European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Stefano De Luca.

CONTEXT

Technologies are evolving rapidly, data traffic is growing significantly, and demand for gigabit connectivity is increasing. Modern and sustainable digital infrastructures for connectivity and computing are critical enablers for digitalisation and for both industrial competitiveness and for society. High-quality, secure and resilient connectivity is needed, everywhere and for everybody in the European Union. The EU has set non-binding ‘digital decade’ targets to be reached by 2030. These include providing all EU households with access to a fixed gigabit network (with a capacity of 1 Gigabit per second – Gbps) and ensuring that all populated areas are covered by next-generation, high-speed wireless networks with performance at least equivalent to that of 5G.

On 21 January 2026, the European Commission published a proposal for a digital networks act. The proposed regulation aims to consolidate sector-specific legislation currently set out, inter alia, in the European Electronic Communications Code (EECC), the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) Regulation, the Open Internet Regulation, the ePrivacy Directive and the radio spectrum policy programme. By replacing directives with a regulation, the Commission aims to ensure uniform application of telecoms rules across all Member States.

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL

2026/0013(COD) – Proposal for a regulation on digital networks, amending Regulation (EU) 2015/2120, Directive 2002/58/EC and Decision No 676/2002/EC and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1971, Directive (EU) 2018/1972 and Decision No 243/2012/EU (Digital Networks Act) – COM(2026) 0016 final, 21.01.2026.

NEXT STEPS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

For the latest developments in this legislative procedure, see the Legislative Train Schedule.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Digital networks act legislation‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Tristan Marcelin.

AI rules and governance

The AI Act was adopted by the European Parliament and the Council in 2024 to improve the functioning of the internal market, promote the uptake of human-centric and trustworthy AI, ensure a high level of protection against the harmful effects of AI systems and support innovation.

Rules for AI systems and GPAI models

The AI Act regulates AI systems, which are machine-based systems designed to operate with a certain degree of autonomy and generate outputs from the inputs they receive. The regulation applies a risk-based approach to AI systems, differentiating between ‘unacceptable risks’, ‘high risks’, ‘transparency risks’ and ‘minimal risks’. While prohibited AI systems are not allowed in the internal market, providers, deployers, importers and distributors of high-risk AI (HRAI) systems are under certain obligations, including ensuring that systems are compliant and meet particular standards.

The AI Act also regulates general-purpose AI (GPAI) models, which are capable of performing a wide range of tasks and being integrated into a variety of systems or applications. The GPAI definition includes generative AI models, such as OpenAI’s GPT‑5, Google’s Gemini 3 and Mistral Large 3. The AI Act considers that some GPAI models pose systemic risks (such as negative effects on democratic processes or on public and economic security) if they reach a defined level of capability or are designated as such by the European Commission. GPAI models with systemic risks are subject to extra requirements, such as model evaluation and risk assessment.

Governance framework

The AI Act establishes a hybrid enforcement model with a centralised and a decentralised part. The risk-based approach for AI systems is enforced at national level with support and advice from centralised entities, including the European Commission. Conversely, GPAI rules are exclusively supervised and enforced by the Commission. However, researchers note that the decentralised pattern remains dominant in the AI Act, potentially leading to challenges around uneven enforcement in the EU.

This model differs from purely decentralised or other hybrid models. For instance, under the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the data protection rules are in principle subject to decentralised enforcement, but data protection authorities must cooperate in accordance with the ‘one-stop shop mechanism‘ and the new GDPR procedural rules in cross-border cases. Moreover, the European Data Protection Board can issue general guidance and opinions.

Enforcement at national level

The AI Act obliges Member States to designate two types of authority – at least one notifying authority and a market surveillance authority. Both authorities have distinct roles within the enforcement process and its timeline. The national market surveillance authority also functions as the single point of contact at national level. Member States were required to designate their competent authorities and single points of contact by 2 August 2025.

The European Commission maintains a list of single points of contact for all Member States. As of March 2026, the list comprised eight single contact points, out of 27.

Notifying authority, conformity assessment body and notified body

The notifying authority is responsible for setting up and carrying out the necessary ex‑ante procedures for assessing HRAI systems before they enter the EU market. However, the notifying authority does not conduct the assessment itself but instead designates conformity assessment bodies to carry out the task. Notifying authorities must inform the Commission and other Member States once the conformity assessment body has been designated, which then becomes a ‘notified body’. Notified bodies must be independent of the provider and operator of the HRAI system they assess.

Market surveillance authority

The market surveillance authority performs ex‑post checks once AI systems have been placed on the internal market. Its powers include requesting documents, evaluating systems and imposing fines, if needed. However, a separate authority may be in charge of ex‑post checking in certain situations, such as controlling HRAI systems for financial institutions or law enforcement.

Enforcement at EU level

The AI Act has created a number of EU‑level entities to assist, support and advise Member States and the Commission (which runs the AI Office) in their enforcement tasks.

AI Office

The AI Office is defined by the AI Act as the ‘Commission’s function of contributing to the implementation, monitoring and supervision of AI systems and general-purpose AI models, and AI governance’. It has the sole authority to enforce the AI Act provisions on GPAI models. It is also responsible for soft instruments, such as codes of practice, guidelines and communications that shape the regulation’s implementation

Digital omnibus on AI proposal – further centralisation
The digital omnibus on AI, put forward in November 2025 by the Commission, is a set of amendments to the AI Act to further centralise its enforcement. If European co-legislators adopt the proposal in its current state, the AI Office would supervise the compliance of AI systems integrated into very large online platforms (VLOPs) or very large search engines (VLOSEs), as defined under the Digital Services Act, as well as AI systems based on GPAI models where the system and model come from the same provider.

European AI board

The European AI board is composed of one representative per Member State, with the European Data Protection Supervisor and the AI Office as observers. According to researchers, the board’s tasks are limited to advisory and coordinating functions, including ‘facilitating cooperation among national competent authorities, aggregating and disseminating technical and regulatory expertise among Member States, and offering guidance on the AI Act’s implementation’.

Scientific panel of independent experts

The AI Act defines the scientific panel as a panel of experts selected by the Commission on the basis of up-to-date scientific and technical expertise in the field of AI. The panel is aimed at centralising expertise to advise and support the AI Office, as well as national market surveillance authorities at their request.

AI advisory forum

The AI advisory forum comprises stakeholders from industry, start-ups, SMEs, civil society and academia. The AI Act tasks the forum with providing technical expertise, advising the board and the Commission and contributing to their tasks under the regulation.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Enforcement of the AI Act‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ralf Drachenberg, Annastiina Papunen and Astrid Worum.

The main aims will now be to overcome the two-country veto on the Ukraine loan, and to define a common approach to a rapidly evolving situation in the Middle East – notably to prevent escalation, promote a diplomatic path to end the crisis and provide support to partner countries in the region, while addressing the possible impact on global energy security. In that context, the European Council will discuss the Middle East as well as multilateralism with the UN Secretary General, António Guterres. However, despite a probable change of focus, competitiveness will feature prominently in the European Council conclusions and provide a high degree of detail, probably going beyond the EU leaders’ role of setting the general priorities. Other topics on the agenda are the next multiannual financial framework (MFF), European security and defence, and migration, which, due to time constraints, are expected to trigger less discussion. Following the European Council meeting, EU leaders will convene for a Euro Summit focusing on the economic situation in the EU, the international role of the euro and the savings and investment union.

1. General

As usual, European political parties will hold pre-summit meetings with their respective affiliated EU leaders. Additionally, a growing group of ‘like-minded’ countries on migration will meet prior to the start of the meeting. Following a similar pattern, a new group of around 20 EU leaders, which first met ahead of the informal retreat of 12 February 2026, had a videoconference on 10 March to discuss rising energy prices and competitiveness. The European Council itself will start with the address by the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola. This meeting will be the first for the new Dutch Prime Minister, Rob Jetten, and for Andrey Gyurov, the caretaker Prime Minister of Bulgaria.

2. European Council meeting Ukraine

A central topic for discussion at this European Council will be the enactment of the EU’s €90 billion loan to Ukraine, already agreed upon in December 2025, and the adoption of the 20th sanctions package against Russia. Following an exchange of views with the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, EU leaders will attempt to persuade the prime ministers of Hungary, Viktor Orbán and Slovakia, Robert Fico to lift their veto on the EU loan. To enable the urgently needed funding for Ukraine to be disbursed, several pieces of legislation, already signed off in Parliament, need to be adopted: 1) a regulation establishing the loan; 2) an amendment to the Ukraine Facility; and 3) a revision to the MFF, which requires a unanimous decision. In a letter to European Council President António Costa, Orbán indicated that his country would oppose the loan until the Druzhba pipeline, which provides Hungary and Slovakia with Russian crude oil and which was damaged by Russian air strikes, is operational again – a potentially dangerous and lengthy process.

Amid criticism of the two countries’ behaviour, which according to Costa does not comply with the principle of sincere cooperation, temporary alternatives were put forward, such as the Adriatic pipeline, an option rejected by Hungary and Slovakia, who cited high prices. Ahead of the meeting, attempts will be made to find a solution, notably in the context of the Paris Nuclear Energy Summit, while Nordic and Baltic countries are considering bilateral loans (not requiring EU approval) to cover Ukraine’s needs until May. Oil supply was also the justification given for vetoing the 20th sanctions package, which was due to mark the fourth anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Moreover, considering Ukraine’s increased financial needs, now estimated at €135 billion for 2026‑2027, EU leaders are likely to call on non-EU partners to cover an additional €30 billion – beyond the €15 billion secured from Western partners. With some fearing that the war in Iran could distract attention from Ukraine, EU leaders are expected to reiterate their unwavering support to the war-torn country – as did the presidents of the three EU institutions in a joint declaration adopted on the fourth anniversary of Russia’s invasion. They are likely to stress the need to ensure that the country has all the necessary military and financial means to continue fighting the aggressor.

Middle East

The concerning developments in Iran, which threaten the stability of the entire Middle East region, as well as the global implications of the conflict in Iran, are likely to be the focus of EU leaders’ attention. Leaders will probably attempt to develop a unified approach beyond the statement issued on behalf of the EU by the High Representative/Vice President, Kaja Kallas, on 1 March, and reaffirm their commitment to dialogue and to a diplomatic path to end the crisis.

Although in contact with countries in the region from day one, the Union has struggled to find a coordinated EU position since the joint Israeli-US attack on Iran on 28 February. Assessments of the situation have varied widely from one Member State to another. Some have criticised Israel and the US for breaching international law, notably Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, who called the military intervention ‘unjustified and dangerous‘, and French President Emmanuel Macron, who stated that the ‘military operations in Iran were conducted outside international law’. Others have shown reluctance to criticise the US-Israeli strikes on Iran, with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz not wanting ‘to lecture our allies’. Even Costa and Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, who released a joint statement on the day of the joint attack, pointing to the ‘extensive sanctions [adopted by the EU] in response to the actions of Iran’s murderous regime and the Revolutionary Guards’, were, according to some observers, said to be conveying differing messages. In a speech on 6 March, Costa indirectly denounced the joint attacks, stating that, even if Iran ‘bears responsibility for the root causes, … unilateralism can never be the path forward’, while von der Leyen was criticised for stating that a ‘credible transition in Iran is urgently needed’, which hints at regime change and could be understood as approval of the US‑Israeli attacks.

However, the extent of Iran’s response – with strikes on neighbouring countries, ‘an unjustifiable violation of their sovereignty’, drones targeting a military base in Cyprus, an EU Member State, and strikes imperilling critical supply chains and energy infrastructure across the Gulf – has highlighted how closely the EU’s security and interests are linked to the region. According to the Cyprus EU Council Presidency, the only way for the EU to address its ‘long-lasting concerns regarding Iran’, is by: 1) preventing the country from acquiring a nuclear weapon; and 2) ending its destabilising activities in the region. To that end, the European Council will aim to revive the diplomatic path to end the crisis and initiate ‘a collective effort, including through sanctions’, to achieve its objectives.

As Costa and von der Leyen did after a videoconference with Middle East Leaders, the European Council is likely to condemn in the strongest terms the ‘indiscriminate attacks by Iran against the countries of the region’, and convey its ‘full solidarity with the people of the region’. They will most certainly also express their ‘deep concern about the consequences of the regional crisis on Lebanon’, which could have a severe impact on civilians, triggering large-scale displacement as Israel is launching an extended military campaign against Hezbollah and has refused to halt its offensive to hold talks. In that context, von der Leyen announced the mobilisation of ReliefEU stocks to support some 130 000 persons in Lebanon, with a first flight on 10 March.

In the meantime, European countries have initiated elements of response and solidarity, individually or jointly. For instance, the E3 countries (France, Germany, and the UK) adopted a joint statement, in which they pledge to ‘work together with the U.S. and allies’ to ‘take steps to defend our interests and those of our allies in the region, potentially by enabling necessary and proportionate defensive action to destroy Iran’s capability to fire missiles and drones at their source’. EU Member States have also coordinated their action at several levels. First, by cooperating on the repatriation of their citizens stranded in the Middle East. Nineteen Member States have activated the rescEU mechanism under the European Civil Protection Mechanism. Second, by dispatching air and naval resources to protect Cyprus, with France, Greece, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands sending vessels. Third, by coordinating the dispatch of military resources to ensure freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, while France has taken the lead in building a coalition to secure shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Moreover, the EU has announced a reinforcement of its maritime defensive operations ASPIDES and ATALANTA. Originally launched to protect commercial vessels from attacks by Iran-backed Houthis, the operations will now take on a new scope, as confirmed by Costa and von der Leyen.

Finally, the potential consequences on global energy security will be at the centre of discussions. As oil prices surged over US$119 a barrel, reaching levels not seen since 2022 (even if they have stabilised since), this point could be closely linked to the EU competitiveness agenda point (see below). Despite von der Leyen’s message stating that ‘Today, Europe’s energy system is cleaner, much more diverse – and much more stable than a few years ago’, and EU Member States indicating that they saw no immediate risk to supply from the crisis, there are fears that the Iran war could trigger a new energy crisis, raise energy prices and increase inflation. So much so, that G7 finance ministers held an emergency meeting and the International Energy Agency’s 32 members agreed to release 400 million barrels of emergency oil reserves to avoid shortages. Even if the Commission claims that the storage capacity remains stable, some sources point to gas storage levels standing at only 30 %, noting that the upcoming period is crucial for filling up for next winter.

Competitiveness and the single market

‘We are making 2026 the year of European competitiveness’, Costa stated, ‘just as we made 2025 the year of European defence’. Discussions on ways of delivering on this ambition will build heavily on the outcome of the informal competitiveness retreat in Alden Biesen, Belgium, on 12 February 2026. As the informal retreat did not produce conclusions, the results are expected to be formally turned into concrete decisions in the March conclusions.

One of the key instruments will be the ‘one Europe, one market agenda’, which the European Council is expected to launch to further integrate the single market in all its four freedoms. In order to deliver by the end of 2027, the agenda will be accompanied by a ‘one Europe, one market roadmap and action plan’ to be presented by the Commission, with clear goals and timelines. It was suggested that the roadmap be endorsed by the three institutions to showcase the political momentum and sense of urgency behind the project. The priority areas are expected to be: 1) completion of the single market; 2) simplification and reduction of red tape; 3) affordable energy prices and energy union by 2030; 4) industrial renewal and reduced dependencies; 5) a savings and investment union.

Several notable calls for action can be expected at the meeting. EU leaders are likely to discuss the EU-wide legal framework for companies, the 28th regime, due to be issued by the Commission on 18 March, and to call on the co-legislators to adopt the proposal by the end of 2026. They are expected to ask the Commission to conduct an in-depth review of the EU acquis and withdraw outdated provisions. As a contribution to the effort, Finland has sent a letter to the Commission listing possible ways of simplifying more than 40 pieces of EU legislation. EU leaders are also likely to ask the Commission to identify and map dependencies in strategic sectors. On investment, the European Council could mention the digital euro, and call for the co-legislators to conclude their work by the end of 2026.

With the energy transition and energy affordability very high on the EU leaders’ agenda, especially in the current volatile situation, some countries are pushing for a stronger answer to the crisis. While the European Council is expected to call for the swift implementation of the Energy Union 2030 agenda, it will also discuss ways of immediately alleviating the impact of energy prices on businesses and citizens, as outlined in the new citizens’ energy package. Addressing Parliament, von der Leyen mentioned: 1) the options being explored to reduce the impact of gas prices on electricity prices, such as State aid measures, subsidies or even caps on gas prices; 2) the need to improve the productivity of grids to allow more renewables to access them; 3) the room for action on taxes and levies on energy, which is a national competence; and 4) possible modernisation of the ETS.

Next multiannual financial framework

Following a ‘guiding discussion’ in March 2025 and an MFF ‘stocktaking’ in December 2025, EU leaders will have a brief discussion on the ‘horizontal issues’ of the next MFF to provide guidelines to the Council presidency for the preparation of the negotiating package, with indicative figures due by June 2026. Three aspects are likely to be addressed: 1) the MFF’s contribution to EU competitiveness; 2) the funding of EU ambitions; and 3) the new governance framework. The Leaders’ Agenda envisages an MFF agenda point at all four regular European Council meetings in 2026, with the MFF being the exclusive topic at the 26-27 November special meeting.

European defence and security

The European Council is expected to take stock of progress on the European defence readiness 2030 objectives, and possibly invite the Member States to ensure that concrete capability projects can be launched in the coming months. Moreover, EU leaders could invite the Council to update the 2022 threat assessment, based on a 360° analysis of threats to be prepared by the HR/VP.

Migration

EU leaders will take stock of the implementation of its previous conclusions on migration, with a letter from von der Leyen expected to inform the discussions. Leaders are likely to reiterate their call for Member States and EU institutions to intensify work on all strands of the EU’s approach to migration, notably on the external dimension and on comprehensive partnerships. They could also acknowledge the recent agreement in the Council on the EU-wide list of safe countries, or comment on possible migration waves resulting from the situation in the Middle East.

3. Euro Summit

The first Euro Summit meeting in 2026 is expected to focus on economic developments in the EU, the international role of the euro, and the savings and investment union. Ahead of the meeting, presidents Costa and von der Leyen met the European Central Bank President, Christine Lagarde, and the new Eurogroup President, Kyriakos Pierrakakis, the Greek Minister of Economy and Finance, to prepare discussions. Following the Eurogroup meeting on 9 March, Pierrakakis sent a letter to Costa bringing important points to the attention of the Euro Summit.

Read this briefing on ‘Outlook for the meetings of EU leaders, 19-20 March 2026‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clement Evroux.

Outcome of the association to Horizon Europe

Following the 2021 entry into force of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and the UK, on 1 January 2024 the UK became an associated country to Horizon Europe 2021‑2027. The scope of the association covers the whole programme except for the ‘accelerator’ instrument within the European Innovation Council.

According to the Horizon Europe dashboard, as of 9 January 2026, the number of UK projects participating in Horizon activities was 5 970, corresponding to 3 659 grant agreements, with a net contribution from the EU of €1.32 billion. Most UK participation focuses on pillar I of Horizon Europe (‘excellent science’), with 2 420 project entities, and pillar II (‘global challenges and European industrial competitiveness’), with 3 220 projects. Out of the total 5 970 projects, 907 involve a UK-based small or medium-sized enterprise.

The UK is the associated country with the highest number of Horizon Europe involvements, second only to Norway in terms of net EU contribution received.

Upcoming opportunities for cooperation in research and innovation

Against the backdrop of the multiannual financial framework (MFF) 2028‑2034, the legislative proposals for Horizon Europe and the Euratom training programme both offer relevant opportunities for continuing and strengthening the bilateral cooperation between the Union and the UK on research and innovation. Article 9 of the proposed Horizon Europe 2028‑2034 regulation provides for legal grounds to associate third countries, using a set of rules that largely follow Horizon 2021‑2027’s current guidelines.

However, the unveiling of the proposal on the European competitiveness fund could lead to the UK considering association to this programme under Article 11. This would ensure it remained eligible for the collaborative research activities scheduled under the four policy windows (clean transition and industrial decarbonisation; digital leadership; health, biotech, agriculture and bioeconomy; resilience, security, defence and space). Such activities would be successors to the six clusters that currently make up the second pillar of Horizon Europe. Furthermore, although the UK has chosen not to join the current Euratom training programme, the proposed regulation establishing the Euratom training programme 2028‑2032 includes (in Article 8) a legal ground for association, which would facilitate cooperation on nuclear fission and fusion.

European Parliament’s views on UK association to Horizon Europe

In February 2025, in a resolution on the assessment of the implementation of Horizon Europe, the European Parliament specifically welcomed the association of the UK and Switzerland to Horizon Europe. It recognises that UK and Swiss science and innovation are an integral part of the European science and innovation ecosystem, while also expressing its concern about the automatic rebate for the UK included in the amended protocol in 2023.

Future opportunities in brief

The relevant sectoral proposals in the MFF 2028‑2034 (Horizon Europe, the competitiveness fund and the Euratom training programme) include legal grounds for association tailored to specific countries and relevant joint goals for cooperation.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Research and innovation: State of play of EU-UK cooperation‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Maria Niestadt.

Introduction

Since the United Kingdom’s (UK) withdrawal from the EU in 2020, the parties have continued to cooperate on various digital policy issues. While their regulatory approaches differ in some areas – notably AI – their broader objectives are similar. Both the EU and the UK are pursuing greater digital sovereignty and enhanced global competitiveness, seeking to reduce their strategic dependencies in critical technologies in an increasingly adversarial geopolitical context.

Digital cooperation is evolving alongside efforts to strengthen and formalise the EU-UK partnership. For example, at the first EU-UK summit on 19 May 2025, the parties agreed to establish a new strategic partnership. While digital policy was not explicitly mentioned in the summit’s joint statement, the document outlining the security and defence partnership mentioned further cooperation on cyber issues, countering hybrid threats, strengthening the resilience of critical infrastructure, and addressing FIMI, including through coordination in multilateral fora, such as the G7.

Core framework

The EU-UK relationship is governed by the Withdrawal Agreement, the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), and the Windsor Framework. The TCA explicitly recognises the parties’ ‘right to regulate’ in their respective jurisdictions, while also expressing their wish to cooperate in areas of mutual interest. For example, they have committed to ensuring cross-border data flows, facilitating digital trade and holding regular cyber dialogues. According to Article 776 of the TCA, the parties have to review the implementation of the agreement in 2026, five years after its entry into force. Digital trade issues are discussed in the joint Trade Specialised Committee on Services, Investment and Digital Trade.

In accordance with the TCA, the European Parliament and the UK Parliament established a Parliamentary Partnership Assembly (PPA) in 2021 to enable the exchange of views on the implementation of the TCA. Parliamentarians meet twice a year, with the next EU-UK PPA scheduled to take place in Brussels on 16-17 March 2026.

Since 1 January 2024, the UK has been associated to the Horizon Europe programme.

Artificial intelligence

Although the EU and the UK have different approaches to AI regulation, they share the common goal of promoting the responsible development and uptake of AI. The EU has adopted a comprehensive risk-based regulatory framework through the 2024 AI Act, categorising AI systems by risk and imposing strict obligations on high-risk areas such as critical infrastructure, while banning harmful practices. Minimal-risk AI systems remain largely exempt. In November 2025, the Commission proposed a digital omnibus on AI – amendments to the AI Act – on which the Council and Parliament are currently working.

The UK prefers a lighter-touch approach, regulating AI rather in the context in which it is used. It has established an AI Security Institute and adopted an AI opportunities action plan to boost AI investment, uptake and development. In March 2025, a private member’s bill, the Artificial Intelligence (Regulation) Bill, was introduced in the House of Lords, but, it has not made significant progress. If passed, it would create a central AI authority to oversee AI governance.

Both the EU and the UK are pursuing initiatives to strengthen the AI ecosystem. In April 2025, the European Commission published an AI continent action plan to build large-scale AI data and computing infrastructure across Europe, including AI factories and AI gigafactories. The UK is participating in the AI factories initiative and planning to host an AI factory antenna at the University of Edinburgh. The UK is also establishing its own AI Growth Zones – designated sites for AI-enabled data centres and supporting infrastructure.

At the international level, the EU and the UK collaborate on AI safety and security through their respective bodies – the EU’s AI Office and the UK’s AI Security Institute. The EU and the UK have both signed the Council of Europe Framework Convention on AI, adhered to the OECD AI principles, contributed to international AI safety reports, and worked on shared approaches for measuring and evaluating advanced AI capabilities. They also cooperate on AI standards development through CEN and CENELEC (the European Committee for Standardization and the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization). However, the UK has not signed some AI declarations, such as the Paris AI Action Summit Declaration.

Data flows

Both the EU and the UK are committed to maintaining seamless cross-border data flows. In December 2025, the Commission renewed the two adequacy decisions originally adopted in 2021, confirming that personal data may continue to move freely and safely between the European Economic Area (EEA) and the UK. The Commission concluded that the UK legal framework contains data protection safeguards essentially equivalent to those in the EU. Unless extended, the decisions will expire on 27 December 2031.

Cyber dialogues

The EU and the UK have been holding regular cyber dialogues, as set out in the TCA. Since December 2023, three formal cyber dialogues have taken place: the first in Brussels in December 2023, the second in London in December 2024 and the third in December 2025 in Brussels. These meetings are used to align positions on international cyber norms, exchange views on cyber threats and coordinate responses to malicious cyber activity. Parties provide updates on policy and regulatory developments. The next dialogue will be held in 2026 in London.

Online platforms and search engines

In May 2024, the European Commission’s DG CNECT signed an administrative arrangement with Ofcom – the UK’s regulator for communications services. The arrangement will support the enforcement of the EU’s Digital Services Act (DSA) and the UK’s Online Safety Act, which introduce new obligations for online platforms and search engines, including measures to protect users from illegal and harmful content. The two authorities plan joint training, expert dialogues and studies on issues such as protection of minors, age-appropriate design and platform transparency.

European Parliament

The European Parliament has repeatedly encouraged close cooperation with the UK on digital issues. In its resolution of 27 November 2025 on the implementation of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement, Parliament welcomed the administrative arrangement signed between the Commission and Ofcom, as well as plans to extend data adequacy decisions. It asked the UK not to go too far from the fundamental principles of the two main EU digital regulations: the Digital Markets Act and the DSA.

Acknowledgements

Any AI-generated content in this text has been reviewed by the author. AI was used to improve the readability of the text.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘EU-UK digital cooperation‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Tarja Laaninen.

Background

The end of free movement between the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK) following Brexit has resulted in decreased mobility for EU and UK citizens, particularly for young people. For example, EU and UK touring artists and creative professionals face additional costs and administrative requirements since Brexit, not only for their own mobility, but also for the transport of equipment, which must comply with customs and haulage rules.

The first EU‑UK summit took place in London on 19 May 2025, setting out a new strategic partnership. Both parties agreed to enhance cooperation, sign agreements in several areas and hold an annual summit. Three documents were officially adopted: a joint statement, a common understanding on a renewed EU‑UK agenda and a security and defence partnership. The common understanding outlines commitments from both parties to strengthen bilateral cooperation in policy areas, such as youth, mobility, new technologies and sanitary and phytosanitary measures. Further discussions and negotiations are expected to lead to new formal agreements in these areas. The EU will need to adopt negotiating mandates for new agreements, with the European Commission negotiating on behalf of the EU following authorisation from the Council.

Erasmus+, youth mobility and the youth experience scheme (YES)

When the UK formally exited the European Union on 31 January 2020, it chose not to participate in the Erasmus+ programme. EU student applications to UK universities subsequently fell, and data from HESA (the Higher Education Statistics Agency) show that the number of EU students in the UK halved between 2020/2021 and 2023/2024. Reasons include the need for a student visa, a healthcare surcharge and higher tuition fees. UK students coming to the EU also face visa requirements and higher tuition fees. For student exchanges, the UK set up the Turing scheme, which allows UK students to study abroad, including in EU universities.

After the EU‑UK summit, negotiations took place throughout 2025. In December 2025, the Commission and the British government announced the conclusion of negotiations for the UK to rejoin the EU’s Erasmus+ programme in 2027, enabling learners, students, apprentices, teachers and staff in the fields of education, youth and sport from the EU and the UK to once again benefit from opportunities for study, training and work placements. Erasmus+ is one of the best known and most successful EU‑financed programmes and the most popular exchange scheme in Europe. The UK contribution for 2027 will be approximately £570 million and covers the 2027/28 academic year. Any participation in the next multiannual financial framework (2028‑2034) will need to be agreed in the future.

However, EU students who want to study a degree in the UK are still subject to high international tuition fees. The reverse can also be true, depending on where UK‑based students decide to study in the EU.

In the common understanding from the first EU‑UK summit, the UK and EU shared the view that both parties ‘should work towards a balanced youth experience scheme on terms to be mutually agreed’. Such a scheme should facilitate the participation of young people from the EU and the UK in various activities, such as work, study, au-pairing, volunteering or simply travelling, for a limited period. It should provide a dedicated visa path and ensure that the number of participants is acceptable to both sides, possibly including a cap. Negotiations are currently underway between the European Commission and the UK government. The agreement envisaged would benefit both EU and UK citizens aged 18 to 30. Those eligible would, for example, be able to stay in the destination country for up to two to four years. The EU has also tried to negotiate domestic-level tuition fees for European students in the UK; however, the UK government and UK universities have been against the idea. In a recent joint statement, the EU and the UK expressed their willingness to conclude the negotiations by the next EU‑UK summit (expected to take place in Brussels in 2026). The UK already has similar youth schemes with 13 non‑EU countries and territories.

Culture and touring artists

After Brexit, performing artists can no longer tour and work freely across the EU and the UK. UK artists must comply with the immigration and work permit regulations in each EU Member State, including visa costs. Currently, 24 out of the 27 Member States offer time-limited visa and work permit‑free routes for touring, but the requirements and time limits vary significantly. UK artists touring the EU may also need to hire EU‑registered vehicles to comply with road haulage restrictions and need ATA carnets for going through customs with musical instruments, stage equipment and artworks. Making these kinds of arrangements is particularly challenging for young and lesser-known artists.

EU artists, entertainers or musicians touring in the UK may rely on the UK’s permitted paid engagement scheme, allowing visa‑free travel for one month for paid activities, upon invitation by a UK‑based client. In November 2025, more than 200 cultural organisations from both the EU and the UK signed the EU‑UK policy recommendations, highlighting the importance of culture in political, societal and economic relations. Solutions proposed include an EU‑wide visa waiver agreement for creative industries between the EU and the UK, or a ‘cultural exemption’ from the post-Brexit EU‑UK trade and cooperation agreement (TCA) or from carnet requirements for transporting musical equipment. However, the European Commission and UK government position is that there is no prospect of changing the TCA in the near future.

The UK Musicians’ Union has warned that 75 % of musicians who had previously worked in the EU have experienced a decline in bookings, while a 2025 Best for Britain study showed that the number of artists playing at festivals in the EU had declined by more than a quarter since Brexit. Urged by industry representatives, the UK government has clarified immigration and work permit rules with some individual EU Member States and agreed some easements for touring bilaterally, for example with Spain.

The European Parliament

In its resolution of April 2021 on the outcome of the EU‑UK negotiations, Parliament regretted the lack of ambition of the TCA on mobility policies, and welcomed the mechanism in the TCA allowing the EU and the UK to agree additional arrangements on a case-by-case basis and for specific professions.

On 27 November 2025, Parliament adopted an own-initiative report on the TCA implementation, noting that the EU‑UK summit established key steps for filling the gaps of the TCA. In December 2025, Parliament welcomed the EU‑UK agreement on Erasmus+.

From 16 to 18 February 2026, a delegation from the European Parliament’s Committee on Culture and Education met representatives from the UK government, Parliament, universities, cultural institutions and the creative sector in London to discuss the process of bringing the UK back into EU‑funded programmes, such as Erasmus+, for the post‑2027 period. They discussed barriers to cultural collaboration and practical challenges facing touring artists. The MEPs also took stock of negotiations on the EU‑UK reciprocal youth experience scheme.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘EU-UK relations: Mobility and youth opportunities‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Katarzyna Sochacka.

New framework agreement on relations between Parliament and Commission

The revised framework agreement on relations between Parliament and the European Commission aims at strengthening Parliament’s prerogatives as regards the Commission’s duties to inform Parliament of its plans. The Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) Committee report emphasises that the new framework agreement retains the institutional balance intended in the Treaties, while also creating a clearer and more accountable relationship between the institutions working in EU citizens’ interests. Members adopted the revised agreement, which will enter into force following a signing ceremony with Presidents Roberta Metsola and Ursula von der Leyen, planned during the March II plenary session (25‑26 March).

Package travel

The EU rules on package travel date back to 2015 and need to be updated to improve passenger protection. Members considered amendments to the Package Travel Directive, following an agreement reached between the co-legislators in December 2025. Parliament’s negotiators succeeded in improving the complaints procedure and consumer information provided on what is included in the ‘package’ they purchase. Parliament adopted the report concluding its first reading on the legislation to amend the Package Travel Directive.

Establishing EU talent pool

A shortage of qualified workers continues to be an issue in many EU countries. While the EU has already provided a platform to match EU jobseekers with employers, the Commission proposed legislation to create an EU talent pool open to non-EU citizens. Faced with international competition for talent, the proposal would allow EU countries to attract workers, without creating an alternative pathway to legal migration. Parliament is keen to ensure that the system is fair, protects against discrimination and is rolled out in all EU countries. Members adopted the text agreed in interinstitutional negotiations on the proposal to establish an EU talent pool.

Guidelines for the 2027 budget – Section III – European Commission

The 2027 annual EU budget will be the last under the current multiannual financial framework (MFF), and Parliament’s Committee on Budgets (BUDG) is calling for a strong focus on delivery for people, the economy, the planet and providing investment for competitiveness. Members debated the committee’s report, which emphasises the EU budget’s role in strengthening the bloc’s cohesion in the face of a difficult geopolitical landscape. BUDG also calls to uphold a strong external policy and underlines the agreement between EU institutions that expenditure covering the financing costs of Next Generation EU must not reduce funding for EU programmes. The vote on the guidelines for the 2027 EU budget sets Parliament’s position for interinstitutional negotiations ahead of the Commission’s draft budget.

Addressing the housing crisis in the EU

Closer to home, many citizens are personally concerned about the EU’s housing crisis. While housing policy remains a national competence, Parliament’s Special Committee on the Housing Crisis in the EU (HOUS) tabled a report recommending action to improve housing affordability. The committee proposes to help tackle the issue through EU rules on short-term rentals, aiming to strike a balance between promoting urban local communities and tourism income. The HOUS committee also proposes action to improve quality in the construction and energy-efficiency sectors and calls on EU governments to support people trying to get into the housing market through tax breaks. Members held a debate and later adopted the recommendations on solutions for affordable housing.

Copyright and generative AI

When using artificial intelligence (AI) to generate text, images or code, many people are unaware of the legal implications of the AI tool’s use of copyrighted material as training data. This can mean that content creators, artists and other rights-holders are neither acknowledged nor paid for their input. Members adopted an own-initiative report from the Legal Affairs (JURI) Committee calling for clarification of the legal situation as regards copyright and generative AI.

EU enlargement strategy

Members debated and adopted a Foreign Affairs (AFET) Committee report on the European Union’s enlargement strategy. With nine candidate countries and one potential candidate awaiting EU membership, Parliament’s own-initiative report on EU enlargement strategy underlines its support for the process and for reform of the current procedure for admitting new members. The report also emphasises enlargement’s strategic potential to strengthen the wider region in the face of geopolitical uncertainty. Finally, the report underlines the need for a strong merit-based process where alignment with the EU’s core values is an unconditional principle of membership.

2026 World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference

Ahead of the 2026 World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference, taking place in Cameroon at the end of the month, Members debated and voted a resolution setting out Parliament’s position on the multilateral negotiations. Global instability and the retreat from global trade rules mean the need to reform the WTO is urgent, not least to replace the long-broken dispute settlement system, promote a global level playing field and make the rules more flexible. Parliament’s Committee on International Trade (INTA) underscored Parliament’s support for the multilateral trading system and emphasised the need for greater flexibility. A delegation from the INTA committee is due to attend the Parliamentary Conference on the WTO ahead of the 14th WTO Ministerial Conference.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Five decisions to enter into interinstitutional negotiations – from the Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO), on ‘Amending certain Regulations as regards digitalisation and common specifications’ and ‘Amending certain Directives as regards digitalisation and common specifications’; from the Committee on Fisheries (PECH) on ‘Implementation into Union law of measures adopted by several Regional Fisheries Management Organisations’, from the Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON), Environment, Climate and Food Safety (ENVI) and Civil Liberties, Justice, Home Affairs (LIBE) committees on ‘Omnibus IV: Amending certain regulations as regards the extension of certain mitigating measures available for small and medium-sized enterprises to small mid-cap enterprises and further simplification measures’, and from the ECON and LIBE committees on ‘Omnibus IV: Amending Directives 2014/65/EU and (EU) 2022/2557 as regards the extension of certain mitigating measures available for small and medium-sized enterprises to small mid-cap enterprises and further simplifying measures’, were approved without a vote.

Read this ‘at a glance note’ on ‘Plenary round-up – March I 2026‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Linda Tothova and Sebastian Clapp.

Joint procurement of defence equipment by the EU has gained renewed strategic importance in response to the recent deteriorating security environment and persistent fragmentation within the European defence market. Although the European Defence Agency set a 35 % collaborative procurement benchmark back in 2007, cooperation among Member States remains limited. The 2022 coordinated annual review on defence reported that only 18 % of defence investment took place collaboratively, far below agreed targets. While total EU defence expenditure reached €381 billion in 2025, increased spending has not translated into commensurate growth in joint acquisition. EU institutions continue to highlight duplication issues, capability gaps and over-reliance on non‑EU suppliers.

To address these shortcomings, the Union has expanded financial and regulatory instruments. EDIRPA, EDIP and SAFE provide grants and loans to incentivise joint procurement, while the defence readiness roadmap 2030 raises the ambition to 40 % joint procurement by 2027. Targeted adjustments to the Defence Procurement Directive aim to reduce administrative barriers and facilitate multinational contracting.

Joint procurement offers potential economies of scale, stronger bargaining leverage, greater industrial predictability and enhanced interoperability. Studies indicate that meeting collaborative benchmarks could generate annual savings of several billion euros. Yet significant constraints persist, including differing threat perceptions by national governments, industrial competition that often runs counter to consolidation, governance complexity and risks of cost overruns in multinational programmes.

The European Parliament has consistently supported deeper pooling and interoperability, urging collaborative acquisition to be prioritised in EU instruments while cautioning against incentives that may reinforce national disparities. Sustained progress therefore depends on credible demand aggregation, coherent defence planning and effective coordination across EU and NATO frameworks.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU joint defence procurement‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Steven Blaakman

Europe is one of the world’s primary destinations for international migrants. In 2024, the region hosted approximately 94 million migrants, the highest number of any region in the world. The biggest share enter via legal means. The EU is experiencing skills shortages, which is partly because of its ageing population, and migrants could play a role in helping to plug them. The EU shares competence on migration and asylum policies with its Member States; EU legislation plays a significant role in managing legal migration, although its impact varies by type of migration.

Nonetheless, data consistently show that most EU legal migration tools are under-used. Blue Cards, an EU initiative to attract highly skilled workers, account for only a fraction of permits issued for employment reasons and few EU countries make significant use of them, which would suggest more work is needed to make them an attractive option. Similarly, the Single Permit, which is a combined work and residency permit, is mostly used by just a handful of EU countries. In recent years, the EU has also launched new initiatives with non-EU countries such as Talent Partnerships and a Talent Pool, but it is too early to say anything about their impact. There is also a directive for seasonal workers, but again only a few EU countries make much use of it.

The EU plays an important role when it comes to asylum by setting common standards, clarifying which EU country is responsible for processing an application, and encouraging solidarity. The European Commission has proposed a Return Regulation to make it easer and faster to return non-EU citizens who were unsuccessful in their bid to obtain asylum. It includes the possibility to create return hubs in non-EU countries, which many Member States are interested in. Temporary protection was used for the first time to help Ukrainians after the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Legal migration to the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Laurence Amand-Eeckhout.

CONTEXT

On 16 December 2025, the European Commission put forward a proposal for a regulation to simplify the rules governing medical devices in the EU. The proposal forms part of a broader package of measures aimed at improving citizens’ health and strengthening the resilience and competitiveness of the health sector. An evaluation of the current EU regulatory framework for medical devices concluded that it has led to unnecessary costs, administrative bottlenecks, regulatory uncertainty for companies, and delays in patient access to medical devices. The proposed revision seeks to address these challenges while ensuring that patient safety remains the highest priority, with faster access to safe and innovative devices. It also aims to reinforce the EU’s competitiveness in the medical technology sector, by establishing a more coherent framework enabling companies to better respond to evolving market conditions, technological developments and patient needs.

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL

2025/0404(COD) – Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2017/745 and (EU) 2017/746 as regards simplifying and reducing the burden of the rules on medical devices and in vitro diagnostic medical devices, and amending Regulation (EU) 2022/123 as regards the support of the European Medicines Agency for the expert panels on medical devices and Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 as regards the list of Union harmonisation legislation referred to in its Annex I – COM(2025) 1023, 16 December 2025.

NEXT STEPS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

For the latest developments in this legislative procedure, see the Legislative Train Schedule: 2025/0404(COD)

Read the complete briefing on ‘Medical devices: Simplifying the rules‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Sebastian Clapp.

Member States’ defence budgets

The 23 EU Member States that are also NATO members have long been guided by NATO’s 2 % of GDP defence spending commitment formalised at the 2014 Wales Summit. Allies agreed to ‘move towards’ the 2 % ‘guideline within a decade’, but in 2021 only seven of the 21 Member States that were then NATO members spent 2 % of GDP on defence. EU Member States participating in permanent structured cooperation (PESCO – all except Malta) also agreed to ‘regularly increase defence budgets in real terms’ under their PESCO commitments.

While defence budgets have increased in real terms since 2018/2019 (previously they had not even reached pre-2008 financial crisis levels), this follows years of chronic under-investment in defence in most Member States. In 2021, their combined defence budgets stood at €218 billion. Meanwhile, strategic rivals such as Russia and China increased their defence budgets by 300 % and 600 % respectively over the last decade, compared to a collective 20 % increase in EU countries (to 2022). The European Commission notes that, if all Member States had spent 2 % of GDP on defence from 2006 to 2020, this would have amounted to an extra €1.1 trillion for defence spending.

Defence budget definition

The EU uses the Classification of Functions of Government (COFOG) definition of defence spending, which includes ‘Military defence; civil defence; foreign military aid, R&D related to defence; defence not elsewhere classified’. NATO’s definition of defence spending is broader, as it includes military pensions, military healthcare (COFOG includes salaries but not healthcare) and, in some cases, spending on forces such as police or coast guards, but excludes civil defence, which COFOG includes. Moreover, discrepancies may arise from the timing of expenditure recording, particularly for military equipment, since NATO reporting does not adhere to national accounts rules on when such expenditure is recorded. Significant differences exist at national level: e.g. Spain wants to include investment in cyber security, counterterrorism and curbing climate change in its definition.

Russia’s war on Ukraine was a wake-up call for the EU. At the March 2022 Versailles Summit, EU leaders agreed to spend ‘more and better’ on defence. The Strategic Compass, a concrete plan of action for EU security and defence to 2030, reaffirmed this. The second von der Leyen Commission (2024-2029) has made defence a key EU priority. The first-ever Commissioner for Defence and Space was appointed and the European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Security and Defence was elevated to a full standing committee. The Commission also pledged to advance the European Defence Union, launched significant initiatives to boost the European defence industry (such as the first-ever European defence industrial strategy, EDIS), and a European defence industry programme (EDIP). The EU also legislated to boost ammunition production and incentivise joint procurement of urgent defence equipment. On 4 March 2025, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen presented the ReArm Europe plan/ Readiness 2030. This aims to leverage €800 billion in defence spending to 2029, including a €150 billion EU-backed loan through the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument and measures to encourage national defence spending by activating the National Escape Clause of the Stability and Growth Pact for an additional 1.5 % of GDP spending on defence, redeployment of EU cohesion funds, European Investment Bank support and private capital mobilisation. On 19 March 2025, the Commission presented its white paper for European defence, outlining a strategic plan to close critical capability gaps, strengthen the defence industry and readiness, support Ukraine, and boost innovation and partnerships to ensure the continent’s long-term security. On 16 October 2025, the Commission and High Representative put forward the European defence readiness roadmap, which sets out clear objectives and milestones to achieve defence readiness by 2030. At the NATO Summit held in The Hague, NATO Allies endorsed a revised defence spending commitment, setting a target of allocating 5 % of GDP to defence by 2035 (3.5 % for core defence expenditure and 1.5 % for broader defence-related expenditure). All Allies, except Spain, have pledged to meet the 5 % defence spending benchmark by 2035. According to the EDA, meeting the 3.5 % of GDP would oblige many Member States to significantly increase spending, amounting to roughly €254 billion and lifting aggregate defence spending to about €635 billion in 2025 and€807 billion in 2035. This does not take into account that 3.5 % does not apply to non-NATO EU Member States. However, a clear distinction exists between political commitments and concrete budgetary planning (see Annex).

Defence spending increases

In 2022, collective annual EU defence budgets had already increased to €240 billion. In 2023, Member States reached a combined €279 billion (1.6 % of GDP) and €343 billion in 2024 (1.9 % of GDP). In 2025, Member States reached an estimated €381 billion (2.1 % of GDP). All EU NATO Allies now spend more than the 2 % defence expenditure benchmark agreed at the 2014 NATO Summit. The four non-NATO EU Member States (Ireland, Malta, Austria and Cyprus) do not. EU defence investment reached €106 billion in 2024 and was set to approach €130 billion in 2025.

Figure 1 – EU Member State defence expenditure, 2025, in % of GDP

Data Source: NATO and IISS, 2025.

However, there are significant regional differences in the EU. Germany’s defence spending rose by 23 % in real terms in 2024 and 18 % in 2025, bringing the 2025 budget to €95 billion, double its 2021 level. Spending increased from 1.27 % of GDP in 2021 to 2.14 % in 2025. Following reform of the constitutional debt brake, Berlin has committed to further increases, with funding projected to reach €117.2 billion in 2026 and €162 billion by 2029, equivalent to 3.2 % of GDP, or 3.5 % when broader defence-related items are included. Northern Europe has also recorded sustained growth. Sweden has enacted major uplifts under its Total Defence 2025 to 2030 framework, prioritising air defence, long range weapons, naval assets and research. Denmark established a DKK50 billion acceleration fund, raising spending to 2.65 % of GDP. Finland has maintained levels above 2 % of GDP and plans to reach 3 % by 2029. The Netherlands has more than doubled its defence budget since 2021, reaching €25.8 billion in 2025, around 2.2 % of GDP. In fiscally constrained states, growth is more calibrated. France increased its 2026 defence allocation to €68.5 billion, or 2.25 % of GDP, despite wider deficit pressures. Spain and Italy have also raised spending to 2 %, though in part by reclassifying security expenditures. Poland and the Baltic States top the ranking in relative terms: Poland records 4.48 %, Lithuania 4.00 %, Latvia 3.73 % and Estonia 3.38 %. According to NATO projections, all EU NATO members reached at least 2 % of GDP on defence spending in 2025 (see Figure 1). By comparison, US defence expenditure (NATO definition) has consistently stayed over 3 %; it was US$935 billion (3.19 % of GDP) in 2024 (≈€868 billion) and an estimated US$980 billion (≈3.2 % of GDP) in 2025 (≈€910 billion).

In aggregate terms, EU defence expenditure exceeds the declared budgets of Russia and China respectively, although both figures warrant caution given limited transparency. Despite lower headline spending, Moscow and Beijing are likely to generate higher cost effectiveness due to lower domestic price levels, integrated planning structures and reduced organisational overhead. Measured in purchasing power parity, Russia’s defence expenditure in 2024 is estimated at €234 billion, around twice the level indicated by market exchange rates, with a similar distortion likely in China. Over the past two decades, defence spending in Russia and China has more than doubled in real terms; Member States’ expenditure has risen by just over 50 % since 2008.

European Parliament position

Parliament has consistently called for an increase in defence spending. In its annual report on the implementation of the common security and defence policy 2025, MEPs welcome rising national defence spending but urge deeper European cooperation to prevent market fragmentation. They warn of persistent deterrence gaps and call for doctrinal adaptation, expanded industrial output and greater interoperability.

Read the complete At a glace note on ‘EU Member States’ defence budgets‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ionel Zamfir.

The EU has made closing the gender gap in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) a priority in its education, research and employment policies. This answers to legal requirements to pursue gender equality through any EU action, as well as to practical imperatives to address a shortage of specialists that limits the EU’s ability to compete in the global technological race. Moreover, existing data show that many young women today have strong maths and science skills but are still largely absent from careers in engineering and information and communications technology (ICT).

Research shows that the under-representation of women in STEM has many causes, including: unwelcoming work environments in STEM jobs, family caring responsibilities, and social norms that discourage girls from pursuing these fields. Tackling these issues requires a combined approach including: challenging rigid gender stereotypes, using gender-sensitive teaching methods in schools, encouraging girls to choose STEM careers, and removing barriers to employment.

The EU pursues gender equality as a cross-cutting priority in various policies that cover STEM, and has adopted specific initiatives to promote women in STEM. In education, it uses a range of measures to support women at all levels, from schools to universities. In research, EU funding now depends on programmes promoting gender equality. In employment, EU laws help remove obstacles that might put women off STEM careers.

The EU also funds projects that support women’s innovation, entrepreneurship, networking and mentoring. The European Parliament strongly backs these efforts, and has called for wider action by the EU and its Member States.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Women in STEM in the EU: How to close the gender gap‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Sarah Sheil.

More than one year into the second von der Leyen Commission and six months after her first State of the Union address in this mandate, the Members’ Research Service of the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) presents its twice-yearly monitoring of the Commission’s delivery. This paper analyses in which areas the Commission has focused its efforts, how much it has achieved against its commitments – primarily set out in the State of the Union address and the 2026 Commission work programme – and how its priorities are articulated.

In terms of announcements, initiatives tabled, and texts adopted, the Commission’s main focus has been on competitiveness. To meet the objectives of the Letta and Draghi reports – quoted as the foundations of this policy – much effort will still be needed, as was confirmed by Mario Draghi soon after the 2025 State of the Union address. This priority underpinned the European Council’s 12 February 2026 competitiveness retreat.

The ‘new era for European defence and security‘ comes next. The mainly non-legislative nature of the second Commission priority translates differently, with initiatives far fewer in number but of high political prominence. This policy area is at the forefront in the interinstitutional joint declaration on the EU’s legislative priorities for 2026.

Read the complete Study on ‘The policy priorities of the von der Leyen II Commission: State of play in March 2026‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson

The following debate will see Commission and Council statements on the situation in Iran following the US-Israel military operation, including the need to support the Iranian people. On Tuesday lunchtime, Parliament will celebrate International Women’s Day, with the focus this year on gender stereotypes, disinformation and violence, all of which weaken women’s participation in democracy. Nikol Pashinyan, Prime Minister of Armenia, is expected to address Parliament in a formal sitting on Wednesday.

The 2027 annual EU budget will be the last one under the current multiannual financial framework (MFF), and Parliament’s Committee on Budgets (BUDG) is calling for a strong focus on delivery for people, the economy, the planet and providing investments for competitiveness. On Tuesday, Members are set to debate the committee’s report, which emphasises the EU budget’s role in strengthening the bloc’s cohesion in the face of a difficult geopolitical landscape. BUDG also calls to uphold a strong external policy and underlines the agreement between EU institutions that expenditure covering the financing costs of Next Generation EU must not reduce funding for EU programmes. The vote on the guidelines for the 2027 EU budget will set Parliament’s position for the forthcoming interinstitutional negotiations.

On Tuesday, Members are due to debate a Foreign Affairs (AFET) Committee report on the European Union’s enlargement strategy. To date, merit-based EU enlargement has had a largely positive effect, bringing peace and prosperity to countries joining the bloc. With nine candidate countries and one potential candidate awaiting EU membership, Parliament’s own-initiative report on EU enlargement strategy underlines its support for the process and for reform of the current procedure for admitting new members. The report also emphasises enlargement’s strategic potential to strengthen the wider region in the face of geopolitical uncertainty. Finally, the report underlines the need for a strong merit-based process where alignment with the EU’s core values is an unconditional principle of membership.

Under the Treaties, Parliament’s role is to scrutinise proposed EU legislation – and also international agreements – on behalf of European citizens. The revised framework agreement on relations between Parliament and the European Commission aims at strengthening Parliament’s prerogatives as regards the Commission’s duties to inform Parliament of its plans. On Monday, Members will discuss a report prepared by the Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) Committee. The report emphasises that the new framework agreement retains the institutional balance intended in the Treaties, while also creating a clearer and more accountable relationship between the institutions, working in EU citizens’ interests.

Ahead of the 2026 World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference, taking place in Cameroon at the end of the month, Members are due to debate a resolution setting out Parliament’s position on the multilateral negotiations, on Wednesday afternoon. Here again, global instability and the retreat from global trade rules mean the need to reform the WTO is urgent, not least to replace the long-broken dispute settlement system, promote a global level playing field and make the rules more flexible. Parliament’s Committee on International Trade (INTA) has tabled a motion for a resolution underscoring Parliament’s support for the multilateral trading system and emphasising the need for greater flexibility. A delegation from the INTA committee is due to attend the Parliamentary Conference on the WTO ahead of the 14th WTO Ministerial Conference.

Closer to home, many citizens are personally concerned about the EU’s housing crisis. While housing policy remains a national competence, Parliament’s Special Committee on the Housing Crisis in the EU (HOUS) has tabled a report recommending action to improve housing affordability. The committee proposes to help tackle the issue through EU rules on short-term rentals, aiming to strike a balance between promoting urban local communities and tourism income. The HOUS committee also proposes action to improve quality in the construction and energy-efficiency sectors and calls on EU governments to support people trying to get into the housing market through tax breaks. Members are due to debate the recommendations on solutions for affordable housing on Tuesday morning.

A shortage of qualified workers in various sectors continues to be an issue in many EU countries. While the EU has already provided a platform to match EU jobseekers with employers, the European Commission is proposing to introduce legislation to create an EU talent pool which would be open to non-EU citizens. Faced with international competition for talent, the proposal would allow EU countries to attract workers, while guarding against creating an alternative pathway to legal migration. Parliament is keen to ensure that the system is fair, protects against discrimination and is rolled out in all EU countries. On Tuesday, Members are set to vote on a text agreed in interinstitutional negotiations on the proposal to establish an EU talent pool.

When using artificial intelligence (AI) to generate text, images or code, many people are unaware of the legal implications of the AI tool’s use of copyrighted material as training data. This can mean that content creators, artists and other rights-holders are neither acknowledged nor paid for their input. On Tuesday, Members are therefore due to vote on an own-initiative report from the Legal Affairs Committee calling for clarification of the legal situation as regards copyright and generative AI.

The EU rules on package travel date back to 2015 and need to be updated to improve passenger protection. Members are therefore due to consider amendments to the Package Travel Directive, following an agreement reached between the co-legislators in December 2025. Parliament’s negotiators succeeded in improving the complaints procedure and consumer information provided on what is included in the ‘package’ they purchase. Parliament is scheduled to vote to conclude its first reading on the legislation to amend the Package Travel Directive on Wednesday.

Quick links to all our publications for this plenary session:

European Parliament Plenary Session March 2026 – agenda

• Parliament’s guidelines for the 2027 EU budget: Section III – European Commission
• Parliament’s own-initiative report on EU enlargement strategy
• New framework agreement on relations between Parliament and Commission
• Towards the 2026 WTO Ministerial Conference
• Addressing the housing crisis in the EU
• Proposal for a regulation establishing an EU talent pool
• Copyright and generative artificial intelligence – Opportunities and challenges
• Package travel: Improved protection for travellers

Countries wishing to join the European Union (EU) must meet a set of legal, economic and political requirements. The progress that a candidate country makes to implement EU law and fulfil these requirements is monitored during the ‘accession negotiation’ process. The European Parliament’s approval is needed before a country can join the EU.

Application and accession requirements

Any European country can apply for EU membership if it respects and undertakes to promote the values common to all EU countries, as defined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).

Candidate countries must meet specific political and economic criteria, known as the Copenhagen criteria. These include:

• stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and the protection of minorities;
• a functioning market economy and the ability to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU;
• the ability to take on the obligations that come with EU membership and a commitment to the aims of the political, economic and monetary union.

Accession process

Application stage: A country that wishes to join the EU sends its application to the Council of the European Union, which asks the European Commission to submit an opinion.

Candidate status: If the Commission’s opinion is favourable, the Council may decide to grant the country candidate status. The Council must agree this unanimously.

Negotiations: The Commission carries out a detailed examination of 35 different policy fields (negotiating chapters), together with the candidate country, and either recommends opening negotiations immediately or asks for certain conditions to be met first. The Council then decides (by unanimity) to open negotiations, which take place between the governments of EU countries and the candidate country. Candidate countries may need to undergo a rigorous reform process, with a focus on the functioning of democratic institutions, judicial independence, media pluralism and the fight against corruption and organised crime.

Accession treaty: Once negotiations have been closed, an accession treaty containing the conditions and deadlines of membership is formally drawn up. The treaty is subsequently submitted to the Commission, the Parliament and the Council for approval. Each EU country and the candidate country must ratify (sign)  the accession treaty according to their own procedures.

European Parliament’s role

Parliament monitors the accession process throughout the negotiations with candidate countries. Specifically, the Committee on Foreign Affairs is responsible for coordinating the work on enlargement. The committee regularly exchanges views with the Commissioner responsible for enlargement negotiations, government representatives, experts and civil society actors.

Parliament gives its opinion on the annual Commission reports on individual candidate countries. It adopts resolutions on the accession process and comments on the progress of countries’ reforms.

Parliament also maintains bilateral relations with the parliaments of candidate and potential candidate countries through joint parliamentary committees and inter‑parliamentary meetings which take place once or twice per year.

Parliament’s budgetary powers give it direct influence over the financial aspects of accession, such as the EU funds allocated to support reforms in candidate countries (Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance).

Finally, Parliament must give its consent, by an absolute majority vote of more than half of all Members, before a country can join the EU (Article 49 TEU).

EU enlargement developments

As of early 2026, there are nine candidate countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine.

Albania and Montenegro have made significant progress on the EU accession path by closing certain negotiating chapters and promoting an anti‑corruption and reform agenda.

In the case of North Macedonia, the opening of the first negotiating chapter depends on constitutional reform, progress on the anti‑corruption agenda and improved relations with neighbouring Bulgaria and Greece.

Ukraine and Moldova were granted candidate status in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Ukraine and Moldova successfully completed the examination of their alignment with EU law in 2025. Once all EU countries agree, the negotiating chapters can be opened.

As regards Serbia, political turmoil and reform stagnation have slowed down the negotiations on matters that remained unresolved.

Accession negotiations with Turkey have been on hold since 2018, as the Turkish government has failed to address backsliding on democracy and the rule of law. In May 2025, Parliament said that Turkey’s accession process could not be re-started under the current circumstances as the accession process requires the fundamental values of the Union to be fully respected.

Political instability and institutional challenges inBosnia and Herzegovina have halted the opening of formal negotiations.

In 2024, the EU found that Georgia was backsliding on the rule of law and fundamental rights and therefore conditions to open negotiations had not been met.

Kosovo applied to join the EU in December 2022 but has not been granted candidate status. In May 2025, Parliament called on the five EU countries [CJ1] (Greece, Spain, Cyprus, Romania and Slovakia) that have not yet recognised Kosovo to do so, so that Kosovo can progress its accession process.

Keep sending your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We will reply in the EU language in which you write to us.

Written by Naja Bentzen.

New digital technologies are a mixed blessing for women’s rights and representation in the information sphere in general, and in the democratic debate in particular. Innovative digital tools often promise to make public debates more inclusive, for women too. In practice, recent AI-enabled technology – including deepfake tools – appears to facilitate an increasingly hostile information environment for women, with repercussions for their democratic participation both online and offline. 

At the same time, the ongoing global wave of autocratisation goes hand in hand with a backlash against women’s rights and gender equality. Authoritarian regimes have strategic reasons for suppressing women, and often use gendered disinformation to undermine women opposition leaders, as well as to erode confidence in democratic values and rights.

In the European Union, equality between men and women is a fundamental right and a founding value enshrined in the Treaties. Over the past decades, the EU has worked to increase gender equality at home, and used its global influence to support women’s rights abroad. At the same time, its evolving digital regulatory framework aims to make the digital space safe for all, including by protecting the rights of women online.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Women in the age of AI-enabled disinformation‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Alina Dobreva.

CONTEXT

On 16 July 2025, the European Commission adopted its proposal for the 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework (MFF), which was completed on 3 September with the adoption of a second package. The own resources part of the proposal is intended to equip the EU with a diversified revenue stream and sufficient means for delivering on EU priorities, as well as for the repayment of the debt created by Next Generation EU.

Legislative proposal

2025/0574 (CNS) – Proposal for a Council decision on the system of own resources of the European Union and repealing Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 – COM(2025) 574, 16.7.2025.

NEXT STEPS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

For the latest developments in this legislative procedure, see the Legislative Train Schedule: 2025/0574 (CNS)

Read the complete briefing on ‘System of own resources: Multiannual financial framework 2028-2034‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ionel Zamfir

Despite strong political commitments to gender equality at EU and national level, women still remain politically under-represented at all levels of political power. In the European Parliament, as well as in national parliaments, governments and local assemblies, their share most often is under the symbolic 40 % mark. Moreover, after successive electoral cycles in which women’s share in representative assemblies had increased, this trend has slowed down or come to a halt. Progress has also been uneven among Member States, with women remaining markedly under-represented in some Member States.

Gender-balanced political representation is not only important for women and female politicians but also for political parties themselves and the rest of society. It increases trust in the political system and strengthens economic and political governance.

The EU has committed to achieving gender balance in political representation and participation in the EU; however, except for the European elections, its powers in the area remain limited mainly to soft action. It can support the specific actions to be taken by the EU institutions, national governments, political parties, civil society and the media, by issuing recommendations, facilitating the exchange of good practice or funding projects.

There is substantial evidence of the obstacles to women’s political participation and the means to overcome it. This picture is nevertheless not static, as new challenges emerge, particularly from mounting opposition to gender equality, as well as from digital technologies, most recently artificial intelligence, which can both empower women and discourage them.

This updates a March 2024 briefing by Ionel Zamfir.

Source: European Institute for Gender Equality (2025)

Read the complete briefing on ‘Women in politics in the EU: State of play in 2026‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ivana Katsarova.

Food contact materials (FCMs) include all materials that come into physical contact with food during its production, processing, packaging and storage. They contain thousands of chemicals, some of which can migrate into food, especially at high temperatures, during long contact times or with certain food types.

Scientific evidence shows that such migration is common and may contribute to human exposure to hazardous substances, including endocrine disruptors, carcinogens and reproductive toxicants. Well-known examples include phthalates, bisphenols and PFAS, which remain authorised in some applications despite links to adverse health effects. Current risk assessments often consider substances individually and may underestimate combined or cumulative exposure.

The EU’s core legislation is Regulation (EC) 1935/2004, which sets out general safety and labelling rules, supported by the Good Manufacturing Practice Regulation (EC) 2023/2006. However, only four material types – plastics, ceramics, regenerated cellulose film and active/intelligent materials – are subject to fully harmonised EU rules. The remaining materials (paper, inks, coatings, rubber, metal, etc.) rely mostly on national rules, leading to regulatory fragmentation, uneven safety standards and unclear requirements for industry. In addition, existing rules focus largely on known intentionally added substances, while non‑intentionally added substances (NIAS), impurities and degradation products remain insufficiently addressed.

A 2022 Commission evaluation found the framework only partially effective, with gaps in enforcement, control of NIAS and harmonisation. The Commission has recently reiterated its commitment to further harmonising EU legislation on FCMs.

The European Parliament has pushed for stronger rules, contributing to recent EU‑wide bans on BPA and PFAS in food packaging.

Citizens and stakeholders broadly support a comprehensive revision establishing clearer standards, harmonised testing and stronger consumer protection.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Food contact materials in the EU: State of play‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Liselotte Jensen.

CONTEXT

The carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) is being implemented to create a level playing field on carbon pricing of specific goods within the EU single market. For CBAM-covered goods, free allowances under the EU′s emissions trading system (ETS) will be progressively phased out by 2034.

With the phase-out of free allowances in CBAM-covered goods, EU operators producing goods for export will be at a disadvantage in markets without similar carbon pricing.

The European Commission is proposing a temporary decarbonisation fund to support certain goods in the aluminium, fertilisers, iron and steel sectors. Other energy-intensive industries at continued risk of carbon leakage could also benefit. The fund would provide short-term support as a temporary bridge solution, pending a review in the context of the forthcoming revision of the EU ETS due in 2026.

Legislative proposal

2025/0418(COD) – Proposal for a regulation establishing the temporary decarbonisation fund – COM(2025) 990, 17 December 2025.

NEXT STEPS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

For the latest developments in this legislative procedure, see the Legislative Train Schedule: 2025/0418(COD)

Read the complete briefing on ‘Temporary decarbonisation fund‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.