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Bad omens for Hollande

FT / Brussels Blog - Wed, 16/11/2016 - 07:55

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First, Emmanuel Macron, the young economic adviser the French president promoted as economy minister in 2014, is to confirm his presidential bid, whether or not his mentor decides to seek re-election next year.

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Categories: European Union

Education minister condemns killing of teachers in Yambio

Sudan Tribune - Wed, 16/11/2016 - 07:54

November 15, 2016 (YAMBIO) – The education, gender and social welfare minister in Gbudue, one of South Sudan's newly created states has condemned the killing of two teachers in the recent fighting that displaced pupils preparing for examinations.

The map of Western Equatoria in red

Addressing a public gathering in Yambio on Tuesday, Phillip Pia said the two teachers were killed in the recent fighting between armed groups who attacked the town, but were repulsed by the army.

“It is of great disappointment to see that we are killing teachers who are not supposed to be touched, we are killing the future,” said Pia.

One of those killed was a Mathematics teacher, while the other was the inspector of schools in Gbudue state, according to the minister.

Pia said government imports teachers from neighboring countries.

He further decried the fact that hundreds of pupils have fled their homes, yet schools were to start final examinations as per schedule.

Most of the schools are closed and deserted, mainly in the northern part of Yambio town, as children fled their home into safe locations.

In April, members of South Sudan National Liberation Movement (SSNLM) signed an agreement with the South Sudanese government.

Meanwhile, the commissioner of Yambio county, Grace Apolo urged the displaced residents not to randomly run during the fighting.

She said government will do what it takes to protect civilians from armed groups who intend to destabilize residents of Yambio area.

The security situation in the state is tense as people continue fleeing their homes, amidst rumours of a planned attack as government forces deploy.

(ST)

Categories: Africa

Presidential Human Rights Committee spearheads “Government Consultation-Workshop on the Development of the National Action Plan on Business and Human Rights”

Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung - Wed, 16/11/2016 - 07:21
Presidential Human Rights Committee spearheads “Government Consultation-Workshop on the Development of the National Action Plan on Business and Human Rights”

Trump lehet a közös uniós védelem atyja

Eurológus - Wed, 16/11/2016 - 07:02
Ha igaz, hogy az USA új elnöke magára hagyja a szövetségeseit, az Európai Uniónak össze kell szednie a saját katonai erejét.

U.N urges Sudan and S. Sudan to negotiate over Abyei

Sudan Tribune - Wed, 16/11/2016 - 06:27

November 15, 2016 (JUBA) - The United Nations Security Council has called on Sudan and South Sudan to immediately resume negotiations on the final status of the disputed area of Abyei, saying it constitutes a serious threat to international order.

An officer from the UN peacekeeping mission in Abyei (UNISFA) on patrol in the disputed region, which is claimed by both Sudan and South Sudan (AFP)

The call came after the 15-member council voted unanimously on Tuesday to extend the mandate of its peacekeeping force in Abyei, underscoring that peacekeepers are charged with taking necessary action to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.

In its resolution, extending the peacekeepers' mandate in Abyei, the Council further stressed that the future status of Abyei shall be resolved peacefully, through negotiations and not through the unilateral actions of either party.

The Council, in the resolution, expressed renewed concern over delays and stalled efforts to fully operationalize a Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism in the area, which its peacekeepers would support.

Ownership of Abyei, the disputed oil-producing region, remained contentious even after the world's youngest nation split from Sudan in 2011.

On 27 June, 2011, the Security Council, by its resolution 1990, responded to the urgent situation in Abyei by establishing the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA).

The Security Council was deeply concerned by the violence, escalating tensions and population displacement.

The peacekeepers are tasked with monitoring the flashpoint border between Sudan and South Sudan and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid, and are authorized to use force in protecting civilians and humanitarian workers in Abyei.

UNISFA's establishment came after Sudan's government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) reached an agreement in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to demilitarize Abyei and let Ethiopian troops monitor the area.

(ST)

Categories: Africa

South Sudan youth union plans demo in support of U.S. President-elect

Sudan Tribune - Wed, 16/11/2016 - 06:06

November 15, 2016 (JUBA) - South Sudan's National Youth Union (SSNYU) on Tuesday issued a statement calling on all citizens in Juba to come out and demonstrate peacefully in support of Donald Trump's election victory.

Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump gives the thumbs up (AFP Photo)

The function, according to a public invitation notice, explains that the essence of the demonstration would to a send congratulatory message and affirmation of support to Donald Trump on his successful election as the 45th president of the United States.

The apparently government-backed demonstration will be held on Thursday and demonstrators are expected to start marching from Dr. John Garang Mausoleum to the U.S. Embassy in Juba where they will hand over a congratulatory message to the U.S. Ambassador for onward delivery to Trump.

This comes after President Salva Kiir appeared on the state owned South Sudan broadcasting corporation which he used a means of sending out his congratulatory to Trump on his victory.

The head of state offered to work closely with him to find a solution to the ongoing war in South Sudan.

He expressed hope that the new U.S. administration will be a new page and respectful bilateral diplomatic ties and cooperation to the mutual of the two countries and their citizens.

(ST)

Categories: Africa

What Trump's election could mean for Sudan

Sudan Tribune - Wed, 16/11/2016 - 06:00

by Paul Brandus

November 15, 2016 (WASHINGTON) - Had Hillary Clinton won, it would have been easier to answer, but since Mr. Trump's victory over her came as a surprise, there are no clear answers. Trump has never mentioned Sudan. His advisors—who are scrambling for roles and power in the new White House—have never mentioned Sudan.

The Trump administration will likely support democratic development in Sudan—as the Obama administration has and the Bush administration before that—did. But financial aid could be challenged by both the new administration and Republicans, who will continue to dominate both chambers (the House and Senate) in Congress.

Between 2002 and 2015 the United States provided $7.1 billion for humanitarian, transition and reconstruction assistance, and peacekeeping support in Sudan. But no U.S. assistance has been provided directly to the government of Sudan. This policy seems unlikely to change, for now, under a Trump administration.

Trump's foreign policy advisors—who are still being named—will work with outgoing Obama advisors in both the White House and State Department. They will get an update on current American policy, which outlines three key objectives: 1) an end to the conflict with South Sudan and what the U.S. calls “gross human rights abuses, and genocide in Darfur;” 2) Full and ongoing implementation of the North-South Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and 3) Ensuring that Sudan does not provide a safe haven for international terrorists.

The U.S. is also concerned about what the State Department calls “the Sudanese government's ongoing detention of at least 15 Darfuri individuals, including one Sudanese national employee of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).” The detentions followed a visit by Donald Booth (the Special Envoy to Sudan and South Sudan) to Sudan's North and Central Darfur states as well as internally displaced persons (IDP) camps at Sortoni and Nertiti in the Jebel Marra region of Darfur from July 26-28, 2016. Many others who were not detained were nonetheless questioned by security officials about the nature of their contact with the Special Envoy.

Here is what the State Department says:

“The United States immediately expressed its concern about the reported detentions to senior Sudanese officials, and we call on the Government of Sudan to immediately release all of those detained. These actions are particularly unfortunate as they undercut the Government of Sudan initially granting permission for the Special Envoy's fact-finding visit and allowing him to travel to areas and speak with individuals of his choosing. Such firsthand knowledge is important to shaping future U.S. engagement with the Government of Sudan and opposition groups and leaders regarding Darfur.”

These ongoing issues, for now, continue to cloud U.S.-Sudanese ties, and the possibility of any normalization if relations. It is too early to say just what—if any—changes could result from the surprising election of Dinald Trump as president of the United States.

(ST)

Categories: Africa

Brussels conference to play ‘significant role’ in supporting Central African Republic’s recovery – Security Council

UN News Centre - Africa - Wed, 16/11/2016 - 06:00
Ahead of tomorrow&#39s Brussels conference for the Central African Republic (CAR), the United Nations Security Council emphasized the &#8220significant role&#8221 the gathering will play in expressing the firm political support of international community and to secure essential resources to assist the country to implement key recovery and stabilization priorities over the next three to five years.
Categories: Africa

CPI: l’ouverture de la 15e assemblée assombrie par les départs annoncés

RFI (Europe) - Wed, 16/11/2016 - 05:09
A partir de ce mercredi 16 novembre et jusqu’au 24 novembre s’ouvre à La Haye la quinzième assemblée des Etats parties au Statut de Rome qui, une fois signé et ratifié, place un Etat sous la juridiction de la Cour pénale internationale, active depuis 2003. D’habitude, cette assemblée est surtout l’occasion de faire le bilan annuel des activités de la CPI, d’avaliser son budget et d’évoquer les perspectives d’avenir. Mais cette année, l’avenir est en demi-teinte et ce pourrait être la dernière fois que 124 Etats se rassemblent ainsi à La Haye car trois pays africains, le Burundi, l’Afrique du Sud et la Gambie ont annoncé en octobre leur intention de se retirer du Statut de Rome.
Categories: Union européenne

SPLM-N, SCoP call to escalate campaign to release political detainees

Sudan Tribune - Wed, 16/11/2016 - 04:56


November 15, 2016 (KHARTOUM) - The rebel Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/North (SPLM-N) and the opposition Sudanese Congress Party (SCoP) on Monday have called to escalate the campaign to release political detainees.

Following the government decision to raise fuel and electricity price on November 3rd, the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) launched a large arrest campaign and detained 20 leading figures from the SCoP besides several members of the National Umma Party (NUP), Sudanese Communist Party (SCP), Arab Ba'ath Party, National Alliance Forces (NAF) as well as civil society activists and journalists.

Also, the NISS detained and summoned dozens of the Sudanese doctors participating in the strike that has been ongoing since last month.

On Monday, a delegation from the SPLM-N including its chairman Malik Agar, secretary general Yasser Arman and the movement's representative in South Africa Saber Abu Saadia have met in Pretoria with an SCoP delegate Ihab Al-Sayed al-laythi.

In a joint statement extended to Sudan Tribune, the SPLM-N said it has directed its base to work with the SCoP, the opposition umbrella Sudan Call and the rest of the opposition forces to escalate the campaign to pressure the NISS to release political detainees.

The SPLM-N renewed full solidarity with the detainees from the SCoP, NUP, NAF, SCP and ABP as wells civil society activists, journalists, doctors and all detainees.

The rebel movement said it would raise the issue of the detainees during its meetings with the leadership of the ruling coalition in South Africa and civil society.

It further with the message it received from the acting chairman of the SCoP Abdel-Monem Omer in which he called for the need to reconsider the political process and dialogue talks with the regime and to continue pressure to overthrow the regime.

The SPLM-N also called for the importance to unify the opposition work, demanding its allies in the Sudan Call to take a collective stand to suspend political contacts with the regime particularly after the arrest of some members of the alliance's Leadership Council.

(ST)

Categories: Africa

SPLM-N fighters won't be integrated into the Sudanese army: Bashir

Sudan Tribune - Wed, 16/11/2016 - 04:55


November 15, 2016 (KHARTOUM) - Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir said any peace deal with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) would not include the integration of the rebel combatants in the Sudanese regular forces.

Bashir, who was addressing the forces of the Sudanese Military Intelligence, on Sunday, vowed to restore security to the South Kordofan and Blue Nile state next summer "either through peace or war ", stressing "We want to secure the Sudan, protect all our borders and to clear it from any outlaw."

In a leaked audio recording of his speech in the closed-door meeting, the President stressed that the SPLM-N has missed the opportunity.

"In the past, we used to negotiate a (peace) agreement including security arrangements and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process accordingly they are absorbed in the army, the police and security service, but as of today no single outlaw will be absorbed,” he said.

The Sudanese president pointed out that the SPLM-N forces in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states are part of South Sudan's SPLA army.

"They were supposed to give them (SLPA-N fighters) their rights and the latter had to hand over their weapons before to return to Sudan. But they didn't do that in order to negotiate with us," he said, referring to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005.
Al-Bashir however said every SPLA-N fighter who renders his weapon or vehicle will receive a compensation and be appointed in a job through the DDR Commission.

South Sudan seceded from Sudan on July 9th 2011 following a referendum on whether the semi-autonomous region should remain a part of the country or become independent. 99% of the southern voters chose independence.

The former SPLA (southern guerrilla army) 9th and 10th divisions in South Kordofan and Blue Nile formed the SPLM-N in the run-up to South Sudan's secession and have been fighting the Sudanese army in the two areas since 2011.

Al-Bashir added the SPLM-N should have changed its name to the “southern sector” because they are actually part of South Sudan's army, saying the rebel movement is now present in the south of the new Sudan, Blue Nile and South Kordofan.

Commenting on Sudan's relations with South Sudan, al-Bashir said they are ready for peace or war with the newborn nation.

“If they want peace, they are welcome as brothers and if they don't want peace we are ready [for war] and he who refuse reconciliation will come to regret it,” he said.

He pointed that several unnamed powers had worked to separate the south in order to deprive the north of the oil and establish a powerful state to destroy Sudan, saying however their plot had failed and now they are appealing to Khartoum to achieve peace in South Sudan.

DARFUR REBELS TO BE TREATED DIFFERENTLY

Meanwhile, al-Bashir vowed to deal with Darfur rebels differently and directed his Defence Minister Awad Ibn Ouf to look into ways to integrate their fighters in the Sudanese regular forces if they choose to join the peace process.

He asked Darfur groups to resort to peace as soon as possible, warning that they would force them to chose peace if they refused to lay down their arms.

It is noteworthy that the Sudanese army on 12 April declared Darfur a region free of rebellion following the capture of Srounq area, the last Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM-AW) led by Abdel-Wahid al-Nur stronghold in Jebel Marra.

Earlier in August, the African Union High Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) suspended peace talks on Darfur region, South Kordofan and Blue Nile states after the parties failed to agree on security arrangements and humanitarian access.

Several international, regional and local parties seek to resume talks as soon as possible in order to agree on the cessation of hostilities paving the road for a comprehensive settlement to end the war.

The Sudanese army has been fighting the SPLM-N rebels in Blue Nile and South Kordofan since 2011 and a group of armed movements in Darfur since 2003.

(ST)

Categories: Africa

South Sudan bans media interviews with rebel leader

Sudan Tribune - Wed, 16/11/2016 - 04:55

November 15, 2016 (JUBA) - South Sudanese government under President Salva Kiir has resumed a drive banning media organisations and journalists from interviewing and disseminating any material associated with the former First Vice President and the leader of armed opposition in the country (SPLM-IO), Riek Machar.

A high ranking security officer told Sudan Tribune on Tuesday that “no media entity and journalist will be excused from the ban” until a review of the media policy is completed.

“There are orders and directives we have received from the above that no media is allowed to talk to Riek Machar and come and broadcast or print it out here inside South Sudan. If you defy these directives, then the violators will not escape the longest arms of the law. They will have to face the full force of the law," a security officer told Sudan Tribune on Tuesday .

“So be very careful you members of the media, especially those of you in the electronic media who do not comply with the policies of the government because you think you can not be reached. It is a false perception. The government has the longest arms to reach you”.

The officer whose assignment does not allow him to speak to the media in an official capacity said Eye Radio station was shut down for "promoting rebellion".

Citing the closure of Eye Radio, he claimed, some media do not comply with the directives and despite repeated warnings to observe basic ethics of journalisms during interactive public phone programs.

The management of the United States funded radio also admitted receiving information notifying them the cause of the closure of the radio is linked to the airing of a news clip from a press conference held by Riek Machar a month ago.

The operative says forced to take unilateral decision after the station failed to comply with the directives and warnings to cease interviewing rebel officials and stop doing talkback segments in their programs.

Machar, according to the clip said, "We did not see that there is an initiative from the region or the United Nations or the African Union to rescue the agreement. From our side the agreement has collapsed, or part of the government of national unity has collapsed since July events. We do not want violence.”

He was talking about his replacement and the muted regional response.

(ST)

Categories: Africa

Russia’s Strategic Calculus: Threat Perceptions and Military Doctrine

Russian Military Reform - Wed, 16/11/2016 - 03:50

PONARS Eurasia has just published my memo on Russia’s Strategic Calculus from our September policy conference in Washington. I’m reposting it here. Lots of other very interesting memos are available on the PONARS website.

—-

Russian foreign policy is driven by the political elites’ search for a new basis for national self-esteem after the collapse of the Soviet Union disrupted old Soviet identities. The collapse did not discredit the Soviet Union’s status as a great power, which has thus remained a core aspiration for Russian political elites. As a result of their perception of Russia’s appropriate status in the world and in their region, they have also sought to maintain Russia’s role as a guiding force among the newly independent states that formerly made up the Soviet Union. This combination of Russia as a global great power and regional hegemon is seen as providing the ruling elite with a source of legitimacy with their domestic constituency.

Most of Russia’s immediate foreign policy goals are focused on its immediate neighborhood. These include maintaining friendly or at least compliant governments in neighboring states and, failing that, keeping unfriendly neighboring governments weak and off balance. All of this is placed in a global context because in addition to securing its periphery, these goals also serve to prevent encroachment by Western states in Russia’s desired geographic sphere of influence.

Beyond these overarching goals, Russian leaders are focused on ensuring Russia’s domestic stability, territorial integrity, and sovereignty. These are primarily defensive goals that seek to ensure the survival of the state and its ruling elite in their current form, rather than aggressive goals that seek to expand Russia’s territory or its sphere of influence. Most of Russia’s military and security policies are designed to secure the state and its current territory against potential attacks and to counter the threats that Russian leaders see facing their country. Moreover, Russian leaders do not really have a well-developed strategy on how to achieve this in their immediate neighborhood. Instead, they have a toolkit of political and military tactics and are open to opportunities to use this toolkit.

Russia’s Threat Perception

The main threats to Russian security, as identified by Russia’s political and military leadership, are spelled out in the most recent edition of the country’s military doctrine announced in December 2014 (see the English translation of the doctrine). According to these guidelines, the most serious military risk that Russia faces is the expansion of NATO. The potential of NATO enlargement to include former Soviet republics has been seen as a threat by Russian leaders for many years, with concern about Ukraine and Georgia resulting in Russian involvement in conflicts in both of those countries.

While this concern remains uppermost in Russian leaders’ minds, in recent years they have also come to focus on the expansion of NATO military infrastructure in existing member states near Russia’s borders. The doctrine accordingly identifies military risks associated with “bringing the military infrastructure of NATO member countries near the borders of the Russian Federation” and with the “deployment (build-up) of military contingents of foreign states (groups of states) on the territories of states contiguous with the Russian Federation and its allies, as well as in adjacent waters, including for exerting political and military pressure on the Russian Federation” (Russian Military Doctrine, 12a and 12c).

The 2014 military doctrine was the first official document to highlight the military threat posed to Russia by externally organized regime change. In recent years, this has been repeatedly mentioned as the most serious threat facing the Russian government, but it had not previously been portrayed as a military threat. By mentioning the “destabilization of the situation in individual states and regions and undermining of global and regional stability” and the “establishment of regimes whose policies threaten the interests of the Russian Federation in states contiguous with the Russian Federation, including by overthrowing legitimate state administration bodies” as external military risks, Russian leaders highlighted their perception that regime change originates in secret plans organized abroad, primarily by the United States and its allies (Doctrine, 12b and 12m).

These plans, Russian leaders argue, include a number of aspects. The establishment of hostile regimes in neighboring states through the destabilization of legitimate governments is seen as being part of a campaign to eliminate Russian influence over neighbors that are of vital importance to Russia’s security. In addition, Russia’s adversaries are willing to sow chaos in foreign states in order to create excuses to intervene and establish pro-Western governments there. Finally, even though these efforts mostly take place outside Russia itself, their ultimate goal is to weaken the Russian government in order to create an opportunity to replace the Putin regime with one more amenable to Western dictates. In addition to military and political means to achieve these goals, Russian leaders are concerned about the use of information warfare to weaken Russian sovereignty, political independence, and territorial integrity (Doctrine, 12l). This is part of an overall emphasis on internal threats and the role of state policy in countering Western interference in Russian domestic affairs.

A third set of security risks faced by Russia concern threats to its nuclear deterrence capability. Missile defense remains at the top of this list, as Russian leaders do not believethat the United States can make a credible commitment to refrain from using such defenses against Russia’s nuclear deterrent capability. They are convinced that if the United States were able to develop an effective and financially viable form of defense against ballistic missiles, domestic political pressure would result in it being expanded to counter Russian missiles, regardless of any promises that the leaders of the United States might make in the interim that missile defense is aimed only against rogue states such as Iran and North Korea.

Russian leaders’ concerns about threats to Russian nuclear deterrence capabilities have in recent years moved beyond missile defense to include a variety of new technologies, such as the Prompt Global Strike concept for the development of conventional strategic precision-guided munitions and weapons fired from space. The 2014 military doctrine adds these weapons to the list of military risks faced by Russia (Doctrine, 12d). As with missile defense, the concern is that the United States might use such weapons to eliminate Russian nuclear deterrent capability, rendering it defenseless against a NATO or U.S. attack.

Finally, Russian leaders express a genuine concern about the threat posed to Russia by radical Islamist organizations. This concern is usually articulated through the discussion of global terrorism and extremism. The Russian military doctrine highlights the links between radical international armed groupings and inter-ethnic and inter-confessional tensions in the context of a lack of effective international anti-terrorist cooperation (Doctrine, 12j and 12k). The significance of this concern for Russian leaders is highlighted by its choice as the main theme of the 2016 Moscow Conference on International Security. Given Russia’s recent history with Islamist insurgency in the North Caucasus and terrorist acts committed throughout Russia by extremists over the last 20 years, Russian leaders recognize the potential for a renewed wave of attacks to destabilize the Russian state.

As is usually the case, the Russian military doctrine does not mention any threats posed by China. Ostensibly, this is because Russia considers China a strategic partner rather than a potential threat. Nevertheless, Russian experts regularly discuss the potential long-term risk of Chinese designs on Russian territory in the Far East and regularly contemplate the short-term danger of Russia becoming excessively dependent on China and being reduced to a Chinese junior partner and energy supplier. Furthermore, the Russian military regularly conducts exercises that are designed to counter a land invasion by a major power in the Far East and Siberia. Although no country is mentioned as the target of these exercises, China is the only country that could threaten Russia with a land invasion from the east.

Overall, in recent years, Russian leaders have become more concerned about the threats they feel are emanating from NATO and the United States. In the aftermath of the Arab Spring and especially after the electoral protests that took place in Russia in 2011-12, they started to emphasize the danger to Russia posed by externally fomented domestic protests and regime change. These combined changes in Russian threat perceptions contributed to a serious deterioration in Russia’s relations with the West even before the Ukraine conflict erupted in 2014.

Western planners need to keep in mind that Russian leaders see Russia as weaker than its adversaries and very much on the defensive. This does not preclude a concurrent belief that Russia needs to be proactive and to initiate conflict when critical state interests are threatened and opportunities to seize the initiative present themselves. As a result, Western observers often see Russia as having an aggressive and revanchist mindset, even as Russian leaders perceive their actions as aimed entirely at shoring up their vulnerable security position.

Regional Priorities

Russian foreign policy remains focused on Europe and the United States. Since the international system remains centered on Euro-Atlantic institutions, Russia’s drive for respect in the international system and the geographic proximity of its main population centers to Europe means that Europe remains the primary geographic region of focus for Russian foreign policy. Russian interests in Europe are both economic and political. Economic interests are related primarily to energy sales, while politically Russia seeks to weaken European institutions in order to work bilaterally with individual states.

Russia’s second area of concern is its vulnerable southern border. Russian policy in Central Asia and the Caucasus has in recent years been shaped by three divergent perspectives: 1) great power competition in the region, which leads Russian politicians to view the region’s problems through a geopolitical and military lens; 2) energy, with a focus on securing exclusive rights for gas and oil transit from the region to Europe; and 3) concern about transnational security threats, such as radical Islamism, terrorism, and drug smuggling.

The internal tension among these perspectives has been the main source of inconsistency in Russian policies in the region. Depending on which perspective is in ascendance, Russian officials alternate between a) focusing on soft security threats, which are best dealt with through the development of cooperative mechanisms with states both in and outside the region, and b) taking steps to limit the influence of outside states in the region as part of an effort to retain a monopoly on energy transit and to come out on top in its rivalry with the United States. In recent years, with the fading of U.S. involvement in Central Asia and the decline in energy prices, Russia has become more focused on ensuring that the region is ruled by friendly regimes and supporting their efforts to prevent internal uprisings and infiltration by Islamist extremists.

In recent years, the Middle East has become more important for Russian foreign policy. Russia’s key goals in the region are to reduce instability while increasing its own influence and reducing that of the United States. Russian leaders see U.S. policies that promote democratization as being the main cause of chaos and instability throughout the region. At the same time, Moscow’s interests in the Middle East have clearly benefited from overreach by the United States. Russia has worked to use local dissatisfaction with the conduct of the Iraq war and U.S. support for popular protests against local autocrats to restore some of the influence it lost in the Middle East after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The Russian operation in Syria has done even more to this end, showing that Russia has the interest and resources to be a serious player in the region. The establishment of a permanent military presence in Syria over the last year has further increased Russian influence in the Middle East, to the extent that some analysts argue that Russia now has a commanding position in Syria and perhaps in the region as a whole.

Russia’s involvement in the Middle East is fraught with risks as well. The de facto Shia alliance with Iran, Iraq, and Syria has led to tension with Gulf states and (in the recent past) with Turkey and also brings Russia into direct confrontation with ISIS, potentially exposing it to a higher risk of terrorist attacks against Russian interests and/or on Russian territory.

Finally, Russia’s turn toward Asia has so far been expressed more in rhetoric than in actual policy. Russian elites are starting to realize that Asia matters in its own right, not just as an adjunct or counterbalance to the West. But so far they have been more adept at recognizing the importance of Asia than in developing effective strategies for engaging with it. In part, this is because old stereotypes of Asia as inferior still dominate. But mostly it is because it is hard to reconcile the pursuit of Russian security and economic interests in Asia with the Russian political elite’s Western-centric worldview.

Even in Asia, U.S. behavior in large part determines how Russia responds, since containing and balancing the United States is one of the key missions of Russian foreign policy around the world. This stems in large part from Russian leaders’ belief that Russia can be a global power only by limiting the influence of the United States. In Asia, it has tried to do so (with limited success) by building an anti-hegemonic consensus with China and India. At the same time, despite the currently positive relations with China, Russian leaders remain concerned about China’s increase in power and long-term intentions, particularly given China’s efforts to develop the Silk Road project. They worry that China could replace Russia as the dominant “other” in U.S. foreign affairs, leaving Russia marginalized. For this reason, despite ongoing tension with the United States, Russian leaders are not averse to having the United States work to constrain Chinese ambitions in Asia and around the world. On the whole, Russian objectives in Asia are preventative in nature: containing the United States and China, maintaining Russian influence in the region, and eroding US-led alliances without destabilizing the region, all while staying out of local conflicts.

Conclusion

The election of Donald Trump as president of the United States is unlikely to change Russia’s strategic calculus. Russia will continue to seek to maximize its status in the world, possibly by proposing a deal where the United States recognizes its sphere of influence in its immediate neighborhood in exchange for a more cooperative relationship globally. Such a trade would legitimize Russia as a global great power while avoiding the need to expend scarce resources on a global fight for influence with the United States.


China's first aircraft carrier now 'combat ready', say Chinese media

Jane's Defense News - Wed, 16/11/2016 - 02:00
The People's Liberation Army Navy's (PLAN's) first aircraft carrier, Liaoning, is ready for combat operations, according to Chinese media reports. Senior Captain Li Dongyou, the political commissar of the Soviet-era Admiral Kuznetsov-class carrier, was quoted by the state-owned Global Times
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