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Human rights have become an integral part of most donors' development cooperation. In addition to their intrinsic value, human rights are considered instrumental in achieving sustainable development. Implementing the international development goals related to civil and political rights and governance will be challenging. The EU has gradually refined its policy on integrating human rights into development cooperation. The EU approach includes imposing different forms of conditionality, supporting projects and programmes, and mainstreaming human rights across development actions. Aid to governance and civil society has increased in the last decade, reaching 9 % of the EU’s sectorallocable aid in 2013. Implementing a rights-based approach to development will be decisive, but challenging. The European Parliament, a strong supporter of integrating human rights into development cooperation, has its own toolbox to support human rights abroad.
Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

Human rights have become an integral part of most donors' development cooperation. In addition to their intrinsic value, human rights are considered instrumental in achieving sustainable development. Implementing the international development goals related to civil and political rights and governance will be challenging. The EU has gradually refined its policy on integrating human rights into development cooperation. The EU approach includes imposing different forms of conditionality, supporting projects and programmes, and mainstreaming human rights across development actions. Aid to governance and civil society has increased in the last decade, reaching 9 % of the EU’s sectorallocable aid in 2013. Implementing a rights-based approach to development will be decisive, but challenging. The European Parliament, a strong supporter of integrating human rights into development cooperation, has its own toolbox to support human rights abroad.
Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

Oroszország joggal feltételezheti, hogy a múlt héten azért lőtték le az Szu-24-es orosz harci gépet, mert így akarták biztosítani az Iszlám Állam illegális olajszállítmányainak a zavartalanságát - vélekedett Vlagyimir Putyin hétfőn Párizsban tartott sajtóértekezletén. Az orosz elnök azt állította: Moszkva olyan "kiegészítő adatokhoz" jutott, amelyek alátámasztják feltételezésüket, miszerint az Iszlám Állam által ellenőrzött területeken kitermelt olajat ipari méretekben szállítják át török területre. "Ezért minden okunk megvan azt feltételezni: a gépünk lelövésére vonatkozó döntés mögött az a szándék húzódott, hogy védelmezzék ezeket a török terület felé tartó olajszállítási útvonalakat" - állapította meg Putyin.

(Photo Credit: AP Photo/Getty Images)

With respect to the broader issue of my critics…I think that when you listen to what they actually have to say, what they’re proposing, most of the time, when pressed, they describe things that we’re already doing. Maybe they’re not aware that we’re already doing them. Some of them seem to think that if I were just more bellicose in expressing what we’re doing, that that would make a difference—because that seems to be the only thing that they’re doing, is talking as if they’re tough. But I haven’t seen particular strategies that they would suggest that would make a real difference.

President Obama speaking at a Press Conference in Turkey on November 16, 2015

Last week both Hillary Clinton and Jeb Bush gave major talks outlining their respective plans for defeating terrorists. Those two presidential candidates’ views will be my focus for this blog. In a recent article in the Washington Post, the author noted that with the exception of both candidates calling for no fly zones, “overall the candidates and the president are talking about doing basically the same three things to fight the Islamic State: airstrikes, bolstering local forces, getting the world on the same page.”

I think that’s too broad a generalization and does not get at the heart of all the issues. As a Veteran and retired intelligence professional, when I sit down and listen to what each candidate has to say on national security issues, I’m looking for the answer to two questions. First, does the candidate really understand the depth of the problem and related issues? Second, what are their proposed solutions and third are they feasible?

Do the candidates understand the scope of the problem?

In 2012, at the request of the then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, the Department of Defense published Decade of War Volume I Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations. The purpose was to ensure we learned the lessons from the previous decade of war. The first lesson learned discussed was “a failure to recognize, acknowledge, and accurately define the operational environment led to a mismatch between forces, capabilities, missions, and goals. The operational environment encompasses not only the threat but also the physical, informational, social, cultural, religious, and economic elements of the environment.” Bottom line is: if you don’t get that right, then the strategy you develop won’t work.

Jeb Bush says “Despite elaborate efforts by the administration to avoid even calling it by name, one of the very gravest threats we face today comes from radical Islamic terrorists.” I don’t dispute that but how do you explain the fact that there have been many reports that former members of Saddam Hussein’s Army now make up a lot of the military leadership and intelligence positions within ISIS? Why is that?

Clinton seems to have a better understanding of the complexity of the issues, pointing out that under former Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki’s regime the Sunnis tribes were betrayed and forgotten. She feels that if we are going to win on the ground, we need to bring the Sunnis back on board. Bush also stresses the need to bring the Sunnis on board, but says the problem was caused by the premature withdrawal of U.S. Forces leaving a void that ISIS filled. I agree with Bush that the U.S. withdrawal was a mistake but wonder: if Maliki’s regime had been more inclusive, would the end result have been the same?

I participated in a Department of Defense media program that gave me the opportunity to receive briefings and ask questions to many of the senior Generals involved in the training of Iraqi military forces. One question I asked concerned the Iraqi sectarian issues. Using our own history as an example, I said as long as northern military forces occupied the south after the Civil War, African Americans were able to integrate into southern society, holding government offices and positions. As soon as the troops left, white southerners enacted Jim Crow laws which restricted the freedom of the former slaves. It was not till 100 years later that a lot of the problems caused by these laws were addressed and reversed. What were the chances that the sectarian issues in Iraq between different ethnic and religious groups would prevent them from having an effective and inclusive government? I would pose the same question today to the Presidential candidates.

As the recent attack against an hotel in Mali by a group associated with al-Qaeda reminds us, it is not just ISIS nor is the conflict confined to just Iraq and Syria. Addressing the topic in their annual posture statement, United States Africa Command reported:

The network of al-Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents continues to exploit Africa’s under-governed regions and porous borders to train and conduct attacks. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant is expanding its presence in North Africa. Terrorists with allegiances to multiple groups are expanding their collaboration in recruitment, financing, training, and operations, both within Africa and transregionally.

In its recently released 2015 Global Terrorism Index, the Institute for Economics and Peace stated that the Nigerian based group Boko Haram, which declared allegiance to ISIS in March of this year, was the most deadly terrorist group. “The country witnessed the largest increase in terrorist deaths ever recorded by any country, increasing by over 300 per cent to 7,512 fatalities.”

The “so what” factor for me is that over two million Nigerians have been displaced internally because of the actions of Boko Harum. Another 175,000 have sought refuge in neighboring Chad, Niger, and Cameron. The UN says they’re critically short of funding needed to provide assistance. Are we witnessing the development of another major refugee crisis? Is it not better to destroy and/or neutralize terrorist groups rather than have another large number of people feel the only solution is to seek refugee status and to move to another country?

In her talk, Hillary Clinton stressed that this was a worldwide fight and required a worldwide solution. Two statements stood out for me:

Now, let’s be clear about what we’re facing. Beyond Paris in recent days, we’ve seen deadly terrorist attacks in Nigeria, Lebanon, Iraq and Turkey, and a Russian civilian airline destroyed over the Sinai. At the heart of today’s new landscape of terror is ISIS. They persecute religious and ethnic minorities; kidnap and behead civilians; murder children. They systematically enslave, torture and rape women and girls…

But we have learned that we can score victories over terrorist leaders and networks, only to face metastasizing threats down the road, so we also have to play and win the long game. We should pursue a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy, one that embeds our mission against ISIS within a broader struggle against radical jihadism that is bigger than any one group, whether it’s Al Qaida or ISIS or some other network.

Looking at Jeb Bush’s views expressed in his talk last week at The Citadel and his recent remarks at the Reagan Presidential Library, he says it’s a worldwide problem yet his proposed solutions only address two problem areas: “My strategy meets the unique circumstances in each of the two countries, Iraq and Syria, in which ISIS now has territory.”

He speaks of the importance of allies but again with the exception of Egypt and Tunisia, he only mentions countries in the Middle East:

In all of this, the United States must engage with friends and allies, and lead again in that vital region. Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the most populous Arab country and the wealthiest, are important partners of the United States. Those relationships have been badly mishandled by this administration. Both countries are key to a better-coordinated regional effort against terrorism. We need to restore trust, and work more closely with them against common threats. We have very capable partners, likewise, in the United Arab Emirates, who are willing and able to take the fight to the extremists. We have a moderate and quite formidable leader in King Abdullah of Jordan. We have an ally in the new democratic government in Tunisia, and a fragile democracy in Lebanon—nations that are both under assault by radicals and terrorists. Across the region, responsible governments need no persuading of what the moment requires.

In contrast, Hillary Clinton remarked:

We’ve had a lot of conversation about ISIS in the last week, let’s not forget al-Qaeda. They still have the most sophisticated bombmakers, ambitious plotters and active affiliates in places like Yemen and North Africa, so we can’t just focus on Iraq and Syria, we need to intensify our counter—our counterterrorism efforts on a wider scope.

What are their proposed solutions and are they feasible?

Again Jeb Bush’s strategy solutions focus on Iraq and Syria. For Iraq he is proposing the following actions:
– Support the Iraqi forces
– Consistent air power to support local ground forces
– Give current forces greater range of action
– Provide more support to the Kurds
– Diplomatic strategy for enduring political stability in Iraq

For Syria he proposes:
– A coordinated international effort is required to give Syria’s moderate forces the upper hand
– Expand and improve the recruitment and training of Syrian opposition fighters
– Establish multiple safe zones in Syria
– Along with partners create an expanding no fly zone to prevent more crimes by the regime

For me, he left unanswered how he would fight terrorism in other regions of the world.

Hillary Clinton’s strategy has three main elements:
– Defeat ISIS in Syria, Iraq, and across the Middle East.
– Disrupt and dismantle the growing terrorist infrastructure that facilitates the flow of fighters, financing, arms, and propaganda around the world.
– Harden our defenses and those of our allies against external and homegrown threats.

For each of these points, she provides a great deal of detail. At least for now her more thorough and detailed views seem to be winning over support. A Washington Post/ABC news poll indicated voters find her more trusted on handling the terrorism issue than her Republican rivals.

Clinton also stressed the importance of both political parties working together to defeat terrorism:

When New York was attacked on 9/11, we had a Republican president, a Republican governor and a Republican mayor, and I worked with all of them. We pulled together and put partisanship aside to rebuild our city and protect our country.

In his Reagan Library talk Bush stated:

Who can seriously argue that America and our friends are safer today than in 2009, when the President and Secretary Clinton—the storied ‘team of rivals’—took office? So eager to be the history-makers, they failed to be the peacemakers. It was a case of blind haste to get out, and to call the tragic consequences somebody else’s problem. Rushing away from danger can be every bit as unwise as rushing into danger, and the costs have been grievous.

I’m a firm believer in lessons learned but there is a lot of blame to go around. I think many would argue that Congressional gridlock and its bad relationship with the President has had a major negative impact on national security policy. I’ve blogged before about the toll sequestration has taken on our military forces.

Have Presidential Candidates Proposed Anything New In The Fight Against Terrorism?

President Obama has been steadfast in his refusal to put large numbers of U.S. ground forces in the fight. Both Bush and Clinton advocate using ground forces in coordination with Iraqi and moderate Syrian Forces; but Clinton also stresses the need “to move simultaneously toward a political solution to the civil war that paves the way for a new government with new leadership, and to encourage more Syrians to take on ISIS as well”. Both candidates also advocate establishing no fly zones something President Obama has also resisted.

I’m an avid football fan. One of the mantras the experts always say is defense wins championships. During my time in the military, the mantra was: you can’t win a war with out putting troops on the ground. I agree. As to the feasibility of Clinton and Bush’s proposals, I’m not sold on an approach that relies heavily on local forces to fight terrorism. I still believe the best approach is establishment of an organization like NATO but focused on fighting terrorism. It would also have a standing rapid deployment force made up of coalition members that could be called upon when needed. If I were Queen for a day, I would add that concept to both of their strategies.

Again my views are my own. I think I’ll end here.

Lundi, un exercice simulant une attaque terroriste dans une université de Nairobi a provoqué la mort d'une employée. Une quarantaine d'étudiants ont également été blessés. Certains d'entre eux affirment ne pas avoir été informés de l'opération.

Charles Lister comes back on the show for an in-depth discussion on jihadism in Syria. Some of the topics covered include:

• Islamism and jihadism in Syria prior to the 2011 uprising
• The entrance and evolution of Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham, and Jaysh al-Islam into what became the Syrian war
• Why foreign fighters came into the Syrian conflict
• Why the Islamic State of Iraq decided to enter the war in April 2013 and what it was up to prior to the fitness in January 2014
• What the growth of ISIS and later IS meant for the other extreme factions – JN, Ahrar, and JI

Source.

Hodossy Katalin, a Kerekasztal Jogsegélyszolgálatának tagja és gyakorló anyuka készített egy olyan prezentációt, amely tömören és érthetően magyarázza el mindenkinek, pontosan mi is a probléma a szlovák és magyar tanítási nyelvű intézményekre vonatkozó óraszámok kapcsán. A prezentáció a Prezi rendszerében és külön képeken is megtekinthető a cikkben.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Der Sicherheitsexperte Albert A. Stahel sagt, das Risiko eines Terroranschlags in der Schweiz sei niedrig. Vom Westen fordert er endlich einen Plan zur Vernichtung des strategisch agierenden IS.

Interview in der Aargauer-Zeitung vom 23. November 2015.

 

Der Beitrag als PDF-Datei.

Oubliée comme d'habitude dans les opérations du ministère de l'Intérieur, l'évocation de l'action des
Plus d'infos »

Az orosz politikusok régóta támadják Soros Györgyöt. Két alapítványa ellen július óta vizsgálódnak, most pedig nemkívánatosnak nyilvánították őket. Veszélyezteti Oroszország alkotmányos rendjét és az állam biztonságát Soros György magyar származású amerikai milliárdos két alapítványa, a Nyílt Társadalom Alapítványt és a Nyílt Társadalom Intézetének (OSI) Támogatási Alapítványát. Ezért, az orosz főállamügyészség szerint, nem kívánatosak Oroszországban.

Coding classes started by a non-profit organisation in Ghana are targeting girls living in poverty.

Az Európai Bizottság nyilvántartásba vette hétfőn azt az európai polgári kezdeményezést, amely a szerződés 7-ik cikke szerinti eljárás elindítására vonatkozó javaslat megtételére kéri fel a testületet Magyarországgal szemben az uniós alapértékek feltételezett súlyos megsértése miatt.

Après la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, c’est au tour du tribunal correctionnel de Liège. Le mercredi 25 novembre, le tribunal correctionnel de Liège a condamné le polémiste Dieudonné à 2 mois d’emprisonnement et 9000€ d’amende pour avoir tenu des propos discriminatoires, antisémites, révisionnistes et négationnistes lors d’un spectacle à Herstal en mars 2012. Le Centre Interfédéral pour l’Egalité des chances s’était constitué partie civile, de même que le CCOJB et le Foyer culturel juif de Liège.

« Le Centre défend une liberté d’expression la plus large possible« , explique son directeur Patrick Charlier. « Nous disons oui à l’humour même lorsqu’il dérange, oui à l’humour décalé, oui à l’impertinence. Nous nous opposons aussi à toute censure préalable. La loi Antiracisme n’a pas pour objectif de limiter la liberté d’expression, mais bien de la préserver, en empêchant qu’elle ne soit détournée et utilisée à des fins de propagande haineuse. Dieudonné n’a pas juste dérapé. Il a déguisé un discours antisémite en spectacle soi-disant humoristique. C’est ce que nous voulions dénoncer en nous constituant partie civile. »

Le juge a estimé que le spectacle était de nature à inciter à la haine et qu’on ne pouvait donc plus le qualifier d’acte humoristique. Il a ajouté qu’il portait aussi atteinte à la dignité des personnes handicapées et homosexuelles (deux autres critères protégés par la loi Anti-discrimination). Il a dès lors assorti la condamnation d’une peine accessoire, à savoir la publication de l’intégralité du jugement dans deux quotidiens, afin de porter réparation à toutes les personnes visées par ses propos.

Pour rappel,  tout récemment Dieudonné a déjà été débouté par la Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme dans un autre dossier judiciaire. La Cour a appliqué l’article 17 (abus de droit) de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme, ce qui est assez rare. En d’autres termes, elle a considéré que Dieudonné abusait de son droit à la liberté d’expression pour porter atteinte aux droits et libertés reconnus par la Convention. Elle a ainsi clairement fait entendre qu’elle ne protégerait pas les spectacles négationnistes et antisémites.

Henri-Pierre Legros

Pour en savoir plus

     -. Communiqué du Centre Interfédéral pour l’Egalité des chances http://www.diversite.be/node/37457

     -. Liberté d’expression et discours de haine tout n’est pas permis au nom de la liberté d’expression article de Nea say- Eulogos N° 162 sur le jugement de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme (CEDH) http://www.diversite.be/node/37457

 

Classé dans:Dignité humaine, DROITS FONDAMENTAUX, Liberté d'expression et droit à l'information, Non-discrimination

Today in CCLKOW we are reorienting you to the homeland and the problems of interoperability between police and the armed forces. Even without the Paris Attacks earlier this month, the subject of mastering the ‘JIIM’ environment is critical, both in military operations at home and abroad. To discuss this, I am very happy to bring to you a special guest writer, Ian Wiggett, recently retired as an Assistant Chief Constable from Greater Manchester Police. It should be understood, then, that this piece is written from the British perspective, which includes a significant difference with respect to the use of force by the police, particularly as concerns the generally disarmed stance. Nevertheless, the issue of integrating a military response to an attack to the homeland matters even to the US. Although the matter of Posse Comitatus would seem to forestall the use of the regular forces domestically, this matter has never been tested against any significant threat. And in fact, even as it was ultimately tabled, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks the military role in homeland defence was put on the table for serious debate. It is also worth noting that the American disdain for soldiers operating in the homeland is a legacy of our British heritage, and so to a similar degree the use of the armed forces in domestic circumstances is discomfiting on this side of the Atlantic. Furthermore, although they come under the control of the Governors, the National Guard formations of the individual states are trained as military, not police, forces. Thus, even in the American setting, how the armed forces will act in support of local, state, or even federal law enforcement remains a challenge. Alternatively, should the terrorist threat upon the European Continent reach sufficient proportions, it is not out of the realm of the possibility for recourse to NATO forces to be contemplated. Finally, as the importance of security and stabilization campaigns rise, the ability to work with civilian authorities will become more important. If the problems have not been hashed out for homeland defence, it is very unlikely they will succeed in foreign contingencies. Thus, the locus of operations of the armed forces has shifted and it is time to give serious thought to the issues. Read the piece, consider the implications and questions posed, and join the conversation on Twitter, at #CCLKOW and, it is hoped, the newly launched hashtag for policing discussion, #WeCops. — Jill S. Russell

 

First, some history…

Military Assistance to the Civil Powers (MACP) – also known as Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA) – has existed for centuries.  In the days before a regular civilian police force existed, it was only the military that had the numbers, organisation and capability to restore order and maintain control.  That was, indeed, the role of the militia: a body of soldiers that could be raised at short notice to provide homeland defence.  It was the militia in North America that provided the backbone of the Revolutionary Army, and after independence, the United States retained the militia as the National Guard.

The original concept of “MACP” was therefore built around the military, either militia or regulars, being the force of last resort to restore and maintain the Peace.  Use of force (or at least, show of force) was central to that.  Armed soldiers putting down the insurrection – and casualties and collateral damage were expected.

 

The Peterloo Massacre, Manchester, 1819.
Contemporary cartoon, Cruikshank

The folk memory does not easily or quickly forget the intervention of armed forces.  The Peterloo Massacre of 1819 is still invoked to inspire radicalism in Manchester, and the impact of that violent suppression is generally acknowledged as leading to further radicalism and ultimately to wider reform.  The Easter Rising in Dublin involved only a relatively small number of republican combatants, but the violence of the military response arguably pushed many towards the cause of independence.  In South Wales mining communities Churchill is known not as a wartime Prime Minister, but as the Home Secretary who had sent troops against striking miners in 1911.

 

Troops deployed in support of local police to suppress striking miners, Rhondda Valley, 1910-11

History therefore suggests that the relationship between the people and the military has to be managed carefully.  Too much force, applied clumsily, may achieve its immediate objective of quelling a riot – but the lasting impact may be far more damaging to the established order.  The ‘silent majority’ are very grateful that the forces of law and order (whether dressed in blue or green) have made it safe for them to walk the streets and sleep soundly at night.  But if too many skulls are cracked, that ‘silent majority’ can quickly change sides.

 

How does MACP/MACA work today?

Military Assistance to the Civil Authorities (MACA) falls into three main types.  The first is simply about extra manpower and equipment to help deal with emergencies such as flooding, heavy snow, evacuations, etc.  The military can bring in large numbers people and specialist equipment or skills at short notice.  Filling sandbags to protect critical sites from flooding.  Moving people away from flooded homes.  Helicopters transporting vital supplies.  Building temporary bridges. This is also known as Military Assistance to the Civil Community.   The military also step in when critical services are threatened by industrial action.  Recent examples include fuel deliveries, firefighting, and ambulances.  This is also referred to as Military Assistance to Government Departments.

A second category, closely linked to the first, is the provision of additional or specialist support which may not be available to the civilian authority.  Installing communications equipment in remote areas, deploying radar or aerial photography, for example.  Both the Olympic Games and the Commonwealth Games used military staff to provide searching and access control.  There are long standing arrangements for handling of explosives and munitions, and until recently the military air sea rescue service worked frequently with local police forces and mountain rescue.

This all has to be paid for, of course.  Whilst the military may be very willing to offer their help, the MoD will want to know which authority to recover their costs from.  This has caused delays in the past, with civilian authorities sometimes being reluctant to call in military because of the costs, and/or arguing over which authority would be responsible for paying. Somewhat of a challenge if the emergency was due to an act of God!

Things have moved on considerably in recent years, with a much wider understanding that protecting life and property is far more important than petty turf wars or arguments over bills.  However, there has a growing tendency over the past decade for political leaders to want to do ‘something’ when faced with a crisis.  This has led to the Army being ‘ordered in’ to ‘sort out’ emergencies such as the foot and mouth outbreak, or the Somerset Levels flooding.  The mission may be loosely defined, and the intervention options may be limited – but it’s ok, the army’s here!   In these situations it’s important that the military recognise local sensitivities.  The civilian authorities will have been working hard for some time, and will feel that military intervention represents a criticism of their efforts.  The Army will also feel uncomfortable about being drawn into incidents that inevitably have political ramifications.

The third category is the use of force – Military Assistance to the Civil Power.  This is the most difficult aspect of MACA.  The military are trained to fight wars, not to be police officers.  It is many decades since the military was deployed to restore order on the streets of the mainland UK, although of course they spend several decades supporting the RUC in Northern Ireland. That deployment still has a painful legacy.

In more recent years, the capability, training and tactics of police and special forces have transformed in response to the changing terrorist threat. For obvious reasons, little of that is seen outside of the counter-terrorist functions.  There is a lot of catching up to be done by politicians, communities and those police and military leaders not directly involved in this specialist area of policing in relation to how the police and military will work together – and what this means for constitutional arrangements, and the longer term impact on the police-military-public relationships.  The maintenance of the Queen’s Peace remains a policing mission, even if it is carried out by the military on the police’s behalf.

 

How MACA/MACP works

In simple terms, the civil power requests the assistance of the military.  The advice to the civil authority is to ask for the ‘effect’ desired, not to specify the resource required.  The military cannot deploy without the authority of the minister of defence.  This is an important constitutional check which we perhaps fail to recognise the significance of in the UK.  In countries where there have been instances of military coups, civil war, or military government, the deployment of the military into the civil space can be highly politically charged and in some cases even outlawed.

In the UK, the civil authorities are used to operating on their own initiative, without ministerial or political involvement.  Consequently, the MACA/MACP approval can be seen as a bureaucratic process, mainly to allow the costs to be recharged.  For more sensitive deployments, the request to deploy military assets will require approval from both the minister overseeing the requesting civil power, and the minister of defence.  This ministerial approval process still applies in critical, fast moving incidents.  There are arrangements to ensure the decisions are made quickly, but the process of contacting ministers and completing paperwork will inevitably introduce some degree of delay.

 

Use of military force in support of police

Churchill directing troops at the Sidney Street Siege, 1911.

 The dividing line between police and military used to be clear.  Police forces simply did not have the capability to take on a well armed terrorist cell.  That was the job of Special Forces. Once the civil police could no longer cope, the incident was handed over to the military and special forces neutralised the threat. The most famous example is the Iranian Embassy Siege. Civilian police surrounded the embassy, but at the point when it was decided a forced conclusion was required, a handwritten note on a scrap of paper allowed the police commander to hand the incident over to the military commander. Once concluded, control was handed back to the police.

Planning for a long time since was based on that premise. The incident would be defined and contained.  When the point was reached that an intervention was decided, this would be conducted by special forces. Police handed control to the military until the incident was resolved. The scene would then be handed back to police.  But the world has changed.

 

So what’s changed?

Alongside the changing nature of terrorism, from 9/11 to lone actors and suicide bombers, the attacks that prompted the most rethinking have been Mumbai and Westgate in Nairobi.  Marauding terrorists, well armed, attacking crowded places pose real challenges for the conventional police armed response.  Police firearms officers are trained to contain the threat and make considered decisions whether to open fire. They should use the minimum force necessary – and indeed, rarely open fire, looking to use less lethal options whenever possible.  Once contained, they negotiate a resolution, again avoiding the use of lethal force as far as possible.  Each decision has to be individually justified and will always be subject to intense scrutiny afterwards, particularly if there has been a fatal discharge.

Terrorists intent on killing as many people as possible require very different concept of operations in response.  Armed officers need to respond quickly and take on the terrorists in order to minimise the loss of life. Negotiation is likely to be pointless (but cannot be discounted, regardless of what has happened).  Police forces will need to bring as many armed officers together as quickly as possible.  They will work as ad hoc teams, put together as they arrive.  This has led to common training, tactics, and weaponry.  The fast response also includes Special Forces, mobilised quickly by air.  As the military component will be arriving alongside the civilian police response, the training includes shared and flexible command models. The priority is to save life, and they will need to get in quickly and resolve the incident, using whatever resources are available.

Depending where and when the incident occurs, command structures and ministerial involvement may be ‘in flux’. MACP/MACA will still be needed.  But the situation on the ground will be developing rapidly and is likely to be confused.  There are a number of possible scenarios, ranging from police dealing with the situation themselves through to a full handover to SF.  The priority will always be saving life.

 

But the threat continues to change? What about other scenarios?

In the last few years we have seen: the two Paris attacks; a shooter on a train in France; an attack on a synagogue in Copenhagen; incidents in Belgium; the attack by Anders Breivik in Norway; car bombs in Glasgow and London; lone actors attacking Parliament and the military in Canada; the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby; several attacks and plots in Australia; the downing of civilian jets over Egypt and Ukraine; the attack on tourists in Tunisia.  In the meantime, counter terrorist police and the Security Service have continued to disrupt attack plots in the UK.  The threats range from multiple and coordinated attacks with automatic weapons and explosives, unsophisticated attacks by individuals or groups with knives, to bombing plots with homemade explosives.  The targets could be military personnel, police, crowded spaces, sensitive religious locations or communities, high profile individuals, or representatives of particular countries and communities.

The range of possible attack scenarios is endless. The greatest unknown, however, is the number of threats/incidents that have to be confronted at the same time.  One attack is bad enough, but several happening simultaneously and/or lasting over a long period will stretch the available specialist capacity.   The threat level in the UK is already at severe, the second highest level.  If the threat increases, we are entering unprecedented territory for the UK in peacetime.

The recent Paris attacks could have conceivably happened in the UK.  The response in France and Belgium was a massive armed military presence on the streets.  An incident in the UK or overseas could lead to our government deciding to deploy armed soldiers (other than SF) across the UK.  There may or may not be intelligence to inform the specific response required.  Whilst planning has already envisaged this sort of event, the questions remain – what are they going to do?  What is their role? What are they expected to deal with?

An incident (or incidents) in the UK may require extra numbers to be drawn in beyond the current planning assumptions.

For police forces, there have been further changes in planning assumptions and responses brought about by the 7/7 and 15/7 bombings, the riots of 2011, the 2012 Olympics, and Austerity.  In short, even the largest forces cannot deal with major incidents without support from other forces.  If there are multiple major incidents happening simultaneously and/or for extended periods, police forces may struggle to cope without assistance.  The most likely, if not only source of assistance is the military.

The progressive increase in the threat level in the UK has also brought into question whether police in the UK can remain unarmed for much longer.  There are only a few countries in the world where the police are unarmed.  Whilst a lone officer with a handgun may have limited impact against a group of terrorists armed with automatic weapons, routinely armed police have options which are not available in the UK.  There are between 5,000 and 6,000 armed officers available in the UK, many being committed to protection of vulnerable sites or high profile individuals.  Multiple and protracted incidents could require additional armed resources, which could only come from the military.  But the way police operate with firearms is very different to the way soldiers are trained for combat.

 

What are the likely scenarios?

The various terrorist attacks around the world show the range of possible scenarios.  The unknowns as ever are the where and when.  But the issue for planning are the assumptions about the scale of the attacks and the number of simultaneous attacks (or other incidents).  For the purpose of this paper, the assumption has to be that additional military support has been requested because events are beyond the capability of police and SF capacity.

Without examining each possible scenario, there are are some key considerations that the military need to prepare for:

• Command and Control. It is likely that the incident will remain under civil police command.  Are these arrangements understood?  Does the military understand the police organisational structure?
• Can the military operate effectively within civil police communication systems? What if those systems break down?
• Concept of Operations. Is it clear what the role of the military is? Is this understood by all agencies? Is there a mutual understanding of each other’s roles, constraints, and ‘red lines’?
• Use of Force. What authority is required? What are the rules of engagement? What options are available, including less lethal? What risks and contingencies are envisaged?  What guidance and instructions have been given to the those deployed?  Is the guidance fit for purpose?  Who carries the responsibility if soldiers end up in a situation where they have to defend themselves?
• Locality and Community. How does the local context affect decision making and the options available? What information is needed, and how does that get relayed?

 

Beware of linear assumptions

Planning in the past has been based on a phased, incremental escalation of a single incident.  As the incident escalates, military assistance is engaged.  The mission is relatively clear, and the military resources required are self-selecting.

Planning and preparation are no longer so easy.  It is not inconceivable that the military is deployed for a general security and reassurance presence.  Presumably, though, they will need to react or respond if something happens.

The support requested may be for a specific purpose or role. Perhaps the civil police need additional explosives officers, or logistics, or certain technical skills to deal with the incident, but the military will not be engaged in tackling the threat directly.

There may be a general emergency which requires additional security presence, perhaps for guarding and searching, or to support and work alongside civil police, or even to replace civil police if they are not available or not able to deal with the threat.

And there may be a need for additional armed resources to be deployed quickly to tackle an armed threat, and the current police armed capability may not be available or sufficient.

 

National Security Strategy 2015

The new Strategic Defence and Security Review sets out the need to strengthen domestic resilience, and the need to tackle the terrorist threat at home and abroad using the ‘full spectrum of capabilities’.  Ten thousand military personnel will ‘be available on standby to support the civil authorities for significant terrorist incidents at short notice, supported by a wide range of niche military experts’.

MACA is now a central part of domestic security policy and planning.

 

There is much in the piece to contemplate, and so rather than limiting the discussion to answering a few questions, what I prefer to do is merely set the big issues up as areas of primary concern for debate. To my mind these are very broadly in two categories:

first, the Use of Force and the Rules of Engagement for the armed forces upon the civilian streets; and,

second, the differences between police/law enforcement and the armed forces across the universe of tactics, doctrine, language, etc., for as certainly as ‘secure the house’ means something different between the services (we all know the joke, right?), so too does the same issue apply in this case.

Specifically for the Americans, I would be interested to hear your thoughts as to what level of threat or incident would alter the political calculus on Posse Comitatus.

Join the discussion on Twitter at #CCLKOW and #WeCops.

 

———-

Ian Wiggett is a former police officer who retired in 2015 after 30 years service. Ian served in the Metropolitan Police, Cheshire Constabulary, and Greater Manchester Police, reaching the rank of Assistant Chief Constable. During his service, Ian worked in both detective and uniformed specialist roles, gaining particular expertise in serious crime and counter terrorism investigations, public order, specialist firearms command, and intelligence. He was the chair of the Cheshire Local Resilience Forum and deputy chair of the Greater Manchester Resilience Forum, and has been Gold commander for numerous major operations and events. He was the North West regional lead for counter-terrorism, firearms, and air support. He was the national lead for Casualty Bureau, a member of the national boards for Prevent, and for Protect and Prepare, and a member of the national civil contingencies committee. Ian has led a number of major change programmes and as national lead for systems thinking and continuous thinking helped lead work on demand and new performance measurement approaches nationally.

A lakosság kétharmada szerint Oroszország továbbra is nagyhatalom, de legyen nyugati jólét – áll a Levada Centr felmérésében.

A nagyhatalmi eszmék térnyerése így változott az évek során:

Érdekes megnézni viszont, miképpen változott az évek során a lakosság vélekedése az aktuális politikai és gazdasági helyzettől függően, hogy mit is jelent a nagyhatalom. A két legnépszerűbb válasz változatlanul a lakosság jóléte (64%) és ez nem változott az elmúlt 15 év során. 58% szerint az ország ipari, gazdasági potenciálja a legfontosabb ismérv (64% volt még 1999-ben). Megugrott idén a katonai erő, atomfegyver meglétét prioritásba helyezők aránya. 1999-ben még csak 30% vélekedett így, tavaly 44%, míg idén már 51%

Ezzel párhuzamosan csökken azok száma akik szerint a magas színvonalú kultúra,  tudomány tesz nagyhatalommá egy országot (25%) vagy éppen más államok tisztelet, az ország nemzetközi befolyása (20%). Stabil azok aránya akik szerint a szuperhatalmi státuszhoz fontos hogy legyenek jelentős ásványkincsek valamint az emberi és szabadságjogok megléte (18 és 15%)

Milyennek szeretné látni Oroszországot a jövőben?

  1998 2016 2017 2013 2014 2015 Fejlettnek mint Nyugatot 43 43 50 39 40 36 Mint a Szu alatt 36 32 25 25 27 23 Amilyen most 2 9 10 8 15 14 Amilyen 1917 előtt volt 5 5 4 7 3 3 Másnak 6 5 4 8 6 10 Nem tudja 9 6 6 14 10 14

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