Agrégateur de flux

Sovereignty is often spoken of as something that can be defended, negotiated or restored. Syria, however, forces a far more uncomfortable question: what happens when sovereignty itself collapses — not in theory, but in practice?   After more than a decade of war, sanctions and fragmentation, Syria stands as one of the starkest examples of what the erosion of sovereignty looks like in the twenty-first century. The Sovereignty Index developed by the International Burke Institute places Syria near the very bottom of the global ranking — not as a political judgement, but as a reflection of structural reality. Across nearly every domain that defines a functioning state, Syrian sovereignty has been hollowed out.   Politically, Syria remains internationally recognized, but recognition masks a far more fractured internal landscape. Authority is uneven, contested and often symbolic outside Damascus. Multiple foreign military forces operate on Syrian territory, decisions of international institutions are selectively ignored, and large parts of the country remain outside effective central control. Elections and constitutional reforms have been announced, yet public trust is fragile and consensus elusive. Sovereignty, in this context, exists more on paper than on the ground.   Economic sovereignty has fared even worse. Syria’s economy has been reduced to survival mode. GDP per capita is among the lowest globally, foreign reserves are minimal, and dependence on imports for food, fuel and basic goods is overwhelming. The national currency circulates alongside dollars, euros, liras and rials, reflecting the breakdown of monetary authority. Economic policy is constrained not only by sanctions, but by the destruction of infrastructure, capital flight and demographic collapse. A sovereign economy cannot function when production, trade and finance are structurally incapacitated.   Technological sovereignty is virtually absent. Research and development spending is negligible, digital infrastructure is fragile, and national platforms barely function beyond limited government portals. Internet access remains inconsistent, public digital services are fragmented, and nearly all advanced equipment and software is imported. In Syria, technology does not empower the state; it merely patches gaps in an environment shaped by scarcity and instability.   Information sovereignty follows a similar pattern. State media operate under heavy control, but rely on foreign platforms and infrastructure. Cybersecurity capacity is rudimentary, national data systems are weak, and digital dependence is near total. Control exists, but resilience does not. In such conditions, information sovereignty becomes a tool of containment rather than a foundation for national coherence.   And yet, Syria’s story is not one of total erasure. Cultural sovereignty remains one of the country’s last enduring pillars. Ancient cities, religious pluralism, architectural heritage and culinary traditions continue to anchor Syrian identity. Despite widespread destruction, UNESCO sites, museums, crafts and collective memory persist. Cultural survival has become a form of resistance — not against external powers alone, but against the disappearance of the state itself.   Cognitive sovereignty, though severely damaged, has not vanished. Literacy remains relatively high given the circumstances, and the tradition of education endures even as institutions struggle. Universities operate under extreme constraints, research capacity is limited, and talent continues to emigrate. But the human capital that once sustained Syria has not been fully extinguished — it has been displaced.   Militarily, Syria retains armed forces and mobilization capacity, but autonomy is sharply limited. Equipment is largely imported, strategic decisions are coordinated with allies, and foreign military presence remains decisive. The army exists, but sovereignty over force is shared, negotiated and constrained. In this sense, Syria illustrates a crucial distinction: having armed forces is not the same as possessing military sovereignty.   Taken together, Syria represents a condition that is rarely acknowledged in international discourse: post-sovereign fragility. The state exists, but cannot fully govern. Borders exist, but cannot be fully controlled. Institutions exist, but cannot deliver. Sovereignty has not been surrendered — it has been exhausted.   As the International Burke Institute prepares to release the full Sovereignty Index for all UN member states later this year, Syria’s position will serve as a warning rather than an anomaly. Sovereignty is not destroyed overnight. It erodes through war, fragmentation, institutional decay and prolonged external dependency. Once lost, it cannot be restored by declarations alone.   From my perspective as an expert affiliated with the International Burke Institute and an active participant in initiatives aimed at strengthening sovereignty worldwide, Syria demonstrates the ultimate cost of state collapse. Sovereignty is not merely about independence from others. It is about the capacity to act, to protect, to provide and to endure.   Syria reminds us that sovereignty, when stripped of institutions, resources and cohesion, becomes a memory rather than a mechanism. Rebuilding it will require not only reconstruction funds and diplomatic engagement, but something far harder to restore: trust between the state and its people, and unity within a society that has learned to survive without either.

Dear Colleagues,

As I reflect on my first full year as Chair, I am so proud of the work we have done and especially for the warm support I continue to enjoy. This supportive spirit was very much on display at our last annual conference in Liverpool, hosted by Liverpool John Moores University.

The programme, so expertly put together by our Events Working Group, track conveners and our UACES office staff highlighted different facets of Europe in interesting times. This conference facilitated conversations about the trajectories of European integration and transformation, governance, especially in the health and digital spheres, the importance of law and history to our understanding of the current moment and the utility of critical perspectives. Beyond the academic debates and discussions, the real world implications of our work and activities, especially how our field can respond to a rapidly changing global environment.

The local organising team went all out for us, and I want to extend heartfelt thanks to all of our Liverpool colleagues for their hard work and hospitality.

Aside from the main conference, the Graduate Forum Research Conference in Athens and the Doctoral Training Academy in Madrid were important reminders of how central PhD researchers and early-career colleagues are to the future of European Studies. I am pleased to note that this was yet another successful year and I am thankful to Sydney and the team for leading on our early career activities.

This has also been a year of change within UACES governance. We have said thank you and goodbye to colleagues whose terms on the Committee and in Officer roles have come to an end and welcomed new trustees who are already bringing fresh ideas and energy. I am grateful to everyone who gives their time and expertise to UACES governance, often quietly and on top of already heavy workloads.

Our journals, JCMS and Contemporary European Politics, continue to thrive, with strong rankings and a growing global readership that reflects the quality and breadth of scholarship produced by this community and of course the excellent work of the editors.

Looking ahead, there is much to be excited about. In 2026, we will build on the success of Liverpool as we prepare future Annual Conferences, including our 56th meeting in Prague hosted by Charles University. Prague promises to be a fantastic setting for conversations about how Europe is constructed, contested and reimagined in national discourses and I hope many of you will already be thinking about submitting those panel and paper proposals.

We continue to work on strengthen the infrastructure that underpins our scholarly community. In that spirit and with members of the committee, I undertook a review of how to continue support through Research Networks in a very constraining financial environment. In the new year, we will be relaunching this funding stream in a way that offers more flexible, sustainable backing for collaborative projects and better showcases the diversity of work across European Studies. Alongside this, we are looking at how to expand our awards programme to recognise the different ways in which colleagues at all career stages contribute to our field. Throughout, our priority remains to support research, teaching and impact that is intellectually ambitious, inclusive and outward facing.

None of this would be possible without you.

And to you a massive thank you.

As we approach the holiday season and the turn of the calendar year, I hope you are able to find some time for rest, joy and the people who matter to you.

I look forward to our many collaborations in the coming year.

With warm wishes,

Toni
Chair, UACES

The post End Of Year Letter From UACES Chair appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

***

Fotó: Szórád Tamás

Kritische Rohstoffe sind zu einem Schlüsselthema der Trump-Administration gewor­den. Mit einer Mischung aus Deregulierung, staatlicher Steuerung und Finanzierung will sie die amerikanische Rohstoffindustrie ausbauen. Denn die hohe Ab­hängigkeit der USA von chinesischen Rohstoffen zwingt Washington bei Verhandlungen mit Peking zu schmerzhaften Zugeständnissen. Trump nutzt die Roh­stofffrage nun selbst als geopolitischen Hebel, um seine handels- und sicherheits­politischen Interessen global geltend zu machen. Während multilaterale Foren wie die Minerals Secu­rity Partnership brachliegen, setzt Trump auch im Rohstoffsektor auf bilaterale Deals. Bei der Sicherung kritischer Rohstoffe konkurriert Europa mittlerweile nicht mehr nur mit China, sondern auch mit den USA. Daher sollte die Europäische Union (EU) ihre Rohstoff­souveränität entschlossener stärken, ohne sich bei Fragen der Nachhaltigkeit und regelbasierter Kooperation von Trump in die Defensive drängen zu lassen.

Kim Jong‑un looks so fat that if news broke tomorrow of his death from cardiac failure—amid cheese, cigars, and a stalled treadmill—the world would barely blink; many would simply shrug and say, “Well, that tracks.” Public appearances and open‑source estimates place the supreme leader at roughly 170 cm in height and around 130–140 kg in weight, a profile consistent with severe obesity. Add to that a long‑running pattern of heavy smoking, alcohol use, calorie‑dense diets, irregular sleep, chronic stress, and prolonged sedentary work, and the cardiovascular math becomes uncomfortably straightforward. In an ordinary political system these would remain private failings; in a hyper‑personalized autocracy where a single body doubles as the state’s command center, however, they become public risks—and the country itself ends up hostage to one man’s cholesterol.

Authoritarian regimes often project an image of durability. Measured against the resilience that flows from democratic accountability, however, autocracies tend to be more brittle than they appear: they look solid until they suddenly are not. Rather than eroding gradually, they are prone to fracture once critical thresholds are crossed. History offers a consistent pattern. When a leader’s health deteriorates at the top of a highly personalized system, the effects propagate outward through the state—from Joseph Stalin’s strokes and paranoia distorting late‑stage governance, to Mao Zedong’s physical decline hollowing out decision‑making at the end of the Cultural Revolution, to Hugo Chávez’s prolonged illness paralyzing succession and policy in Venezuela, and to Egypt’s King Farouk, morbidly obese, dying young of heart failure after years of excess.

Taken together, these precedents underscore a sobering lesson for today’s axis of autocracies. China, Russia, Iran, North Korea (often grouped as the so‑called “CRINK” states), and increasingly Venezuela all face succession risks that could generate abrupt discontinuity. Pyongyang, however, remains distinct. Extreme personalization of power, the absence of routinized succession mechanisms, and the centrality of nuclear weapons compress uncertainty rather than allowing it to unfold gradually. This makes any leadership shock uniquely costly: decisions that elsewhere play out over months could be forced into days, with nuclear security, alliance management, and great‑power signaling converging simultaneously.

Were Kim to die suddenly on an ordinary day, succession ambiguity, elevated military alert postures, and nuclear command questions would surface at the same time. The situation is further complicated by the lack of transparent health disclosure, delegated authority, or institutionalized handover—constraints that narrow elite bargaining space and push the system rapidly toward one of three familiar pathways. Two plausibly involve internal stabilization: the “Bloodline Restoration” Scenario, in which the Kim dynasty re‑consolidates power around a designated heir (possibly Kim Jong‑un’s daughter, Kim Ju‑ae); or the “Collective Politburo Governance” Scenario, in which elites coalesce into a technocratic leadership coalition. Absent either, the remaining outcome is the “Warlordization” Scenario—factionalized military chaos and internal collapse, with no coherent authority able to negotiate with or control events.

If Kim’s obesity‑related health risks intensify yet sheer luck keeps him upright through 2026, and President Trump floats a tongue‑in‑cheek confidence‑building gesture—say, an effective weight‑loss drug to keep Kim Jong‑un literally alive, repurposed as diplomatic leverage (sigh)—it would merely confirm how thin the margin for error has become.

And if Kim’s uncontrollable waistline were to achieve what special operations could not, even the most optimistically stable outcome—where President Trump still maintains a hotline with a familiar counterpart, the Kim dynasty—would read like a strange footnote. Washington would not be negotiating with a general or a committee, but with the dynasty’s next custodian—perhaps facing Kim’s daughter, Kim Ju‑ae, across the table—where a Barbie doll slides forward as an icebreaker, along with talk of opening a Toys“R”Us in Pyongyang.

Democracies outlast autocracies thanks to fewer fragile bodies at the top

For policymakers in democracies—where sustainable, healthy lifestyles are not only possible but institutionally supported—the contrast with autocracy carries a dry irony. When power is dispersed and institutions absorb shocks, one leader’s cholesterol no longer qualifies as a strategic variable. After all the grand theory and high geopolitics, the conclusion is stubbornly mundane: democracy lasts not because it is wiser, but because its risks are distributed across many bodies. It is, in the end, dispersed biological durability—not ideology or strategy—that makes democracy more endurable than autocracy.

Thus, this structural advantage is worth taking seriously in 2026 for decision‑makers in democracies. If there is a New Year’s resolution worth making, it is this modest one. Cut back on alcohol, drink more water. Walk between meetings. Treat exercise not as lifestyle branding but as occupational hygiene. Metabolic discipline is not self‑help; it is risk management. Strategic discipline, in turn, begins with bodily discipline. And because power is not trapped in one body, democracies retain a merciful escape hatch: if the job becomes unbearable or the public turns hostile, leaders can step aside, retire, or lose an election, rather than allowing a failing body to linger as a national‑security variable.

The world has no shortage of contingency plans. What it lacks are authoritarian leaders secure enough in both their institutions and their health not to turn their own waistlines into a geopolitical variable.

Face à l’augmentation des risques sécuritaires, la protection balistique n’est plus seulement réservée aux forces armées. Aujourd’hui, de nombreuses autres personnes s’intéressent de plus en plus à ces équipements. Les plus en vogue sont les journalistes en zone sensible, les agents privés et les professionnels de la sécurité. Quelques fois, il s’agit simplement d’un particulier […]

Schon wieder wurde der Abschluss des EU-Handelsabkommen mit den Mercosur-Staaten geschoben - auch, weil Europäier in Lateinamerika bloß einen Absatzmarkt sehen, sagt Lateinamerika-Experte Günther Maihold. Freuen dürfte das China.

The third Disability Rights Week in the European Parliament takes place from 1 to 5 December 2025. On the initiative of the EMPL Committee, all Committees, Policy Departments, Vice-Presidents, Questors and Directorates General are invited to organise hearings and other types of activities focusing on the rights of persons with disabilities in their respective policy and administrative areas.

The rights of persons with disabilities have been high on the agenda in the past mandate and the EU and its institutions have been very active in that respect. Many flagship initiatives stemming from the Commission's Disability Strategy 2021 to 2030 have been put in place but we are still awaiting an update on its second half. The UN CRPD Committee put forward a report on the EU in Spring this year, containing recommendations how the EU and its institutions can better comply with the UN CRPD and thus gave us homework. The forthcoming Disability Rights Week is an excellent opportunity to discuss these issues with, and to learn from persons with disabilities and their representative organisations.

Disclaimer: Committee events and workshops, publically webstreamed, are listed below. For further information, please check the DRW 2025 programme.

Location : Brussels
President Metsola’s video for the Disability Rights Week 2025
Disability Rights Job Interview from Chair
Programme
EP research publications in the area of disability rights
Research for EMPL Committee - Independent living of persons with disabilities in the European Union
Events taking place during the 3rd Disability Rights Week
1 December, 15:00-16:00 - AGRI Exchange of Views: "Promoting the inclusion of persons with disabilities in the agricultural sector : The example of La Canopée in Belgium"
     Webstreaming
     AGRI highlight (with programme)
1 December, 16:00-17:30 - HOUS/EMPL Joint Public Hearing: “Inclusive Housing for All: Accessibility, Disability Rights, Vulnerable Groups and social inclusion in EU Housing Policy”
     Hearing event
     Webstreaming
1 December, 16:00-18:30 - SANT Exchange of Views on several topics: "Disabilities following cancer", "Harmonizing newborn screenings for early detection and disability support", Study Presentation on Rare Diseases
     Event highlight
2 December, 9:00-16:30 - Quaestors Ms Lexmann and Mr Angel & DG ITEC: "Digital Accessibility Day event"
     Programme
2 December, 10:30-11:10, TRAN Exchange of Views: "From ‘Mobility-Restricted’ to "Mobility Redefined"
     TRAN highlight
2 December, 11:00-12:30 - MEP Jagna Marczulajtis-Walczak's Conference: "Why is independent living so important for persons with disabilities?"
     MEP Profile for Jagna Marczulajtis-Walczak
2 December, 14:30-15:15 - CULT Exchange of Views: “Using sport as a tool for empowerment”
     Webstreaming
     CULT highlight
2 December, 14.30-16.00 - Policy Department/DG IUST (for PETI): Annual Workshop on 'The UN CRPD Concluding Observations on the EU report, from the perspective of petitions received"
     Webstreaming
     PETI highlight
2 December, 16:00-17:00 - FEMM Exchange of Views with EUROFOUND: "Integration of Women with Disabilities in the Labour Market"
     Webstreaming
2 December, 16:15-17:00 - DEVE Exchange of Views: 'Global Partnerships for inclusive employment and ending segregation of persons with disabilities'
     Webstreaming
3 December, 9:00 - 10:00, DROI exchange of views: 'Towards a Disability Action Plan in EU External Action: a state of play'
     Webstreaming
3 December, 9:30-10:00 - IMCO Exchange of Views: Accessibility – state-of-play and way forward in light of UN CRPD recommendations
     Webstreaming
3 December, 14:30-15:15 - ITRE Exchange of views with the European Commission's DG JUST: European accessibility Act, assistive technologies and interoperability
     Webstreaming
3 December, 14:30-16:00 - EMPL Public Hearing: “Quality support for persons with disabilities and carers of persons with disabilities at the workplace and in the community”
     Webstreaming
3 December, 16:15-17:45 - Policy Department/EMPL/DG CASP - EMPL Workshop: Independent living of persons with disabilities in the European Union - Implementation of Article 19 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
     Webstreaming
3 December, 18:30 (Open to public on registration) - DG COMM/Civil Outreach Unit - Movie “Deaf /Sorda”, nominated for the 2026 LUX audience award
     Registration
4 December, 10:30-11:30 - JURI Public Hearing: “Legal capacity and supported decision-making mechanisms of adults”: Discussion around the 2023 proposal for a regulation on the protection of adults"
     Hearing event
4 December, 10:30 - 16:00, Quaestor M. Lexmann & DG COMM/ Dir for visitors - Workshop : “Disability and Accessibility to Art – A workshop on how to engage with persons with disabilities through art” with Belgian partner organsiation Zonnelied
     Registration
4 December, 11:45-12:45 - LIBE Exchange of Views: “The rights, freedoms and remaining gaps in the protection of persons with disabilities in the EU”
     LIBE highlight
4-5 December (Charlemagne) - European Commission with European Disability Forum: European Disability Day (Registration required)
     More information
Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Several international and European human rights organizations along with hundreds of social media activists took part in a huge social media campaign in front of the European Parliament in an attempt to raise awareness regarding the human rights situation in Sudan and the use of chemical weapons against civilians following the report of France 24 ,the French channel together with a euronews report that showed members of EUB network which demonstrates the use of chemical weapons against civilians by the Sudanese Armed forces.

The media campaign in Europe comes as a continuous action to support the work of several human rights organizations which called upon the EU and international community to tell the Sudanese Armed forces to stop the use of chemical weapons and to call for ceasefire and peace as well as bring humanitarian aid to a suffering population.

It is also an action to inform young people in Europe and beyond about this forgotten crisis which caused the death of more than 150,000 people, the famine of more than 25 million people and the displacement of more than 14 million people.

Andy Vermaut, journalist and human rights defender, regretted that “Egypt, our neighbor across the sands, has aligned itself with the Sudanese Armed Forces, offering support that sustains the cycle of violence—support driven by borders and waters shared, yet prolonging the very chaos that drives refugees to their doors, over two million strong, fleeing homes turned to ash.”

According to Vermaut, “Iran extends its reach, arming the army with drones and weapons that tear through communities—exporting turmoil to a land already scarred by division, where ambition overshadows aid. Turkey and Qatar, too, lend their hands—through arms, through influence—turning Sudan’s internal strife into a theater of international ambition, where the powerful play games and the powerless pay the price; where alliances meant for stability instead fuel the fires of destruction.”

Vermaut continued, “And then there are the weapons that haunt our collective conscience: reports of chemical agents, chlorine gas deployed by the Sudanese army against its own people—choking the air of hope in places like Khartoum, violating every principle of human decency, echoing the horrors of wars we vowed never to repeat.”

Sadaf Daneshizadeh, representative of “Prosperous Iran”, joined this campaign by highlighting that “The Sudanese conflict must be analyzed not only as an internal crisis, but also within the broader context of regional dynamics. Several external actors, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, appear to be playing an indirect but significant role, notably through military cooperation and the transfer of capabilities, such as drone systems. These interactions, even when presented as strictly bilateral or defensive, contribute to the prolongation of hostilities and the worsening of the humanitarian situation.”

Manel Msalmi, women’s rights advocate and human rights advisor at Milton Friedman Institute, mentioned the report of France 24 and stressed the fact that “We all share a joint duty to uphold the rights and dignity of every individual, regardless of their location. We must not choose silence in the face of inaction; rather, we should raise our voices and ensure that the plight of the Sudanese people is acknowledged. To advocate for and support the Sudanese population, it is crucial to stay updated on the circumstances. This report aims to draw the world’s attention on the swiftly changing situation, underline the dangers of a further decline, and stress the immediate actions that are necessary to avoid further escalation.”

All the participants called for an immediate action, a ceasefire and a peace plan which guarantees access to humanitarian aid, food and shelter and put an end to the huge displacement crisis.

By Francesco Duina (Bates College, USA)

For decades, the EU has projected its internal legal frameworks onto the world. It has done so indirectly through the Brussels Effect, whereby countries and trading blocs in other parts of the world pre-emptively adopt EU internal standards in order to facilitate trade with the EU. And it has done so directly, by way of imposing its own standards through trade agreements. Given this, most observers of the EU have viewed it as an ‘exporter’ of norms – and this has represented perhaps its most important form of international power.

The possibility of the EU importing standards from other countries or blocs has been given little consideration. Instead, attention has consistently gone to the continued production of EU internal regulations which, once in place, have had significant external effects. The EU’s unabated propensity to regulate has sustained this interest: its various efforts to slow down or even reverse its regulatory output have come and gone, with little impact on the overall picture. Between 2019 and 2024 alone, for instance, the EU passed 13,000 legal acts. The EU has in turn relished the benefits associated with being the ‘first mover’ in new areas such as, say, digital markets and environmental policy: it knows that those who regulate first set the terms and that those who follow must at least consider them, especially if the first mover enjoys a huge internal market. These dynamics have turned the EU into a regulatory juggernaut committed to its internal standards and historically eager to have other countries and blocs adopt them.

The Animal Welfare Case

A recent development in animal welfare policy represents, however, a noteworthy departure from this pattern. I explained how and why this happened in my recent JCMS article. The EU – widely viewed as already having a wide-reaching regulatory framework in this policy area – was about to announce four long-awaited proposals in late 2023 on transport, slaughter, labelling, and the housing of animals. The Commission had determined that its existing frameworks, developed over the previous 25 years or so, required modernization. Equally important, major polls, the European Citizens’ Initiative ‘End the Age Cage’ that was supported by 170 non-governmental organisations and nearly 1.5 million citizens across the EU, and various protests, electoral campaigns and other civil society initiatives had put pressure on the EU. More broadly, the measures were consistent with its wider effort to ‘green’ agricultural trade.

Crucially, and not surprisingly, the four proposals would have come with ‘conditionality’ expectations: the requirement that trade partners exporting products into the EU comply in their treatment of animals with the standards set in those laws. An announcement by the Commission on the proposals was expected by the end of December 2023. But starting in the summer of that year the momentum slowed. Then, in her State of the Union speech in September, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen signalled that something might go astray: there was no mention of animal welfare in her list of priorities. At the end of 2023, the Commission finally presented a proposal only on transport. The surprise turnaround caused significant consternation. The media publicised it, and NGOs and other interested parties voiced their objections (with, for instance, Eurogroup for Animals putting up posters in Brussels’ subway system) that continued well into late 2024.

What can explain this unexpected turn of events? Several factors surely played a role. These included powerful farmers’ protests against more agricultural regulation and unfair international competition, a diminished interest in the Commission’s Green Deal at a time when conservative populist parties seemed poised to do well in national and EU elections, and food security concerns fuelled by the war in Ukraine.

But the pending ratification of the EU-Mercosur trade deal (twenty years in the making) also played a (late-stage) role. In particular, Commission officials worried – whether justifiably or not – that the proposals’ conditionality clauses for exporters to the EU would have risked upsetting the South American countries given their lower standards.  These concerns led those officials to conclude that only one of the four proposals could go ahead. The EU-Mercosur trade deal thus became the ‘nail in the coffin’ for animal welfare progress in the EU.

What is crucial to emphasize here is that this meant not only a derailment of internal EU policy but, in effect, a willingness to accept that the lower standards of trading partners should be a cause of that derailment. Put differently, rather than a rule ‘giver’ the EU became in essence a rule ‘taker.’ Close attention should therefore go to how, exactly, Commission officials reached their position.

My analysis highlights the confluence of three dynamics. The first were institutional: competition amongst three directorates-general, with Directorate General Trade prevailing in its push to conclude the deal over the preferences of Director General Health (which supported the proposals) and Director General AGRI (which demanded that, should the proposals be pursued, conditionality had to be imposed). The second set of dynamics were temporal: animal welfare came to be seen as the ‘last straw’ in terms of EU demands on Mercosur especially because the EU had just months before greatly frustrated the Mercosur countries with extensive demands on deforestation. The third were symbolic: the Commission had made increasingly vocal public commitments to conclude several major trade deals in the very near future.

The Broader Lessons

The derailment of EU animal welfare policy thus offers us an opportunity to observe a sort of reversal of the EU’s ability to project its regulatory power. As such, it also prompts us to reflect on two broader points related to the nexus between EU trade policy and its regulatory power.

First, when it comes to trade, the EU may no longer be fundamentally concerned with the projection of regulatory power. We know that the Commission has already asserted, in part given its new Open Strategic Autonomy direction, the importance of geopolitical priorities as it pursues trade opportunities across the world. Regulatory power may become a victim of this new approach.

Second, there may be subject areas where the EU will struggle to impose its regulatory standards onto its trading partners, even if it wants to do so. There is in fact something particular about animal welfare that also applies to policy areas like the environment and labour standards. The target is not the physical standards of finished products that exporters wish to send to the EU. Instead, it is the processes associated with the production of those products. These are much harder to observe and measure, and ultimately make intrusive demands on the trading partners. The EU will therefore likely find it rather difficult to project its standards in those areas.

Francesco Duina is Charles A. Dana Professor of Sociology at Bates College (USA). His research focuses on the relationship between the economy, culture, and politics.  He co-edited Standardizing the World: EU Trade Policy and the Road to Convergence, published by Oxford University Press.

Website: https://www.bates.edu/faculty/profile/francesco-g-duina/

 

The post Always a Norm Exporter? The Case of Animal Welfare Policy and Trade appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

What could be more festive than reading about alien worlds and malevolent AI leaders? Check out this year’s recommended reads from cybersecurity experts.

In Moscow, an annual televised direct line with President Vladimir Putin, combined with a major press conference, brought together journalists and citizens against the backdrop of ongoing fighting in the special military operation zone and renewed discussions in the European Union about confiscating frozen Russian assets. Strategic Initiative on the Battlefield "Immediately after our troops pushed the enemy out of the Kursk region, the strategic initiative fully and completely passed into the hands of the Russian Armed Forces. Our troops are advancing along the entire line of contact — faster in some areas, slower in others, but everywhere the enemy is retreating.” Situation in the Special Military Operation Zone The president reported the capture of Seversk, calling it a key settlement that opens operational routes toward Sloviansk, one of the main fortified areas in the region. "Krasny Liman will be taken in the very near future. Fifty percent of the city is already under our control. From there, the movement will continue further south, toward Sloviansk.” He also described the capture of Krasnoarmeysk as a significant operational success, calling it a strong staging area for future offensive operations.

The policy dialogue on “Transnational Repression (TNR): Mapping Trends and Improving Responses” is jointly organised by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN Human Rights), the European Parliament Sub-committee on Human Rights (DROI) and the European External Action Service (EEAS), in collaboration with the Tackling TNR Europe Civil Society Working Group.
TNR constitutes an increasing danger both by posing systemic threats to human rights, civic space, democratic institutions and the rule of law and by frequently undermining national security, sovereignty and legal order of host states.

Policy makers and experts from EU institutions, the UN, Member States, civil society and academia will come together to exchange views about their findings and experiences, and explore ways to improve responses to TNR, including through policy initiatives, synergies and collaborations. This is a concrete follow-up action by DROI on the recently adopted by the Parliament report on Addressing TNR of Human Rights Defenders (HRDs).
Location : European Parliament (ASP 1G2)
Programme
Live streaming
Key takeaways of the Expert Workshop on Transnational Repression
Photos
Poster
Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Die Europäische Kommission erwägt seit 2024, die Zuständigkeiten und Aktivitäten von Europol auszubauen. Das Personal der Agentur soll dabei verdoppelt und ihr Mandat um drei Themen erweitert werden – Sabotage, Desinformation und hybride Bedrohungen. Angepeilt werden eine noch zu definierende Umgestaltung von Euro­pol in eine »schlagkräftige« Polizeibehörde und eine stärkere Kontrolle über die Agentur. Diese Vorhaben, die auf politischen wie bürokratischen Überlegungen be­ruhen, kamen ohne vorherige Konsultation der EU-Mitgliedstaaten und technische Abschätzung zustande. 2026 will die Kommission den Mitgliedstaaten einen Vorschlag für die Mandatsänderung vorlegen. Der Schwerpunkt einer Weiterentwicklung von Europol sollte jedoch nicht unbedingt auf einem neuen Mandat liegen, sondern sich vorrangig nach dem operativen Bedarf richten, den die nationalen Strafverfolgungsbehörden bei der Bekämpfung von Drogenhandel, Cyberkriminalität und Terro­rismus haben. In diesen Kernbereichen sind Personalaufstockung und Innovation er­forderlich, jedoch nicht zwingend durch eine Mandatsreform. Generell bedarf es bei der EU einer langfristigen Strategie für die künftige Architektur der inneren Sicher­heit, an der sich eine Ausgestaltung von Europol orientieren sollte.

United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions are under political and financial pressure. In his letter dated 10 October 2025, UN Secretary-General António Guterres called on nine missions to prepare contingency plans for spending cuts of up to 25 per cent. The peacekeeping mission in Cyprus (UNFICYP), established in 1964, shows why Europe has a fundamental interest in the UN remaining engaged.

The conflict between the Republic of Cyprus in the Greek-speaking south and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, the Turkish-speaking region recognised only by Ankara, has been largely frozen since the de facto division of the island. This certainly has also been due to UNFICYP’s presence. Since the 1974 ceasefire, the mission has controlled the “Green Line”, a 180-kilometre strip separating the two parts that is intended to prevent direct confrontation.

Nevertheless, the mission continues to record numerous military and civilian violations in and along the buffer zone By doing so, it still prevents “those sparks from bursting into flames”, as Colin Stewart, head of UNFICYP until August 2025, put it. To this day, there still is no direct military contact mechanism between the parties. In fact, the threat perception has increased again on both sides recently.

New impetus for peace efforts

For this reason alone, the European Union and its member states cannot be interested in any further reduction or even a potential withdrawal of the mission. The political process is just beginning to tentatively gain momentum. María Angela Holguín Cuéllar was reappointed as the Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy in May 2025 and is tasked with exploring possibilities for a new round of formal negotiations and breaking the deadlock. 

This is a difficult undertaking. While the UN Security Council continues to pursue a federal solution, Northern Cyprus and Turkey have been promoting a two-state solution for years. However, the election of Turkish Cypriot President Tufan Erhürman in October has raised hopes that the door could open for new negotiations under UN auspices. The first trilateral meeting between him, the President of the Republic of Cyprus, and Holguín has just taken place. But a rapprochement is likely to take time. Confidence-building measures and the safeguarding of peace by the UN therefore remain essential.

The essential role of the UN

As the Republic of Cyprus is a member of the EU, the Union itself can hardly act as an impartial mediator. It therefore primarily supports the UN-led political process. The EU’s options in the security domain are also constrained. A separate EU mission – as is currently being considered for Lebanon following the withdrawal of UNIFIL – would be unrealistic, if only because of the tense relationship between Greece and Turkey, both of which, alongside the United Kingdom, are the guarantor powers for Cyprus. 

Therefore, the stabilising function of the UN mission remains essential for the foreseeable future. It also creates the framework for practical rapprochement, for example through the projects of the Technical Committees. Under joint Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leadership and facilitated by the UN, these initiatives promote understanding between the two communities, and the EU provides a large portion of the funding. 

UNFICYP is in a better financial position than many larger UN missions, as Greece and the Republic of Cyprus cover about half of the budget. However, staffing and operational cuts will be necessary. At the same time, the raison d'être of a mission that has been running for decades is repeatedly being called into question. At the end of January 2026, the mandate is up for renewal again. Despite all the criticisms from the Turkish government and former leaders in Northern Cyprus, the UN Security Council's position has remained unchanged so far. 

In order to break the deadlock in negotiations, there is a need for more economic engagement from the European side to improve the situation in the north. In the short term, however, EU member states should make it clear that UNFICYP – and UN peacekeeping as a whole – is indispensable.

Peacekeeping-intelligence (PKI) plays a central role in enhancing the safety and security of UN personnel and in supporting mandate implementation, particularly the protection of civilians. Yet despite growing recognition that gender dynamics shape conflict behavior, threat patterns, and community engagement, gender perspectives remain unevenly integrated across PKI institutions, analytical processes, and training systems. This limits missions’ situational awareness, weakens their early-warning capacity, and constrains their operational effectiveness. 

This issue brief examines how gender can be more systematically integrated into PKI across three interrelated dimensions: the representation of women within PKI institutions, the integration of gender perspectives across the PKI cycle, and the design and delivery of PKI training. Drawing on UN policies and more than 100 interviews with personnel across five peacekeeping missions, the brief highlights persistent structural, analytical, and institutional gaps that undermine gender-responsive intelligence. 

The brief argues that integrating gender into PKI is not merely a normative obligation but a core operational requirement. Advancing this agenda requires sustained investment in workforce diversity, analytical methodologies, data systems, training design, and institutional collaboration to strengthen predictive capacity, enhance civilian protection, and improve mission performance. 

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Insights from UN DESA Data on Patterns, Trends, and Misconceptions

President of Russia Vladimir Putin took part in a meeting of the Defense Ministry board, where he delivered a wide-ranging address focused on the military operation in Ukraine, the state of Russia's armed forces, and the broader geopolitical environment. Ukraine, the West, and the Myth of a Big War The Russian leader described the current international situation as tense but rejected claims by Western politicians that Europe faces an inevitable large-scale war with Russia. "In Europe, people are being fed fears about an unavoidable clash with Russia, about the need to prepare for a big war. This is a lie and pure nonsense,”