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Gazan children standing in the rubble of their demolished home in Rafah. Credit: UNICEF/Eyad El Baba

By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, Sep 17 2025 (IPS)

On September 16, the Israeli military began its ground offensive in Gaza City, accompanied by intensified bombardment of residential areas and a surge in civilian displacement. Concurrently, the United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem and Israel, issued a report in which it found that Israel is responsible for committing genocide in Gaza, citing deliberate efforts to destroy Palestinian life, carried out with near-total impunity.

“The responsibility for these atrocity crimes lies with Israeli authorities at the highest echelons who have orchestrated a genocidal campaign for almost two years now with the specific intent to destroy the Palestinian group in Gaza,” said Navi Pillay, Chair of the Commission. “The Commission also finds that Israel has failed to prevent and punish the commission of genocide through failure to investigate genocidal acts and to prosecute alleged perpetrators.”

The Commission found that Israeli forces have repeatedly disregarded orders from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as well as warnings from UN Member States, human rights groups and civil society organizations. Israeli officials have dismissed the Commission’s findings, accusing it of bias and refusing to cooperate with its investigations.

In response to the Commission, Israeli President Isaac Herzog told journalists, “While Israel defends its people and seeks the return of hostages, this morally bankrupt Commission obsesses over blaming the Jewish state, whitewashing Hamas’s atrocities, and turning victims of one of the worst massacres of modern times into the accused.”

The Commission described its report as the “strongest and most authoritative UN finding to date”, while noting that it operates independently from the UN and does not speak on its behalf. Currently, the UN does not categorize Israel’s actions in Gaza as a genocide, but has been under increasing pressure from its agencies to do so. Back in August, over 500 staff from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) urged UN Human Rights Chief Volker Türk to explicitly recognize the situation as a genocide. “OHCHR has a strong legal and moral responsibility to denounce acts of genocide,” said the letter signed by the UNHCR Staff Committee in Geneva. “Failing to denounce an unfolding genocide undermines the credibility of the U.N. and the human rights system itself.”

Humanitarian experts project that ongoing bombardments will result in an immense loss of human life and eliminate the remaining prospects of survival for those still in the enclave. The UN Human Rights Council (HCR) noted that controlled detonations in Gaza City have leveled entire neighborhoods and are in the process of wiping out “the last viable element of civilian infrastructure’ essential for survival.

The Commission reports that since October 7, 2023, Israel has repeatedly bombarded densely populated residential areas, often relying on explosive weapons with wide-area impacts. One spokesperson for the Israeli security forces told the Commission that they were “focused on what causes maximum damage”. The Commission has documented numerous instances of Israeli forces targeting high-rise buildings and residential apartment blocks, leading to the destruction of entire neighborhoods and the deaths of almost all civilians involved.

Additionally, the Commission observed that the number of bombs used by Israel in the past two years is unprecedented in comparison to other world conflicts, noting that Israel drops in less than a week the number of bombs the United States used in Afghanistan over an entire year —concentrated in a much smaller and more densely populated area.

Airstrikes and shellings on critical civilian infrastructures have disrupted nearly all aspects of life for Palestinians in Gaza. According to the report, damage to agricultural lands across the entire enclave poses significant long-term risks to food production and accelerated food insecurity, leading to famine.

As of February 2025, 403 school buildings in Gaza have been damaged by Israeli bombardment, including eighty-five that have been completely destroyed and seventy-three left only partly functional. The Commission warns that the strikes have effectively collapsed Gaza’s education system, disrupting schooling for over 658,000 children. Without urgent intervention, thousands are expected to suffer long-term psychological harm and stunted cognitive development due to the loss of education and psychosocial support services.

Furthermore, the widespread destruction of hospitals and the immense number of traumatic injuries from Israeli attacks have overwhelmed hospitals and healthcare centers across Gaza, leading to the collapse of the healthcare system. The siege has led to severe shortages in fuel and electricity, while also causing the looting and damaging of life-saving medical supplies and medications. As a result, patients with chronic illnesses and infections from diseases have been deprioritized, leading to a sharp increase in the number of preventable deaths and complications. Medical experts told the Commission that the targeting of healthcare facilities has severely restricted access to care for thousands of Palestinians, with children being among the most affected.

According to the report, between October 2023 and July 2025, approximately 53,000 Palestinians in Gaza were killed as a direct result of Israeli military operations. The Commission reports that Palestinians in Gaza were also attacked in their homes, in hospitals, as well as shelters, such as schools and religious sites. Israeli forces also repeatedly targeted journalists, healthcare personnel, humanitarian workers, and other protected individuals, sometimes even during ceasefire periods and without warning.

The report also documents Israeli forces targeting Palestinians in evacuation routes and designated safe zones, finding that women and children were most often directly targeted and killed, often while alone and in areas not experiencing active hostilities. In every case reviewed, the Commission found that Israeli forces were aware of civilians’ presence but opened fire regardless. Many of the victims were children carrying makeshift white flags , including toddlers who were reportedly shot in the head by snipers.

Furthermore, the report underscores that the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) was largely ineffective in providing direct relief to struggling Palestinians and has been linked to a surge in civilian deaths. As of July 31, at least 1,373 Palestinians had been killed while trying to access food, with 859 killed near GHF sites and 514 along convoy routes—with most fatalities attributed to the Israeli military.

Furthermore, Israeli forces have effectively hindered humanitarian operations through routine bombardments and shellings. From October 2023 to July 2025, the Commission recorded at least 48 staff and volunteers from the Palestine Red Crescent Society (PRCS) that were killed. Additionally, medical personnel also informed the Commission that Israeli forces deliberately shelled ambulances, with many workers stating that they believed that they had been intentionally targeted.

The Commission also found that Israel weaponised the withholding of life-sustaining necessities, such as food, water, fuel, and humanitarian aid, leading to a sharp increase in preventable civilian deaths. According to the report, families in Gaza have less than one liter of water per person per day for drinking, cooking, and hygiene, which is far below international minimum standards for daily water consumption.

Moreover, water shortages have led to a deterioration of the sanitation system, which is particularly pronounced in displacement camps, where nearly 400,000 kilograms of waste piles up each day. This has led to the rampant spread of infectious diseases such as Hepatitis A.

Additionally, more than ninety percent of the population in Gaza has faced acute food insecurity since October 2023, with the most severe cases being concentrated in northern Gaza. According to figures from the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), as of July 2025, food consumption has fallen far below the famine threshold in most areas of the enclave and malnutrition has reached the famine threshold in Gaza City.

The report found that Israeli forces were responsible for deliberately starving and depriving civilians in Gaza of resources that are paramount for human survival, with PRCS stating that Gaza is “unable to sustain life in its current state as civilians find their basic needs unmet”.

The Commission warns that the near-total impunity that Israeli forces and officials have emboldened the continuation of atrocities in Gaza, with global pressure mounting from the international community which urgently calls for an immediate de-escalation of hostilities, unimpeded humanitarian access, and credible mechanisms to hold perpetrators accountable.

“The international community cannot stay silent on the genocidal campaign launched by Israel against the Palestinian people in Gaza. When clear signs and evidence of genocide emerge, the absence of action to stop it amounts to complicity,” said Pillay. “Every day of inaction costs lives and erodes the credibility of the international community. All States are under a legal obligation to use all means that are reasonably available to them to stop the genocide in Gaza,” she added.

Following the report’s release, the leaders of twenty aid agencies working in Gaza, including Oxfam International, CARE and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), issued a joint statement also urging member states to take action to “prevent the evisceration of life in the Gaza Strip”.

“All parties must disavow violence against civilians, adhere to international humanitarian law and pursue peace. States must use every available political, economic, and legal tool at their disposal to intervene. Rhetoric and half measures are not enough. This moment demands decisive action,” the statement reads.

“The UN enshrined international law as the cornerstone of global peace and security. If Member States continue to treat these legal obligations as optional, they are not only complicit but are setting a dangerous precedent for the future. History will undoubtedly judge this moment as a test of humanity. And we are failing. Failing the people of Gaza, failing the hostages, and failing our own collective moral imperative.”

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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The 32-year-old footballer was in court accused of raping two women and sexually assaulting another.

Former Arsenal midfielder Thomas Partey plays for Villarreal against Tottenham, a day before he is set to appear in court on rape and sexual assault charges.

By CIVICUS
Sep 17 2025 (IPS)

 
CIVICUS discusses the deaths of Indigenous activists in custody in Tajikistan with Khursand Khurramov, an independent journalist and political analyst.

Khursand Khurramov

Five Indigenous Pamiri activists have died in Tajikistan’s prisons in 2025, reportedly after being denied adequate medical assistance. Since 2021, around 40 Pamiris have been killed and over 200 activists arbitrarily detained. Civil society organisations condemn these deaths in custody and the state’s broader pattern of systematic repression against the Pamiri ethnic minority, who make up less than three per cent of Tajikistan’s population.

What’s the background to the state’s persecution of Pamiri people?

The Pamiris are an Indigenous minority who have lived on their land for thousands of years. Throughout history, they have been part of various empires – from the Achaemenids and Alexander the Great to the Arab Caliphate and the Timurids – but have always retained de facto autonomy. At the end of the 19th century, the Pamir region was divided between the British and Russian empires, and the Pamiri people found themselves separated by the borders of modern states – Afghanistan, China, Pakistan and Tajikistan – while retaining their cultural and linguistic characteristics and, importantly, their historical attachment to their land.

In Tajikistan, the Pamiris live in an area called Gorno-Badakhshan (GBAO). The Soviet period was favourable for them in terms of demographic, economic and technological progress. The region had good transport links with Kyrgyzstan, while the road to the central regions of Tajikistan was only accessible seasonally.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, civil war broke out in Tajikistan in 1992. The Pamiris supported the United Tajik Opposition and became victims of mass repression. Many were murdered, with the number of victims unknown to this day. Following the war, the authorities continued to persecute former opponents, including the Pamiris, and several military operations have been carried out in the region, resulting in dozens of deaths and hundreds of arrests.

This means the Pamiri identity formed amid difficult conditions, largely in response to state pressure. Tajik authorities apparently fear recognition of Pamiri identity will lead to separatism, although there have never been any calls or demands for separatism within the Pamiri community.

It’s clear the authoritarian regime perceives Pamiri people’s desire for democratisation and freedom as a bad example for the rest of Tajikistan’s population, and it uses collective punishment to suppress any challenge to its authority.

What led to the recent wave of deaths in custody?

In November 2021, Tajikistan’s security officers carried out an operation in GBAO, in which a local resident was killed. This sparked mass protests, which in Tajikistan are prohibited by law and therefore extremely rare. Activists tried to hold those responsible to account by cooperating with law enforcement agencies. But instead of investigating, the authorities launched a large-scale crackdown on protesters, instrumentalising the law to justify violence by security forces.

In 2022, when protests flared up again, the authorities classified them as terrorist acts, allowing security forces to use firearms against protesters. As a result, around 40 people were killed. They also conducted mass arrests of activists. Some 300 people were imprisoned with sentences of over 15 years, and 11 received life sentences. Considering the entire Pamiri population is only about 220,000, these numbers represent a catastrophic scale of persecution. Prison conditions are extremely harsh, with relatives of prisoners repeatedly reporting overcrowding, lack of access to medical care and systematic psychological pressure. In 2025 alone, five men from GBAO aged between 35 and 66 have died in Tajikistan’s prisons.

How has the crackdown on civic freedoms affected GBAO?

Restrictions on civil liberties affect the whole of Tajikistan, but GBAO is subject to particularly harsh repression. In 30 years of independence, not a single independent media outlet has existed in GBAO. International media outlets such as the BBC and Radio Liberty have been unable to obtain accreditation to cover events in the region. As a result, most of what happens in GBAO remains unknown to the public, and state propaganda interprets events in a light favourable to the authorities, demonising Pamiri people in the eyes of the rest of the population.

At the national level, these restrictions take the form of a ban on political activities, a complicated procedure for registering associations and informal bans on the creation of parties and movements within the country and abroad. Any political or civic activity outside Tajikistan seems to be viewed by the authorities as a potential threat. Until 2022, Pamiris had a fairly powerful informal youth diaspora structure in Russia, but this has been effectively destroyed with its key figures arrested and returned to Tajikistan. The main reason for this was a rally they organised in November 2021 outside the Tajik embassy in Moscow.

Now even likes of social media posts by opposition groups are classified as extremism. According to the Tajikistan Prosecutor General’s Office, 1,500 people have been convicted for this, including nine journalists and bloggers. Many of them were not involved in politics at all. Their posts were exclusively about social rather than political issues.

How are Russia and other states in the region involved?

Russia and other post-Soviet states play a role in this process as political allies of the Tajik government. For Russia, the regime is an important partner in the areas of security and labour migration, so it tries to prevent the strengthening of forces that could threaten the status quo. As a result, it supports Tajikistan’s official position, including in international organisations, and often returns wanted political activists and opposition figures to Tajikistan.

Some post-Soviet states share a similar political logic, because they fear recognising ethnic or regional diversity within their borders. By supporting Tajikistan in suppressing Pamiri identity, they are consistent with their domestic policies of denying minority rights. Russia and the other member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation – Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – cooperate on security matters, exchanging data and coordinating operations against opposition activists, including Pamiris. This is a mutually beneficial practice that strengthens authoritarian solidarity and reduces the risks of alternative centres of political influence emerging in the region.

What role can civil society and the international community play in holding the government accountable?

In Tajikistan, civil society in the classical sense has practically ceased to exist. Even those organisations that continue to operate are forced to coordinate their activities with the government. Although on paper these organisations may address civic space or human rights issues, their activities are largely formal: they function more as a facade than a mechanism for protecting rights within an authoritarian system. Over the past decade, any human rights work has been effectively equated with political activity, which carries serious risks.

Outside Tajikistan, diaspora civil society is also underdeveloped, with no strong institutions yet in place. However, the main thing activists and the diaspora can do is to draw international attention to the problem, talking about it as often as possible in different forums and in different languages. Only then can we expect the international community to put pressure on the Tajik authorities.

Despite these efforts, the situation for Pamiri people in Tajikistan has remained virtually unchanged. Authorities continue to deny the existence of their distinct identity. In prisons, people continue to die from torture, disease and inhumane conditions, but these facts are silenced and their deaths are presented as natural deaths.

The international community must move beyond statements to tangible action by strengthening monitoring and reporting through the European Parliament, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the United Nations. They must impose personal sanctions on officials responsible for repression and torture, and condition aid, loans and grants on Tajikistan’s compliance with human rights obligations. Support for the diaspora and independent media is also essential to provide alternative information channels and prevent the regime isolating GBAO.

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SEE ALSO
Tajikistan: end systematic repression of Pamiri people CIVICUS 04.Aug.2025
Tajikistan: ‘Authorities silence dissent by accusing activists of extremism, terrorism and spreading false information’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Leila Seiitbek 20.May.2025
Tajikistan’s crackdown on dissent: erosion of rights and civic space CIVICUS Monitor 17.Feb.2025

 

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Damage to the water tank at the Maisat water pumping station. Credit: WaSH Sector Lebanon

By Ed Holt
BRATISLAVA, Sep 17 2025 (IPS)

Just under a year into a fragile ceasefire, 150,000 people in southern Lebanon continue to deal with the potentially lethal aftermath of Israeli bombing, highlighting the devastating long-term effects of conflict.

A report published late last month (AUG) by Action Against Hunger, Insecurity Insight, and Oxfam said that at least 150,000 people remain without running water across the south of Lebanon after Israeli attacks had damaged and destroyed swathes of water sanitation and hygiene (WASH) facilities since the beginning of the conflict in Lebanon.

The report, When Bombs Turn the Taps Off: The Impact of Conflict on Water Infrastructure in Lebanon, laid bare both the immediate and long-term effects of repeated attacks on Lebanese water infrastructure between October 2023 and April 2025.

It said that more than 30 villages were without any connection to running water, leading to long-term disruption to supplies of fresh water, fueling dependence on water trucking that many people cannot afford and, according to the World Bank, losses estimated at USD171 million across the water, wastewater and irrigation sectors.

A severe rainfall shortage in recent months has exacerbated the problem, increasing risks of outbreaks of waterborne diseases as  vulnerable communities are forced to resort to utilizing unsafe or contaminated water sources for their daily needs.

But groups behind the report warn that without mitigating action, the situation could become even worse.

“We can see there is the potential for some severe long-term repercussions of these attacks. There are 150,000 people without running water at the moment, but that number could rise in the future,” Suzanne Takkenberg, Action Against Hunger’s country director, told IPS.

Among the groups’ biggest concerns is the effect of the destruction on local agriculture.

In villages near the southern Lebanese border, farmers’ irrigation networks have been destroyed, cutting off vital water supplies to farms. Trucked-in water supplies have not been sufficient to replace this and allow them to irrigate land or give drinking water to their livestock, farmers say.

Meanwhile, farmers have also been unable to access their land due to security concerns—a November ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah has held only partly, with violations reported regularly—compounding problems with food production.

“One of our major worries is the mid- to long-term effects of the difficulties for farmers to irrigate their land,” explained Takkenberg.

“They have been struggling to irrigate their land since October 2023, due to security concerns hindering access to their land, as well as water problems. We have seen as a consequence of these attacks that food prices have increased and food productivity has decreased.”

Another concern is the growing reliance on trucked-in water for communities.

“Worryingly, people are becoming dependent on using water that is trucked in. This is sometimes ten times more expensive than using water from a public network, and the checks on that water are not the same as those carried out on public water supply networks,” said Takkenberg.

“Water quality after any kind of conflict is a concern and we are definitely worried about it in southern Lebanon after these attacks,” she added.

Illness and disease related to water quality and shortages are major concerns.

A destroyed water pumping station in Tyre, Lebanon, following an airstrike in November 2024.
Credit: Insecurity Insight

While the report states that waterborne and water-related illnesses were not reported by people interviewed, some highlighted the limited resources available for testing water quality and possible contamination. There are also worries that water may have been contaminated by white phosphorus, the use of these munitions in Lebanon having been verified by Human Rights Watch.

Meanwhile, there are further concerns that residents may resort to using unsafe water sources due to limited supplies, a situation exacerbated by low rainfall and water shortages at critical reservoirs.

Local officials interviewed for the report also highlighted damage to sewerage networks in some areas. This, combined with the known large-scale damage to water infrastructure and the possibility that damaged sewerage infrastructure has contaminated water sources, ramps up the potential of negative long-term effects on health if the water supply crisis is not adequately addressed, the report states.

It also points to evidence from Ethiopia, Ukraine and the Middle East, demonstrating clear links between damage to water and sanitation infrastructure during conflict and adverse public health outcomes.

“People are cutting back on their water use, which can have an effect on health and hygiene and raises disease risk—cholera is already epidemic in Lebanon and this situation could exacerbate that. Other diseases could also be spread. We have already seen cases of watery diarrhea, which is bad not just in itself, but also because in children it can cause problems with malnutrition as their bodies struggle to absorb nutrients,” Takkenberg said.

But while the potential long-term impact of the damage and destruction to water infrastructure is severe, early action could mitigate the worst possible outcomes, experts say.

“There is an urgent need to repair systems and while this is ongoing, to track water into the area. The consequences of water system destruction are rarely immediate. Most often, the impacts accumulate over time. It is the combination of destroyed infrastructure with the failure to repair it, insufficient water trucking, or lack of access to trucked-in water that eventually produces devastating outcomes for individuals and communities,” Christina Wille, Director of Insecurity Insight, told IPS.

“This is why the destruction of infrastructure demands close attention: if not effectively mitigated, cascading consequences are inevitable. People may be forced to leave, adding to the numbers of displaced populations, or they may fall ill. Yet there is also an opportunity—by addressing damaged infrastructure early—to prevent the worst outcomes of displacement and disease and to save lives,” she added.

But while repairing and rebuilding water infrastructure is essential to preventing the most severe long-term impacts on local communities, implementing it is a different matter.

Authorities have managed to carry out some limited repairs to some networks, but issues around the continued presence of Israeli forces and concerns about ongoing conflict violence have prevented wider-scale or more extensive reconstruction. Finances for repairs are also under strain amid the socio-economic crisis the country has faced since 2019.

“Disease outbreaks are very predictable and the cost of not dealing with them is much worse than dealing with them now. The health ministry has been good in warning [of potential health risks] but there is a limit to what the government can do with the resources that are available after years of economic crisis. It is a very difficult situation,” said Takkenberg.

The report ends with a call for, among others, all parties to the conflict to strictly comply with the ceasefire agreement and adhere to international humanitarian law (IHL) and ensure the protection of civilians, health workers, and essential infrastructure.

It urges humanitarian programmers and donors to support the rehabilitation and operationalization of conflict-affected water infrastructure and ensure temporary access to safe water and basic sanitation services through the provision of water trucking, emergency water points, and safe wastewater discharge.

The report also says UN member states should push for the establishment of independent, impartial, and transparent investigations into all allegations of IHL violations.

Satellite imagery shown in the report indicates that in at least several incidents the damaged or destroyed facilities were located in large open areas without clearly identifiable military targets, suggesting that in some cases they may have been specifically and deliberately targeted.

The authors of the report point out that under IHL, parties to a conflict must always distinguish between lawful military targets and civilians and civilian objects and that deliberately targeting civilians and civilian objects is prohibited and amounts to a war crime. The various kinds of water infrastructure are protected as civilian objects under IHL and must never be attacked.

“Determining whether each incident deliberately targeted water infrastructure would require access to confidential military decisions, which is not available, as well as information on whether any military objectives were present at the time of the attacks. Our data is limited to the observable effects on the ground following the attacks. Nevertheless, the scale and nature of the observed damage raise serious questions regarding compliance with international humanitarian law, which governs the conduct of hostilities,” said Wille.

While it may not be possible to determine whether the attacks were deliberate, their impact is clear and highlights the need to look at not just the direct but also indirect effects of conflict, said Wille.

“Conflict deaths are not only direct (caused by weapons) but also indirect, when the destruction of systems produces cumulative and deadly consequences. The more complex and interconnected our societies become, particularly in securing food and water, the more vulnerable they are to such systemic shocks. At the same time, it becomes harder to trace devastating outcomes back to a single act of destruction.

“This is why we must learn to examine conflicts through the lens of systems and interconnectivity and to apply this knowledge to our legal analysis of the conduct of warfare,” she said.

“The public needs to ask more direct questions about the conduct of warfare and how the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution are being applied. We need a broader debate on how these principles should be interpreted in today’s conflicts. Modern societies rely on highly interconnected and complex infrastructure to secure basic needs such as food and water, while warfare is increasingly conducted remotely through advanced technologies. In this context, what counts as proportional? And what kinds of precautions are necessary in today’s world?” she added.

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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The iconic blue whale looms over the Milstein Hall of Ocean Life at the American Museum of Natural History. Credit: UN Photo/Mark Garten

By Peter Bridgewater and Rakhyun Kim
SHEFFIELD, UK / UTRECHT, The Netherlands, Sep 17 2025 (IPS)

Other articles in this series on clustering conventions that are addressed by the Triple Environmental Crisis of pollution (Stanley-Jones), biodiversity (Schally) and climate change (Azores) I have touched on the idea of clustering not only conventions but the science-policy bodies established separately to serve them. We address the question of the negative consequences of maintaining status quo and identify how “consolidating knowledge” might make a difference.

Azores notes the progressive evolution of environmental challenges and their governance from the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, resulting in today’s institutional landscape – a complex web of multilateral agreements aiming to foster sustainable development, living in separate spaces with inefficient coordination mechanisms.

From 1945 onwards establishment of the UN and its specialised agencies including UNESCO and FAO, saw increased focus on the knowledge needed to address environmental issues. From its founding in 1974 UNEP also became increasingly active in this area.

UNESCO established a range of research agendas in biodiversity, earth sciences and water with a range of human-environment links, as did FAO for its areas of responsibility. This research pointed to the interconnected nature of global environmental challenges.

The links between climate adaptation, mitigation and biodiversity were identified in the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (ipbes) “Nexus” assessment (ipbes 2024a).

Both Azores and Schally cite the successful clustering of the Basel, Rotterdam, and Stockholm agreements demonstrating that formalised arrangements can enhance operational efficiencies, scientific coherence, and policy alignment.

They also suggest similar clustering of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the ipbes, and the nascent Intergovernmental Science-Policy Panel on Chemicals, Waste, and Pollution (ISP-CWP) could similarly enhance better links between the knowledge – policy links in resolving the polycrisis of climate change, biodiversity and pollution.

Yet the question remains can such science-policy bodies be clustered easily, or is it preferable to seek ways to enable them to work more effectively?

The science-policy bodies.

Since its establishment in 1988, the IPCC has delivered six Assessment Reports at approximately seven-year intervals. Each of the reports is on climate change and approaches to mitigation and adaptation, yet with changing overall themes.

An independent science-led exercise on status and trends in biodiversity and ecosystem services funded by UNEP with support from UNESCO, UNCCD, the Ramsar Convention and a wide range of scientific support was launched in 2000. This Millennium Ecosystem Assessment was designed to help not only the CBD make more informed policy choices, but also influence all biodiversity-related Conventions, including UNCCCD.

But while it was always to be a “one-off”, the Millennium Assessment led to pressure for a “biodiversity counterpart to the IPCC”, resulting in an intergovernmental meeting that established ipbes in 2012.

Since its establishment, ipbes has developed in ways that are different from IPCC – producing a range of thematic, regional and global assessments on issues including; pollination, land degradation, regional and a global assessment on biodiversity and ecosystem services status and trends, sustainable use of wildlife, invasive species, and the values of nature.

Its most recent products are an assessment on how to achieve transformative change in managing the environment and an assessment of the nexus between climate change, biodiversity, human health, food and water. Crucially, it has embraced a range of knowledges beyond science.

The third Intergovernmental Science-Policy Panel – on Chemicals, Waste, and Pollution (ISP-CWP) was officially established on June 20, 2025, by UNEA Resolution 5/8: The ISP-CWP Secretariat is Hosted by UNEP, with its first Plenary Expected in 2026.

After extensive negotiations, governments have agreed its role is to provide policy-relevant scientific advice to support sound management of chemicals and waste in the environment and to prevent chemical pollution and protect human health and ecosystems.

So, there are now three science-policy platforms dealing with apparently very different issues. Yet as the ipbes nexus report details there are multiple synergies between the topics covered, and the role for the ISP-CWP alludes to including ecosystems in its work.

The existence of a report from a workshop in 2021, sponsored by IPCC and ipbes, on biodiversity and climate suggested changes might be afoot, but thus far each silo remains resolutely separate.

How do the Science-policy bodies work?

The IPCC uses a rigorous, consensus-driven process where assessment drafts undergo multiple rounds of expert and government review to ensure accuracy and neutrality. In similar vein ipbes has drafts that are subject to a range of external reviews, culminating in the government- member plenary carefully reviewing the Summary for Policy Makers draft before approving it.

Both use a range of subsidiary bodies to manage technical and political issues. And both use scenarios and modelling in developing the assessments. Ipbes has had more emphasis on bringing a range of knowledges to bear in its assessments, and there is some evidence IPCC is embarking on a similar pathway.

It is not yet fully clear how ISP-CWP will operate, but it seems more focus will be on horizon scanning and links with the corporate world.

All three have a range of constraints: weak funding structures; the need to build capacity in the global south; the elaborate and frustrating approval processes; ensuring material is “confidential’ over the life of the assessment, which inhibits the flexibility needed in managing todays environmental pressures; managing data gaps; dealing with rapidly developing novel issues; balancing transparency while ensuring rigour; and avoiding capture by any particular sectoral voices.

Despite the activities of these global science-policy bodies, individual conventions have been producing “global outlooks”. The UNCCD has its own science-policy interface, with an unfortunate result that its first Global Land “outlook” was released at the same time as the ipbes assessment on Land degradation and restoration, a considerable duplication of effort.

The CBD has produced five Global Biodiversity Outlooks since 2001, the last in 2020. And the Ramsar convention has produced two Global Wetland Outlooks, one in 2018 and the most recent in 2025. A State of the World’s Migratory Species Assessment was published in February 2024 under the CMS.

While it could be argued that the more information available to inform policy development and implementation the better, this is not an evident result. Rather, production of the outlooks resembles “zombie activity” – producing material for its own sake, without reference to the wider global situation.

Do we need three separate Science-policy Bodies?

It can be argued that we already know which policies need implementation, yet many nations still argue strongly for the need to inform policy development through the best available knowledge. IPCC reports inform UNFCCC & its COPs, ipbes assessments inform CBD, and other biodiversity-relevant conventions, while ISP-CWP aims to support the “chemicals conventions” cluster and guide global regulation of chemicals and waste.

A major player is UNEP-GEO (Global Environment Outlook) that has been in operation since 1995. It has become more all-embracing in recent years and strives also to be a science-policy interface. Inevitably it covers some ground also covered by the IPCC, ipbes and the putative ISP-CWP.

GEO operates a more flexible approach, offering continuing assessment processes with regular reporting to provide updates on the changing environmental situation, the effectiveness of policy actions, and the policy pathways that can ensure a more sustainable future, with increasing focus on using a full range of knowledges.

How can this be made more efficient and this effective?

Clustering of the chemicals conventions was achieved relatively easily, resulting in considerable savings on efforts. Schally has alluded to the desirability of clustering the “ biodiversity regime” to replicate the practical synergies achieved in the chemicals and waste cluster – to avoid missed outcomes during a critical decade for nature. Should such clustering occur, there would be argument for greater synergy, if not fusion, between science-policy bodies.

Given the urgency of the polycrisis, time is of the essence, there are several possible ways co-operation between the bodies can be enhanced without full clustering. Such cooperation can lead to products that are policy-helpful, rather than simply policy-relevant, using, rejuvenating, and refining structures already agreed and in place, without damaging and time-consuming reorganisations. UNEP, through its GEO work, and with guidance from the UNEA, is certainly well placed to foster and manage such cooperative arrangements.

– Firstly, given the strength of links between Climate change, biodiversity, food water and human health demonstrated in the ipbes nexus report (ref), the biodiversity-related convention liaison group (BLG) should be strengthened by the addition of UNFCCC, UNCCD, FAO, WHO and UNESCO and meet regularly (at least 6 monthly) at secretariat level.

– Secondly, Chairs of the Scientific Advisory Bodies of the biodiversity-related conventions (CSAB) originally met as a sub-group of the BLG. However, CSAB met only five times before disbanding due to lack of resources, leaving coordination efforts solely to the secretariats. To ensure full co-ordination and buy-in from government, CSAB should be regenerated, and expanded to include the Chairs of the subsidiary bodies of UNFCCC, UNCCD, and the of the bureaux of IPCC, ipbes, ISP-CWP and GEO, with this group chaired by Deputy Executive Secretary of UNEP. This body should resolve overlaps and duplication and highlight crucial up-coming knowledge needs.

– Thirdly, continuous reporting should be adopted as the norm by all assessment bodies, with CSAB being the body that shapes the direction of assessments, with the concurrence of the plenaries of each organisation involved. GEO could supply horizon-scanning/Foresight to enable this work.

– Fourthly, the rationale for continued production of “outlooks” from conventions must be questioned, with efforts directed towards developing one key source of knowledge to assist policy development and implementation.

UN80 enables an opportunity of addressing how best science can support the Triple Environmental Crisis. Adopting these four strategies would decrease duplication, improve the quality and information in the assessment products, without upsetting the existing frameworks and systems that have been in place over a range of time periods.

This would allow also fusion and regrouping at a pace and direction that plenary members are comfortable with, without losing momentum. It can also help the UN system deliver transformative change as outlined in the ipbes Transformative change report (ipbes 2024b), and in the context of UN80.

Peter Bridgewater is an Associate Researcher at the Advanced Wellbeing Research Centre, Sheffield Hallam University, UK.; Adjunct Professor at the University of Canberra, Australia; a former Director of the Division of Ecological Sciences in UNESCO; and Secretary General of the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands.

Rakhyun Kim is Associate Professor in Earth System Governance at the Copernicus Institute of Utrecht University, the Netherlands.

Ipbes 2024a Summary for Policymakers of the Thematic Assessment Report on the Interlinkages among Biodiversity, Water, Food and Health of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.13850289.

Ipbes 2024b Summary for Policymakers of the Thematic Assessment Report on the Underlying Causes of Biodiversity Loss and the Determinants of Transformative Change and Options for Achieving the 2050 Vision for Biodiversity of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.11382230

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Credit: UN Photo/Loey Felipe

By Harvey Dupiton
NEW YORK, Sep 17 2025 (IPS)

The recent IPS article, “UNGA’s High-Level Meetings: NGOs Banned Again,” served as a stark and painful reminder of a long-standing paradox: the United Nations, an organization founded on the principle of “We the Peoples,” often closes its doors to the very communities it was created to serve.

Yet, after sharing this article with our members, we were reminded of a powerful truth: in spite of these physical barriers, the NGO community is “better together” and remains a potent force capable of shaping the decisions of governments.

The ban, far from silencing us, has only amplified our resolve. As we speak, hundreds of NGOs are organizing side events outside the UN, participating with willing governments and continuing our vital work.

We are often told that access is restricted “for security.” IPS quotes voices across civil society who have heard that refrain for years. But the net effect is to marginalize the very partners the UN relies upon when crises break, when schools need rebuilding, when refugees need housing, when women and youth need pathways into the formal economy.

If the room is too small for the people, you don’t shrink the people—you build a bigger room.

This ban also speaks to the very heart of why our NGO Committee is so deeply involved in the 2025 UNGA Week (September 22-30) of International Affairs initiative. We are committed to expanding UNGA beyond the walls of the UN and into the vibrant communities of the Tri-State area and beyond.

Our goal is to transform this week into an “Olympic-caliber” platform where diplomacy connects directly with culture, community, and commerce.

As a private-sector committee of NGOs, we recognize we are sometimes perceived as being “on the side of governments” because we emphasize jobs, investment, and a strong economy. That has spared us some of the blowback that human rights and relief NGOs bear every September.

But proximity to government doesn’t mean complacency. Where we part ways with business-as-usual—both in some capitals and within parts of the UN system—is on the scale of joblessness that goes uncounted.

Official series routinely understate the lived reality in many communities. In Haiti and across segments of the LDC bloc, our coalition’s fieldwork and partner surveys suggest joblessness well above headline rates—often exceeding 60% when you strip away precarious, informal survivalism. If you don’t count people’s reality, you can’t credibly fix it.

That is why our 2025 agenda is jobs-first by design. Our Global Jobs & Skills Compact is not just a proposal; it is a declaration of our commitment to a jobs-first agenda, aligning governments, investors, DFIs, and diaspora capital around a simple test: does the money create decent work at scale—and are we measuring it?

We are mobilizing financing tied to verifiable employment outcomes, building skills pipelines for the green and digital transitions, and hard-wiring accountability into the process so that “promises” translate into paychecks.

Accountability also needs daylight. During the General Debate we will run a Jobs-First Debate Watch—tracking job and skills commitments announced from the podium and inviting follow-through across the year.

The point is not to “catch out” governments but to help them succeed by making the public a partner. Anyone who has walked with a loved one through recovery knows the first step is honesty. Denial doesn’t heal; measurement does. That is as true for addiction as it is for unemployment.

IPS rightly reminds us that NGOs are indispensable to multilateralism even when we are asked to wait outside. We agree—and we’ll add this: if the UN is “We the Peoples,” then UNGA Week must be where the peoples are.

In 2025, that means inside the Hall and across the city—on campus quads and church aisles, in galleries and small businesses, at parks and public squares. We’ll keep inviting governments to walk that route with us, shoulder to shoulder.

Until every door is open, we will keep building bigger rooms. And we will keep filling them—with jobs, skills, investment, and the voices that make multilateralism real.

Harvey Dupiton is a former UN Press Correspondent and currently Chair of the NGO Committee on Private Sector Development (NGOCPSD).

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As the 50th independence anniversary approaches the country grapples with poverty and inequality.

As the 50th independence anniversary approaches the country grapples with poverty and inequality.

The political rift that could spiral into conflict again after the vice-president was accused of treason.

The political rift that could spiral into conflict again after the vice-president was accused of treason.

Faith Kipyegon storms to a fourth world 1500m title and extends her streak of dominance with a fifth consecutive global gold in the event.

Uniformed marines hand over UN and Turkmenistan flags to UN special representative on LLCDs Rabab Fatima and Turkmenistan's Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov during a flag lowering ceremony in Awaza. Credit: Kizito Makoye/IPS

By Kizito Makoye
AWAZA, Turkmenistan , Sep 16 2025 (IPS)

The theater of diplomacy can be more revealing than the speeches. Under a scorching Caspian sun in Awaza, two marines lowered their flags with the precision of a ballet. The green silk of Turkmenistan, folded into a neat bundle before the UN’s blue-and-gold standard, fluttered briefly and vanished into waiting hands.

Delegates squinted in the glare. A security guard, drained after days of marathon negotiations, whispered, “We made it.” The applause that followed carried an implicit bet that geography would no longer condemn 32 landlocked developing countries (LLDCs) to economic stagnation.

“This is not the end,” Rabab Fatima, the UN’s top envoy for LLDCs, told the assembled diplomats. “It is the beginning of a new chapter for the LLDCs. LLDCs may be landlocked, but they are not opportunity-locked.”

Her words capped four days of bargaining that produced the Awaza Political Declaration and a ten-year Programme of Action—promising structural economic transformation, regional integration, resilient infrastructure, climate adaptation, and the mobilization of financing partnerships. But whether these ambitions become asphalt, fiber-optic cable, and trade corridors depends on what happens next—starting with the LLDC Ministerial meeting on September 26, on the sidelines of the 80th UN General Assembly.

“For the first time, we have a programme of action for the LLDCs, which includes a dedicated priority area on climate action and disaster resilience,” Fatima said. “As we all know, digital technology is reshaping how the world learns, trades, governs and innovates. The Awaza Programme of Action puts digital transformation at its core through investment in science, technology and affordable infrastructure for e-learning, e-governance and e-commerce.”

The geography tax

Being landlocked remains one of development’s oldest handicaps. More than 600 million people live in LLDCs. Their exports must cross at least one international border—and often several—before reaching a port. Transport costs can be twice as high as those of coastal economies, eroding profit margins and discouraging investment.

Dean Mulozi, a delegate from Zambia, put it bluntly: “It’s not just that we’re far from the sea. It’s that the world’s arteries don’t reach us easily. We are always waiting—for fuel, fiber-optic cable, containers, investment.”

The Declaration seeks to unblock those arteries: freer transit, harmonized customs, integrated transport corridors, and digital transformation—policies designed to cut border delays, lower costs, and attract investors. For countries such as Rwanda and Burundi, this is not rhetoric. Rwandan coffee growers lose profits as trucks crawl over narrow mountain roads toward Tanzania’s Dar es Salaam port. Burundian tea producers navigate customs regimes that can turn a week’s delay into financial ruin.

Ambition Versus Reality

The Awaza Programme includes a proposed Infrastructure Investment Finance Facility, with a headline USD 10 billion commitment from the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. In theory, this could carve reliable corridors linking East Africa’s heartlands to the African Continental Free Trade Area. In practice, similar pledges have evaporated in the past when political will or money ran dry.

Five priorities dominate the blueprint: doubling manufacturing output and services exports; deepening trade integration; building transport links; embedding climate resilience; and mobilizing partnerships with development banks and private investors. Fatima called it “a blueprint for action, not just words,” but the distance between the two is long.

Rwanda and Burundi: Land-Linked Potential

Consider Rwanda, which has embraced digital innovation and ranks among Africa’s top reformers in business climate. Yet moving a container from Kigali to Dar es Salaam costs more than shipping it from Dar es Salaam to Shanghai. Blockchain pilots between Rwanda and Uganda have already reduced border clearance times by 80 percent, but scaling such reforms requires regional cooperation—the very essence of Awaza’s call for “land-linked” thinking.

Burundi faces even starker challenges. Political instability has disrupted transit agreements with neighbors. Poor road maintenance and limited rail options mean Burundian manufacturers pay a hidden geography tax on every exported item. A coordinated East African transport corridor—funded under Awaza’s financing facility—could halve transit times and cut spoilage for perishable goods.

Testing the Promise Divine

The first test comes on September 26, when ministers meet on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. They are expected to name national coordinators, align budgets, and press for LLDC concerns at COP30 and UNCTAD XVI. As Turkmenistan’s foreign minister, Rashid Meredov, warned, the network of coordinators will make or break implementation.

The Climate Conundrum

LLDCs are among the most exposed to climate shocks: droughts paralyze Sahelian farmers, cyclones sever southern Africa’s trade routes, and glacial melt threatens Central Asia’s water supplies. Rwanda and Burundi, reliant on rain-fed crops, can see a single flood wipe out a season’s earnings. Awaza’s plan for an LLDC Climate Negotiating Group aims to amplify their voice at global talks. Shared hydropower grids and renewable energy corridors, if built, could stabilize supply chains and keep factories running.

Digital Detours

Physical infrastructure is not the only hurdle. Maria Fernanda, a Bolivian tech entrepreneur, captured the digital struggle: “Sometimes it feels like the internet is slower here because it has to climb mountains like we do.” Fiber-optic networks and regional data hubs—central to the Awaza agenda—could level the digital playing field. Rwanda’s ambition to be East Africa’s data hub and Burundi’s expansion of mobile banking are previews of what “land-linked” economies could look like.

The Politics of Pipelines

Awaza was also about geopolitics. Turkmenistan used its role as host to burnish its neutrality and to tout hydrogen energy schemes, circular economy frameworks, and Caspian environmental projects. Landlocked development, it signaled, is not merely a technical problem but a diplomatic one. Transit states and inland economies must cooperate, not compete, over corridors and pipelines.

As one UN development official observed, “Land-linked flips the narrative: inland countries become bridges, not barriers. With AfCFTA, LLDCs can turn geography into a competitive edge—moving goods, services, and data faster and more affordably across Africa and beyond.”

Bringing Civil Society and Youth to the Table

One innovation at LLDC3 was the deliberate inclusion of youth and grassroots activists “not outside the halls, but right here in the meeting rooms.” This multistakeholder approach could ensure that local voices—such as Rwandan farmers’ cooperatives or Burundian women traders—shape the policies affecting them. But inclusion must be sustained beyond Awaza’s photo ops.

From Awaza to Action

The Ministerial meeting will likely spotlight three urgent tasks:

Operationalizing the Finance Facility—Without timely disbursements, promised corridors and digital highways will remain on paper.

Integrating LLDC Priorities into Global Agendas—Ensuring COP30 and UNCTAD XVI address LLDC vulnerabilities.

Ensuring Accountability and Transparency—Regular progress reports, perhaps modeled on climate COP stocktakes, could keep momentum alive.

Fatima’s closing words resonate: “Let us make the promise of ‘land-linked’ not only a phrase but a new way of life.”

A Fragile Opportunity

For Mazhar Amanbek, the Kazakh trucker whose apples rot at customs, and for Burkinabe grain shipper Mohamad Oumar, Awaza’s words must become tarmac and telecoms. For Rwandan cooperatives betting on premium coffee exports, or Burundian entrepreneurs seeking markets beyond their borders, the declaration could mean the difference between subsistence and prosperity.

The UN will be pressed to broker the deals and financing that can make LLDCs competitive. These inland nations are not short of resources or ambition—minerals, fertile soils, and human talent abound. The challenge is converting potential into prosperity.

As the blue UN flag was folded under the Caspian sky, the marines’ boots clicked on the promenade, and the heat bent the air into shimmering waves. Awaza’s delegates boarded planes carrying a slender sheaf of paper with an outsized ambition: to turn geography’s oldest curse into an engine of shared growth.

The world’s attention will now shift to New York, where LLDC ministers must prove Awaza was not a mirage. If they seize the moment, the next decade could see East African trucks rolling on new highways, fiber cables humming under deserts, and landlocked nations from Bolivia to Burundi trading on equal terms. If not, the folded flags of Awaza will join the archive of fine promises that melted under a scorching sun.

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Participants at the AfDB pavilion at the Second Africa Climate Summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Credit: Farai Shawn Matiashe/IPS

By Farai Shawn Matiashe
ADDIS ABABA, Sep 16 2025 (IPS)

As increasingly frequent droughts and devastating floods are affecting agricultural productivity, leaving millions of people food insecure in Africa amid a lack of climate finance, the African Development Bank (AfDB) has committed USD 11 billion to support various climate-resilient and infrastructure projects in rural areas.

Climate change-induced humanitarian emergencies are materializing in every corner of the world. Often, more frequently than predicted. Over the past few years, many countries have been experiencing extreme weather events almost every month. Poor countries like those in Africa emerged as the worst affected, bearing the brunt of climate change.

Africa warmed faster than the rest of the world, according to a report released last year by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO). The Horn of Africa, as well as Southern and Northwest Africa, suffered from exceptional multi-year droughts recently, while other African countries reported significant casualties due to extreme precipitation leading to floods in 2023.

Targeting Climate Action Projects

James Kinyangi, coordinator of the Climate and Development Special Fund and the Climate Action Window at AfDB, said they are providing funding for various climate adaptation and mitigation projects across Africa.

“AfDB has several ways in which they are tackling climate challenges and integrating finance for climate action in its portfolio. Last year, we had total approvals for projects in African countries for about USD 11 billion,” he told IPS in an interview at the AfDB Pavilion during the Second Africa Climate Summit (ACS2) held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 8 to 10 September. The summit took place in anticipation of the United Nations Climate Conference (COP30), in Belém, Brazil, scheduled for November 2025.

“Out of that, close to half was mainstream climate finance. Of the nearly USD 5 billion that went to climate finance, nearly 65 percent was adaptation finance. The remaining was mitigation.”

Kinyangi said they have a mainstream of climate finance for climate action in their main portfolio, making sure that all of the lending of the bank responds to climate action.

“We also screen our projects. Now, nearly 100 percent of all new approvals of the bank are mainstream with climate action. They are climate-informed designs of projects,” he said.

Kinyangi, an AfDB early warning expert, says they also have various special funds and trust funds that respond to climate change.

“One that is visible is through our major constitutional lending window, the African Development Fund. We have created the Climate Action Window, which has mobilized a total of USD 500 million as climate finance,” he said. “That has now been programmed for 37 low-income African countries that benefit from the resources of the African Development Fund. We have about 41 projects that are adaptation and we have another 18 projects that are mitigation.”

The cost of climate adaptation in sub-Saharan Africa would be between USD 30 and 50 billion annually over the next decade, according to the WMO. This is a huge blow to a continent where 118 million extremely poor people have a daily income of less than USD 1.90 per day. If adequate climate funding is not secured in time, farmers in the rural areas will be poorer by 2030 as national budgets continue to be diverted.

AfDB’s investments in Africa cut across energy, agriculture, water resources and sanitation, forestry, climate information systems, and green projects seeking finance to help transform mitigation pathways. Kinyangi said several of these projects are designed to support rural communities, including early warning systems, climate-smart agriculture and clean cooking solutions.

In the Sahel region, AfDB is supporting a project called Farmer Managed Natural Regeneration (FMNR), a low-cost, sustainable approach where farmers protect and manage the natural growth of trees and shrubs on their agricultural lands, rather than planting new ones. The practice restores degraded soil and increases agricultural yields, improving food security.

As part of their climate-smart agricultural projects, AfDB is supporting 20 million farmers across Africa. Kinyangi said AfDB is supporting technologies like drought insurance for the management of risks associated with losses of livestock and crops due to drought. He said the result is a whole host of technologies they are financing in rural communities across Africa, supporting farmers with water harvesting and renewable energy.

In Zimbabwe, for instance, AfDB is working with the International Fund for Agricultural Development, a United Nations agency working to eliminate poverty and hunger in rural areas and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) to support school feeding programs for children.

“This includes improving cooking equipment in schools and improving the delivery of vaccines and other medications through rural dispensaries by use of cold chains powered by solar, ” said Kinyangi. Across Africa, AfDB is revamping irrigation projects, changing from diesel-powered to solar-powered systems to reduce emissions.

Bridging the Financing Gap for Countries in Debt Distress

Several African countries that are exposed to extreme weather events like droughts and floods divert their national budgets to respond to these disasters. These are funds meant for the health and education sectors, which are diverted to support affected communities and rebuild destroyed infrastructure. To fill the financing gap, they turn to multinational lenders like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, which leaves them in debt.

Efforts have been made in the past to restructure debt through the G20 Common Framework, which was created during the COVID-19 crisis in 2020 as a debt relief effort. But African leaders say it is slow and creditor-driven. Five years after it was established, only Ghana and Zambia have managed to restructure their debt under the G20 Common Framework.

Between 2010 and 2020, Africa’s external debt increased more than fivefold and accounted for almost 65% of Gross Domestic Product in 2023. Even though Africa’s average debt-to-GDP ratio is expected to decrease to 60% in 2025, the continent faces an escalating debt crisis, according to the African Union. Statistics from the IMF and World Bank’s Debt Sustainability Framework show that African countries in distress, or at high risk of debt distress, have risen from 9 in 2012 to 25 in 2024.

Kinyangi said the AfDB Climate Action Window was established to help countries in debt distress.

“For example, countries like Mozambique, Malawi and Zimbabwe are exposed to tropical cyclones in the Indian Ocean. So, they divert national resources to combat the negative impacts of tropical cyclones. That leaves them in a budget hole. Sometimes they have to borrow to leave that budget hole.”

Kinyangi said AfDB’s aspirations are to ensure that it channels more climate finance to vulnerable countries to cushion those countries against having to divert important national budgets to combat the impacts of climate change. He said climate finance is supposed to go directly to building resilience against the negative impacts of extreme weather events while preserving the national budget that is meant to create education systems and promote health and infrastructure.

The AfDB was among the African banks that have committed to mobilizing USD 100 billion to fund green industrial projects at the ACS2. While a copy of the final declaration from the three-day Addis Ababa Summit is yet to be released, African leaders set a new goal to raise USD 50 billion annually for climate solutions. In 2023, about USD 26 billion was mobilized at the ACS1 in Nairobi, Kenya, but it is not clear how much funding has been disbursed. The continent needs USD 1.3 trillion per year to finance its climate adaptation plans, according to the AU.

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The UN General Assembly voted on the “New York Declaration,” a resolution endorsing the two-state solution between Israel and the Palestinians. 12 September 2025. Of the 193 UN Member States, 142 countries voted in favour of a resolution backing the document. Israel voted against it, alongside nine other countries – Argentina, Hungary, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Tonga and the United States – while 12 nations abstained. https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/09/1165835

By James E. Jennings
ATLANTA, USA, Sep 16 2025 (IPS)

In a long past due move, the UN General Assembly voted 142-10 to approve a plan called “The New York Declaration” that hopes to revive the long dead Two State Solution for Palestinian Independence.

Many observers may see it as a welcome initiative to curtail Israel’s century-long colonial project in Palestine. The declaration was proposed by France, Saudi Arabia, the UK, Canada and a gaggle of other countries as way to establish a Palestinian state on the West Bank of the Jordan River.

But it is a cruel deception.

Just last year the UN General Assembly demanded that Israel end its so-called “security operations” in Gaza before the end of this month of September, 2025. Israel has ignored the deadline and has no intention of complying.

Nothing approaching peace for Palestine is likely to happen, no matter the overwhelming vote at the UN General Assembly. Why? Because creating a virtual state in Palestine is not a real state and therefore does not solve the problem.

The clever leaders from this group of countries, most of them apparently sincere, have figured out a way—in the absence of a realistic plan to restrain Israel—to merely kick the can of peace down the road. But it doesn’t mean it will happen.

It may be designed to attenuate Palestinian suffering and limit Israel’s endless denial of human and political rights, but it cannot succeed by prolonging the already decades-long and miserably failed “Peace Process.” The Oslo process took thirty years, and peace is farther away than ever.

You either have peace, or you don’t. It cannot be a process. Although post-war peace negotiations are sometimes long and tedious, if intentions are sincere the shape of an agreement takes only minutes to define and outline. Any meaningful agreement, whether between individuals or nations, requires a straightforward statement of goals and adherence to the principles of equality, and justice.

Yet despite UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres’ frequent statements that Israel’s occupation of Gaza and the West Bank Is illegal under international law and must stop, and bombing civilians is illegal and must stop, those standards are not being faced honestly by the coalition of nations operating now as “The New York Declaration.”

None of the great nations involved in this latest initiative are calling for Israel to withdraw from Gaza and the West Bank, much less to stop the genocide immediately. Why not?

The intent of this diplomatic maneuver led by France, the UK, Canada, and other countries is to avoid these pressing demands, not implement them. Rather, if the UN vote does succeed in getting Israel to temporarily stop bombing the hapless civilians in Gaza, the world can expect a great follow-up hubbub about a “Peace Process” for Palestine that may last years but will in fact sideline the principled demands of the General Assembly’s September 12 Resolution.

That in fact may be the point of this initiative, as sincere as President Macron and the others may be. The threat of UK Prime Minister Starmer to recognize a Palestinian state in September is hollow and just the same: to distract from the UN General Assembly’s demands by signing on to a “process” that will never end. It’s a good guess that, like Lucy in the Peanuts Cartoon, he will pull the football away in the nick of time, leaving Palestine like Charley Brown flat on the ground.

Creating a virtual state, not a real one, is just playing into Netanyahu’s hands. The key nations leading the agreement have not labeled Israel’s actions in Gaza genocide as they should or called for an immediate halt to the killing and starvation.

Neither have the three leading military suppliers, Germany, the UK, and France, stopped sending weapons and technical military support components to Israel.

And for what? Not for advancing justice or even humanity, much less Palestinian political rights, but to smoothly guide the international community to an endorsement of Israel’s genocide in Gaza and its military control of the entire Middle East.

They imagine that the countries of the Middle East, led by Saudia Arabia’s murderous crown prince Muhammad bin Salman, aka MBS, will eventually allow the Western powers to confirm Israel’s military hegemony in Gaza and the West Bank.

The vision endorsed by these leading countries fails to call Israel to account for its genocide in Gaza or its de facto takeover of the West Bank. If implemented, the people of Palestine will become merely “hewers of wood and drawers of water,” in the Biblical phrase, for Israel’s triumphant military umbrella over the Middle East region.

Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States will be free to make money, and the US will pay for Gaza’s reconstruction. The world can expect a great hubbub about the “Peace Process” in the coming months that will sideline the principled demands of the General Assembly’s Resolutions.

What will happen to the people in Gaza is left out of the calculation. Be warned. Pay attention. It is a cruel deception.

James E. Jennings is President of Conscience International, a former aid worker in Gaza, and a longtime advocate for Palestinian human and political rights.

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Windmills are at the backdrop of a highway in Ninh Thuận, Vietnam. Governments should invest in renewable energy and infrastructure as part of financing for development to close SDG gaps in Asia and the Pacific. Credit: Unsplash/Moc Diep

By Heather Lynne Taylor-Strauss and Eiichiro Takinami
BANGKOK, Thailand, Sep 16 2025 (IPS)

Over the past two decades, foreign direct investment (FDI) has been the single largest and most stable source of external development capital in Asia and the Pacific (see Figure).

In 2022 alone, FDI flows into the region exceeded US$300 billion, outpacing official development aid (ODA), remittances and portfolio investment flows. Even in 2023, when global investment slowed under higher interest rates and geopolitical uncertainty, FDI into the region remained close to $290 billion.

Figure: External capital inflows to developing countries in Asia and the Pacific

Source: Created by ESCAP based on World Development Indicators, UNCTAD, and IMF data.

For a region facing a $1.5 trillion annual financing gap to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), this is more than a statistic. It is a reminder that the future of development finance and achievement of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development depends on whether countries can effectively attract and channel FDI.

From the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA) in 2015 to the most recent Sevilla Commitment agreed at the International Conference on Financing for Development (FFD4), the global community is aligned to leveraging FDI for sustainable development. In fact, the Sevilla Commitment elevated the role of FDI.

While the AAAA positioned FDI as complementary to public finances for sustainable development, the Sevilla Commitment identified FDI as a key source of development capital, devoting an entire subsection to scaling up FDI.

ODA, portfolio investments and remittances all play important roles. But none match the stability, scale or transformative power of FDI. While ODA is vital for humanitarian and social priorities, donor budgets are increasingly squeezed by competing demands such as defence spending and climate adaptation.

Portfolio investments represent a large volume but are more susceptible to global economic events and often seek short-term returns. Personal remittances are stable and sustain household welfare. However, remittances are primarily consumption-oriented and often are not channelled to building productive capacity. FDI is different. It can build renewable energy plants, expand digital infrastructure, and create jobs. It is not just money flowing in; it is productive capital tied to long-term development.

Nonetheless, not all FDI is equal. Its impact depends on whether investments are effectively channelled towards SDG priorities. To accomplish this, investment promotion agencies (IPAs), with their mandates to promote, attract, and facilitate FDI, play a crucial role. With the right strategies and tools, IPAs can ensure that the FDI contributes to sustainable development needs.

The following three areas are particularly important for action by the IPAs.

1. Aligning and implementing IPA’s investment attraction strategies with SDGs.

IPAs need to create medium-term investment promotion and attraction strategies that are aligned with their SDG priorities. This involves IPAs finding their country’s “niche” target sectors to attract investments.

Aligning strategies with the SDGs is essential because many corporate investors now value alignment as part of their ESG investment criteria. Over the past several years, ESCAP has supported its member States in developing and implementing practical, targeted investment promotion and attraction strategies. These projects have enabled IPAs to narrow their focus, identify niche opportunities, and connect with high-potential investors.

2. Leveraging regional cooperation on investment promotion.

While IPAs often compete for investors, regional cooperation can be even more powerful—especially in attracting cross-border investments that require scale. By pooling markets and aligning promotion efforts, countries can present themselves not as fragmented destinations but as part of a larger, integrated investment destination. This approach not only makes the region more attractive to global investors but also enables each country to highlight its comparative strengths within wider value chains.

ESCAP has been at the forefront of advancing such cooperation. In South East Asia, the ASEAN Regional Investment Promotion Action Plan (RIPAP) 2025–2030 was endorsed by all ASEAN member States as the first region-wide initiative to jointly promote investment opportunities.

In Central Asia, ESCAP and the International Islamic Trade Finance Corporation launched the Boosting Exports through FDI programme, which helps countries attract investment that strengthens regional value chains and to become more competitive. Regional collaboration of this kind demonstrates that cooperation—not just competition—can unlock larger, more sustainable flows of FDI.

3. Developing impact measurement tools.

Developing and utilizing impact measurement tools can help IPAs demonstrate how their work is contributing to advancing the SDGs. With database systems and tools, IPAs can track growth in sectors like green industries or progress on digital transformation, making their impact more visible. For example, Investment Fiji has tailored its Customer Relationship Management system to more effectively monitor how the investment they have helped facilitate contributes to the SDGs.

As traditional development aid budgets plateau, FDI remains the most stable and transformative capital for building productive capacity. FDI has already been instrumental in driving SDGs in areas such as transitioning to clean energy, accelerating digital connectivity, and generating decent jobs needed for inclusive growth. But to fully realize this potential, governments and IPAs must be strategic, collaborative and impact-driven.

ESCAP stands ready to support its member States and their IPAs in developing and implementing FDI promotion and attraction strategies aligned with SDGs.

Heather Lynne Taylor-Strauss is Economic Affairs Officer, ESCAP; Eiichiro Takinami is Junior Economic Affairs Officer, ESCAP.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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Opinion polls show that the majority of the U.S. population holds positive views on immigration. Credit: Shutterstock.

By Joseph Chamie
PORTLAND, USA, Sep 15 2025 (IPS)

Most of the population in this country wants immigrants, but the current government does not share the same sentiment. The country in question is the United States, often referred to as “a nation of immigrants”, home to more immigrants than any other country worldwide, having received over 100 million immigrants since its founding in 1776.

Opinion polls show that the majority of the U.S. population holds positive views on immigration. A national survey conducted in June revealed a record high of 79% of U.S. adults considering immigration beneficial for the country, with 17% viewing it negatively (Figure 1).

 

Source: Gallup Poll.

 

The poll also found that 62% of U.S. adults disapprove of the president’s hardline immigration enforcement measures. Specifically, a majority of the U.S. public opposes immigration arrests in protected areas such as places of worship, schools, hospitals, and clinics.

Opinion polls show that the majority of the U.S. population holds positive views on immigration. A national survey conducted in June revealed a record high of 79% of U.S. adults considering immigration beneficial for the country, with 17% viewing it negatively

It is estimated that the current government authorities have deported at least 180,000 people so far. By the start of August, the number of deportations is reported to have reached close to 1,500 people per day.

Analyses of recent census data show that in the first seven months of 2025, the U.S. foreign-born population declined significantly, estimated to be between 1.5 million and 2.2 million.

The foreign-born population decreased from 53.3 million immigrants, a record high representing 15.8% of the U.S. population, to 51.9 million immigrants or 15.4% of the country’s population, with other estimates of the decline even lower at 51.1 million. The drop in the foreign-born population marked the first decline in the country’s immigrant population since the 1960s.

Many in the U.S., estimated to be about a third of the population, have expressed agreement with the general principle of deporting undocumented migrants, especially those who have committed violent crimes.

However, a national opinion poll conducted in late June found that the majority of the U.S. population, 54%, believe the government’s immigrant enforcement program has “gone too far” with their methods and tactics being extreme, aggressive, and heavy-handed.

Additionally, 78% of the U.S. population favor providing pathways to citizenship for undocumented immigrants already living in the country, with the proportion rising to 85% for immigrant children.

The proportion of U.S. adults who want immigration to remain at its current level is 38%, while 26% would like to see it increased. In contrast, 30% prefer a reduction in immigration (Figure 2).

 

Source: Gallup Poll.

 

Another survey found that 60% of the U.S. population disapprove of the suspension of most asylum applications and the termination of Temporary Protected Status. Many have objected to the administration’s steps to block access to the asylum process, which is in violation of U.S. law.

Additionally, on his first day in office, the U.S. president issued an executive order aimed at ending birthright citizenship for babies of undocumented immigrants and individuals with temporary status in the country.

If birthright citizenship were to end in the U.S., it would impact an estimated 6% of the country’s annual births, or about 225,000 babies born in the country each year.

However, a national survey conducted in June revealed that 68% of registered U.S. voters actually support birthright citizenship, which was established by the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in 1868.

Section 1 of the amendment states: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside”. The president’s executive order ending birthright citizenship has become a significant legal battle for the country and will likely be decided by the Supreme Court.

The current administration considers all undocumented immigrants living in the country as criminals and has falsely claimed that undocumented migrants are responsible for the rise in crime, despite data showing crime rates have been decreasing.

It is important to note that being in the United States illegally is a civil violation, not a criminal one. Many undocumented immigrants who have been arrested have not been convicted of a crime.

In June, the Supreme Court ruled that the administration could resume expedited deportations of migrants to countries that are not their places of origin, referred to as third-country deportations. The administration has reached agreements with countries like Honduras, Rwanda, and Uganda to accept deported migrants who are not their own citizens.

These agreements allow for redirecting asylum-seekers to countries that are not their own if the U.S. government believes these nations can fairly assess their claims for humanitarian protection.

Confusingly, the U.S. president recently ordered a “new” population census that excludes undocumented immigrants.

This is a historic demand, considering the U.S. has counted every person in its census for over 230 years, dating back to 1790. During his first term, the president tried to alter the country’s decennial population census by adding a citizenship question to the 2020 census, but the Supreme Court blocked it.

The U.S. Census Bureau projects that approximately one million immigrants per year will drive the country’s population growth throughout the rest of the 21st century. The nation’s fertility rate, at 1.63 births per woman in 2024, is expected to remain well below the replacement level in the coming decades.

By mid-century, immigration is expected to contribute twice as many people to the U.S. population as natural increase. According to the main series population projection, by 2080, the current U.S. population of 342 million is projected to reach nearly 370 million (Figure 3).

 

Source: U.S. Census Bureau.

 

However, without future immigrants and fertility remaining below replacement, the U.S. population is projected to decline as deaths soon begin to outnumber births. The Congressional Budget Office expects deaths to exceed births by 2031.

By the end of the 21st century, the Census Bureau estimates that without immigration the country will experience nearly 2 million more deaths than births. The U.S. population in the zero immigration scenario is expected to decline to about 226 million, or approximately 116 million fewer people in 2100 than today.

The United States is currently experiencing a significant need for workers across various sectors of the economy, including agriculture, construction, healthcare, hospitality and manufacturing.

Immigrant workers are seen as crucial in filling these labor shortages, especially for jobs such as farmworkers that the native-born U.S. population typically does not want to do.

Many economists have emphasized that immigration is a vital component of a healthy U.S. economy. The president’s deportation and tariff policies are believed to be contributing to an inflationary shock to the economy.

Immigration can help reduce inflation, strengthen manufacturing and increase employment rates. The chair of the Federal Reserve has indicated that the president’s stricter immigration policies are one of the reasons U.S. economic growth has slowed.

In addition to filling job vacancies, immigrant workers also contribute to the growth of the country’s economy and boost tax revenue. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that immigration growth will add $1.2 trillion in federal revenue over the period from 2024 to 2034.

The U.S. population is expected to undergo significant demographic ageing in the coming decades. By 2035, the number of people in the U.S. aged 65 years or older is projected to exceed the number of children under the age of 18.

As the U.S. population ages, the number of working-age individuals per retired person is decreasing. In 1975, the potential dependency ratio of those aged 20 to 64 years old per person aged 65 years or older was slightly over five. Currently, the dependency ratio is about three and is expected to decline to two by 2075. Without future immigration, the U.S. dependency ratio is projected to be approximately 1.5 by 2075.

In summary, it is clear that the majority of the population in the United States supports immigration, while the government does not. Despite the widespread backing for immigration and the substantial demographic, economic, and social impacts of immigration, the new administration is concentrating on significantly decreasing immigration. They have put in place policies, initiated programs, and issued executive actions to achieve this objective.

Joseph Chamie is a consulting demographer, a former director of the United Nations Population Division, and author of various publications on population issues, including his recent book, “Population Levels, Trends, and Differentials”.

 

A wind farm in the state of Baja California, in Northwestern Mexico. This territory depends on fossil fuels for electricity generation, while the contribution of renewables is still low, but it is gradually moving towards residential solar generation. Credit: Sempra

By Emilio Godoy
MEXICO, Sep 15 2025 (IPS)

Over the past four months, Mexican researcher Nicolás Velázquez has paid around US$23 for electricity, thanks to the photovoltaic system installed in his home in the northern city of Mexicali.

“You can see the direct benefit. My neighbor received a bill over US$400. The problem is the high temperatures, which double demand” from March to August, said Velázquez, coordinator of the  Center for Renewable Energy Studies at the Engineering Institute of the public Autonomous University of Baja California.

Due to the high temperatures in cities such as Mexicali, capital of the northwestern state of Baja California, people need air conditioning systems during the summer, which increases electricity consumption in a state with 3.77 million inhabitants, affected by a shortage of infrastructure and generation.“Distributed generation is better for us. It is done by Mexican companies. We import the technology, but there is a chain of Mexican participation. We participate from engineering onwards, activating the economy to a certain level, helping the residential sector”–Nicolás Velázquez.

In late August, residents of several neighborhoods in Mexicali blocked the highway between that city and neighboring Tijuana due to a lack of electricity.

In an attempt to alleviate the situation, the Mexican government launched the Techos Solares del Bienestar (Solar Roofs for Welfare) program in March, aimed at low-income homeowners who pay high rates and consume between 400 and 1,000 kilowatt hours between July and August, so they receive solar panels for their homes in Mexicali and the neighboring municipality of San Felipe.

It is one of the steps to relaunch the energy transition to less polluting sources that the previous government halted in 2018.

The initial plan is to install solar panels in 5,500 homes in Mexicali with an investment of around US$10 million. The ultimate goal is to cover 150,000 homes by 2030. The scheme promises to reduce electricity bills from 49% to 89%.

For Velázquez, the central question revolves around the advisability of resorting to centralized or distributed generation, which consists of electricity production by systems of many small generation sources close to the end consumer.

“Distributed generation is better for us. It is done by Mexican companies. We import the technology, but there is a chain of Mexican participation. We participate from engineering onwards, activating the economy to a certain level, helping the residential sector,” he said from Mexicali.

In his opinion, “there has to be a balance between centralized and distributed generation, because there will not be a single solution. More energy justice is achieved through distributed generation.”

In Mexico, home to some 129 million people, there are at least 12,000 communities without electricity and some 9,000 homes without connection to the national grid, a quarter of which are located in Mexicali, which had 1.05 million inhabitants according to the 2020 census.

Small-scale or distributed generation is on the rise in the country.

Since 2007, the government’s Energy Regulatory Commission has authorized 518,019 licenses for a distributed energy generation capacity of 4,497 megawatts (MW). In 2024, it approved 106,934 interconnections for 1,086 MW.

The western state of Jalisco and the northern states of Nuevo León and Chihuahua top the list, while Baja California ranks 14th among the 32 Mexican states.

In July, the government’s National Energy Commission updated the regulations for interconnected self-consumption for installations between 0.7 and 20 MW, which expands the margin for distributed generation, also known as citizen generation.

Solar panels in a community in the municipality of Ensenada, in the northwestern state of Baja California. The existing microgrid in that town provides electricity to the small community. Credit: Secihti

More promises

The energy policy of president Claudia Sheinbaum, in office since October 1, has so far been marked more by proposals than by concrete actions, and Baja California is no exception to this dynamic.

Her government will allocate US$12.3 billion for electricity generation, US$7.5 billion for transmission infrastructure, and US$3.6 billion for decentralized photovoltaic production in homes.

The plan would add 21,893 MW to the national energy matrix, reaching 37.8% clean energy from the current 22.5%, so that the state-owned Federal Electricity Commission (CFE) would hold 54% of the market, with the rest going to private and individual entities.

On August 26, the president announced the construction of two solar thermal plants in the state of Baja California Sur, which shares a peninsula with Baja California, with a public investment of US$800 million to generate more than 100 MW. The territory is also isolated from the national grid and suffers from a chronic energy deficit.

Solar thermal energy converts solar radiation into electricity using mirrors to generate steam and drive turbines, as well as enabling energy storage.

The CFE plans to tender phase II of the Puerto Peñasco photovoltaic plant, in the town of the same name in the northern state of Sonora, with a capacity of 300 MW and 10.3 MW of battery backup. The first 120 MW phase of this facility has been operating since 2023. Completed in 2026, it will contribute 1,000 MW at a cost of US$1.6 billion.

However, the Mexican government continues to promote fossil fuels, despite the urgency of phasing them out, as it seeks to strengthen the CFE and the state-owned Petróleos Mexicanos.

All of this impacts places such as Baja California, where 16 public and private power plants operate, with an installed capacity of 3,461 MW, including three wind farms with more than 300 MW of capacity and three solar farms with 50 MW.

The private company Sempra Infraestructura, a subsidiary of the US company Sempra, is building a wind farm with a capacity of 300 MW, which is expected to be operational in 2026. In addition, CFE operates a 340 MW geothermal plant.

Despite its shortcomings, the state exports around 1,100 MW to the neighboring US state of California and imports around 400 MW. Baja California could produce 6,550 MW of solar power, 3,495 MW of wind power, and 2,000 MW of geothermal power.

In addition, CFE is building two combined-cycle power plants in Baja California that burn gas and generate steam to drive turbines, which would reduce blackouts.

The country faces insufficient production to meet annual demand growth of about 4% and an obsolete power grid.

In the first half of 2025, the country generated 310.49 terawatt-hours, virtually the same as during the same period last year. Some sources, such as gas, hydroelectric, wind, and photovoltaic, increased, but others, such as thermoelectric and nuclear, decreased.

In Mexico, electricity generation depends mainly on fossil gas, followed by hydroelectricity and nuclear energy. Renewable sources have a capacity of 33,517 MW, but only contribute one-fifth of the electricity produced.

Energy map of the northern Mexican state of Baja California. Electricity generation is not enough to meet growing demand, causing frequent blackouts. Credit: Government of Baja California

New schemes

Baja California’s 2022-2027 Energy Program consists of four strategies, including providing access to electricity to remote communities and unregulated housing, as well as promoting the rapid transition to decarbonization and the use of clean energies.

In addition, it envisions eight outcomes, including the promotion of two annual microgrid power generation projects for isolated communities and a 3% increase in alternative electricity generation. However, there is no evidence of progress toward these goals.

If it so desired, the Mexican government could transform its national electricity subsidy of more than US$5 billion annually into distributed generation.

The Universal Electricity Service Fund is a case in point. Intended to cover marginalized communities, available data indicate that it has covered more than 1,000 municipalities out of a total of 2,469, including two in Baja California, since 2019.

Velázquez proposed that these funds could finance solar panels and microgrids.

“Year after year, they give a subsidy, but if these families were provided with a photovoltaic system, it would solve the problem at its root. We need to look for more far-reaching measures; the actions have to be different,” he said.

In December 2023, during the climate summit in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, Mexico joined the Global Renewables and Energy Efficiency Pledge, which consists of tripling alternative installed capacity and doubling the energy efficiency rate by 2030. In comparison, Sheinbaum’s plans fall short.