Diplomacy & Crisis News

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’hiver de Politique étrangère (n° 4/2017). Stéphane Valter propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Florence Gaub, Guardians of the Arab State: When Militaries Intervene in Politics, from Iraq to Mauritania (Hurst, 2017, 272 pages).

Voici un ouvrage fort intéressant, même si ce n’est pas le premier travail sur la question, et que plusieurs points n’y sont guère traités, alors que les répétitions sont nombreuses. Son plan est discutable : des questions générales, concernant toutes les armées arabes, sont abordées, puis reprises plus loin au gré des sections traitant des cas d’espèce (les armées par pays), ce qui génère des redites, seraient-elles utiles.

Si le livre propose une bonne synthèse sur son sujet, on peut néanmoins regretter que l’auteur n’ait apparemment pas utilisé de sources en langue arabe car, même si elles sont loin d’être toujours utiles, elles permettent souvent de saisir les dynamiques internes, mieux que les études en langue étrangère (l’anglais, en l’occurrence), qui s’inspirent souvent les unes des autres, quelquefois sans grande originalité. Les références du livre sont cependant nombreuses, ce qui aidera ceux qui voudraient approfondir telle ou telle question.

Un atout de l’ouvrage est de présenter une histoire synthétique de plusieurs armées arabes, depuis les indépendances, et même avant. S’il n’y a là rien d’original, il faut savoir gré à l’auteur de replacer le présent dans une perspective plus large. Quant aux derniers développements, depuis 2010-2011, qui mériteraient probablement un surcroît d’investigation, ils ne semblent pas toujours présentés comme étant le fruit de recherches approfondies de terrain, par ailleurs difficiles voire dangereuses. Si bien qu’on se demande où est l’apport vraiment personnel de l’auteur, si ce n’est une remarquable capacité à synthétiser.

Un des focus du livre – les coups d’État – suscite un intérêt particulier étant donné leur nombre dans l’histoire arabe contemporaine. L’auteur en explique parfaitement la mécanique, à grand renfort d’explications théoriques générales, parfois plus ou moins évidentes. On peut ainsi se demander si cet angle d’analyse, utile pour sa technicité, propose un éclairage suffisamment pénétrant pour aider à saisir toutes les dynamiques mouvementées entre forces armées et nations. Peut-être eût-il fallu réfléchir plus sur les aspects sectaires et ethniques, sur les divergences politiques qui traversent les corps des officiers, sur le sentiment d’appartenance nationale, sur les rapports socio-économiques de manière générale, sur les influences religieuses, etc., autant de points abordés mais sans doute sans la profondeur nécessaire.

Outre les questions générales et transversales, le livre traite de plusieurs cas, dont certains semblent mieux maîtrisés (ou en tout cas développés) que d’autres. Pour la Syrie, le lecteur reste sur sa faim, par manque d’enquêtes de terrain – mais qui pourrait le reprocher ? –, et les chiffres avancés doivent plus être vus plus comme indicatifs qu’exacts. Pour le cas égyptien, l’analyse sur l’immixtion de l’armée dans les affaires économiques offre une grille de lecture lumineuse, mais certaines questions restent à approfondir (perception des menaces et priorités stratégiques). Les pages sur l’Irak sont remarquables, mais il y a peu de choses sur les milices. Quasiment tous les pays sont abordés, mais avec un succès inégal. Et il y a peu de développements sur le recours aux sociétés privées de sécurité et autres mercenaires qui opèrent dans le Golfe, au détriment des armées nationales, qui n’existent, en fait, pas vraiment.

Stéphane Valter

S’abonner à Politique étrangère

Mandatory military conscription is the French equivalent of Donald Trump’s wall — a pet project that’s become a political albatross.

Italy’s most dangerous populists are the immigrant-hating Catholic fundamentalists of Forza Nuova.

Poor countries have borne the brunt of the refugee crisis. Tanzania’s refusal to bear the cost of a new U.N. program is a warning to the West.

The Eastern Mediterranean energy patch is hot — unfortunately, in more ways than one.

Despite White House promises and U.S. legal protections for religious minorities, Washington rejects appeal for asylum from more than 100 Iranian Christians.

The imagery agency wants its own “CIA World Factbook.”

There’s a very familiar method to the administration’s apparent regional madness.

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’hiver de Politique étrangère (n° 4/2017). Marc Hecker, rédacteur en chef de Politique étrangère et chercheur au Centre des études de sécurité de l’Ifri, propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Fethi Benslama et Farhad Khosrokhavar, Le Jihadisme des femmes. Pourquoi ont-elles choisi Daech ? (Seuil, 2017, 112 pages).

Fethi Benslama et Farhad Khosrokhavar sont deux chercheurs connus pour leurs travaux sur la radicalisation. Le premier est professeur de psychopathologie à l’université Paris-Diderot, le second directeur d’études à l’École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS). Dans ce court ouvrage, ils cherchent à croiser la vision du psychanalyste et du sociologue pour tenter de « détecter des passerelles entre faits psychiques et faits sociaux ». Leur objectif est de mieux comprendre le phénomène du djihadisme féminin. Pour ce faire, ils ont collecté des données – soit directement (entretiens, consultations cliniques), soit indirectement (ouvrages, articles de presse) –, sur une soixantaine de cas.

Sur 5 000 Européens ayant rejoint Daech en Syrie et en Irak, environ 10 % sont des femmes. La proportion est plus élevée chez les Français : fin 2015, 220 Françaises avaient rejoint l’organisation terroriste, soit approximativement 35 % des ressortissants français alors présents dans les rangs de l’État islamique (EI). Un tiers de ces femmes se seraient converties à l’islam. La plupart proviennent des classes moyennes. Seule une minorité est originaire des banlieues.

Les deux chercheurs s’évertuent à étudier le rapport des femmes djiha­distes à la mort, au religieux, à la sexualité, ou encore à la famille. Ils établissent des catégories qui montrent que tous les profils ne se ressemblent pas : certaines poursuivent un idéal romantique, d’autres fuient un traumatisme (violences familiales, agressions sexuelles), une minorité veut prendre les armes ou perpétrer des attentats, etc. Ces femmes savent pertinemment qu’en rejoignant Daech elles ne seront pas considérées comme égales aux hommes : elles dénoncent le concept d’égalité entre les sexes, et perçoivent l’émancipation des femmes dans les pays occidentaux comme une hypocrisie. Elles mettent au contraire en avant la notion de complémentarité hommes/femmes.

Ainsi, nombre de Françaises ayant rejoint Daech affirment fièrement leur statut d’épouses de combattants et de mères de « lionceaux du califat ». Si la polygamie est érigée en règle dans les territoires contrôlés par Daech, les femmes tendent aussi à se marier plusieurs fois en raison du fort taux de décès chez les hommes. Benslama et Khosrokhavar écrivent : « Le père est potentiellement un martyr à venir produisant de futurs orphelins. La cité du jihad est une fabrique de pères morts et de mères polyandriques. »

En définitive, il n’y a pas de réponse simple à la problématique de la radicalisation des femmes. Les deux chercheurs s’opposent à ceux qui offrent des explications réductrices. Ils dénoncent par exemple l’approche sectaire, selon laquelle les femmes se feraient « laver le cerveau » par des recruteurs. À cet égard, ils affirment que la théorie de l’embrigadement relève d’une « posture victimaire souvent adoptée pour nier les motivations inconscientes qui amènent quelqu’un à faire des choix pour lesquels il est responsable ». Ils évoquent également le débat entre Gilles Kepel et Olivier Roy, soulignant qu’« il y va dans le djiha­disme autant de la radicalisation de l’islam que de l’islamisation de la radicalité ». À défaut d’offrir des solutions, Benslama et Khosrokhavar démontrent au moins la complexité du problème. Une complexité telle qu’elle continue de laisser perplexe…

Marc Hecker

S’abonner à Politique étrangère

The Trump administration looked small and inconsequential on the international stage.

An annual security gathering in Munich has become the new hot spot for top intelligence officials meeting in the shadows of a public event.

Mahmoud Abbas challenges American leadership of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process at the United Nations.

Allow me to make two observations before I turn to my remarks. The Mission statement of the Forum’s website asks that we be honest and direct.  And so, although I do not wish to appear overly harsh in my observations, nevertheless I am obliged to be frank and open.  Otherwise, why have a conference such as this at all?  Also, I want to emphasize that when I speak about the “West”, or use the term “we”, I do not at all include the people in this room who are not from Ukraine, and who know and understand far more than the general citizenry of the countries that they represent.  They and their institutions have labored tremendously on the very issues that we are so concerned about, and deserve much credit.

“Why Putin Likes the West” may seem to be an anomalous title for my remarks.  After all, what we incessantly hear is that Putin is blaming the West for everything.  We hear about Russia’s “lost pride,” that it is “humiliated,” “embittered,” “insulted,” “lost,” “confused.”  One of the advisors to Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders in the last presidential campaign said, “Putin has been trying hard to find love, appreciation and recognition.”

The demonstrable facts are opposite.  Fiona Hill is formerly from the Brookings Institution, a well-recognized think tank in Washington, and is now with the National Security Council in the White House. She is recognized in many circles as a Russia and Putin expert. A few years ago, she wrote a book about Putin where she said that Putin is “unable to understand the mindset of Americans and Europeans and their political dynamics.”

For someone who doesn’t understand us, however, Putin has done quite well. Let’s just take one example. We have his money in our bank.  We hold the key. Yet he brazenly expands his aggression.  Russia–one country–taunts, menaces, intimidates, and threatens with nuclear war the collective of Western democracy.  And Putin doesn’t in the least feel that his money is at risk. Why not? Where does he get his self-assurance from?  We gave it to him.

Putin is not brilliant. But he knows and understand very well the hundred-year history of relations with the West. He has identified patterns of Western behavior, thinking and emotions that are clear, predictable, and reliable.  His conclusions, based on those patterns, are also themselves predictable.  He sees repeated strategic blunders by the West, squandered opportunities, and an inability and absence of political will to think and act strategically, in an affirmative, and not a reactive, manner. But how can this possibly be the case if, as we tell ourselves, it was the West that “won the Cold War”? We’ll return to that question later.

What is the history that Putin sees? In 1918, Ukraine declared independence, was recognized by Lenin and was promptly invaded. Ukraine turned to the West, requesting aid in the form of surplus WWI equipment and medication. Ukraine was denied. Ukraine warned that in a generation the West would be confronted directly by Russia. Ukraine was ignored. Moscow of course conquered and occupied Ukraine, and its control of Ukraine was pivotal to the formation and viability of the Soviet Union.

In 1933, the United States extended diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Union at the same time that Moscow was using starvation to break the back of Ukrainian resistance, thereby ensuring the regime’s survival. In the eyes of the world, recognition represented America’s legitimization, acceptance and approval of Stalin’s murderous regime. Furthermore, this was legitimization, acceptance and approval by America, the devil of the capitalist world, the intended victim of the very regime that had declared itself the leader in the world campaign to destroy capitalist America.  How should Putin assess our strategic sense?

In World War II, the West liberated Europe, but only part of it. We facilitated one tyrant, Hitler’s partner, replacing the other.  The West in effect measured the dimensions of the Iron Curtain.  America’s Lend/Lease program delivered to the Kremlin far more equipment and material, both in type and quantity, than necessary for military needs. Unfortunately, Moscow used the “Made in America” label to crush the underground resistance movements in Ukraine and in the Baltics, and also the uprisings in the GULag in the early 1950’s.

From the late 1940’s and for 40 years, the West–essentially the United States–pursued a policy of containment, seeking to contain Soviet expansionism. Containment, however, did not contain.  Compare the relative position of the United States and the Soviet Union after WWII, and then 40 years later.  For all the treasure spent and precious lives lost on “containment”, there was a dramatic shift, with the Soviet Union massively increasing its global influence and military capacity as America retreated.

The problem with containment was that it was exclusively reactive, with no sense of the West undertaking any affirmative measures to bring about the dissolution of the USSR.  We surrendered situational control to the Kremlin. We concluded that the only way to deal with a pyromaniac was to build a very expensive, very large and very mobile fire department that would run around the world, putting out fires that were set by the Kremlin, at its choice of time, place and intensity.  Containment was based on hope.  But if hope is not a policy or strategy for the stock market, how can it be the basis for national security?  Not surprisingly, the prominent American journalist at the time, Walter Lippmann, described containment not as a strategy, but as a “strategic monstrosity.”

But containment’s most fundamental flaw was that it didn’t recognize, in the least, the multi-national structure of the Soviet Union, that it was a colonial empire.  Containment perpetuated the “Russia”/”Soviet Union” equivalence that distorted Western thinking from the very first days of the Soviet Union. This was a massive and continuing blunder, one that helped Moscow’s repression of the submerged nations of the Soviet Union.  Today, a full generation after the fall of the USSR precisely because it was not simply “Russia,” US government officials at the very highest levels often repeat that same “Russia”/”Soviet Union” equivalence.

The Reagan Administration broke the mold, and went beyond the purely reactive restrictions of containment.  He undertook affirmative measures to cause the dissolution of the USSR.  After the election of George Bush, Sr., however, the US reversed.  Astonishingly, we worked to preserve the USSR intact. Jack Matlock, the US ambassador to the Soviet Union at the time, said directly: “The common assumption that the West forced the collapse of the Soviet Union and thus won the Cold War is wrong. The breakup of the USSR into 15 separate countries was not something the United States caused or wanted.”  As we know, Ukraine ignored Washington, declared independence, and the rest is history. So, if “winning the Cold War” meant the collapse of the Soviet Union, did that occur because of, or in spite of, America’s containment policy?

What happened after the fall of the USSR? We never implemented or even conceived of establishing a “Marshall Plan” to secure the independence and security of the former captive nations as a bulwark against Russia. We did not do what we did with the Marshall Plan in Europe in WWII, even though the necessity for doing so after the fall of the Soviet Union was ten times greater.  Unlike the devastated economy and military capacity of Germany, the Soviet economy, though in poor shape, was intact. And its military capability was very much intact as well. But most critically, while Germany came to terms with its past, and admitted, apologized for its crimes, Moscow accelerated in the opposite direction.  It celebrates its crimes.

Why were we so passive? Because, again, we simply “hoped” that things would change.  How, why? What, exactly, did we think the millions in the KGB, in the nomenklatura, would do, where would they go?  They would somehow become democrats overnight?  Why? How? What about the secret people making secret poisons in secret laboratories in secret cities?  How could we possible consider that that vast repressive system, with such a bloody history, would simply suddenly change?  Again, we simply “hoped” that it would. This total lack of responsibility by Western democracies for their very own security, the passivity and refusal to face reality and anticipate the future, is startling.  Unfortunately, it was not the first time.

History is another name for experience, and experience is another name for a book of lessons.  What lessons does Putin draw from all this?  His first conclusion is that the West itself has learned no lasting lessons.  We have not learned from our experience, and therefore have no predictive capacity.  Our experience was never sufficiently painful to leave a lasting imprint on our societal memory or political institutions.  Thus, for example, President Obama came into office wholly innocent about Moscow, but at the end he was hopefully at least somewhat more aware. But the revolving door in politics prevented the solidification of lessons to be learned. What conclusions do we expect Putin to reach?

Furthermore, Putin knows that we don’t have any understanding that Russia is a predator state.  We have no conception of the Soviet system, and cannot grasp the significance of Putin’s background, his resurrection of Stalin, and its implications for the West.  We don’t bat an eyelash over the fact that there is a “KGB Bar” in New York City, or that Jay Kearney, President Obama’s press secretary, has Soviet propaganda posters in his home, and splashed on the pages of a major Washington magazine with no objection by anyone.

In 1999, Putin celebrated Stalin’s birthday. In that year, we also saw the Moscow’s false flag operations in the Moscow apartment bombings, serving as a pretext for Moscow war against Chechnya.   His so-called Millennium Speech at the end of that year was an unmistakable blueprint for his future.  Only months later, in 2000, Condoleezza Rice was asked at a conference in the US what was the key issue that would indicate to her what kind of person Putin was, if he would be the kind of person that the US “could work with”. She replied that it would depend on what kind of tax reforms he would undertake.

Later that year, we saw no significance in Putin’s celebration of Felix Dzerzhinsky’s birthday, the notorious founder of the Cheka, precursor to the NKVD and KGB.  And that was on 9/11, the day of the destruction of the World Trade Center towers.  In February 2002, at the Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, Utah, Putin, in his typically probing manner, tested a “light” version of Soviet symbolism. No reaction by the West. In the following year, in 2003, Michael McFaul, President Obama’s future ambassador to Russia, published a book predicting that Russia was no longer a threat to the West. By April 2005, when Putin lamented that the fall of the Soviet Union as a “tragedy”, he had already for six years been celebrating its bloody past.  The West ignored it all.  Today, Che Guevara remains a fashion statement.

Putin sees the West in a historically self-imposed requirement “not to offend” or “not to antagonize the Russians.”  On July 2, 1934, the British Foreign Office received an inquiry from the House of Commons about Moscow’s starvation of Ukraine.  The internal memo circulated within the Foreign Office read: “We do not want to make it [information about the Ukrainian genocide] public, because the Soviet Government would resent it and our relations with them would be prejudiced. We cannot give this explanation in public.”

George Orwell’s Animal Farm was rejected by 14 publishers because they “didn’t want to offend the Russians.”

In the 1970’s and 80’s, Western intelligence knew that the Kremlin was organizing, directing and financing Middle East terrorism against the West under the name of “Arab Nationalism”.  Later it also extended to terrorism by local actors in Germany, Italy and Ireland. Yet Western politicians wanted to keep this quiet, not wanting to “offend the Russians.”

The United States, in particular, seems to be particularly compelled to “make nice.”  “Can’t we just get along and be friends?” President Truman is generally recognized as having been more hard headed than President Roosevelt, but even Truman wrote in his diary, after the war was over and when it was already clear that Stalin had deceived the West about Eastern Europe: “I’m not afraid of Russia.  They’ve always been our friends, and I don’t see why they shouldn’t always be . . . so let’s just get along.” The same approach we see repeated by Presidents Carter, Bush and Obama.  Only months after Putin invaded Georgia, President Obama initiated his infamous “reset” with Russia.  How can it be that it is we who made the overture to Putin, and not the other way around?

Putin sees us trying to transfer our commercial genetic code and our deal making culture to our relations with the Kremlin.  That does not work.  The words “stability” and “management” appear endlessly in Western writing and commentary about Russia.  That is what “doing business” requires.  But that has never been the way that the Kremlin operates.  It thrives, needs and therefore creates instability.  It is always on the offensive. It exerts a hydraulic pressure of pushing, accusing, blaming, distorting, demanding and attacking. Relentlessly. The West, on the other hand, is reactive only, perpetually responding from one crisis to another to another.  We are Pavlovian.

And, of course, doing business means entering into agreements.  In our psyche, an agreement is a roadmap to resolving a problem. Agreements with Russia do work, but in the very opposite direction and with the opposite result that the agreements are meant to achieve. We scrupulously comply with agreements.  Russia scrupulously does not. Indeed, the one exception to our trying to superimpose our commercial heritage in dealing with Russia is that we tolerate and encourage the very kind of behavior that we would never tolerate in a business setting–endless breaches of agreements by the other side of the table.  The only exception to our lack of predictive capacity that I mentioned earlier is that we have superb predictive capacity about Moscow’s breach of the very next agreement. Inexplicably, we simply ignore the breaches, always coming back for more. After WWII, the US was #1 in the world, the sole superpower, economically and militarily.  Only the US had the atomic bomb.  After forty years of containment and dozens of agreements with Moscow, what was the result?  The USSR immeasurably expanded its global influence, and its military/nuclear capacity had at least reached parity with the US.  So much for agreements.

And finally, there is the question of money. During the course of a century, Western democracies were the source of untold amounts in economic value to Moscow, whether in forms of credits, technology, know how, or other direct or indirect economic benefit. Without the West having economically propped up the Soviet Union it would have collapsed much, much earlier.  The other side of it is that today it is we who are captive to Russia’s money, and not the other way around. In 2006, a British citizen was assassinated by a miniature nuclear device in the front yard of Buckingham Palace, so to speak.  Alexander Litvinenko, a British citizen, was the victim of nuclear warfare on British territory. What did three successive British Prime Ministers do?  Nothing. Russian money purchased London.

So, what are the consequences when the West has such a character profile? We are hugely susceptible to what I call “strategic deception”.  George Orwell called it “reality control.”  The late historian, Robert Conquest, was more direct and call it simply “mind slaughter.”  When dezinformatsia, maskirovka, provokatsia, kompromat, agitatsia combine together and superimpose a total disorientation, a false perception, whether upon a person or upon an entire nation, it creates not just an alternative reality.  It creates total reality reversal.  It’s doubly dangerous, because it’s in our subconsciousness.  I sometimes give the example of your waking up in the middle of the night and finding yourself in the wilderness.  You look for the bright star in the sky, the North star, in order to get your bearings.  You see the star, or you think you do.  However, you do not realize that while you were asleep you were transported to the Southern Hemisphere. All of your decisions and actions are correct, based on the assumption of that bright star that you see is what you assume it is– the North Star.  But it’s not.  You wind up walking in the opposite direction. You don’t even think about questioning the accuracy of the assumption because you’re not even aware of it.

What is the first reality reversal that confronts us?  That Russia is merely being “defensive.”  You’ve heard it all before, and I know that no one here shares that view.  Nevertheless, it remains an enormously powerful one, regardless of the fact that Russia’s most recent intrusion into the electoral processes in Europe and the US.  You all know the litany–that Russia has “security needs,” that it requires “spheres of influence,” that it is “afraid of NATO encirclement”, that it has “legitimate interests” and “historic claims,” that it feels “victimized” by World War II, that it needs a “buffer,” etc.

This is nothing new.  President Roosevelt assured us: “Stalin doesn’t want anything but security for his country, and I think that if I give him everything I possibly can and ask nothing from him in return, he won’t try to annex anything and will work with me for a world of democracy and peace.”  That, obviously, was during the war. But after WWII, and similar to what President Truman had said, Secretary of State Dean Acheson added: “To have friendly governments along her borders is essential both for the security of the Soviet Union and the peace of the world.”

Much credit is due to Mitt Romney and his advisers, when during the first presidential debate with President Obama Romney identified Russia as America’s primary geopolitical foe.  Unfortunately, Mr. Romney later wrote an article in The Wall Street Journal that America should give the Kremlin assurances that we wouldn’t threaten Russia’s influence in Kyiv. This is reality reversal.

“Russia’s immense contribution in World War II is part of their proud history of standing up to imperialist powers.”  This is in the introduction of an extended speech that US Ambassador to the UN, Samantha Power, gave in January of this year.  I was pleased to hear that, in the balance of the speech, and after many years Ambassador Power had begun to understand some of the hard reality about Russia, but her statement at the beginning is inexcusable. In the 1890’s, the Russian General Staff conducted a study of military campaigns between 1700 and 1870.  Russia waged thirty-eight wars. Two were defensive.  How else do you become the largest empire, and also the largest country, in the world, encompassing an entire one-third of Asia and much of the European sub-continent?  You do not do so by being “defensive.”

When we participate in such reality reversal we become multipliers in the denial of history, in the denial of the victimization of entire nations, and in the applause of the perpetrator. Why don’t they have the right to exist?  It is the victim nations that the Kremlin has persecuted for generations, and in many instances for centuries, that have the right to feel secure, who have “historic claims” against Russia, who need “spheres of influence,” and who require a “buffer.” And it was the failure of the West to recognize this that has led to the situation that now confronts us.

Part of that same “defensive” deception is Russia’s re-engineering of World War II. “Had it not been for the colossal sacrifices made by the Soviet Union in WWII–in which they lost more than 20 million people, many times more than any other nation, friend or foe–the war would have dragged on much longer.”  Again, this is Ambassador Power speaking on that same occasion. And note that Power again equates “Russia” with the “Soviet Union,” and even describes the Soviet Union as a “nation.” It was not.  It was an empire.  A quarter of century after the fall of the USSR, far too many Western politician and commentator continue to speak and think in precisely the same terms.  This is inexcusable, and again illustrates that we have never grasped the very essence of the USSR, or the meaning of Putin’s celebration of it.

As to World War II, itself, let’s be clear that Stalin and Hitler were not simply allies.  They were equal partners, joint venturers.  When Hitler was appointed Chancellor in January 1933, thanks to the Soviet Union the German armaments industry was already far along the path toward being rebuilt. Under the Treaty of Rapallo with Germany, in the 1920’s Moscow provided critical resources for the rebuilding of Germany’s military capability, much of it plundered, ironically, from Ukraine.  German military maneuvers took place on Soviet territory.  Tours of the growing GULag were provided. And this was at the same time that Western, particularly American, industrial assistance was flowing to the Soviet Union. How does Putin assess our strategic acumen?

How many decades have passed since the end of World War II?  Why don’t we ever hear about Hitler’s purpose for the war?  It was to colonize Ukraine. Only during this past summer did Yale’s Professor Timothy Snyder address the German Bundestag reminding Germany of its history.  It’s an astonishing distortion when Germany feels guilt about WWII and “Russland”, when it was “Russland” that started the war together with Germany, and when it was not “Russland” but Ukraine that was Germany’s target and greatest victim.  The number of Allied troops that invaded Normandy was 132,000.  The number of Wehrmacht and other troops that invaded the Soviet Union in Operation Barbarossa on June 22, 1941, was 3.2 million.  And that did not just include Germany troops, but Hungarian, Rumanian, Slovakian, Finnish, and Italian troops as well. Do we refer to those countries today as “Nazi”?  It’s no wonder that Ukraine suffered more than any other country during World War II, whether measured in terms of loss of humanity or physical destruction.  Four times more Ukrainian civilians were killed in World War II than the combined military deaths of the United States, France, Italy, Great Britain, Canada. Millions more Ukrainians were killed serving in the military and taken as slave laborers to Germany.  Ukrainians are Nazis? It’s another massive reality reversal, another strategic deception.

Yet another example in the strategic deception that Russia is merely being “defensive” is the drumbeat of NATO “encirclement”. First, I suggest we look at a map. How many NATO countries border Russia? “Encirclement” is a geographic impossibility. And even if it were possible, we are to somehow feel guilty about it?  Second, Putin knows that NATO is defensive. He knows there that is no chance, whatsoever, that NATO will invade Russia.  Stalin knew about NATO and its purpose before it even formally existed. Third, we never exhibited the psychology of affirmative, “take the offensive” thinking about Russia during the last 100 years even where there was never any military component. Fourth, if there was ever a time for fear of an invasion, it was during WWII and immediately thereafter.  That never happened, and could not have, given the absence in the West of any understanding of Moscow’s threat.  Fifth, how, exactly, will more than two dozen nations be coordinated?  For what purpose?  To achieve what?  Finally, for us to believe that “NATO encirclement” is something that Putin in fact fears would also require that we simply ignore the hard, demonstrable reality that he knows and understands our political dynamics better than we do.  He has proven that.  Does anyone here in the room really think that public panic (due to what, exactly?) in the West about Russia will rise to the level that it translates into political decisions for a coordinated military invasion of Russia? This is nonsense.  Putin and Lavrov may beat that drum for domestic and foreign consumption, but they know reality well enough.  So should we.

The second example of reality reversal is Western talk about “engaging” Russia in fighting ISIS.  Where is the logic of that, however, when the roots of ISIS and Al Qaeda reach back to the genetic code for “Arab nationalism” that the Kremlin created in the 1970’s and ’80’s at Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow and the surrounding KGB training camps?   Today, Moscow does not have to be directing or controlling ISIS. It simply receives the benefit of a weakened, disoriented, disheartened and dispirited West.  Furthermore, consider the “genius” that it took for Moscow to be able to turn the Middle East against the West a generation or more ago.  First, the Soviet Union was an atheistic state.  Second, it –and before that, the Russian Empire–had a violent history of suppressing the Muslim nations of the Caucasus and Central Asia. And yet the Kremlin prevailed, and a Nobel Prize was awarded to its creation, Yasser Arafat. Truly, a remarkable achievement.

Finally, Ukraine.  I know there are those present for whom Ukraine is not on the mental map as are other “traditional” countries of Europe, such as Poland or Italy, for example, even though Ukraine’s now international recognized status is not questioned.  I will not get into the distortions of Russian historiography that were put in place in the 18th and 19th centuries, and will only mention that Russian historiographers who emigrated to the West after the Bolshevik coup d’état established the foundation of so- called “Russian studies” in the West.  Though the historiographers may not have been supportive of the Bolshevik regime, they nevertheless transplanted to the West the imperial history that they themselves fashioned and absorbed.

We’ve all heard the assertions: “Russia traces its 1000 year history to its beginnings in Kiev”, “Ukraine is a historic part of Russia,” “Kievan Russia was the beginning of modern Russia,” “a thousand years of Russian Christianity.” As a result, as Putin whispered in President Bush’s ear, Ukraine does not exist. Neither did it for Hitler, who identified Ukrainians in the camps as either Russians or Poles.

So let’s examine the reality reversal, the strategic deception that is grounded in the anomaly of the periphery of the Kyivan Rus’ state, Russia, pre-empting and laying claim to the center, Kyiv.  And remember, at that time the amount of Russian territory that was part of the Kyivan Rus’ empire was only some 3% or so of Russia that we know today.

Firstly, I know of no other instance in history or geography where the creation of an artificial 1000 year pedigree is used to justify war, invasion and terrorism today and accepted so totally uncritically by the West. Indeed, it is more logically and intellectually consistent to justify Kyiv’s “historic claim” to Russia, as part of Kyiv’s former empire.

Secondly, even if we accept the “1000 year history” argument, then what is the result?  Because of the Viking influence in the establishment of the Kyivan Rus’ state, Ukraine today can claim Oslo, Stockholm or Copenhagen as the beginnings of Ukraine?  Norwegians, Swedes and Danes are “really” Ukrainians”, or “Little Ukrainians” or “younger brothers”? The same holds true with the influence of Byzantium on Kyivan Rus’, complete with the Cyrillic alphabet and religion. Ukraine “really” began in Byzantium/Istanbul? Today’s France, as Spain, Germany and Israel, were part of the Roman Empire, as was part of Russia a part of the Kyivan Rus’ state. Does that mean that France can claim that Rome is “really” French, and that Italians are Frenchmen?  And what of Romania, which appropriated even the name of Rome, as Russia did with “Rus'”? What is the German word for France?  Frankreich.  Land of the Franks, a Germanic tribe.  What are we to conclude from that?  France has a claim to Germany, or is it the other way around?  I will not belabor the point.  Ignorance of history, and the lack of critical thinking on something that is not very deep, makes the West, again, a prime target for such reality reversal.

So why does Putin like the West?  First, the West does not understand how and why it finds itself in the situation that it is in today.  One country, with nothing to offer to the world, has managed to put the Western democracies on the ropes. How, why, is any of this possible?  And why are we suddenly so very surprised?  But where do we see any self-examination? Second, Western attention to Ukraine has historically been at the opposite end of the spectrum compared to Moscow’s razor focus. Even today, Western concern doesn’t even begin to approach the degree of seriousness that is necessary, given that Ukraine drove the nail into the coffin of the USSR, and in a very real sense saving the world from it.  In addition, as we know Ukraine surrendered its nuclear arsenal, in large part to its historic persecutor.   What do we think that Putin makes of all this?  What conclusions does he draw about our strategic sense? His money is safe with us, and existing sanctions are and will remain inconsequential in impacting the situation on the ground.

I suggest that in the next two days we seek to benefit from the Forum so that we can return to our respective countries in order, ultimately, to work for their national security interests. And that is achieved by anchoring the security and independence of Ukraine as the best chance we have of turning Russia inward. We must think strategically and escape from the perpetual defensive, reactive position that we have frozen ourselves into.  And let there be no mistake. Only then will tyrants in the Middle East, China, and North Korea also understand that the West recognizes and has the will to act in its own self-interest.

L’VIV SECURITY FORUM, L’viv, Ukraine

28 November 2017

 

Victor Rud is the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Ukrainian American Bar Association. He has been practicing law for 40 years and has spoken before various audiences on Russia/US/Ukraine relations. Some of his more recent commentary was carried by Forbes and The Kyiv Post. The above is the keynote speech delivered at the dinner reception for the L’viv Security Forum, on November 28, 2017.  Mr. Rud holds an undergraduate degree in international affairs from Harvard College, and law degree from Duke University School of Law. 

The post Why Putin Likes the West appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’hiver de Politique étrangère (n° 4/2017). Victor Fèvre propose une analyse du Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations (Cambridge University Press, 2017, 640 pages).

L’Organisation du traité de l’Atlantique nord (OTAN) a créé et implanté son « centre d’excellence cyber » (NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence – CCDCOE) à Tallinn, après les cyberattaques dont l’Estonie a été victime en 2007. Un groupe d’experts (militaires, chercheurs, juristes, etc.) a été rassemblé sous son égide pour élaborer un ouvrage collectif sur les règles d’engagement d’une opération cyber, inexistantes jusqu’à présent. C’est ainsi que le Tallinn Manual 1.0 a été publié en 2013, même si ce n’est pas officiellement sous l’étiquette OTAN. Le premier manuel était très axé sur les opérations militaires, et le groupe d’experts a été élargi pour étendre la réflexion à toutes les opérations dans le cyberespace. Le présent Tallinn Manual 2.0 a été publié en 2017. La France n’était pas représentée dans le groupe, et le manuel n’existe qu’en anglais – comme le site internet du CCDCOE.

Formellement, ce manuel est un exercice de casuistique : énumération de 154 règles, avec de nombreux paragraphes, regroupés en chapitres thématiques. Si quelques principes de base sont mentionnés, le manuel est constitué d’une longue liste de cas pratiques accompagnés de principes supposés guider la conduite des parties.

Sur le fond, l’ouvrage se veut un manuel et non un code. Il ne s’impose pas en source du droit, et ne fait que transposer, par analogie, dans le cyberespace, des principes puisés à des sources juridiques externes. Les sources classiques du droit international public demeurent les références : le droit des conflits armés (ad bellum & in bello), de la mer, de l’air, de l’espace, de la diplomatie, de la cybercriminalité, etc., avec tous leurs traités internationaux. Le Tallinn Manual n’innove donc pas dans ce domaine. Le fait de considérer une cyberattaque comme une agression méritant une riposte armée proportionnée, appréciée selon certains critères (gravité, urgence, lien direct, pénétration, mesurabilité, caractère militaire, responsabilité étatique et présomption de légalité) vaut pour n’importe quelle agression d’un État.

La souveraineté reste le principe cardinal de ce guide. La version 2.0 du manuel devait couvrir les opérations du cyberespace n’ayant pas forcément un caractère militaire, ou une responsabilité étatique. Pourtant, toutes les règles ne traitent que de rapports entre États ; toute attaque, quels que soient le groupe ou l’individu responsables (entreprise, organisation criminelle, particuliers), émane par définition d’un lieu où se situe le responsable. L’État exerce sa souveraineté sur son territoire et sa responsabilité est engagée : il doit faire régner l’ordre et le droit chez lui.

Une faiblesse demeure cependant. Il est admis que tous les États sont de bonne foi, coopèrent et transmettent toute information en leur possession qui pourrait être utile aux autres (concept de due diligence). Le manuel part du principe que tous les États ont une connaissance réelle et suffisante des activités cyber sur leur territoire, et sont capables d’y exercer toute leur souveraineté. Il est pourtant illusoire d’imaginer pouvoir attribuer avec certitude une cyberattaque. Certains États sont faibles, d’autres sont complaisants. Même si ces derniers ont tort juridiquement, comment exercer une coercition ? Le droit international public n’est ici que difficilement applicable – et ce n’est pas l’apanage du cyberespace.

Victor Fèvre

S’abonner à Politique étrangère

By Dominik P. Jankowski & Liana Fix

To many who assumed that the Russian-Ukrainian conflict would calm down in 2018, the end of 2017 foretold quite the opposite. The conflict is back in motion, yet with some contradictory signals. On the plus side, the biggest swap of prisoners was held between Ukraine and the Russian-backed militants since the beginning of the war. This demonstrated that some progress on humanitarian issues is possible with the help of the Normandy format and the Trilateral Contact Group.

On the minus side, Russia withdrew its military personnel from the Joint Center for Control and Coordination (JCCC), a Russian-Ukrainian military body that helped to monitor the ceasefire and facilitated the withdrawal of heavy weapons. Not only did the JCCC provide a direct military channel of communication between Ukraine and Russia, it also reduced security risks for OSCE monitors. Immediately after Russia’s withdrawal, some of the worst fighting since February 2017 took place in eastern Ukraine.

Against this backdrop, Russian President Vladimir Putin again raised his proposal for a UN peacekeeping force, which he first tabled as a draft UN Security Council resolution in September 2017. Putin claimed at his end-of-year press conference that he is in principle not against a broader mandate for international peacekeepers in Donbas, but that a decision should be negotiated between Kyiv and the militants, which is—for good reasons—not acceptable to Ukraine and the West.

Nevertheless, Western allies redoubled their diplomatic efforts to find a workable solution for a UN mission with several parallel tracks of negotiations, including a direct U.S.-Russia channel between Kurt Volker, U.S. special representative for Ukraine negotiations, and his Russian counterpart, Vladislav Surkov. After a few months, there was little evidence of progress, which led the UN Secretariat to stall all preparations of an assessment mission to Ukraine. Despite that fact, German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel called for a decision on a UN peacekeeping force to be taken before the Russian presidential election in March.

On paper, the Russian proposal seems to be a shift in posture. In reality, it is part of Russia’s strategy to backtrack from the political responsibility for the conflict and instead position Russia as a mediator within a new UN framework. Moscow proposed a limited, six-month mission, equipped with small arms, and with the exclusive mandate to ensure the security of the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) along the line of contact. A mission under such parameters would likely freeze the conflict; it is also hard to imagine how it could support the implementation of the Minsk agreements.

Therefore, any Western proposal for a UN mission in Ukraine must embrace three key elements. First, its mandate must cover the whole territory of the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts, including the Russian-Ukrainian border—a precondition the Russian president has already agreed to during a phone conversation with the German chancellor. This is essential to ensuring an end to further rearmament of the militants by Russia. In practical terms, a UN mission should be deployed at once—or, at maximum, over no more than two phases—to prevent Russia from obstructing further deployments.

Second, a UN mission should reinforce—not replace—the operations of the OSCE mission on the ground. The UN lacks practical expertise in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and has been recently involved in peacekeeping operations mostly outside of Europe. UN peacekeepers should help the OSCE SMM to maintain peace, including by monitoring the withdrawal of heavy weapons and forces, guarding arms and ammunition depots, and protecting civilians. A joint OSCE-UN mission should hence be seriously considered. To effectively deliver on these tasks, such a mission should involve around 20,000 peacekeepers, excluding Russian forces.

Third, a UN mission should support the implementation of the Minsk agreements and facilitate the return of areas not controlled by Kyiv to Ukrainian authority, including creating conditions for credible local elections. The UN Security Council could grant the mission executive powers to help oversee the implementation of the Minsk agreements. The mission could also assist with the selection of local officials and police, as well as their training at later stages, and might also facilitate the safe return of displaced persons. In sum, it would engage the whole “UN family”— with its many affiliated programs, funds, and specialized agencies—in the post-conflict Donbas reconstruction.

How could Russia agree to such a UN mission? Most importantly, a coordinated policy of carrots and sticks by the U.S. and European partners is needed. The U.S. administration’s approval of the largest sale of weapons to Ukraine since 2014 has boosted Ukrainian defensive capabilities. Politically, it could have been used as a stick towards Russia, if it had been coordinated with European allies. Instead, it has created additional rifts with Germany and France. On the other hand, the West has a serious incentive on hand: sanctions. A proper UN mission, with a robust mandate, can help fully implement the Minsk agreements—a precondition to lift Donbas-related sanctions.

The proposal for a UN mission to Ukraine is a small window of opportunity for diplomacy. Yet it is not a silver-bullet to solving the conflict. Political will on both sides remains a prerequisite for keeping peace.

This article was originally published by Carnegie Europe.

Dominik P. Jankowski is a security policy expert, diplomat, think tanker, and social media aficionado.

Liana Fix is the program director of the Körber Foundation’s International Affairs Department.

The views and opinions expressed here are the authors’ and do not necessarily reflect the official positions of the institutions they represent.

The post A Chance for Peace in Ukraine? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’hiver de Politique étrangère (n° 4/2017). Olivier Louis propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Vijay Joshi, India’s Long Road: The Search for Prosperity (Oxford University Press, 2017, 360 pages).

Voici une excellente analyse de l’histoire économique de l’Inde depuis son indépendance. L’auteur explique clairement pourquoi jusqu’à 1980 la croissance annuelle indienne est restée bloquée autour de 3,5 % – à peine supérieure à l’augmentation de la population –, et pourquoi, à partir de cette date, elle s’est accélérée : entre 1980 et 2000 autour de 5,5 % annuellement, entre 2000 et 2010 de 7,3 %, et entre 2010 et 2014 de 6,1 %. Depuis lors, la croissance reste élevée mais irrégulière : elle a dépassé 9 % en 2015 mais est retombée à moins de 6 % pour 2017. Compte tenu de l’accroissement de la population, du nombre de pauvres (entre 269 et 360 millions selon les modes de calcul en 2011), du taux très élevé d’analphabétisme (37 % de la population de plus de 15 ans), de l’importance de la mortalité infantile (48 décès sur 1 000 naissances), et d’une espérance de vie de seulement 63 ans, Vijay Joshi estime que l’Inde a besoin d’une croissance annuelle de 7 à 9 % pendant les 30 prochaines années (6 à 8 % de croissance par habitant) pour espérer atteindre une prospérité comparable à celle des pays européens les moins prospères comme le Portugal et la Grèce.

Une telle croissance annuelle moyenne est-elle possible, alors que seuls trois pays dans le monde – Chine, Corée du Sud et Taïwan – ont, jusqu’à maintenant, réussi cette performance ? L’Inde bénéficie de facteurs favorables : une population en âge de travailler très nombreuse et en croissance, une classe entrepreneuriale qui a prouvé sa capacité à saisir les opportunités offertes depuis les réformes de 1980-1990, une capacité d’investissement par rapport au PIB très significative (33 % à l’heure actuelle), une classe moyenne encore très peu nombreuse (autour de 100 millions de personnes selon l’auteur), mais qui ne cessera de s’accroître à un rythme soutenu avec la croissance. Mais les difficultés à surmonter sont considérables : un État central faible et corrompu ; un environnement politique extérieur loin d’être stabilisé (Chine, Pakistan) ; des services publics, en particulier l’éducation primaire et secondaire et la santé publique dans un état catastrophique ; des infrastructures (aéroports, transports publics, routes, etc.) qui ne rattrapent que lentement leur immense retard.

Le programme des réformes à accomplir est impressionnant : assurer un environnement macro-­économique stable ; redéfinir les relations entre l’État central, les États fédérés, le secteur privé et le marché – dont l’auteur pense qu’elles sont largement dysfonction­nelles ; réformer profondément le secteur bancaire en privatisant les banques publiques saines et en fermant celles qui n’ont aucune chance de devenir profitables ; faire le même exercice pour les nombreuses entreprises publiques aujourd’hui dépendantes de subventions budgétaires ; et surtout revoir entièrement la fiscalité du pays, en supprimant les subventions aux biens de consommation pour les remplacer par un revenu universel qui permettrait de sortir de l’extrême pauvreté les populations qui la subissent. L’auteur doute que ces réformes aient des chances réalistes d’être entreprises, en particulier par le gouvernement de Narendra Modi dont il juge que les performances sont, pour le moment, « mixtes ».

La perspective la plus probable lui paraît donc celle d’une croissance « respectable » (de 5 à 6 %), mais insuffisante pour hisser le pays au niveau des pays développés.

Olivier Louis

S’abonner à Politique étrangère

Mind the Gap: How France and Germany Can Spearhead Joint Foreign Policy Initiatives Now  (extraits du dossier dirigé par Claire Demesmay, DGAP, Berlin) : lire ici
Edited by Claire Demesmay 
In light of the current instability on Europe’s borders and uncertainties about the international role of the US under the administration of President Donald Trump, it is high time for Franco-German foreign policy initiatives. With a possible new German government in sight, a window of opportunity opens for new joint action by the two countries at the core of the EU. At the same time, differences between France and Germany, both on policy issues and in terms of their strategic cultures, could impede any such cooperation. This study shows how Paris and Berlin can bridge – and exploit – these gaps to facilitate joint initiatives, even in the short term, on four key topics: Russia, transatlantic relations, Syria and Turkey.
Syria: Associating German with French InitiativesFrédéric Charillon & Andreas Rinke  
The conflict in Syria currently stands at the center of much of the international debate because it triggered a destabilization of the entire Middle East region – with the military involvement of a large number of foreign countries. The armed conflict also sent huge numbers of refugees to neighboring countries and Europe. As a result, Syria swiftly climbed to the top of the diplomatic agenda
for Germany and France. Despite the shared urgency, however, both countries have very different views on the conflict: This is due partly to historical reasons, and partly to the fact that France and Germany play different roles in world politics and hold different views on the use of military power. Nonetheless, the time for joint initiatives is now better than ever before – frstly, because  both countries share common interests in the Middle East, and secondly, because the election of French President Macron might help fnd a common stance. A common French-German strategy for Syria, and for the wider Middle East, is both possible and necessary, and the EU offers the best framework in pursuing this. Paris made it clear that it wanted to promote new initiatives. Associating Germany with them would be indispensable.
France and Germany: Different Approaches Toward Syria
Germany and France diverge widely in their approaches toward Syria for at least three reasons. These relate to the two countries’ different historical involvement in the region, to their divergent attitudes on the use of military force, and lastly, on the context of current terrorist attacks.
The historical factors at play in the issue date back to colonial times: Unlike Germany, which does not have any colonial background in the Middle East, France used to exert tutelary power in both Lebanon and Syria and has kept strong links with the Levant ever since. Paris’ political clout in Lebanon somewhat decreased when frst, the Syrian, and then the Iranian grip on the country intensifed after the Civil War (1975-1989). But a struggle for influence between the West – mainly France and the US – and the Syrian-Iranian camp remained. Several attacks on the French territory in the 1980s, as well as the assassination of the French Ambassador in Beirut in 1981 and
later the killing of French hostages were attributed to Damascus, Tehran and their local allies, such as Hezbollah.  
Lire la suite

Recently, the Trump Administration decided against nominating Victor D. Cha as Ambassador to South Korea due to his opposition to the “bloody nose” strategy against North Korea advocated by the White House. On the heels of this report, U.S. disarmament ambassador Robert Wood declared that North Korea stands only months away from the ability to hit U.S. territory with a nuclear weapon.

During such a time of uncertainty, it would stand to reason that appointing a qualified ambassador to a long-standing ally neighboring a nuclear-armed country that has threatened the United States would rank as a top priority for President Trump. Nevertheless, the United States is left without the diplomatic expertise of someone like Cha and armed instead with a Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) that promotes a greater use of nuclear weapons than ever before.

The “bloody nose” strategy, opposed by Cha but favored by National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster, argues for a preventative military strike against North Korea that would inevitably end in an untold number of causalities in South Korea and Japan—where combined more than 60,000 U.S. troops are stationed—as well as possibly in nearby China. This is not to mention the fate of U.S. coastal cities and territories such as Guam, who already has been threatened by the regime in Pyongyang partly as a result of bellicose, ignorant remarks by President Trump. There is far from any guarantee that North Korea would submit after an initial strike given Kim Jong Un’s erratic, unpredictable behavior, and with the recent NPR in hand, the United States could enter into a war with Pyongyang armed with even more readily deployable nuclear weapons.

The Trump Administration’s record thus far in handling nuclear threats and nonproliferation has only served to ratchet up tensions rather than make Americans any safer. In addition to provoking the regime in Pyongyang, President Trump has repeatedly threatened what’s commonly known as the Iran Deal. After “decertifying” it in October, he then only issued the waiver of key sanctions in January after saying it would be the last time.

The concerns behind these decisions—that the deal did not address Iran’s continued funding of terrorism, testing of ballistic missiles, and oppression of its citizens—are valid. The nuclear negotiations, however, were focused on removing nuclear weapons from Tehran with the understanding that further diplomacy would be required to address the other bad behavior. And currently, the deal is achieving what it set out to do: 17,000 centrifuges and 95 percent of Iran’s highly enriched uranium stockpile have been removed and Iran’s only plutonium reactor has been disabled. Plus, trust in Tehran’s word is not needed to verify these achievements because the best nuclear inspectors in the world are on the ground, watching Iran’s uranium from the mines to the laboratories.

Undermining this deal would only result in setting the United States on a path to war with Iran. So rather than continuing down that course, the Trump Administration should instead encourage the enforcement of bipartisan, smartly targeted sanctions against Iran that do not violate the terms of the agreement. After all, sanctions, when used correctly, can be a strong tool—as seen when crippling sanctions helped move Tehran towards the negotiating table in the first place.

Just as sanctions have a role with regard to Iran, so do they have a role in pressuring North Korea. Last week, Vice President Mike Pence stated that the administration will soon roll out “the toughest and most aggressive round of economic sanctions on North Korea ever.” Carefully targeted sanctions are a smart step towards what must be the end goal in North Korea: phased denuclearization. This next round of sanctions will follow one announced two weeks ago, and it would similarly be best geared against those individuals and entities who are allegedly financing Kim’s nuclear programs—but specific details have yet to emerge.

Such economic action is a much surer and safer path what the NPR encourages. The review called for developing new, expensive nuclear weapons and stated that nuclear weapons will only be used in “extreme circumstances,” which could include “non-nuclear strategic attacks” such as cyber attacks. For decades, the United States has led the global charge to reduce nuclear weapons, but now, it is reversing course with unnecessary nuclear weapons and a lower threshold to using them—making nuclear war all the more likely.

So as the Trump Administration continues to grapple with charting the path through current nuclear issues facing the United States, they must set aside the unnecessary and expensive expansion of nuclear weapons as encouraged by the NPR. As evidenced by the succeeding Iran Deal, diplomatic and economic action remains the best bet in dealing with hostile, nuclear armed nations. Any brash military action and a withdrawal from diplomacy will only spark a war on the Korean Peninsula or in the Middle East respectively, risking the lives of Americans at home, abroad, and in uniform.

Shannon Bugos is the Communications and Writing Coordinator at Truman National Security Project. She is a graduate of the University of Notre Dame. Views expressed are her own.

The post North Korea, Iran, and the Nuclear Posture Review appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Créée en 1936, Politique étrangère est la plus ancienne revue française dans le domaine des relations internationales. Chaque vendredi, découvrez désormais « l’archive de la semaine ».

* * *

L’article « Révolution culturelle et politique extérieure chinoise », écrit par François Joyaux, professeur émérite de civilisation de l’Asie de l’Est à l’Institut national des langues et civilisations orientales (INALCO), a été publié dans le numéro 1/1968.

Armée, monde des lettres et des arts, Université, parti, organisations de masse, industrie et dans une certaine mesure, paysannerie : ce sont presque tous les secteurs de la vie nationale chinoise qui ont été touchés par la «Grande Révolution Culturelle Prolétarienne». Dans tous ces domaines, les méthodes anciennes sont dénoncées, les résultats acquis sont remis en cause, certains des hommes qui en furent les promoteurs sont limogés. Bref, un mouvement qui modifie radicalement les structures et l’évolution interne d’un régime qui, en 1965 encore, semblait, sinon définitivement, du moins solidement établi.

Aussi est-il légitime de s’interroger sur les répercussions éventuelles d’un tel bouleversement en matière de politique étrangère. La Révolution Culturelle est-elle, d’une manière quelconque, liée aux problèmes extérieurs ? Plus précisément, la politique étrangère chinoise fut-elle un des facteurs qui amenèrent les dirigeants favorables à la ligne maoïste à lancer la Révolution Culturelle vers la fin de 1965 ? Et dans quelle mesure ces deux années de crise ont-elles affecté les relations internationales de la Chine Populaire ?

Il n’est pas douteux que les origines de la Révolution Culturelle furent principalement internes. Après les difficultés considérables de ce qui fut appelé les « années noires » (1959- 1961), l’économie avait retrouvé en 1964 son niveau de 1957 et la production industrielle et agricole progressait, la première assez favorablement, la seconde plus difficilement il est vrai. Sur le plan politique interne, peu de changements notables étaient intervenus depuis les Plenums de 1959 (Lushan) et de 1961. En somme, les difficultés consécutives au Grand Bond en Avant et à l’instauration des communes populaires étaient en voie de résorption. Et sous la pression des éléments les plus modérés du Comité Central, une « libéralisation » du régime se faisait jour, à tel point que certaines tendances bourgeoises réapparurent qui alarmèrent les cadres les plus « activistes », au premier rang desquels Mao Ze-dong lui-même. C’est pour mettre un terme à ces tendances, tels l’accroissement des lopins individuels à la campagne, le fléchissement de l’enthousiasme révolutionnaire, la bureaucratisation croissante du régime, que fut lancé en 1963-1964 le «Mouvement d’Éducation Socialiste» qui, à l’automne 1965 et surtout au printemps 1966, s’élargit en «Révolution Culturelle».

Une étude approfondie des origines de cette dernière montrerait que les facteurs internes y furent prépondérants. C’est là un point qui se dégage des textes actuellement connus.

Mais il est permis de se demander si les problèmes de politique extérieure ne jouèrent pas également un rôle dans le déclenchement de la Révolution Culturelle. Trois séries de difficultés peuvent en effet avoir eu quelque influence à cet égard : la rupture idéologique entre la Chine et l’URSS ; l’escalade américaine au Vietnam et les échecs chinois dans de nombreux pays du Tiers-Monde.

La détérioration des relations sino-soviétiques était déjà ancienne puisque le différend idéologique entre les deux pays était devenu public dès 1958 et avait connu une première phase critique en 1960, lors du retrait des techniciens soviétiques. Mais c’est trois ans plus tard que la rupture put être considérée comme grave, après l’échec des dernières négociations, à Moscou, en juillet 1963. A compter de cette date, le conflit devient ouvert. Dans l’ensemble du Tiers-Monde, l’URSS s’emploie à saper les quelques positions qu’y possède la Chine, par exemple au Congo, à Cuba, ou lors des négociations en vue de la seconde conférence de solidarité afro-asiatique. La crise devient si violente qu’en 1964 les revendications chinoises s’étendent aux questions territoriales : Xin Jiang, Mandchourie, Mongolie. Le gouvernement chinois accuse l’URSS de masser des troupes le long de la frontière. En 1964, il est devenu clair que le conflit entre les deux pays n’est plus seulement idéologique. Et ce n’est pas là, comme l’affirment les Chinois, la conséquence de la politique personnelle de Khrouchtchev, puisque lorsque celui-ci est remplacé par Kossygine en octobre 1964, aucune détente ne s’amorce.

Au début de 1965, les rapports entre l’URSS et la Chine étaient donc à leur point le plus bas. Plusieurs indices laissaient à penser que la rupture était irréversible. C’était là un des éléments majeurs de la situation internationale de la Chine.

L’extension de la guerre au Vietnam en était un second. Depuis 1963, l’implantation américaine au Vietnam du Sud s’était considérablement renforcée. Puis en juin 1964, le général Westmoreland avait été nommé au poste de commandant en chef des troupes américaines et, le 5 août, avaient commencé les premiers bombardements américains contre le Vietnam du Nord à la suite d’un incident mal défini entre navires américains et nord-vietnamiens dans le golfe du Tonkin. Deux jours plus tard, le Congrès autorisait le président Johnson à prendre toutes les mesures nécessaires pour mettre fin à l’agression communiste. La politique de l’«escalade» était lancée en février 1965 ; les premiers raids systématiques sur le Vietnam du Nord décidés tandis que les «marines» débarquaient à Da-Nang.

La menace américaine n’avait jamais été aussi proche de la Chine depuis le conflit coréen. Et cette situation était d’autant plus alarmante pour Pékin que, dans le même temps, le gouvernement de Hanoï se rapprochait de Moscou.

Initialement, en effet, lors des débuts du conflit entre Pékin et Moscou, le Vietnam du Nord s’était efforcé d’observer une prudente neutralité à l’égard des deux thèses. Après la seconde conférence de Genève (1962) lorsque Khrouchtchev lui refusa tout supplément d’aide économique et militaire, Hanoï avait esquissé un rapprochement avec la Chine afin d’en obtenir les fournitures que l’URSS lui refusait, sans que, toutefois, ses rapports avec Moscou fussent devenus mauvais. Mais après l’incident du Golfe du Tonkin, en août 1964, après la chute de Khrouchtchev, en octobre, et surtout après le début de l’«escalade», en février 1965, le Vietnam du Nord se rapprocha à nouveau de l’URSS (visite de Kossyguine à Hanoï, en février 1965), plus en mesure que la Chine de lui fournir à la fois du matériel militaire moderne (fusées SAM) capable de limiter les bombardements américains, et une aide économique suffisante pour remédier aux destructions massives auxquelles le pays était soumis. Il est vraisemblable qu’aux yeux des dirigeants nord-vietnamiens, la protection soviétique semblait moins dangereuse que celle de la Chine Populaire.

Cet ensemble de facteurs fut à l’origine du rapprochement, notable durant toute l’année 1965, entre le Vietnam du Nord et l’URSS au fur et à mesure que la pression militaire ennemie se fit plus forte. Or cette évolution, et la proximité des raids américains dans la zone frontalière sino-vietnamienne, étaient pour Pékin de plus en plus inquiétantes. La remontée de l’influence soviétique à Hanoï pouvait être considérée comme une atteinte au prestige de la Chine et comme un échec diplomatique.

A ces difficultés avec l’URSS, s’ajoutaient des inquiétudes à propos de la Corée du Nord qui évoluait selon le même schéma que le régime de Hanoï.

Alors que jusque vers 1960, le gouvernement de Pyong Yang s’en était aussi tenu à une égale réserve vis-à-vis des deux thèses et que de 1960 à 1963, il s’était même orienté vers une approbation des positions chinoises, la chute de Khrouchtchev modifia cette tendance. Au début de 1965, le rapprochement entre l’URSS et la Corée du Nord s’affirma encore, et un traité fut signé entre les deux pays, en mai 1965, par lequel le premier s’engageait à renforcer le potentiel défensif du second.

Or la Chine avait toujours considéré la Corée, de même que le Vietnam, comme une zone où son influence devait être prépondérante. Ambitions historiques anciennes qui se prolongeaient avec le nouveau régime et qui expliquent l’échec que représentait pour lui la ligne suivie par les gouvernements nord-vietnamien et nord-coréen.

Les difficultés auxquelles se heurtait la Chine au Vietnam et en Corée n’étaient pas les seuls indices de la dégradation des positions extérieures chinoises. D’autres événements, au long de l’année 1965, réduisaient le nombre des appuis acquis par la Chine en Asie, en Afrique et en Amérique Latine. […]

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