people, all  according to estimates by Brown University’s Costs of War project.  America’s slightly less direct wars – those we fund or supply with bombers and bombs – in Yemen, Gaza, and Ukraine are devastating and costly financially, environmentally, and in humanitarian impact. 

Interventionists – and their cheerleaders in the media and think tanks – are never held to account for their failures.   

Moreover, most advocates of greater restraint are not opposed to all uses of force. For example, U.S. support for Ukraine’s effort to fend off Russia’s invasion of their country is essential. But it must be accompanied by a diplomatic track aimed at preventing a long, grinding war that causes more death and destruction and precludes rebuilding, while constantly risking escalation to a direct U.S.-Russia or NATO-Russia conflict.  This view appears to be gaining traction with at least some U.S. officials. But when advocates of a diplomatic track raised the idea early in the conflict, many experts and policy advocates within the DC establishment mislabeled it as isolationist.

Given the challenges we face, from thwarting Russian aggression in Ukraine, to taking a balanced approach to the challenges posed by China, to stopping the slaughter in Gaza and heading off a region-wide Middle East war, America desperately needs a serious debate on what policies to pursue in a rapidly changing global security environment.  That means evaluating proposals grounded in a policy of restraint seriously, not dismissing them with misleading labels.  

A critical component of a more effective, more affordable approach to national security should be a more realistic view of the challenges posed by China. Unfortunately, many top U.S. officials are doing more to promote exaggerated views of a hostile Chinese regime bent on global domination than they are to encourage a factual assessment of Beijing’s intentions and capabilities. For example, at the recent Aspen Security Forum, Joint Chiefs chair Gen. Charles Brown warned that if the U.S. lapsed into isolationism – a term he did not define – it “opens the door to Xi Jinping and others who want to do unprovoked aggression . . .We have credibility at stake.”

The tensions between the United States and China are real, but there is little evidence to suggest that Beijing is chomping at the bit to invade its neighbors if the U.S. shifts to a more restrained, realistic strategy.  The most contentious issue –the future status of Taiwan – would be best addressed via diplomacy, in the form of a revival of the “One China” policy that has kept the peace in the Taiwan Straits for the past five decades.  The policy holds that the United States will not recognize Taiwan as a sovereign nation, and that it will maintain informal relations with Taipei and refrain from treating it as if it were a treaty ally. For its part, China would pledge to pursue unification with Taiwan via peaceful means only.

There are larger problems in the U.S.-China relationship, most notably an action-reaction cycle based on each side’s worst case assessment of the other’s motives and military might.  While neither side is actively seeking conflict, there is a danger that the two sides might stumble into war if they remain on their current paths. In this context, a truly defensive strategy in East Asia that seeks to deter Chinese military action against its neighbors while abandoning the more dangerous and costly goal of being able to “win” a war with that nation is the course most likely to establish stability in the region.

As we elect a new President and Congress, we should debate the future of U.S. foreign policy.  But let’s do it honestly, without throwing around misleading labels intended to shut down debate and to keep us mired in a deadly, expensive and counterproductive approach to world affairs.

About the Author: 

William D. Hartung is a senior research fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.

Today’s stronger-than-expected GDP numbers make it very unlikely that the Federal Reserve will start an interest rate-cutting cycle at its policy meeting this week. This is a great pity, considering the multiple downside risks to the economic recovery that are now in plain sight. By the time the Fed starts cutting interest rates, it will likely be too late for the Fed to stave off an economic recession.

The distinguishing characteristic of the Jerome Powell Fed is its backward-looking monetary policy approach. In 2021, the Fed was inexcusably slow in raising interest rates at a time when there were clear signs of an acceleration in inflation. Today, the Fed is very slow in cutting interest rates. It is too slow at a time when there are clear signs that inflation is moderating and that downside risks to the economy are building.

A backward-looking Fed will likely say that today’s GDP numbers do not provide it with sufficient reassurance that inflation is coming down to its 2 percent inflation target on a sustainable basis. In defense of its position, the Fed will note that in the second quarter, GDP growth accelerated to a faster-than-expected 2.8 percent. It will also point out that the core personal consumer expenditure deflator, the Fed’s favorite inflation yardstick, ticked up 2.7 percent compared to a year ago.

The basic mistake that the Fed now appears to   shopping habits following the pandemic, commercial property prices are dropping, and property developers are already starting to default on the $900 billion in property loans that fall due this year. This will hit the banks especially hard at a time when high interest rates have wrought serious damage on their loan and bond portfolios. It is estimated that the banks are currently sitting on more than $1 trillion in mark-to-market losses on those portfolios.

According to a recent National Bureau of Economic Research study, close to 400 small and medium-sized banks could fail due to high interest rates and the commercial property crisis. Were such failures to materialize, they would be reminiscent of the 1980s Savings and Loan Crisis, which contributed significantly to an economic recession.

Another risk that could derail the recovery is the United States’ drift toward protectionist policies, especially against China. One clear indication of this drift is the emphasis in the current election cycle on the need to protect American jobs from foreign competition. Donald Trump has made clear that if he wins the election, he will impose a 60 percent import tariff on China and a 10 percent across-the-board tariff on all other countries’ exports. That would carry the risk of retaliation by our trade partners and a return to the economically destructive beggar-thy-neighbor policies of the 1930s.

Looking abroad, there is no shortage of political and economic risks to which the Fed should be paying attention. Russia is still engaged in its war with Ukraine, while the Israel-Hamas War could spill over to the rest of the Middle East. China, the world’s second-largest economy and, until recently, its main engine of economic growth, is struggling to cope with the fallout from the bursting of its massive housing and equity bubble. Meanwhile, a heavily indebted and ungovernable France raises the specter of another round of Eurozone sovereign debt crises.

In 2021, at a time when the economy was recovering strongly and receiving its largest peacetime stimulus on record, the Powell Fed maintained interest rates at zero to keep a strong recovery going. That allowed the inflation genie out of the bottle. Today, at a time when the Fed’s high interest rates have caused inflation to moderate sharply and at a time when downside risks to the economy are building, the Fed is choosing to stick to its hawkish monetary policy stance. This heightens the chance that the Powell Fed will end up with contributing not only to the inflationary surge to a multi-decade high in 2022 but to an economic recession by early next year.

About the Author: Desmind Lachman 

Desmond Lachman is a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and was previously a Deputy Director in the International Monetary Fund’s Policy Development and Review Department as well as the Chief Emerging-Market Economic Strategist at Salomon Smith Barney.

Image: Shutterstock.com. 

Avec une marge nette de près de 20 %, deux fois celle des plats de la restauration ordinaire, le burger fait figure de « cash-machine ». Très vite rentabilisé, vite préparé, vite avalé, il figurerait aujourd'hui à la carte de trois lieux de restauration sur quatre en France ; en 2023 dans l'Hexagone, on (...) / Agroalimentaire, Agriculture, Alimentation - 2024/07

The spectacle of recent electoral shifts in Britain and France, together with looming ones in the United States and elsewhere, raises the question of whether there is any common pattern here. The Left seems to be winning in some cases and losing in others. Clearly, incumbents are unpopular, regardless of ideology. Is there anything more to it than that?

One way to understand all these cases is to refer to the old English idea of a Court Party versus a Country Party. As described by Viscount Bolingbroke in the early eighteenth century, England’s Court Party was led by a Whig elite of the wealthiest aristocrats in alliance with the City of London. This party dominated the king’s ministry and used the resulting patronage to its own benefit. Bolingbroke argued for the legitimacy of an alternate faction, called the Country Party, with its base of support among the lesser nobles, yeomanry, and older faith of rural England. This party, he hoped, could rule in the interest of the whole nation rather than simply in the interest of its metropolitan establishment.

Over the past decade, electoral politics in nearly every Western nation has been upended by a new axis of division closely resembling Bolingbroke’s pairing of Court versus Country. Since this division cuts across the familiar one of Left versus Right, it confuses and frightens observers who misunderstand it. Most working-class, rural, and small-town voters feel that traditional party elites have stopped protecting the people’s interests—or even granting heartland voters a minimal degree of respect. This has encouraged the growth of Country Party insurgencies against besieged Court Party elites among conservatives as well as progressives.

The resulting political dynamic is best understood by picturing four political factions in competition with one another: Court Progressives, Court Conservatives, Country Progressives, and Country Conservatives. This competition is more complex than the simple dichotomy of Left versus Right, allowing for cross-cutting tensions and tactical alliances in different directions. Its exact outcomes vary greatly from one Western nation to the next, depending on local circumstances, including national leaders and the strategies they pursue.

France

Let’s start with the most recent electoral shift involving the case of France. President Emmanuel Macron created Ensemble, a socially progressive, pro-business coalition devoted to liberal technocratic governance. Further left, the Nouveau Front Populaire (NFP) emerged this year as an anti-establishment coalition featuring the Gallic version of a Country Progressive platform.

Les Republicains, a traditional center-right establishment party, represents Court Conservatives in France. Meanwhile, Country Conservatives have rallied to Marine Le Pen’s National Rally or Rassemblement National (RN), a movement opposed to continued mass migration from the Muslim world. While often described as far-right—including by the supposedly neutral Ministry of Interior—Le Pen has taken pains to distance herself from her father’s noxious anti-Semitism. In fact, she critiques Macron’s economic policies from the Left and supports liberal abortion laws while defending a distinctly French national identity.

In the first round of French parliamentary elections, held on June 30, Marine Le Pen’s coalition won a clear plurality of the vote. This triggered the creation of an alliance between Macronists and the NFP, whereby hundreds of candidates from both coalitions stepped down to allow for the strongest possible competitor versus the RN in each district. The tactic worked. Even though Le Pen’s coalition won an even bigger plurality in the second and final round of voting on July 7, Ensemble and the NFP each won more seats. Meanwhile, Les Republicains ran a distant fourth.

Most striking were the demographics of these results. According to Ipsos France, Le Pen’s RN-led alliance won a whopping 57 percent of blue-collar workers, far outpacing any other coalition. Meanwhile, the NFP found its greatest strength among big cities, younger voters, managers and professionals, those with postgraduate degrees, the non-religious, and those describing themselves as “upper class.” Ensemble dominated the vote only among septuagenarians.

The French case illustrates findings that ring true throughout much of the Western world. Objectively, the RN’s overall policy combination is now center-right. But it’s a version of center-right unacceptable to some traditional establishment conservatives. The RN-led alliance is therefore defined as “far right.” Furthermore, the self-imposed difficulties in getting Court Conservatives and Country Conservatives to cooperate against the Left are immense.

Meanwhile, French progressives have no such qualms. Working on the premise of no enemies to the Left, Court Progressives work tactically with Country Progressives to collectively achieve power. This leaves the Left in control despite overwhelming working-class support for Country Conservatives.

The United Kingdom

The UK’s general election held on July 4 suggests a similar pattern despite all the obvious differences with France. Britain’s Conservative or Tory Party worked under the disadvantage of having governed for too long in a way that alienated voters in nearly every direction. Their leader, Rishi Sunak, was a Court Conservative down to his fingertips. He was also unable to bring mass migration, high taxes, political correctness, a sluggish economy, or regulatory overkill under control. Under such conditions, why vote Tory? Nigel Farage, the cigarette-smoking English populist, therefore led Country Conservatives into his newborn creation, Reform UK. Reform did very well for a novel third party, winning 14 percent of the popular vote. Sunak’s Tories were left with a little less than 24 percent. However, the distribution of seats was such that Reform only won five seats in the House of the Commons, while the Tories won 121.

On the Left, Labour’s Keir Starmer was able to build and maintain a working alliance between Court Progressives and Country Progressives that was more than sufficient to win the election. However, this was not because Labour’s ideology was beloved by most Britons. Polling at less than 34 percent nationwide, it did not do especially well for a governing party in terms of the popular vote. Rather, the key—at least in England—was division among the Conservatives, along with the sheer unpopularity of Sunak’s government. Given the UK’s first-past-the-post electoral system, Labor won a colossal 412 seats, while the Tory coalition splintered and collapsed. In truth, this was among the least exciting and most unrepresentative landslides in British history.

Looking ahead, small-c conservatives in Britain face four possible futures in the coming decade. First, the Tories may find a new leader who can win back Country Conservatives and sail to victory, as Boris Johnson did only a few years ago. Second, Reform UK and the Tory Party may continue to split center-right voters, Court versus Country, allowing indefinite rule by Labor. Third, Nigel Farage may succeed in absorbing most Court Conservatives into Reform UK, leaving the Tories as a minor remnant. Fourth, Farage and the Tories may agree to merge into a new party acceptable to all British conservatives. And while this last scenario may seem most unlikely, it has happened in the past. For an example of that, we turn to Canada.

Canada

In Canada—unlike Britain or the United States—the great split between Court and Country Conservatives occurred more than thirty years ago. The leading issues driving that split were not immigration, trade, or foreign policy but regional and constitutional. Canada’s Liberal Party ruled for thirteen years as a result. Once center-right political activists finally reunited in a newly formed Conservative Party, its leader, Stephen Harper, won the federal election of 2006. This helped to set the pattern for subsequent Tory leaders. Ever since Harper, Canada’s Court Conservatives have responded to Country Conservatives not by denouncing them but by staying closely in touch with their concerns. This process—also known as “politics”—has helped to maintain Tory unity through thick and thin.

Canada’s Liberals are the party of that nation’s Court Progressives, based in the downtown districts of Toronto, Ottawa, and Montreal. In 2015, the Liberals won back power under Justin Trudeau. Initially hailed as a fresh face, he turned out to be a disaster, presiding over a period of inflation, scandal, dysfunction, and woke revolution. Most Canadians are thoroughly fed up with him. He maintains a working majority in the House of Commons only through the tactical forbearance of Canada’s New Democratic Party (NDP)—a coalition of democratic socialists or Country Progressives. 

Trudeau must hold an election by October 2025 at the latest. The most recent polls have him winning 24 percent of the vote nationwide, reduced to something like 70 seats out of 338 in the Commons. Further to the Left, the NDP holds steady at around 20 percent in these polls, leaving them approximately twenty seats. The Conservatives, meanwhile, polled around 40 percent, winning them over 200 seats under current projections. A Quebec separatist party, the Bloc Quebecois, secured a plurality of seats in La Belle Province under current projections, as they usually have over the past generation.

The current Tory leader, Pierre Poilievre, is a fluently bilingual Albertan skilled at making his party’s case in a plucky, common-sense manner persuasive to ordinary people. He’s also on track to defeat Trudeau’s Liberals in a landslide next year. As a result, the media denounces him as “a conspiracy theorist.” Of course, he is nothing of the sort. Poilievre is a conservative pragmatist with populist, libertarian, and politically incorrect sensibilities. Or, to put it another way—take my word for it—he’s a typical Canadian prairie boy.

In the second part of this series, the author applies the framework of Court versus Country to the United States, with implications for the November election.

Colin Dueck is a professor in the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University and a nonresident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

Image: Frederic Legrand - COMEO / Shutterstock.com.