Biztonságpolitika

How does international assistance impact public attitudes towards donors in the recipient country when tied to strategic interests? European leaders increasingly highlight the strategic and transactional nature of international assistance. Yet, we still do not know much about how such shifts in the framing of international assistance are perceived by the recipient public, especially in contexts with prevalent anti-Western attitudes and propaganda that dismisses aid as hypocritical and disingenuous. I conducted an online survey experiment in Turkey to assess the attitudinal and quasi-behavioural effects of different types of international assistance post-disaster – conditional, unconditional, and strategic – and whether they help sway public attitudes in the face of authoritarian propaganda. Strategically distributed humanitarian aid decreased trust in the government as a defender of national interest among conservative, nationalist and Eurosceptic regime supporters, and also increased trust in European organisations. It did so partly by mitigating conspiracism and evoking positive emotions among pro-government voters whose views are hard to change. However, this comes at a cost: increased trade scepticism and decreased engagement with foreign media outlets among regime opponents. The findings have significant implications for international assistance strategies for increasing European soft power.  

Governance theories offer a useful approach to policy by highlighting the need for multi-actor, multi-sectoral, and multi-level cooperation to deal with complex problems. Digitalisation, on the other hand, can be a means for managing networks, for helping to maintain the dynamics of meta-governance, and for generating problem-solving strategies based on knowledge exchange. Both seem to imply each other: governance requires tools to foster collaboration through the development of common understandings of problems, for which digitalisation can be instrumental. Effective digitalisation should foster governmental, social, and private steering towards public service, transparency, and the improvement of accountability. Digitalisation appears to require some basic conditions of governance related to fair access to services; beliefs and narratives that promote cooperation; processes of co-creation; and the interchange of information, as well as operative regulatory institutions. Governance and digitalisation together are fundamental for the management of complex policy problems. 
The aim of this Discussion Paper is theory advancement and refinement, linking assumptions about governance theories – particularly those resulting from the three waves of governance – to those of mainstream digitalisation literature. It formulates a research agenda to explore the possible mutual repercussions of those literature developments. The Discussion Paper is neither mainly descriptive nor prescriptive, but develops certain implications that stem from some fundamental problems of governance – defined as a process of multi-actor, multi-sector, multi-level cooperation – and digitalisation. The research agenda is presented in the form of conjectures relevant to the Mexican case, related to the roles, functions, and expected results of different actors dealing with governance problems within the context of increased digitalisation. The conjectures advance possible research areas related to the role of digitalisation in meta-governance carried out by governmental actors; in those of network cooperation maintained by academic institutions; in the improvement of problem-solving by non-governmental organisations; and in the possible co-creation of new knowledge through information-based interactions by the media.

Francisco Porras is a professor and full-time research fellow at the Mora Research Institute (Instituto Mora), Mexico City.

Development is a complex phenomenon that involves economic, social, and environmental transformations. In recent decades, sustainable development (SD) has gained prominence as a policy objective, emphasizing balanced progress in economic growth, social inclusion, and environmental protection. However, measuring SD progress remains challenging, given the need to consider such multiple dimensions, which often show trade-offs; this is especially true in developing countries such as Peru, where rapid socioeconomic changes coexist with environmental degradation. Traditional metrics, such as GDP or composite indicators such as the Human Development Index, often fail to capture the multidimensional and dynamic nature of SD, especially in terms of the environmental side. This paper employs a multivariate latent Markov model (LMM) to assess Peru's progress toward SD from 2004 to 2017, incorporating economic, social, and environmental indicators. LMMs are advantageous, as they account for unobserved heterogeneity and state transitions between sustainability levels over time, offering a nuanced understanding of SD dynamics. Our findings reveal that while Peru experienced economic and social improvements during the study period, the inclusion of environmental factors in the SD measure curbs overall progress, highlighting potential trade-offs between poverty reduction and environmental quality. The results underscore the importance of integrating environmental considerations into SD strategies, particularly in the context of rapid economic growth. This study contributes methodologically by applying a dynamic and data-driven approach to measuring SD and provides valuable information on the interaction among its dimensions.

Bonn, 1. September 2025. Deutschland und die Europäische Union verfolgen ehrgeizige Strategien zur Dekarbonisierung ihrer Gesellschaften, mit Wasserstoff als Energieträger und Rohstoff für industrielle Prozesse. Im Einklang mit den Klimazielen muss der verwendete Wasserstoff in kohlenstoffarmen Verfahren hergestellt werden. Idealerweise ist dies grüner Wasserstoff, der durch Elektrolyse unter ausschließlicher Verwendung erneuerbarer Energien gewonnen wird. In dem lange vorherrschenden optimistischen Diskurs wäre die globale Versorgung mit Energieträgern künftig nicht mehr an die vorhandenen Öl-, Gas- oder Kohlevorkommen gebunden. Vielmehr könnte Wasserstoff überall dort hergestellt werden, wo ein gutes Potenzial für Wind-, Solar- oder Geothermie besteht. Dies würde neue Möglichkeiten für Länder mit niedrigem und mittlerem Einkommen eröffnen. Die in den Strategien festgelegten Ziele sind sehr ehrgeizig. In der Wasserstoffstrategie von 2023 rechnet Deutschland für 2030 mit einer Elektrolyseurkapazität von 10 GW. Da dies nicht ausreichen würde, um die erforderlichen Mengen an H2 zu produzieren, könnten Importe 50 % bis 70 % des gesamten Wasserstoffbedarfs decken.

Fünf Jahre nach Veröffentlichung der Wasserstoffstrategien ist die Euphorie der Enttäuschung gewichen. In Deutschland waren bis zum ersten Quartal 2025 nur 170 MW Elektrolysekapazität installiert worden, und das Ziel von 10 GW bis 2030 gilt als nicht mehr erreichbar. Aus internationaler Sicht ist die Lage nicht besser. Laut der Internationalen Energieagentur haben derzeit nur etwa 7 % aller weltweiten Wasserstoffprojekte eine endgültige Investitionsentscheidung durchlaufen und werden daher wahrscheinlich umgesetzt.

In den letzten Monaten gab es zahlreiche Berichte über gestrichene H2-Projekte. Dies betrifft alle Elemente der Lieferkette: Im Juli 2025 stoppte das spanische Energieunternehmen REPSOL ein 200-MW-Projekt in einer Raffinerie in Puertollano, eines der größten geplanten H2-Projekte in Europa. Monate zuvor hatten Equinor (Norwegen) und RWE (Deutschland) ihre gemeinsamen Pläne für eine Wasserstoffpipeline durch die Nordsee annulliert. Diese Pipeline hätte eine zuverlässige Versorgung von Industriekunden in Deutschland und Europa mit Wasserstoff ermöglicht. Kürzlich lehnte der zweitgrößte Stahlproduzent der Welt, ArcelorMittal, ein Angebot der deutschen Regierung ab, mehr als eine Milliarde Euro an Subventionen für die Dekarbonisierung von zwei Stahlwerken zu beziehen. Das Unternehmen sieht die langfristige Versorgung mit Wasserstoff als unsicher an und befürchtet, dass grüne Technologien ihm einen Wettbewerbsnachteil gegenüber internationalen Konkurrenten verschaffen könnten.

Es gibt viele Gründe für die strukturelle Krise beim Ausbau der Wasserstoffwirtschaft. Besorgniserregend ist, dass die beteiligten Unternehmen nicht nur weiche Faktoren (wie unklare Vorschriften) anführen, die bei entsprechenden politischen Willen schnell überwunden werden könnten. Vielmehr argumentieren sie mit den wirtschaftlichen Grundlagen der H2-Wertschöpfungsketten: Wasserstoff ist nach wie vor deutlich teurer als fossile Brennstoffe wie Erdgas. Potenzielle Kunden sind nicht bereit oder in der Lage, für Wasserstoff deutlich höhere Preise zu zahlen als für weniger klimafreundliche Alternativen. Darüber hinaus sind mehrere Elemente der Wasserstoffversorgungsketten technologisch noch nicht ausgereift, wie beispielsweise das Cracken von Ammoniak, um den Transport von H2 in Form eines besser geeigneten Derivats zu ermöglichen.

Trotz all dieser Schwierigkeiten gehen wir davon aus, dass H2 eine Zukunft hat und sich ein Wasserstoffmarkt entwickeln wird, sobald die Umsetzungslücke überwunden werden kann. Die meisten Länder fühlen sich an ihre Klimaschutzverpflichtungen gebunden, und einige Sektoren können ohne Wasserstoff als Energieträger oder Rohstoff kaum dekarbonisiert werden. Darüber hinaus wird die angewandte technische Forschung fortgesetzt, mit dem Potenzial, den Wasserstoffausbau wieder auf die Tagesordnung zu setzen.

Wie sollten Länder mit niedrigem und mittlerem Einkommen und die internationale Zusammenarbeit auf den aktuellen „Wasserstoff-Limbo“ reagieren? Eine abwartende Haltung würde unnötig Zeit kosten. Sinnvoll ist, die Umsetzung von H2-Projekten fortzusetzen und sich dabei auf H2-basierte Lösungen für Herausforderungen der nachhaltigen Entwicklung zu konzentrieren. Zwei Beispiele: 1) Wasserstoff kann zur Dekarbonisierung der Düngemittelindustrie beitragen. Eine dezentrale Düngemittelproduktion auf Basis von emissionsarmem Wasserstoff kann die Ernährungssicherheit in Afrika unterstützen, Treibhausgasemissionen reduzieren und zur Weiterentwicklung der Wasserstofftechnologien beitragen. 2) Als Alternative zur Elektrolyse kann Wasserstoff aus Abwasser gewonnen werden, z. B. durch Fermentation. Dadurch können Umweltbelastungen (z. B. die Eutrophierung von Gewässern) und Gesundheitsrisiken im Zusammenhang mit städtischen Abwässern verringert werden.

Werden verschiedene Entwicklungsziele gleichzeitig verfolgt, verlieren die Kostenunterschiede zwischen Wasserstoff und konventionellen Technologien an Bedeutung. Die skizzierten alternativen Technologien sollten in Forschungspartnerschaften mit dem Globalen Süden entwickelt werden; als wichtiger Bestandteil einer multilateralen Wasserstoffstrategie zur Bewältigung globaler Herausforderungen.

Die Unterstützung des Wiederaufbaus in der Ukraine hat sich seit dem Frühjahr 2022 als wichtiges Element der deutschen Ukraine-Politik herausgebildet. Aufseiten der Bundesregierung hat die Unterstützung des Wiederaufbaus – auch als wesentlicher Teil der zivilen Kriegsunterstützung für das Land – eine hohe Priorität, insbesondere für das in vielen Aspekten federführend tätige BMZ. Gleichzeitig geht das deutsche Engagement für den Wiederaufbau in der Ukraine weit über die Unterstützung durch die Bundesregierung hinaus. Von zivilgesellschaftlichen Organisationen hin zu Städten und Gemeinden gibt es eine große Solidarität mit der ukrainischen Gesellschaft und ihrem unbändigen Willen, das Land gegen die russische Aggression zu verteidigen und schnellstmöglich wieder aufzubauen. Vom weiteren Verlauf des Krieges wird abhängen, wie sich der Wiederaufbau und damit auch seine Unterstützung von Partnern wie Deutschland zukünftig gestalten wird. Unabhängig von den nächsten Kriegsmonaten ist jedoch bereits jetzt klar, dass der Wiederaufbau der Ukraine langfristige internationale Unterstützung über mehrere Jahre erfordern wird. Der Beitrag zeichnet die bisherigen Debatten und Weichenstellungen zum Wiederaufbau der Ukraine systematisch nach und untersucht, wie Deutschland und die Europäische Union den Wiederaufbau bisher unterstützt haben. In einer Bewertung dieses Engagements wird auch ein Blick auf die Herausforderungen und möglichen Grenzen des deutschen und internationalen Engagements geworfen.

Die Unterstützung des Wiederaufbaus in der Ukraine hat sich seit dem Frühjahr 2022 als wichtiges Element der deutschen Ukraine-Politik herausgebildet. Aufseiten der Bundesregierung hat die Unterstützung des Wiederaufbaus – auch als wesentlicher Teil der zivilen Kriegsunterstützung für das Land – eine hohe Priorität, insbesondere für das in vielen Aspekten federführend tätige BMZ. Gleichzeitig geht das deutsche Engagement für den Wiederaufbau in der Ukraine weit über die Unterstützung durch die Bundesregierung hinaus. Von zivilgesellschaftlichen Organisationen hin zu Städten und Gemeinden gibt es eine große Solidarität mit der ukrainischen Gesellschaft und ihrem unbändigen Willen, das Land gegen die russische Aggression zu verteidigen und schnellstmöglich wieder aufzubauen. Vom weiteren Verlauf des Krieges wird abhängen, wie sich der Wiederaufbau und damit auch seine Unterstützung von Partnern wie Deutschland zukünftig gestalten wird. Unabhängig von den nächsten Kriegsmonaten ist jedoch bereits jetzt klar, dass der Wiederaufbau der Ukraine langfristige internationale Unterstützung über mehrere Jahre erfordern wird. Der Beitrag zeichnet die bisherigen Debatten und Weichenstellungen zum Wiederaufbau der Ukraine systematisch nach und untersucht, wie Deutschland und die Europäische Union den Wiederaufbau bisher unterstützt haben. In einer Bewertung dieses Engagements wird auch ein Blick auf die Herausforderungen und möglichen Grenzen des deutschen und internationalen Engagements geworfen.

Why do business allies (not) defect from authoritarian regimes? An emerging scholarship shows that connected businesses face high political risk, and the autocrat can financially pressure business allies during economic crises. And yet, despite their disruptive power, the business elite rarely switch to opposition. I argue that this unexpected loyalty does not always stem from credible power-sharing. The more material quid pro quo the business elite engage in with the dictator, the less they can credibly threaten the dictator with defection. I present a bargaining game between the dictatorship and its business allies and test it using a country-year-level dataset of 76 countries for 1992–2019. The results indicate that higher degrees of patrimonial co-optation lower the risk of business opposition. This effect is partly mediated through the government’s control over the media landscape. These findings suggest that even informal, non-institutional tools of co-optation can effectively deter defection.

Why do business allies (not) defect from authoritarian regimes? An emerging scholarship shows that connected businesses face high political risk, and the autocrat can financially pressure business allies during economic crises. And yet, despite their disruptive power, the business elite rarely switch to opposition. I argue that this unexpected loyalty does not always stem from credible power-sharing. The more material quid pro quo the business elite engage in with the dictator, the less they can credibly threaten the dictator with defection. I present a bargaining game between the dictatorship and its business allies and test it using a country-year-level dataset of 76 countries for 1992–2019. The results indicate that higher degrees of patrimonial co-optation lower the risk of business opposition. This effect is partly mediated through the government’s control over the media landscape. These findings suggest that even informal, non-institutional tools of co-optation can effectively deter defection.

Török VIP-helikopter, a TCCB-1 lajstromú S-92 az erkélyről, útban Prágából. 

Zord

Russia considers multilateralism to be an instrument for promoting and managing multipolarity. It regards the UN as an important component of the international system and would like to see it reflect a multipolar world order, which in Russia’s rhetoric is marked by the dominance of principles of sovereignty and non-interference. This shapes Russia’s approach to the UN development pillar, where it seeks to advance its geopolitical interests, including countering Western influence.
Financially, Russia remains a marginal player in the UN development pillar. Between 2018 and 2022, it was the smallest contributor to UN development activities among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (P5) and ranked 23rd among all UN member states. In terms of international professional staff, the share of Russian nationals in the UN system has remained below 1 per cent over the past five years, with the majority concentrated in the UN Secretariat. However, its diplomatic missions – particularly in New York and Geneva – are relatively well-staffed and are recognised for their diplomatic skills and expertise.
Lacking prominent material weight, Russia leverages diplomatic and rhetorical tools to project its power. It portrays itself as an “anti-colonial leader” and champion of the Global South. Russia positions itself as an advocate of an alternative approach to development cooperation, affirming in its rhetoric that developing countries have the right to independently choose their model of socio-economic development without external influence or pressure. In line with this, it rejects the imposition of what it argues are Western liberal values on developing states – which it equates with conditionality in development assistance and infringement on sovereignty – and presents itself as a defender of what in Russian discourse are referred to as “traditional values”, which are usually in opposition to individualism and progressivism.
Although Russia’s arguments resonate among Global South states – because they tap into legitimate grievances – there are cases in which its rhetoric appears instrumental and does not match its practices.
While Russia’s material capacity to project its power and position itself as an alternative development partner is limited, its diplomatic efforts, rhetoric and ability to capitalise on the grievances of the Global South as well as Western double standards amid global power shifts position it as a noticeable actor in UN development work, suggesting it should not be prematurely disregarded based on its modest role as a donor.
Main takeaways:
• Strategic use of UN development pillar: Russia engages in UN development work as a platform to advance its broader geopolitical objectives and its view of the international system, including positioning itself rhetorically as a counterweight to Western influence. While already politicised to some extent, this further reinforces the role of UN development work as a stage for power politics.
• Diplomatic leverage: Although Russia’s material weight in UN development pillar is modest, it uses diplomatic channels and discursive engagement in decision-making processes across UN entities and fora to pursue its interests.
• Anti-colonial narratives and normative contestation: Russia rhetorically appeals to the grievances of the Global South and challenges Western-driven norms and approaches to development. It promotes the vision of a multipolar world order with Moscow as one of the poles of power.

Russia considers multilateralism to be an instrument for promoting and managing multipolarity. It regards the UN as an important component of the international system and would like to see it reflect a multipolar world order, which in Russia’s rhetoric is marked by the dominance of principles of sovereignty and non-interference. This shapes Russia’s approach to the UN development pillar, where it seeks to advance its geopolitical interests, including countering Western influence.
Financially, Russia remains a marginal player in the UN development pillar. Between 2018 and 2022, it was the smallest contributor to UN development activities among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (P5) and ranked 23rd among all UN member states. In terms of international professional staff, the share of Russian nationals in the UN system has remained below 1 per cent over the past five years, with the majority concentrated in the UN Secretariat. However, its diplomatic missions – particularly in New York and Geneva – are relatively well-staffed and are recognised for their diplomatic skills and expertise.
Lacking prominent material weight, Russia leverages diplomatic and rhetorical tools to project its power. It portrays itself as an “anti-colonial leader” and champion of the Global South. Russia positions itself as an advocate of an alternative approach to development cooperation, affirming in its rhetoric that developing countries have the right to independently choose their model of socio-economic development without external influence or pressure. In line with this, it rejects the imposition of what it argues are Western liberal values on developing states – which it equates with conditionality in development assistance and infringement on sovereignty – and presents itself as a defender of what in Russian discourse are referred to as “traditional values”, which are usually in opposition to individualism and progressivism.
Although Russia’s arguments resonate among Global South states – because they tap into legitimate grievances – there are cases in which its rhetoric appears instrumental and does not match its practices.
While Russia’s material capacity to project its power and position itself as an alternative development partner is limited, its diplomatic efforts, rhetoric and ability to capitalise on the grievances of the Global South as well as Western double standards amid global power shifts position it as a noticeable actor in UN development work, suggesting it should not be prematurely disregarded based on its modest role as a donor.
Main takeaways:
• Strategic use of UN development pillar: Russia engages in UN development work as a platform to advance its broader geopolitical objectives and its view of the international system, including positioning itself rhetorically as a counterweight to Western influence. While already politicised to some extent, this further reinforces the role of UN development work as a stage for power politics.
• Diplomatic leverage: Although Russia’s material weight in UN development pillar is modest, it uses diplomatic channels and discursive engagement in decision-making processes across UN entities and fora to pursue its interests.
• Anti-colonial narratives and normative contestation: Russia rhetorically appeals to the grievances of the Global South and challenges Western-driven norms and approaches to development. It promotes the vision of a multipolar world order with Moscow as one of the poles of power.

1. Nature-based Solutions (NbS) have been gaining prominence across the Rio Conventions primarily as a means of addressing climate change with co-benefits for nature and humans. However, they have also faced significant criticism for enabling greenwashing, encouraging market-driven approaches and not addressing the root causes of environmental degradation. Some critics argue that NbS divert attention from urgent transformative actions such as decarbonisation and systemic economic reforms.

2. We present the case for a broader framework, centred around the concept of Integrated Nature-Climate Action (INCA), which extends beyond NbS to drive the structural changes essential for tackling climate change, biodiversity loss and desertification, while delivering positive outcomes such as supporting livelihoods, addressing inequities and upholding the rights of Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities. We provide examples of INCAs with significant, tractable benefits for people and nature, including the removal of environmentally harmful subsidies, land rights recognition and circular economic transitions.

3. We argue that the wide range of actors mobilised by INCAs would increase the finance available to fill the deficit for climate and biodiversity action. While tracking the impact of these actions could be challenging, existing United Nations (UN) initiatives could provide models for ensuring the integrity of INCA. A clear definition and set of standards must also be agreed upon to avoid the pitfalls that plague NbS. Careful oversight from stakeholders and rightsholders is vital to ensure legitimacy and that the uptake of INCA does not favour one outcome over others.

4. Policy implications: Moving beyond NbS to pursue an inclusive INCA concept can help address the systemic drivers of the global polycrisis. With synergies between the Rio Conventions expected to be a key focus of the upcoming Conference of the Parties for the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP30), there is a clear policy window to broaden the scope of interventions relevant to all three conventions and engage a more diverse array of actors to support enhanced coordination. This is essential for transitioning towards a regenerative economic system that works for people and the planet.

1. Nature-based Solutions (NbS) have been gaining prominence across the Rio Conventions primarily as a means of addressing climate change with co-benefits for nature and humans. However, they have also faced significant criticism for enabling greenwashing, encouraging market-driven approaches and not addressing the root causes of environmental degradation. Some critics argue that NbS divert attention from urgent transformative actions such as decarbonisation and systemic economic reforms.

2. We present the case for a broader framework, centred around the concept of Integrated Nature-Climate Action (INCA), which extends beyond NbS to drive the structural changes essential for tackling climate change, biodiversity loss and desertification, while delivering positive outcomes such as supporting livelihoods, addressing inequities and upholding the rights of Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities. We provide examples of INCAs with significant, tractable benefits for people and nature, including the removal of environmentally harmful subsidies, land rights recognition and circular economic transitions.

3. We argue that the wide range of actors mobilised by INCAs would increase the finance available to fill the deficit for climate and biodiversity action. While tracking the impact of these actions could be challenging, existing United Nations (UN) initiatives could provide models for ensuring the integrity of INCA. A clear definition and set of standards must also be agreed upon to avoid the pitfalls that plague NbS. Careful oversight from stakeholders and rightsholders is vital to ensure legitimacy and that the uptake of INCA does not favour one outcome over others.

4. Policy implications: Moving beyond NbS to pursue an inclusive INCA concept can help address the systemic drivers of the global polycrisis. With synergies between the Rio Conventions expected to be a key focus of the upcoming Conference of the Parties for the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP30), there is a clear policy window to broaden the scope of interventions relevant to all three conventions and engage a more diverse array of actors to support enhanced coordination. This is essential for transitioning towards a regenerative economic system that works for people and the planet.

Egy együléses vadászgép esetében nem kérdés, hogy aki a fülkében ül, az csakis a gép pilótája lehet, de más a helyzet, ha többen is vannak a fedélzeten. Az amerikai haditengerészet (US Navy) és tengerészgyalogság (Marines) esetében elég egy pillantást vetni az egyenruha vagy az overall bal felső részére és a jelvény azonnal megmondja, hogy viselője milyen beosztásban dolgozik egy repülőgép vagy helikopter fedélzetén.

A pilótajelvények története szinte egyidős a repülőgép katonai célú felhasználásával. Hiába gondolták a Wright fivérek, hogy valami olyat alkottak, amely megakadályozza az újabb háborúkat, a valóság nem is állhatott volna távolabb a derék úttörők alapgondolatától. Nem sok idő kellett ahhoz sem, hogy a levegő harcosai először alegységeiket, majd magukat is jelvényekkel különböztessék meg mindenki mástól. A századjelvények esetében a legkülönbözőbb megoldások születtek, a pilótajelvényeknél pedig a szárny lett a közös pont.

Az amerikai haditengerészeti repülés elmúlt több mint száz évében megannyi jelvényt hoztak létre a különböző beosztásokhoz. Szárnyas kitűzőt viselhettek a ballonpilóták, repülőorvosok, ápolónők, logisztikusok, megfigyelők, meteorológusok, ejtőernyősök és a haditengerészeti háttérrel rendelkező űrhajósok is. Néhány még ma is rendszerben van, de elsősorban három aranyszárny a meghatározó. Ezeket viselik a tiszti rendfokozatú haditengerészeti pilóták (Naval Aviator) és haditengerészeti repülőtisztek (Naval Flight Officer) valamint a legénységi állományú hajózók (Aircrew), akik a repülőgépek és helikopterek fedélzetén szolgálnak. Legyen bármilyen a szárny, közös vonásuk, hogy egyiket sem adják könnyen és megszerzésük, ha vérrel nem is, de verítékkel és esetenként könnyekkel jár. Írásomban e három, sokak által áhított és kevesek által megszerzett jelvény rövid történetéről lesz szó.

[...] Bővebben!

An Asian mother is taking care of her baby while cooking with traditional stove. Approximately one billion people in Asia and the Pacific still rely on traditional polluting cooking fuels that lead to poor indoor air quality. Credit: Unsplash/Quang Nguyen Vinh

By Armida Salsiah Alisjahbana
BANGKOK, Thailand, Aug 28 2025 (IPS)

The future of the global energy landscape will be shaped by Asia and the Pacific. Over the past two decades, our region has been the principal driver of global energy demand and emissions. Energy has powered prosperity, lifted millions out of poverty and transformed societies.

This progress, however, has come at a cost: widening inequalities, entrenched fossil fuel dependencies and increasing climate vulnerability – which make achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and climate objectives challenging.

The gaps we must close

What will it truly take for the region to realize the energy transition and achieve SDG 7 – clean, affordable, reliable and modern energy for all – by 2030? The new Regional Trends Report on Energy for Sustainable Development shows that universal access to electricity is within reach. Yet other dimensions of sustainable energy require urgent acceleration.

Clean cooking remains the most pressing challenge. Nearly one billion people in Asia and the Pacific still rely on traditional fuels, exposing households – especially women and children – to dangerous levels of indoor air pollution. Renewable energy is growing, although the pace still falls short of what is needed to meet rising demand and lower emissions at the scale required.

Per capita, Asia and the Pacific’s installed renewable energy capacity remains lower than in other parts of the world. At the same time, energy efficiency continues to be underutilized, leaving untapped potential to reduce consumption, lower energy costs and reduce carbon emissions.

These challenges are compounded by emerging pressures. Securing access to and sustainably developing critical raw materials is essential for advancing energy transitions, while expanded regional power grid connectivity is crucial to improving energy security and keeping electricity affordable.

Rapidly growing sectors, such as data centres, also need to shift toward low-carbon pathways. Meeting these priorities will demand strategic planning, coordinated action and a strong commitment to fairness and equity.

Emerging momentum

The Asia-Pacific region is showing encouraging signs in recent years with many emerging initiatives to draw inspiration from. Subregional initiatives, including the ASEAN Power Grid and the Nepal-India-Bangladesh trilateral power trade, are fostering cross-border electricity exchanges, improving reliability and enabling greater renewable integration.

China and India are at the forefront of renewables, while Pacific countries such as Fiji, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu have set targets for 100 per cent renewable electricity by 2030. Indonesia and the Philippines are expanding geothermal capacity. Grid-scale battery storage in Australia is helping manage renewable fluctuations and strengthen system resilience.

Industries, urban centres and the transport sector are also driving change. Countries are rapidly expanding the adoption of electric vehicles through investment and infrastructure. Japan and Singapore are improving building energy efficiency with strict standards and incentive programmes, and the Republic of Korea is deploying smart grid technologies to optimize usage.

These examples illustrate that innovation, investment and cooperation are creating the conditions for scalable energy progress across the region.

A just transition for all

The energy transition is not only a technological shift, but also a social transformation. For many such as workers in fossil fuel industries, those in energy-poor households and youths entering the job market, the transition will be a lived reality. Reskilling, education and social protection must accompany this shift, while creating decent jobs in the renewable and energy efficiency sectors.

Women are disproportionately affected by energy poverty and remain underrepresented in the energy workforce and decision-making roles. Unlocking women’s full participation in the sector is needed to accelerate innovation and inclusive growth. A just energy transition must be gender-responsive, with policies and investments designed to close gaps in access, employment and leadership.

Turning ambition into action

Three ingredients stand out:

1. Ambition in policy and planning. Countries need bold, integrated policies that align national energy plans with climate commitments, including net-zero targets. This means setting higher renewable energy ambitions, phasing down coal dependency, embedding energy efficiency into every sector, and ensuring policies are just and inclusive.
2. Scaled-up investment. Delivering SDG 7 requires mobilizing trillions in sustainable energy investment. Governments alone cannot bear this burden. De-risking mechanisms, innovative financing and public-private partnerships will be critical to unlock capital flows.
3. Regional cooperation. Regional grid integration and cross-border power trade, and shared approaches to the development of critical energy transition minerals and technology standards can create efficiencies and resilience.

The region has shown that transformative change is possible. Just twenty years ago, hundreds of millions lacked access to electricity. Today, universal access is within reach, proving that the seemingly insurmountable gaps in clean cooking, renewable deployment and efficiency can be overcome with decisive political will and bold action.

As Asia-Pacific countries gather in September at the ESCAP Committee on Energy, the message is clear: we must act with urgency, ambition and solidarity, or risk being locked in high-carbon pathways. The decisions made in the coming years will define the region’s energy future well beyond 2030.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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Armida Salsiah Alisjahbana is United Nations Under-Secretary-General and Executive Secretary of ESCAP

A report ‘Oil and Gas Expansion in the Colombian Amazon: Navigating Risks, Economics, and Pathways to a Sustainable Future, warns oil and gas projects threaten over 483,000 km² of Colombian Amazon forest, home to more than 70 indigenous groups, and risk becoming stranded assets as global fossil fuel demand declines.

By Umar Manzoor Shah
BOGOTÁ and SRINAGAR, India, Aug 27 2025 (IPS)

A report has warned that Colombia’s push to expand oil and gas exploration in the Amazon risks undermining environmental goals, Indigenous rights, and long-term economic stability, unless the government pivots toward sustainable development pathways.

The study, “Oil and Gas Expansion in the Colombian Amazon: Navigating Risks, Economics, and Pathways to a Sustainable Future”, lays out the stakes for one of the planet’s most biodiverse and climate-critical regions.

Colombia’s Amazon region, covering nearly one-third of the country, is not only a biodiversity hotspot but also home to hundreds of indigenous communities and vast carbon-storing forests. Yet beneath its soils lie oil and gas reserves that the government and industry see as potential drivers of energy security and economic growth.

According to the report released by Earth Insight, the International Institute of Sustainable Development (IISD), and the National Organisation of Indigenous Peoples of the Colombian Amazon (OPIAC), the national government has in recent years signalled openness to further exploration and production in the Amazon, despite its public commitments to environmental protection and the global push to decarbonise.

“The Colombian Amazon is at a crossroads. The decisions taken in the next few years will either lock in a path of fossil fuel dependency and ecosystem degradation or open the door to a sustainable, diversified economy,” reads the report.

Oil and gas operations in the Amazon, the report warns, could trigger cascading ecological consequences. Roads and seismic lines fragment forests; drilling operations risk oil spills; and increased human access often accelerates deforestation and wildlife loss. “Infrastructure associated with oil and gas projects tends to create long-lasting environmental footprints that extend far beyond the drilling sites themselves,” the authors claim.

The Amazon is already under stress from illegal mining, logging, and agricultural expansion. Adding industrial petroleum activity could push ecosystems toward tipping points, including irreversible shifts in forest cover and carbon balance.

Ignacio Arroniz Velasco, Senior Associate for Nature & Climate Diplomacy at Earth Insight, told IPS news that the Amazon is an integrated ecosystem. As of 2022, according to The Amazonia 80×2025 Initiative, preserving 80 percent of the Amazon by 2025 was still possible with urgent measures to safeguard the 74 percent (629 million hectares) of the Amazon that are Intact Key Priority Areas (33 percent) and with Low Degradation (41 percent); and restoring 6 percent (54 million hectares) of land with high degradation is vital to stop the current trend.

“Although still under threat from industrial expansion, ca. 80 percent of the Colombian Amazon is preserved; however, unless other Amazon countries do the same, the whole ecosystem could collapse. This would mean a shortage of food supplies, medicine (stable forest), and water (water productivity and headwaters). As well as the regulation of floods (aquatic systems) and areas with the highest carbon stock for climate stability,” Velasco told IPS.

Proponents argue that oil and gas projects could generate royalties, jobs, and infrastructure for remote areas. But the report questions whether these benefits outweigh the long-term costs. “Global demand for fossil fuels is projected to decline as the world accelerates toward net-zero emissions. New investments in oil and gas risk becoming stranded assets before they recoup their costs,” it warns.

According to Pablo Jamioy from OPIAC, enforcing environmental protections in the Colombian Amazon in the face of armed groups and illegal economies is a major challenge that cannot be addressed solely through repressive measures, as these tend to increase local tensions and negatively affect communities, especially indigenous peoples.

“The reality is that without first guaranteeing basic conditions for well-being—such as security, access to health services, education, and legal economic opportunities—and without strengthening local governance, particularly the leadership and territorial rights of indigenous peoples, any attempt at environmental control is likely to generate conflict and resistance.”

Jamioy told IPS that from a realistic perspective, a comprehensive, long-term strategy is needed that combines effective state presence with inclusive policies that respect and empower Amazonian communities. “Only in this way can illegal economies be discouraged and the influence of armed actors reduced without exacerbating social tensions,” he said, adding that in this sense, environmental protection necessarily involves strengthening local capacities, recognising the importance of indigenous knowledge systems in conservation, and promoting sustainable development models that link the care of nature with real improvements in living conditions in the region.

The authors stress that the volatility of oil prices and the finite nature of reserves make heavy dependence on fossil fuels a risky economic bet for Colombia. They also point out that historically, resource extraction in remote regions has delivered limited lasting benefits for local communities.

Beyond economics, the expansion raises deep concerns for indigenous peoples, who have constitutionally protected rights to their lands and resources. The report documents cases where extractive projects proceeded without adequate consultation, undermining the principle of consulta previa (prior consultation) required by Colombian law and International Labour Organization Convention 169. “Indigenous territories, when respected and supported, are among the most effective barriers to deforestation. Disregarding their rights for short-term gains would be both unjust and environmentally counterproductive,” the report notes.

Communities fear that oil and gas activity will disrupt traditional livelihoods, pollute rivers, and erode cultural heritage. Many have voiced opposition, warning that once exploration begins, social and environmental change becomes difficult to reverse.

Colombia has pledged to achieve net-zero deforestation by 2030 and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions under its Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to the Paris Agreement. Yet the licensing of new oil and gas blocks in the Amazon appears at odds with these goals.

Velasco said that Colombia has not issued new exploration licences under the current government. It has also lowered its deforestation rate to record low levels, although this latter trend was recently reversed. “Both achievements place Colombia at the very top of the world’s climate and environmental leaders. However, millions of hectares of the Colombian Amazon are still threatened by oil and gas blocks that have not been licensed to investors yet. These “available” blocks would allow future Colombian governments to undo all the hard-earned progress and issue new fossil fuel licenses in the Amazon.”

According to Velasco, to avoid this economic, social and ecological risk in the Amazon, the current Colombian government could choose to permanently remove the unlicensed blocks from its official records. He said that the report suggests different pathways to achieve this, such as via new national legislation, administrative acts grounded on Colombia’s international commitments, expanding natural protected areas or legally recognising more Indigenous territories.

The report identifies governance gaps, including insufficient enforcement of environmental safeguards, lack of transparent data on exploration plans, and inadequate inter-agency coordination. “Without coherent policy alignment, Colombia risks pursuing mutually incompatible objectives — expanding fossil fuel extraction while professing climate leadership,” the authors write.

The report goes beyond merely calling for a halt to oil and gas expansion by presenting concrete alternatives such as expanding renewable energy in non-Amazonian regions, investing in sustainable forest economies, and directing state resources toward rural development that aligns with conservation goals. Key recommendations include strengthening land tenure for indigenous and rural communities to improve forest stewardship, redirecting subsidies from fossil fuels to clean energy and low-impact livelihoods, enhancing environmental monitoring with community participation, and ensuring that all projects in indigenous territories prioritize free, prior, and informed consent.

Pablo Jamioy from OPIAC told IPS News that one of the fundamental mechanisms for strengthening free, prior, and informed consent in indigenous territories in Colombia is to guarantee the legal formalisation of territories requested for collective titling, as well as ancestral territories that have been subject to protection and recovery strategies from Amazonian indigenous peoples. These territories, according to Jamioy, must be recognised under special conservation categories and be subject to their own environmental governance systems. “In addition, it is necessary to implement and ensure the recognition and effective exercise of indigenous environmental authorities, in accordance with Decree 1275 of 2024, which recognises their environmental competencies to consolidate their own systems of administration and use of the territory based on ancestral knowledge.”

He added that it is essential to implement Decree 488 of 2025, “Which establishes the necessary fiscal regulations and others related to the functioning of indigenous territories and their coordination with other territorial entities,” a key regulation for the implementation of Indigenous Territorial Entities. “This decree strengthens their autonomy, both in the management of their systems of government and in dialogue with external actors for the implementation of public policies and the guarantee of the fundamental and collective rights of indigenous peoples.”

Colombia’s Amazon protection efforts receive significant funding from international donors, including Norway, Germany, and the United Kingdom, as well as multilateral initiatives like the Amazon Fund. The report urges these partners to condition future support on clear progress toward phasing out high-risk extractive activities in sensitive ecosystems. “International finance can catalyse progress, but it must be coupled with genuine political will and local participation to be effective,” the briefing states.

Industry representatives contend that modern drilling technologies can minimise environmental harm and that oil and gas revenues are essential for national development. They also argue that Colombia cannot yet afford to forgo these resources given fiscal pressures.

Environmental advocates counter that the country’s long-term prosperity depends on avoiding the boom-and-bust cycles of extractive industries and capitalising instead on its unparalleled natural capital.

The report has predicted that the coming years will see heightened legal, political, and grassroots battles over new oil and gas blocks in the Amazon.

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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The turbines in a wind farm, like this one in the Northeast region of Brazil, contain magnets made from rare earths in their generators. This makes rare earths, which Brazil has in abundance, indispensable for both decarbonized electricity generation and the development of electric motors in the automotive sector and others. Credit: Fotos Públicas

By Mario Osava
RIO DE JANEIRO, Aug 27 2025 (IPS)

Brazil, which stands out for exporting basic products such as iron ore, oil, coffee, and soybeans, rather than industrialized goods with higher added value, now intends to make a shift regarding rare earths, a key component in new technologies that it has in abundance.

Brazil is the second country in reserves of this natural resource, estimated at 21 million tons, surpassed only by China, with 44 million tons, explained Julio Nery, director of Mining Affairs at the  Brazilian Mining Institute (Ibram). Together, the two countries account for about two-thirds of the total."The critical phase of processing which adds the most value is the separation of the rare earth elements, with high costs due to numerous and successive treatments, not so much because of the technology" –Fernando Landgraf.

But Brazil is only just beginning to exploit this wealth on a large scale, while China practically holds a monopoly on its refining, about 90% of the world total, to supply its own electronics industry, electric vehicles, wind turbines, and many other equipment, as well as the industry of almost the entire world.

Rare earths have become the new mining and technological fever, due to the accelerated growth in their demand and, now, due to the trade war unleashed by the United States under the presidency of Donald Trump.

China’s threat to condition the exports of its rare earth chemical elements forced Trump to backtrack on his escalation of additional tariffs against its biggest economic rival, which reached 145% in April, and to enter into negotiations that continue with the tariff reduced to 30%.

Rare earths get their name not because of their scarcity, as they exist in many places, but because of their physical properties, such as magnetism, which are indeed limited, explained Nery to IPS, by phone from Brasilia, about this sector comprised of 17 chemical elements that also have other unique properties such as electrochemical and luminescent ones.

Geopolitical disputes tend to accentuate a movement by many countries to reduce their dependence on China’s rare earths.

Launch of the MagBras project to develop the entire rare earth chain in Brazil, from mining to permanent magnets, key components of electric motors, wind turbines, and numerous electronic products, on July 14, 2025, at the laboratory and factory that will serve the project, near Belo Horizonte, the capital of the state of Minas Gerais. Credit: Sebastião Jacinto Junior / Fiemg

Adding value

In Brazil, an alliance of 38 companies, scientific institutions, and development foundations, driven by the Federation of Industries of the State of Minas Gerais (Fiemg), through its arm of the National Service for Industrial Training, aims to develop the entire rare earth chain, “from mining to the permanent magnet.”

That magnet, which contains four of the 17 rare earth chemical elements, is the derivative with the highest added value due to its now indispensable use in electric motors, cell phones, many electronic devices, wind turbines, and defense and space technologies.

This will be the focus of the project called MagBras, as the Industrial Demonstrator for the complete production cycle of Brazilian rare earth permanent magnets was named and officially launched on July 14 in Belo Horizonte, the capital of the state of Minas Gerais.

The goal is to unite industry with universities and research centers so that Brazil does not continue primarily as a major exporter of raw materials, without added value, as is the case with coffee, iron, oil, and soybeans.

Rare earth processing technology was developed decades ago in many countries, which abandoned the activity in the face of China’s low-cost production, recalled André Pimenta, who leads the project as coordinator of the Rare Earths Institute of Fiemg.

Some of the 17 chemical elements of rare earths, critical for the future and whose demand is projected to multiply 30 times in the coming decades. After China, Brazil is the second country with the largest estimated reserves of these rare earths, for which a geostrategic and geopolitical battle has already begun. Credit: Icog

Better deposits

In addition to having large ionic clay deposits, which have advantages over the rocky ones in other countries, the scale of production and the scant or non-existent environmental requirements contributed to China’s advance towards a near monopoly, he noted.

Brazil has similar areas of ionic clay, a factor that, with the advancement of technologies, favors the country’s potential to emerge as an alternative producer with the possibility to compete, even if it is “difficult or even impossible” to surpass China, acknowledged the chemist Pimenta in a telephone interview with IPS from Belo Horizonte.

MagBras has a laboratory in facilities originally designed for a factory with the capacity to produce 100 tons of magnets per year, the only one existing in the southern hemisphere, which will serve for research and even production on that limited scale.

Nery, from Ibram, warns of the risk of focusing on a single resource to the detriment of the set of critical minerals, which in addition to rare earths includes lithium, cobalt, nickel, among others. These are scarce products.

There was already enthusiasm for lithium, due to the increased demand for cell phone and electric vehicle batteries; a few years earlier the same thing happened with niobium, he recalls.

“Technologies change and alter priorities,” he warned. That is why it is necessary to define a policy to promote the 22 critical and strategic minerals, with defined and flexible priorities.

The production of electric cars in Brazil has gained momentum in 2025, which will increase the demand for magnets, intended to be manufactured in Brazil with the rare earths abundant in some regions of the country. Credit: Mario Osava / IPS

Set of factors

Furthermore, value-added projects require a broad view of the different factors that affect the entire chain. Adequate infrastructure, with good roads, availability of energy, and sufficient demand for the chosen products are indispensable for success, he exemplified.

“Do we have firm demand for permanent magnets? The products that incorporate them, such as batteries, electric car motors, and wind turbines, are currently imported,” Nery pointed out.

In his opinion, “the government must promote conditions to generate internal demand, in a general effort, since industrial participation in the Brazilian economy has greatly reduced in recent decades.”

Research centers have already developed solutions for refining rare earths, the most costly process, but doing it on an industrial scale will require a lot of investment and time, according to Nery, a mining engineer.

In mining, any project takes at least five years in geological research, environmental licensing procedures, and operational preparation, he noted.

Brazil, which in the past sought rare earths in monazite, which is unfavorable because it contains radioactive material, now concentrates its extraction on ionic clay, which is better. “Its deposits are superficial, which facilitates research and limits environmental impacts,” he pointed out.

A concrete experience with this type of soil is that of Serra Verde, a company owned by two US investment funds and one British fund, with a plant in Minaçu, in the state of Goiás, in central-western Brazil.

It began operations in 2024 and has already exported US$7.5 million to China this year, according to Nery. It produces the oxide concentrate, a first step in processing, which enriches and increases the rare earth content index in the clay, which in the soil is only 0.12%, according to Serra Verde.

A positive note is that its concentrate contains the most in-demand elements because they are used to make permanent magnets: the light ones neodymium and praseodymium, in addition to the heavy ones dysprosium and terbium. The heavy ones are rarer and less present in rocky or monazite deposits.

But Serra Verde’s goal of producing 5,000 tons of concentrate per year and doubling that amount by 2030 seems distant. In the first half of 2025, it only exported 480 tons, it was revealed, as the company does not disclose its data.

Also in the state of Goiás, the current Brazilian epicenter of rare earths, another project, the Carina Module, by the Canadian company Aclara Resources, expects to extract mainly dysprosium and terbium starting in 2026, with investments of US$600 million.

“The critical phase of processing and the one that adds the most value is the separation of the rare earth elements, with high costs due to numerous and successive treatments, not so much because of the technology,” said Fernando Landgraf, an engineer and professor at the Polytechnic School of the University of São Paulo.

One kilogram of neodymium oxide, present in these heavy rare earths, is worth at least 10 times more than the five dollars for a kilogram of concentrate, he said by telephone from São Paulo.

Mining company Serra Verde, in Minaçu, state of Goiás, where the extraction of rare earths began, which, in an initial processing, were concentrated and exported to China. They contain four of the 17 rare earth elements used to produce permanent magnets, key components of electric motors, wind turbines, and military and space equipment. Credit: Serra Verde

The threat of uncertainty

In his assessment, “the biggest risk of the business is the uncertainty about the future,” especially now that rare earths have become a target and a weapon of geopolitics.

The demand for rare earths will grow significantly, but a large increase in production in the United States could lead to an oversupply. It is a limited market, far from the volumes of other minerals, such as iron ore.

“Uncertainty does not justify sitting idly by. Demand will grow, and the movement to reduce dependence began earlier, during the pandemic, which left many without essential respirators and medical equipment because there was nowhere to import from. It is a one-way street,” stated Pimenta.

Geologist Nilson Botelho, a professor at the University of Brasilia, considers the estimate of Brazil’s reserves to be reliable. Mining in Goiás is successful because it contains heavy rare earths, the “most critical” ones, which are among the “four or five most valuable elements.”

But there are many deposits in other parts of Brazil. In addition to the geological formation of its very extensive territory of over 8.5 million square kilometers, the temperate tropical climate, rainfall that infiltrates the soil, and the high plateau favor the presence of rare earths, he explained to IPS from Brasilia.

Another geologist, Silas Gonçalves, opposes the idea that mining in ionic clay has fewer environmental impacts.

Mining there alters the landscape and the soil, causes deforestation and diffuse damage, such as changes and contamination of the water table. These are different impacts, not lesser ones, he argued to IPS from Goiânia, the capital of Goiás, where he runs his geological and environmental studies company, called Gemma.