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Diplomacy & Crisis News

Shinzo Abe Just Pulled a Theresa May

Foreign Policy - Thu, 05/10/2017 - 05:34
Japan's prime minister called an early election to strengthen his mandate — and gave an opening to a serious new challenger.

The Economy of Secession (II)

German Foreign Policy (DE/FR/EN) - Thu, 05/10/2017 - 00:00
(Own report) - As can be seen in an analysis of the separatist movements in Catalonia, Lombardy and Flanders, the deliberate promotion of exclusive cooperation between German companies and prosperous areas in countries with impoverished regions has systematically facilitated the autonomist-secessionist movements in Western Europe. According to this study, Flanders, as well as Lombardy - two already economically prosperous regions - have been able to widen the gap between themselves and the impoverished regions of Belgium and Italy, also because they have played an important role in the expansion of the German economy, the strongest in the EU. Through an exclusive cooperation with the state Baden Württemberg, Catalonia and Lombardy have been able to expand their economic lead over more impoverished regions of Spain and Italy, which has spurred their respective regional elites to seek to halt their financial contributions for federal reallocations through greater autonomy or even secession. The consequences of deliberate cooperation - not with foreign nations - but only with prosperous regions, can be seen with Yugoslavia.

The U.N. Can’t Enforce Its Sanctions on the North Korean Arms Trade

Foreign Policy - Wed, 04/10/2017 - 22:31
Fortunately, the United States can.

Draft U.N. Report Calls Out Saudi Arabia for Yemeni Children’s Deaths

Foreign Policy - Wed, 04/10/2017 - 21:20
The Gulf kingdom is on a blacklist of countries that harm children in conflict.

Senate Probe Gets ‘Clearer Picture’ of Possible Trump, Russia Collusion

Foreign Policy - Wed, 04/10/2017 - 19:40
Sen. Richard Burr said his committee’s investigation has “expanded slightly.”

Les frontières incertaines du Kurdistan

Le Monde Diplomatique - Wed, 04/10/2017 - 19:31
Entre Arabes et Kurdes irakiens, la fracture n'a rien de nouveau : elle découle des promesses faites au lendemain de la chute de l'Empire ottoman. Les dirigeants kurdes et fédéraux devront bientôt prendre une décision : conclure un accord ou, en cas d'échec, se préparer à une prochaine et très (...) / , , , - 2010/03

Are Parking Spaces the Next Casualty of the U.S.-Russian Diplomatic Spat?

Foreign Policy - Wed, 04/10/2017 - 18:52
Russia has 11 spots in D.C. Where they are, nobody knows, but perhaps they could soon go.

Tillerson Says He’s Never Considered Resigning, Calls Trump ‘Smart’

Foreign Policy - Wed, 04/10/2017 - 18:09
The secretary of state reaffirmed his commitment to “America First” policy but sidestepped questions about calling president a “moron.”

A book I contemplated writing, but it’s already been done: ‘Grant and Sherman’

Foreign Policy - Wed, 04/10/2017 - 17:36
Assessing two books on Grant and Sherman

Pour un nouvel ordre économique mondial

Le Monde Diplomatique - Wed, 04/10/2017 - 17:31
« L'attitude des syndicats des pays développés à l'égard d'un nouvel ordre économique » : c'est sur ce thème que l'ONU a organisé à Vienne (Autriche), les 23 et 34 octobre, un colloque au cours duquel se produisirent de vifs affrontements entre syndicats des pays riches et représentants du tiers-monde. (...) / , , , , , , , , , , - 1978/11

Europe Slams Its Gates (Part One)

Foreign Policy - Wed, 04/10/2017 - 17:15
European aid intended to combat African migration may just be making the problem worse.

Trump to Chart Hawkish Course on Iran

Foreign Policy - Wed, 04/10/2017 - 16:59
By telling Congress the nuclear deal is not in the U.S. interest, the White House is gambling on European help to roll back Iranian influence.

Mapped: The Last Islamic State Stronghold in Syria

Foreign Policy - Wed, 04/10/2017 - 16:49
The Islamic State has retreated to a remote tribal region. Taking it back won’t be easy.

Latest on Venezuela woes

Foreign Policy Blogs - Wed, 04/10/2017 - 12:30

Pictured on left is Diosdado Cabello, newly appointed to Venezuela’s inaugural Constituent Assembly. President Nicolas Maduro created this new authority to consolidate power and subvert opposition influence. Photo: Credit Juan Barreto/Agence France-Presse

When I last wrote about Venezuela in May, protests raged across the country. They derived from the ruling regime-controlled Supreme Court attempting to wrest power away from the National Assembly, Venezuela’s federal legislature and last vestige of opposition voices in the government. The move was met with harsh criticism at home and abroad, and President Nicolas Maduro quickly abandoned the maneuver, although protests and discontent lumbered on in the spring and summer.

Yet by mid-August, protests dwindled significantly in both in number and size. Was this because the opposition, and supporters of democracy in Venezuela, accomplished its goals making protests unnecessary? Unfortunately this was not the case, and the reason for the decline in demonstrations is far more sinister: Maduro and his political supporters found a way to make them obsolete.

In July, Maduro spearheaded the creation of a new governing body called the Constituent Assembly. The regime mandated that this group would have authority to rewrite the country’s constitution, and, according to the New York Times, “govern Venezuela with virtually unlimited authority.” On July 30 Venezuelans elected members of the Constituent Assembly. While the candidates did represent different occupations and every region of the country, they all had one thing in common: every single one was considered a trusted ally of the ruling regime. There were no opposition legislators on the ballot, and voters could not reject the creation of the assembly.

What’s more, the regime made no efforts to hide the fact that an express goal of this new authority it created was to wipe away the last remaining presence of the opposition in government. Maduro granted the Constituent Assembly the power to fire any official it considered to be disloyal, and to disband the National Assembly altogether. Diosdado Cabello, a former military chief and one of the new group’s most powerful members, said on television, point blank, “There is no possibility that the opposition will govern this country…Mark my words — no possibility.”

On August 18, only 2 weeks after it began operating, the Constituent Assembly gave itself the power to write and pass legislation. Nicholas Casey of the New York Times reported that this move “essentially nullifies the opposition-led legislature and puts [Maduro’s] party firmly in control of the country.” Casey further states that this latest power grab “is a decisive step in the quest by Mr. Maduro’s allies to dismantle the country’s legislature.” While Maduro has often acted to suppress his critics in the past, it seems that now his government isn’t even trying to maintain the appearance of adhering to the democratic process.

Beyond the political maneuvering, Venezuelan citizens continue to suffer under crippling economic conditions. And one definitely affects the other. Largely in response to the actions described above, on Aug, 25 the U.S. government placed new sanctions on Venezuela restricting trading of Venezuelan bonds in American financial markets. While not expected to have a significant impact, it may further hinder the Maduro’s regime ability to address its massive debt and pay off its loans.

And as if often the case in authoritarian regimes, those who are in the most need are those who are not getting help. The value of Venezuela’s currency continues to shrink while prices keep rising. Many cannot afford basic necessities, and many turn to the black market for goods and currency which further strangles the economy. The value of minimum wage earnings has plummeted by an astounding 88% in the last 5 years.

Has Maduro achieved checkmate in Venezuela? Has he eliminated the possibly of being removed from power? Just as those critical of his rule seemed to be gaining momentum, he found a way to pull the rug out from under them. Let’s hope the opposition is taking this opportunity to regroup and develop a new approach. International pressure should continue to be brought to bear, and aid to the Venezuelan people must be provided. More attention needs to be paid to the immense hardships facing them.

And democracy must make a comeback. It is long past due.

The post Latest on Venezuela woes appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Une voie nouvelle : enrichir la revendication

Le Monde Diplomatique - Tue, 03/10/2017 - 17:23
Face à l'explosion scientifique et technique, au développement du nombre des salariés très qualifiés, à la croissance du secteur tertiaire, à l'extension du travail en continu, à la condition des ouvriers spécialisés, à la prise de conscience grandissante de millions de femmes, aux 2 millions de (...) / , , , , , , - 1973/05

Les réfugiés climatiques

Politique étrangère (IFRI) - Tue, 03/10/2017 - 16:39

Dans sa chronique « Le Journal des idées » du 28 septembre dernier, Jacques Munier, chroniqueur chez France Culture, examine l’impact du climat sur les mouvements de population à travers le monde et sur les ressources naturelles, notamment en Arctique : il cite à ce titre le dossier « Arctique : une exploration stratégique » publié dans le numéro d’automne de Politique étrangère (n° 3/2017).

« … Plus au nord, l’Arctique est un enjeu géopolitique en raison de ses nombreuses ressources naturelles : gaz et pétrole, minerais précieux comme le diamant et l’or, ou plus répandus comme le fer et le zinc. Géopolitique par la convergence des états impliqués : États-Unis, Canada, Russie, Norvège et Danemark – à travers le Groenland. C’est pourquoi la revue Politique étrangère propose dans sa dernière livraison « une exploration stratégique » de l’Arctique. Là, par un curieux paradoxe, la fonte des glaces arrange tout le monde car elle facilite l’accès aux ressources : « 13% des réserves mondiales de pétrole et 30% des réserves mondiales en gaz naturel ». Et elle permet d’étayer les revendications territoriales sur « des relevés scientifiques plus détaillés ».

Lire la chronique de Jacques Munier en entier sur France Culture.

S’abonner à Politique étrangère.

Why is the International Community so Hostile to Kurdish Independence?

Foreign Policy Blogs - Tue, 03/10/2017 - 12:30

Iraqi Kurds numbering 5.2 million are voting today in a Kurdish independence referendum. The referendum includes the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) territories and contested provinces of Kirkuk, Shingal, Makhmur, and Khanaqin.

The ballot reads: “Do you want the Kurdistan Region and the Kurdistani areas outside the administration of the Region to become an independent state?” Either ‘Yes’ or ‘No.’ The balloting already started in diaspora on September 23, the results so far showing a close to 98 percent of ‘Yes.’

Kurdish independence vote takes place despite the international community’s pressures. The UN Security Council raised concern over the KRG’s unilaterally holding the referendum. Turkey, Iraq and Iran in a joint statement expressed their unequivocal opposition to the referendum, warning counter measures. Turkey threatened with sanctions and deployed military vehicles and personal to its border with northern Iraq.

If Self determination is a right, as inscribed in the UN Charter, why is the international community persistently hostile to Kurdish expression of will for self-determination?

As expressed, the international community is concerned that the Kurdish referendum might undermine the fight against the Islamic State. There is also an unuttered belief that a successful separation of Iraqi Kurdistan might inspire independence movements.

Of all enigmas surrounding the Kurdish independence, the most concerning perhaps is the international community’s fear that an independent Kurdish state may further destabilize the already volatile region.

This fear predominantly stems from a zero-sum understanding of the international community—an understanding which constantly feeds the principal approach of keeping the existing borders intact. This approach has served for further violence and has been maintained by the international community at the expense of grave human rights violations, oppression, and injustices against the local peoples.

As a matter of fact, the seemingly bad examples of separation are regions where host states work to turn the newly separated part into a failed state through conflict instigation and exporting violence. Host states destabilize these parts either directly or through their militias and allies.

Thus it is not the independence per se that generates conflicts or invites instability, but the hostile attitude and the belligerent policies of host states and/or neighboring countries that insist in their destabilizing moves.

South Sudan is illustrative at this point. Sudan with its Arab allies and militias did not cease infiltrating conflict and instability after the South Sudanese separation in 2011.  Malaysia invested in turning Singapore into a failed state. While the attempts succeeded in the former, they failed in the latter case.

Added to the international community’s fear is the anxiety of neighboring countries, particularly Turkey and Iran, because of their existing Kurdish minority populations. My research shows that due to a history of conflict with their Kurdish populations, they seem to have developed Kurdophobia—any Kurdish gain is considered an existential threat to their own security and national unity. As such, Kurdish empowerment elsewhere might instigate further demands from the Kurds in these respective countries.

In a nutshell, Turkey approaches Kurdish independence as a win-lose. Turkey’s official stance has been one of denial and disapproval—an obstinate stance that is saturated by its existential fear of any Kurdish gain. Turkey’s Kurdophobia for decades has been fueling the Turkish war against Kurds.

If Turkey can overcome its deeply entrenched Kurdophobia, and look for the prospects of building the foundations for stronger cooperation with the newly independent Kurdish State, it will be one of the, if not only, beneficiaries. As it were after the establishment of the Kurdish de facto autonomy in 1993 in Iraq, despite Turkey’s initial furry and threats against the Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq. Thus, rather than fomenting the seeds of tension and conflict with the Kurds, Turkey should look for the opportunities that arise from Kurdish independence.

In addition to economic, security and energy cooperation, an independent Kurdish state will efficiently, and resourcefully, mediate between regional actors and their Kurdish minority populations. The KRG has mediated for decades between the PKK, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, and Turkey. The Kurdish state will have a vested interest in helping them peacefully resolve some of the entrenching, seemingly intractable issues the Kurds have with their host states.

The international community has to accept Kurdish independence with all of its complexity and dynamism. A broader understanding of the issues surrounding Kurdish independence and a collaborative approach to help resolve some of the entrenched relations, through win-win solutions, can make the region a better place. Such constructive approach will contribute to regional stability and global security.

The international community and the Iraqi Central Government can choose peace and stability through collaboration and constructive engagement with the Kurds, or to maintain the status quo and force the Kurds to remain part of Iraq—an option that seems hard to endure and particularly difficult for Iraqi Kurds to accept.

And a third possibility, and perhaps mostly disregarded, is the Kurdish pursuit for statehood notwithstanding the concerns of the international community or the Iraqi State. This is a trajectory that neither the international community nor the Iraqi government would want, as this might instigate conflict between the Iraqi Central Government and the KRG and lead Iraq into a new phase of civil war in the post-Islamic State era.

Kurdish independence is a reality and will materialize. However, it should be pursued through constructive diplomacy and mutual respect both for the rightful claims of the Kurds and genuine concerns of the international community and the Iraqi Government.

Huseyin Tunc is a New York Mediator and Researcher working on the Turkey’s Kurdish conflict at the Institute for the Study of Human Rights, Columbia University. He has published, including in the peer-revived journals.

Contact Email: ht2360@columbia.edu and Phone: +1 917- 804 2003

 

The post Why is the International Community so Hostile to Kurdish Independence? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

In the Quest for Successful Refugee Integration, Merkel Must Address Employment Discrimination Against Ethnic Minorities in Germany Head-On

Foreign Policy Blogs - Mon, 02/10/2017 - 12:30

On Sunday, Germany elected Angela Merkel as chancellor for the fourth time, matching the postwar record set by the late Helmut Kohl, who was chancellor of West Germany at the time I was born there.

Helmut Kohl has cemented his place in German and European history as the unifier of East and West Germany and one of the original champions of the European Union. Merkel, a Kohl protégée, has now similarly made her mark as one of the Western world’s longest serving leaders, as well as a key figure in navigating Europe’s economic crisis, Brexit, and a migration crisis that drew 1.2 million people to Germany.

Overcoming the integration challenges associated with the migration crisis in particular will present Chancellor Merkel with the opportunity to maximize her impact on history. Broadly speaking, access to employment for refugees and immigrants is an important factor for successful integration. Merkel, therefore, should focus on developing policies and laws that focus on the socio-economic integration of refugees by addressing societal issues, like employment discrimination, head-on. If she seizes this moment, Merkel will ensure that these newly arrived refugees and their children not only build new economic opportunities for their own families, but also contribute to the fabric of a more diverse and aging German population.

Muslims, a visible minority in Germany, have experienced higher labor integration than Muslim communities in other European countries like neighboring France. To ensure continued economic integration of newly arrived refugees, the German government adopted the Integration Act in August 2016, which provides for integration classes, vocational training, employment, and training opportunities.

However, the law does not address hurdles that refugees may encounter once they are integrated. Educational achievement has not guaranteed a smooth transfer to gainful employment for immigrants in Germany. Studies indicate that ethnic minorities, including Turks, experience discrimination in the German labor market. Having a foreign name can also reduce the chance of getting a job interview; this happened to my father around the time that he completed his PhD in the late 1980s.

My father left the former Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of Congo, not long after the infamous “Rumble in the Jungle” boxing match in 1974. Not knowing any German, he left Zaire for Germany in hopes of becoming an engineer, having received a scholarship through the European Economic Community. My father was required to take one year of intensive German language courses at the Carl Duisberg Society. Thereafter, he gained acceptance to RWTH Aachen University to study electrical engineering.

By the time my father submitted his doctoral thesis in 1987, he expected that graduating with a PhD from one of Europe’s top engineering universities would result in numerous employment opportunities. That did not happen. He mailed out 50 resumes to various German companies and did not receive a single offer. I suspect that racial discrimination, unfortunately, was a contributing factor in this situation. One fateful day in January 1988, however, he decided to apply for a job interview in neighboring Luxembourg with an American company—General Motors. He got the job, and the rest, as they say, is history.

To be clear, the racial climate in German society has improved since the late 1980s, and Germany enacted the General Equal Treatment Act in 2006 to address employment discrimination based on categories like race and ethnic origin. The law, however, has noted gaps. The Federal Anti-Discrimination Agency, the body tasked with the implementation of the act, does not have the power to carry out their own investigations in discrimination proceedings, for example. If Germany expects refugees to fully integrate into German society, the hope is that they will be rewarded with employment opportunities that will permit them to enjoy all facets of German life. Everyday discrimination against ethnic minorities is still commonplace in Germany, and the Merkel government should develop legal and policy tools that adequately address the barrier that employment discrimination could present to the successful integration of refugees.

The German people are a resilient and welcoming people, and Chancellor Merkel took a huge political risk by opening Germany’s borders to the world’s most vulnerable because of it. In 2015, she famously said that Germany would overcome the challenges associated with the migration crisis by saying “wir schaffen das,” which translates to “we can do it.” I really hope she does—just like Helmut Kohl did when Germany faced uncertainty in earlier times. The stability of German society could hang in the balance.

Laura Kupe is a German-born, Congolese-American attorney and a Political Partner at Truman National Security Project. She served as a Special Assistant in the Office of Policy, working on European affairs, at the Department of Homeland Security in the Obama Administration. Views expressed are her own.

The post In the Quest for Successful Refugee Integration, Merkel Must Address Employment Discrimination Against Ethnic Minorities in Germany Head-On appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

We Know All About You

Politique étrangère (IFRI) - Mon, 02/10/2017 - 09:30

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’automne de Politique étrangère (n°3/2017). Jérôme Marchand propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, We Know All About You. The Story of Surveillance in Britain and America (Oxford University Press, 2017, 304 pages).

En s’intéressant aux systèmes de surveillance de masse implantés en Grande-Bretagne et aux USA depuis la seconde moitié du XIXe siècle, et traitant des secteurs public et privé, ce texte dresse une longue liste d’abus étatiques, mais invite à ne pas sous-estimer les menaces que posent le renseignement d’entreprise et le data-mining. Plutôt qu’une réflexion politologique ou sociologique, Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones propose une promenade historique et chronologique.

L’ensemble s’articule en 12 chapitres, riches en portraits et anecdotes. Il expose d’abord les opérations de fichage et de black-listing montées par le patronat américain et britannique. Suivent des passages plus politiques, exposant les connivences latentes entre Roosevelt et Hoover, revenant sur les purges anticommunistes des années 1940-1950, puis sur les menées « anti-radicales » des années 1960-1980 (COINTELPRO). Au final, We Know All About You aborde la question des régressions démocratiques enclenchées depuis une quinzaine d’années avec l’assentiment de larges blocs de citoyens-consommateurs.

Le sentiment d’ensemble ? L’auteur apporte des éléments de comparaison utiles pour appréhender opportunités et entraves que connaissent les « sécurocrates » des deux pays. En revanche, l’analyse se montre lacunaire. Plutôt synthétique et structuré jusqu’aux mesures régulatrices des années ­1970-1990 (de la commission Church aux initiatives de Tony Blair), We All Know About You perd en consistance à partir du chapitre 9, qui traite de l’impact des attentats du 11 Septembre. Les chapitres qui suivent, qui examinent les pratiques intrusives des grandes entreprises, l’affaire Snowden et les réformes prises de l’ère Cameron-Obama, se réduisent par moments à de simples déroulés événementiels. Entre autres exemples, l’affaire News of the World, ponctuée par le sabordage de cette publication, méritait mieux que le traitement des pages 198-200 – en particulier si l’on tient compte des mises en perspective du journaliste d’investigation Nick Davies dans Hack Attack (Random House, 2014).

Plus profondément, l’ouvrage donne l’impression d’osciller entre deux thèmes : la mise sous surveillance légale ou illégale de contingents sans cesse plus fournis de citoyens britanniques et américains d’une part, d’autre part la formation de réactions de contrôle démocratique à forte résonance médiatique. Cette dualité éclaire les compromis réalisés par tel ou tel grand décideur. Mais elle ne donne pas forcément une idée juste des luttes d’influence qui s’exercent dans les coulisses du pouvoir, sous l’impulsion d’une haute fonction publique concernée de près par le Big Business sécuritaire et ses sinécures dorées.

Point connexe, l’ouvrage manifeste une nette tendance à placer sur un même plan les déviances du public et du privé, sans relever la responsabilité particulière de politiciens ou de fonctionnaires qui violent délibérément des normes démocratiques qu’ils sont chargés d’appliquer de manière convaincante. Ce qui pose de tout autres problèmes d’érosion normative, de dé-légitimation institutionnelle, et de rupture d’hégémonie que les intrusions des grandes entreprises. La bibliographie est bonne, mais avec des absences notables concernant les agissements criminels des cabinets d’investigation barbouzards (Lubbers) et les retombées systémiques des débords étatiques (Tarrow).

Jérôme Marchand

S’abonner à Politique étrangère

 

Austerity and Secession

German Foreign Policy (DE/FR/EN) - Mon, 02/10/2017 - 00:00
(Own report) - The escalating Catalan secessionist conflict is upsetting Spain, a country hard hit by Berlin's austerity dictate. Spain - occasionally praised in German media as a showcase for an alleged successful austerity policy - is still confronted with enormous social and economic problems, in spite of a modest economic growth. Unemployment and poverty remain at high levels. Crisis policies over the past few years have also increased the economic gap between Spain and the euro zone's centers of prosperity. One still cannot speak of debt reduction - the official objective of Germany's austerity policy within the EU. The poor economic situation, the high debt burden level and the distribution of federal and regional debts are fueling Catalonia's secessionist conflict.

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