Credit: Jaime Saldarriaga/AFP
By Inés M. Pousadela
MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Jun 26 2026 (IPS)
On 21 June Colombians made their choice. By the narrowest of margins, Abelardo de la Espriella, a far-right criminal lawyer who’s never held elected office, became president-elect. Climate activists, human rights defenders, Indigenous communities and peace advocates have the most to lose from the incoming government’s agenda.
The election results follow the logic of a decade of deepening polarisation. Since the 2016 Peace Accord with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia began a contested and incomplete transition away from armed conflict, Colombian society has divided into two mutually hostile blocs. The election further revealed that no middle ground remains between them. The mainstream right is gone, its candidate receiving a humiliating 6.3 per cent of the first-round vote, and a new right, harsher and less constrained by institutional norms, has taken its place.
Peace agreement in trouble
Nothing divided the two runoff candidates more starkly than the 2016 Peace Accord. Iván Cepeda, the candidate backed by outgoing leftist President Gustavo Petro, is a long-time human rights advocate and senator, and chairs the Senate’s Peace and Post-Conflict Commission. He ran on a ‘comprehensive peace’ platform focused on addressing the structural roots of violence, including land access, inequality and the absence of state services in rural areas.
In contrast, De la Espriella said there would be no peace process under his watch, proposing instead to resume aerial bombardment of armed groups and reinstate herbicide fumigation of coca crops, a practice with well-documented environmental and public health consequences.
According to figures from Colombia’s Ombudsman’s Office, the six-decade conflict caused over 1.1 million killings and more than 200,000 enforced disappearances, while over nine million were forcibly displaced. That record, and the significant progress made since 2016, will now be judged expendable by a government that regards the accords as illegitimate.
For the communities living in territories where armed groups overlap with extractive industries, this is no abstract policy debate. Human rights organisations have warned that a return to a full military offensive will be devastating for civilian populations, particularly the environmental defenders and Indigenous communities who already face lethal threats. Colombia is the world’s deadliest country for environmental and land rights defenders. It’s likely about to get worse.
Cutting the human rights lifeline
De la Espriella also proposes to part ways with the international human rights architecture that has provided Colombia’s victims with a path to justice. On the campaign trail, he announced his intention to withdraw from ‘useless’ international organisations including the UN and the Organization of American States, and denounced the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights as ‘a farce’ that has served only to ‘support the left and persecute our security forces’.
In Colombia’s conflict-ridden territories where Afro-Colombian and Indigenous communities continue to experience massacres and displacement, international monitoring bodies are often the only source of independent verification that violence is happening. The American Convention on Human Rights, which Colombia ratified in 1973, is embedded in the country’s constitutional framework, shaping the interpretation of fundamental rights across the legal system.
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has hundreds of cases involving Colombia. In December 2024, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights found the state responsible for the 1995 enforced disappearance of two human rights defenders. Their families waited almost three decades for closure, and only got it because they turned to the regional system when domestic institutions failed them. Now that route could be closed.
What the results mean
Colombia’s change of direction could have global repercussions. Just weeks before the election, Colombia hosted the First Conference on Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels, bringing together 57 states alongside civil society and scientists frustrated by the repeated failure of UN climate summits to deliver binding commitments on fossil fuel phase-out. Under Petro, renewable energy grew from two per cent to around 16 per cent of the energy mix, and Colombia issued no new contracts for fossil fuel exploration.
That era ends when de la Espriella takes office on 7 August. He frames fossil fuel expansion as a fiscal imperative and calls for the immediate legalisation of fracking, currently banned by judicial moratorium. Since the country includes significant parts of the Amazon rainforest, the climate impacts won’t be limited to Colombia.
Ultimately, De la Espriella did not win for his positions on peace, climate or human rights. He won on security and the promise of order. Calling himself ‘The Tiger’, he modelled his campaign on the populist template of Argentina’s President Javier Milei and El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele, vowing to shrink the state, build megaprisons and combat corruption with tools normally reserved for organised crime. The movement he founded, Defenders of the Homeland, carried Donald Trump’s public backing. The combination proved effective in a country exhausted by decades of violence where many are deeply sceptical of the left’s ability to deliver safety.
The far-right candidate converted legitimate grievances about insecurity into a mandate to dismantle the peace process, reverse climate commitments and withdraw from the international human rights architecture. The consequences will be felt most acutely by those his campaign never meant to speak to.
Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Head of Research and Analysis, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report. She is also a Professor of Comparative Politics at Universidad ORT Uruguay.
For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org
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Peut-on parler de rupture historique entre la France et l’Afrique ?
Indéniablement la rupture qui s’est opérée entre 2022 et 2025 avec le départ des forces françaises du continent africain est historique. Elle était prévisible mais l’érosion progressive de l’influence française caractérisée par un « sentiment anti-français », n’a pas été interprétée. Embourgeoisée dans une relation déséquilibrée et paternaliste, la France n’a pas vu monter l’exigence de souveraineté des jeunesses africaines. Facteur amplifiant, la montée en puissance de l’Union européenne depuis le traité de Lisbonne de 2007, a positionné Bruxelles comme un acteur financier important tandis que nos ambassades ne cessent de répéter qu’elles n’ont plus de budget. La nature a horreur du vide. Il a permis l’arrivée de compétiteurs comme les Russes qui, en 2018, s’installent en République centrafricaine, conséquence du départ de la mission militaire SANGARIS. La France, rétractée sur une vision héritée de l’histoire, n’a pas perçu l’arrivée massive des Russes, des Américains, des Turcs, des Chinois et in fine de tous les États européens, l’Allemagne et l’Espagne en tête, qui se ruent à la conquête de nouveaux marchés. Notre discours récurrent sur la fin de la « France-Afrique » et du soi-disant « pré carré » a miné notre positionnement car les États africains avaient eux, intégré de longue date cet état de fait. La guerre de 2011 en Libye voulue par les Français, a enfin prouvé notre perte de la langue de l’Afrique. La France a démontré à cette occasion la perte collective de cette compréhension fine qu’elle avait du continent. L’opération SERVAL en 2013 aura été le dernier moment d’une action militaire française en autonomie. L’opération Barkhane qui a suivi n’avait, compte tenu de ses effectifs et de la dimension de la zone d’action, que peu de chances de réussir. La densification des actes terroristes dans le Sahel et la descente des groupes armés vers le Golfe de Guinée, ont révélé la faiblesse du dispositif français. Les coups d’État successifs entre 2020 et 2023 au Mali, au Burkina Faso et au Niger et le rejet consécutif de la France, ont constitué le départ du feu de brousse qui a emporté tout le dispositif militaire en 2025… à l’exception de la base de Djibouti que nous louons.
Est-elle irréversible ?
Probablement, malgré le désir caché de certains qui imaginent que, lassés des Russes, les États africains souhaiteront notre retour. Cette manière de voir les choses est illusoire et enfantine. L’histoire ne repasse évidemment pas les plats. On dénombre 58 soldats morts pour la France dans le Sahel. Le départ des forces françaises d’Afrique a été humiliant. Ce sentiment partagé par tous, a été synthétisé par Emmanuel Macron le 6 janvier 2025 lors de la réunion annuelle des ambassadeurs par son « on a oublié de nous dire merci ». Mais n’allons pas trop loin tout de même. La rupture n’est pas totale puisque des accords de coopération et de défense existent toujours. Mais nous devrons agir avec d’autres, compte tenu des 33 accords de défense signés avec les Russes en dix ans, ajoutés aux 39 accords de défense contractés avec les Turcs. Les Américains, de leur côté, ne sont pas en reste grâce à leurs différents programmes « Train and Equip » financés par le Département d’État et l’effort réalisé par Donald Trump en direction des pays dotés de matières premières rares comme en RDC ou au Nigéria. À partir de 2022, sentant le vent du boulet arriver, Jean-Marie Bockel est désigné comme « envoyé personnel » du chef de l’État pour l’Afrique. Il n’a pas démérité mais il a passé les années 2023 et 2024 à courir derrière une histoire qui allait plus vite que lui. « La France passe d’une logique de stock à une logique de flux en Afrique » conclut-il sur les ondes de Radio France Internationale le 7 novembre 2024. Perspective tellement technocratique qu’elle nous fait revenir à l’époque des comptoirs du XIXème siècle ?
La France a-t-elle trop fait preuve de condescendance ?
La parole péremptoire et paternaliste des élites politiques françaises à l’égard de l’Afrique francophone est un paramètre essentiel pour comprendre la prise de distance et le ressentiment observés ces dernières années. Il est largement sous-estimé dans les facteurs ayant contribué à une prise de distance des élites de l’ancien « pré carré » français. Or, ce facteur est essentiel. Nous y consacrons d’ailleurs un chapitre entier de notre livre.
Ce mode opératoire consistant à tenir des propos blessants et culpabilisants est l’apanage de presque tous les présidents de la Vème République. C’est bien le problème ; François Mitterrand et Jacques Chirac avec leurs injonctions sur la démocratie, François Hollande avec la question des Droits de l’Homme, Emmanuel Macron avec ses thèmes sur la démographie. Le discours que Nicolas Sarkozy a prononcé à Dakar, en juillet 2007, en est la caricature. Près de vingt ans après, nous payons encore cette intervention qu’aucun autre chef d’État à travers le monde, y compris européen, n’aurait pu tenir en terre africaine.
Loin des partenariats « gagnant – gagnant » régulièrement vantés, chaque président français se sent ainsi obligé de donner ses conseils, de s’ériger en moralisateur en expliquant aux opinions publiques africaines ce qui est bon pour elles ; que la démocratie est un passage obligé ; combien d’enfants elles doivent faire, etc.
La France est la seule ex-puissance coloniale européenne à s’autoriser une telle liberté de ton. Sans doute parce que inconsciemment elle entend toujours façonner les Africains à son image par un message universaliste. Paris n’a pas vu que, sur ce point aussi, les Africains en ont assez. D’autant que cette approche professorale bute désormais sur les relations que les pays africains entretiennent avec des pays qui, comme la Chine, la Russie ou la Turquie, ont une attitude plus respectueuse de leur souveraineté. Les Africains sont d’autant plus agacés que Paris est proche de certains pays où les libertés publiques et la démocratie sont extrêmement faibles. Ce double standard ne passe plus.
Était-ce une erreur de s’abstenir lors du vote à l’ONU, en avril 2026, sur la résolution proclamant la traite des esclaves comme le plus grave crime contre l’humanité ?
La France n’a pas approuvé cette résolution car elle ne souhaitant pas hiérarchiser les crimes contre l’humanité. Cela peut s’entendre. En réalité, elle a surtout voulu éviter de tomber dans le débat sur les réparations et les dédommagements financiers.
Il faut remarquer que, malgré quelques avancées (rapport sur la guerre d’indépendance au Cameroun, sur le génocide de 1994 au Rwanda, sur le cas de Thiaroye au Sénégal, sur l’abrogation récente du Code Noir…), la France reste en retrait par rapport à ses partenaires européens sur les questions mémorielles. Notamment sur la restitution des œuvres pillées ou spoliées durant les conquêtes coloniales. Pour l’instant, seule une trentaine de pièces ont été rendues à plusieurs pays (Bénin, Madagascar, Sénégal, Côte d’Ivoire) alors que les autres capitales européennes en sont déjà à plusieurs milliers. Il y a encore une vraie pusillanimité à regarder l’Histoire en face. En mai dernier, le Parlement français a adopté une loi-cadre sur cette question. Mais la France est-elle prête à vider ses musées si d’aventure tous les pays africains venaient à demander une restitution en masse des œuvres qui s’y trouvent ? C’est la vraie question.
L’article « Out of Africa » – 4 questions à Peer de Jong et Frédéric Lejeal est apparu en premier sur IRIS.
Credit: Andrew Caballero-Reynolds/IMF Photo
By Chie Aoyagi, Maurizio Leonardi, Athene Laws and Hamza Mighri
WASHINGTON DC, Jun 26 2026 (IPS)
For decades, official development assistance has been a central pillar of financing in sub-Saharan Africa. That pillar is now weakening—quickly and broadly.
In 2025, bilateral aid to the region fell sharply, with early estimates pointing to cuts of about 26 percent in a single year. Multilateral support is also under pressure, with major institutions projecting sizeable budget reductions. More cuts may follow as donors reset priorities in a shifting geopolitical environment.
As we explain in chapter 2 of the IMF’s recent Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa, this is not a routine fluctuation. It is hitting countries that have limited room to adjust and few alternative sources of financing.
Why aid matters
Sub-Saharan Africa had the highest aid dependency globally in 2024. On average, aid accounted for 3 percent of GDP at the regional level. But that average hid sharp differences. In low-income countries and fragile states, aid often reached the equivalent of 6 percent of GDP or more, and in some cases far higher.
Over half of that aid was used to finance essential services such as health, education, and humanitarian assistance. And because development partners and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) often deliver services directly to people in need, aid cuts can also curtail the very systems that people rely on. Effective responses to crises such as the Ebola emergency in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, the high and rising needs of people forcibly displaced by conflict, and the ongoing drought in the Horn of Africa rely heavily on the health and humanitarian infrastructure that aid has consistently helped to build.
A different reality
Aid flows have always fluctuated. But this episode stands apart.
The recent cuts are large and broadly simultaneous across countries. They are driven by donor decisions rather than changes in recipient economies. And they come at a time when traditional buffers are weaker: multilateral institutions and NGOs, which have often cushioned past declines, are themselves facing funding constraints. While non-traditional donors, such as China and the Gulf States, have grown their aid presence in the region, the magnitudes are not able to cover the reduction in traditional donors.
The cuts are also difficult to manage because they follow six years of successive shocks—including the pandemic, tighter global financial conditions, and food and energy crises—that have already eroded fiscal space.
Tough trade-offs
Governments now face difficult choices. Many have limited fiscal space, rising debt, and low reserves.
IMF-administered surveys covering 28 African countries suggest four broad policy responses:
Each option comes with trade-offs. Replacing lost aid can protect services and growth, but at the cost of wider deficits and external imbalances. Not replacing it stabilizes budgets and protects debt sustainability, but risks lasting damage to human capital and development.
There are no easy choices.
How to respond
The policy challenge is to manage the adjustment while preserving core development gains. Three priorities stand out.
First, protect and target high-impact aid.
With resources scarce, allocation matters more. Aid should be directed toward the countries and sectors where it has the greatest effect—especially low-income countries and fragile states, and essential humanitarian needs. Stronger coordination can reduce fragmentation and avoid duplication.
Second, broaden the financing toolkit.
Grant financing will remain essential, particularly in humanitarian contexts. But other instruments can play a larger role. Blended finance—using public funds to mobilize private investment—can help expand financing for infrastructure, energy, and agriculture. It is not a substitute for aid: it is harder to scale, more complex, and can add to debt if poorly designed. Managing these trade-offs will be critical.
Third, strengthen domestic capacity.
With aid less predictable, resilience increasingly depends on domestic institutions. This means mobilizing more revenue, improving spending efficiency, and strengthening policy design and service delivery. Aid has often provided both funding and implementation; replacing that capacity will take time and sustained investment.
A turning point
The shift that began in 2025 is unlikely to be temporary. It reflects a broader reconfiguration of development finance, shaped by tighter donor budgets and changing priorities.
The implications will vary by country, depending on exposure, initial buffers, and policy choices. But the direction is clear: reliance on external aid will become more uncertain, and domestic policy will matter more.
The immediate task is to manage the decline in aid without backsliding on the significant human development achievements of the past decades. The longer-term challenge is to adapt to a world where aid is less abundant and less predictable. How countries navigate both will shape growth and development outcomes for years to come.
Chie Aoyagi, Maurizio Leonardi, and Athene Laws are economists in the IMF’s African Department, where Hamza Mighri is a research analyst.
IPS UN Bureau
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By Appolinaire Djikeng
NAIROBI, Kenya, Jun 26 2026 (IPS)
Smallholder farmers in Africa and Asia are likely to still be reeling from the fuel and fertilizer crisis caused by conflict in the Middle East when what forecasters expect to be a “super” El Niño arrives later this year.
Appolinaire Djikeng
When climate extremes and conflict converge to cause crop harvests to fail, livestock will once again offer a resilient source of nutrition, organic fertilizer and incomes. But the confluence of shocks will nevertheless reverberate worldwide in everything from global food supply chains to increased migration and social tensions.Consensus is increasingly clear that tackling climate change to avert such crises is a legal duty under international law. Bringing down emissions requires both short-term and long-term action. And yet one of the most effective levers available — sustainable livestock farming — receives just 1 to 2 per cent of climate finance dedicated to agriculture. That is a vanishingly small share for a sector that, in many low- and middle-income countries, accounts for as much as 80 per cent of agricultural GDP.
This funding gap matters because livestock offer something relatively rare in climate policy: the chance to cut emissions fast while also building resilience. Methane is a more potent greenhouse gas than carbon dioxide over the short term, which means reducing it delivers quicker climate benefits.
Cattle and other livestock are among the primary sources of methane emissions. But crucially, both direct and indirect methane emissions from livestock production are often higher than necessary because of the same factors that hold back productivity. Poor animal health, low quality feed and nutrition, and climate stress all undermine production and increase both direct emissions and emission intensity. Tackling these fundamental factors solves both challenges.
In Ethiopia, for example, poor animal health has been found to increase livestock emissions by 50 per cent while also resulting in lower meat, milk and egg yields. Parasites and other vector-borne diseases increase the methane produced in animals’ guts while stunting growth and development.
Simply by applying existing tools to improve animal health, such as vaccines, drugs that kill parasites and good nutrition, research suggests that emissions could be conservatively reduced by at least 15 per cent per unit of output. The same interventions also increase productivity and improve livelihoods.
New research is also uncovering new opportunities to reduce methane from livestock while also boosting productivity and resilience.
Scientists from CGIAR research centres and partners have analysed nearly 300 forage samples and found that varieties of African clover, cowpea and lablab could reduce methane emissions by up to 90 per cent. These plants contain compounds that alter the microbes in cows’ stomachs and block the process that generates methane.
Testing is now under way to identify varieties that could be grown as low-methane feed, which not only helps reduce emissions but also supports local seed systems.
Restoring rangelands adds another layer: it helps improve forage availability to support better animal nutrition, lower methane emissions and build stronger ecosystems. Last year, for example, participatory rangeland management (PRM) was strengthened across 340,000 hectares in Ethiopia and 50,000 hectares in Tanzania, improving rangeland health and supporting livestock production.
Many more solutions exist to improve livestock sustainability for short-term and long-term gains, including those developed by the Livestock and Climate Solutions Hub. But despite growing evidence of impact from livestock interventions, climate finance continues to flow elsewhere, away from the agricultural systems that hundreds of millions of people depend on most directly.
In a post-aid world, directing more climate finance towards sustainable livestock farming in low- and middle-income countries is an investment in global stability.
Investing in more sustainable livestock production has a ripple effect that improves food security, livelihoods, and economic growth and contributes to greater stability and resilience in the face of shocks like the “super” El Niño.
Climate vulnerability is costly. Building resilience through the primary sectors of low- and middle-income countries is an insurance against future crises.
Prof. Appolinaire Djikeng is Director General of the International Livestock Research Institute
IPS UN Bureau
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By Jomo Kwame Sundaram and Nurina Malek
KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia, Jun 26 2026 (IPS)
Leadership of the Global South has gradually declined since the 1980s. Many hope BRICS+ will fill the vacuum, but its purpose and membership suggest such hopes may be misplaced. A repurposed Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) offers the best way forward.
Jomo Kwame Sundaram
Golden AgeIn 1964, developing countries formed the G77 caucus and created the UN Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) within the UN system.
In 1974, the UN General Assembly called for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) after President Nixon ended the 1944 Bretton Woods international monetary system in 1971.
In 1979, the US Fed responded to Western stagflation by sharply raising interest rates. This triggered fiscal and sovereign debt crises in Latin America and Africa, forcing many to seek IMF emergency funds to cope.
Meanwhile, the Thatcher-Reagan-inspired counter-revolution against Keynesian and development economics led to ‘neoliberal’ Washington Consensus policy reforms, deepening economic contraction.
At New York’s Plaza Hotel, the US got its G7 caucus of the world’s 7 largest allied economies to address its overvalued dollar by requiring the currencies of Japan and Germany to appreciate sharply.
Nurina Malek
G7-encouraged financial liberalisation, especially the IMF-promoted opening of national capital accounts in the 1990s, increased the frequency and impact of crises.With its legitimacy at stake following the East Asian, Russian, and other financial crises of 1997-99, G7 finance ministers agreed in 1999 to create a more inclusive G20 grouping of finance ministers of the world’s 20 largest economies.
Soon after the 2008 global (actually Western) financial crisis began, the first G20 leaders’ summit convened in the White House in November 2008.
Making BRICS
‘BRICs’ was coined in late 2001 by then-Goldman Sachs Global Economic Research head Jim O’Neill, referring to Brazil, Russia, India, and China.
Ostensibly to include Africa, the BRICs invited South Africa to join, creating BRICS as a coalition of the five more independent large ‘emerging market’ economies.
Also serving as a caucus within the G20, BRICS has tried to improve international monetary and financial relations. It has since admitted more nations into an expanded BRICS+ with two tiers of affiliation.
To be sure, neither BRICS nor BRICS+ was ever intended to represent the even more diverse interests of the entire Global South. Understandably, it serves its ‘financially significant’ developing economy members.
BRICS and the South
The BRICS promise a world less dominated by the rich and powerful nations of the Global North, mainly in the West.
The world has been dominated by the US since the end of WW2, and especially after the first Cold War. Despite occasional dissent, the US’s European NATO allies seem happy playing second fiddle.
Many developing countries have long felt that existing arrangements do not serve their best interests. The BRICS seem to offer some ‘voice’ and alternative bases for international economic cooperation.
BRICS has undoubtedly strengthened the Global South’s voice and developed new arrangements to support developing country interests, especially to finance development.
The BRICS have also advocated on specific international issues for the Global South. All five BRICS countries have also led developing-country groupings on specific issues with varying degrees of success.
Unsurprisingly, many developing countries appreciate the BRICS role in such matters, with some choosing to publicly align with and even affiliate with it.
However, the BRICS expansion into BRICS+ is unlikely to resolve many problems faced by developing nations due to international power asymmetries and imbalances.
Potential and problems
The diversity of the Global South complicates any grouping’s claim to represent it.
BRICS+ brings together countries with very different political and economic systems, priorities and aspirations, including development goals and interests.
This diversity enhances BRICS’ broad appeal but also makes it difficult to ensure it becomes an effective platform consistently advocating all developing nations’ interests.
This challenge becomes more apparent when the interests and ambitions of weaker developing countries are compared with those of the major BRICS+ powers.
Many vulnerable nations are preoccupied with food security, structural change, deindustrialisation, environmental sustainability, planetary heating, and financialization.
Meanwhile, BRICS members seek to pursue their own strategic interests, garner finance and investments, boost their exports and increase their influence internationally.
Such objectives are not inherently contradictory, but rarely fully aligned. This makes it more difficult to pursue shared interests, advocate collectively, and sustain cooperation.
BRICS+ membership by invitation also limits its effective accountability to the Global South. It is unrealistic to expect BRICS+ to consistently advocate for the full range of concerns of all developing countries, especially the poorest and least influential.
The Global South should undoubtedly try to benefit from the economic weight and voice of BRICS+. But it can best advance its shared interests with its own voice and organised strength via a revived NAM, repurposed for peace, development and justice.
IPS UN Bureau
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