Biztonságpolitika

By David Howarth (University of Luxembourg) and Lucia Quaglia (University of Bologna)

Financial market integration has been a core objective of European integration since the 1950s. Over several decades, the European Union (EU) has adopted hundreds of legislative acts aimed at removing barriers to cross-border finance and harmonising the regulation and supervision of capital markets. Yet progress has been uneven, contested, and repeatedly repackaged.

The most recent example is the transformation of the Capital Markets Union (CMU)—launched in 2015, relaunched in 2020, and rebranded as the Savings and Investments Union (SIU) in early 2025. Our recent article with JCMS examines key policy narratives—the causal stories policymakers use to justify and promote specific reforms— that have been used to promote CMU over time. We find it surprising that—despite the importance of financial market integration for EU economic growth—the Commission has strategically promoted the policy through a variety of narratives linked to policy goals that have greater support among member state governments and public opinion.

A technical project with broad ambitions

Financial market integration is, at its core, a technical policy area. It primarily concerns banks, non-bank financial firms (e.g., asset management), stock exchanges, clearing houses, and supervisors. For most citizens—and many politicians—it remains remote and opaque. Yet over time, EU institutions have increasingly presented financial integration as a solution to a wide range of broader economic and political challenges — notably, the digital and green transitions, and European competitiveness in relation to the United States and China.

This expanding ambition is also visible in the shift from CMU to SIU. What began as a project to deepen European capital markets has been reframed as a tool to support economic growth, finance the green and digital transitions, strengthen Europe’s geopolitical position, and mobilise household savings for long-term investment. Rather than abandoning a stalled project, EU policymakers have repeatedly changed the story told about it.

To explain this strategy, we adopt an actor-centred constructivist perspective, which highlights how purposeful actors deploy ideas strategically to build political support for a policy. In particular, we examine how EU supranational actors use policy narratives to widen support for a highly contested integration project.

Five narratives for one project

Drawing on a qualitative and quantitative analysis of 421 public speeches delivered between 2014 and 2024 by senior officials at the European Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB), and the three European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs), we identify five main policy narratives used to promote financial market integration.

First, CMU has been framed as a way to create new opportunities for European financial firms, enhancing their competitiveness and scale. Second, it has been presented as a mechanism to increase private funding for the real economy, especially for small and medium-sized enterprises. Third, EU officials have linked CMU to the green and digital transitions, portraying integrated capital markets as essential to financing climate action and technological innovation. More recently, a fourth narrative has gained prominence: financial integration as a response to geopolitical and geoeconomic challenges, notably Europe’s lagging competitiveness relative to the United States and China. Finally, a fifth narrative focuses on long-term investment and savings, emphasising the need to channel Europe’s high household savings into productive investment—an argument central to the rebranding of CMU as SIU.

These narratives overlap, but their relative importance has shifted over time, reflecting changing economic conditions and political priorities. The evolution of CMU narratives closely tracks broader shifts in EU policy priorities. In its early phase, CMU was tied to post-crisis economic recovery and investment, notably through the Juncker Plan. After 2020, it became increasingly linked to financing the green and digital transitions. Following the pandemic, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and growing global economic fragmentation, geopolitical narratives moved to the fore.

The latest rebranding as Savings and Investments Union builds on these earlier narratives while adding a new emphasis on retail savings. Influential reports by Enrico Letta and Mario Draghi have reinforced the argument that Europe must better mobilise household savings to support long-term investment and competitiveness. The shift also reflects an effort to make financial integration appear more relevant to citizens, not only as workers or consumers but as savers and investors.

Why progress towards CMU has been so difficult

The repeated reframing of CMU reflects the deeply contested political economy of financial market integration. CMU is not a single reform but a bundle of measures, including supervisory centralisation, tax harmonisation, insolvency law reform, market infrastructure consolidation, and the expansion of non-bank finance.

Each of these elements creates winners and losers across and within member states. Large economies may favour stronger EU-level supervision, while smaller states resist it. Countries with low corporate taxes oppose harmonisation, while others push for it. Banks often support securitisation reforms but resist measures that increase competition from non-bank intermediaries.

As a result, stable coalitions in favour of CMU have been hard to build. EU officials themselves have acknowledged that national vested interests have repeatedly stalled or diluted reforms. In this context, policy narratives become a key political tool. By linking financial market integration to widely supported objectives—such as climate policy, innovation, or strategic autonomy—EU institutions seek to expand the boundaries of the issue and attract new supporters beyond the financial sector.

The limits of narrative power

Our findings highlight both the strategic use and the limits of policy narratives. EU supranational actors clearly act as ideational entrepreneurs, flexibly reframing financial market integration to align with the priorities of the moment. This confirms the importance of ideational power for institutions that lack strong coercive tools. At the same time, repeated shifts in narrative have not delivered a decisive breakthrough in financial market integration. Despite more than a decade of reframing, CMU—and now SIU—remains incomplete. Narratives can attract attention and broaden debate, but they cannot eliminate underlying distributional conflicts.

The story of CMU and SIU thus illustrates a broader dynamic of European integration: when political consensus is elusive, projects persist not by succeeding, but by being continuously reinterpreted. Whether the latest narrative centred on savings and investment will finally unlock significant progress remains an open question.

David Howarth has been a Full Professor of Political Science at the University of Luxembourg since 2012 and was previously a Jean Monnet Chair at the University of Edinburgh. He researches on European economic governance / political economy topics and specifically financial regulation and Economic and Monetary Union. He is the author or co-author of six monographs, a textbook, over seventy peer-reviewed journal articles and dozens book chapters. He has also edited or co-edited fifteen journal special editions and six volumes on these topics including, most recently (with Judith Clifton and Daniel Fuentes), Regional Development Banks in the World Economy (OUP, 2021). His most recent monographs are Banking on Europe: How the European Commission became a semi-sovereign borrower (OUP, 2026, with Dermot Hodson et al.), Bank Politics (OUP, 2023, with Scott James) and The Political Economy of Banking Union (OUP, 2016, with Lucia Quaglia).

Lucia Quaglia (DPhil Sussex, MA Sussex) is Professor of Political Science at the University of Bologna. Previously, she was Professor at the University of York. She has published 9 books, 7 of which with Oxford University Press. Her most recent book is The Perils of Internal Regime Complexity in Shadow Banking, Oxford University Press. She has guest co-edited seven special issues of academic journals, including the Journal of European Public Policy, New Political Economy, Review of International Political Economy, Journal of Common Market Studies, and Journal of European Integration. She has published more than 60 articles in refereed academic journals in the fields of public policy, political economy, and EU studies. Together with Manuela Moschella and Aneta Spendzharova she has edited the textbook European Political Economy, Oxford University Press, 2024.

The post From Capital Markets Union to Savings and Investments Union: Why the EU keeps changing the story on financial integration appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

In early 2025, the new US administration announced a series of tariff increases in violation of its commitments in the World Trade Organization (WTO), undermining the very system of trade rules that the US had helped establish after World War II. The US actions led to many retaliatory responses of increased tariffs by trading partners including the European Union (EU). Over the next several months, the US engaged in a series of negotiations leading to so called ‘framework’ agreements with the EU and others.

This paper explores first, the short term implications of these chaotic changes in the world trading regime on the economies of the EU and Greece. Second, it considers how the world trading system will evolve in the medium to longer term and its policy implications for the EU and Greece. The paper concludes that the recent turmoil in international trade should be addressed through the implementation of a basic set of policies to strengthen European integration and institutions as articulated by recent major studies commissioned by the EU, as well as, through trade agreements between the EU and like-minded countries.  These policies should help the European Union rise to the challenges created by the current turmoil and lead to a future strengthening of the WTO.

Read here the policy paper by Constantine Michalopoulos, ELIAMEP Senior Policy Advisor; former senior official World Bank and USAID; Adjunct Professor, American University, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University.

Introduction 

In early 2025, the Greek economy had mostly recovered from the disastrous calamities of a decade earlier and the pandemic’s aftermath. Although income levels had not regained pre debt crisis levels, the economy had been growing steadily for three years. However, continued structural deficiencies, an aging population, as well as technology and climate change, all presented serious challenges to long term economic prospects; and there were two raging wars in the near vicinity. [1]As if these challenges were not enough, the new US administration announced a series of tariff increases in violation of its commitments in the World Trade Organization (WTO), undermining the very system of trade rules that the US had helped establish after World War II.

In the US, the administration’s actions prompted numerous challenges to their constitutionality.[2] Internationally, they led to many retaliatory actions by trading partners including the European Union (EU), China and others. Over the next several months, the US backed off a number of the very large early tariff increases and engaged in a series of negotiations leading to so called ‘framework’ agreements with many countries, including the EU. But throughout 2025, the US continued to introduce arbitrary tariff changes, all in violation of the fundamental Most Favored Nation (MFN) non-discrimination principle, enshrined in the WTO, thereby raising significantly the degree of uncertainty in trading transactions.

The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, to explore the short-term implications of these chaotic changes in the world trading regime on the Greek economy; and second, to consider how the world trading system will evolve in the medium to longer term and its implications for the EU and Greece. The analysis, by its very nature, will be tentative, as the policy changes are relatively recent and have not had the time to make a serious impact on trade transactions. Besides, the main new element introduced by the US actions is increased policy uncertainty.

The EU- US Agreement 

The US administration introduced peremptorily and unilaterally a number of tariff changes in early 2025 without offering an authority or justification for them. For example, President Trump announced plans on February 26, 2025, to impose tariffs of 25 percent on imports from the European Union. The major executive action that prompted reaction from the EU occurred on April 2, when the US announced a set of so called “reciprocal” tariffs affecting more than 60 countries, some as high as 50% depending on the countries’ trade balance with the US. According to these, International Economic Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA) tariffs, the US reciprocal rate on imports from the EU would have been set at 20 percent. On May 23, President Trump announced he would be imposing a 50 percent reciprocal tariff on the EU beginning June 1. On May 25, he announced these tariffs would take effect July 9 instead. On July 12, President Trump announced the reciprocal tariffs for the EU would be set at 30 percent by August 1 [4].

In the meantime, the EU retaliated by lifting the suspension of previous tariffs, with rates of up to 50 percent, affecting $8 billion of US exports scheduled for April 1, 2025 and increased tariffs to an additional $20 billion of US exports scheduled for April 13. Finally, on July 15, the EU released a list of $84 billion worth of US goods that would face retaliatory tariffs, if no deal was reached by August 1 [5].

On August 4, 2025, the US and the EU reached a framework agreement on tariffs and other economic issues which governs the tariff rates affecting trade between them to date.

On August 4, 2025, the US and the EU reached a framework agreement on tariffs and other economic issues which governs the tariff rates affecting trade between them to date.

According to the main trade related commitments of the agreement, the US will:

• Apply a maximum, all-inclusive 15% tariff ceiling for EU products, including cars and car parts, pharmaceuticals, and semiconductors [6] and [7].
• Apply only MFN tariffs, (which are effectively zero or close to zero) to the following EU products: unavailable natural resources (including cork), all aircraft and aircraft parts, generic pharmaceuticals and their ingredients and chemical precursors.
• Impose tariffs of 50% to aluminum and steel products justified by the US under a different exemption, on grounds on national security (US Section 232, of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act).

The EU agreed to:

• Eliminate completely tariffs on a large number of industrial products imported from the US—with an estimated value of €5 billion [8].
• Improve significantly market access to US exports through tariff reductions for certain seafood, nuts, dairy products, fresh and processed fruits and vegetables, processed foods, grains and planting seeds, soybean oilseeds, pork and bison meat and lobster  all implemented via product-specific Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs).

In addition, the two sides agreed to work together to eliminate non-tariff and technical barriers to trade, accept and provide mutual recognition of each other’s standards in automobiles as well co-operate on a number of other important issues affecting trade with China—for example, regarding the latter’s imposition of export controls on rare earths. Finally, the agreement contains a number of EU commitments to ease procedural requirements which the US feels restrain its exports as well as to purchase $40 billion worth of AI chips [9].

There was widespread criticism that the deal was too one-sided favoring the US. But there were also voices suggesting that this was the best the EU could do under the circumstances and that, in any case, there was no logical response to the US requests.

There was widespread criticism that the deal was too one-sided favoring the US. But there were also voices suggesting that this was the best the EU could do under the circumstances and that, in any case, there was no logical response to the US requests [10].

The US actions regarding tariffs were expected to be implemented in some cases as of September 1, 2025 and in others as soon as the EU Commission submitted the needed legislative proposals, which it did in September, 2025. The EU Council took the necessary steps to implement the agreement, including through the establishment of tariff quotas for US products [11].  It is expected that the EU Parliament will complete approval of the relevant legislation by February 2026. At this point it is unclear whether the Parliament will introduce changes in the agreement or what will happen, if such changes are introduced.

Economic Impact on the EU- short term

In the course of 2025 various studies concluded that the US tariffs would result in significant GDP losses both to the US and to the global economy, as well as increased inflationary pressures in the short term. As the year progressed, the estimates of the damage the tariff actions would cause were reduced for several reasons: exporters absorbed some of the increased tariff costs; many importers anticipating the tariffs, had stocked up during the year and the original tariff increases were subsequently reduced.

In the course of 2025 various studies concluded that the US tariffs would result in significant GDP losses both to the US [12] and to the global economy, as well as increased inflationary pressures in the short term [13]. As the year progressed, the estimates of the damage the tariff actions would cause were reduced for several reasons: exporters absorbed some of the increased tariff costs; many importers anticipating the tariffs, had stocked up during the year and the original tariff increases were subsequently reduced [14].

The economic impact of the EU-US trade agreement on individual EU countries will depend on several factors: (a) the amount and composition of each country’s exports to the US; (b) the amount and composition of its imports from the US whose tariffs will be reduced; (c) the specifics of the pass-through in each traded good; (d) any exchange rate changes following the imposition of the tariffs; and (e)  the indirect effects on each country’s future trade of changes in income resulting from the EU-US agreement.

Early studies on the issue [15], suggested that the US tariffs will result in a decline of approximately 0.2-0.3% of EU GDP in 2025. A more recent study [16] confirmed the 0.3 % GDP decline on average and suggested that different countries will have different results depending on the importance of the US in their export market and the composition of their exports. Using a model that took into account the longer term second order effects adversely affecting EU exports as a result of declines in EU and other countries incomes as a consequence of the tariffs, the study suggested a decline of 0.5% on average for 2026. Similar views were expressed by European business in a survey in November 2025 [17]. The most recent IMF World Economic Outlook [14] includes two risk scenarios for 2026: in the worst case, GDP of the euro area would decline by about 1%t below its original baseline in 2026; in the best case, output of the euro area could increase by around 0.7–0.8 percentage points above baseline despite the tariffs. But no studies appear to have included the longer term positive but likely small effects of EU incomes rising as a result of the future reduction of tariff barriers against US imports.

In the first 8 months of 2025, US exports to the EU increased by about 10% and imports, slightly less—around 9.5%. This resulted in an increase in the US trade deficit with the EU in the first eight months of the year from $151.9 billion in 2024 to $165.8 billion in 2025. The results are skewed however, because of very large anticipatory US imports in early 2025. In the months June- August 2025, US imports from the EU declined relative to 2024 [18].

Economic Impact on Greece-short term

Early commentary on the impact of the EU-US agreement on Greece suggested a much higher decline in Greece’s exports and GNP in 2026 than that presented in the above studies. Kathimerini [19] predicted a GDP decline of 0.5%-1.0% in 2025, and smaller effects ranging from 0.2% to 0.4% in 2026 and even smaller declines in 2027.

…the effect of the US tariff increases and the subsequent US-EU trade agreement will result in significantly lower adverse effects on Greek GDP. The main reason for this is that Greece depends much less on the US market for its exports than the EU average.

It is unclear on what analysis these projections were based and no model estimates based on an econometric model of Greece appear to exist. Nevertheless, given the projections for EU as a whole and the size and composition of Greek exports, the analysis below will argue that the effect of the US tariff increases and the subsequent US-EU trade agreement will result in significantly lower adverse effects on Greek GDP. The main reason for this is that Greece depends much less on the US market for its exports than the EU average. Table 1 below shows the evolution of Greek trade with the EU, the US and the rest of the world (ROW) over the 2018-2024, period, i.e. after the Greek economy stabilized from the debt crisis.

Table 1 shows that Greek exports to the US account pretty steadily for about 4% of total Greek exports and about 10% of Greek exports outside the EU. This compares to an average of EU exports to the US of 21% of EU exports to the rest of the world [16]. Roughly speaking, Greece is about half as much exposed to the US market for its exports relative to the average EU member, and much less than countries like Germany or Ireland. The story is similar for Greek imports. Greece has run a small surplus in its trade balance with the US in the last two years while running a persistent huge trade deficit overall. Greece offsets its traditional large trade deficits by running a large surplus in services, especially through earnings from shipping and tourism [21].

The composition of Greek exports to the US does not suggest that Greece would be hit harder than the average EU member by the increased US tariffs. While no detailed estimates are available, the main problem appears to derive from Greece exports of aluminum and steel products which are subject to 50% tariffs (see below Table 2). It should be noted however, that the US tariffs on aluminum (and steel) had been earlier imposed by the US on the grounds of security (Sec. 232) and separately from the IEEPA tariffs that ultimately led to the US- EU agreement.

 

Table 2 shows two dimensions of the importance of aluminum and steel on the Greek economy: first, they are small relative to Greek exports to the US, 7.0% and 2.1% respectively; and second, that the proportion of Greece’s exports of aluminum and steel products to the US are quite small relative to the total Greek exports of these products, 5.1% and 6.5% respectively. The latter would imply that Greek exporters could shift sales of these products elsewhere.[3]

Of the products in which the US is an important market accounting for more than 10%  of total exports, only the agricultural products in the categories of Vegetables and Fruits (20.9%), Essential oils (10.5%) and Edible fruits (16.2%) are likely to be affected by the new US tariffs. And the US has committed that these will not exceed 15%. Greece is not an oil producer and the large exports of oil products  to the US as well as the rest of the world are determined primarily by decisions of the oil companies, some US owned, which import crude oil from the Middle East refine it in Greece and ship out oil products all over the world.  The US importance of the category ‘Aircraft, spacecraft’ probably reflects transactions of air carriers and repairs of aircraft engines and parts as Greece does not produce either aircraft or spacecraft. Greece does produce a variety of crude materials, salt earth etc., for which the US market is significant (21.6%), but as noted earlier, the US will maintain minimal tariffs on these products.

 

Estimates of US trade with Greece for the first eight months of 2025 showed the US to have decreased both its export and its imports to and from Greece- in the case of exports by 10% in the case of imports—i.e. exports from Greece by 3.3% [19].  These data suggest that the pattern of Greece’s trade with the US is somewhat different than that noted earlier for the EU as a whole. It remains to be seen how this pattern will be affected in the longer term by the emerging changes in the world trading system.

Recent reports confirmed the mixed impact of the US tariffs on Greek exports to the US.  Tariffs on edible fruits have been recently removed, but exports of dairy products have been adversely affected. Despite high tariffs, “iron/steel pipes, rose from a zero base in 2023, to €21.8 million in 2024 and to €49.2 million in the April-September 2025 period. Electrical conduits reached €38.4 million in 2024 but during the tariff period they experienced a decrease of 88.1%” [22]. 

On balance, given the relatively small importance of the US market to Greece, compared to other EU countries, it is fair to conclude that the impact of the US-EU agreement on Greek GDP will be significantly smaller than for the EU as a whole. We would guess that the impact could be in the neighborhood of 0.1% to 0.15% reduction of GDP relative to baseline forecasts for 2025 and 2026, much smaller than earlier estimates.

On balance, given the relatively small importance of the US market to Greece, compared to other EU countries, it is fair to conclude that the impact of the US-EU agreement on Greek GDP will be significantly smaller than for the EU as a whole. We would guess that the impact could be in the neighborhood of 0.1% to 0.15% reduction of GDP relative to baseline forecasts for 2025 and 2026, much smaller than earlier estimates. That size of an effect could easily be overwhelmed by other developments in Greece or in the global economy.

The World Trade System

…the US actions on tariffs violated its commitments to the core principle of the WTO of not unilaterally increasing duties that have been capped in previous agreements with its partners (Article II of the GATT) . Similarly, the bilateral deals, such as those with the UK as well as the EU, China, and other countries violate US commitments to the most-favored nation (MFN) non-discrimination clause (Article I of the GATT).

Throughout 2025, the US actions on tariffs violated its commitments to the core principle of the WTO of not unilaterally increasing duties that have been capped in previous agreements with its partners (Article II of the GATT)[4]. Similarly, the bilateral deals, such as those with the UK as well as the EU, China, and other countries violate US commitments to the most-favored nation (MFN) non-discrimination clause (Article I of the GATT). Such preferential deals are permitted only if they are part of an established Free Trade Area or Customs Union. These deals also defy the WTO approach of promoting trade through multilateral negotiations [23] and [24].

For a while, it appeared that the US may wish to leave the WTO. It had withdrawn from other multilateral institutions such as UNESCO and WHO and it had not paid its WTO dues for two years. There were even some voices suggesting that the trading system as a whole would be better off if the US did leave the WTO [25]; or for that matter that it could be expelled [26]. But the US did pay its dues, and others have argued that the US should stay in the WTO as it could provide a useful counterbalance to China which has also been guilty of significant WTO violations.

It is also fair to argue that, in the last twenty years, the WTO based trade system has been undermined by an erosion of global commitments to multilateral rules by many countries including the EU.

It is also fair to argue that, in the last twenty years, the WTO based trade system has been undermined by an erosion of global commitments to multilateral rules by many countries including the EU. It started first, with the failure of completion of the Doha Round of negotiations, which were abandoned after more than a decade of trying—for which, countries like India and China, were as responsible as the EU and the US.  Later, economic and political and developments resulted in reduced emphasis on multilateral approaches to improve firms’ participation in international trade:

• Attempts to facilitate small and medium enterprises foreign trade participation led to “mini-deals” that may be beneficial for a subset of firms in certain sectors but undermine global standards. “The EU has concluded over 2,000 such mini-deals, which cumulatively cover a large share of EU trade participation in global supply chains” [27].
• Countries, and the EU in particular, have established regulatory standards based on concerns about the environment, health and safety, cross border data flows, cyber-security, consumer or worker protection. The national agencies tasked with implementing regulations generally have not wanted, even if they are permitted — to adjust regulatory norms simply to facilitate trade [28].
• The Covid-19 pandemic resulted in a sudden and large contraction in global trade, revealing deep vulnerabilities in international supply chains. This led many countries to introduce policies that promote strategic autonomy, meaning steps that would the ensure availability of critical goods without dependence on foreign suppliers. Governments adopted export restrictions, stockpiling, and incentives for domestic production or near-shoring [27].
• A direct consequence of the strategic autonomy logic was a renewed interest and justification of a wide range of industrial policy measures. Industrial policy became more fashionable and acceptable [29].

Despite, or one would argue, in parallel with these developments, the WTO continued to function. A fisheries agreement came in to force in mid-summer and the EU finalized a WTO compatible agreement with Mercosur that had been under negotiation for more than a decade. And as WTO Director Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala noted in a September 17, 2025 speech, following the US measures there was an 8% decline of trade conducted under MFN rules, but MFN rules continued to apply to 72% of world trade.

In light of these developments, what can be said about the future of rules that would govern world trade? As of November 1, the US average effective tariff rate was 13.1% compared to 2.5% in 2024 [31]. Clearly the most important new element is the introduction of additional uncertainty, for better or worse. On November 14, 2025, the US administration, facing increasingly unfavorable reaction by the US public to the imposition of tariffs on consumer goods, eliminated the   IEEPA tariffs on a whole lot of food and agriculture products. And the constitutionality of all of the IEEPA tariffs is uncertain with the US Supreme Court expected to rule on the issue in the spring of 2026.

Still, given the apparent attraction of tariffs as a foreign policy instrument to President Trump, it is expected that in the event the US Supreme Court rules that the IEEPA tariffs are unconstitutional, the US Administration will seek to justify tariffs under different legislative provisions, such as under section 301 or 202 of the US code or under section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 which gives the President the authority to impose a temporary tariff of up to 15 percent for up to 150 days to address “large and serious United States balance-of-payments deficits”. All these measures are likely to be challenged in US courts, resulting in litigation that could easily last another 1-2 years.

This means essentially, that global uncertainty on the rules of international trade is likely to continue at least until the end of the current US administration in 2028.

This means essentially, that global uncertainty on the rules of international trade is likely to continue at least until the end of the current US administration in 2028. A look into the Trade Policy Uncertainty (TPU) Index is quite telling in this respect: it shot up in early 2025, came down for a while and shot up again [32]. Other things equal, this factor alone is going to affect adversely the volume of future world trade.

Medium Term Scenarios

The uncertainties surrounding the future of the world trade system have led to the elaboration of many alternative scenarios. In considering these scenarios, one should keep in mind that trade negotiations take a long time to conclude as they involve detailed analysis of data, something that the ‘framework’ agreements concluded by the US did not do. Nevertheless, all scenarios about the future of word trade in the medium term—until 2028, are bleak.

The scenarios discussed below do not include what might happen, if there is a major political or military conflict involving the three major protagonists in world trade, the US, the EU and China. Also, for reasons discussed above, the scenarios do not include a ‘Retreat’ scenario in which the US administration, faced with a recession and declining public support, reverses course and abandons its WTO inconsistent tariff policy.

Scenario 1- Malaise

Under this scenario, WTO members would tolerate higher tariffs and US-dictated deals for as long as they last, while continuing to go about their other WTO business as usual. “The relevance of the WTO will continue to be eroded, though its stabilizing influence may not disappear entirely”[5]. But this scenario contains a lot of complex issues for WTO members. For example, Brazil may file a complaint in the WTO that the US-EU agreement that gives preferential treatment to US exports to the EU damages Brazil’s interests. In this case the EU may not wish to jeopardize its agreement with the US or face counter-measures, in which case it may need to appeal through the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA) members [33].

It is unclear how long WTO members would be willing to accept this situation. Perhaps they will wait until the end of the current US administration- while in the meantime they pursue other options. In the case of the EU, it is clear that it would be desirable to explore links with the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). A free trade agreement between the EU and CPTPP will account for 30% of world trade. Krueger has argued that the two groups should combine to establish a new organization, the GTO without the US [25].

Scenario 2 –Fragmentation

Under this scenario fragmentation accelerates. The MFN principle and multilateralism are further weakened and give way to a new logic: every country or exporting firm cuts the best deal for itself.[6]

The scenario has many regional variants. If the WTO continues to produce nothing and the EU combines with CPTPP and others to produce a modern agreement, is it necessary to anchor it in the WTO ?

A lot will depend on what role China will want to play. Under one variant, China could take the lead in organizing a large group of countries, for example through an expanded BRICS, to set up their own system. But many countries are worried about unfair Chinese policies that support Chinese firms as it promotes its manufacturing exports because of over capacity at home; and/ or countries may be concerned about China’s willingness to employ trade as a coercive instrument for foreign policy purposes.

Still, such an initiative by China could force Europe to work with Japan, South Korea, and Australia to create their own group and the US with some Latin American and Caribbean to establish yet another. Africa would strengthen its regional trade institutions and possibly ally itself with the BRICS. In all these variants, the WTO is not closed down, but becomes increasingly irrelevant. On the other hand, China has recently indicated that it is willing to abandon its WTO treatment as a ‘developing country’ suggesting a willingness to work within the WTO and thereby dropping a source of a lot of disputes.

The Future of EU Trade Policy

In these uncertain times, it would be natural for the EU to take the lead in strengthening the global multilateral trade system, to the benefit of its members, including Greece but also to the benefit of global trade and the reduction of global poverty.

Co-operation in trade was the essence of what started European integration through the Treaty of Rome more than 70 years ago. In these uncertain times, it would be natural for the EU to take the lead in strengthening the global multilateral trade system, to the benefit of its members, including Greece but also to the benefit of global trade and the reduction of global poverty.

EU should start working hard to strengthen its links with CPTPP. Combined with the EU- Mercosur agreement, this would make a formidable group of countries which could become the basis of attracting other members from Africa and Latin America.

The EU Commission views at this point is that an EU-CPTPP link is a complement and not a substitute to the WTO [34].[7]. In my view, EU should start working hard to strengthen its links with CPTPP. Combined with the EU- Mercosur agreement, this would make a formidable group of countries which could become the basis of attracting other members from Africa and Latin America. It could then work with China and possibly the US to strengthen the multilateral trade system and the WTO.

Such an effort should have two dimensions: first, work with others to establish needed reforms to the WTO; second, adopt internal EU policies that use trade to support equitable and sustainable economic growth for its people.

Regarding WTO reform Mavroidis [24] suggests that it may be useful for the international community to attempt a last-ditch negotiation to bring the US back to the multilateral house, and they should be prepared to amend the WTO’s rules in order to lure the US back to the spirit of the multilateral agenda that would benefit the institution at large. This initial agenda should take care of the US’s concerns such as the introduction of more flexibility in the current Safeguards Agreement or to deal with oversupply in particular sectors as well as amending the Compulsory Third-Party Adjudication (CTPA).

This is certainly worthwhile. The question is at what point it should be done. The current administration has in mind a totally different non- multilateral approach to international trade, feels that the “ancient régime” is obsolete, and should be substituted with a new supposedly more fair and balanced scheme. In any case, putting together an EU- CPTPP understanding will take time, after which a different US administration may be in place which may be more agreeable to global trade agreements. 

There is a need to revise the basis of participation in the WTO by different groups of countries.

It is clear that WTO reforms are needed in several areas in addition to the ones noted above that bother the US. These include the following five areas:

• There is a need to revise the basis of participation in the WTO by different groups of countries. The existing provisions regarding special and differential treatment that permit a group of countries to participate on the basis of more limited commitments to general rules for being ‘developing’ based on ‘self-selection’ proved unworkable during the Doha Round[8]. Yet, there is a need to reduce differences in national regulatory regimes that impact international trade through the mutual adoption of agreed good regulatory practices to which not every WTO member can or may be willing to adhere. Such efforts can be pursued among like-minded states — that is, on a plurilateral and variable-geometry basis. Open Plurilateral Agreements (OPAs) — agreements between groups of countries on specific policies that significantly affect international trade costs and that are open to participation to any country willing to implement a set of agreed rules and disciplines can make a major contribution to facilitating trade. Such agreements can be pursued in several areas such as Digital Trade, Climate and Environment [28], as well as subsidies (see below).[9]

• The WTO subsidies agreement should be revised in order to address several issues: first, is the issue of how to deal with subsidies that provide public goods—including those that address environmental issues. A subsidy that reduces world market prices for products like solar panels or wind turbines has positive consequences for the energy transition, but negative economic repercussions for local producers. Revisiting current WTO rules that center on the adverse effects of foreign subsidies on national firms to recognize that some types of subsidies may be appropriate and desirable to address market failures, in the process benefiting foreign countries, is an important subject for plurilateral negotiations. Still other issues arise from the complexities involving subsidies of trade in global value chains, as well as the desire to pursue ‘industrial’ policies.

• The definition of ‘economic security’ needs to be clarified as the relevant WTO provisions are too vague.

• There is a need to make meaningful progress of liberalizing trade in services. Everybody is infatuated with the desire to protect and restore production of goods, in particular manufacturing, forgetting that services will inexorably rise as a share of incomes and output.

• The link between trade policy and environmental action needs to be clarified especially as the EU is starting to implement its Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) in January 1, 2026. As noted above, this is an area where an OPA can be especially useful as it is quite clear and it is internationally agreed that poorer countries are not in a position to make the same kind of commitments as more developed economies. A specific proposal for an OPA of such a ‘club’ is contained in [37].

This is a tall order of reforms that need to be undertaken. They will take time to negotiate in part because the political economy of negotiating trade issues resulting from regulatory regimes is more difficult than negotiating a mutual reduction of quotas or tariffs where the costs to some domestic producers can be offset by gains of exporters.  Also, the Doha failure suggests that countries are not likely to want to try to have a ‘Round’ where nothing is agreed until everything is agreed by every participant. A more modest approach using OPAs may be a better avenue for future reform.

These efforts must be accompanied by EU policies that use trade to support a sustainable and equitable growth of incomes. In this connection, measures that raise productivity of EU producers are critical.

These efforts must be accompanied by EU policies that use trade to support a sustainable and equitable growth of incomes. In this connection, measures that raise productivity of EU producers are critical. Since 2019 labor productivity in the EU grew by 2% compared to 10 % in the US [38]. According to a recent study, the main difference between US and EU in labor productivity growth is that EU productivity rose much less than that of the US in the services sector since 2000 [39].

The Draghi study commissioned by the EU in 2024 contains a large number of recommendations on how to raise productivity, some of which are only now slowly being implemented [40]. In particular, there is concern that the EU is lagging far behind the US and China in the application of AI which is critical to future productivity growth. According to Draghi’s report, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), introduced by the EU to protect citizen’s privacy in 2018, is a drag on Europe’s competitiveness. “Europe must move beyond fragmented and overly rigid regulatory structures if it wants to remain competitive in a fast-changing digital landscape. Evidence already shows that GDPR data transfer rules have constrained export potential, and additional regulatory layers introduced through the AI Act risk amplifying these pressures”[41].

Measures to promote diversification of imports of oil and natural gas, by accelerating the green energy transformation are of obvious importance to future trade policy as well as steps to diversify supply of critical minerals away from China. These efforts, however, should not lead to generalized promotion of import substitution through protection incompatible with WTO provisions or commitments with regional trade partners.

“A ‘manufacturing-first’ attitude has taken hold in the European economic policy discussion. New strategies and industrial policies are designed with the ambition of boosting development and output in traditional industrial sectors” [42].[10] There is a clear danger, that disturbances in international trade will encourage the establishment of inefficient EU production —reshoring or home-shoring justified on the vagaries of ensuring adequate supplies of ‘critical’ products from global supply chains—while the future lies in services where growth has been and likely will continue to be greater than in manufacturing; and where the EU is the largest exporter in the world.

Implications for Greek Policy

For Greece, foreign trade policy is determined at the EU level.

For Greece, foreign trade policy is determined at the EU level. This should be helpful in protecting its interests through the large weight that Brussels would bring to bear in any negotiations with China or the US. [11] There are also serious limits to what individual countries can do to promote exports. As Greece has a very small share of exports relative to its GDP, there is a temptation to suggest that export promotion agencies can correct this problem [43]. They obviously can be of some help, but they are not likely to be determinant of overall performance, and in a country like Greece, where there is a tendency of cronyism, there are dangers of trying to pick winners by supporting friends. The best way to promote exports is through general policies that increase productivity and reduce bureaucratic hassles [44].

In this connection, the recommendations of the Draghi report are especially relevant. In many respects, the report sounds as if it was talking specifically about problems facing Greek industry and more generally the Greek economy. The importance of productivity growth to export performance has been well established. In this connection, I argued long ago that the export performance of the ‘Asian Targets’ in the 1960’s was critically dependent on the growth of total factor productivity [45].

Among the Draghi’s report many recommendations are proposals to raise productivity through more training as well as improved technology through increased expenditures on research and development. Implementing these proposals in Greece would require significant increases in both public and private investment from the current levels of roughly 15% of GDP.

Among the Draghi’s report many recommendations are proposals to raise productivity through more training as well as improved technology through increased expenditures on research and development. Implementing these proposals in Greece would require significant increases in both public and private investment from the current levels of roughly 15% of GDP. EU support can be helpful to Greece in this area, but it cannot substitute for stronger and better implemented public sector investments.

Conclusion

In sum, the recent turmoil in international trade should not result in a deviation from the basic set of policies that Greek governments need to pursue in collaboration with their European counterparts to strengthen European integration and institutions. They should do so based on the policy recommendations contained in the several studies referred to above. As it has done in the past, Europe can rise to the challenges created by the current turmoil and restore faith in the prospects of a sustainable and equitable future for its people. This will not happen through retrenchment and protection but through openness to trade. The EU is in the best position to lead a future restoration of a trade system governed by multilateral rules and agreements and a strengthened WTO.

[1]For a discussion see [1] and [2].

[2] Lower US courts judged the IEEPA tariffs to be unconstitutional, but the US Supreme Court permitted them to be retained until it passed a final judgement on them expected in early 2026 [3].

[3] There may be limit to such a shift, as both products, especially aluminum, appear to be in global over supply.

[4] GATT-General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade- incorporated in the treaty establishing the WTO.

[5] This scenario is basically the same as what Cernat [30] called ‘Sclerosis”.

[6] This is similar to Cernat’s’[30] third scenario ‘contagion’.

[7] Experience with international organizations over the last century suggests that they are almost as difficult to shut down—even after their usefulness is questionable [35] as to create new ones

[8] For a detailed discussion of the absurdities in the current system see [37]. For example, Turkey and Israel just like China were considered ‘developing countries’ just because they said so.

[9] Such agreements can also be pursued outside the WTO and at some point brought into the system.

[10] As well as in the United States.

[11] But EU membership may not provide cover in the wider US-China conflict: The recently appointed US Ambassador to Greece expressed her concerns to Prime Minister Mitsotakis about the 67% ownership of the Port of Piraeus by the Chinese firm Cosco and suggested that Greece may wish to force a sale of it in the future. To which the Prime Minister responded that agreements have to be respected [46].

 

 

"Csak a bátorság gyönyöréért jöttünk, a magasztos férfipróba örömére s eljövünk felétek, valahányszor ebben kedvünk lelik…" - így szólt részben az egyik üzenet azok közül, melyeket az olasz légierő felderítőgépei röplapokon szórtak le egyszer Bécsre az I. világháborúban. Az akkor igen hosszúnak számító repülőúton a bátor propaganda-különítményt a hírneves irodalmár, a katonai pilótának mellesleg már eléggé túlkoros Gabriele D'Annunzio őrnagy vezette, és tőle származott a fent idézett nyilatkozat is, melyet (a 400 ezer röplapból 50 ezret) a többivel ellentétben a parancsnokság mulatságos módon le sem fordíttatott németre, merthogy annak magvas üzenetét osztrákok úgyse értenék - mintha csak egy orosz avantgárd művészekről szóló viccet hallana az ember. (Ezt a hiányosságot könnyen lehet, hogy azóta se pótolta senki; angol fordítással viszont szolgál a Wikipédia.)

[...] Bővebben!

The policy brief by Dr. Ioannis Armakolas (Head, South-East Europe Programme – ELIAMEP & Director, think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration) and Ioannis Alexandris (Research Fellow, South-East Europe Programme – ELIAMEP & Researcher, think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration), “Enlargement and the EU Budget: Is the price to pay high? The case against fiscal alarmism”, was prepared in the framework ELIAMEP’s initiative think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration, supported by the Open Society Foundations – Western Balkans. 

At a time when EU enlargement is increasingly contested by Eurosceptic and radical-right forces, the policy brief examines one of the most politically sensitive aspects of the debate: the budgetary and fiscal implications of enlargement. Building on think nea’s thematic report on radical-right narratives, the authors analyse how fears about costs to taxpayers, agricultural subsidies, and cohesion funds are mobilised to undermine public support for further EU expansion, particularly in net-contributor Member States.

Drawing on recent EU budget proposals for the 2028–2034 Multiannual Financial Framework, as well as economic modelling and lessons from previous enlargements, the brief demonstrates that the actual fiscal cost of enlargement is modest and manageable, especially when phased-in mechanisms and structural reforms are applied. At the same time, it shows that EU transfers are transformational for candidate countries, particularly in the Western Balkans, Moldova and Ukraine, supporting convergence, institutional reform and infrastructure development.

The analysis also highlights the opportunity costs of non-enlargement, emphasising how past rounds of enlargement generated significant economic gains for existing Member States through trade, investment, labour mobility and integrated supply chains. In this light, the brief reframes enlargement not as a fiscal burden but as a strategic investment in Europe’s competitiveness, resilience and long-term stability.

The paper concludes with concrete policy recommendations on how to reframe public debate, embed enlargement within the EU’s new competitiveness and strategic autonomy agenda, and counter fiscal alarmism by presenting enlargement as a win-win process that benefits both current and future Member States.

You can read the policy brief here.

The South-East Europe Programme of ELIAMEP is a member of the IGNITA network, led by Open Society Foundations – Western Balkans.

Az amerikai űrsikló program hajnalán a NASA elképzelése az volt, hogy a többször használható űrjárművet olyan sugárhajtóművekkel látja el, amelyekkel önállóan lesz képes átrepülni a leszállásra kijelölt kaliforniai Edwards légierő bázisról a floridai Kennedy űrközpontba, a következő felbocsátás helyszínére. A megvalósításnak számos technikai akadálya volt, ezért a figyelem egy olyan speciális szállítógép felé fordult, amely képes a hátára venni az űrsiklót és átszállítani az országon.

A NASA két óriást vehetett számításba: a légierő Lockheed C-5A Galaxy teherszállító gépét, és a Boeing 747-est, a Jumbo Jetet, amely öt évvel korábban mutatkozott be az utasforgalomban. Az 1973-ban lefolytatott tesztek eredményei az utóbbit hozták ki alkalmasabbnak. A Jumbo biztonságosabbnak bizonyult, képes volt az Egyesült Államok leszállás nélküli átrepülésére, rövidebb futópályát tudott használni, és az élettartama is hosszabb volt. A NASA 1974 júniusára végleg elengedte azt az elgondolást, hogy az átrepülésekhez sugárhajtóműveket helyezzen el az űrsiklón, és jóváhagyta egy Boeing 747-es beszerzését és átalakítását űrsikló-hordozónak. A kiválasztott Jumbo egy 1970-es gyártású, kilencezer repült órával rendelkező Boeing 747-100-as volt, amelyet addig az American Airlines használt utasszállításra. A 30 millió dolláros költséggel tervezett átépítésre a Boeing everetti üzemében, Washington államban került sor.

[...] Bővebben!

Az európai szempontból a világ végén fekvő, zord éghajlatú Falkland-szigetek lakossága ekkoriban mintegy kétezer főt számlált, akiknek túlnyomó része a keleti szigeten élt. A szigetek egyetlen nagyobb települése Port Stanley két utcából álló városkája volt, ahol nagyjából ezer ember élt. A Falkland-szigetek kormányzói feladatait ekkor már tíz éve Sir William Lamond Allardyce látta el. Az indiai születésű, és korábban a trópusokon szolgáló Allardyce számára nem kis nehézséget jelenthetett a zord éghajlathoz való akklimatizáció, de hivatalát kifogástalanul ellátta.

Cradock hajórajának veresége után a falklandiak biztosak voltak benne, hogy ők lesznek a németek legközelebbi célpontjai, ezért amennyire lehetőségeikből tellett, megszervezték a város védelmét. A fegyverfogható férfilakosságból megalakították a helyi milíciát, a partok mentén figyelőszolgálatot hoztak létre, a kikötő bejáratát pedig házilag barkácsolt aknákkal zárták el. Egy német támadás esetén felkészültek a város kiürítésére is. A hivatalokban elégették a titkos dokumentumokat, a lakosok pedig a kertekben elásták értékeiket. November 13-ától a védelmet erősítette a Canopus is, melyet a belső kikötőöböl déli oldalán zátonyra futtattak. A hajó innen tűz alatt tudta tartani a belső kikötőbe és Port Stanley-be vezető szűk átjárót, valamint a délkeleti szektorban, ahol a tengert és az öblöt csak alacsony dombok választották el, a tenger felé is tüzelhetett, fedezve ezzel a szigetek errefelé elhelyezkedő rádióállomását is. A hajó előárbocának árbockosarát kibővítették, és erről a megfigyelőállásról állandóan szemmel tartották a kikötő bejáratához vezető útvonalakat. A csatahajó és a part között közvetlen telefonvonalat létesítettek, melyen keresztül rögtön riasztani tudták a kormányzóságot és a milíciát. A Canopus felépítményeit és kéményeit többszínű álcázófestéssel látták el, hogy minél jobban beleolvadjanak a kikötőt övező dombok hátterébe. A páncélos kisebb ágyú közül néhányat leszereltek, és átadtak a partvédelemnek.

[...] Bővebben!

Zord

I notice it’s been some six months since my last post here, which reflects on both the new pace of UK-EU relations and the lack of anything useful to add to the debate.

I did bestir myself to write about the return of finance-based framing back in November, as various people noticed this was a thing, but even that was a very brief matter (albeit one we might return to).

Even the recent number of press stories launched by Labour about the new for a closer relationship currently lack any great depth: the items that are being mentioned relate to stuff already on the reset agenda, which have themselves moved at a glacial pace. The failure of SAFE negotiations in November was undoubtedly a set-back and one that helped to move up the ERASMUS+ decision some weeks later, but this has deflected attention from the lack of quick movement elsewhere. Even the Spain-UK treaty on Gibraltar, agreed last June, is still to be put through ratification.

At best, this suggests that things might be moving forward, rather than are demonstrably doing so. Even if we make allowances for the likely cross-linkage of ETS, SPS and Youth Mobility, there risks being little to show come the next EU-UK summit, whose date is still to be fixed.

Ultimately, this reflects on the lack of urgency for either side. The EU has many other more pressing things to attend to right now, while British policy is caught up in the general funk about the government’s central strategic purpose. Moreover, none of the reset elements will actually make a huge difference to those involved, beyond helping to remove some points of friction and to rebuild trust.

However, with Labour languishing in the polls, the EU might be forgiven for wondering whether it’s worth moving now on more relations, when a new British government might come along a tear those apart in three years’ time: witness the flourishing adoption of ECHR withdrawal on the right that continues to contain no concern about the impact on the TCA/WA.

This all said, it’s good not to be too downbeat about things. The rhetoric remains positive, negotiations do continue and British public opinion is still relatively benign on closer links.

As such, I’m going to try to be more active this year as we move through the reset, looking both at the specific elements and the wider relationship. As ever, I’m always very happy to produce graphics on particular things: just contact me and I’ll be on it.

In the meantime, here are some updates of the main trackers on WA/TCA meetings and the progress on the Strategic Partnership. As always, you can follow the links to the PDFs with clickable links to source documents.

PDF: https://bit.ly/UshGraphic85

 

PDF: https://bit.ly/UshGraphic125

PDF: https://bit.ly/UshGraphic141

The post New year, same old UK-EU relations? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

AI risk pyramid. Source: European Commission https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/regulatory-framework-ai

Bao-Chau Pham

When the European Union‘s Artificial Intelligence Act finally entered into force on 1 August 2024, it was widely described as a landmark: the world’s first comprehensive framework for regulating AI. Throughout the policy-making process from early 2018 onwards, much of the debates focused on how the Act regulates – its risk categories and list of banned use-cases – and what these legislative choices do. This included commentary on its neglect of human rights, as well as concerns that it might stifle innovation. Sitting underneath these discussions, however, is a simpler question: what problem is the AI Act actually trying to solve?

That question is at the heart of my article, co-authored with Sarah R. Davies and published in Critical Policy Studies. As the EU now debates delays and possible revisions of the Act – or “rollbacks”, as more critical voices have put it – the question feels newly relevant. The recently proposed Digital Omnibus package may not just tweak the AI Act as a legal instrument. We may be witnessing the re-articulation of the very problem the legislation was designed to address.

In this post, I briefly introduce the argument of our article, reflect on why this way of reading the AI Act matters, and suggest why current discussions about revisiting the Act make the question ”What problems is the AI Act really solving?” even more salient.

 

Reading policy as problem representations: the WPR approach

Our article starts from the premise that policies do not merely respond to external issues. Instead, policies actively participate in producing the very problems they are designed to solve. Drawing on Carol Bacchi’s seven-step “What’s the Problem Represented to Be?” (WPR) approach, we therefore read the AI Act as a document that constructs a particular understanding of AI and its governance.

From this perspective, asking whether the AI Act is effective or proportionate is only half the story. The more fundamental question is how the Act frames AI as a policy problem in the first place. This, in turn, allows us also to interrogate what and who gets foregrounded, sidelined, or taken for granted in the process.

Using the WPR approach, we identify two dominant, yet ambivalent, problem representations of AI in the Act. On the one hand, AI is framed as a major economic and societal opportunity, essential for competitiveness and Europe’s (digital) future and something that Europe risks „missing out“ on. On the other hand, AI appears as a source of significant risk, particularly to European fundamental rights and democratic values. 

This dual framing is not a contradiction to be resolved; it is the organising logic of the Act. The cascading scale of risk – dividing systems into minimal, limited, high, and unacceptable risk categories – emerges directly from this way of problematising AI. The AI Act frames the policy problem as one of managing trade-offs: how to promote uptake while preserving trust, or how to govern a fast-moving technology without stifling it.

Seen this way, the AI Act is not just regulating technology. It stabilises a particular vision of AI as something that can, and should, be rendered governable through categorisation, technical requirements, and legal obligations. Other possible ways of characterising AI as a policy issue, as well as other possible responses, are, in the process, foreclosed. 

Importantly, the problem is also represented in a way that positions the European Union as the primary actor capable of solving it. One of our key arguments that follows is that the AI Act also plays a role in enacting a particular version of Europe and Europeanness. It constructs and institutionalises the notion of the EU as an exceptional, morally authoritative policy actor in global AI governance. In this sense, the AI Act is as much about Europe’s self-identification in a global technological landscape as it is about regulating specific AI systems.

 

Why this matters now: shifting goalposts

At first glance, current discussions about revising the AI Act may look like implementation politics: delayed technical standards, pressures from industry and lobbyists, and geopolitical concerns about competition. If we return to the question of problem representation, however, these debates take on a different meaning. They point to a possible shift in what is understood to be the central problem that AI policy should address.

As we argue in our article, during the AI Act’s legislative process the dominant discourse centred on risk to fundamental rights alongside economic opportunity. Increasingly, however, public debate is framed in different terms: how to avoid over-regulation, maintain competitiveness, and keep pace with global AI development. The risk that now receives the most attention is not always harm to citizens or democratic institutions, but harm to innovation ecosystems and market position.

This does not mean that fundamental rights have completely disappeared from the conversation, but it does suggest that they may no longer be the primary lens through which the policy problem is articulated. From a WPR perspective, the question is not whether the AI Act is being weakened or strengthened. It is whether the problem the policy is meant to solve is being re-articulated.

If AI is increasingly represented as a competitiveness challenge rather than a rights challenge, then different policy solutions, which favour scalability and speed, follow suit. Seen in this light, current proposals to simplify the AI Act are interventions in an ongoing struggle over how AI should be understood as a matter of public concern and whose interests should take priority when trade-offs are made.

This is precisely why the question “what problem is the AI Act solving?” remains important. It reminds us that regulation and policy are never only about technicalities. If we take problem representation seriously, then revisiting the AI Act is equally about deciding which understandings of AI become stabilised in European governance going forward.

To conclude, the AI Act was never just a response to extraneous technological developments. From a critical policy perspective, it reads as an attempt to stabilise a particular way of thinking about AI and governance in Europe. As the constellation we saw in the AI Act is now being reconsidered, returning to the question of problem representation can help us unpack and trouble what is at stake. Whether the AI Act ultimately changes or not, it is worth remembering that the debates about AI governance are not only about how we regulate, but about what we think needs regulating, why, and for whom.

 

Bao-Chau Pham is a recent PhD graduate in Science and Technology Studies from the University of Vienna (Austria). In her dissertation, Bao-Chau explored imaginaries of artificial intelligence in European policy and media discourses. 

The post Revisiting what problems the EU AI Act is actually solving appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Az Air Base blogon, ha nem is túl gyakran, de időről időre előveszem a hajózás témáját is, (ami olvasóim körében, számomra is némiképp meglepő módon, kedvező fogadtatásra talált). A kereskedelmi hajózásra leszűkítve a kört volt már szó az SS Baron Gautsch katasztrófájáról, a Greenwichben kiállított Cutty Sark klipperről, a XVIII. századi holland Amsterdam vízen úszó, jól sikerült replikájáról, spliti, fiumei és londoni múzeumok gyűjteményéről vagy csak egyszerűen egy-egy tengeri kikötő forgalmáról. Így lesz ez most is, a tavaly nyáron készült fotóimból összeállított album formájában.

[...] Bővebben!

Az elmúlt évekhez hasonlóan 2025-öt is egy vegyes albummal zárom. Olyan válogatással az idei fotókból, amelyek a cikkekből, bejegyzésekből – egyelőre – kimaradtak.

Az Aeroparkban tett tavaszi látogatásom fókuszában a légimentők L-410-ese állt, de távolról a Malév Tu-134-eséről is készítettem fotót. Néhai nemzeti légitársaságunk 1987-ben az üvegorrú HA-LBElemérrel kezdte meg a típus kivonását, de a gépet szerencsére sikerült itthon tartani, ráadásul egy darabban

[...] Bővebben!

A kettővel ezelőtti podcastunkban a Hunyadi c. tévésorozatról úgy vélekedtünk, hogy a média már amúgy is csámcsogott rajta egy sort, az abban feldolgozott téma pedig nagy vonalakban történelmi alapismeret kellene, hogy legyen, ennek következtében pedig szokásunktól eltérően felesleges részletekbe menő kommentárt leközölnünk arról. Hasonló feltételezéssel élünk ma is, bár eltérő okokból. Abból a valószínű tényállásból következtetünk erre, hogy témánk, a das Boot a Magyarországon legismertebb háborús filmek közé sorolható, és ha ez nem is igaz a teljes közönségre, akkor is biztosan vonatkozik arra az idősebb nemzedékre, amely még másolt/kölcsönzött, és ugyebár sok esetben alámondásos kazettákra volt kénytelen fanyalodni az efféle szórakozás érdekében (persze a nosztalgia ezen a téren is sok mindent megszépít).

[...] Bővebben!

Az atlanti partok nagy múltú francia kikötőiről olvasva az ember hatalmas kikötővárosokat képzel el, és aztán meglepődik amikor kiderül, némelyik még magyar viszonylatban is csak kisváros minősítést kapna. Ilyen például Cherbourg, melynek hatalmas kikötője Napóleon egyik nagy presztízsberuházása volt, bár a négy kilométer hosszú hullámtörő gátak építését igazából már a forradalom előtti időkben elkezdték, és aztán majd csak XIX. század végén fejezték be. A kikötő, mely eredetileg Napóleon angliai inváziójának fő támaszpontja lett volna, a XIX. század második felében az Amerikába irányuló személyszállítás – vagyis a kivándorlás – egyik legforgalmasabb kiindulópontja volt, ez volt a Titanic utolsó kikötője is, mielőtt az elindult volna New York felé. Az első világháború alatt a város az országba érkező angol, majd az amerikai expedíciós csapatok egyik legfontosabb kikötője volt, majd a két háború között ismét a személyforgalom központja. A második világháborúban, a németektől való visszafoglalása után, az Európában harcoló amerikai csapatok utánpótlásának központja, a kikötő forgalma ezekben a hónapokban kétszer akkora volt, mint New York kikötőjének.

[...] Bővebben!

Zord

Dear Colleagues,

As I reflect on my first full year as Chair, I am so proud of the work we have done and especially for the warm support I continue to enjoy. This supportive spirit was very much on display at our last annual conference in Liverpool, hosted by Liverpool John Moores University.

The programme, so expertly put together by our Events Working Group, track conveners and our UACES office staff highlighted different facets of Europe in interesting times. This conference facilitated conversations about the trajectories of European integration and transformation, governance, especially in the health and digital spheres, the importance of law and history to our understanding of the current moment and the utility of critical perspectives. Beyond the academic debates and discussions, the real world implications of our work and activities, especially how our field can respond to a rapidly changing global environment.

The local organising team went all out for us, and I want to extend heartfelt thanks to all of our Liverpool colleagues for their hard work and hospitality.

Aside from the main conference, the Graduate Forum Research Conference in Athens and the Doctoral Training Academy in Madrid were important reminders of how central PhD researchers and early-career colleagues are to the future of European Studies. I am pleased to note that this was yet another successful year and I am thankful to Sydney and the team for leading on our early career activities.

This has also been a year of change within UACES governance. We have said thank you and goodbye to colleagues whose terms on the Committee and in Officer roles have come to an end and welcomed new trustees who are already bringing fresh ideas and energy. I am grateful to everyone who gives their time and expertise to UACES governance, often quietly and on top of already heavy workloads.

Our journals, JCMS and Contemporary European Politics, continue to thrive, with strong rankings and a growing global readership that reflects the quality and breadth of scholarship produced by this community and of course the excellent work of the editors.

Looking ahead, there is much to be excited about. In 2026, we will build on the success of Liverpool as we prepare future Annual Conferences, including our 56th meeting in Prague hosted by Charles University. Prague promises to be a fantastic setting for conversations about how Europe is constructed, contested and reimagined in national discourses and I hope many of you will already be thinking about submitting those panel and paper proposals.

We continue to work on strengthen the infrastructure that underpins our scholarly community. In that spirit and with members of the committee, I undertook a review of how to continue support through Research Networks in a very constraining financial environment. In the new year, we will be relaunching this funding stream in a way that offers more flexible, sustainable backing for collaborative projects and better showcases the diversity of work across European Studies. Alongside this, we are looking at how to expand our awards programme to recognise the different ways in which colleagues at all career stages contribute to our field. Throughout, our priority remains to support research, teaching and impact that is intellectually ambitious, inclusive and outward facing.

None of this would be possible without you.

And to you a massive thank you.

As we approach the holiday season and the turn of the calendar year, I hope you are able to find some time for rest, joy and the people who matter to you.

I look forward to our many collaborations in the coming year.

With warm wishes,

Toni
Chair, UACES

The post End Of Year Letter From UACES Chair appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

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Fotó: Szórád Tamás

By Francesco Duina (Bates College, USA)

For decades, the EU has projected its internal legal frameworks onto the world. It has done so indirectly through the Brussels Effect, whereby countries and trading blocs in other parts of the world pre-emptively adopt EU internal standards in order to facilitate trade with the EU. And it has done so directly, by way of imposing its own standards through trade agreements. Given this, most observers of the EU have viewed it as an ‘exporter’ of norms – and this has represented perhaps its most important form of international power.

The possibility of the EU importing standards from other countries or blocs has been given little consideration. Instead, attention has consistently gone to the continued production of EU internal regulations which, once in place, have had significant external effects. The EU’s unabated propensity to regulate has sustained this interest: its various efforts to slow down or even reverse its regulatory output have come and gone, with little impact on the overall picture. Between 2019 and 2024 alone, for instance, the EU passed 13,000 legal acts. The EU has in turn relished the benefits associated with being the ‘first mover’ in new areas such as, say, digital markets and environmental policy: it knows that those who regulate first set the terms and that those who follow must at least consider them, especially if the first mover enjoys a huge internal market. These dynamics have turned the EU into a regulatory juggernaut committed to its internal standards and historically eager to have other countries and blocs adopt them.

The Animal Welfare Case

A recent development in animal welfare policy represents, however, a noteworthy departure from this pattern. I explained how and why this happened in my recent JCMS article. The EU – widely viewed as already having a wide-reaching regulatory framework in this policy area – was about to announce four long-awaited proposals in late 2023 on transport, slaughter, labelling, and the housing of animals. The Commission had determined that its existing frameworks, developed over the previous 25 years or so, required modernization. Equally important, major polls, the European Citizens’ Initiative ‘End the Age Cage’ that was supported by 170 non-governmental organisations and nearly 1.5 million citizens across the EU, and various protests, electoral campaigns and other civil society initiatives had put pressure on the EU. More broadly, the measures were consistent with its wider effort to ‘green’ agricultural trade.

Crucially, and not surprisingly, the four proposals would have come with ‘conditionality’ expectations: the requirement that trade partners exporting products into the EU comply in their treatment of animals with the standards set in those laws. An announcement by the Commission on the proposals was expected by the end of December 2023. But starting in the summer of that year the momentum slowed. Then, in her State of the Union speech in September, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen signalled that something might go astray: there was no mention of animal welfare in her list of priorities. At the end of 2023, the Commission finally presented a proposal only on transport. The surprise turnaround caused significant consternation. The media publicised it, and NGOs and other interested parties voiced their objections (with, for instance, Eurogroup for Animals putting up posters in Brussels’ subway system) that continued well into late 2024.

What can explain this unexpected turn of events? Several factors surely played a role. These included powerful farmers’ protests against more agricultural regulation and unfair international competition, a diminished interest in the Commission’s Green Deal at a time when conservative populist parties seemed poised to do well in national and EU elections, and food security concerns fuelled by the war in Ukraine.

But the pending ratification of the EU-Mercosur trade deal (twenty years in the making) also played a (late-stage) role. In particular, Commission officials worried – whether justifiably or not – that the proposals’ conditionality clauses for exporters to the EU would have risked upsetting the South American countries given their lower standards.  These concerns led those officials to conclude that only one of the four proposals could go ahead. The EU-Mercosur trade deal thus became the ‘nail in the coffin’ for animal welfare progress in the EU.

What is crucial to emphasize here is that this meant not only a derailment of internal EU policy but, in effect, a willingness to accept that the lower standards of trading partners should be a cause of that derailment. Put differently, rather than a rule ‘giver’ the EU became in essence a rule ‘taker.’ Close attention should therefore go to how, exactly, Commission officials reached their position.

My analysis highlights the confluence of three dynamics. The first were institutional: competition amongst three directorates-general, with Directorate General Trade prevailing in its push to conclude the deal over the preferences of Director General Health (which supported the proposals) and Director General AGRI (which demanded that, should the proposals be pursued, conditionality had to be imposed). The second set of dynamics were temporal: animal welfare came to be seen as the ‘last straw’ in terms of EU demands on Mercosur especially because the EU had just months before greatly frustrated the Mercosur countries with extensive demands on deforestation. The third were symbolic: the Commission had made increasingly vocal public commitments to conclude several major trade deals in the very near future.

The Broader Lessons

The derailment of EU animal welfare policy thus offers us an opportunity to observe a sort of reversal of the EU’s ability to project its regulatory power. As such, it also prompts us to reflect on two broader points related to the nexus between EU trade policy and its regulatory power.

First, when it comes to trade, the EU may no longer be fundamentally concerned with the projection of regulatory power. We know that the Commission has already asserted, in part given its new Open Strategic Autonomy direction, the importance of geopolitical priorities as it pursues trade opportunities across the world. Regulatory power may become a victim of this new approach.

Second, there may be subject areas where the EU will struggle to impose its regulatory standards onto its trading partners, even if it wants to do so. There is in fact something particular about animal welfare that also applies to policy areas like the environment and labour standards. The target is not the physical standards of finished products that exporters wish to send to the EU. Instead, it is the processes associated with the production of those products. These are much harder to observe and measure, and ultimately make intrusive demands on the trading partners. The EU will therefore likely find it rather difficult to project its standards in those areas.

Francesco Duina is Charles A. Dana Professor of Sociology at Bates College (USA). His research focuses on the relationship between the economy, culture, and politics.  He co-edited Standardizing the World: EU Trade Policy and the Road to Convergence, published by Oxford University Press.

Website: https://www.bates.edu/faculty/profile/francesco-g-duina/

 

The post Always a Norm Exporter? The Case of Animal Welfare Policy and Trade appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

By Sebastian Heidebrecht (Centre for European Integration Research, Department of Political Science, University of Vienna)

On 30 October 2025, the European Central Bank (ECB) announced the next preparatory phase and its readiness to introduce a digital euro in 2029. Unlike private forms of electronic money created by private banks, the digital euro will be a retail central bank digital currency (CBDC). As such, it will be directly available to citizens for everyday use. Unlike electronic money held in bank accounts, which is money created by the private banking system, the digital euro will be a direct liability of the central bank, like cash. Shortly before, on 23 October 2025, the European Council also signalledcontinuing support, highlighting the importance of the digital euro project for “a competitive and resilient European payment system” and “Europe’s strategic sovereignty and economic security”.

Down The Rabbit Hole? A Puzzling Policy Initiative

It seems the common currency is getting fit for the digital age, or are key European Union (EU) policymakers marching towards a digital Euroland? (Perceptive readers will note that I am referring to an earlier debate around the introduction of the analogue euro in the JCMS issues of June and September 1999.) A fictive wonderland, in which polarised politics, citizen concerns, and stakeholder interests do not play much role? It is essential to note that the issuance of the digital euro will depend on the success of an accompanying legislative package, which will, among other things, introduce the digital euro as a form of legal tender. Yet, CBDCs have long been met with considerable scepticism; inter alia, they are deemed “a solution in search of a problem”. Furthermore, the digital euro will require costly public infrastructure, marking a departure from the previous reliance on private actors and the general principle that state intervention should only occur in clear cases of market failure.

Perhaps most importantly, the digital euro project, and particularly the retail version, also poses several potential challenges, including public opinion. Banks and traditional payment providers may resist it to defend their business models. Populist parties may also oppose it and defend analogue cash against what they may perceive as an elite-driven project originating from Brussels and Frankfurt. In times of tight public budgets and rising Euroscepticism, the drive by the ECB and the Commission to introduce the digital euro seems particularly surprising. Why are the EU institutions advancing this project?

Through the Looking Glass: Why EU Actors Promote the Project

In a recent JCMS article, I examine the move forward of the digital euro project. I demonstrate the importance of how digitalisation, intertwined with geopoliticisation, impacts the euro area. Of course, innovation in the world of finance has long been closely tied to technological advancements. ‘Fintech,’ or the use of digital technology to provide financial solutions, may thus be only the most recent innovation in a long list of financial innovations. Yet, big platform companies have entered the sector, offering payment services such as Apple Pay, Google Pay, and Amazon Pay. These may, due to lock-in and network effects, consolidate markets and create potential oligopolies or even a monopoly in certain sectors. Furthermore, states are using digital financial technology to weaponize interdependence, as demonstrated by Russia’s exclusion from the SWIFT international payment system in March 2022.

Against this backdrop, important developments in the late 2010s and early 2020s encouraged EU policymakers to advance the project.

First, in 2019, Meta (formerly Facebook) announced its intention to introduce its own cryptocurrency, sparking significant debate among public officials about potential threats from private and/or foreign financial innovations, and demonstrating the need to keep pace with financial innovation.

Secondly, policymakers reconsidered the problematic fragmentation of the EU payment sector along national lines, which results in a reliance on a few international card companies, such as Visa and Mastercard. This issue has long been recognised, with repeated but unsuccessful attempts to integrate the euro retail payment market. The latest attempt of a private-run and publicly promoted initiative failed in 2022, revealing the challenges of a market-based European solution.

Third, EU policymakers increasingly aim to ensure monetary sovereignty and the public role of money, thereby safeguarding EU strategic autonomy. One argument presents the European payment sector’s dependence on foreign infrastructure and a few foreign private companies as problematic, particularly in a period of growing international tension. Ever since the prospect of a second Trump presidency in January 2025 emerged, EU officials in the Commission and the ECB have increasingly framed the digital euro in geopolitical terms.

Waking Up: Political Challenges and EU Politics

Yet, concerns remain. Far-right politicians mobilise against the project, inter alia claiming to defend an imaginary “fortress cash”, demanding a “no to CDBC”, and advocating the usage of crypto alternatives instead. The private banking sector is also sceptical about the project. In terms of EU bureaucratic politics, one of the most controversial issues for policymakers and the institutions involved is whether, in line with the Commission’s proposal on the digital euro, holding limits and the prohibition of remuneration should be addressed in secondary legislation. The ECB opposes these measures, arguing that such restrictions in secondary legislation are contrary to its monetary policy competences and may be necessary in exceptional scenarios, such as a negative interest rate environment. Yet, legislators defend them based on their structural impact on the financial system, which, as an economic rather than monetary policy, would be an issue of political concern.

Against this backdrop, it will be interesting to see if the digital euro project can overcome political challenges in the legislative process. Perhaps most importantly, many of the project’s controversial design features will affect whether and how the digital euro will be accepted and used by citizens. Ultimately, this will be the main benchmark for assessing whether we will find ourselves in a digital wonderland, in which the digital euro exists only in central bank drawing boards, or worse, is implemented but not used by anyone, or if we wake up in a world where the familiar euro has found an actual digital reflection.

Sebastian is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Centre for European Integration Research, housed in the University of Vienna’s Department of Political Science. His research looks at how actors, processes, and institutions shape the digital transformation of European economies and societies, with a particular focus on European Union policies. Website: https://eif.univie.ac.at/heidebrecht/index.php LinkedIn: www.linkedin.com/in/sebsebastian-heidebrecht-22194066

The post Ready to Introduce a CBDC – or ECB in Digital Euro Land? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

When biztonsagpolitika.hu was launched more than twenty years ago, security policy occupied a relatively limited space in Hungarian public discourse, confined mainly to academic and professional circles. Today, it has become unavoidable. War has returned to Europe, hybrid threats have blurred the boundary between peace and conflict, and information itself has emerged as a strategic domain. In this environment, the value of a security-policy platform is no longer measured by speed, but by its capacity to provide context. This is where biztonsagpolitika.hu has played — and continues to play — a distinct role.

Continuity in a volatile media environment

In its early years, biztonsagpolitika.hu filled a structural gap. It offered independent, expert-driven analysis at a time when few Hungarian-language platforms treated security policy as an autonomous analytical field rather

Forrás: AI generált kép

than a subsidiary of foreign affairs reporting. Over time, the site evolved into more than a publishing interface. Closely linked to the Security Policy College, it became the outward-facing expression of a professional community and a training ground for emerging analysts.

This continuity matters. While formats, technologies, and thematic emphases have changed, the platform has remained committed to analytical depth over performative commentary. In a media ecosystem increasingly shaped by immediacy and simplification, that choice has become a strategic asset rather than a liability.

The existence of the platform’s archived “old” site further underscores this continuity. Preserving earlier analyses in a dedicated archival format is not merely a technical solution, but a statement of intellectual responsibility. In security policy, where long-term patterns, past assumptions, and earlier assessments matter, such archives allow readers to trace how interpretations evolved over time—and how certain questions have remained remarkably persistent.

Depth as relevance, not resistance

The past decade has rewarded acceleration. Algorithms favor reaction over reflection, and security debates are often compressed into binary narratives. Yet core strategic questions—deterrence, escalation management, resilience, technological dependence—resist such compression. They require historical awareness, comparative framing, and a willingness to accept ambiguity.

Biztonsagpolitika.hu represents a counter-model to real-time opinion cycles. Its relevance does not stem from competing with breaking news, but from slowing the conversation down. By prioritizing background analysis and longer-term patterns, the platform enables readers—researchers, practitioners, and students alike—to approach security not as a sequence of events, but as an interconnected system.

Adapting without dilution

Depth alone, however, does not guarantee sustained relevance. A platform built on rigorous analysis must also adapt to changing patterns of consumption. This does not require abandoning standards, but translating them. Structured briefings, visual explanations, podcasts, and selective international outreach can extend reach without compromising intellectual integrity.

The core challenge for the coming years is therefore not analytical quality, but visibility: how serious security analysis can remain present and influential in an attention-driven environment.

Why this still matters

Two decades on, biztonsagpolitika.hu demonstrates that security policy is not merely about reacting to crises, but about interpreting long-term dynamics. In an era defined by strategic uncertainty and informational overload, platforms that privilege context over immediacy perform a quiet but essential public function.

The past twenty years have established credibility. The next twenty will test whether analytical depth can remain influential in a world increasingly resistant to it. If it can, biztonsagpolitika.hu will not merely endure—it will continue to shape how security is understood, debated, and taught in Hungary.

A Twenty Years of Security Discourse: Why Context Still Matters bejegyzés először Biztonságpolitika-én jelent meg.

A több mint ötven éve repülő Boeing 747-es típus másodvirágzása az elmúlt évtizedben fellendült e-kereskedelemnek köszönhető. A légi áruszállításban az utasforgalomból fokozatosan kiszorult és kargógéppé átalakított Jumbók éppúgy megtalálhatók, mint az eredetileg is teherszállítónak készült példányok. Néhány ilyen gép kormánya mögött magyar pilóta ül. Egyikük Szüle Zsolt kapitány, aki immár tíz éve repüli a legendás típust. 

Volt idő, amikor a Boeing 747-esre csak a közforgalmi repülésben eltöltött évtizedek, a szakmai lépcsőfokok megmászása – 10-15 ezer óra repült idő, szélestörzsű tapasztalat, stb. - után, pályafutásuk megkoronázásaként kerülhettek a pilóták. Az ezredfordulót követően ez megváltozott, és már a fiatalabb repülőgép-vezetők is lehetőséget kaptak a típuson. Így bukkantak fel a világban szerencsét próbáló, szakmai kihívást kereső magyar pilóták is a B 747-esek fedélzetén. Ők többnyire első tisztként dolgoztak, és csak néhányukból lett idővel kapitány. Arra sokáig nem is volt példa, hogy valaki kapitányként debütáljon a Jumbón. Az elsők között volt Szüle Zsolt is, aki először légiforgalmi irányító majd később Boeing 737-es első tiszt és kapitány lett. A párhuzamosan űzött két hivatás nehezen fért meg egymás mellett, és amikor döntenie kellett, a frekvencia másik végét, a pilótafülkét választotta.

A közelmúltban azért kerestem meg, hogy saját élményein és tapasztalatain keresztül nyújtson betekintést a Boeing 747-esen dolgozó, világjáró kargópilóták kívülről kalandosnak tűnő, belülről olykor nagyon is rögös mindennapjaiba. Beszélgetésünkre, ha nem is egy Jumbo fedélzetén, de mindenképpen autentikus környezetben került sor, Zsolt B 747-es szimulátor központjában, a Simflite-ban. Arra kértem, hogy mielőtt elmerülünk a kargópilóták mindennapjaiban, röviden idézze fel a pilótafülkébe vezető út főbb állomásait.

[...] Bővebben!