European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Annastiina Papunen and Rebecca Zamponi

The two-day meeting saw discussions on the situation in the Middle East and its geopolitical and economic impact on the EU, EU defence and security, energy, competitiveness, Ukraine, and the EU’s long-term budget for 2028-2034. A notable moment on the sidelines of the meeting was the signing of the ‘One Europe, One Market’ roadmap by the Presidents of the European Parliament, the European Commission and Cyprus (representing the EU Council) – a document which sets clear timelines and deliverables to strengthen EU competitiveness and the EU single market by the end of 2027.

Back to back with the informal meeting, EU leaders were joined for an informal lunch by the leaders of key regional partners in the Middle East (Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Syria, and the Gulf Cooperation Council). The leaders on both sides welcomed the ceasefires between the US and Iran as well as between Israel and Lebanon. European Council President António Costa stressed that ‘the European Union is not a part of the conflict, but we will be a part of the solution’, which reflected the discussions and the general mood of EU leaders. European Parliament President Roberta Metsola underlined that ‘we all want the same thing: a swift and lasting end to the war’.

1. General

EU leaders met in Cyprus for an informal meeting, in Ayia Napa on 23 April over dinner, and in Lefkosia the next day. Security was heightened at the meeting venues, after the drone attack that had targeted the UK military base of Akrotiri in March. Furthermore, Cypriot farmers blocked roads to protest strict governments measures limiting the spread of the highly contagious foot-and-mouth disease. Over 100 farms have been affected and, as per EU rules, the infected animals need to be culled, adding to the plight of farmers harmed by rising costs and adverse climate phenomena.

The President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, addressed EU leaders, as did Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who attended the meeting in person. This would have been the last European Council meeting for Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán after he lost the April parliamentary elections to Tisza leader Péter Magyar (EPP). However, Orbán, who is currently the longest-serving member of the European Council, with 16 years in post, did not attend.

2. European Council meeting Ukraine

The informal European Council meeting started on the bright side, with President Costa welcoming the final approval of the €90 billion loan to Ukraine and the 20th package of sanctions against Russia on the doorstep. Latvian Prime Minister Evika Siliņa stressed that these two decisions demonstrated that the EU could deliver what it promised, even in turbulent times. EU leaders had agreed on the loan at the December 2025 European Council meeting. However, Hungary and Slovakia blocked the necessary amendment of the financial framework (requiring unanimity) until Russian oil deliveries to the two Member States, via the Druzhba pipeline, had resumed. The High Representative, Kaja Kallas, suggested that the EU should revisit previous sanctions red lines. Zelenskyy, after welcoming the unblocking of the €90 billion loan, raised the issue of the implementation of EU support to Ukraine, the need to pressure Russia towards real diplomacy, and his visit to the Middle East and the new security agreements concluded with partners in the region. He also called for ‘full-fledged EU membership’ for Ukraine, a country which is ‘defending common European values’.
Ahead of the informal meeting, Presidents Costa and Zelenskyy and Commission President Ursula von der Leyen released a joint statement that highlighted the progress Ukraine had made in its reforms and called for the ‘opening of negotiation clusters without delay’. There is, however, no unity on the accession process of Ukraine. While Estonian Prime Minister Kristen Michal said that he favoured ‘accelerating’ Ukraine’s membership, Luxembourg Prime Minister Luc Frieden stated that enlargement should be seen in a geostrategic perspective, but that there could be no short cuts. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz ruled out immediate membership but proposed partial integration to bring the country closer to the EU, for instance by participating in the work of the institutions without voting rights. Merz claimed there was support among his fellow leaders for the proposal, with the main hurdle being Ukraine’s involvement in the internal market.

Middle East

The discussion on the EU’s response to the evolving situation in the Middle East had two main components: 1) contributing to de-escalation and peace; and 2) the core principle of freedom of navigation. Fragile ceasefires between the United States and Iran as well as between Israel and Lebanon formed the background to the discussion. From the outset, the EU has been unified in calling for de-escalation; however, there has not been clear agreement on what the EU and the Member States could do to achieve this.

On Lebanon, President Costa reiterated earlier calls for negotiations to continue in full respect of international law and of Lebanon’s territorial integrity. Lebanese President Joseph Aoun was commended for banning the military activities of Hezbollah and reassured of EU support. In March 2026, the EU announced it was increasing humanitarian aid and financial support to Lebanon. Moreover, at the Foreign Affairs Council on 21 April, Spain, Ireland and Slovenia had put forward a proposal to suspend the EU-Israel Association Agreement over military actions in Lebanon and Palestine. In his doorstep statement, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez said there was disunity between Member States on this possibility. However, if a total suspension, requiring unanimity, seems out of reach, some countries such as Belgium and the Netherlands are suggesting a suspension of the trade-related provisions of the Association Agreement, which only requires a qualified majority.

The US and Iran have been in a stand-off in the Strait of Hormuz, as both sides enact their own blockades, preventing free navigation. President Costa called for the Strait of Hormuz to be re‑opened without restrictions or tolling in full respect of international law and freedom of navigation. Von der Leyen stated that the EU must move past reactive crisis management and suggested expanding the scope of naval missions like ASPIDES.

After the informal meeting, Costa and von der Leyen both expressed the EU leaders’ general agreement that, given the brutality inflicted very recently by the Iranian regime on its people, it was too early to consider removing sanctions against Iran in exchange for lifting the blockade on the Strait of Hormuz. EU leaders consider that a number of milestones would have to be reached before the EU could consider lifting sanctions, notably assurances on the end of Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. The ongoing blockage of the Strait of Hormuz has had a negative impact on the European and global economy (see below).

European security and defence

Faced with this challenging geopolitical and security environment, EU leaders discussed Europe’s readiness to respond and to provide assistance to a Member State victim of armed aggression on its territory. Following a drone attack on the British base of Akrotiri in Cyprus on 1 March, Nikos Christodoulides, President of Cyprus, had put the possible use of the European mutual assistance clause under Article 42(7) TEU on the EU leaders’ agenda, prompting questions on its scope, implementation and the role of the EU institutions. Enshrined in EU primary law in 2009, the clause has only been triggered once, by France following the 13 November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris. Similar to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the clause envisages ‘an obligation [for EU Member States] of aid and assistance by all the means in their power’, i.e. not necessarily military means. For non-NATO EU Member States (Austria, Cyprus, Ireland and Malta), and amid doubts over the US’s readiness to honour the NATO Article 5 commitment, Article 42(7) appears particularly relevant.

Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk – whose country is NATO’s biggest defence spender proportionate to GDP, and one of Europe’s most pro-transatlantic countries – questioned the US’s ‘loyalty’ to the NATO Article 5 pledge. He stressed that the discussions on the clause were about defining practical ways for EU countries to support each other in the event of an attack. Likewise, Christodoulides called for the clause to be made operational, stating that ‘Europe must be ready to respond swiftly and decisively … . We must put this mechanism firmly in place’. Kallas briefed EU leaders on the ongoing work to provide guidance, which will result in a Commission blueprint, on when and how a country can trigger the mutual assistance clause, and what assets can be mobilised once it is invoked. However, with certain EU countries wary of steps that could be seen as undermining NATO, the Article 42(7) discussion remained part of a wider discussion on geopolitics.

Energy crisis and economic consequences of the war

At their regular March meeting, EU leaders agreed on a set of measures and recommendations to protect EU citizens and the EU economy from the crisis. As stressed at the Eurogroup meeting on 27 March: ‘The rise in oil and gas prices is directly affecting European households and businesses and will put pressure on inflation and dampen growth’. The situation has since grown even more dire; as the Strait of Hormuz is still closed to normal traffic, energy prices have risen further. The EU bill for imported fossil fuels has gone up by €25 billion in 54 days, and Energy Commissioner Dan Jorgensen has warned that the EU should be prepared for ‘a long-lasting energy shock’. Some analysts even consider that a recession may already be unfolding.

In their March 2026 conclusions, EU leaders asked the Commission to present ‘a toolbox of targeted temporary measures to address the recent spikes in the prices of imported fossil fuels arising from the crisis in the Middle East’ without delay. Published ahead of the Cyprus meeting, the toolbox, entitled AccelerateEU, aims in the short and medium term to shield Europeans from the crisis with timely, targeted and temporary measures, and to further accelerate electrification. President Costa stated that ‘coordination is key’ and that EU leaders were ‘ready to step up their response’ if needed. He also noted that, in the long term, there was only one option for the EU – to speed up energy transition and to use clean home-grown energy sources. While acknowledging that the Commission toolbox was a good step forward, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni said ‘it is not enough’. Likewise, Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever criticised it for not being concrete enough; he would have liked to see larger adjustments to the EU emissions trading system (ETS) and an EU-wide tax on windfall profits. According to Christodoulides, EU finance ministers are expected to work on further proposals to address the rising energy prices at the two Ecofin meetings in May.

Competitiveness

On Friday, on the sidelines of the EU leaders’ meeting, Presidents von der Leyen, Metsola and Christodoulides (on behalf of the Cyprus Presidency of the Council) formally signed the joint ‘One Market, One Europe roadmap‘, which is the result of discussions at the Alden Biesen competitiveness retreat in February and at the regular March meeting. Christodoulides called it ‘a strong signal of our collective determination to truly boost European competitiveness’. The Commission had promised the roadmap for the March regular meeting, but it was finally postponed by a month. In the European Parliament, some dissatisfaction with the preparatory process was apparent, since the draft was only circulated one week before the meeting, leaving very little time for reflection and negotiations. Nevertheless, as the Council’s press release underlines: ‘This agreement demonstrates the resolve of the three institutions to move forward together on a clear path. Against the backdrop of sustained geopolitical and economic volatility, this roadmap represents a decisive step to urgently strengthen Europe’s competitiveness, with concrete actions and targets for agreements, at the latest by end 2027.’

Main message of the President of the EP: Roberta Metsola said that the roadmap would allow the EU to deliver ‘what the citizens have asked from us’ in a fast and effective way, adding that ‘we are now at the point where commitments need to turn into delivery’. However, she also underlined that: ‘We also need the space – and the trust – to do our job of democratic oversight and legitimacy properly. 720 MEPs from more than 200 political parties are not, and will never be, a rubber stamp.’

Multiannual financial framework 2028-2034

EU leaders had an exchange of views on the next multiannual financial framework (MFF), notably on the contribution of the new EU long-term budget to the EU’s competitiveness agenda. As von der Leyen pointed out, there are four elements in the budgetary equation: the need to 1) repay Next Generation EU from 2028; 2) invest in new priorities; 3) sustain funding for the EU’s long-standing priorities; and 4) keep national contributions in check. Matching the EU’s resources with its ambitions and needs is challenging and will therefore not be possible without new own resources.

After the meeting, Costa reported that EU leaders had confirmed that new own resources would have to play an important role in funding the budget. The Commission’s new own resources package will constitute the basis for discussions, but EU leaders have also expressed openness to considering the suggestions put forward by the European Parliament, which is proposing to tax digital services, online gambling and crypto-assets. However, own resources are expected to be subject to intense discussions. Irish Prime Minister Micheál Martin, the next holder of the rotating Presidency of the Council of the EU, stated that ‘own resources is a difficult part of the file, in the sense that those [Commission] proposals haven’t garnered too much support across the 27 Member States’. Germany and the Netherlands, for instance, oppose a tax on the turnover of large companies, while revenue collected through the ETS does not seem popular among EU leaders.

As usual in this phase of MFF negotiations, groups of Member States try to influence the discussions by issuing positions or ‘non-papers’ on core aspects of the future MFF, such as the non-paper by Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden on the proposal for a European Competitiveness Fund.

Regarding the timeline, Costa’s objective is to ‘find an agreement by the end of this year’. However, some EU leaders such as Merz questioned ‘whether we’ll actually be able to finalise it this year’. The MFF is due to be addressed at the June meeting, based on a ‘negotiating box’ with figures to be put forward by the Cyprus Presidency, and at the regular meetings in October and December; in addition, there will be a special meeting on 26-27 November.

Main message of the President of the EP: Roberta Metsola pointed out that the European Parliament would adopt its position the following week. She stressed that Parliament supported a stronger focus on competitiveness and defence, while calling on EU leaders ‘to look with fresh eyes on own resources. We need new money to service the debt’. She added that ‘Europe cannot face a new era with an old framework. The current budget has been stretched to its breaking point by crises it was never designed to absorb. We made it work but we see its limits … What we need now is a budget that is fit for purpose – ready to deliver where, and when, it matters most.’

3. Informal meeting with key regional partners in the Middle East

Back to back with the informal meeting, EU leaders held an informal working lunch with leaders from Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria as well as the Secretary-General of the Gulf Cooperation Council to discuss the situation in the region and regional cooperation. This lunch followed Costa’s two days of meetings with the leaders of the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar on 14-15 April. After the informal meeting, Christodoulides emphasised that the security and stability of the Middle East was interlinked with that of Europe. He also stated that the Pact for the Mediterranean was a crucial first step to strategically enhancing cooperation with countries in the region, but that much more needed to be done. Cyprus would put forward specific suggestions to achieve that, such as a step-by-step approach to removing sanctions and boosting cooperation with the Syrian regime. On 20 April, the Commission proposed the full resumption of the EU-Syria Cooperation Agreement (partially suspended since 2011). Von der Leyen emphasised that close relations between Europe and the Middle East was not just for now, but also for the future, outlining a number of upcoming conferences and high-level meetings with partners in the region.

Read this briefing on ‘Outcome of the meetings of EU leaders, 23 – 24 April 2026‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Angelos Delivorias.

Australia is one of the world’s biggest economies, and possesses raw materials reserves that place it at the centre of the green and digital transition. In addition, its geographical position and military capabilities make it a central player in the geostrategic balance of the Indo-Pacific. In the past 70 years, Australia has been mainly governed by the Australian Labor Party and the Coalition (the alliance between the Liberal Party of Australia and the National Party of Australia). In the most recent elections in 2025, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and the Labor Party were re-elected.
The country has had long and strong relations in several sectors with the United States (US). At the same time, the decisions and rhetoric of President Donald Trump’s administration have created tensions in the relationship. Similarly, the country shares strong relations with China, albeit concentrated in fewer areas (mainly trade and migration); nevertheless, these relations have become increasingly strained over the last decade, peaking during the COVID-19 pandemic. The current government has been trying to adopt a firm tone towards the US and diversify its economy and defence, without jeopardising the deep relations between the two countries. It has also adopted a less confrontational tone towards China, while at the same time trying to diminish its reliance on bilateral trade.
In 2026, relations between the EU and Australia reached a new milestone, with the conclusion of a free trade agreement (FTA) and a security and defence partnership (SDP). The FTA eliminates tariffs on almost all Australian goods entering the EU and vice versa. It gives greater access to the respective agricultural markets while protecting several geographical indications. Thanks to the elimination of tariffs on critical minerals, the EU secures greater access to necessary inputs and strengthens the resilience of its supply chain. The SDP – the EU’s 11th (out of 12) since the launch of the Strategic Compass – reflects the bloc’s willingness to play a more active global role, in collaboration with like-minded partners who share converging strategic interests.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Australia: Current landscape and engagement with the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson with Áine Feeney.

Parliament is due to adopt its negotiating mandate for the EU’s 2028-2034 budget, with a debate scheduled on Tuesday morning on an interim report on the MFF. The report adopted by the Committee on Budgets (BUDG) defends a budget set at 1.27 % of the EU’s gross national income (GNI), excluding Next Generation EU (NGEU) repayment. This is a 10 % increase compared with the Commission proposal. BUDG also calls for a budget of €385.12 billion to be ringfenced for the common agricultural policy in the next MFF, with a €274.34 billion budget for cohesion policy. In terms of governance and rule of law, Members are concerned that the proposed budget weakens transparency, and stress that the Commission must apply the necessary legal provisions in cases where EU financial interests are threatened.

Members should also vote on guidelines for the 2027 budget, following the debate at the March session, with the aim of feeding into the draft budget the Commission plans to adopt on 10 June.

On Tuesday afternoon, Members are due to debate granting discharge for the 2024 financial year to the various institutions and bodies of the EU. The Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT) has recommended granting discharge to the Commission and all six executive agencies, but is concerned about the rule of law and corruption, calling on the Commission to ensure the EU budget is protected. Likewise, CONT has recommended granting discharge to seven of the eight other institutions, but yet again recommends postponing discharge for the European Council and the Council of the EU. The Council refuses to acknowledge Parliament’s oversight role, and Parliament has therefore not granted discharge since 2009. The CONT committee also recommends granting discharge for all 33 EU decentralised agencies, but raises concerns about financial risks including rising EU debt and structural weaknesses in financial management, staffing and procurement.

Reform of EU trade with less developed countries is on the horizon, with Members due to consider a provisional agreement on revision of the Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) Regulation on Tuesday lunchtime. Following negotiations between Parliament and the Council in December 2025, the agreed text includes the addition of new human rights and environmental treaties, which participating countries must ratify to benefit from trade preferences, as well as stricter criteria that must be met before GSP countries can see their preferential tariffs withdrawn for non-cooperation in the readmission of migrants illegally present in the EU. Once formally adopted, the legislation would apply from 1 January 2027.

As combating sexual violence and violence against women remains an urgent issue globally, Parliament continues to support a strong and survivor-centred legal framework. On Monday, Members are due to examine a joint own-initiative report from Parliament’s Committees on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) and on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE), which calls on the Commission to propose EU legislation to define rape based on consent, in line with the Istanbul Convention. The report reiterates Parliament’s previous call to make gender-based violence a specific area of EU crime, stresses that legislation should also apply to virtual acts of sexual assault, and should consider circumstances in which giving consent is precluded. This marks a renewed legislative effort on reform after provisions on a consent-based definition of rape were not included in the EU directive adopted in 2024.

Rising energy costs and a decline in demand are affecting Europe’s chemicals industry. Parliament supports simplification of certain requirements but prioritises consumer protection and clear labelling. In April 2026, Members of the Committees on Environment, Climate and Food Safety (ENVI) and Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) jointly rejected the Commission’s proposals to extend the time before bans are applied on the use of carcinogenic substances in cosmetic products and opposed the removal of certain text requirements to ensure labels remain legible for consumers. On Wednesday afternoon, Parliament is due to vote on its negotiating mandate for the ‘Omnibus VI proposal’, which aims at simplifying rules for chemicals, cosmetics and fertiliser manufacturing.

Transport is responsible for about a quarter of the EU’s greenhouse gas emissions (GHG). Nevertheless, EU countries have to rely on emissions calculation tools with limited reliability in their efforts to cut emissions. On Tuesday afternoon, Parliament is set to consider a proposed common framework to calculate GHG emissions from both freight and passenger transport. This follows a trilogue agreement reached by negotiators from the Committees on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) and Transport and Tourism (TRAN). The agreed text, which Parliament will consider at second reading, backs the Commission proposal for a single EU methodology and calls for a free public calculation tool to make data widely available. If adopted, this universal methodology would mean a reduction in the administrative burden and allow for greater transparency and fairer comparison between services.

European Parliament Plenary Session April 2026 – agenda

• 2028-2034 EU budget: Parliament’s position
• Discharge for 2024 budget: Commission including RRF, executive agencies, EDFS
• Discharge for 2024 budget: Other institutions
• Discharge for 2024 budget: EU decentralised agencies and joint undertakings
• A new generalised scheme of preferences
• The need for consent-based definition of rape
• Emissions accounting in transport services
• Omnibus VI – Simplification of requirements and procedures for chemicals

Written by Ulrich Jochheim.

Global imbalances have been a major topic in international economic policymaking since at least the 1970s. Although they decreased after the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008, they have begun to widen again in recent years. As the 2008 crisis demonstrated, the sudden unwinding of current account surpluses and deficits (‘disorderly adjustment’) can have major consequences not only for the countries directly involved but also for many third countries through spillover effects, particularly in financial markets.

Against this background, developments in the Chinese economy have become particularly important for global economic stability: while China played an important stabilising role in overcoming the GFC, its economic model has largely focused on export promotion and, more recently, import substitution. This has led to substantial current account surpluses, both as a percentage of GDP and in nominal terms, given the size of China’s economy.

International organisations have been trying for some time now to convince China’s authorities that the country’s growth model is shifting the burden of adjustment to its trading partners and risks becoming globally unsustainable. Prior to the adoption of China’s 15th Five-Year Plan by the two houses of Parliament (the ‘Two Sessions’) in March 2026, the IMF, in particular, proposed strategies to render China’s economic expansion more sustainable for its partners while reducing the risk of a disorderly adjustment.

However, a more detailed analysis of the new plan suggests a continuation of the current economic policy trajectory. At the same time, the ongoing crisis in the Middle East/Iran seems to have prompted some within China to reconsider priorities, at least in the short term. It remains to be seen, however, whether recent, more accommodating statements by the Chinese side are merely for external consumption, especially in view of the summit between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping (currently planned for mid-May 2026).

Read the complete briefing on ‘China’s economic challenge to the world‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson and Sebastian Clapp.

Russia’s attack on Ukraine turned out to be merely the opening salvo in a deteriorating global security scenario. Security has become a top concern for Europeans – and this concern has deepened. More than two thirds of Europeans (68 %) believe their country is under threat, and 52 % trust the EU to strengthen security and defence. The European Parliament has called for the EU to move towards a more unified defence stance, based on credible deterrence, operational readiness, and continued support for Ukraine.

To ensure all EU countries are able to rely on a robust defence against attack, the EU roadmap to defence readiness by 2030 aims at overcoming defence industry fragmentation and a dependence on non-EU suppliers through coordinated investment, collaborative spending and encouraging a robust industrial and technological base. While EU countries increased their defence spending in 2025, Parliament is keen to see EU governments work together more closely to unlock the economies of scale that joint defence procurement could bring. Such coordinated defence spending could benefit the EU’s rapidly-expanding defence industry, with several new financial and legislative initiatives promoting cross-border cooperation in the industry.

Four years into Russia’s war, Parliament still stands firm with Ukraine. Parliament held an extraordinary plenary session in February 2026, marking this sombre anniversary, with President Metsola remarking ‘Ukraine’s security is Europe’s security’. Parliament also voted in favour of a €90 billion support loan package to strengthen Ukraine’s defence and economy. As the loan guarantee requires an amendment to the EU multiannual financial framework, the file requires a unanimous decision in the Council – which to date has been blocked by Hungary.

Presciently, the EU already launched its first approach to boosting defence with the European Defence Fund in 2021. To increase cooperation between EU countries, this €8 billion fund promotes joint defence research and capability development, defence innovation and cross-border industrial cooperation through over 160 collaborative projects. However, the interim evaluation of the European Defence Fund (EDF) highlighted the need for funding to be faster, more flexible, and for better definition of projects for real strategic impact.

The EDF is just one way in which the EU aims to tackle the European defence industry’s high fragmentation, where Member States take national positions that nevertheless undermine overall efficiency, interoperability and competitiveness at the EU level. Today’s goal to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of EU defence spending is to develop a true common market for Europe’s security and defence industry. Less red-tape and greater defence alignment between EU countries could lead to governments enjoying the advantages of economies of scale in both industrial processes and procurement. Companies operating in the European defence technological and industrial base (known as EDTIB) could expand, and less funding would be lost to procurement from non-EU firms. Parliament is a strong supporter of a competitive EU defence market, which would lead to improved deterrence and resilience, and help EU countries better protect their sovereignty in today’s unpredictable geopolitical environment.

In a resolution on its 2025 annual report on the implementation of the EU common foreign and security policy, Parliament reiterated that the EU must defend its interests and called for increased support for Ukraine, an expanded presence in the Middle East, and underlined the need for close coordination with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). As many EU countries are also members of NATO, they are subject to Article 5, the collective defence clause. The armed forces of one or several EU Member States may therefore be called on to defend a border or a NATO Ally and so need to be able to move swiftly across EU territory. However, military mobility today faces considerable barriers – outdated, inadequate or missing infrastructure (such as bridges) and inconsistent legislation. While some improvements have already been seen on customs and transport procedures, tackling the under-investment and regulatory barriers in this area as a collective could lead to benefits almost three times higher than when EU countries do not coordinate their investment.

Returning to the situation in Ukraine, military drones are the main cause of casualties among both civilians and troops. The EU is already using EDF funding to develop drone technology and countermeasures, with EU governments already investing heavily in drone production. Parliament is monitoring the situation carefully to ensure robust ethical guardrails and strong accountability – and is particularly concerned that military drone innovation should not lead to development of lethal autonomous weapons.

Finally, to help Ukraine defend its borders and its people, the question of how to use Russian central bank assets, frozen by Western countries because of Russia’s attack, to sustain Ukraine against its aggressor(s) has not been resolved. While legal opinions on the lawfulness of confiscating Russia’s money diverge, G7 countries have already agreed to use the extraordinary revenues generated by the assets to service and repay a US$50 billion G7 loan to Ukraine. The EU channels its support for Ukraine through the European Peace Facility, and has already allocated €6.1 billion to address military and defence needs (2022-2024). This funding adds to military support directly provided by EU Member States, leading to an estimated €63.2 billion in total support for the Ukrainian armed forces. Fully behind the principle that Russia should pay for the damage it has inflicted, Parliament remains unwavering in its support for Ukraine.

Further reading:

• European defence readiness roadmap
• EU defence funding
• EU joint defence procurement
• European defence industry
• EU support for Ukraine for 2026–2027
• The interim evaluation of the European Defence Fund
• Building a common market for European defence
• Military mobility
• Towards a comprehensive and beneficial approach to military mobility
• Military drone systems in the EU and global context: Types, capabilities and regulatory frameworks
• Confiscation of immobilised Russian sovereign assets: State of play, arguments and scenarios
• European Peace Facility – For Ukraine, but not only

Written by Issam Hallak

Obstacles to businesses’ cross-border operations and expansion constitute a major hurdle to an effective single market. The International Monetary Fund estimates that persistent barriers to the single market represent the equivalent of a 44 % and 110 % tariff on goods and services, respectively. The Letta report emphasised that a single business code would be a ‘game-changer’, making all business procedures – from establishment to end of activity – smoother and more transparent.

To address this issue, the European Commission published a proposal on 18 March 2026 for a regulation establishing the 28th regime corporate legal framework that introduces a new legal entity, EU Inc. Any company would be able to register in any Member State and opt in to the EU Inc. company form. The framework would allow quick, fully digital registration that is automatically valid across the whole EU, thereby benefiting the operations and expansion of EU Inc. businesses. In addition, the proposal provides for a single tax treatment of employee remuneration through stocks and enables employee participation schemes. It also provides for fast-track termination of solvent companies, and a legal framework for winding up insolvent small and young innovative companies, known as start-ups.

Parliament adopted a resolution in January 2026 supporting the approach but remained cautious about its chances of success.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The 28th regime corporate legal framework‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Laurence.Amand-Eeckhout.

CONTEXT

Health biotechnologies are increasingly important for public health, innovation, and the European Union’s competitiveness in global research and healthcare markets. They encompass, for example, gene therapies for rare diseases, cell therapies to treat cancer, immunotherapies, bio-artificial skin for burn treatment, and mRNA vaccines. Biotechnology is among the fastest-growing economic sectors in the EU, yet the EU continues to lag behind the United States and China in translating biotech innovation into commercially viable products and large-scale manufacturing. Structural challenges remain, particularly in clinical development, regulatory processes, and manufacturing capacity.
On 16 December 2025, the European Commission proposed a package of measures intended to improve the health of EU citizens, and ensure the long-term resilience and competitiveness of the EU health sector. The package includes a proposal for a ‘European biotech act’ setting out an EU-level framework to strengthen the competitiveness of the health biotechnology and biomanufacturing sector in the EU, by simplifying regulatory processes, promoting innovation, boosting EU-based biomanufacturing with new incentives and support tools, and facilitating access to finance, while maintaining high safety, ethics and sustainability standards.
Following this health-focused initiative, the Commission is expected to propose a second European Biotech Act later in 2026, centred on industrial biotechnologies and biomanufacturing, to ensure a competitive internal market for all biotechnology areas.

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL

2025/0406(COD) – Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Union’s biotechnology and biomanufacturing sectors particularly in the area of health and amending Regulations (EC) No 178/2002, (EC) No 1394/2007, (EU) No 536/2014, (EU) 2019/6, (EU) 2024/795 and (EU) 2024/1938 (European Biotech Act) – COM(2025) 1022, 16 December 2025.

NEXT STEPS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

For the latest developments in this legislative procedure, see the Legislative Train Schedule:2025/0406(COD)

Read the complete briefing on ‘European biotech act‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Colin Murphy with Greta Baltika

The virtual, online world is a significant part of everyday life. As a reflection of modern society, it features a range of criminal behaviour. The internet is a complex system of interconnected computer networks allowing applications to communicate with one another. Through this complexity, it has a simplistic structure with a visible top layer, a deeper content layer and finally, a small but significant dark layer.
This dark layer, known as the dark web, is a less explored and understood part of the web. It contains content that is not searchable and is accessed using a process to maintain anonymity. There are legitimate and appropriate reasons for accessing the dark web, such as activists and whistleblowers avoiding identification. However, it has a reputation for illicit content and activity. This notoriety can be justified, as the dark web, while not unlawful in itself, does contain websites providing access to illegal content and services such as drugs, firearms, stolen data and child sexual abuse material. This online space is being progressively scrutinised by law enforcement agencies, who have become increasingly specialised in countering certain aspects of the dark web, with some notable successes in dismantling cybercrime infrastructure and bringing criminals to justice

Read the complete briefing on ‘Understanding the dark web‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Guillaume Ragonnaud with Raphaël Wainstain.

Overview

On 16 December 2025, the European Commission published the automotive omnibus as part of a broader automotive package aimed at supporting the sector in the transition to clean mobility. The automotive omnibus is the ninth set of simplification measures (also known as ‘omnibus packages’) that have been published by the Commission since 2025. Its purpose is to simplify the rules governing the EU automotive industry and improve coherence and consistency between different regulatory requirements. The two legislative proposals included in the package would amend the EU rules concerning tachograph obligations for electric light commercial vehicles (electric vans) and motor caravans, as well as those applying to speed limitation devices for electric vans. Additionally, the package would introduce a definition of a small electric car in motor vehicle legislation and authorise the Commission to adopt delegated acts to lay down the technical requirements for vehicle interoperability with charging infrastructure and grid. Furthermore, the proposals would simplify the rules for EU type-approval of new motor vehicles in terms of their sound level; remove some low-temperature laboratory tests from the Euro 7 Regulation; simplify Euro 7 rules for heavy-duty vehicles; and empower the Commission to adopt implementing acts on car data management.

Procedural information (1) Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EC) No 561/2006, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2019/2144 and (EU) 2024/1257 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the simplification of technical requirements and testing procedures for motor vehicles and repealing Council Directive 70/157/EEC and Regulation No 540/2014

(2) Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 92/6/EEC to exempt certain N2 electric vehicles from the requirement to install and use a speed limitation deviceCommittee responsible:(1) Environment, Climate and Food Safety (ENVI), Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO), and Transport and Tourism (TRAN) (joint committee)

(2) Transport and Tourism (TRAN) (1) COM(2025)993

(2) COM(2025)999Rapporteur:(1) Tbd
(2) Tbd (1) 2025/0422(COD)

(2) 2025/0424(COD)Next steps expected:Publication of draft reports

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU automotive omnibus‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Jakub Przetacznik.

The reintegration of Ukrainian war veterans into civilian life presents both a significant challenge and an opportunity for Ukraine’s economic reconstruction. Veterans are facing various difficulties depending on factors such as their educational background, military role, access to healthcare (including psychological assistance), gender and access to housing, especially for those from territories currently occupied by Russia.

Ukraine recently adopted its veterans policy strategy for 2030, aiming to restore the human capital and wellbeing of veterans and their families. It also seeks to express respect and gratitude towards veterans, commemorate fallen soldiers and define the role of veterans in ensuring Ukraine’s security and defence capabilities.

The European Commission’s Ukraine 2025 enlargement report addresses the situation of veterans in several sections, assessing reforms and providing recommendations for progress on the path to EU membership. These sections concern employment and the rights of people with disabilities.

Implementing the veterans policy for 2030 and various recommendations from the European Commission will require further resources to build a lasting support system for veterans. This issue is expected to be discussed during the Council of the European Union meeting on 21 April 2026.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Ukraine’s veterans policy‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Antonio Vale.

Introduction

The past few years have seen considerable interest in generative AI, particularly large language models (LLMs). This has translated into massive investment amounting to hundreds of billions of euros per year, especially in the US, in AI data centres designed around Graphics Processing Unit (GPU)-based platforms. Such breakneck expansion is increasingly running into constraints, particularly with regard to electricity availability.

Running AI models requires large amounts of power (as well as water, much of which is used to produce the electricity required), with data centres responsible for 1.5 % of global electricity consumption (2 % in the EU) and growing at 12 % annually. Moreover, they are often geographically concentrated, for example in Ireland, where they account for over 20 % of electricity consumption. Future scenarios suggest that this demand could continue to increase rapidly, although this should be taken with the caveat that investment in AI might be a bubble, LLMs may be supplanted by other models with different compute needs, and chip design innovations beyond GPUs may provide energy efficiency gains.

This situation has given rise to the idea of deploying compute in space to take advantage of the free, abundant solar energy. Originally focused on orbital processing of observational data and space mission support, the concept has rapidly evolved into the deployment of AI data centres in orbit to service ground-based needs. Recently, the strongest push has come from the US, with the merger between SpaceX and xAI linked to a request to put a million satellites in orbit, as well as interest from Google with project Suncatcher, and startups such as Starcloud and Axiom. Meanwhile, China has also launched pilot satellites intended to be the first in a future constellation, and in the EU the Horizon Europe-supported ASCEND project has concluded a feasibility study, aiming towards an operational system from 2030.

Potential impacts and developments

Launch costs represent a key constraint for any orbital infrastructure. The introduction of reusable rockets has led to a considerable decrease in recent times, to around several thousand euros per kilo of payload. This reduction is expected to continue thanks to improved heavy rockets and reusable second stages, with the European Space Agency (ESA) aiming for €280/kg with a new super-heavy lift launcher. Most ideas for future space data centres would involve either large constellations or modular construction, allowing build-up to occur over time. Even so, this would require a very high launch cadence, with a complete data centre likely needing upwards of one hundred launches, followed by a significant proportion yearly to replace satellites at end of life; this compares to around 300 space launches overall in 2025.

The main attraction of placing data centres in space is solar power: for objects located above the atmosphere, insolation (incoming solar radiation) can be several times greater than on the ground. The ideal choice would be a terminator sun-synchronous orbit, allowing satellites to keep pace with the dawn/dusk line and ensuring constant solar exposure on one side, while keeping the other dark to assist with cooling. Solar panels would need to be very large – up to a gargantuan 4 km per side, as envisaged by Starcloud for a 5 GW data centre; a small satellite with the equivalent of a server rack might make do with a more manageable 60 m2 and 28 kW, as deployed on the International Space Station (ISS). Newer thin-film solar panel technology may help keep the weight down.

If power is the main advantage, cooling is possibly the major challenge. Although space is cold, it is also a vacuum, meaning cooling can only take place via radiative emission. This can be achieved by coupling a coolant loop (the ISS uses ammonia) with large radiators pointing towards deep space, which would be of comparable size to the solar panels but considerably heavier. The spacecraft’s cooling system is particularly vulnerable: any rupture, for example from a meteoroid strike, can cause coolant loss and damage the electronic systems. Given radiative cooling scales as the fourth power of temperature, further advances may come from lighter radiators running at higher temperatures. The other main concern in orbit is radiation, which can cause random bit flips and whose impact over time can lead to a degradation of performance or malfunction. Recent work from Google and Starcloud, which has deployed a NVIDIA H100 chip in orbit, has given promising indications, but fault tolerance, error correction, redundancy (deliberate duplication of critical components or systems), and shielding are all required.

Any assembly or maintenance would pose a significant challenge. Heavy AI workloads can lead to relatively high chip failure rates, which, added to radiation effects, imply short lifespans of a few years. Depending on the concept, this would require redundancy or satellite replacement, with a weight or cost penalty, or else robotic maintenance in orbit, which still needs further development. Finally, there is the issue of communications. Large amounts of data from the ground, to be used for training, may simply be physically carried by ‘data shuttles‘, while server-side communications, needing high data rates, could use optical communication between satellites, in turn implying close proximity. Google’s plans, for example, envisage satellites hundreds of metres apart. With space debris and collisions being a critical issue, this would represent a major challenge in terms of the coordination of collision avoidance manoeuvres, which may be frequent given the sizes of the constellations being proposed.

Anticipatory policymaking

Deploying data centres in space poses important challenges, but does not appear to face insurmountable technical barriers and might be feasible even with current technology. The main hurdle is rather economic, with a mildly optimistic estimate placing near-future costs around three times those on the ground, although opinions are divided on whether such optimism is justified or not. Further innovation could help, with the evolution of launch costs a key determinant. This may lead to interesting synergies, with further technological and skills development benefiting other potential uses of space such as space-based solar power.

The current legal framework leaves space data centres in a grey zone: the United Nations’ Outer Space Treaty establishes no sovereignty in outer space, with launch states (a concept that presents its own issues) instead bearing responsibility and liability for space activities. Drafted in the 1960s, this treaty lacks explicit provisions regarding data. Article VIII of the treaty refers to jurisdiction over a space ‘object, and over any personnel thereof’, which has prompted some stakeholders to urge regulators to explicitly consider the concept of a ‘digital flag state’. Furthermore, relevant laws and treaties relying on the territorial location of data may require clarification. Examples include the GDPR‘s concept of transfers of personal data to third countries and the recently signed UN Convention against Cybercrime, which includes ships and aircraft but not satellites under its jurisdictional provisions. Likewise, legislation dealing with space activities may need to account for considerable processing of data originating from the ground rather than space. Extending the definition of space-based data and primary providers of space-based data in the Space Act, for example, could offer additional clarity. The overall situation is complex, involving potential multiple layers of overlapping jurisdiction. In the future, in-orbit assembly and AI agents risk further increasing this complexity. These issues highlight that extraterritorial application, as conceived in the GDPR or the Space Act, will be a crucial factor in the future regulation of space data centres.

The potential scale of orbital data centres is also important to consider. A 1 GW data centre, similar in scale to the largest under construction on the ground, could require a total payload upwards of 10 000 tons, or over three times the total payload mass launched in 2025. This risks potential infrastructure bottlenecks, such as the limited availability of launch facilities or liquid oxygen. It also raises sustainability questions, given that lifetime emissions may be larger than on the ground. Furthermore, the pollution of the upper atmosphere that would be caused by de-orbiting large numbers of end-of-life satellites is still poorly understood. Finally, it poses a critical, geopolitically relevant question regarding orbital congestion, as international regulation of slots in low Earth orbit is currently only done indirectly through radio spectrum assignment by the International Telecommunications Union, generally on a first-come, first-served basis.

What ifs are two-page-long publications about new or emerging technologies aiming to accurately summarise the scientific state-of-the art in an accessible and engaging manner. They further consider the impacts such technologies may have – on society, the environment and the economy, among others – and how the European Parliament may react to them. As such, they do not aim to be and cannot be prescriptive, but serve primarily as background material for the Members and staff of the European Parliament to assist them in their parliamentary work.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘What if AI data centres were put in space?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marie Lecerf.

The Roma are Europe’s largest ethnic minority. A significant number of Roma people live in very poor socio-economic conditions. The social exclusion, discrimination and segregation they face are mutually reinforcing. Their restricted access to education and difficulties entering the labour market result in low income and poor health compared with non-Roma people.

Since the mid-1990s, the EU has been stressing the need for better Roma inclusion. In 2011, an EU framework for national Roma integration strategies up to 2020 was launched to tackle their socio-economic exclusion and discrimination. This was followed in October 2020 by the EU Roma strategic framework for equality, inclusion and participation 2020-2030, complemented by the Council’s March 2021 recommendation promoting national strategic frameworks and the October 2023 European Council conclusions on desegregated housing and segregated settlements. The EU continues to support Member States through structural and investment funds with the 2021-2027 Common Provisions Regulation emphasising alignment with European Semester recommendations and the European Pillar of Social Rights.

In parallel, the EU anti-racism action plan 2020-2025, succeeded by the EU anti-racism strategy 2026-2030, strengthened enforcement of anti-discrimination law, while the Fundamental Rights Agency’s Roma survey 2024 confirms modest progress but warns of shortfalls against 2030 targets in poverty, housing, employment, education and discrimination.

Issues relating to the promotion of democratic values and practices, as well as economic, social and cultural rights for Roma people, have received particular attention from civil society organisations. The European Parliament has consistently advocated for Roma inclusion since the 1990s, with recent resolutions and debates targeting implementation gaps, antigypsyism, child segregation, women’s rights and the new anti-racism strategy.

This is a further update of a briefing originally published in May 2021; the previous update was in March 2025.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Understanding EU action on Roma inclusion‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Szczepański.

The world has changed since the European Union adopted its first economic security strategy in 2023. An increasingly confrontational geopolitical environment and the possibility of coercive behaviour from both China and the United States require a longer term strategy to reduce dependencies as well as a short-term ability to react swiftly to threats. On 3 December 2025, the European Commission adopted its new communication on economic security aiming to switch up a gear, from finding ad-hoc responses to crises based on risk identification, to proactive risk anticipation and mitigation. This new approach also focuses on providing clarity on the strategic and coherent use of the many instruments already available in the EU toolbox.

Aiming for a safer and more resilient EU economy, the Commission’s communication proposes ways to protect and develop strategic industries and reduce the EU’s vulnerabilities to coercion and other disruption. To build a solid knowledge base for informed decision-making and common understanding of risks and responses, the approach seeks to strengthen data gathering, analysis and overall economic security policy governance, with increased public and private stakeholder participation. To boost coherence, the Commission wants to adapt existing policy tools to deployment with a clear aim of managing economic security risks, taking possible impacts across policies into account. The Commission will seek to close existing security gaps with new instruments, such as the revised Blocking Statute.

The communication met with mixed reactions from the expert community, with both praise for taking the much needed step in the right direction, as well as criticisism for its insufficient response to the stark challenges facing the EU. The European Parliament is preparing its opinion on the role of trade in strengthening the EU’s economic security, to be adopted in the coming months.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Strengthening EU economic security – From crisis response to proactive anticipation: Joining the dots for a resilient economy‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Also known as the Normandy Index, the Peace and Security Index ranks 138 countries and the 27 European Union Member States as a whole, based on specific threats to peace in each. Eleven indicators gather data on the security, economic and social situation. The indicators are identified using the EU global strategy and strategic compass, a tool EU policymakers use to assess countries at risk and in need of EU assistance.

In her foreword to the latest edition of the Index, President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, said ‘a clear understanding of the threats to peace, security and democracy around the world is crucial. This makes the Normandy Index a valuable tool for navigating today’s world’.

The results of the 2025 exercise suggest the level of threats to peace in the world is the highest in the seven years since the index began, confirming declining trends in global security resulting from the war in Ukraine, multiple crises, conflicts and geopolitical rivalry, including those linked to economic, digital and energy dimensions. Among the top three most peaceful countries are Switzerland, Iceland and Norway.

The most fragile countries are the Central African Republic, Afghanistan and Somalia. Geopolitical crisis in the European neighbourhood resulted in a fall in the EU‑27’s overall global ranking of 3 places in 2024. In 2025, the EU‑27 ranking remains the same as the previous year (10th globally). After a slight improvement from 2019 to 2022, the global peace profile (5.74 average in 2023‑2024) has also declined in the past year to 5.79 – unsurprisingly given current geopolitical tensions (10 is the highest mark).

According to the Index’s lead author, Branislav Stanicek, the 2025 edition also reflects the changed dynamics of today’s international conflicts, which particularly affect energy security and fiscal policies. He stresses: ‘International actions such as restrictive measures against Russian Federation clearly affected governmental revenue and suggests a tightening of the Russian government’s fiscal stance’. In 2025, Russia fell 16 positions down the Index, to 124th globally. However, increased sovereign debt, measured by economic indicator, also demonstrates a certain vulnerability within EU‑27 and Western democracies. Nevertheless, Professor Steve Hanke of Johns Hopkins University argues ‘Public debt is just a deferred tax. It will be paid by future taxpayers, either through an explicit tax increase or by inflation’.

Derived from the Index, 63 individual country case studies provide a picture of the state of peace in the world today. An online, interactive version of the Index allows data comparison across countries, regions and timeline. In 2023, the Index won the Forbes Social Communication Award (in the domain of public communication of peace and security).

The Normandy Index differs from other indices in that it adopts an approach tailored by and to EU action. It also defines conflict and the numerous stages between perfect peace and total war as a product of factors linked to the main threats identified by the EU in its external action strategy. The EU global strategy identifies the following 11 threats as the current main challenges to peace and security.  

Trends towards inflation, trade, energy disruption and weaker economies, underway since 2021, continued in 2025. Global GDP growth slowed in 2022 to 3.2 %, more than 1 percentage point less than expected at the end of 2021, mainly weighed down by Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine. Following 2.6 % growth in 2023 and sub-trend global growth of 2.8 % in 2024, global growth is projected to reach 3.2 % in 2025 and 3.1 % in 2026. At the same time, Kristalina Georgieva, managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), issued a stark warning in October 2025 about the mounting risks facing the global economy: ‘buckle up: uncertainty is the new normal’.

Read the complete study on ‘Mapping threats to peace and democracy worldwide: Normandy Index 2025‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Tristan Marcelin.

Introduction Some history

The concept of a regulatory sandbox already existed before the AI Act. According to Arto Lanamäki et al., it first emerged in 2016 with the United Kingdom’s financial technology (fintech) regulation. Studies suggest that regulatory sandboxes have reduced legal uncertainty and raised fintech venture investment. A 2022 EPRS publication also lists other sectors where regulatory sandboxes have emerged as test beds, including transport, energy, telecommunications and health. It adds that the UK and Norway have already established regulatory sandboxes for AI products. It also notes that the European Parliament has called for introducing regulatory sandboxes in several resolutions since 2019.

Definition

AI regulatory sandboxes were first introduced in the proposal for a regulation on artificial intelligence (AI Act) published by the European Commission in April 2021. The final version of the AI Act, adopted in 2024, defines an AI regulatory sandbox as ‘a controlled framework set up by a competent authority which offers providers or prospective providers of AI systems the possibility to develop, train, validate and test, where appropriate in real-world conditions, an innovative AI system, pursuant to a sandbox plan for a limited time under regulatory supervision’.

Benefits and risks

Regulatory sandboxes offer three main benefits: they can help regulators develop better policies, innovators to develop compliant AI products, and consumers by bringing safer products on to the market. In a 2020 report, the OECD found they may facilitate dialogue between authorities and new players entering the market. Another report from the World Bank confirms these benefits based on its study of the fintech sector. However, the World Bank report also warns of implementation risks, where additional administrative burdens and lack of resources could outweigh the benefits.

AI Act regulatory sandboxes Obligations on Member States

EU Member States are required to ensure their national competent authorities establish, or participate in, at least one AI regulatory sandbox, which should be operational by 2 August 2026. The AI regulatory sandboxes aim to improve legal certainty to achieve regulatory compliance, support sharing of best practices through fostering cooperation, innovation and competitiveness, contribute to evidence-based regulatory learning and speed up access to the single market. They are accessible on a voluntary basis and include specific measures targeted at SMEs and start-ups.

Implementation and coordination

The AI Act established a hybrid enforcement system whereby the Commission and the European AI board assist Member States in setting up their AI regulatory sandboxes. National competent authorities are also obliged to coordinate with and report to EU‑level entities, produce guidance, supervision and support within the sandboxes, and facilitate cross-border cooperation. Meanwhile, the Commission is required to adopt secondary legislation that specifies how the AI Act is to be implemented and gives details of terms and conditions and how to access sandboxes. The European Data Protection Supervisor may also establish an AI regulatory sandbox for EU institutions.

Challenges Design

Claudio Novelli et al. describe three phases of regulatory sandboxes: pre-testing, testing and post-testing. Designing a sandbox involves defining the variables of each phase, such as the eligibility criteria (pre-testing), the level of realism and replication of oversight (testing), and the exit pathway and streamlined conformity assessments (post-testing). They believe the right balance must be struck between each variable to attract innovators and ensure compliance. For instance, eligibility criteria should permit different situations and lead to a tailored track when using the sandbox, since AI systems in early-stage development do not need the same support as those in late-stage development.

Fragmentation

The rules for AI systems are enforced at Member State level through national authorities. While Member States must ensure that authorities have enough resources to set up and run their sandboxes, fragmented enforcement could result in some authorities receiving more resources than others, leading to uneven capacities. AI providers might therefore intentionally choose less stringent sandboxes, risking inconsistencies in the act’s enforcement.

Time

Challenges related to the design and fragmented implementation are compounded by additional time constraints. The AI Act provisions related to regulatory sandboxes will take effect from 2 August 2026. Since the Commission has not yet adopted any implementing acts providing guidance, Member States have to act independently to design their sandboxes, recruit and train staff, and build capacity.

State of play and next steps National implementation

In August 2025, Deirdre Ahern noted that out of the 27 Member States, only one – Spain – has an AI regulatory sandbox which is up and running. Five are actively implementing their sandboxes, four have declared their intention to do so and 16 have not yet communicated their plans. Spain seems to be the most advanced Member State currently, as its sandbox opened in 2025 and began hosting 12 high-risk AI systems. This initial experience enabled the Spanish authority, AESIA, to publish guidelines in December 2025 to support the implementation and compliance of systems with the AI Act. The act further obliges the Commission to develop a single, dedicated interface containing all relevant information on AI regulatory sandboxes to allow stakeholders to interact with them.

Secondary legislation and omnibus

Under the AI Act, the Commission must adopt implementing acts specifying how to establish, develop, implement, operate and supervise the sandboxes. In December 2025, the Commission published a draft version and requested feedback by January 2026. In the recitals of the draft, the Commission insists on the need to ensure consistent implementation of the rules. In addition to the implementing acts, a new regulation known as the digital omnibus on AI has been proposed by the Commission to amend the AI Act. The proposal suggests granting the Commission the right to create an EU‑level AI regulatory sandbox for AI systems under its supervision and strengthen coordination between national sandboxes. As of March 2025, the relevant European Parliament committees are engaged in examining the proposal.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘AI regulatory sandboxes: State of play and implementation challenges‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Kamil Baraník.

European political parties (‘europarties’) emerged in the 1970s, preceding the first direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979. The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 granted them legal recognition; however, it was only in 2004 that EU law defined their status, set establishment criteria, and provided independent funding. The most recent regulatory change in 2025 emphasised protecting EU values, strengthening safeguards against foreign interference, and updating transparency and financing requirements. Europarties’ influence depends on balancing European and national interests. Ongoing deliberations seek to enhance europarties’ resilience, and their independence from national politics, reflecting the broader debate on the balance of power between Member States and EU institutions. This search for equilibrium continues to drive significant academic and political discussion.

Read the complete briefing on ‘European political parties‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Fergurson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

European Union–United States trade deal

Against a background of trade tariff instability, and to pave the way for negotiations with the Council on implementing the 2025 framework agreement between the EU and the United States (the ‘Turnberry deal’), Parliament debated and adopted its first-reading position on Committee on International Trade (INTA) reports on the two regulations proposed. The report on the main proposal covers EU industrial tariff liberalisation/agricultural tariff rate quotas, proposing a ‘sunset’ date of 31 March 2028, defensive measures in case of additional demands, and a safeguard clause. The second report, which deals specifically with trade in lobster, proposes a ‘sunset’ date of 31 December 2028, and includes defensive measures in case of US imposition of additional tariffs, breaches of human rights or threats to EU security interests. Both reports propose to evaluate the situation six months after implementation of the EU-US framework agreement.

Deposit protection and early intervention measures

Members remain determined to protect taxpayers from the consequences of failed banking institutions. A joint debate took place on deposit protection and early intervention measures, followed by a vote on agreed texts on a package of proposals that seek to further harmonise the current EU bank crisis management and deposit insurance framework. The agreements would facilitate access to industry support for failing banks, with resort to national deposit guarantee schemes set as a last resort. They also clarify the criteria for choosing whether to liquidate or rescue a bank and retain the current two-tier system for deposit protection.

Combating corruption

Following lengthy negotiations, Members approved a provisional agreement on the proposed directive to combat corruption. Aimed at developing a more robust legal and policy framework, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs’ report on the proposal called for an extended definition of a ‘public official’ potentially subject to criminal proceedings in the case of ‘abuse of function’, and to introduce new categories of offence. It also sought enhanced rights for the public to participate in corruption-related proceedings and called for EU countries to adopt anti-corruption strategies. Parliament’s recommendations shaped the compromise text in this latter respect, but with limited extensions to definitions.

Digital omnibus on artificial intelligence

The development and use of artificial intelligence (AI) is changing many aspects of daily life, and at considerable speed. The EU’s flagship Artificial Intelligence Act introduced measures to encourage development whilst also protecting citizens. However, setting up the governance structure to apply the act takes time. To ensure safe AI development can continue in the interim, Members adopted Parliament’s position for trilogue negotiations on proposed measures to simplify application of the AI Act. A report from Parliament’s Committees on Internal Market and Consumer Protection and on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs agrees with the Council position that fixed deadlines should be set for delaying the rules governing high-risk AI systems. The report also introduces a targeted ban on AI generation of non-consensual sexual and intimate content.

Global gateway

The EU’s global gateway strategy seeks to promote clean and secure energy connections by working with international partners worldwide. Members debated and adopted an own-initiative report from the Committees on Foreign Affairs (AFET) and on Development (DEVE), assessing the first four years of the strategy’s implementation. While noting the funding has been successfully spent on promoting sustainable and inclusive growth in non-EU countries, the report nevertheless proposes improvements. These include moving to a more demand-driven strategy, based on partners’ needs and greater private sector involvement. The committees recommend revising the governance structure for greater democratic legitimacy, and advocate simpler and more predictable financing, as well as avoiding global gateway projects exacerbating debt in third countries.

Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive

In the EU, citizens largely enjoy access to clean water. The EU’s urban wastewater legislation was updated in 2024, to bring it into line with the EU’s climate neutrality targets. The new Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive (UWWTD) introduced stricter requirements for urban wastewater treatment, water re-use and sanitation. Members posed an oral question to the Commission on the implementation of this directive, with Members debating how to uphold the ‘polluter pays’ principle without risking production of vital medicines, as the pharmaceutical industry is a major user of water resources. During negotiations on the file, Parliament insisted on measures to avoid unintended consequences for vital products like medicines and to promote the re-use of wastewater and plant modernisation.

European Citizens’ Initiative – ‘Ban on conversion practices in the European Union’

Against the backdrop of several national bans on conversion practices in EU countries, Parliament debated a European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI), with over one million signatures in support, calling for an EU-wide ban on conversion practices targeting LGBTIQ+ individuals. Conversion practices (also known as conversion ‘therapies’) are widely condemned as constituting torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, resulting in severe physical and psychological harm. The European Parliament firmly opposes conversion practices and has long denounced all forms of LGBTIQ+ discrimination.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

One decision to enter into interinstitutional negotiations from the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) on the common system for the return of third-country nationals staying illegally in the Union (Return Regulation), announced on 12 March 2026, was approved by vote.

This ‘at a glance’ note is intended to review some of the highlights of the plenary part-session, and notably to follow up on key dossiers identified by EPRS. It does not aim to be exhaustive. For more detailed information on specific files, please see other EPRS products, notably our ‘EU legislation in progress’ briefings, and the plenary minutes.

Read this ‘at a glance note’ on ‘Plenary round-up – March II 2026‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson with Áine Feeney

Members gather for their second plenary session in March 2026, to progress decisions on a number of important files. Representatives of the European Council and European Commission are expected to make statements on the conclusion of the leaders’ meeting of 19 March 2026, at which the European Union’s competitiveness and the situation in the Middle East, as well as continued support for Ukraine was discussed. The Council and Commission are also due to make statements on energy security, independence and supply in the current fraught geopolitical context, with a view to ensuring market stability and affordable energy for industry and citizens.

Against a background of trade tariff instability, and to pave the way for  negotiations with the Council on implementing the 2025 framework agreement between the EU and the United States (the ‘Turnberry deal’), Parliament is on Thursday set to consider its first-reading position on Committee on International Trade (INTA) reports on the two regulations proposed. The report on the main proposal covers EU industrial tariff liberalisation/agricultural tariff rate quotas, proposing a ‘sunset’ date of 31 March 2028, defensive measures in case of additional demands, and a safeguard clause. The second report, which deals specifically with trade in lobster, proposes a ‘sunset’ date of 31 December 2028, and includes defensive measures in case of US imposition of additional tariffs, breaches of human rights or threats to EU security interests. Both reports propose to evaluate the situation six months following implementation of the EU-US framework agreement.

Harking back to an earlier, financial, crisis, Members remain determined to protect taxpayers from the consequences of failed banking institutions. A debate is therefore scheduled for Wednesday afternoon on deposit protection and early intervention measures, with a vote scheduled on agreed texts on a package of proposals that seek to further harmonise the current EU bank crisis management and deposit insurance framework. The agreements would facilitate access to industry support for failing banks, with resort to national deposit guarantee schemes set as a last resort. They also clarify the criteria for choosing whether to liquidate or rescue a bank and retain the current two-tier system for deposit protection.

The development and use of artificial intelligence (AI) is changing many aspects of daily life, and at considerable speed. The EU’s flagship Artificial Intelligence Act introduced measures to encourage development whilst also protecting citizens. However, setting up the governance structure to apply the act takes time. To ensure safe AI development can continue in the interim, Members are due to vote on Thursday to set Parliament’s position for negotiations on proposed measures to simplify application of the AI Act. A report from Parliament’s Committees on Internal Market and Consumer Protection and on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs agrees with the Council proposal that fixed deadlines should be set for delaying the rules governing high-risk AI systems. The report also introduces a targeted ban on AI generation of non-consensual sexual and intimate content.

Following lengthy negotiations, Members are expected to consider a provisional agreement on the proposed directive to combat corruption on Wednesday. Aimed at developing a more robust legal and policy framework, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs’ report on the proposal called for an extended definition of a ‘public official’ subject to criminal proceedings in the case of ‘abuse of function’, and to introduce new categories of offence. It also sought enhanced rights for the public to participate in corruption-related proceedings and called for  EU countries to adopt anti-corruption strategies. Parliament’s recommendations shaped the compromise text in this latter respect, but with limited extensions to definitions.

In the EU, citizens largely enjoy access to clean water. The EU’s urban wastewater legislation was updated in 2024, to bring it into line with the EU’s climate neutrality targets. The new Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive (UWWTD) introduced stricter requirements for urban wastewater treatment, water re-use and sanitation. An oral question to the Commission is tabled for Thursday morning on the implementation of this file. The question is likely to raise debate on how to uphold the ‘polluter pays’ principle without risking production of vital medicines, as the pharmaceutical industry is a major user of water resources. During negotiations on the file, Parliament insisted on measures to avoid unintended consequences for vital products like medicines and to promote the re-use of wastewater and plant modernisation.

The EU’s global gateway strategy seeks to promote clean and secure energy connections by working with international partners worldwide. On Thursday morning, Members are due to consider a report from the Committees on Foreign Affairs (AFET) and on Development (DEVE), assessing the first four years of the strategy’s implementation. While noting the funding has been successfully spent on promoting sustainable and inclusive growth in non-EU countries, the report nevertheless proposes improvements. These include moving to a more demand-driven strategy, based on partners’ needs and greater private sector involvement. The committees recommend revising the governance structure for greater democratic legitimacy, and advocate simpler and more predictable financing, as well as avoiding global gateway projects exacerbating debt in third countries.

Against the backdrop of several national bans on conversion practices in EU countries, on Wednesday, Parliament is set to discuss a European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI), with over one million signatures in support, calling for an EU-wide ban on conversion practices targeting LGBTIQ+ individuals. Conversion practices (also known as conversion ‘therapies’) are widely condemned as constituting torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, resulting in severe physical and psychological harm. The European Parliament firmly opposes conversion practices and has long denounced all forms of LGBTIQ+ discrimination.

European Parliament Plenary Session March II 2026 – agenda

• Implementing the EU tariff commitments under the 2025 EU-US Framework Agreement
• Deposit protection and early intervention measures
• Parliament’s emerging position on the Digital Omnibus on AI
• Directive on combating corruption
• Implementation of the Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive
• Global Gateway – Past impacts, future orientation
• European Citizens’ Initiative ‘Ban on conversion practices in the European Union’

Written by Anja Radjenovic.

The safe third country (STC) concept is well established in international asylum policies. According to the concept, certain migrants should not be granted protection in the country where they have applied for it. Instead, they may be returned, or transferred, to a country where they could have found, or can find, international protection. Amid ongoing EU-level discussions on safe third country rules, in 2018 the United Nations Refugee Agency developed legal considerations on safe third countries.

Within the framework of the body of EU law on asylum, the STC concept is based on the assumption that certain third (i.e. non-EU) countries can be designated as safe for applicants seeking international protection, under specific conditions. The concept builds on cooperation with third countries in a bid to reduce irregular arrivals and increase return rates. It seeks to speed up the processing of the claims of asylum applicants arriving from safe third countries, to prevent overburdening national asylum systems.

The recently adopted Asylum Procedure Regulation provides for broader applicability of safe country clauses. This concerns, in particular, four aspects: (i) the safety assessment when applying the STC concept; (ii) the interpretation of the ‘connection requirement’, i.e. the connection between an asylum seeker and a third country when readmitting an applicant to a designated STC; (iii) the option to designate a third country as safe with territorial limitations or to exclude certain vulnerable groups from such a designation; and (iv) the creation of a common EU list of STCs in addition to national lists. The regulation was amended in February 2026, modifying rules on applications from STCs.

The success of any STC scheme relies on third countries’ cooperation, something that can be challenging to obtain. To counter criticisms of burden shifting and to boost the viability of STC schemes, the EU must demonstrate solidarity through burden sharing. Furthermore, many potentially safe third countries lack asylum laws and administrative frameworks. Consequently, they would likely require substantial support from external partners.

This is an update of a 2024 EPRS briefing.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Safe third country concept in the EU pact on migration and asylum‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Sasa Butorac and Agnieszka Widuto.

Europe’s key instrument to achieving energy independence and increasing competitiveness lies in the energy transition and, specifically, in boosting the generation capacity of renewable sources of energy. Following the European Green Deal and ‘fit for 55’ initiatives, the EU legislative framework for achieving this is largely in place. Significant progress has been made, in particular since the launch of the REPowerEU initiative in May 2022 in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Member States have increased the share of renewables in their energy mix, and the EU is consistently progressing towards its target of a 42.5 % share of renewables in final energy consumption by 2030. The share of renewables in sectors such as electricity (47.5 % of final energy consumption in this sector), heating and cooling (26.7 %) and transport (11.2 %) is also increasing, although progress has been fastest in terms of electricity. The main challenges to an accelerated deployment of renewables can be identified as the cost of capital, timely development of the grids, and the complex and lengthy permitting procedures both at European and national level.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Renewable energy in the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.