Diplomacy & Crisis News

/ Inde, Économie, Éducation, Pauvreté, Santé - Asie / Inde, Économie, Éducation, Pauvreté, Santé - Asie

Donald and Ivanka Trump with Dubai partner Hussain Sajwani

President Donald J. Trump’s global conflict-of-interest problems just got a little bit bigger. As McClatchy DC reports in detail, Trump and a Dubai property development partner have hired a shady Chinese government construction firm to build a part of the Trump International Golf Club Dubai in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). This news comes “despite a pledge from Donald Trump that his family business would not engage in any transactions with foreign government entities while he serves as president.”

Trump’s partner in Dubai is DAMAC Properties (داماك), headed by billionaire Emirati property developer Hussain Sajwani (حسين سجواني), pictured above with Donald and Ivanka Trump. Sajwani has been called the “The Donald of Dubai,” and has raised conflict-of-interest concerns among Trump’s critics by openly trading off of his relationship with the U.S. president. The Chinese firm in question is majority state-owned China State Construction Engineering Corporation (CSCEC, 中国建筑工程总公司), awarded a $32 million road construction contract for the “AKOYA Oxygen” residential portion of the Trump Dubai project, where residential units will be priced up into the millions of U.S. dollars.

CSCEC is clearly a Chinese Communist Party-led organization: CSCEC chairman Guan Qing (官庆) doubles as the company’s party secretary. CSCEC president and general manager Wang Xiangming (王祥明) likewise doubles as the company’s deputy party secretary. CSCEC’s deputy general managers are also party members. As in other Chinese state-run organizations, CSCEC staff regularly take part in mandatory Communist Party political education and party-building programs. The party’s objectives differ sharply from U.S. policy goals in the “Greater China” and Asia-Pacific region.

Trump’s Dubai golf venture presents possible overseas conflicts of interest on two fronts: One with the UAE’s “Donald of Dubai,” and the other with China’s corrupt one-party dictatorship. As The Atlantic observes, “Trump’s relationship with Sajwani certainly creates the impression that this venture could give special benefits to the Emirati businessman and, by extension, other investors who have Sajwani’s ear.” Moreover, Trump “will be profiting from business interests [in the UAE that] could jeopardize his ability to make objective and effective decisions about policy that will affect the U.S., the UAE, and the Middle East overall.”

As McClatchy further observes, China’s state-run CSCEC “was one of several [Chinese companies] accused by the World Bank of corruption for its role in the bidding process for a roads project in the Philippines and banned in 2009 from World Bank-financed contracts for several years.” CSCEC also appears in documents from the notorious Panama Papers leak, drawing scrutiny for possible tax evasion and/or money laundering. For the President of the United States to be entangled with such a firm raises obvious concerns.

The Trump-Kushner family’s Chinese conflicts of interest have been previously noted, including valuable Chinese trademarks for Trump businesses, manufacturing in Chinese sweatshops for Ivanka Trump fashion products, and Chinese investment in Trump-Kushner real estate projects from the controversial EB-5 “visa-for-sale” scheme for wealthy investors. Any of these dealings could influence Trump administration policy decisions with regard to China.

Trump business ventures abroad also come at significant cost to taxpayers: When Trump’s sons Eric and Donald Jr. traveled to Dubai for a February 2017 ribbon-cutting ceremony at the Trump International Golf Club, the Secret Service shelled out nearly $17,000 for agents’ hotel bills alone (Add this to the nearly $100,000 the Secret Service spent on hotel bills for Eric Trump’s business trip to Uruguay in January, the more than $50,000 for Eric and Tiffany Trump’s business trip to Vancouver in February, and the many other taxpayer-funded business and pleasure expenses for the most costly First Family in U.S. history).

American voters might wish to consider all of this very carefully before deciding ever again that a “businessman president” is what America needs most.

The post Trump Hires Chinese Government Firm for Dubai Golf Club appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Cette carte indique les résultats des élections de 2009 pour le renouvellement de la Lok Sabha. Il y avait alors 28 Etats et 7 territoires, dont ceux de Delhi et de Pondichéry ; il y en a aujourd'hui un de plus : le Telangana. Certains Etats comptent plus d'électeurs qu'un pays comme la France – (...) / Inde, Élections, Politique - Asie

Amidst recurring bullish predictions and rhetoric of Asia’s rise we should be careful of falling into complacency. Despite years of high economic growth, Asia faces many serious challenges. Regional political relations, economic health, water-security and demographic trajectories will push many key Asian nations towards instability.

Western leaders have watched, with envy and concern, the rapid growth rates of countries in Southern and Eastern Asia.  Many commentators agree that the Asian Century is upon us, and merely debate whether it will be Chinese or Indian.  The balance of power is certainly adjusting.  Last December, China seized a US monitoring drone  in the international waters of the South China Sea, with impunity; an act unimaginable two decades ago.  However, for all their bluster, the continued rise of the Asian Tigers is far from assured. A great many problems remain which could undermine their growth.

On July 24th, Vietnam pulled the plug on a $300 million gas-drilling expedition in a disputed area of the South China Sea after China threatened to attack Vietnamese bases in the Spratly Islands.  Setting aside these familiar tensions in the South China Sea, Asia has many other serious territorial disputes affecting most Asian nations.  Japan has disputes with all of its neighbours, and China is engaged in 13 territorial disputes with 8 neighbours.  These disputes impact business and investment and can spark conflict-generating economic and political instability.  Concerningly, despite improving multilateral cooperation over the last two decades, there is still no effective regional political community and there are few political mechanisms to manage crisis.  These disputes also become scapegoats for a host of domestic problems – such as slowing economies, water-security, and demographic problems – which constitute de-stabilising threats in their own right.

Faltering economic health

Asia’s economic health should be watched as growth slows, particularly in China.  Slowing growth has led to unsustainable debt increases in many countries, such as Singapore and Taiwan.  Japan’s aging population and weak productivity have generated a 234.7% GDP-to-debt ratio; the highest in the world.  Beijing’s repeated use of cheap credit to stimulate growth caused China’s gross debt to surpass 304% of GDP in May 2017; links between state-owned companies and banks heighten the economic risk inherent in this debt.  A default in the heavily indebted corporate sector could send shockwaves through state-owned banks and trigger a systematic crisis.  Further, China’s efforts to transition from an export-led economy to one driven by domestic spending, has had limited success.  This is clearly reflected in economic statistics – consumer spending only makes up 37% of China’s GDP, far below the United States (68.1%), Japan (58.6%), or even Russia (51.9%).

Drought in India.

Populous and thirsty

Asian water-security is being pressured by climate change, water management, and economic and population growth.  Water shortages disrupt economic production and generate political unrest.  Given their economic and demographic significance, scarcity in India and China are particularly concerning.  Between 2003 and 2009, northern India lost water at the fastest rate in the world according to NASA.  The livelihood of 600 million Indians depends on agriculture and almost 2/3 of India’s cultivated land relies on rainfall rather than irrigation. India is also uneconomic with its water, using 28% more freshwater than China despite a smaller population and economy.  India’s water stress explains, in part, the tension between India and Pakistan in Kashmir in which major rivers – namely the Punjab – begin.

There is also a growing water-security crisis in China.  The glaciers that feed the Yangzi and Yellow River are melting, even as experts predict that Chinese water demand will outstrip supply by 2030.  As of 2014, North China holds two thirds of Chinese agriculture but only one fifth of its water, and 45% of GDP is in regions with a similar water resource per capita as the Middle East.  China’s water issues will inevitably drive it to strengthen control over its watershed.  The major rivers that feed the Asian sub-continent and South East Asia start in the Tibetan Himalayan glaciers; dashing any hopes of an independent Tibet.  Chinese exploitation of Tibetan water will create conflict with downstream nations; in the Indian subcontinent and Southeast Asia which rely on these rivers.

Depressing demographics

After World War II,  commentators thought the Japanese economy would soon dominate the world as its equity market soared and Japanese businessmen purchased US trophy properties such as Pebble Beach.  Yet, in the 1990s, Japan’s economy stagnated, due in part to the burden posed by its aging population.  Most developed Asian countries, such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, are facing aging populations which will increase dependency ratios and dampen economic performance.

In particular, China will likely become old before it becomes rich.  China’s One Child Policy enabled a ‘demographic dividend’ by decreasing the amount of dependents average earners needed to support. This has underpinned China’s economic rise, and accounted for up to one quarter of China’s per capita GDP growth since the mid-1970s as the working share of the population rose from 55% to 73%. But this rise has now peaked and China’s developing economy now faces a glut of aging workers without the affluence to support strong social care.  This will cause economic and social stress as a smaller working share of the population will yield a lower per capita living standard, and savings and investments will fall.  Huge economic gains have helped the Chinese Communist Party to contain dissent, yet China already suffers 200,000 protests a year of varying sizes. China is perhaps less stable than many realise.

Given Asia’s importance, the diversity of risks that face it must be understood.  Asia could dominate the 21st century for the wrong reasons – as a source of political turmoil and economic instability.

This article was originally published on Global Risk Insights, and was written by Ban Abbs.

The post Are the “Asian Tigers” Hamstrung by Hidden Flaws? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

La vision libertaire d'un Internet « espace de liberté » a souvent oublié le rôle du département de la défense américain — désireux de ne pas dépendre d'un centre pouvant être détruit en cas d'attaque nucléaire des « rouges » — dans la naissance de la Toile. Si la guerre froide est terminée et s'il n'y a pas (...) / Conflit, État, Géopolitique, Internet, Technologies de l'information, Technologie, Télésurveillance, Infoguerre - Médias

« Il n'y a plus place pour les traditions même les plus respectables : tout est mouvement. Aucun fils ne peut dire ce qui fut vrai durant tant de siècles : “Plus tard, je ferai comme papa” ; la seule certitude est que précisément il ne pourra pas faire comme papa » Yvon Gattaz, président du Conseil (...) / France, Économie, Entreprise, Travail, Chômage, Néolibéralisme - La valise diplomatique

As China and India continue to face off over a tiny patch of Himalayan highland, Bhutan is caught in the middle with the dispute as much about Bhutan’s foreign policy as it is about territory.

Beijing and New Delhi have been facing off over the 34 square kilometres that constitute the Doklam (called Donglang in China) region close to the tiny Himalayan kingdom of Bhutan. China and India have a difficult legacy of border disputes and the standoff over Doklam adds another to this list. Interestingly, the two chief actors in this saga are Bhutan and China, not India. Indeed, India has not expressed a claim on the region, but rather has acted on behalf of Bhutan (according to New Delhi) and intervened in protest to what it considers Chinese expansionism. Conversely, China claims that Bhutan informed Beijing that it did not know about Indian troop movements in the region, nor had it asked India into intervene on its behalf.

Status of Doklam a historical oversight

The spark for this entire confrontation was the entry of Chinese road workers and troops into the Doklam region on June 16th, which is claimed by both Bhutan and China. India saw these movements as a threat to both Bhutanese sovereignty and Indian security interests, sending military forces across the border to occupy the region in response. With regards to security, India is concerned about an increased Chinese presence in, and access to, the Doklam region, as it is near the strategically vulnerable Siliguri Corridor connecting India’s northeastern regions with the rest of the country. A Chinese military advance of some 130 kilometres would cut off the north east of India (and some 50 million people) from the rest of the country: such an eventuality took place during the 1962 Sino-Indian War.

Along with allegations that India is demolishing the aforementioned road, Beijing was angered by Indian military forces crossing an established border (namely the Indian-Chinese border) to intervene in the affairs of a third country. In response, India claims that China’s road building efforts on contested land are illegal. It has since emerged that the road in question has been there for over a decade, and that China was likely widening it. India’s involvement is also predicated on one interpretation of 1890 Convention of Calcutta which delineated the border between British Raj and Qing dynasty China in Sikkim and Tibet.

According to Article 1 of the Convention, the border begins at Mount Gipmochi, with the same article going on to state that the border will follow the watershed. The problem is that Mt. Gipmochi does not lie on the watershed. Accordingly, the border ought to start six kilometres north of said mountain at Batang La. This was reinforced by a British map from between 1907-1913 that showed the border starting at Batang La.

What this all means is that “if Mt.Gipmochi is the starting point, Doklam is in China, but if Batang La is the real starting point, then Doklam is in Bhutan and China has no right to build a road there.” Unsurprisingly, China and India cite the two opposing interpretations as justifications for their actions. Nevertheless, even if India’s preferred interpretation is the correct one, this does not sanction its intervention into Bhutan’s affairs.

What is interesting is that both India and China are clinging to a treaty signed by two defunct predecessor states (British India and imperial China). It also interesting to note China’s adherence to a treaty signed during the country’s ‘Century of Humiliation’ – a perennial sore spot for China’s politicians and public. Intriguingly, on June 30th, the same day that China emphasized the 1890 treaty it also stated that the 1984 Hong Kong treaty signed with the UK regarding the territory’s fate out to 2047 was a “historical document that no longer has any realistic meaning.”

Winter is coming

The problem facing both India and China is that the longer the standoff persists the less appealing any unilateral draw down becomes for either side. Chinese rhetoric is ratcheting up in the run-up to the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, scheduled for this fall. This uptick in rhetoric before a major gathering is a familiar trend, but it does mean that the issue is likely to remain unsolved until after the Congress, when Xi Jinping no longer needs to rally party cadres to action.

Indeed, this is one of the plans tendered by India: wait out the fall and winter, as weather concerns will limit any activity in the region, and seek a quick diplomatic solution in 2018. Another option is to replace Indian troops in the area with Bhutanese ones, de-escalating the standoff that way and drawing down troops levels. This provides China with a face-saving measure, as it would have stood its ground against India, while working with non-threatening Bhutan to resolve the issue according to China’s own ‘Good Neighbour’ framework.

Interestingly, Bhutan is China’s only neighbour that does not have diplomatic relations with Beijing. Indeed, Bhutan does not have diplomatic relations with any of the UNSC’s P5 members. It is one thing to try and forge a limited diplomatic path free of great power intrigue, but quite another when you happen to be surrounded by them. Bhutan’s close ties to India but minimal, semi-formal ones with China are a legacy of its close orbit around New Delhi, yet one which does not make full use of the potentially productive relationships landlocked Bhutan could cultivate.

India’s bipolar role in Bhutan’s young democracy

Sandwiched between the world’s two largest nations, Bhutan’s efforts to engage China complicate its longstanding ties with India. India has long viewed Bhutan as firmly within its orbit; a veritable protectorate. Having inherited Britain’s paternalist legacy regarding the various Himalayan nations, India maintained a cooperation agreement with Bhutan which saw New Delhi exercise considerable power over the former’s security and foreign policies from 1949 to 2007.

When Bhutan reportedly made unilateral concessions to China in 2005 (then still obliged to consult with India on foreign affairs) India was aghast and scrambled to undo the ‘damage’. Said damage likely entailed China settling for a small concession in Doklam in exchange for larger Bhutanese gains in the north and east. Two years later, India reneged on its role in Bhutan’s affairs, as the country transitioned towards constitutional monarchy. India also expressed great displeasure in 2013 after Bhutan announced its intentions to pursue a “balanced foreign policy” including establishing relations with China; a seemingly commonsense aspiration to outside viewers, but anathema to New Delhi’s interests.

The Bhutanese military in its modern incarnation was brought about with substantial Indian support in 1951 following China’s absorption of Tibet. While Bhutan stood by India during the 1962 war, and was one of the first nations to support Bangladesh’s independence, New Delhi’s loss to China and the inconclusive result of the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War called into question India’s pledge to protect Bhutan. Moreover, Indian arguments pointing to China’s annexation of Tibet as a threat to Bhutan were drastically undermined after India’s incorporation of Sikkim in 1975.

Ironically, India has been the largest supporter of and also largest threat to Bhutan’s democracy since the transition from absolute monarchy in the mid 2000s. Alongside the structural problems facing Bhutan from decades of dependence on India, New Delhi continues to meddle in Bhutan’s politics. Specifically, the upcoming 2018 election will see New Delhi rooting for Bhutan’s pro-India prime minister Tshering Tobgay as he seeks re-election. Tshering ousted pro-China Jigme Thinley in 2013, thanks in part to (alleged) Indian support.

Despite being one of the biggest proponents of the country’s transition to democracy, India was quickly accused of back-seat politicking. Specifically, India abruptly cut gas and kerosene subsidies (along with a host of other harsh measures) just days before the 2013 election, throwing Bhutan’s economy in turmoil. Jigme went on to lose the election, and many doubt claims that the cuts were a mere coincidence.

Energy politics

Having been accustomed to decades of overarching influence, India has often neglected relations with Bhutan: a similar failing has estranged Nepal and pushed that country closer to China. India’s “colonial-style approach of buying loyalty through economic aid may no longer work,” notes former Indian ambassador P. Stobden.

60% of Bhutan’s government expenditure is spent on Indian imports, with 75% of all imports stemming from India, as well as 95% of Bhutan’s own exports destined for India. India’s economic shadow looms large over Bhutan, as witnessed by the rupee devaluation, which sent Bhutan’s economy into shock as an unintended (and perhaps overlooked) consequence of New Delhi’s surprise monetary decision.

Bhutan is also facing a growing debt crisis as government borrowing has seen the country’s debt to GDP ratio climb to 118%. Lopsided trade relations (mainly with India) and extensive hydro-power expansion (accounting for 77% of debt to GDP) both highlight India’s ongoing influence. Firstly, “90 to 95% of what Bhutan borrows from India goes back to India,” with Bhutan’s main export – hydro power – chiefly benefitting India. Add to this the fact that India is Bhutan’s largest creditor – responsible for 64% of Bhutan debt – and the situation is clear: India effectively controls both ends of Bhutan’s economic cycle.

With a hydro-power potential of some 30,000MW (of which only 5% is developed) and less than a million people, Bhutan stands to greatly benefit from its energy wealth: Bhutan’s projected GDP growth rate for 2017-19 is a staggering 11.1%. Specifically, hydro-power accounted for 32.4% of Bhutan’s exports and 8% of GDP in 2016. With plans to develop 10,000MW by 2020, Bhutan stands to gain from feeding China and India’s energy needs. India’s influence in the country means that it is wary of Bhutan becoming closer to Beijing, and it’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR) framework.

In another ironic twist, India has been whispering to Bhutan for years that OBOR is a debt trap, even as it continues to hold the majority of Bhutan’s debt. Meanwhile Bhutan is viewing OBOR as a means to diversify investment and move away from its reliance on Indian funding. China for its part would be more than willing to supplant India and acquire access to additional renewable energy sources.

In this context, the 24 rounds of border negotiations between Bhutan and China, as well as rumours of closed door territory swaps make India very nervous. Despite not having official diplomatic ties with Beijing, Bhutan has nevertheless made recent overtures to court China and send India a message. Chief among these has been the visit by Bhutan’s ambassador to India to the Chinese embassy to attend the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) 90th anniversary. Given the military tensions in Doklam and the fact that it is very rare for an ambassador to attend a foreign country’s armed forces day, this sends a clear signal to New Delhi.

Under the Radar uncovers political risk events around the world overlooked by mainstream media. By detecting hidden risks, we keep you ahead of the pack and ready for new opportunities.

Under the Radar was origionally published on Global Risk Insights and is written by Senior Analyst Jeremy Luedi.

The post Doklam Standoff Highlights India and China’s ‘Great Game’ over Bhutan appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’automne de Politique étrangère (n°3/2017). Denis Bauchard, conseiller pour le Moyen-Orient à l’Ifri, propose une analyse croisée des ouvrages de Jean-Pierre Filiu, Le Miroir de Damas. Syrie, notre histoire (La Découverte, 2017, 240 pages) et de Frédéric Pichon, Syrie : une guerre pour rien (Éditions du Cerf, 2017, 192 pages), et de l’étude de Michel Duclos, Syrie : en finir avec une guerre sans fin (Institut Montaigne, 2017).

La tragédie syrienne, qui entame sa huitième année, continue de nourrir un débat interne parfois vif. À ceux qui apportent leur soutien aux « rebelles » et réclament le départ de Bachar Al-Assad, qualifié de criminel de guerre, s’opposent ceux qui estiment que les pays occidentaux, par impuissance ou naïveté, ont contribué à répandre le chaos dans un Moyen-Orient dont la stabilité avait déjà été affectée par l’intervention américaine de 2003 en Irak.

Ces deux livres, Le Miroir de Damas et Syrie : une guerre pour rien, écrits par deux auteurs qui connaissent bien ce pays pour y avoir vécu, participent à ce débat et proposent deux lectures diamétralement opposées de la situation, de ses déterminants profonds, comme du jeu des acteurs de ce drame. Comment en est-on arrivé là ? Qui est responsable de cette « guerre pour rien » ? Autant de questions auxquelles Jean-Pierre Filiu et Frédéric Pichon essaient de répondre à partir d’approches totalement divergentes.

Jean-Pierre Filiu a toujours exprimé une forte sympathie à l’égard des rebelles syriens, comme en témoignent son ouvrage récent Je vous écris d’Alep (Denoël, 2013) ou son blog Un si proche Orient. Il situe cette fois-ci son propos dans une perspective résolument historique, en soulignant que l’histoire de la Syrie est également, pour reprendre le sous-titre du livre, « notre histoire ». « N’oublions jamais », écrit-il à la dernière ligne de son livre, « qu’un peu de notre destin, à nous ici, se joue chez eux, là-bas ». En effet, l’Europe, et plus encore la France, se sont trouvées impliquées dans l’histoire de ces « espaces de Syrie… saturés d’une histoire complexe » et souvent violente. Les croisades, le régime des Capitulations mis en place dès le XVIe siècle, la protection des chrétiens d’Orient, l’intervention française de 1860 à la suite des massacres de chrétiens, le rôle de la France dans le dépeçage de l’Empire ottoman et son mandat sur le Liban et la Syrie, une politique active d’intervention depuis le début de la Ve République : tout montre que l’histoire de la Syrie est une partie de notre histoire. Cela signifie-t-il que nous avons une part de responsabilité dans la tragédie syrienne d’aujourd’hui ? Filiu n’est pas loin de le penser. Après avoir évoqué la façon quelque peu chaotique dont a été exercé le mandat, il ajoute : « Comment ne pas trouver dans ce triste feuilleton mandataire les échos de la conflagration actuelle ? »

À cet égard, l’auteur évoque l’évolution de la politique française, soulignant à juste titre ses variations et ses contradictions. La « guerre des ombres » menée par Hafez Al-Assad contre François Mitterrand va de l’assassinat de l’ambassadeur de France au Liban à l’attentat contre le Drakkar, où périssent en 1983 58 soldats français, et se termine par la visite du président français à Damas en 1984 – pour tourner la page. Jacques Chirac, sur le conseil de Rafic Hariri, développe des liens personnels avec Hafez Al-Assad, aux obsèques duquel il sera le seul chef d’État occidental à se rendre. Il reçoit les dividendes de ce rapprochement lors de l’opération « Raisins de la colère », qui aboutit, grâce à l’appui du président syrien, à la mise en place d’un comité de surveillance co-présidé par la France et les États-Unis, comité permettant de protéger la souveraineté libanaise contre les incursions d’Israël. Sa prévenance à l’égard de Bachar Al-Assad qu’il voit comme un réformateur est pourtant rapidement déçue : après l’assassinat de Rafic Hariri, Jacques Chirac bascule dans un affrontement déterminé avec le régime. Quant au président Sarkozy, il passe, comme à son habitude, d’un excès à l’autre, invitant Bachar Al-Assad à Paris le 14 juillet 2008 pour participer au lancement de l’Union pour la Méditerranée, le recevant chaleureusement en décembre 2010 à Paris, avant d’exiger quelques semaines plus tard le départ d’un chef d’État qui « tire contre son peuple ».

En fait, le livre de Jean-Pierre Filiu confirme que la Syrie, le pays de Cham qui s’étend du Taurus au Sinaï, a été au cours des siècles un espace de violences continues, comme l’irruption des croisés, la dévastation de Damas et le pillage d’Alep par Tamerlan en 1401, ou le bombardement de Damas par les troupes ­françaises en 1925. Il note que des événements récents peuvent trouver de troublantes analogies dans un passé parfois lointain. Il juge ainsi que la présidence d’Hafez Al-Assad est tout aussi « implacable que le califat de Moawiyya », fondateur de la dynastie des Omeyyades. Quant à l’utilisation de la faim comme arme de guerre, il rappelle le précédent ottoman de 1915 envers les Arméniens.

Pour sa part, Frédéric Pichon donne une analyse sans complaisance de la situation de la Syrie d’aujourd’hui, et une critique de la position des pays occidentaux, et donc de la France. Il relève la capacité de résilience du régime, manifestement ­sous-estimée, ce dernier continuant à bénéficier non seulement de l’appui des minorités alaouite, druze et chrétienne mais également de celui d’une partie de la ­bourgeoisie sunnite intégrée au pouvoir. Pour l’auteur, « le système en vigueur à Damas cumule le double héritage historique du clientélisme clanique et des méthodes soviétiques ». Il note également que « la brutalité de la répression, les méthodes d’infiltration, le retournement des adversaires, la torture et la propagande grossière sont encore là », et contribuent au succès sur le terrain, notamment à Alep. Le régime est certes affaibli, mais il tient une « Syrie utile », qui représente le tiers du territoire mais les deux tiers de la population, où la vie quotidienne se déroule selon une certaine normalité. L’affaiblissement est pourtant celui du baasisme, et du régime lui-même, qui doit désormais composer avec « un entreprenariat milicien », et la présence de plus en plus encombrante de la Russie et de l’Iran.

La détermination russe et iranienne à défendre le régime a été à l’évidence également sous-estimée. Dès 2011, l’appui russe est à la fois économique – approvisionnement en produits pétroliers raffinés – et politique – vétos systématiques à des projets de résolution déposés auprès du Conseil de sécurité. Il prend une nouvelle dimension en septembre 2015, avec des frappes aériennes de forte densité. Pour Frédéric Pichon, « la cohérence et l’efficacité de l’appui russe […] apparaissent à juste titre comme remarquables ». L’Iran, pour sa part, s’est engagé à la fois indirectement, par le Hezbollah et des milices chiites composées de combattants irakiens et afghans, et de plus en plus directement à travers la force Al-Qods, des Gardiens de la Révolution. Son chef, le général Qassem Soleimani, est devenu un véritable proconsul qui pèse sur la politique intérieure syrienne. Ces appuis ont été déterminants pour éviter la chute du régime en 2015, et pour entamer la reconquête des zones d’opposition modérée, notamment la reprise d’Alep. Face à cette détermination, l’auteur ne peut que constater la pusillanimité des pays occidentaux, et leur échec à aider efficacement une opposition divisée et de plus en plus radicalisée.

Frédéric Pichon est particulièrement critique de la politique, ou plutôt de « l’irrealpolitik », suivie par la France d’abord avec Nicolas Sarkozy puis François Hollande, et du « naufrage de la diplomatie française ». Il y voit l’effet de l’influence des « néoconservateurs » français, qui entretiennent des liens étroits avec les think tanks américains, et dont le paradigme se situe, selon lui, entre « brutalité guerrière et posture humanitaire, de relativisme et d’essentialisme tout à la fois ». Il ajoute : « La dernière décennie a illustré l’épuisement de la prophétie occidentaliste : ses valeurs ont définitivement sombré dans les montagnes afghanes et les déserts irakiens. » D’une façon plus générale, il estime que le conflit syrien est le révélateur des « basculements inédits de l’ordre international […] Se joue aussi sur le théâtre syrien la progressive paralysie de l’Occident entravé dans ses actes mais aussi ses mots, donnant la pénible impression d’un monde qui lui échappe ». De fait, son livre élargit le propos à des considérations sur l’islam, sur la réaction de l’Occident face au terrorisme, et le sort des chrétiens d’Orient.

La lecture de ces deux ouvrages permet de mieux comprendre les enjeux et les termes d’un débat qui n’est pas près de se clore. Au Moyen-Orient rien n’est simple, et ces deux livres tentent d’en décrypter la complexité.

Celle-ci est bien mise en lumière dans l’étude très complète intitulée « Syrie : en finir avec une guerre sans fin » rédigée par Michel Duclos, ancien ambassadeur en Syrie, et que vient de publier l’Institut Montaigne. Cette étude, qui se présente comme une défense et illustration de la politique française menée depuis 2011, évoque successivement « les leçons de la crise syrienne », « la nature du régime », « fin de partie ou guerre sans fin », avant de proposer six orientations pour contribuer à résoudre le conflit. Au nombre de celles-ci, figurent notamment l’absolue nécessité d’instaurer un cessez-le-feu, la nécessaire intensification du dialogue stratégique avec la Russie, la constitution d’une force de stabilisation issue de la rébellion arabe sunnite, la refonte du processus de transition. L’auteur ne dissimule pas la difficulté de l’exercice, compte tenu du rapport de forces actuel.

De fait, la tragédie syrienne n’est pas seulement une guerre entre « l’opposition modérée » et le régime. Cette guerre, au départ civile, est devenue un conflit régional voire international aux conséquences considérables, impliquant un grand nombre d’acteurs. Des affrontements nouveaux s’y sont développés : entre l’opposition et les groupes djihadistes, entre l’EI et l’émanation syrienne d’Al-Qaïda, entre la Turquie et les Kurdes syriens contrôlés par le PKK, entre les États-Unis et l’Iran, voire entre les États-Unis et la Russie.

Ces contributions nourriront opportunément le débat à un moment où une nette inflexion est apportée par le président Macron à la politique française dans cette zone sensible.

Denis Bauchard

Pour vous abonner à Politique étrangère, cliquez ici.

 

(Own report) - Berlin sees China's growing economic presence in the EU's eastern periphery as an increasing threat to German predominance over Eastern and Southeastern Europe. During his visit to Paris at the end of August, German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel warned against the People's Republic's alleged "division of Europe." Beijing's cooperation with 16 Eastern and Southeastern European countries is threatening the EU's "unity" and must be stopped. China should follow a "one-Europe policy." German media and think tanks have been sharply criticizing Chinese economic activities in Eastern and Southeastern Europe since years. In a recent analysis, the Friedrich-Naumann Foundation (FDP) assailed the Czech government for signing a "declaration on the territorial integrity of the People's Republic of China" in view of comprehensive Chinese investments in that country. Beijing has reacted to these attacks by pointing to Germany's dominant status in the EU.

D'ici à 2015, les Objectifs du millénaire pour le développement prévoient de « donner à tous les enfants, garçons et filles, partout dans le monde, les moyens d'achever un cycle complet d'études primaires ». Mais, avec 120 millions d'enfants analphabètes en 2010, long est le chemin qui reste à (...) / Économie, Éducation, Entreprise - Economie et finance

Principaux responsables de l'échec de la conférence sur le traité de non-prolifération (TNP) en mai 2005, les Etats-Unis (mais aussi la Grande-Bretagne et la France) s'apprêtent à se lancer dans la fabrication d'une nouvelle génération d'armes nucléaires. D'autre part, selon des documents du Pentagone, (...) / Corée du Nord, États-Unis, Iran, Armement, Nucléaire militaire, Défense, Pacifisme, Stratégie militaire - 2005/11 Désastres contre utopie

Depuis plusieurs années, Gabriel García Márquez se consacre à l'écriture de ses Mémoires, dont le premier tome, « Vivre pour la raconter », paraît en français en octobre prochain. Durant les quelques pauses qu'il s'accorde, il travaille sur un recueil de six nouvelles, qui peuvent être lues soit (...) / Amérique latine, Colombie, Littérature - 2003/08 Voyages

Shipan Kumer Basu, head of the Hindu Struggle Committee, meets with President of India Ram Nath Khovind

The minorities in Bangladesh are in a dire and tragic predicament. According to Shipan Kumer Basu, head of the Hindu Struggle Committee, “The constitution of Bangladesh gives certain rights to the minorities of the country,” Basu says.

“Everyone in the state is supposed to grant equal treatment under the law to all minority communities to enjoy their own culture, practice their own religion and use their own language.

Sheikh Hasina (who has served as prime minister since 2009) has done nothing to develop these principles or give security to the minorities. On the contrary, she has made the minorities live in fear and insecurity. The reason for this is prejudice and bigotry against the minority communities in Bangladesh.”

It is for this reason that Basu is appealing to Israel as a member of the international community to help his people.

“Different forms of violence are reported against the minority communities in Bangladesh in several national newspapers,” he said. For example, it was reported recently that Soma Biswas, a 25-year-old Hindu woman, was gang- raped and burned alive because of her Hindu heritage.

Unfortunately, she is one of many such cases. The plight of Sukhiya is another. After her husband was murdered, the women and girls of her family were raped and abused regularly until she herself was murdered, thus leaving the rest of her family even more vulnerable. “Reportedly, this has all been part of an attempt by some affluent and influential local people to displace Sukhiya and her family so that they can take over the land.” According to the Bangladesh Hindu, Buddhist and Christian Unity Council, “Rape and violence against women is one of the biggest social challenges facing Bangladesh.”

At least in the case of Sukhiya and Biswas, everything is documented and there is a campaign to obtain justice for Sukhiya’s family. “It is important to stress that many more incidents occur that go unreported, especially in the rural areas,” says Basu. “Additionally, violence against women is generally not made public due to cultural and social taboos. Sheikh Hasina is the spearhead and brainchild in giving a strong foothold to ISIS in Bangladesh. They have terrorized the minorities. She has given them moral, administrative and political support to carry out their dreadful activities. A peaceful country has become a killing field for the minorities.”

Sheikh Hasina, Basu says, has placed her people in all government offices and this adversely affects the minority communities: “The higher officials in the police are all her people. They don’t even take the minorities into account. When brutality happens, they turn a blind eye to it and even threaten the minorities”.

“The government has put a few ISIS people behind bars so that they evade the eyes of the world, but their malicious and terrorist activities within the jails continues,” he noted. “Very minor charges are levied against them and they are protected by government functionaries themselves. Leaked reports from inside the jails say that these people belong to an ISIS group trained in Syria and other ISIS strongholds outside Bangladesh.”

He continues: “There are hundreds of examples. Where will all of the minorities go? We are denied peace and tranquility in our own place of birth. We have the right to live, breathe fresh air and to live freely as others do. If we leave our own country and go to India, we are given refugee status. Other countries will also do so to save us.”

According to Basu, however, Bangladeshi Hindus don’t want to leave behind the land of their ancestors, so he wants a solution from inside Bangladesh: “To stop this systematic suppression, killing, murder, rape, land grabbing and terrorizing, I appeal to the whole world to take note of the grave situation that the minorities are facing in their own land and to save the minorities.”

Given the history of the Jewish people being persecuted for thousands of years, Basu believes Israelis are in a unique position to provide support: “Israel has a history of helping people who are in distress throughout the world. Israel is a country full of talent and has vast expertise. Extending their strong helping arms will strengthen our country and the minorities both intellectually and financially.”

This wouldn’t be the first time Israel would be aiding the Bangladeshi people.

“In the 1971 Bangladeshi War for Liberation, then-Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi appealed to Israel for help,” Basu notes. “Israel readily helped with arms and ammunition and thus Bangladesh was born. Israel was the first country to recognize Bangladesh officially. But it did not establish any relations with Israel.”

Some Bangladeshi Muslims are now greatly opposed to this reality. As Kaji Aujijul Haq says: “Why can’t we keep ties with Israel when most of the Arab world is opening up to Israel? Our prophet instructed us to keep ties with the Jews. Have we become more powerful than the prophet himself?”

Basu, who has already asked the Israeli Druze diplomat Mendi Safadi, head of the Safadi Center for International Diplomacy and Public Policy, to help bring the issue to international forums, believes there are many ways Israel can help.

“The voting rights of the minorities have been systematically diminished and, therefore, they don’t have a say in the government. Unless the minorities are empowered, the torture and subduing of minority groups won’t stop,” he says. “If Israel campaigned that the next general election be held with the supervision of a UN peace-keeping force, it would be a wonderful thing loved by the absolute majority of the Bangladeshi population, including the Hindus.”

Basu argues that if the Awami League comes to power again through a showcase vote, it will be a disaster. “All of the minorities will lose the power to vote and then the party will start snatching land, killing people and forcing the Hindus to leave Bangladesh. So, a very neutral election is needed at this time so that both the Hindus and Muslims along with the other minorities can live in peace.”

The post Hindu Rights Activist Seeks Israeli Support for Bangladeshi minorities appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

La rédaction a le plaisir de vous offrir à lire ce second article, « Élections allemandes : le jour d’après », écrit par Hans Stark, secrétaire général du Comité d’études des relations franco-allemandes (Cerfa) de l’Ifri, et paru dans notre nouveau numéro, « Arctique : une exploration stratégique ».

Alors que l’alternance régulière, sinon le « dégagisme », semble à la base du fonctionnement des démocraties occidentales, la République fédérale constitue visiblement une exception. Selon toute probabilité, le 24 septembre prochain, le Parti chrétien-démocrate (CDU) d’Angela Merkel remportera une nouvelle fois les législatives.

Vers novembre ou décembre 2017, le prochain contrat de coalition signé, le Bundestag élira Angela Merkel pour la quatrième fois consécutive à la chancellerie – phénomène sans égal dans le monde dit libre, sauf justement en Allemagne qui a vu Konrad Adenauer et Helmut Kohl élus chancelier à quatre reprises. En d’autres termes, la campagne électorale s’achève avant même d’avoir commencé, tant les sondages sont sans appel : depuis mai 2017, la CDU-CSU bénéficie d’une avance stable de 15 points sur le SPD (Parti social-démocrate). Aucune majorité ne se profile contre la CDU. La chancelière dispose, en revanche, de multiples options pour les quatre prochaines années, allant de la simple poursuite de la « grande coalition » avec le SPD, à une coalition de centre-droit avec les libéraux du FDP (Parti libéral-démocrate), en passant par la formule tripartite d’une coalition « jamaïcaine » rassemblant la CDU-CSU, le FDP et les Verts.

Angela Merkel – une chancelière incontestée ?

Tout semble donc sourire à Angela Merkel. Elle règne sans partage sur la CDU, qu’elle préside depuis 2000, et profite à la fois des faiblesses de son challenger social-démocrate Martin Schulz et des déchirures des leaders du parti populiste d’extrême droite Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). De plus, une hypothétique alliance de gauche plurielle rassemblant le SPD, les Verts et le parti d’extrême gauche Die Linke, non seulement n’a pas de majorité dans le pays mais, surtout, n’aurait aucune chance de tomber d’accord ne serait-ce que sur une timide ébauche de programme commun. Pourtant, même victorieuse des élections de 2017, Angela Merkel entamera un quatrième mandat qui sera sans doute le plus difficile de sa carrière.

Rappelons que même en Allemagne la vie politique d’un chancelier chrétien-démocrate peut avoir une fin. Et c’est souvent le quatrième mandat qui sonne le glas. Après quatre victoires consécutives entre 1949 et 1961, Konrad Adenauer, pourtant vénéré comme père fondateur de la République fédérale, ne fut « toléré » par son parti à la chancellerie que contre sa promesse, contrainte et forcée, d’un retrait à mi-parcours de son quatrième mandat. Quant à Helmut Kohl, le tout aussi auréolé « chancelier de l’unité » a bel et bien terminé son quatrième mandat et brigué même un cinquième en 1998. Mais ce fut contre l’avis, et la volonté, des autres ténors de la CDU, qui lui avaient préféré Wolfgang Schäuble, pourtant paralysé après l’attentat de 1990. Helmut Kohl a perdu devant Schröder – défaite d’autant plus lourde que sur les 18 législatives de la République fédérale entre 1949 et 2013, le SPD n’a devancé la CDU-CSU qu’à deux reprises, en 1972 et 1998. Et il est peu probable que cette tendance s’inverse en 2017.

Réélue, Angela Merkel sera donc inévitablement confrontée à la question : compte-t-elle aller au bout de son mandat et candidater à nouveau, ou choisira-t-elle le moment propice pour se retirer et permettre à son successeur désigné – dont nul ne connaît aujourd’hui l’existence – de préparer la campagne de 2021 dans des conditions permettant aux chrétiens-démocrates de l’emporter ? Cette inconnue va inévitablement affaiblir la chancelière qui, pourtant, entame la campagne de 2017 dans de très bonnes conditions. Si les sondages créditent son parti de 40 % des voix – score absolument exceptionnel après douze années de pouvoir – c’est qu’aucune volonté de changement ne se fait sentir outre-Rhin, en tout cas pas à l’échelle de la majorité des électeurs. Cette quête de continuité et de stabilité – qui résulte aussi des soubresauts du Brexit et de la victoire de Trump – se reflète dans les sondages qui ont toujours été positifs pour la chancelière, à l’exception de la période été 2015-été 2016, durant la crise des réfugiés, où une majorité d’Allemands, pourtant très mobilisés pour permettre leur accueil humain, a demandé une inflexion de la politique de la chancelière.

Pour lire l’article dans son intégralité, cliquez ici.

S’abonner à Politique étrangère.

US President Donald Trump shakes hands with Prime Minister Narendra Modi as they begin a meeting at the Oval Office of the White House in Washington. (Reuters)

Recently, the U.S. has reached out to India to help it stabilize the situation in Afghanistan. This mirrors the U.S.’ efforts to solicit China’s assistance in resolving the North Korean crisis. While these maneuvers acknowledge both India and China’s importance in their respective geographic areas, they simultaneously reduce both India and China’s core strategic interests in resolving these crises to continued beneficial trade relations with the U.S..

Threaten Friend And Foe Alike

The U.S.’ appeal to both India and China alike is an indicator of accelerating multipolarity in the 21st century. After decades of frustration with North Korea, the U.S. has recently turned to China for help. The North Korean situation affects all Northeast Asian states, to include South Korea, Japan, and Russia. However, as the region’s emerging hegemon, China’s interests in resolving the crisis clearly must be taken into account by the U.S. as well.

To date, the U.S. has reduced China’s concern with resolving the North Korean dilemma to that of a potential nuclearized Korean Peninsula and a hypothetical collapsed North Korean state which would lead to a refugee crisis for China. Both of these concerns are certainly valid. However, they are subordinate to China’s primary security concern in having an intact North Korea as a buffer state against any perceived encroachment of U.S. forces, which led to China’s entrance into the first Korean War. Until this overall security interest is acknowledged by the U.S., either publicly or privately, there will be no resolution of the crisis.

Security considerations will outweigh economic ones for all countries, and China is no different in this respect. Therefore, U.S. sanctions against China, threats of further sanctions against Chinese entities suspected of enabling North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, and threats of downgrading the U.S.-China relationship are all futile. These threats would have had much more teeth a generation ago when the U.S. economy was much stronger and more singularly indispensable to the global economy as a whole. As this is no longer the case, any reduction in U.S.-China trade would actually hurt the U.S. more, while accelerating China’s OBOR.

The Longest U.S. War Has No End In Sight

Similarly, the U.S. has singled out India to help it in its efforts to bring stability to Afghanistan. Of course, India has always had an overriding security interest in Afghanistan as both South and Central Asia lie within its sphere of influence. However, like China, the U.S. has yet to make the case to India on how exactly it will benefit India’s security interests to assist the U.S.. Also, the U.S.-India trade relationship is being threatened by the U.S. and this is being used as a stick to get India to comply with U.S. wishes.

However, as with China, India is far from being a treaty ally of the U.S. and, as such, has no concrete incentive to follow the U.S. lead in resolving a regional crisis unless its own security interests are acknowledged and taken into account. With India, one interest of concern is surely the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. As India doesn’t already trust Pakistan due to its relationship with China, this mistrust is compounded by Indian uncertainty regarding the exact nature of U.S.-Pakistani ties with respect to terrorism.

A bad situation is made much worse by the fact that the U.S. is now actively seeking Indian and Pakistani help in Afghanistan. Luckily, the Doklam standoff is now resolved, otherwise it could have emerged as a bargaining chip as both China and India might have asked the U.S. which one it truly favored in the crisis as the price of assistance in the North Korean and Afghan theaters of concern respectively.

This Model Won’t Work On Iran Or Russia Either

If this model is to be followed in the future, then the U.S. will continue to seek assistance from regional hegemons to help it resolve local crises. How will this play out in the Syria Crisis? Yes, Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia are all powerful regional actors with various interests in resolving this particular crisis. However, unlike Turkey and Saudi Arabia, Iran is not a U.S. ally and so therefore will ask the U.S. what concrete benefits will accrue to it for helping the U.S. to resolve this particular crisis. Unfortunately, the U.S. has already shot itself in the foot with sanctions against Iran despite its acknowledgement that Iran is still in compliance with the Iran nuclear deal.

Finally, after so many other crises, there is still the Ukraine Crisis. There is no other regional hegemon the U.S. can deal with to resolve this situation other than Russia. Recent U.S. veto-proof sanctions against Russia, combined with recent talk of arming Ukraine with offensive weaponry, severely undermine its incentive to help resolve this crisis, to say the least. Yet again, decreased economic ties with the U.S. pale in comparison to core Russian security concerns such as NATO expansion.

This particular raft of sanctions also further reduce the incentives for the above Chinese, Indian, and Iranian assistance as they explicitly target global firms looking to benefit from Russia’s oil and gas sector. Additionally, the overall situation is worsened as Russia itself is a key player in the North Korean Crisis, Afghanistan, and the Syrian Crisis and now has absolutely zero interest in helping the U.S. realize its own objectives in these various theaters. Summarily, as long as the U.S. keeps subordinating key regional states’ core security interests to their economic ones, its strategy to resolve various regional crises is doomed to ultimate failure.

The post The U.S.’ Outreach To Regional Hegemons Is Both Right And Wrong appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Le nouveau numéro de Politique étrangère (3/2017) vient de paraître ! Il consacre un dossier complet à l’Arctique et ses enjeux stratégiques, tandis que le « Contrechamps » se concentre sur l’Arabie Saoudite et son environnement régional. Enfin, comme à chaque édition, de nombreux articles viennent éclairer l’actualité, comme les élections allemandes ou encore la crise du Golfe.

Deux espaces stratégiques sont à l’honneur dans le numéro de la rentrée de Politique étrangère.

L’un, l’espace Arctique, aligne les enjeux : militaires, énergétiques, climatiques, économiques et commerciaux. Avec des revendications qui se croisent, s’opposent, mais essaient de dialoguer dans un multilatéralisme tempéré. L’Arctique serait-il la survivance d’un multilatéralisme mal en point, ou l’annonce d’une société internationale mieux gérée en commun ?

Tout autre tableau : celui qu’offrent le Golfe arabo-persique et le Levant. Des rivalités ouvertes de puissances régionales qu’échouent à maîtriser des puissances extérieures démonétisées. La crise qui oppose l’Arabie Saoudite au Qatar n’est que l’écho d’oppositions mal stabilisées, d’une recomposition régionale (entre Arabie, Iran, Turquie…) dont les dynamiques nous échappent. Le tout dans une région qui demeure stratégiquement essentielle, pour tous les acteurs globaux, y compris en Asie.

Plus proches de nous : les élections allemandes de septembre 2017. L’inconnue n’est pas tant le nom du vainqueur que sa marge de manœuvre future. Angela Merkel disposera-t-elle de la coalition qui lui permettra de prendre les bonnes décisions pour l’Europe, avec un partenaire français qui est à la fois demandeur… et attendu ? »

* * *

Découvrez la présentation vidéo de Dominique David :

Découvrez le sommaire complet ici.

Téléchargez le dossier de presse ici.

Lisez gratuitement :

• l’article de Hans Stark, « Élections allemandes : le jour d’après »
• l’article de Corentin Brustlein, « Forces nucléaires françaises : quel renouvellement ? »

Achetez le numéro 3/2017 de Politique étrangère ici.

Suivez-nous sur Twitter : @Pol_Etrangere !

 

Last August, North Korea launched what is believed to be a Hwasong-12 military grade ballistic missile towards Japan. This aggressive act towards the US ally is thought to be the latest move in the tit for tat between North Korea and the United States. There is the belief that North Korea is close to being able to place nuclear weapons on its ballistic missile systems, and has already demonstrated that it is capable of reaching targets well beyond its own borders.

Questions come with how the region wishes to progress in the future. In addition, the strategy to achieve this progression and the often unmentioned innocents living in North Korea that are subject to the fate given to them by the response of the two biggest egos in the metaphorical room.

Since the end of the Korean War in the 1950s there has been a cease-fire, but no actual peace agreement was achieved for the last few generations. This allowed North Korea and its ruling family to live and thrive by means of appeasement diplomacy. North Korea’s neighbours had to either walk softly around a large military force run by one individual, or have passively supported the regime so that it would not have to deal with the consequences of millions of North Koreans suddenly ending up with no control or leadership.

Ignoring a problem did not reduce its risk, and while North Korea was being appeased diplomatically, it slowly created its own nuclear weapons program, including semi-sophisticated missile systems to protect its ruling elite.

The risks posed by North Korea is reaching a critical stage where any leverage by the US or its allies have been spent without much definitive progress over the years trying to reduce a weapons program that will now certainly come into existence.

It is not expected that the US or its allies will want to greatly change the status quo, and there is next to no mention of the rights of those living in North Korea as regime change is mostly off the table. In this scenario, neighbours can only hope that North Korea decides they are content keeping the region hostage without a nuclear or conventional weapons strike, and hope that order does not beget chaos within North Korea with a nuclear weapons program ready to launch.

A stronger position would be to take the time to develop a truly effective Anti-Ballistic Missile system, similar to one that forms a defensive ring around Moscow, and hope that shooting down threats diffuses the calls for escalating a situation into a larger conflict. ABM diplomacy would allow US allies to regain a bit of their leverage, but still would maintain a horrific scenario where a nuclear armed and capable North Korea could set off a conflict at the whims of their leader, at the time and place of his choosing.

The end result of years of passive diplomacy over North Korea’s future nuclear threats is coming to a climax, and there are fewer and less viable options as North Korean technology approaches the reality of their spoken threats. With more small nations choosing ballistic missile diplomacy as a means to an end, the ABM diplomacy route may be the best/worst option in maintaining a status quo in diplomacy that has led to the current crisis, and will likely lead to many others.

The post The Need for Anti-Ballistic Missile Diplomacy appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

(Own report) - Chancellor Merkel will meet one of Venezuela's leading government opposition politicians today in the Chancellery. Julio Borges, who, according to reports, supported the 2002 putsch attempt in Caracas, will discuss the political development in Venezuela with the chancellor. Fierce power struggles are being waged in that country. The opposition, mainly composed of representatives of the traditional wealthy elites, has ties to Western powers und is also supported by Berlin. With its operational assistance, for example in advising Borges' Primero Justícia (Justice First) party in "political communication," the CDU-affiliated Konrad Adenauer Foundation has been playing a special role. Primero Justícia had also participated in the 2002-attempted putsch. Berlin is pursuing an approach similar to that used in other Latin American countries, wherein it regularly supports the traditional elites. This resembles the German authorities' interventions in the run-up to the putsch in Ukraine.

Some ethnic organizations in multicultural Western societies frequently neglect to perform their bridging role between old comers and new comers. These organizations’ missions are often abused to shine the private glory of old comer board members’ social prestige, misrepresenting the political interests of new comer immigrants.

The ramming of identity-politics-based extremism disparately sprouting around the globe has reawakened the totalitarian madness of unrefined mass politics under which religiously or racially shared violent norms dangerously surface into repulsive ‘praxis’. The imminent threats of such hyper-rationalized political action lie in the fact that it could now potentially jeopardize the socially embedded concept of ‘pluralistic equality’ being an essential premise for securing the ‘level playing field’.

In many multicultural Western societies, the evaporation of pluralistic equality might not only imply the breakdown of democratic solidarity but also play an overture for the collapse of the Republican notion of the public sphere where privileged yet responsible civism is supposed to guard the constitution values through inter subjective reasoning.

Why is the order of ‘worldliness’ (borrowing Hannah Arendt’s term) falling? Why do citizens of secular republics distrust the freedom-unleashing works of glorious ‘craftsmen’ and rather violently claim for the quasi-totalitarian group values of a single religion or race instead of those of their cosmopolitan public sphere? In the meantime, why have glorious craftsmen failed to stop the rise of extremism?

Both White supremacists and Islamic extremists have in common that they renounce the crafted secular glories of the public sphere and ignore the social constructive nature of the public sphere. Especially, they reject critical race theories’ assumptions under the intersectionality theory that citizens have multiple social identities that are not mutually exclusive.

What has caused the extremist groups to turn skeptical towards such theoretical assumptions?

One does not dare question the contributions that Hannah Arendt’s political theories and interdisciplinary critical race theory have made to the progress of humanity since the end of the world wars but one must cautiously point out that the theories have some limits in redressing the reality of the 21st century multicultural public sphere.

First, they undermine the motivating role of secular self-realization and self-discipline that guide individuals, especially the masses, towards righteous praxis. Arendt, for example, depreciates the value of French bonheur in her book, The Human Condition, because she considers it a “modern enchantment with ‘small things’” that is “an extraordinary and infectious charm that a whole people may adopt as their way of life, without for that reason changing its essentially private character.” In other words, she sees French bonheur as a mass hyponastic propaganda disseminated by a private organization that dissipates citizens’ political willingness to perform praxis in the public sphere.

Yet, in 21st century reality, it is the unnatural rhythmic coolness of gangster hip-hop and the (George) Bataillean way of squandering social excess that have overwhelmingly brainwashed our young generations’ way of life, not the ‘small things’ emphasis of French bonheur. Such excessively liberally expressed ‘crafts’ are often too existentialist in that they are vaingloriously stimulating, anesthetizing our young generations’ sensitivity in finding intrinsically self-realizing or self-disciplining meanings out of the crafts. One does not mean to say that these crafts have no socially contributing values but the fabricated heroism (cultural elitism) within the crafts entices young generations to falsely interpret the intended ‘unnatural rhythms’ and instead to ironically naturalize the rhythms limitedly for their own existentialist purposes. In so doing, young generations lose their passion to remold the rhythms into a unique one and also to present the remolded rhythm representing their true individuality to the public.

Considering these dysfunctions, today’s ‘craftsmen’ should urgently innovate alternative ways of accommodating secular self-realization and self-discipline other than the above types of ‘crafts’.

The development of happiness, or subjective well-being, studies could shed some light on this future challenge when it is truly understood as a praxis-arousing craft that pro-activates individuals’ community-consciousness as well as self-consciousness.

Second, the theories pay little attention to intra-ethnic power relations in Western multicultural societies. For example, the scholarly frame of critical race theory is mostly in the mainstream institutions vs minority individual context that limits the scope of research into studying how institutionalized racism oppresses minority individuals. Such an approach rarely recognizes the fact that the rise of multicultural elites and the upper middle class in Western societies since the 1980s has deepened intra-ethnic inequality especially between old comer and new comer immigrants. Indeed, the inequality is increasingly observable as a significant portion of minority citizens in multicultural Western societies have cast their votes to extreme rightist candidates in the past few years.

The problem of intra-ethnic asymmetry of information between old comer and new comer immigrants is as important to note as that within mainstream society. The less the degree of the asymmetry of information between old comer and new comer immigrants, the higher the likelihood that new comer immigrants integrate into American society. And the higher the likelihood of such integration, the less the likelihood that conflicts between working class citizens and new comer immigrants arise.

Similar to the way civic organizations as social capitals can ameliorate the problem within mainstream society, ethnic civic organizations as intermediating agencies (e.g. Korean American Associations) can narrow down the aforementioned inequality gap. Unfortunately, in reality, many such organizations neglect to perform their bridging role between old comers and new comers. These organizations’ missions are often abused to shine the private glory of old comer board members’ social prestige, misrepresenting the political interests of new comer immigrants.

Nevertheless, many social clubs and trade associations of successful second-generation or old comer professionals barely pay attention to this kind of intra-ethnic affairs or to the welfare of new comer immigrants unless doing so embellishes their American ivory tower.

Often, it seems like the priorities of the organizations, supposedly the public goods of an ethnic group, are to advertise good pictures that they have taken with vote-seeking local politicians so that they can garner the public image of seating on the top of the intra-ethnic hierarchy. All these dysfunctional intra-ethnic power relations especially within ethnic groups with soaring numbers of immigrants since the 1980s make intra-ethnic institutions in multicultural Western societies nothing more than the reincarnation of the clientelist  political machines of the late 19th century America.

Social costs associated with the asymmetry of information between self-conceited old comer and misinformed new comer immigrants must be reduced. Western governments should therefore find ways to systematically evaluate how ethnic civic organizations substantially play their bridging role between old comer and new comer immigrants.

The post Is Extremism the Sole Reason for the Collapsing Order of ‘Worldliness’? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.