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Book about Wagner PMC

CSDP Blog (András István Türke) - Wed, 04/24/2024 - 06:48
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Russia’s Wagner PMC (Wagner Group):
Establishment, purpose, profile and historic relevance worldwide

> Autors: Besenyö, Janos – Türke, András István – Szénási, Endre 
> Publisher: Helion
> EUVI/ CERPESC Contribution: Wagner PMC in Africa
> COMING SOON (Spring 2024)

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The Wagner Group is symbolic of Russia’s deployment of private military companies (PMCs) to exercise influence in Africa, the Middle East and Europe since the mid-2010s. Nominally an independent commercial enterprise, but actually operating on behalf of the Russian government, and in close cooperation with the Ministry of Defence and its Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), and the Federal Security Service (FSB), it has been deployed to perform a very wide range of military and paramilitary tasks, provide security, and collect intelligence. 

Through much of its existence, the activity of the Wagner Group appears to have been clandestine and poorly recorded. In practice, the operating principles of this PMC have been very similar to those of numerous similar enterprises from the West.

Since its failed coup attempt in the summer of 2023, the fate of the Wagner Group appears to be sealed. Indeed, presently, it is highly unlikely that a Russian PMC might ever again have the same power and influence that Wagner once wielded. However, this does not mean that such all such enterprises have been completely disbanded: only that the Wagner Group has not (yet) been replaced by some other enterprise – whether Russian or foreign. In fact, we are witnessing a recurrent trend that is likely to become even more characteristic for conflicts in the coming decades as almost everybody who can afford to pay for the services of a PMC is hiring them. Indeed, numerous governments in control of relatively weak or disloyal armed forces have concluded that the deployment of a PMC holds significant advantages.

This two-part works examines the predecessors to the Wagner Group, and the establishment of the latter organisation by Yevgeny Prigozhin, its activities in a number of conflicts around the world, and its armed mutiny against the top leadership of the Russian Federation. It is thoroughly illustrated with authentic photographs and custom commissioned colour illustrations and maps.


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Categories: Blogroll, CSDP

EUNAVFOR ASPIDES : From the Red Sea to the Gulf 

CSDP Blog (András István Türke) - Tue, 02/20/2024 - 20:50

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19/02/2024: The European Union launched a naval mission (Aspides = Protektor in Greek) to protect commercial vessels in the Red Sea from attacks by Iran-backed Houthi rebels.

Since late 2023, as a result of Houthi attacks on maritime shipping, maritime security in the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Gulf has significantly degraded. The deterioration of the maritime security in the Red Sea has disrupted a key geopolitical area for international shipping. This affects negatively the EU as well as the wider international community.

Operation ASPIDES will contribute to restore and safeguard freedom of navigation, for the sake of the EU, the region, and the wider international community.

EUNAVFOR OPERATION ASPIDES, within its purely defensive mandate, will protect shipping targeted by attacks at sea or air. It will not conduct strikes on land. ASPIDES will act in line with the UN Security Council Resolution 2722, which demands the cessation of Houthis’ attacks on merchant and commercial vessels, and recognises the right to defend vessels against such attacks, in line with international law. Building upon the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, ASPIDES consolidates the EU’s capacity to respond rapidly to a global crisis, in cooperation with like-minded international partners, while reinforcing the strategic autonomy of the EU.

The force commander Stefano Constantino was former tactical commander of the Operation AGENOR operation in the Strait of Hormuz from 6 July 2022 to January 2023. AGENOR was the military component of the European led Maritime Awareness in the Strait of Hormuz (EMASoH) established at the beginning of 2020 by the governments of Denmark, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal (to which was recently added also Norway) in order to guarantee the safety of navigation in an area of ​​operation centered on the Strait of Hormuz and extended northwards to the entire Gulf and southwards to the area of ​​the Indian Ocean located along the Omani coasts.

Last year, Constantino held the position of tactical commander at sea of ​​Operation Safe Mediterranean (OSM), in a portion of the Mediterranean that goes from the west of Sardinia to include its entire central and eastern part.
Among the tasks of Operation Safe Mediterranean stand out the defense of maritime communication lines, the monitoring and protection of the national, merchant and fishing fleets, the increase in surveillance and the protection of the dense network of strategic underwater infrastructures that run on the seabed around the Peninsula, such as telephone and data transfer cables, electricity lines and gas pipelines. International, inter-ministerial cooperation and synergy in the field of maritime security with the countries bordering the Mediterranean complete the picture of the activities carried out by this important Operation to defend the free use of the sea.

OHQ: EU multunationalisable HQ, Larissa (Greece)
– OHQ: 130
– FHQ embarked on a Frigate: 30
Operation Area : From the Red Sea to the Gulf and a large part of the North-West Indian Ocean
Assets: 4 frigates + 1 aerial asset
Budget: €8 million
Participating States: Greece, France, Italy, Germany
Force commander: Rear Admiral Stefano Costantino (IT)
D-day: 19 February 2024 



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Categories: Blogroll, CSDP

Adaptive Hussars 2023

CSDP Blog (András István Türke) - Wed, 11/15/2023 - 08:22

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Joint NATO Military Exercice in Hungary: In November 2023, under the name ADAPTIVE HUSSARS 2023, the Hungarian Defence Forces are going to hold a multinational domestic military exercise with the participation of NATO forces in order to test the defence capabilities of the country. The objective of the exercise is to test the military’s readiness for and response to an imagined situation threatening Hungary’s security.

The Hungarian Defence Forces will be carrying out military operations on several spots around the country, with the objective of strengthening cooperation between the HDF and the civilian public administration.

This is the Largest Military Exercise in Hungary in 30 Years, the population must be advised that in the framework of this multinational exercise, increased military traffic will be moving on major and minor roads at several places in Hungary between 2 and 26 November. 

Adaptive Hussars 23 involves around 5,000 Hungarian troops, including 500 reservists.

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Categories: Blogroll, CSDP

New CERPESC site 2023

CSDP Blog (András István Türke) - Wed, 08/23/2023 - 20:33

The new site of CERPESC started to be developed!  The old site remain available here 



Updated page : Burkina Faso


New pages : Rwanda and Burundi


Updated page : Trade Policy


Nouvelle série : Les Manuels du CERPESC

More news→ (function(i,s,o,g,r,a,m){i['GoogleAnalyticsObject']=r;i[r]=i[r]||function(){ (i[r].q=i[r].q||[]).push(arguments)},i[r].l=1*new Date();a=s.createElement(o), m=s.getElementsByTagName(o)[0];a.async=1;a.src=g;m.parentNode.insertBefore(a,m) })(window,document,'script','//','ga'); ga('create', 'UA-40360849-1', ''); ga('send', 'pageview');

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Categories: Blogroll, CSDP

Book about North Africa and the Sahel Region

CSDP Blog (András István Türke) - Tue, 08/22/2023 - 19:40

Terrorism and Political Contention in North Africa and the Sahel Region 

> Editors: János Besenyő, Leonid Issaev, & Andrey Korotayev

> Publisher: Springer

> COMING SOON (2023)

The book analyzes factors of political contention in North Africa and the Sahel after the Arab Spring. The sharp increase in the terrorist activity in the Sahel after the Arab Spring led to serious destabilization, as well as the emergence of new and re-actualization of old conflicts in the region. A number of terrorist groups have emerged and/or intensified their activities, including ones associated with al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (AQIM, DNIM, ISGS, ISWAP, etc.). In a number of cases, full-scale Islamists insurgencies emerged and provoked increased external interference in the affairs of the region. The aforementioned processes led to the fact that the position of some of the great powers and countries present in North Africa and the Sahel region weakened or even strengthened, so they had to re-evaluate their previous policies. The effect of this is even less visible now, but in the long term it will clearly affect the security of the region and the processes taking place there. This is also true for the current Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the effects of which are already visible in the countries of the African continent and whose impact on the security of the region will entail serious challenges. The book proposes to analyze and generalize organization forms and dynamics of the terrorism and conflict in North Africa and the Sahel region.

EUVI/CERPESC contributions : 

(5) “Chasse gardée » or « faubourg »?: Politico-Military Interventions of France in the Sahel Region
(Andras Istvan Türke – Europa Varietas Institute, Switzerland and African Research Institute of Óbuda University, Budapest)


On September 11, 2006 Ayman Al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda’s number two announced that France is as much their enemies as the USA and the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat has become France`s number one enemy in the field of terrorism. In the Sahel region, France increased its presence after 2008 with counter-terrorist operations against jihadist organizations. The operations of special commandos were followed and accompanied by specific intervention operations. The Libyan intervention and the disintegration of Libya (2011) had a drastic domino effect. States are disintegrating, jihadist organizations (based on historical precedents from the 19th century) are multiplying and strengthening, and in many cases, they also perform state functions and are increasingly popular among the local population. With the weakening and elimination of state factors, the local legal bases for the fight against jihadist terrorist organizations have disappeared. The chapter focuses on French interventions in the Sahel region, especially on the relations with Chad, on the operations in the “peripheral regions” (in Mauritania, Djibouti and Somalia) and finally on today`s French anti-jihadist operations and their geopolitical context, with particular attention to the Task Force SabreServal and Barkhane operations.

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Categories: Blogroll, CSDP

Livre sur l`Afrique francophone

CSDP Blog (András István Türke) - Mon, 08/21/2023 - 19:55

Frankofón Afrika (Afrique francophone) (HU)

> Editeur: CUF Szeged

> Rédacteur-en-chef: Brucker, Balázs – Kruzslicz, Péter

> Parution prévue: octobre 2023

Contribution de l`Institut Europa Varietas (CERPESC):

Türke, Andras Istvan:
A CEDEAO (Nyugat-afrikai Államok Gazdasági Közössége) a nyugat-afrikai integrációs törekvések tükrében
La CEDEAO de l`aspect de l`intégration de l`Afrique occidentale

Türke, Andras Istvan:
Az afrikai Nagy tavak térségének frankofón államai – A Kongói Demokratikus Köztársaság, Ruanda és Burundi
Les Etats de la région des grands lacs en Afrique – L`histoire contemporaine de la République Démocratique du Congo, du Rwanda et du Burundi

(Illustration: Tiffet; Source:

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Categories: Blogroll, CSDP

EU finance Rwanda`s troop in Capo Delgado (Mozambique)

CSDP Blog (András István Türke) - Sat, 07/15/2023 - 19:02

The intervention by 3,000 Rwandan soldiers and police officers was partly financed by the European Peace Facility, a mechanism that enables it to “support partners in the fields of defense in order to prevent conflicts and strengthen international security.”

The Rwandan military benefited from assistance worth €20 million, intended particularly for the transport of troops and the purchase of equipment (tents, vehicles, generators, and so on).

Since 2021 Rwanda Security Forces were deployed to fight terrorists,  there base is in Mocimboa da Praia.

“In 2018, a contingent of 160-300 people of Wagner PMC  arrived in Mozembique  to help fight against jihadists (Al Shabab, 1 500 – 4 000 people) settled in the northern part of the country, who were posing a threat for the Cabo Delgado gas fields. Fighting alongside the 12 000-strong Mozambican Army, Wagner was given the Nacala base in August 2019. President Filipe Nyusi and Putin signed a bilateral defence agreement. Nevertheless, the Wagner Group finally left the country in May 2020 because it suffered very serious losses. ” (See more details)

Source of image

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France-Croatia: Enhanced Cooperation

Old CSDP Blog (András István Türke) - Fri, 11/26/2021 - 19:33

Croatia's purchase of Rafales aircraft appears to be a hallmark of an important new geopolitical alliance. The strengthened Franco-Croatian cooperation has 6 pillars and is organized by three-year projects

1.) The first pillar deals with strengthening political cooperation and partnership at bilateral and European level.
2.) The second pillar deals with enhanced dialogue and a privileged relationship with South-Eastern Europe.
3.) The third part is devoted to joint cooperation in the environment and international organizations, France's support for Croatia's path to Schengen, the euro zone, the OECD.
4.) The fourth pillar concerns the strengthening of military cooperation, which provides an opportunity to make better use of the funds available within the EU to strengthen military capabilities and the military industry.
5.) The fifth pillar concerns the strategic partnership linked to the strengthening of economic, cultural, scientific and university cooperation.
6.) The sixth part concerns administrative cooperation.

Tag: FranceCroatieRafale
Categories: Blogroll, CSDP

SNA Suffren's first trip to the sea

Old CSDP Blog (András István Türke) - Tue, 04/28/2020 - 00:00

The French Navy’s new nuclear attack submarine made its first sea trip on April 28

Tag: Suffren
Categories: Blogroll, CSDP

Opération Résilience

Old CSDP Blog (András István Türke) - Wed, 04/22/2020 - 14:10

BPC Mistral (Antilles et Guyane), BPC Dixmude (Réunion) et BPC Tonnerre (Corse) sont mobilisés.

Tag: BPCOpération Résilience
Categories: Blogroll, CSDP

North Macedonia becomes NATO’s 30th member

Old CSDP Blog (András István Türke) - Sat, 03/21/2020 - 20:43

“North Macedonia is now part of the NATO family, a family of 30 nations and almost 1 billion people. A family based on the certainty that, no matter what challenges we face, we are all stronger and safer together," NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said in a statement. Macedonian President Stevo Pendarovski said: "We cannot rejoice and mark the event as it should [be marked] … But, this is a historic success that after three decades of independence, finally confirms Macedonian security and guarantees our future. Congratulations to all of you! We deserve it!”

Pendarovski signed the so-called instrument of accession after Spain earlier in the week became the last alliance member to ratify the former Yugoslav republic’s membership.

Since gaining independence, one of the strategic goals of the country was to join NATO, as was stated in 1993, and the relationship with Alliance was always marked by close cooperation. North Macedonia joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1995, and in 1999 the country submitted its first Membership Action Plan. Furthermore, North Macedonia deployed troops in support of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan from 2002 to end 2014 and is currently supporting the follow-on Resolute Support mission to train, advise and assist the Afghan security forces. Before that, the country was a key partner in supporting NATO-led operations in Kosovo in 1999, as well as to provide logistical support to the Kosovo Force (KFOR) mission.

The 20th NATO Summit in Bucharest in 2008 was more than symbolic, as it was expected that Albania, Croatia and (then) Macedonia would receive an invitation to join NATO. However, although Albania and Croatia did receive the invitation and became members a year later.

It marks the end of a long quest for the former Yugoslav republic. Joining NATO and the European Union has been a priority for its leaders, but a dispute with neighboring Greece over the country’s name stalled progress for more than two decades. North Macedonia previously was known as FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), a name it shared with a Greek province. Under a 2017 deal with Athens, the country changed its name and Greece agreed to drop objections to its NATO and eventual EU membership.

On the other hand, Kržalovski thinks that until now the participation of North Macedonia in NATO mission was symbolic.

“We have also increased defense part of the budget, though we are not at the level of 2% of the GDP yet. As a small country, both the requirements and expectations from other members are not so high, and our participation so far in NATO missions were rather symbolic, although we have participated with a relatively high number of soldiers in proportion to the overall size of the Army”, explains Kržalovski.

The budget increase that he mentions is DEN 10,133,000,000 for 2020, or about 1.4% of North Macedonia’s total GDP, which is an increase over 2019 when it was about 1.19% of total GDP. Interestingly, this is a third year of the defense budget increase, but it is still far from the prescribed 2% of BDP. However, this is not a major problem, as many current NATO members have not fulfilled this provision.


Categories: Blogroll, CSDP

Accident au Mali

Old CSDP Blog (András István Türke) - Tue, 11/26/2019 - 00:00

13 morts. Il s'agit du bilan humain le plus lourd pour les opérations extérieures de l'Armée française depuis 36 ans. Le 23 octobre 1983, 58 soldats français avaient été tués lors de l'attentat du Drakkar à Beyrouth (Liban). L'accident de lundi dépasse le bilan de l'embuscade d'Uzbin en Afghanistan, le 18 août 2008, où dix Français avaient perdu la vie.

Tag: Mali
Categories: Blogroll, CSDP

HMS Prince of Wales will be commissioned soon

Old CSDP Blog (András István Türke) - Mon, 11/18/2019 - 00:00

HMS Prince of Wales, second Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carrier for the Royal Navy will be formally commissioned on December, 10 2019.

Tag: HMS Prince of Wales
Categories: Blogroll, CSDP

SCAF : The New Franco-German Aircraft

Old CSDP Blog (András István Türke) - Wed, 06/26/2019 - 15:15

SCAF : Future Combat Air System

Categories: Blogroll, CSDP

Conférence et Table-Ronde "Renforcer l'économie de l'UE: la perspective du V4-France"

Old CSDP Blog (András István Türke) - Wed, 03/06/2019 - 11:09

18-19 février 2019 Institut polonais des affaires internationales
compte rendu rédigé par Kinga Torbicka

Le 18 février 2019, à l'Institut polonais des affaires internationales a eu lieu la conférence "Renforcer l'économie de l'UE: la perspective V4-France”. Elle s'est déroulée dans le cadre du projet "Développement d'une nouvelle voie pour une coopération renforcée et améliorée V4-France" (cofinancée par les gouvernements de la République tchèque, de la Hongrie, de la Pologne et de la Slovaquie grâce aux subventions du Fonds international de Visegrad). Le lendemain ont eu lieu des ateliers d'experts sur la compétitivité et l'intégration dans l'Union européenne de la perspective du groupe de Visegrad et de la France ainsi que sur l'avenir de „l'Europe sociale”.

En tant qu'organisation régionale à forte ambition géopolitique et économique, le groupe Visegrad doit redéfinir ses relations avec la France comme l'un des partenaires stratégiques en Europe. La volonté de renforcer le partenariat franco-allemand sur le forum européen, l'approche du Brexit va changer l'avenir du processus décisionnel au niveau de l'UE, sa dynamique de pouvoir et la construction d'une coalition. La nouvelle situation reste sans aucune doute un défi pour l’unité du V4 et la défense de leurs intérêts communs. Par conséquent, il est nécessaire de trouver un niveau de coopération socio-économique bilatérale et / ou multilatérale entre le V4 et la France.

Durant la première journée la conférence a servi aux échanges parmi des invités. Selon Daniel Bartha (Centre d'intégration euro-atlantique et de démocratie) du point de vue du pragmatisme économique, la France reste et restera à jamais un partenaire plus important pour la Hongrie que d’un point de vue politique. Vincent Biret (Conseiller pour les affaires économiques de l'ambassade de France en Pologne) estime que la coopération entre la France et le V4 crée des fondements importants pour la coopération au niveau de l'UE.

Emmanuel Macron, dans son discours à la Sorbonne à Paris le 26 septembre 2017, a souligné la nécessité de réformes dans l'UE afin de protéger l'économie européenne. Pour la France, le V4 reste un partenaire économique important en Europe. Une éventuelle coopération peut avoir lieu dans le cadre du marché unique numérique. Cette position est partagée par Martin Michelot (Institut Européen pour la politique européenne).

La République tchèque considère la France comme un partenaire important dans le commerce et l’investissement. Matej Navrátil (Département des sciences politiques, Université Comenius) a souligné que le V4 reste une force économique régionale importante. La Slovaquie, en tant que membre de la zone euro, participe à presque tous les projets ID. Selon Sebastian Płóciennik (Institut polonais des affaires internationales), l'Allemagne, en raison de sa proximité avec les pays du V4 et de la vigueur de son économie, reste un partenaire économique important en tant que facteur d'équilibre de la coopération germano-française.

L’adaptation des réglementations légales, y compris les réglementations fiscales, au développement de la coopération économique dans de nouveaux domaines, tels que les nouvelles technologies, l’innovation, le secteur bancaire et les infrastructures, constitue le défi le plus important auquel sont actuellement confrontés les pays de V4. Le projet de la création d’une zone de développement industriel en Europe centrale à l’instar de la "Silicon Valley” constitue un défi pour l’avenir.

Il est important de montrer la coopération entre le V4 et la France dans un contexte européen. Il existe de nombreux problèmes communs dans lesquels il est possible de rapprocher (ou non) le V4 de la France: le budget de l'UE, le changement climatique, la Chine, l'union bancaire et les règles de la compétitivité.

Un rapport spécial sera publié à la fin de 2019.


18-19 luty 2019 Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych
Konferencja i warsztaty „Wzmocnienie gospodarki UE: perspektywa V4-Francja”

18 lutego 2019 roku w Polskim Instytucie Spraw Międzynarodowych miała miejsce konferencja „Wzmocnienie gospodarki UE: perspektywa V4-Francja” zorganizowana w ramach projektu „Opracowanie nowej drogi dla wzmocnionej i ulepszonej współpracy V4-Francja” (współfinansowany przez rządy Czech, Węgier, Polski i Słowacji poprzez granty Wyszehradzkie z Międzynarodowego Funduszu Wyszehradzkiego). Następnego dnia miały miejsce warsztaty ekspertów dotyczące konkurencyjności i integracji w Unii Europejskiej z perspektywy Grupy Wyszehradzkiej i Francji oraz przyszłości „Europy socjalnej”.

Grupa Wyszehradzka jako organizacja regionalna z silnymi ambicjami geopolitycznymi i gospodarczymi w zaistniałej sytuacji musi przedefiniować swoje relacje z Francją, jako jednym ze strategicznych partnerów w Europie. Chęć wzmocnienia partnerstwa francusko-niemieckiego na forum europejskim, zbliżający się Brexit zmienią przyszłość procesu decyzyjnego na szczeblach UE, jej dynamikę władzy i budowanie koalicji. Nowa sytuacja stanowi bez wątpienia wyzwanie dla jedności V4 i obrony wspólnych interesów. Wobec tego konieczne jest znalezienie płaszczyzny społeczno-ekonomicznej współpracy bilateralnej i/lub multilateralnej między V4 a Francją.

Według Daniel Bartha (Centre for Euro-Atlantic Integration and Democracy). Z punktu widzenia ekonomicznego pragmatyzmu Francja jest i będzie dla Węgier ważniejszym partnerem niż z perspektywy politycznej. Vincent Biret (Conseiller do spraw ekonomicznych Ambasady Francji w Polsce) uważa, że współpraca między Francją a V4 stwarza ważne fundamenty kooperacji na płaszczyźnie UE. Emmanuel Macron w swojej przemowie na Sorbonie w Paryżu 26 września 2017 roku podkreślał, że w UE jest potrzeba reform aby chronić gospodarkę europejską. Dla Francji V4 pozostaje ważnym partnerem gospodarczym w Europie. Potencjalna możliwa współpraca może odbywać się w ramach jednolitego rynku cyfrowego. Stanowisko to podziela Martin Michelot (EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy). Republika Czeska postrzega Francję jako istotnego partnera w wymianie handlowej i inwestycjach. Matej Navrátil (Departament of Poliitcal Science, Comenius University) podkreślił, że V4 pozostaje znaczącą regionalną siłą ekonomiczną.

Słowacja jako członek strefy euro uczestniczy w prawie wszystkich projektach DI. Zdaniem Sebastiana Płóciennika (Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych) Niemcy ze względu na bliskie sąsiedztwo z krajami V4 i silną gospodarką pozostają ważnym partnerem ekonomicznym jako czynnik równoważący współpracę Niemcy-Francja. Najważniejszym wyzwaniem jakie stoi obecnie przed państwami V4 to dostosowanie regulacji prawnych, w tym podatkowych do rozwoju współpracy gospodarczej w nowych dziedzinach, takich jak nowe technologie, innowacyjność, sektor bankowy, infrastruktura. Takim wyzwaniem może być stworzenie w Europie Środkowej na wzór „silicon valley” strefy rozwoju przemysłowego.

Ważne pozostaje ukazanie współpracy między V4 a Francją w kontekście europejskim. Pojawia się dużo wspólnych problemów, w których pojawia się możliwość zbliżenia (lub nie) między V4 a Francją: budżet UE, zmiany klimatyczne, Chiny, unia bankowa, zasady konkurencyjności.

Podsumowaniem dwudniowego spotkania ma być raport, który będzie opublikowany pod koniec 2019 roku.

Categories: Blogroll, CSDP

The European Intervention Initiative (EI2)

Old CSDP Blog (András István Türke) - Sat, 11/17/2018 - 22:22

The European Intervention Initiative (Initiative européenne d'intervention, EI2/IEI) was first proposed by French President Emmanuel Macron in his Sorbonne keynote in September 2017 and nine members signed a Letter of Intent (LoI) to begin work on 25 June 2018. France's motivation to establish this, and other European military projects, is to support its operations in the Sahel which it is struggling to maintain alone.

The ultimate aim of the EI2 is a shared strategic culture that would enhance the ability of its members to act together on missions as part of NATO, the EU, UN or other ad-hoc coalitions. The project is intented to be resource neutral and makes use of existing assets and other joint forces available to members. EI2 seeks for enhanced interaction on intelligence sharing, scenario planning, support operations and doctrine.

The starting point of the EI2 is the speech on Europe delivered on September 26, 2017 at the Sorbonne by President Macron during which in the field of defense, he "proposes now to try to build this culture. in common, by proposing a European intervention initiative aimed at developing this shared strategic culture. [...] At the beginning of the next decade, Europe will have to have a common intervention force, a common defense budget and a common doctrine to act ". The French will was to constitute a "hard core" ready to act very quickly in case of need as was the case in Mali where France mounted Operation Serval. in a few days. Not all IEI Member States will necessarily participate in each operation.

It is not a matter of creating a new rapid response force prepositioned as it already exists in the framework of NATO (with the NRF) or the CSDP (with the Battlegroups), or bilaterally for example between France and the United Kingdom (with CJEF (in). The means provided will be composed to specifically meet the needs of a crisis.
According to the LoI, the initiative will focus on enhanced interaction in four key areas: strategic foresight and intelligence sharing, scenario development and planning, operations support, and fourth. feedback and doctrine. To this end, the armed forces of the signatory countries will notably carry out exchanges of officers, joint exercises of anticipation and planning, the sharing of doctrines and the writing of joint scenarios of intervention.

The French Armed Forces Staff is responsible for organizing the effective launch of the IEI by holding the first Military European Strategic Talks (MEST) and developing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) here the end of the year 2018.

France's long-term ambition is to create a "common strategic culture". The French Minister of the Armed Forces, Florence Parly, specifies that it is about "developing between countries at the same time militarily capable and politically voluntary" habits "to work together, to be able to prepare, if necessary to be in capacity to intervene, where they decide, at the moment of their decision, on extremely varied scenarios ". German Federal Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen adds that "the aim is to create a forum, with like-minded states, who will analyze situations, who will have discussions early, when crises will manifest themselves in a region, and which, together, will be able to develop a political will".

Participating States
The signatory states on June 25, 2018 of the letter of intent are Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. Germany is initially reluctant for fear that this new initiative will weaken those taken since 2016 under the CSDP (notably the European Defense Action Plan and Permanent Structured Cooperation). The meeting of the Franco-German Council of Ministers on 19 June at Meseberg Castle, near Berlin, offers a positive response.

Italy participated in the preparatory meetings but the new government formed on 1 June 2018 asked for a reflection period. The participation of the United Kingdom, in the process of withdrawal from the European Union, illustrates the willingness of the British to remain leading partners in European security. Their participation, like that of Danes who are not part of the CSDP, is made possible by the fact that the EI2 is outside the institutional framework of the European Union. Finland confirmed, during the visit of French President Emmanuel Macron in Helsinki on 30 August 2018, its decision taken a few days earlier to join the European intervention initiative and its accession was validated on 7 November 2018 by the nine defense ministers of IEI member countries.

Relationship with PeSCo
The EI2 is the creation of a set of European states as prerequisites for joint operational commitments in various predefined military intervention scenarios. EI2 operationally complements Permanent Structured Cooperation (CSP or PeSCo) focused on the capability area. Based on Article 42.6 and Protocol 10 of the Treaty on European Union, PeSCp was introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, and first initiated in 2017.

EI2 seeks some synergies with the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) that has newly been established within the European Union's (EU) Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), and PESCO projects are intended to be integrated into the EI2 where feasible. France's concern is that developing the EI2 within PESCO would result in lengthy decision times or watered down ambition. This led to some tensions regarding the project between France and Germany, with the latter concerned that it would harm the EU's political cohesion. Including the EI2 within PESCO is also seen as problematic as it prevents the participation of the UK and Denmark.

The minimum number of participating states for cooperation under PESCO, according to the Lisbon Treaty, is nine. As the IEI does not fit within the institutional framework of the CSDP the number of participants is not limited.

NATO does not need such a structure anymore. Moreover it is very anacronistic at the moment or by the BREXIT one of the most powerful European armies will leave the Union. The participation of states, member of the EU but not member of the CSDP (Denmark) shows how this initiative can be considered serious.
The need for the establishment of the EI2 is highly questionable. One more idea of the political leaders (especially French) who instead of realizing and ensuring the conditions sine qua non of the programs already launched, the strengthening and modernization of the army. Everyone tinkers with his own new initiative, promises roaring never or little done. Why the battle groups do not work have never engaged? Instead of meeting this challenge rather another program with very nebulous goals, confused with lots of bullshits.
"A common doctrine to act" should be preceded by a "common strategy", but that of the EU is far from being a real strategy.

Tag: European Intervention InitiativeEI2Initiative européenne d'interventionIEIMEST
Categories: Blogroll, CSDP

Towards a New Russian Military Doctrine?

Old CSDP Blog (András István Türke) - Sat, 11/10/2018 - 20:59

According to Viktor Yesin, Russian weapons may simply be ineffective in case of an open armed confrontation. The point is about the withdrawal of the United States from the INF Treaty, which regulates the elimination of short and medium range missiles.

The Perimeter functions perfectly and has passed all stages of preparation and verification, the system can be used only if all of Russia's other nuclear weapons are destroyed as a result of the enemy's attack. This Russian system of automatic nuclear retaliation in the West is known as the Dead Hand.

The Perimeter system was put in operation in the USSR in 1985. In a nutshell, the system ensures the automatic launch of nuclear missiles in case of a nuclear attack against Russia, even if there is no one left to be able to give such an order. All the available data about the work of the system is served with such words as "probably," "possibly," and so on. No one knows how the system works exactly. In general, the Perimeter is a form of artificial intelligence that evaluates a multitude of factors about a nuclear attack on the basis of information received from radar stations, space satellites, seismic activity, etc.

Nuclear-capable missiles will thus be launched from silos, mobile launchers, strategic aircraft, submarines to strike pre-entered targets, unless there is no signal from the command center to cancel the attack. In general, even though there is little information available about the work of the Perimeter, one thing is known for sure: the doomsday machine is not a myth at all - it does exist.

The specialist is convinced that the United States can easily destroy Russia's nuclear arms. Without the INF Treaty, the USA will be able to deploy as many ballistic missiles as possible in Europe. According to Yesin, the Americans will thus be able not only to destroy Russian nuclear weapons, but to intercept them if Russia launches missiles to retaliate. The attack led to a massive nuclear exchange between the two countries that caused irreparable damage to the two states and claimed the lives of more than 400 million people.

Russia must revise its nuclear doctrine as soon as possible.

Source :

Tag: RussiaINF TreatyPerimeter
Categories: Blogroll, CSDP

New Failure of Europe of Defense : the Belgian F-35s

Old CSDP Blog (András István Türke) - Fri, 10/26/2018 - 12:34

Unsurprisingly, Belgium has announced that it has chosen the American F-35 fighter.Unsurprisingly, Belgium has announced that it has chosen the American F-35 fighter. Second betrayal of partners by Belgium, "heart of the European Union" since the 1970s. After 48 years, new proof to what extent Belgium's policy is influenced by the Americans, which was also the case in 1970. New proof to what extent European integration can be considered serious. Quo vadis European integration?

Why has Belgium once again turned its back on the European preference?

Thanks to two defining criteria that were insinuated in the specifications for the replacement of the F-16: the ability to carry a US-made nuclear bomb and stealth. Two crucial criteria for the success of the F-35. Belgium has been carrying out the nuclear mission on behalf of NATO for decades. The F-16s stationed at Kleine-Brogel (F-16A) are capable of carrying and dropping an American B-61 nuclear bomb. In any case, Brussels who wishes to keep it, had made it known.

This skewed the competition and favored the American F-35 against its four competitors: F / A-18E / F Super Hornet, Rafale F3R, JAS-39E / F Gripen and Eurofighter Typhoon. Only the F-35 will be able to carry out the mission of nuclear attack by carrying a B-61 American gravitational bomb. It is designed as dual capacity (conventional and nuclear) and should be able to carry a bomb B-61 in a later phase (!) of its development, probably from 2022 (!).

What is not the case for other contenders to Belgian market, with the exception of the Rafale, which already carries a nuclear weapon. However, Germany has also made a formal request to the United States to integrate the B-61 under the Eurofighter. In theory, this ability could also be certified on the European fighter. Not sure if Washington shares with anyone the firing and releasing codes of the B-61s.

"Within the Alliance, Belgium has accepted, five decades ago, that its fighter jets have both conventional and nuclear capabilities, taking into account a joint analysis of the global threat. NATO is asking us to continue to maintain our combat aircraft available for any such missions, and we look forward to meeting all our obligations in this regard, " said Belgian Foreign Minister Didier Reynders.

In addition, the Belgian Air Force is close to that of the Netherlands, which without hesitation bought eight F-35s in March 2015 on a target of 37 aircraft.

Despite the fact that about 38,000 signatures were collected against the idea of ​​equipping the Belgian air force with F-35 stealth fighter jets, the finance committee of the House of Representatives refused to hear the arguments opponents of this project.

The F-35 project is the most expensive project ever seen. The aircraft had several hundred defeats (hardver + software) his "brother" the F-22 Rapter, after it was put in place with the US Army, was less effective in the fight against the Eurofighter and the former F-16 is stealth is also highly doubtful.

Tag: BelgiumF-35RafaleEurofighter
Categories: Blogroll, CSDP