Intitulé des emplois
Auditeur Interne et de la Qualité (AIQ)
Nbre
01
Formation, Expérience professionnelle
FORMATION :
– Être titulaire d'un diplôme de niveau BAC+5 en Audit, contrôle et comptabilité ou équivalent.
EXPERIENCE PROFESSIONNELLE :
– Justifier d'une expérience professionnelle avérée d'au moins dix (10) années de service après l'obtention du diplôme en matière d'audit, de contrôle, ou dans les domaines connexes au sein d'un organisme public ou privé.
Intitulé des emplois
Chargé de Communication
Nbre
01
Formation, Expérience professionnelle
FORMATION :
– Être titulaire d'un diplôme de niveau BAC+4 en Communication, journalisme ou équivalent.
EXPERIENCE PROFESSIONNELLE :
– Justifier d'une expérience professionnelle avérée d'au moins cinq (05) années après l'obtention du diplôme dans la mise en œuvre d'une politique de communication, d'une politique marketing ainsi que la mise en œuvre d'une politique de relations publiques.
Intitulé des emplois
Agent de liaison et de reprographie
Nbre
01
Formation, Expérience professionnelle
FORMATION :
– Être titulaire d'un Brevet d'Etude du Premier Cycle (BEPC).
EXPERIENCE PROFESSIONNELLE :
– Justifier d'une d'expérience professionnelle avérée d'au moins trois (03) années de service en matière d'Agent de liaison et de reprographe ou d'agent coursier (liaison) au sein d'un organisme public ou privé.
1. Conditions Générales :
– Être de nationalité Burkinabè ;
– Être âgé de 18 ans au moins et de 45 ans au plus au 31 décembre 2026 pour les postes d'Auditeur Interne et de la Qualité et de Chargé de Communication ;
– Être âgé de 18 ans au moins et de 37 ans au plus au 31 décembre 2026 pour le poste d'Agent de liaison et de reprographie ;
– Jouir de ses droits civiques et être de bonne moralité ;
– Être apte à travailler en équipe et sous pression.
2. Lieu d'affectation : Ouagadougou
3. Composition du dossier :
– Une lettre de motivation, datée et signée adressée à Madame la Directrice Générale du cabinet ;
– Un curriculum vitae sincère, assorti des contacts de trois (03) noms de personnes de référence ;
– Une copie légalisée du diplôme exigé ;
– Une copie légalisée de la Carte Nationale d'Identité Burkinabè ou Passeport en cours de validité ;
– Une copie du (des) attestation (s)/certificat (s) de travail.
4. Dépôt des dossiers de candidature : les dossiers sont réceptionnés uniquement sur la plateforme www.criburkina.com en créant son compte et joindre les fichiers demandés.
5. Date limite de dépôt des dossiers : Vendredi 10 avril 2026.
6. Procédure de recrutement : présélection sur dossier, test écrit et entretien oral.
7. Limitation : seuls les cinquante (50) premiers dossiers seront réceptionnés pour le poste d'agent de liaison et de reprographie.
NB :
-L'avis de recrutement détaillé est également disponible sur le site www.criburkina.com ;
– Pour toute information complémentaire, appeler le +226 25 47 64 01 ou 51 22 46 39.
« Je suis la résurrection et la vie. Celui qui croit en moi, même s'il meurt, vivra » Jean 11, 25
Sa Majesté Naaba Zoom-Wobgo de Andemtenga,
La grande famille KABORÉ à Andemtenga, Koupéla, Pouytenga, Ouagadougou et en Côte d'Ivoire,
Les familles BONEGO et BANGRE à Zonatenga, Fada N'Gourma, Ouagadougou, Kampouaga, Tenkodogo et Abidjan,
La famille GUIGUI à Tiébélé, Ouagadougou et Bobo-Dioulasso,
Les familles alliées,
Le Docteur KABORÉ Issa et ses enfants,
Le Colonel-major à la retraite BONEGO Maxime, son épouse et leurs enfants,
Profondément touchés par les nombreuses marques de compassion, de fraternité et de solidarité qui leur ont été témoignées à l'occasion du rappel à Dieu, le 05 février 2026, puis de l'inhumation, le 06 février 2026, de leur épouse, fille, belle-fille, sœur, mère et tante bien-aimée,
Docteure KABORE née BONEGO Marthe
adressent leurs sincères et pieux remerciements à toutes les personnes qui, de près ou de loin, leur ont apporté un soutien moral, spirituel, matériel et financier en cette douloureuse circonstance.
Ils expriment particulièrement leur reconnaissance :
• aux autorités du Ministère de la Santé ;
• au personnel du CHU Yalgado Ouédraogo ;
• au Conseil National de l'Ordre des Médecins du Burkina Faso ;
• à la délégation de l'Institut National de Santé Publique ;
• au personnel de RESADE ;
• au clergé de la paroisse Saint Charles Lwanga de Wayalghin ;
• aux Communautés Catholiques de Base (CCB) Saint Kisito et Sainte Cécile de Wayalghin ;
• aux promotionnaires, amis et collègues de Dr KABORÉ Issa et de Dr KABORÉ née BONEGO Marthe ;
• aux voisins et à la jeunesse de Wayalghin.
À tous ceux dont les noms n'ont pu être cités ici, mais dont la présence, les prières, les gestes de réconfort et les diverses manifestations de soutien ont été d'un grand secours, les familles renouvellent leur profonde gratitude.
Que le Seigneur, dans son infinie miséricorde, rende à chacun au centuple ses bienfaits.
Union de prières !
Credit: US Department of Defense / Wiki Commons
By Herbert Wulf
Apr 6 2026 (IPS)
Donald Trump ran on a platform of ending wars. After his success in Venezuela, he is intoxicated by his military achievements and is banking on regime change in several countries.
In a swift and decisive move, US forces abducted Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro and his wife to the United States. The current government in Caracas has little choice but to largely submit to Washington’s dictates. Trump’s motives for the war against Iran remain unclear, partly because the US president has cited various reasons: to finally destroy the Iranian nuclear program, to end the Iranian threat to the Middle East, to support the Iranian people, and to overthrow the terrible regime in Tehran. He remains vague about his reasoning and seems to make off the cuff suggestions for regime change. Trump had a lofty idea at how he envisions the end of this war. He has suggested “unconditional surrender,” followed by his personal involvement in the selection of a successor: I must be involved in picking Iran’s next leader.
The swift victory against Iran failed to materialize, an end to the war is not in sight, and a new leader has been chosen without Trump’s involvement. The structures of the mullah regime appear so entrenched that the anticipated regime change following the rapid decapitation of the leadership did not occur. Yet Donald Trump had proclaimed: “What we did in Venezuela is, in my opinion, the perfect, the perfect scenario.” The Atlantic calls this attitude a “hostile corporate takeover of an entire country”. Now the US government expects Cuba to surrender. “I think I could do anything I want” with Cuba, Trump declared, now that the island is virtually cut off from energy supplies and its economy is in ruins. He is demanding the removal of Cuban President Diaz-Canel.
In the business world hostile corporate takeovers sometimes work, sometimes they fail. Similarly with Trump’s idea of swift government surrenders. In the case of Iran, he was misguided by the Wall Street playbook. Irresponsibly, he called on Iranians to overthrow the government before the bombing campaign started. Regime change in Iran has now been forgotten and Trump is agnostic about democracy. He is interested to get the oil price down and the stock market up.
Lessons from the past
The concept of regime change—replacing the top of the government to install one more agreeable to the US—is not new to US foreign policy. Proponents of regime change usually point to Japan and Germany as positive examples of successful democratization. Often, however, the goal is not, or at least not primarily, democratization, but rather the installation of a government that is ideologically close to the US or amenable to them. But the “Trump Corollary”, as explicitly stated in the National Security Strategy to enforce the Monroe Doctrine, is not new either. In reality, it was already the Kennedy, Nixon, Reagan, and Bush doctrine.
Both Trump’s idea of regime change and his rigorously pursued territorial ambitions (Canada, Greenland, the Panama Canal) are reminiscent of the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, particularly the version of this doctrine expanded by President Roosevelt in 1904. This doctrine legitimized American interventions in Latin America. At the beginning of the 20th century, the US intervened in numerous Latin American countries in ‘its backyard’, using military and intelligence means: in Colombia, to support Panamanian separatists in controlling the Panama Canal; repeatedly in the Dominican Republic; they occupied Cuba from 1906 to 1909 and intervened there repeatedly afterward; in Nicaragua during the so-called ‘Banana War’, to protect the interests of the US company United Fruit; in Mexico, as well as in Haiti and Honduras.
The New York Times recently suggested that Trump’s current enthusiasm for regime change is most comparable to that of Dwight D. Eisenhower. During his two terms in office from 1953 to 1961, the once coldly calculating general allowed himself to be seduced into a downward spiral from one coup to the next. In 1953, the US succeeded in overthrowing the elected Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh with Operation Ajax. Mossadegh wanted to nationalize the British-owned oil industry. The coup succeeded with CIA support. The US installed the Shah as its puppet. He ruled with absolute power until the so-called Iranian Revolution and the dictatorship of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979. After the successful overthrow of the government in Iran, Eisenhower decided to intervene in Guatemala. The elected president, Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán, who initiated far-reaching land reform laws, was overthrown in a coup d’état in 1954 and replaced by the pro-American colonel, Castillo Armas.
During this period, the US government also formulated the so-called domino theory, which aimed to prevent governments, particularly in Asia, from aligning themselves with the Soviet Union. The assumption was that if one domino fell, others would follow. It was during this time that the costly war in Korea ended in an armistice. Therefore, countries like Vietnam, Laos, Burma, Indonesia, and others were on Eisenhower’s domino list. However, the destabilization campaigns carried out by the CIA sometimes had the opposite effect. Governments in Indonesia and Syria emerged strengthened from the interventions. Eisenhower left Kennedy with the loss of American influence in Cuba. The failed Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961, intended to overthrow Fidel Castro, was the starting point for the decades-long blockade of Cuba, which Trump is determined to end now through regime change.
The most dramatic example of failed regime change in recent history is undoubtedly the Iraq War, which began in 2003 under President George W. Bush. The stated goal was to remove Saddam Hussein from power and destroy his weapons of mass destruction. The war led to the overthrow of the regime. The United Nations and US teams found no weapons of mass destruction despite intensive on-site investigations. Attempts to establish an orderly state in Iraq failed. These experiences, and especially the disastrous outcome of two decades of military intervention in Afghanistan, discredited the concept of regime change.
What are the implications?
The most important lesson taught by efforts to affect externally forced regime change is that interventions often lead to crises that were ostensibly meant to be prevented or solved. The temptation was too great for Trump to miss the opportunity to depose the despised Maduro government.
Scholarly studies of the numerous attempted regime changes and democratization efforts reveal three key findings. First, simply removing the government from power (whether through assassination, as in the case of Saddam Hussein in Iraq or now in Iran, or through kidnapping as in Venezuela) is insufficient, as such actions often lead to chaos, state collapse, or even civil war. Thus, it will be interesting to watch further developments in Venezuela, Cuba, and Iran.
A second lesson from empirical studies of regime change is that democratization is more likely to succeed if democratic experience already existed in the country. However, this is often not the case.
Finally, if the real goal is democratization (and not just to secure spheres of influence or oil supplies etc.), it is far more promising not only to hold elections (as in Afghanistan, for example), but to renounce violence and initiate a long-term program with development aid and support for civil society.
Whether the US government will be impressed by these findings, or even acknowledge them, is doubtful. Currently, the American president is euphoric, despite the strong reaction from the Iranian government which he, surprisingly, did not expect. His promises to end the senseless wars and not start any new ones, however, seem to have been forgotten.
Related articles:
The US: Good at Starting but Bad at Ending Wars
Failure of US–Iran Talks Was All Too Predictable — But Turning to Military Strikes Creates Dangerous Unknowns
The ‘Donroe Doctrine’
The Return of the Ugly American
Herbert Wulf is a Professor of International Relations and former Director of the Bonn International Center for Conflict Studies (BICC). He is presently a Senior Fellow at BICC, an Adjunct Senior Researcher at the Institute for Development and Peace, University of Duisburg/Essen, Germany, and a Research Affiliate at the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Otago, New Zealand. He serves on the Scientific Council of SIPRI.
This article was issued by the Toda Peace Institute and is being republished from the original with their permission.
IPS UN Bureau
Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
*Mercredi 8 avril 2026 : 20h veillee au domicile familiale
*Jeudi 9 avril :
* 6h30 : levée du corps à la morgue pour le domicile familiale
* 8h30 : départ pour l'absoute a l'eglise
Paroissiale Saint Charles Lwanga de wayalghin
* 9h00mn : Absoute
* Enterrement au cimetière de Borgo.
2 Timothée 4,2 : J'ai combattu le bon combat, j'ai achevé la course
Credit: Mamunur Rashid/NurPhoto via AFP
By Inés M. Pousadela
MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Apr 6 2026 (IPS)
Bangladesh’s first credible election in nearly two decades delivered a landslide win for the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and its leader Tarique Rahman, son of a former prime minister, just back from 17 years of self-imposed exile.
The election was made possible by a Generation Z-led uprising that security forces sought to repress by killing at least 1,400 people. The protest that began when young people rose up against a job quota system that functioned as a tool of patronage grew into a movement that brought down a government. Many protesters wanted something beyond the ousting of an authoritarian government, calling for old politics to be swept aside and young people to have a genuine say in government. What’s resulted falls short of that, and Bangladesh’s new government should be aware that unless it delivers genuine change, protests could rise again.
The uprising
The 2024 protests that toppled Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina began when Bangladesh’s High Court reinstated a 30 per cent quota for descendants of 1971 independence war veterans, leaving less than half of public sector jobs open to recruitment based on merit. In a country with acute youth unemployment, frustrated young people rejected this system as a vehicle for Awami League patronage. Coordinated by the Students Against Discrimination network, the movement spread nationwide through road and railway blockades.
The government’s response turned a policy dispute into a political crisis. Members of the Awami League’s student wing attacked protesters. Authorities imposed a nationwide curfew with a shoot-on-sight order, shut down the internet and directed security forces to fire lethal weapons into crowds. But the repression backfired. People used their phones to document every incident, and footage circulated widely after internet access was partly restored, directly undermining the government’s narrative that cast protesters as violent agitators. The killing of student coordinator Abu Sayed, filmed as he stood unarmed with arms outstretched before police opened fire, became the uprising’s defining image.
On 5 August 2024, facing a mass march on her residence, Hasina fled to India on an army helicopter. As CIVICUS’s 2026 State of Civil Society Report sets out, Bangladesh’s Gen Z-led uprising went on to inspire subsequent protests in Indonesia, Nepal and beyond.
Reforms in the balance
Three days after Hasina fled, Nobel Peace Prize-winning economist Muhammad Yunus was sworn in as Chief Adviser of an interim government. This was a victory for the student movement, which had made clear it would not accept a military-backed administration. His government established reform commissions covering the constitution, corruption, judiciary, police and public administration, and negotiated the July National Charter with political parties: 84 proposals designed to reduce the concentration of power in the prime minister’s office and make it structurally harder for any future government to capture the state the way Hasina had. Most parties signed it in October 2025.
But the path to the election was neither clean nor consensual. The International Crimes Tribunal, a domestic judicial body reinstated by the interim government, convicted Hasina in absentia for crimes against humanity and sentenced her to death. In May 2025, the interim government banned the Awami League under anti-terrorism legislation. International observers warned that excluding the country’s largest party risked disenfranchising millions and undermining the election’s democratic credibility.
The election timing was also bitterly contested: the BNP, eager to capitalise on its frontrunner status, pushed for an early date, while the newly formed National Citizen Party (NCP), founded by Gen Z protesters, wanted more time to organise and for institutional reforms to be locked in first. The BNP prevailed.
A dynasty returns
The BNP and its allies won 209 of 299 contested seats, securing a decisive two-thirds parliamentary majority. The right-wing Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami — whose 2013 ban the interim government lifted — emerged as the main opposition with close to 80 seats, its best-ever result. The NCP won just six of the 30 seats it contested.
The NCP’s poor showing had partly structural causes — formed in February 2025, it had barely a year to build an organisation with limited funds and no networks beyond urban centres — and was partly self-inflicted. A decision to ally with Jamaat-e-Islami as part of an 11-party coalition alienated many young voters who had hoped for genuinely new politics. Prominent NCP figures resigned in protest and stood as independents. NCP leader Nahid Islam, just 27 years old, did win a seat, and the party has pledged to rebuild in opposition.
The election itself was a genuine improvement on Bangladesh’s recent history. Turnout reached 60 per cent, up from 42 per cent in the fraud-ridden 2024 poll. Over 60 per cent of voters endorsed the July Charter in a referendum that was held alongside the election, giving the reform agenda a democratic mandate the new government will find difficult to ignore. Yet the vote would have been more legitimate had all parties been permitted to compete freely, and the campaign was not fully free of violence either: rights groups documented that at least 16 political activists were killed in the run-up to polling day.
Now the BNP inherits a state apparatus politicised over decades of one-party dominance and holds a two-thirds parliamentary majority with no meaningful check on its authority. Whether it will govern differently from those it replaced, or simply settle into the same logic of power, remains to be seen. The young people whose uprising made this election possible are watching. They have already brought down one government. The new one would do well to remember this.
Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Head of Research and Analysis, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report. She is also a Professor of Comparative Politics at Universidad ORT Uruguay.
For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org
Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
La grande famille SINARE à Zitenga, Ouagadougou et Abidjan,
– Monsieur SINARE Karim à Ouagadougou,
– Monsieur SINARE Ablassé à Koudougou,
– Monsieur SINARE Ablassé à Fada N'Gourma,
– Monsieur KONSIEMBO Valentin à Ouagadougou,
La grande famille ZABSONRE à Tenkodogo et Ouagadougou,
– Monsieur YELBI Inoussa Claver et son épouse Marie Béatrice ZABSONRE à Ouagadougou,
– Colonel Major ZAMPALIGRE Harouna à Ouagadougou,
– Monsieur ZABSONRE Rodrigue Marie Stéphane à Ouagadougou,
– Monsieur ZABSONRE Rayangnewendé Yanick à Téma/Ghana,
Les familles alliées : NASSA, NANEMA, OUEDRAOGO, SORGHO, BERE, BAMBARA, YELBI, MINOUNGOU, ZAMPALIGRE,
Monsieur SINARE Omer Abdoul Dramane à Ouagadougou-Secteur 1,
Les enfants : Yann Frédéric Gautier Paling-Wendé, Astrid Marie Violaine, Maryse Gloria Wend-Kuuni,
Très touchés par vos nombreuses marques de compassion, d'affection, d'amitié et de réconfort, vous réitèrent leurs sincères remerciements et leur reconnaissance, pour vos soutiens multiformes que vous leur avez témoignés lors de la maladie, du rappel à Dieu le 28 mars 2026 et de l'inhumation le 30 mars 2026, de leur fille, nièce, sœur, belle-fille, belle-sœur, tante, épouse, mère :
Mme SINARE/ZABSONRE W. Diane Clémence
Ils se réservent le droit de citer des noms de peur d'en oublier. Que Dieu le Tout-Puissant récompense chacun au centuple ses bienfaits.
Par ailleurs, ils vous informent que la grande messe de requiem aura lieu le dimanche 12 avril 2026 à 09H00 à la Cathédrale de l'Immaculée Conception de Ouagadougou.
Que par la miséricorde de Dieu, l'âme de SINARE/ZABSONRE W. Diane Clémence repose en paix.
« Je ne meurs pas, j'entre dans la vie » Sainte Thérèse de l'enfant Jésus.
NAABA SONRÉ, Chef du Canton de Ouéguédo et ses notables,
Le Zangue-Naaba de Ouéguédo,
Les épouses KOUDOUGOU Antoinette et KÉRÉ Goudouma,
MINOUNGOU Sanré Christian à Ouagadougou,
Ses frères, sœurs, cousins et cousines, neveux et nièces, enfants et
petits-enfants ;
Ont la profonde douleur de vous annoncer le décès de leur cousin,
père, beau-père, grand-père, arrière-grand-père ;
Le Kosnaaba de Ouéguédo MINOUNGOU Bila Donatien le 1 e r avril
2026 au CHU de Bogodogo à 81ans dans sa 53ième année de règne.
Le programme des obsèques s'établit comme suit :
MINOUNGOU Bila Donatien
Kosnaaba de Ouéguédo Levée du corps suivie du transfert à Ouéguédo, Commune de
Tenkodogo, province du Boulgou le lundi 6 avril 2026 à 13h à la
1945 - 1 e r avril 2026 morgue du CHU de Bogodogo
Veillée de prières le lundi 6 avril 2026 à partir de 20 h au
La famille MINOUNGOU à Ouéguédo, Zanghin, Kougsabla, domicile familial ;
Tenkodogo, Gomissi, Bittou, Lioulgou, Ouagadougou, en Côte Messe d'absoute à l'église saint Camille de la paroisse de
Ouéguédo le mardi 7 avril 2026 à partir de 10h ;
d'Ivoire, au Ghana, au Luxembourg, en Belgique et au Canada ;
Enterrement à partir de 11h en famille.
Les familles alliées : SAMANDOULGOU, ZANGA , KOUDOUGOU ,
KÉRÉ , BALIMA, SANA, YAMYAOGO, KORGHO, SORGHO, Que par la miséricorde de Dieu l'âme de papa Donatien repose en
TARNAGDA, YAMMA, NOKBAONGO, OUÉDRAOGO, SÉONÉ , paix.
KAFANDO, SORGHO, TARZÉMA, OUBDA, SÉCRÉ et ZABSONRÉ ;
Union de prières.