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Europe Slams Its Gates (Part One)

Foreign Policy - Wed, 04/10/2017 - 17:15
European aid intended to combat African migration may just be making the problem worse.

Trump to Chart Hawkish Course on Iran

Foreign Policy - Wed, 04/10/2017 - 16:59
By telling Congress the nuclear deal is not in the U.S. interest, the White House is gambling on European help to roll back Iranian influence.

Mapped: The Last Islamic State Stronghold in Syria

Foreign Policy - Wed, 04/10/2017 - 16:49
The Islamic State has retreated to a remote tribal region. Taking it back won’t be easy.

Latest on Venezuela woes

Foreign Policy Blogs - Wed, 04/10/2017 - 12:30

Pictured on left is Diosdado Cabello, newly appointed to Venezuela’s inaugural Constituent Assembly. President Nicolas Maduro created this new authority to consolidate power and subvert opposition influence. Photo: Credit Juan Barreto/Agence France-Presse

When I last wrote about Venezuela in May, protests raged across the country. They derived from the ruling regime-controlled Supreme Court attempting to wrest power away from the National Assembly, Venezuela’s federal legislature and last vestige of opposition voices in the government. The move was met with harsh criticism at home and abroad, and President Nicolas Maduro quickly abandoned the maneuver, although protests and discontent lumbered on in the spring and summer.

Yet by mid-August, protests dwindled significantly in both in number and size. Was this because the opposition, and supporters of democracy in Venezuela, accomplished its goals making protests unnecessary? Unfortunately this was not the case, and the reason for the decline in demonstrations is far more sinister: Maduro and his political supporters found a way to make them obsolete.

In July, Maduro spearheaded the creation of a new governing body called the Constituent Assembly. The regime mandated that this group would have authority to rewrite the country’s constitution, and, according to the New York Times, “govern Venezuela with virtually unlimited authority.” On July 30 Venezuelans elected members of the Constituent Assembly. While the candidates did represent different occupations and every region of the country, they all had one thing in common: every single one was considered a trusted ally of the ruling regime. There were no opposition legislators on the ballot, and voters could not reject the creation of the assembly.

What’s more, the regime made no efforts to hide the fact that an express goal of this new authority it created was to wipe away the last remaining presence of the opposition in government. Maduro granted the Constituent Assembly the power to fire any official it considered to be disloyal, and to disband the National Assembly altogether. Diosdado Cabello, a former military chief and one of the new group’s most powerful members, said on television, point blank, “There is no possibility that the opposition will govern this country…Mark my words — no possibility.”

On August 18, only 2 weeks after it began operating, the Constituent Assembly gave itself the power to write and pass legislation. Nicholas Casey of the New York Times reported that this move “essentially nullifies the opposition-led legislature and puts [Maduro’s] party firmly in control of the country.” Casey further states that this latest power grab “is a decisive step in the quest by Mr. Maduro’s allies to dismantle the country’s legislature.” While Maduro has often acted to suppress his critics in the past, it seems that now his government isn’t even trying to maintain the appearance of adhering to the democratic process.

Beyond the political maneuvering, Venezuelan citizens continue to suffer under crippling economic conditions. And one definitely affects the other. Largely in response to the actions described above, on Aug, 25 the U.S. government placed new sanctions on Venezuela restricting trading of Venezuelan bonds in American financial markets. While not expected to have a significant impact, it may further hinder the Maduro’s regime ability to address its massive debt and pay off its loans.

And as if often the case in authoritarian regimes, those who are in the most need are those who are not getting help. The value of Venezuela’s currency continues to shrink while prices keep rising. Many cannot afford basic necessities, and many turn to the black market for goods and currency which further strangles the economy. The value of minimum wage earnings has plummeted by an astounding 88% in the last 5 years.

Has Maduro achieved checkmate in Venezuela? Has he eliminated the possibly of being removed from power? Just as those critical of his rule seemed to be gaining momentum, he found a way to pull the rug out from under them. Let’s hope the opposition is taking this opportunity to regroup and develop a new approach. International pressure should continue to be brought to bear, and aid to the Venezuelan people must be provided. More attention needs to be paid to the immense hardships facing them.

And democracy must make a comeback. It is long past due.

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Une voie nouvelle : enrichir la revendication

Le Monde Diplomatique - Tue, 03/10/2017 - 17:23
Face à l'explosion scientifique et technique, au développement du nombre des salariés très qualifiés, à la croissance du secteur tertiaire, à l'extension du travail en continu, à la condition des ouvriers spécialisés, à la prise de conscience grandissante de millions de femmes, aux 2 millions de (...) / , , , , , , - 1973/05

Les réfugiés climatiques

Politique étrangère (IFRI) - Tue, 03/10/2017 - 16:39

Dans sa chronique « Le Journal des idées » du 28 septembre dernier, Jacques Munier, chroniqueur chez France Culture, examine l’impact du climat sur les mouvements de population à travers le monde et sur les ressources naturelles, notamment en Arctique : il cite à ce titre le dossier « Arctique : une exploration stratégique » publié dans le numéro d’automne de Politique étrangère (n° 3/2017).

« … Plus au nord, l’Arctique est un enjeu géopolitique en raison de ses nombreuses ressources naturelles : gaz et pétrole, minerais précieux comme le diamant et l’or, ou plus répandus comme le fer et le zinc. Géopolitique par la convergence des états impliqués : États-Unis, Canada, Russie, Norvège et Danemark – à travers le Groenland. C’est pourquoi la revue Politique étrangère propose dans sa dernière livraison « une exploration stratégique » de l’Arctique. Là, par un curieux paradoxe, la fonte des glaces arrange tout le monde car elle facilite l’accès aux ressources : « 13% des réserves mondiales de pétrole et 30% des réserves mondiales en gaz naturel ». Et elle permet d’étayer les revendications territoriales sur « des relevés scientifiques plus détaillés ».

Lire la chronique de Jacques Munier en entier sur France Culture.

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Why is the International Community so Hostile to Kurdish Independence?

Foreign Policy Blogs - Tue, 03/10/2017 - 12:30

Iraqi Kurds numbering 5.2 million are voting today in a Kurdish independence referendum. The referendum includes the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) territories and contested provinces of Kirkuk, Shingal, Makhmur, and Khanaqin.

The ballot reads: “Do you want the Kurdistan Region and the Kurdistani areas outside the administration of the Region to become an independent state?” Either ‘Yes’ or ‘No.’ The balloting already started in diaspora on September 23, the results so far showing a close to 98 percent of ‘Yes.’

Kurdish independence vote takes place despite the international community’s pressures. The UN Security Council raised concern over the KRG’s unilaterally holding the referendum. Turkey, Iraq and Iran in a joint statement expressed their unequivocal opposition to the referendum, warning counter measures. Turkey threatened with sanctions and deployed military vehicles and personal to its border with northern Iraq.

If Self determination is a right, as inscribed in the UN Charter, why is the international community persistently hostile to Kurdish expression of will for self-determination?

As expressed, the international community is concerned that the Kurdish referendum might undermine the fight against the Islamic State. There is also an unuttered belief that a successful separation of Iraqi Kurdistan might inspire independence movements.

Of all enigmas surrounding the Kurdish independence, the most concerning perhaps is the international community’s fear that an independent Kurdish state may further destabilize the already volatile region.

This fear predominantly stems from a zero-sum understanding of the international community—an understanding which constantly feeds the principal approach of keeping the existing borders intact. This approach has served for further violence and has been maintained by the international community at the expense of grave human rights violations, oppression, and injustices against the local peoples.

As a matter of fact, the seemingly bad examples of separation are regions where host states work to turn the newly separated part into a failed state through conflict instigation and exporting violence. Host states destabilize these parts either directly or through their militias and allies.

Thus it is not the independence per se that generates conflicts or invites instability, but the hostile attitude and the belligerent policies of host states and/or neighboring countries that insist in their destabilizing moves.

South Sudan is illustrative at this point. Sudan with its Arab allies and militias did not cease infiltrating conflict and instability after the South Sudanese separation in 2011.  Malaysia invested in turning Singapore into a failed state. While the attempts succeeded in the former, they failed in the latter case.

Added to the international community’s fear is the anxiety of neighboring countries, particularly Turkey and Iran, because of their existing Kurdish minority populations. My research shows that due to a history of conflict with their Kurdish populations, they seem to have developed Kurdophobia—any Kurdish gain is considered an existential threat to their own security and national unity. As such, Kurdish empowerment elsewhere might instigate further demands from the Kurds in these respective countries.

In a nutshell, Turkey approaches Kurdish independence as a win-lose. Turkey’s official stance has been one of denial and disapproval—an obstinate stance that is saturated by its existential fear of any Kurdish gain. Turkey’s Kurdophobia for decades has been fueling the Turkish war against Kurds.

If Turkey can overcome its deeply entrenched Kurdophobia, and look for the prospects of building the foundations for stronger cooperation with the newly independent Kurdish State, it will be one of the, if not only, beneficiaries. As it were after the establishment of the Kurdish de facto autonomy in 1993 in Iraq, despite Turkey’s initial furry and threats against the Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq. Thus, rather than fomenting the seeds of tension and conflict with the Kurds, Turkey should look for the opportunities that arise from Kurdish independence.

In addition to economic, security and energy cooperation, an independent Kurdish state will efficiently, and resourcefully, mediate between regional actors and their Kurdish minority populations. The KRG has mediated for decades between the PKK, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, and Turkey. The Kurdish state will have a vested interest in helping them peacefully resolve some of the entrenching, seemingly intractable issues the Kurds have with their host states.

The international community has to accept Kurdish independence with all of its complexity and dynamism. A broader understanding of the issues surrounding Kurdish independence and a collaborative approach to help resolve some of the entrenched relations, through win-win solutions, can make the region a better place. Such constructive approach will contribute to regional stability and global security.

The international community and the Iraqi Central Government can choose peace and stability through collaboration and constructive engagement with the Kurds, or to maintain the status quo and force the Kurds to remain part of Iraq—an option that seems hard to endure and particularly difficult for Iraqi Kurds to accept.

And a third possibility, and perhaps mostly disregarded, is the Kurdish pursuit for statehood notwithstanding the concerns of the international community or the Iraqi State. This is a trajectory that neither the international community nor the Iraqi government would want, as this might instigate conflict between the Iraqi Central Government and the KRG and lead Iraq into a new phase of civil war in the post-Islamic State era.

Kurdish independence is a reality and will materialize. However, it should be pursued through constructive diplomacy and mutual respect both for the rightful claims of the Kurds and genuine concerns of the international community and the Iraqi Government.

Huseyin Tunc is a New York Mediator and Researcher working on the Turkey’s Kurdish conflict at the Institute for the Study of Human Rights, Columbia University. He has published, including in the peer-revived journals.

Contact Email: ht2360@columbia.edu and Phone: +1 917- 804 2003

 

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In the Quest for Successful Refugee Integration, Merkel Must Address Employment Discrimination Against Ethnic Minorities in Germany Head-On

Foreign Policy Blogs - Mon, 02/10/2017 - 12:30

On Sunday, Germany elected Angela Merkel as chancellor for the fourth time, matching the postwar record set by the late Helmut Kohl, who was chancellor of West Germany at the time I was born there.

Helmut Kohl has cemented his place in German and European history as the unifier of East and West Germany and one of the original champions of the European Union. Merkel, a Kohl protégée, has now similarly made her mark as one of the Western world’s longest serving leaders, as well as a key figure in navigating Europe’s economic crisis, Brexit, and a migration crisis that drew 1.2 million people to Germany.

Overcoming the integration challenges associated with the migration crisis in particular will present Chancellor Merkel with the opportunity to maximize her impact on history. Broadly speaking, access to employment for refugees and immigrants is an important factor for successful integration. Merkel, therefore, should focus on developing policies and laws that focus on the socio-economic integration of refugees by addressing societal issues, like employment discrimination, head-on. If she seizes this moment, Merkel will ensure that these newly arrived refugees and their children not only build new economic opportunities for their own families, but also contribute to the fabric of a more diverse and aging German population.

Muslims, a visible minority in Germany, have experienced higher labor integration than Muslim communities in other European countries like neighboring France. To ensure continued economic integration of newly arrived refugees, the German government adopted the Integration Act in August 2016, which provides for integration classes, vocational training, employment, and training opportunities.

However, the law does not address hurdles that refugees may encounter once they are integrated. Educational achievement has not guaranteed a smooth transfer to gainful employment for immigrants in Germany. Studies indicate that ethnic minorities, including Turks, experience discrimination in the German labor market. Having a foreign name can also reduce the chance of getting a job interview; this happened to my father around the time that he completed his PhD in the late 1980s.

My father left the former Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of Congo, not long after the infamous “Rumble in the Jungle” boxing match in 1974. Not knowing any German, he left Zaire for Germany in hopes of becoming an engineer, having received a scholarship through the European Economic Community. My father was required to take one year of intensive German language courses at the Carl Duisberg Society. Thereafter, he gained acceptance to RWTH Aachen University to study electrical engineering.

By the time my father submitted his doctoral thesis in 1987, he expected that graduating with a PhD from one of Europe’s top engineering universities would result in numerous employment opportunities. That did not happen. He mailed out 50 resumes to various German companies and did not receive a single offer. I suspect that racial discrimination, unfortunately, was a contributing factor in this situation. One fateful day in January 1988, however, he decided to apply for a job interview in neighboring Luxembourg with an American company—General Motors. He got the job, and the rest, as they say, is history.

To be clear, the racial climate in German society has improved since the late 1980s, and Germany enacted the General Equal Treatment Act in 2006 to address employment discrimination based on categories like race and ethnic origin. The law, however, has noted gaps. The Federal Anti-Discrimination Agency, the body tasked with the implementation of the act, does not have the power to carry out their own investigations in discrimination proceedings, for example. If Germany expects refugees to fully integrate into German society, the hope is that they will be rewarded with employment opportunities that will permit them to enjoy all facets of German life. Everyday discrimination against ethnic minorities is still commonplace in Germany, and the Merkel government should develop legal and policy tools that adequately address the barrier that employment discrimination could present to the successful integration of refugees.

The German people are a resilient and welcoming people, and Chancellor Merkel took a huge political risk by opening Germany’s borders to the world’s most vulnerable because of it. In 2015, she famously said that Germany would overcome the challenges associated with the migration crisis by saying “wir schaffen das,” which translates to “we can do it.” I really hope she does—just like Helmut Kohl did when Germany faced uncertainty in earlier times. The stability of German society could hang in the balance.

Laura Kupe is a German-born, Congolese-American attorney and a Political Partner at Truman National Security Project. She served as a Special Assistant in the Office of Policy, working on European affairs, at the Department of Homeland Security in the Obama Administration. Views expressed are her own.

The post In the Quest for Successful Refugee Integration, Merkel Must Address Employment Discrimination Against Ethnic Minorities in Germany Head-On appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

We Know All About You

Politique étrangère (IFRI) - Mon, 02/10/2017 - 09:30

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’automne de Politique étrangère (n°3/2017). Jérôme Marchand propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, We Know All About You. The Story of Surveillance in Britain and America (Oxford University Press, 2017, 304 pages).

En s’intéressant aux systèmes de surveillance de masse implantés en Grande-Bretagne et aux USA depuis la seconde moitié du XIXe siècle, et traitant des secteurs public et privé, ce texte dresse une longue liste d’abus étatiques, mais invite à ne pas sous-estimer les menaces que posent le renseignement d’entreprise et le data-mining. Plutôt qu’une réflexion politologique ou sociologique, Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones propose une promenade historique et chronologique.

L’ensemble s’articule en 12 chapitres, riches en portraits et anecdotes. Il expose d’abord les opérations de fichage et de black-listing montées par le patronat américain et britannique. Suivent des passages plus politiques, exposant les connivences latentes entre Roosevelt et Hoover, revenant sur les purges anticommunistes des années 1940-1950, puis sur les menées « anti-radicales » des années 1960-1980 (COINTELPRO). Au final, We Know All About You aborde la question des régressions démocratiques enclenchées depuis une quinzaine d’années avec l’assentiment de larges blocs de citoyens-consommateurs.

Le sentiment d’ensemble ? L’auteur apporte des éléments de comparaison utiles pour appréhender opportunités et entraves que connaissent les « sécurocrates » des deux pays. En revanche, l’analyse se montre lacunaire. Plutôt synthétique et structuré jusqu’aux mesures régulatrices des années ­1970-1990 (de la commission Church aux initiatives de Tony Blair), We All Know About You perd en consistance à partir du chapitre 9, qui traite de l’impact des attentats du 11 Septembre. Les chapitres qui suivent, qui examinent les pratiques intrusives des grandes entreprises, l’affaire Snowden et les réformes prises de l’ère Cameron-Obama, se réduisent par moments à de simples déroulés événementiels. Entre autres exemples, l’affaire News of the World, ponctuée par le sabordage de cette publication, méritait mieux que le traitement des pages 198-200 – en particulier si l’on tient compte des mises en perspective du journaliste d’investigation Nick Davies dans Hack Attack (Random House, 2014).

Plus profondément, l’ouvrage donne l’impression d’osciller entre deux thèmes : la mise sous surveillance légale ou illégale de contingents sans cesse plus fournis de citoyens britanniques et américains d’une part, d’autre part la formation de réactions de contrôle démocratique à forte résonance médiatique. Cette dualité éclaire les compromis réalisés par tel ou tel grand décideur. Mais elle ne donne pas forcément une idée juste des luttes d’influence qui s’exercent dans les coulisses du pouvoir, sous l’impulsion d’une haute fonction publique concernée de près par le Big Business sécuritaire et ses sinécures dorées.

Point connexe, l’ouvrage manifeste une nette tendance à placer sur un même plan les déviances du public et du privé, sans relever la responsabilité particulière de politiciens ou de fonctionnaires qui violent délibérément des normes démocratiques qu’ils sont chargés d’appliquer de manière convaincante. Ce qui pose de tout autres problèmes d’érosion normative, de dé-légitimation institutionnelle, et de rupture d’hégémonie que les intrusions des grandes entreprises. La bibliographie est bonne, mais avec des absences notables concernant les agissements criminels des cabinets d’investigation barbouzards (Lubbers) et les retombées systémiques des débords étatiques (Tarrow).

Jérôme Marchand

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Austerity and Secession

German Foreign Policy (DE/FR/EN) - Mon, 02/10/2017 - 00:00
(Own report) - The escalating Catalan secessionist conflict is upsetting Spain, a country hard hit by Berlin's austerity dictate. Spain - occasionally praised in German media as a showcase for an alleged successful austerity policy - is still confronted with enormous social and economic problems, in spite of a modest economic growth. Unemployment and poverty remain at high levels. Crisis policies over the past few years have also increased the economic gap between Spain and the euro zone's centers of prosperity. One still cannot speak of debt reduction - the official objective of Germany's austerity policy within the EU. The poor economic situation, the high debt burden level and the distribution of federal and regional debts are fueling Catalonia's secessionist conflict.

Pernille RIEKER, French Foreign Policy in a Changing World


Pernille RIEKER, French Foreign Policy in a Changing World: Practising Grandeur. Palgrave MacMillan, Londres, 2017



Il n'est jamais facile d'écrire avec justesse sur la politique étrangère d'un autre pays. A cet égard il convient de saluer la publication du livre de Pernille Rieker sur la politique étrangère de la France, qui se distingue dans cet exercice pour au moins trois raisons: l'auteur ne sur-théorise pas, et délaisse avec raison ce terrible appauvrissement académique qui consiste à tout réduire à la question agent-structure ; elle évite également les clichés habituels sur le gaullisme, l'ENA, etc., qui marquent encore trop souvent la littérature scientifique anglo-saxonne sur la France ; enfin elle propose un tour d'horizon certes non exhaustif mais pertinent, des grands dossiers de notre diplomatie (Afrique, Russie, Etats-Unis, OTAN, terrorisme...). Si un chapitre à part entière sur l'Europe eut été utile, on ne peut s'empêcher de penser que son absence (l'ouvrage a été achevé avant l'élection d'Emmanuel Macron) est significative. Idem sur l'Asie ou l'Amérique du Sud, rarement présentées à Paris comme des priorités. Tout au plus pourrait-on souhaiter une perspective plus assumée sur les approches de la Méditerrannée et du Proche-Orient (les cas libyen ou syrien sont néanmoins bel et bien discutés).
Mais l'essentiel est ailleurs. Pernille Rieker, dont les travaux au sein du Norvegian Institute of International Affairs font référence, pose des questions justes : Paris a-il  plus de leviers ou au contraire moins de "grandeur", dans un monde globalisé et régionalisé? Comment  la France peut-elle continuer à influencer le monde, plaider pour son exceptionnalisme, compte tenu de ressources contraintes qui l'obligent souvent à boxer au-dessus de sa catégorie ? Réponse: par la promotion des valeurs liées à son universalisme, ou perçues comme telles. Elle peut compter pour cela sur plusieurs atouts: un rôle global qui lui confère une légitimité historique, des institutions et une élite administrative fortes, une présence dans les principales institutions internationales, des instruments de projection qui participent aussi bien du hard power (l'outil militaire) que du soft power (diplomatie culturelle).
En opposant la puissance matérielle à la puissance symbolique, et en croyant davantage à la seconde qu'à la première, la chercheuse lance un vrai débat, qui rejoint celui sur lesintérêts opposés aux valeurs dans l'action extérieure. On pourrait lui objecter que c'est le discours français qui était en panne, plutôt que l'outil matériel (comme l'ont montré les récentes opérations militaires, au Mali, en Centrafrique, en Libye...). C'est le message symbolique qui n'était plus perçu, alors même que la puissance structurelle demeure (l'image de la France dans le Sud, notamment s'est considérablement brouillée dans les dernières années). On  peut aussi estimer que puissance symbolique et puissance matérielle se rejoignent dans la pratique concrète, car une diplomatie d'influence digne de ce nom a un coût, et croire qu'on peut la décréter "à moyens constants" est une dangereuse illusion. Mais l'important était de briser le tabou et de poser la question.
En liant le destin de la France comme puissance d'influence à sa capacité à réinventer l'universalisme, Pernille Rieker ouvre encore un chantier important, valable également d'ailleurs pour le Royaume-Uni, l'Allemagne, même les Etats-Unis, et le monde occidental en général.
Après plusieurs discours de politique étrangère du nouveau président, et les premières indications sur la tonalité de ce que pourrait être un "macronisme de politique étrangère", les questions posées dans l'ouvrage apparaissent plus pertinentes encore. Comme si la nouvelle équipe au pouvoir, elle aussi, se posait la question de la pérennité de l'influence française, avec déjà quelques éléments de réponse, proches des hypothèses de Pernille Rieker. La réinvention du message universaliste est un souci visible à Paris, qui semble passer par la promotion du multilatéralisme ("multilateralism is the new universalism", pour reprendre une structure de phrase à la mode). La reconquête de l'influence telle que proposée se fait en trois temps: 1- dégager des marges de manœuvre budgétaires et montrer une crédibilité sérieuse dans la remise en ordre de la gestion intérieure ; 2- relancer le projet européen, meilleure garantie de notre rôle dans le monde ; 3- enfin, à partir de ce socle, proposer ensuite un agenda international. On retrouve bien la dialectique entre puissance symbolique et puissance matérielle, discutée dans le livre. Mais on retrouve aussi les mises en garde sous-jacentes qu'implique ce travail: le système international, comme régional, est bien là, avec ses acteurs et ses contraintes. La France ne pourra, seule, réinventer le multilatéralisme ni imposer le dialogue, si elle n'est pas suivie par d'autres sur ce terrain. Un Donald Trump à la Maison Blanche, une Angela Merkel maintenue mais affaiblie, une Grande-Bretagne qui doute, une Europe orientale qui se crispe, ne seront pas pour aider.
La France "compte toujours", pour répondre à une question posée jadis par un ouvrage antérieur. Et Pernille Rieker le prouve, en s'y intéressant au point de lui consacrer un livre. Mais la "pratique de la grandeur" devra suivre une voie parsemée d'embûches.

En finir avec le franc CFA ?

Le Monde Diplomatique - Thu, 28/09/2017 - 14:12
Le mouvement de protestation contre le franc CFA s'étend en Afrique francophone. Des manifestations réunissant plusieurs centaines de manifestants mais aussi des conférences publiques, dans les capitales africaines et à Paris, réclament la fin de cette monnaie issue de la colonisation. Il est temps (...) / , , , , , , , , - La valise diplomatique

Unleashing Nigeria’s Energy Potential?

Foreign Policy Blogs - Thu, 28/09/2017 - 12:30

(Photo: Nigeria Electricity Hub)

After five quarters, Nigeria has edged out of a recession as GDP expanded by 0.55 percent in the second quarter, according to the National Bureau of Statistics. The growth is fragile, which the government concedes, and there are not many rosy predictions from experts and pundits of a trend line continuing upward.

The Economic Recovery and Growth Plan (ERGP), announced in April, could lend a potential conduit, though. “Nigeria will be on its way to sustainable growth in the medium-term if it successfully implements the ERGP,” said Gloria Joseph-Raji, Senior World Bank economist. Potential growth may be based on increased oil production, agriculture, infrastructure and additional foreign-currency reserves.

Nigeria, the continent’s most populous country with nearly 200 million citizens, is awash in energy riches: it is the continent’s largest oil producer churning out about 200,000 barrels of crude oil per day and has the second largest oil reserves in Africa of about 37 billion barrels, trailing Libya which tallies an estimated 48 billion barrels. The nation holds the largest gas reserves in Africa – ninth globally – with 180 trillion cubic feet (tcf) with Algeria second totaling 160 tcf. With such immense supply, and comparatively lower consumption levels, the nation is the fourth largest exporter of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) globally. The reserves present plenty of room for natural gas expansion, but rapid growth has been restricted by a lack of new infrastructure, violence and to viably capture flared gas.

Tapping the resources has left the nation saddled by the drop in oil prices and previously decreasing oil production, also partly due to militants in the oil rich southern Niger Delta forcing companies to scale back operations. The current price for a barrel of Brent crude oil sits around $55/barrel, less than half the price of $115/barrel in June 2014 (in the latest round of oil instability, the price bottomed in early 2016 to under $30/barrel). This is a tough burden to guard against as the oil and gas industry constitutes around 70 percent of Nigeria’s government revenue and over 90 percent of exports.

Nigeria’s economy has been diversifying, though, and the oil and gas industry’s contribution to its Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which was rebased in April, is actually the lowest in OPEC. The National Bureau of Statistics found the industry contributed about 10.45 percent to real GDP in the third quarter. Compared to Angola, Africa’s second largest oil producer, oil production and its supporting activities contribute about 45 percent of the nation’s GDP and in Saudi Arabia, the largest producer in all OPEC, 48 percent of GDP is accounted for by the industry. In 2016, Nigeria’s GDP grew to 405 billion USD, the largest in Africa, but with a GDP per capita of 2,178 USD in 2016, trailing Sudan’s 2,415 USD, according to the World Bank.

Millions of Nigerians Remain in the Dark

With such abundant natural gas, and geography to exploit solar, among other sources, electricity access has remained low, yet increasing the past years. Estimates still range from 75 million to nearly 100 million people not having access to electricity, and of that a disproportionate amount of those with access are located in urban areas. Where electricity is present, there is well accepted knowledge that poor service, losses and the widespread lack of reliability and consistent access is unacceptable. There is large scale use of diesel generators, which can have negative health and environmental effects, as well as increase the cost of business and local goods, to make up for the shortfalls. Furthermore, the International Energy Agency estimates that 115 million people rely on traditional biomass as their main sources of energy – mostly wood, charcoal and waste – to meet basic needs, such as cooking and heating.

The Federal Ministry of Power, Works and Housing publishes updated power data on its website frequently. As of September 19, the data displayed generation peaked at 4,518 megawatts (MW), generation capability was 6,989 MW, but distribution capacity was 4,600 MW leaving potential new power to be stranded, and peak demand forecast was 17,720 MW. In a speech September 21, Federal Minister of the aforementioned ministry, Babatunde Raji Fashola, stated generation peaked at 7,001MW. Regardless of the discrepancy in peak generation information, there is an immense gap from the peak supply and peak demand.

In order for future electricity to reach end-users, and reliably, vast investment is needed by generation companies (gencos) and distribution companies (discos) for new plants, transformers, repairs, improvements, expansion and protection against theft. Nigeria began to privatize its power industry in 2013 under President Goodluck Jonathan’s administration under the auspices of the Energy Sector Reform Act of 2005, and 60 percent share of the twelve discos are privatized, so it is vital to harness that source of capital. According to Mr. Fashola, government’s role, both federal and local, now is to implement the laws, voice policies and take actions that help the private sector play its part effectively.

Lack of electricity and energy overall can lead to unstable situations, often accompanied by higher unemployment in growing young populations. Situations similar to these have been cited as potential Boko Haram recruiting grounds. That in itself can be seen as a need to stimulate access, but, of course, is not an answer in its own to prevent the scourge of terrorism.

Infrastructure Insufficient but Investment and Possibilities Continue

The acting Director General of the Infrastructure Concession Regulatory Commission (ICRC), Mr. Chidi Izuwa, has pegged the total amount of funds required to provide quality infrastructure in Nigeria over the next six years at about 100 billion USD. Of that sum, 60 billion USD would be required for the oil and gas sector and about 20 billion USD to bring the power sector up to speed.

One such project to help overcome the electricity shortage and power sector funding is the huge 3,050 MW Mambilla hydropower project, including transmission, with a price tag of 5.8 billion USD. The project has been in discussion since the 1970s with various obstacles. A new attempt to resuscitate the project has come about with an agreement with a Chinese consortium, led by the Chinese Export-Import Bank, and approved by the Federal Executive Council, presided over by President Muhammadu Buhari. An anticipated completion date was announced for 2024. Based on the multiple efforts and the last attempt being cancelled in 2013, the question is will this deal for the ambitious project actually come to fruition and shovels in the ground. The project is also expected to help Nigeria meet its Paris climate agreement commitment.

In addition, further investment is evident with Shoreline, a Nigerian company, recently completing a 300 million USD agreement with a Shell subsidiary to develop gas infrastructure around Lagos. Shoreline wants to bring its natural gas to the growing business hub and residential communities.

Solar energy is in its infancy in Nigeria. There have been multiple utility scale solar projects moving beyond concept stage and signing power purchase agreement (PPAs), but none have yet to reach commercial operations. Starting in 2015, ten PPAs were signed by the government-owned Nigeria Bulk Electricity Trading (NBET). In sum of potential projects, more than 1,000 MW could be operational. There have been additional pledges by companies that could reach more than 4,000 MW. It is only a matter of time before solar does come online with the administration’s focus of solar energy and necessary financial structuring being negotiated.

Policy is Catching Up

The Nigeria Electricity Regulatory Commission (NERC) issued a feed-in tariff in 2015, making the market more attractive for investors. One of the aims was to stimulate more than 2,000 MW of renewable generation by 2020. As another part of the scheme, discos need to source at least 50 percent of their procurement from renewable energy. The remaining 50 percent needs to be sourced from the NBET – which needs improved financial capability itself to support the electricity market.

NERC has also issued mini-grid regulations this past August to allow people to provide their own power from 1 kilowatt-1 MW. Mini-grids can play an important role reaching those in rural communities without access to electricity. In addition, an important step taken by President Buhari in March was the formation of the Board and management of the Rural Electrification Agency to facilitate access and advocate for solar options. There are a multitude of multi-national organizations, such as the World Bank, that have mini-grid/off-grid programs in other nations with electricity shortages that could act as a multiplier with investment.

The Power Sector Recovery Program involves producing more power, reducing system losses, increasing financial viability, completion of transmission projects, increasing access to electricity and implementation of more meters.

Future Remains Bright with Right Commitment

Vast opportunity continues to lay ahead for Nigeria with its increasingly educated population, the largest internet penetration in Africa, a developing tech sector, financial structure and various entrepreneurial companies sprouting up. Appropriate further policy can lead the nation on a sustainable course of development and address many of the current pressing needs, despite political wrangling and disagreements. In addition to energy, important areas to keep a focus on will be agriculture, transport, infrastructure, education, transparency, stymying corruption and evolving technology. A solid grasp of these plus Nigerians ingenuity and passion will be a path to success with appropriate support from office holders.

The post Unleashing Nigeria’s Energy Potential? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

La Chine au risque de la dépendance alimentaire

Politique étrangère (IFRI) - Thu, 28/09/2017 - 10:22

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’automne de Politique étrangère (n°3/2017). Marie-Hélène Schwoob propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Jean-Marc Chaumet et Thierry Pouch, La Chine au risque de la dépendance alimentaire (Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2017, 216 pages).

Jean-Marc Chaumet et Thierry Pouch brossent un tableau des problématiques de sécurité alimentaire auxquelles la Chine est aujourd’hui confrontée, et exposent en détail les causes de cette insécurité (évolution de la demande alimentaire chinoise, manque de ressources en terres et en eau, problématiques liées au foncier…), ainsi que les politiques mises en place par le gouvernement pour tenter d’apporter des réponses à ce qui reste encore aujourd’hui une priorité stratégique pour le pays : assurer un taux d’autosuffisance alimentaire minimal pour sa population.

Les deux premiers chapitres, qui plongent dans l’histoire de la Chine depuis la période des Royaumes combattants jusqu’au Grand Bond en avant, retracent la naissance et le développement de cette vision particulière que porte la Chine sur la sécurité alimentaire de son territoire. De l’utilisation de l’arme alimentaire par les royaumes jusqu’aux famines qui ont très durement frappé le pays – pour la famine du Grand Bond en avant (1958-1961), les pertes sont estimées entre 10 et 50 millions de morts –, l’histoire éclaire la volonté des dirigeants chinois d’aujourd’hui à prendre au sérieux cette question de la sécurité alimentaire, et à mettre tout en œuvre pour éviter d’engager le pays sur un modèle de dépendance aux importations de produits agricoles et alimentaires, à l’instar du Royaume-Uni ou du Japon.

Le livre s’attache également à démonter certaines idées reçues, s’affranchissant par exemple de la séparation généralement établie entre période maoïste et période dengiste, ou encore étudiant avec attention les chiffres réels du land grabbing, qui suscitent les craintes de « post-impérialisme » chinois en Afrique. Les auteurs font également des mentions très intéressantes du point de vue chinois sur les questions de sécurité alimentaire. Ils citent les travaux de nombreux universitaires ou relatent les débats sur la question des importations, qui malgré des réticences certaines, se sont récemment imposées comme inévitables pour l’approvisionnement de la population chinoise et la protection des ressources du territoire, déjà fortement dégradées par un productivisme forcené.

Le livre lie de manière passionnante ces questions agricoles internes à l’histoire de la pensée économique et à l’évolution actuelle de la géopolitique mondiale de l’alimentation. La thèse selon laquelle la Chine, qui aspire à être une puissance hégémonique, serait contrainte dans son accession à ce statut (voire menacée de déclin) par sa dépendance croissante aux importations alimentaires, peut faire débat dans un contexte où sa balance commerciale reste très fortement excédentaire, et où de nombreux autres facteurs de déclin économique entrent en compte. Il est cependant certain que, comme le soulignent les auteurs, cette dépendance alimentaire constitue une puissante force de rappel pour le pays, mais aussi à l’extérieur de ses frontières, pour la Chine comme pour d’autres pays. La Chine, du fait des quantités massives de produits agricoles qu’elle importe désormais, façonne et défait l’économie de territoires entiers hors de ses frontières. En éclairant l’impact majeur des politiques chinoises sur les tendances haussières et baissières des marchés internationaux agricoles, cet ouvrage pose une pierre fondamentale pour la compréhension de la géopolitique de la sécurité alimentaire mondiale.

Marie-Hélène Schwoob

S’abonner à Politique étrangère

 

Preventing the Next Attack

Foreign Affairs - Wed, 27/09/2017 - 16:43
The terrorist threat has changed since 9/11 and the United States must develop a strategy for this new phase in the war on terrorism.

Energy Security Is a Matter of National Security Say Retired Military Leaders

Foreign Policy Blogs - Wed, 27/09/2017 - 15:41

Speaking at a panel this week in New York City, retired Marine Corps Brigadier General Stephen Cheney emphasized the link between energy security and U.S. national security.

“Our nation’s concept of energy security was defined in the American mind by the two oil crises of the ’70s…where our country found its economy literally held hostage by hostile foreign powers over decisions that our leaders made in international affairs,” he said. “To ensure that nothing like that ever happens again—that should be our goal in building energy security.”

General Cheney is the CEO of the American Security Project (ASP), which presented the panel in partnership with the Foreign Policy Association. He spoke alongside two of his colleagues at ASP, Navy Vice Admiral Lee Gunn and Air Force Lieutenant General Norman Seip, both retired. The panel was an Official Affiliate Event of 2017 Climate Week NYC.

While the Department of Defense (DoD) remains the single largest consumer of fossil fuel in the world, the military faces an array of strategic and tactical concerns that have propelled it to become a leader in energy innovation. Threats include, for instance, fuel price volatility, the vulnerability of fuel convoys to attack, and the susceptibility to disruption of the commercial power supplies that installations rely on.

DoD’s energy usage is divided between installation energy (about 25%) and operational energy (about 75%). The Army is the largest installation energy user, while the Air Force is the largest operational energy user. DoD is required by law to obtain 25% of its electricity from renewable sources by 2025, and it has committed to install one gigawatt each of renewable generating capacity from the Army, Navy and Air Force Installations by 2025.

Lieutenant General Seip highlighted programs in each of the services that address energy security on the operational level, including the Navy’s Great Green Fleet; the Marines’ Ground Renewable Expeditionary Energy Network System (GREENS) and Solar Portable Alternative Communications Energy System (SPACES); the Army’s flagship Net Zero Initiative; and the Air Force Energy Flight Plan.

“The good news is that alternative energy type of biofuels are getting to be cost-competitive,” he stressed. “It’s got to be drop-in, it’s got to be scalable, it’s got to have the same performance…and it has to be cost-competitive.”

DoD recognizes climate change itself as a threat to national security. Vice Admiral Gunn described climate change as a strategic challenge, using three terms—“threat multiplier,” “catalyst for conflict,” and “accelerant of instability”—that are employed by ASP and by CNA, where Gunn serves as president of the Institute for Public Research.

On the tactical side, he noted that “more than thirty bases around the country, but also around the world, are subject to the threats of changing climate,” including sea level rise and extreme weather conditions.

The panelists stressed the focus on long-term planning in the military, in contrast to political preoccupation with election cycles. “We must see energy security as a long-term process, not as a moment that’s frozen in time,” said Brigadier General Cheney. “Some policies get billed on security today while harming our future security.”

Vice Admiral Gunn noted progress and enthusiasm on the the local and state level in the absence of Trump administration leadership. But he warned that “China, the EU and even Saudi Arabia have national energy strategies. The United States does not and never has.” On research, development and deployment of renewables, he continued, “We’re number three and falling back every day in terms of national dedication to this…There’s no leadership on this…It’s going to be very damaging to our country.”

The post Energy Security Is a Matter of National Security Say Retired Military Leaders appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Fresh Wind Down the Silk Road (I)

German Foreign Policy (DE/FR/EN) - Wed, 27/09/2017 - 00:00
(Own report) - To secure its influence in Central Asia in rivalry to Russia and China, Berlin is taking new initiatives toward Uzbekistan, the most populous country in the region. Among the five post-Soviet Central Asian countries, Uzbekistan has been Germany's key partner for the past 25 years, even hosting a Bundeswehr base over an extended period of time. Now the German government seeks to reinforce it position in Uzbekistan by expanding economic relations. Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, in office since one year, is initiating a neo-liberal policy in his country. At the same time, Russia's rise in influence in the economic and military sectors, alongside China's greatly enhanced economic advances has put Germany under pressure. If Germany does not want to lose ground in Central Asia, it must act quickly.

Nihilisme et radicalisation

Le Monde Diplomatique - Tue, 26/09/2017 - 18:53
Dans la profusion des publications — essais parfois polémiques, enquêtes journalistiques, vulgarisation de la recherche historique, sociologique ou géopolitique — consacrées au phénomène que, de façon plus ou moins rigoureuse, on désigne sous l'expression « terrorisme djihadiste », peu aident à (...) / , , , , , , - 2017/10

Prisonniers de la mobilité

Le Monde Diplomatique - Tue, 26/09/2017 - 16:53
L'idéologie dominante s'appuie sur des notions si communément admises qu'elles finissent par se dispenser de toute mise en perspective. Tel est le cas de la « mobilité ». / France, Capitalisme, Idéologie, Migrations, Société, Transports, Travail, Ville, Néolibéralisme - (...) / , , , , , , , , - 2015/01

Au Kenya, les habitants de la côte exclus du banquet démocratique

Le Monde Diplomatique - Mon, 25/09/2017 - 16:45
Prisée des touristes pour ses plages et ses safaris, la côte kényane subit depuis plusieurs mois une vague d'attentats meurtriers. Des crimes imputables au terrorisme islamiste, venu de la Somalie voisine ? Cette explication, trop aisée, masque les fractures politiques et sociales qui déchirent le (...) / , , , , , , , , , , , , , - 2014/10

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