Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Wegen der steigenden Öl-Preise lockern die USA vorübergehend die Sanktionen gegen Russland. Claudia Kemfert, Leiterin der Abteilung Energie, Verkehr, Umwelt im DIW Berlin, kommentiert dies wie folgt: 

Die temporäre Lockerung der Ölsanktionen gegen Russland ist energie- und geopolitisch ein falsches Signal. Sanktionen sollen den finanziellen Spielraum für Kriegsführung begrenzen. Wenn sie kurzfristig aufgeweicht werden, stärkt das genau jene fossilen Machtstrukturen, die Konflikte überhaupt erst ermöglichen. Die temporäre Lockerung der Ölsanktionen gegen Russland ist ein klassischer energiepolitischer Kurzschluss: Ein kurzfristiges Markt- oder Preisproblem wird ausgerechnet mit der Energiequelle beantwortet, die das Problem strukturell verursacht hat.

Wir sehen hier erneut das Muster der Fossilokratie: Kurzfristige Interessen am fossilen Energiesystem werden über langfristige sicherheits-, klima- und energiepolitische Ziele gestellt. Das stabilisiert Abhängigkeiten statt sie zu überwinden. Gerade jetzt wäre das Gegenteil notwendig: eine konsequente Reduktion fossiler Abhängigkeiten durch den beschleunigten Ausbau erneuerbarer Energien, Effizienz, Elektrifizierung und resilientere Energiesysteme. Wer Sanktionen gegen fossile Kriegsfinanzierung lockert, begeht einen energiepolitischen Kurzschluss – und verlängert damit die fossile Abhängigkeit und ihre geopolitischen Konflikte.

The policy brief by Ioannis Alexandris (Research Fellow, Wider Europe Programme – ELIAMEP & Researcher, think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration) and Dimitra Koutouzi (Defence Policy Analyst), “From Nuuk to Reykjavik: The High North’s geopolitical scramble and the consequences for the EU and its enlargement policy”, was prepared in the framework ELIAMEP’s initiative think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration, supported by the Open Society Foundations – Western Balkans.

This policy brief explores how the rapidly evolving geopolitical dynamics in the Arctic are intersecting with the European Union’s enlargement policy. Heightened strategic competition in the High North—combined with uncertainty surrounding the transatlantic security architecture—has reopened debates in Iceland about reviving its EU accession process. Against this backdrop, the brief examines how a potential Iceland track could reshape the EU’s broader enlargement agenda.

While Iceland represents a relatively “low-friction” candidate due to its deep regulatory alignment with the EU, its potential return to accession negotiations raises important questions about the coherence and credibility of the Union’s enlargement strategy. Progress with an advanced Nordic partner could generate political momentum for enlargement but may also risk overshadowing more politically complex accession processes in the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe. Countries that have waited over a decade in the accession queue may perceive accelerated progress for Iceland as evidence of a differentiated enlargement logic driven by geopolitical urgency rather than merit-based conditionality.

The brief therefore situates Iceland within the EU’s evolving enlargement landscape, highlighting how geopolitical considerations—including Arctic security, strategic autonomy, and shifting transatlantic relations—are increasingly shaping accession debates. Ultimately, it argues that the Union must balance strategic opportunities in the North Atlantic with the need to maintain credibility and fairness toward existing candidates, particularly in the Western Balkans. 

You can read the policy brief here.

One of the main arguments for implementing public works programmes (PWPs) instead of other social protection schemes such as cash transfers is that the assets created through these programmes themselves can generate medium- to long-term benefits. This is particularly important as the costs for supervision and the construction materials can account for up to 70 per cent of programme budgets. Despite this, there is scarce empirical evidence on PWPs’ effects through the “asset channel”: indeed; most studies have focused solely on the traditional “wage channel”. To bridge this gap, this paper examines whether and how assets created under Malawi’s Climate-Smart Enhanced Public Works Programme (CS-EPWP) – a programme recently implemented by the government of Malawi and funded by the World Bank – strengthen the resilience of households to climate shocks such as droughts and floods. The paper relies on case study analysis using primary qualitative data based on focus group discussions and key informant interviews with different stakeholders at the national, district and community levels. Interviews were conducted during fieldwork in September 2024 in two southern districts of Malawi highly affected by climate change. The analysis is complemented by site visits and quantitative survey data on asset quality. By combining these methods, we find that the CS-EPWP generates durable, community-maintained assets, which in turn enhance households’ capacity to cope with and adapt to climate shocks. In particular, land-based assets provide multiple benefits for both households and communities, while forest-based interventions are expected to generate similar long-term gains, though further research is needed to confirm their (long-term) impacts. To maximise the impact of climate-smart public works programmes, policymakers and donors should align asset creation with climate objectives and adopt participatory approaches to ensure their relevance, maintenance and long-term sustainability.

Sophia Schubert is an independent researcher.
Dr Donald Makoka is a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Agricultural Research and Development (CARD) of the Lilongwe University of Agriculture and Natural Resources (LUANAR) in Malawi.

One of the main arguments for implementing public works programmes (PWPs) instead of other social protection schemes such as cash transfers is that the assets created through these programmes themselves can generate medium- to long-term benefits. This is particularly important as the costs for supervision and the construction materials can account for up to 70 per cent of programme budgets. Despite this, there is scarce empirical evidence on PWPs’ effects through the “asset channel”: indeed; most studies have focused solely on the traditional “wage channel”. To bridge this gap, this paper examines whether and how assets created under Malawi’s Climate-Smart Enhanced Public Works Programme (CS-EPWP) – a programme recently implemented by the government of Malawi and funded by the World Bank – strengthen the resilience of households to climate shocks such as droughts and floods. The paper relies on case study analysis using primary qualitative data based on focus group discussions and key informant interviews with different stakeholders at the national, district and community levels. Interviews were conducted during fieldwork in September 2024 in two southern districts of Malawi highly affected by climate change. The analysis is complemented by site visits and quantitative survey data on asset quality. By combining these methods, we find that the CS-EPWP generates durable, community-maintained assets, which in turn enhance households’ capacity to cope with and adapt to climate shocks. In particular, land-based assets provide multiple benefits for both households and communities, while forest-based interventions are expected to generate similar long-term gains, though further research is needed to confirm their (long-term) impacts. To maximise the impact of climate-smart public works programmes, policymakers and donors should align asset creation with climate objectives and adopt participatory approaches to ensure their relevance, maintenance and long-term sustainability.

Sophia Schubert is an independent researcher.
Dr Donald Makoka is a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Agricultural Research and Development (CARD) of the Lilongwe University of Agriculture and Natural Resources (LUANAR) in Malawi.

One of the main arguments for implementing public works programmes (PWPs) instead of other social protection schemes such as cash transfers is that the assets created through these programmes themselves can generate medium- to long-term benefits. This is particularly important as the costs for supervision and the construction materials can account for up to 70 per cent of programme budgets. Despite this, there is scarce empirical evidence on PWPs’ effects through the “asset channel”: indeed; most studies have focused solely on the traditional “wage channel”. To bridge this gap, this paper examines whether and how assets created under Malawi’s Climate-Smart Enhanced Public Works Programme (CS-EPWP) – a programme recently implemented by the government of Malawi and funded by the World Bank – strengthen the resilience of households to climate shocks such as droughts and floods. The paper relies on case study analysis using primary qualitative data based on focus group discussions and key informant interviews with different stakeholders at the national, district and community levels. Interviews were conducted during fieldwork in September 2024 in two southern districts of Malawi highly affected by climate change. The analysis is complemented by site visits and quantitative survey data on asset quality. By combining these methods, we find that the CS-EPWP generates durable, community-maintained assets, which in turn enhance households’ capacity to cope with and adapt to climate shocks. In particular, land-based assets provide multiple benefits for both households and communities, while forest-based interventions are expected to generate similar long-term gains, though further research is needed to confirm their (long-term) impacts. To maximise the impact of climate-smart public works programmes, policymakers and donors should align asset creation with climate objectives and adopt participatory approaches to ensure their relevance, maintenance and long-term sustainability.

Sophia Schubert is an independent researcher.
Dr Donald Makoka is a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Agricultural Research and Development (CARD) of the Lilongwe University of Agriculture and Natural Resources (LUANAR) in Malawi.

Iran-Krieg und US-Handelspolitik belasten deutsche Wirtschaft etwas, stoppen aber bisher Aufschwung nicht – Gestiegene Energiepreise dürften Inflation um 0,4 Prozentpunkte erhöhen und Wirtschaftswachstum um 0,1 bis 0,2 Prozentpunkte senken – Expansive Finanzpolitik stützt deutsche Erholung – In ...

Il suffit de mettre en parallèle l'efficacité des robots conversationnels et la médiocrité de l'information produite par la plupart des médias pour goûter une amère ironie : volontairement asservi à la pression du clic et de l'instantané, le journalisme s'est lui-même rendu automatisable. Face à (…) / À propos du « Diplo », Information, Presse, Technologies de l'information, Médias

Comment un parlementaire « de gauche », engagé dans le combat contre la haine raciste, a-t-il pu rallier Vichy et servir avec zèle le maréchal ? Moins atypique qu'il n'y paraît, le cas de Paul Marchandeau (1882-1968) éclaire le rôle des ambitions personnelles, des connivences notabiliaires et (…) / Histoire, Seconde guerre mondiale 1939-1945, France, Personnalités

The G77 represents the Global South in the United Nations (UN). It holds a two-thirds majority and exercises significant influence in the General Assembly, while also being party to North–South tensions in the UN. Nearly all intergovernmental processes at the General Assembly, particularly those related to economic and financial issues, are marked by protracted and frustrating negotiations that affect the UN’s ability to develop solutions to global challenges. Despite its influence in the General Assembly, little is known about the G77’s internal processes. This article addresses this gap by examining the group’s decision making and how it shapes multilateral negotiations and outcomes in the General Assembly. It introduces an ideal-type model of intra-group interest aggregation and assesses how this function unfolds in the G77 and with what effects on UN negotiations. Drawing on group politics literature and interviews with UN delegates, the article demonstrates that while the G77 can leverage its numerical strength, there are noteworthy deficits in the group’s function of aggregating interests. Specifically, the limited inclusiveness in the group’s decision making, the dominance of a few members and the lack of informed input can undermine effective multilateralism and reinforce North–South tensions.

The G77 represents the Global South in the United Nations (UN). It holds a two-thirds majority and exercises significant influence in the General Assembly, while also being party to North–South tensions in the UN. Nearly all intergovernmental processes at the General Assembly, particularly those related to economic and financial issues, are marked by protracted and frustrating negotiations that affect the UN’s ability to develop solutions to global challenges. Despite its influence in the General Assembly, little is known about the G77’s internal processes. This article addresses this gap by examining the group’s decision making and how it shapes multilateral negotiations and outcomes in the General Assembly. It introduces an ideal-type model of intra-group interest aggregation and assesses how this function unfolds in the G77 and with what effects on UN negotiations. Drawing on group politics literature and interviews with UN delegates, the article demonstrates that while the G77 can leverage its numerical strength, there are noteworthy deficits in the group’s function of aggregating interests. Specifically, the limited inclusiveness in the group’s decision making, the dominance of a few members and the lack of informed input can undermine effective multilateralism and reinforce North–South tensions.

The G77 represents the Global South in the United Nations (UN). It holds a two-thirds majority and exercises significant influence in the General Assembly, while also being party to North–South tensions in the UN. Nearly all intergovernmental processes at the General Assembly, particularly those related to economic and financial issues, are marked by protracted and frustrating negotiations that affect the UN’s ability to develop solutions to global challenges. Despite its influence in the General Assembly, little is known about the G77’s internal processes. This article addresses this gap by examining the group’s decision making and how it shapes multilateral negotiations and outcomes in the General Assembly. It introduces an ideal-type model of intra-group interest aggregation and assesses how this function unfolds in the G77 and with what effects on UN negotiations. Drawing on group politics literature and interviews with UN delegates, the article demonstrates that while the G77 can leverage its numerical strength, there are noteworthy deficits in the group’s function of aggregating interests. Specifically, the limited inclusiveness in the group’s decision making, the dominance of a few members and the lack of informed input can undermine effective multilateralism and reinforce North–South tensions.

Der kanadische Premier hat ein Bündnis vorgeschlagen, um sich gegen den neuen Imperialismus zu wehren. Doch je nach Partnerwahl könnte das sogar kontraproduktiv sein, warnt Lars Brozus.

In the coastal zone, the triple planetary crisis manifests as accelerating losses and changes and increasing challenges and risks for people and livelihoods. Acceptance of a future existential crisis compels the urgency of corrective action to cause an inverse positive societal response to bend the negative trajectories of loss and damage. The rate and extent of corrective societal action (policies, laws, practices, knowledge, etc.) should at least keep pace with the projected rate of loss and environmental degradation. This urgency and acceleration of action are major societal challenges, especially considering the overwhelming evidence of impacts. In this paper, we offer three propositions for accelerating urgent actions and fostering innovation in coastal research and management, focusing on emerging trends and foundational changes. Scientists need to (1) reflect on the performativity of their research and perceptions of neutrality in anticipating the future of coasts; (2) think and act equitably in local and global partnerships; and (3) improve their engagement and willingness to innovate with society. This is not a call for linear or incremental change, but a call for the radical. The relationship between society and science drives progress and shapes our collective future.

In the coastal zone, the triple planetary crisis manifests as accelerating losses and changes and increasing challenges and risks for people and livelihoods. Acceptance of a future existential crisis compels the urgency of corrective action to cause an inverse positive societal response to bend the negative trajectories of loss and damage. The rate and extent of corrective societal action (policies, laws, practices, knowledge, etc.) should at least keep pace with the projected rate of loss and environmental degradation. This urgency and acceleration of action are major societal challenges, especially considering the overwhelming evidence of impacts. In this paper, we offer three propositions for accelerating urgent actions and fostering innovation in coastal research and management, focusing on emerging trends and foundational changes. Scientists need to (1) reflect on the performativity of their research and perceptions of neutrality in anticipating the future of coasts; (2) think and act equitably in local and global partnerships; and (3) improve their engagement and willingness to innovate with society. This is not a call for linear or incremental change, but a call for the radical. The relationship between society and science drives progress and shapes our collective future.

In the coastal zone, the triple planetary crisis manifests as accelerating losses and changes and increasing challenges and risks for people and livelihoods. Acceptance of a future existential crisis compels the urgency of corrective action to cause an inverse positive societal response to bend the negative trajectories of loss and damage. The rate and extent of corrective societal action (policies, laws, practices, knowledge, etc.) should at least keep pace with the projected rate of loss and environmental degradation. This urgency and acceleration of action are major societal challenges, especially considering the overwhelming evidence of impacts. In this paper, we offer three propositions for accelerating urgent actions and fostering innovation in coastal research and management, focusing on emerging trends and foundational changes. Scientists need to (1) reflect on the performativity of their research and perceptions of neutrality in anticipating the future of coasts; (2) think and act equitably in local and global partnerships; and (3) improve their engagement and willingness to innovate with society. This is not a call for linear or incremental change, but a call for the radical. The relationship between society and science drives progress and shapes our collective future.

Mit dem Amtsantritt von José Antonio Kast am 11. März 2026 und dem Ende der Präsidentschaft von Gabriel Boric fand in Chile ein Machtwechsel statt, der die größte politische Veränderung seit dem Übergang zur Demokratie markiert. Zwar ist Kast der globalen radikalen Rechten zuzuordnen und hat im Wahlkampf die Notwendigkeit eines fundamentalen Wandels betont. Aufgrund seines zurückhaltenden Stils und der politischen Tradition des Landes dürfte seine Regierungsführung jedoch weniger disruptiv ausfallen als die von Donald Trump in den USA, Javier Milei in Argentinien oder Jair Bolsonaro in Brasilien. Während der chilenische Institutionenrahmen sich mäßigend auswirkt, begünstigt der externe Faktor Trump eine Politik, die Rechtsstaat und Demokratie in der Region erodieren lassen könnte.

Deutschland stellt sich thematisch zu breit auf in einer sich neu ausrichtenden Weltordnung. Das zeigt sich besonders in der Entwicklungspolitik, die als Instrument deutscher Außenpolitik und internationaler Zusammenarbeit dort eingesetzt werden sollte, wo Wirkung realistisch nachgewiesen ist.

Deutschland stellt sich thematisch zu breit auf in einer sich neu ausrichtenden Weltordnung. Das zeigt sich besonders in der Entwicklungspolitik, die als Instrument deutscher Außenpolitik und internationaler Zusammenarbeit dort eingesetzt werden sollte, wo Wirkung realistisch nachgewiesen ist.

Deutschland stellt sich thematisch zu breit auf in einer sich neu ausrichtenden Weltordnung. Das zeigt sich besonders in der Entwicklungspolitik, die als Instrument deutscher Außenpolitik und internationaler Zusammenarbeit dort eingesetzt werden sollte, wo Wirkung realistisch nachgewiesen ist.

Germany is spreading itself too thinly across too many issues in a world order that is undergoing realignment. This is particularly evident in development policy, which, as an instrument of German foreign policy and international cooperation, should be used where its effectiveness has been realistically proven.