Peut-on engager une réforme constitutionnelle alors que l'Est de la République démocratique du Congo continue de vivre au rythme de la guerre et des déplacements massifs de populations ? C'est l'interpellation majeure du député national Daniel Furaha Uma au chef de l’Etat.
A Solebay-i csatában elszenvedett károk és veszteségek miatt az angol–francia flotta egészen őszig nem volt képes nagyobb hadműveleteket kezdeni, ezt követően pedig már az időjárás nem kedvezett azoknak. A háború legválságosabb szakaszában Hollandia így időt nyert, ami lehetővé tette számára a túlélést. Következő tavaszra a frontokon már stabilizálódott annyira a helyzet, hogy ismét el lehetett kezdeni a flotta felszerelését, és a hadsereghez átirányított tengerészek hajókra való visszavezénylését. A haditengerészet vezetésében is történt változás, amit azonban valószínűleg csak kevés holland tengerésztiszt érzett pozitívnak. Orániai Vilmos határozott kívánságára Ruyter „kibékült” a haditengerészettől hét évvel korábban kirúgott Cornelis Tromp-al, aki ismét átvette az amszterdami Admiralitás osztagának, és az egyesített flotta utóvédjének a vezetését.
Az egyébként vitathatatlan tehetségű Tromp-ot az előző háborúban bocsátották el a haditengerészettől, miután a Szent Jakab napi csatában fegyelmezetlenségének és önfejűségének köszönhetően megbontotta a flotta harcrendjét, amivel majdnem katasztrófába lökte a hajóhadat. Kirúgásának másik, kimondatlan, de mindenki által tudott oka Trompnak az orániai párt iránti elkötelezettsége volt, amit ő lépten-nyomon igyekezett is hangsúlyozni. Szinte vallásos hittel és buzgalommal szolgálta a pártot és a herceget, még portréin is többnyire narancsszínű köpenyben festette le magát. Az általános vélekedés szerint ő volt az egyik fő szervezője a Witt testvérek meggyilkolásának, melyben talán személyesen is részt vett. Vilmos herceg respektálta is Tromp igyekezetét, és hatalomra jutása után megígérte neki, visszahelyezteti a flottához, melynek Ruytert követően ő lesz a főparancsnoka. A herceg elég egyértelműen célozgatott rá, ehhez nem is kell feltétlenül megvárni Ruyter halálát, vagy nyugdíjba vonulását.
À l’occasion du 66ᵉ anniversaire de l’indépendance de la République démocratique du Congo, célébré mardi 30 juin, le gouverneur militaire de la province de l’Ituri, le général Gaby Kasongo Mulumba, a lancé un message fort en faveur de la paix, de la cohésion sociale et du vivre-ensemble.
A fiatalok közül egyesek a hegyekbe kirándulnak, mások kedvükre fesztiváloznak a nyár folyamán, és olyanok is vannak, akik otthon töltik a vakációt. Elfoglalják magukat, nem kell őket félteni. Magyarosi László földrajz-történelem szakos tanár meghívására júniusban a nagybányai Németh László Elméleti Líceumban jártunk, ahol nyári programjaikról kérdeztük a tizedikeseket. Szó esett a csütörtökön kezdődő Vibe fesztiválról […]
Articolul Vibe-tól az otthoni programokon át a Főtér Fesztiválig – nagybányai tizedikesekkel a nyárról apare prima dată în Kolozsvári Rádió Románia.
A protester holds up a placard thar reads ‘Resist, don’t compromise’ at a mass march held under the slogan ‘The people are hungry, the prisons are full’ through popular neighborhoods in Tunis, Tunisia, on 16 May 2026. Credit: Chedly Ben Ibrahim/NurPhoto via AFP
By Andrew Firmin
LONDON, Jul 1 2026 (IPS)
In May, Tunisian lawyer and journalist Sonia Dahmani was handed her second conviction of the year. Her latest sentence, a two-year jail term, came in reaction to her criticism of poor prison conditions. She previously received an 18-month sentence for calling out the government’s anti-migrant policies. Dahmani faces five more charges under a 2022 cybercrime law that criminalises the spreading of what it calls ‘false information’.
Dahmani is one of many victims of President Kais Saied, who continues to steer Tunisia in an ever more repressive direction. Saied won a free and fair election in 2019, but in 2021 he removed the prime minister and parliament, ruling by decree instead. The following year, he rewrote the constitution to give himself near-absolute power, approved in a low-turnout referendum held after key opposing voices had been jailed. When he won his second term in 2024, credible opponents had been criminalised and barred from running. It’s all a long way from the democracy that sprang into life after the 2011 Jasmine Revolution.
Growing criminalisation
Saied’s repression operates behind a facade of legality, with the criminal justice system serving as a tool of presidential control. In 2022, Saied sacked judges who disagreed with him and gave himself the power to control judicial appointments. Courts now do his bidding and jail opponents. At least nine staff of civil society organisations have received prison sentences so far this year.
Journalists Borhen Bssais and Mourad Zeghidi received three-and-a-half-year sentences on trumped-up money laundering and tax evasion charges in January. In 2025, 37 journalists, lawyers, opposition politicians and other dissidents were found guilty of terrorism and plotting to destabilise Tunisia. Following a mass trial, some were given decades-long jail terms. A November 2025 appeal court hearing that defendants weren’t allowed to attend upheld almost all convictions and increased some sentences.
The latest phase of the crackdown is targeting anti-racism campaigners. Since 2023, Saied has deployed the populist strategy of attacking Black African migrants to distract from the economic problems he’s failed to address. He’s repeatedly accused migrants of being responsible for crime and disorder, fuelling violence against them from security forces and the public.
Saied has branded organisations that stand up for migrants’ rights as traitors and foreign agents. Vilification prepares the ground for incarceration. In March, Saadia Mosbah, president of Mnemty, a Tunisian association that fights against racism, received a staggering eight-year sentence on bogus illicit enrichment and money laundering charges. Five of her colleagues were convicted alongside her.
Mnemty faces the threat of being closed down, part of an assault on associational freedoms that has seen dozens of other civil society organisations suspended. Hundreds more could face the same treatment. In 2024, courts ordered the closure of the Tunisian Council for Refugees. Last November, two of its leaders, Mustapha Djemali and Abderrazek Krimi, received two-year sentences for offences under a 1975 law on passports and travel documents.
No one appears to be beyond the state’s reach. In March, a judge ordered the pretrial detention of seven people on money laundering charges for their involvement in the first Global Sumud Flotilla, which last October attempted to take humanitarian aid to Gaza’s besieged population. Meanwhile being one of the organisations that won the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize offered no protection for the Tunisian League for Human Rights. The group was slapped with a one-month suspension in April.
For civil society organisations, suspension marks the start of a process that can lead to dissolution. Civil society organisations also face asset freezes, lawsuits and tax investigations. The combination of criminalisation, legal harassment and top-down vilification results in a pervasive chilling effect.
Judges that don’t do Saied’s bidding are also at risk. Anas Hmedi, President of the Association of Tunisian Magistrates, has been subjected to criminal proceedings since 2022, with a summons on fresh charges issued in January.
Europe says little
Tunisians continue to protest. Hundreds marched in the capital, Tunis, on 6 June to demand media freedoms and the release of political prisoners. Protesters in May also called out Saied’s failure to address the economic crisis. But they need international support.
Last October, Saber Ben Chouchane was handed a death sentence for criticising Saied on Facebook. Authorities interpreted his posts as constituting crimes of attempting to change the form of government, insulting the president and spreading false information. But this time the repression backfired. The severity of the sentence caused such an international outcry that Saied was forced to pardon and release him. This shows that international criticism can make a difference.
The European Parliament spoke up last November, passing a resolution calling for the release of political prisoners and the repeal of the false information provisions. But such gestures have limits, as shown by Saied’s dismissal of the resolution as ‘blatant interference’.
Resistance to autocratisation takes more than words, but the EU isn’t acting. It’s in a weak position towards Saied because it pays the Tunisian government to help prevent migrants crossing into Europe, and in April 2025, it classified Tunisia as a safe country of origin. This means it believes migrants can be deported there on the basis that they won’t be at risk of persecution, a claim that rings hollow for the many from civil society now in jail.
EU policies have contributed to the rising number of migrants in Tunisia, since people can make it there but no further. This makes them a ready target for Saied’s scapegoating. The EU must acknowledge its responsibility and change course. It must recognise that migrants’ rights in Tunisia aren’t being protected and that, in the current situation, only civil society can do that. In its dealings with Tunisia, it must insist that civil society freedoms are respected and people are free both to defend migrants’ rights and criticise the government’s decisions. Continuing silence will make it complicit in the consolidation of a dictatorship.
Andrew Firmin is CIVICUS Editor-in-Chief, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.
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