Agrégateur de flux

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2025 - EP

À partir du 1er janvier prochain, M. Mamdani, un « démocrate-socialiste » assez éloigné des sociaux-démocrates européens, dirigera la capitale financière du monde. Et ce musulman solidaire de la Palestine sera également le maire d'une ville qui compte une population juive à peu près égale à (…) / États-Unis, Élections, Ville

Plus de 84 % des exportations du Mexique se dirigent vers les États-Unis, mais avec la guerre commerciale menée par Donald Trump, le pays pourrait être tenté de trouver de nouveaux débouchés au sein de l’Union européenne.

The post Pour échapper à Trump, le Mexique jette un œil vers l’Europe appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Willkommen bei Rapporteur! Jeden Tag liefern wir Ihnen die wichtigsten Nachrichten und Hintergründe aus der EU- und Europapolitik. Das Wichtigste: Omnibus: EVP und Sozialdemokraten in letzter Verhandlungsrunde, um Lieferketten-Regeln zu retten Budget: EU-Hauptstädte uneins über Zusammenlegung von Agrar- und Regionalfonds im nächsten Siebenjahreshaushalt Parlament: EU-Bürgerbeauftragte Teresa Anjinho wegen Beförderung ihrer engsten Vertrauten in der Kritik […]

How do Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) involved in Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects navigate international pushback, balance political directives with commercial objectives, and comply with intensified Party oversight? This article addresses a key gap in party-state capitalism literature by exploring the under-examined role of reputational governance in shaping the operations of Chinese SOEs abroad. Drawing on interviews and fieldwork in China, Ethiopia, Zambia and Tanzania, we analyze the reputational governance practices of a SOE that spearheaded two flagship railway projects: the Tanzania–Zambia Railway and the Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway. We argue that reputational governance is a core feature of party-state capitalism, with overseas SOEs serving as examples of this unique model, where elements of party loyalty and capitalism coexist.

How do Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) involved in Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects navigate international pushback, balance political directives with commercial objectives, and comply with intensified Party oversight? This article addresses a key gap in party-state capitalism literature by exploring the under-examined role of reputational governance in shaping the operations of Chinese SOEs abroad. Drawing on interviews and fieldwork in China, Ethiopia, Zambia and Tanzania, we analyze the reputational governance practices of a SOE that spearheaded two flagship railway projects: the Tanzania–Zambia Railway and the Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway. We argue that reputational governance is a core feature of party-state capitalism, with overseas SOEs serving as examples of this unique model, where elements of party loyalty and capitalism coexist.

How do Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) involved in Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects navigate international pushback, balance political directives with commercial objectives, and comply with intensified Party oversight? This article addresses a key gap in party-state capitalism literature by exploring the under-examined role of reputational governance in shaping the operations of Chinese SOEs abroad. Drawing on interviews and fieldwork in China, Ethiopia, Zambia and Tanzania, we analyze the reputational governance practices of a SOE that spearheaded two flagship railway projects: the Tanzania–Zambia Railway and the Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway. We argue that reputational governance is a core feature of party-state capitalism, with overseas SOEs serving as examples of this unique model, where elements of party loyalty and capitalism coexist.

The accelerating pace of digitalisation - driven by artificial intelligence (AI), e-commerce, cloud computing, and cryptocurrencies - has significantly increased the global demand for data centres. While these facilities underpin the digital economy, their rapid expansion has created substantial challenges in energy consumption and sustainability. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that data centres accounted for approximately 1–2% of global electricity use in 2022, excluding the additional energy required for associated infrastructure. With the continuing proliferation of AI-driven applications, this trend is expected to intensify dramatically, raising critical concerns regarding carbon emissions, energy security, and the broader environmental impact of digital transformation. As nearly 90% of global data centres are located within G20 countries, the group holds a pivotal position in addressing these challenges. However, considerable disparities exist in the distribution of data centres between and within the members of the group. The United States alone accounts for approximately 46% of global data centres while China follows with ten times fewer facilities. Such concentration amplifies energy consumption pressures and risks deepening global digital and economic inequalities. This policy brief examines the relationship between digitalisation and energy use through the lens of data centre distribution within the G20. It highlights the uneven concentration of data infrastructure and energy demand, revealing significant imbalances in data power and resource allocation. The brief concludes with policy recommendations for fostering climate- and resource-efficient digitalisation, enabling G20 members to align data-driven growth with global sustainability and net-zero objectives.

The accelerating pace of digitalisation - driven by artificial intelligence (AI), e-commerce, cloud computing, and cryptocurrencies - has significantly increased the global demand for data centres. While these facilities underpin the digital economy, their rapid expansion has created substantial challenges in energy consumption and sustainability. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that data centres accounted for approximately 1–2% of global electricity use in 2022, excluding the additional energy required for associated infrastructure. With the continuing proliferation of AI-driven applications, this trend is expected to intensify dramatically, raising critical concerns regarding carbon emissions, energy security, and the broader environmental impact of digital transformation. As nearly 90% of global data centres are located within G20 countries, the group holds a pivotal position in addressing these challenges. However, considerable disparities exist in the distribution of data centres between and within the members of the group. The United States alone accounts for approximately 46% of global data centres while China follows with ten times fewer facilities. Such concentration amplifies energy consumption pressures and risks deepening global digital and economic inequalities. This policy brief examines the relationship between digitalisation and energy use through the lens of data centre distribution within the G20. It highlights the uneven concentration of data infrastructure and energy demand, revealing significant imbalances in data power and resource allocation. The brief concludes with policy recommendations for fostering climate- and resource-efficient digitalisation, enabling G20 members to align data-driven growth with global sustainability and net-zero objectives.

The accelerating pace of digitalisation - driven by artificial intelligence (AI), e-commerce, cloud computing, and cryptocurrencies - has significantly increased the global demand for data centres. While these facilities underpin the digital economy, their rapid expansion has created substantial challenges in energy consumption and sustainability. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that data centres accounted for approximately 1–2% of global electricity use in 2022, excluding the additional energy required for associated infrastructure. With the continuing proliferation of AI-driven applications, this trend is expected to intensify dramatically, raising critical concerns regarding carbon emissions, energy security, and the broader environmental impact of digital transformation. As nearly 90% of global data centres are located within G20 countries, the group holds a pivotal position in addressing these challenges. However, considerable disparities exist in the distribution of data centres between and within the members of the group. The United States alone accounts for approximately 46% of global data centres while China follows with ten times fewer facilities. Such concentration amplifies energy consumption pressures and risks deepening global digital and economic inequalities. This policy brief examines the relationship between digitalisation and energy use through the lens of data centre distribution within the G20. It highlights the uneven concentration of data infrastructure and energy demand, revealing significant imbalances in data power and resource allocation. The brief concludes with policy recommendations for fostering climate- and resource-efficient digitalisation, enabling G20 members to align data-driven growth with global sustainability and net-zero objectives.

Le principal aéroport de Belgique a été contraint de fermer pendant environ une heure jeudi 6 novembre dans la soirée après une nouvelle observation de drone. Il s'agit de la troisième fermeture en une semaine, alors que le pays est confronté à une recrudescence d'activités suspectes dans son espace aérien.

The post Drones : l’aéroport de Bruxelles fermé pour la troisième fois en une semaine appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Nous faisons une petite pause à l’occasion de la journée de l’armistice en Belgique (et en France). Rapporteur sera de retour dans votre boîte mail le mercredi 12 novembre. Bienvenue dans Rapporteur. Je suis Nicoletta Ionta, avec Eddy Wax à Bruxelles. Vous avez une info à nous communiquer ? Écrivez-moi. À savoir : Omnibus : […]

The post Le PPE et le S&D suivent une thérapie appeared first on Euractiv FR.

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5 – 6 November 2025, Santeri Leinonen, Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office on Youth, Peace and Security, visited Tashkent to deepen dialogue on the positive, active and inclusive role of young people in the efforts towards sustainable peace and security.

During a full day of meetings, Mr. Leinonen met with representatives of the Youth Affairs Agency of Uzbekistan, Nordic International University and the University of World Economy and Diplomacy, as well as with young representatives of civil society

At the Youth Affairs Agency, discussions focused on strengthening youth participation in policy-making and peacebuilding, highlighting shared priorities in empowering young people as drivers of positive change.

Mr. Leinonen visited Nordic International University and the University of World Economy and Diplomacy, where he presented the outcomes of the OSCE Chairpersonship Youth Forum, held in Helsinki in late July 2025. Young people from across the OSCE region – including Uzbekistan – contributed to shaping the OSCE-wide Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) Roadmap to be launched under Finland’s OSCE Chairpersonship. He also shared Finland’s experience in youth cooperation and the process of drafting the country’s National Action Plans on YPS, followed by an open exchange with students and members of university youth and diplomatic clubs about the role of youth in fostering peace, dialogue and mutual understanding.

The visit concluded with a meeting with young civil society representatives, where participants discussed opportunities for regional collaboration and youth-led initiatives.

Reflecting on his visit, Santeri Leinonen said: “Meeting so many active and committed young people here in Tashkent has been truly inspiring. Their energy, creativity and dedication to building bridges across communities are at the heart of sustainable peace. Strengthening youth cooperation across regions and cultures is essential to creating a more inclusive and secure future for all. Field visits have been most rewarding part in my role as Special Representative.”

Throughout the day, discussions highlighted how Uzbekistan’s young people are taking an active role in shaping their communities and contributing to regional cooperation – a reflection of the shared spirit of the Youth, Peace and Security agenda across the OSCE area.

AMENDMENTS 124 - 306 - Draft report Amending Regulations (EC) No 1907/2006, (EC) No 1272/2008, (EU) No 528/2012, (EU) 2019/1021 and (EU) 2021/697 as regards defence readiness and facilitating defence investments and conditions for defence industry
Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety
Committee on Industry, Research and Energy
Committee on Security and Defence
Antonio Decaro, Aura Salla, Sven Mikser

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

AMENDMENTS 124 - 306 - Draft report Amending Regulations (EC) No 1907/2006, (EC) No 1272/2008, (EU) No 528/2012, (EU) 2019/1021 and (EU) 2021/697 as regards defence readiness and facilitating defence investments and conditions for defence industry
Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety
Committee on Industry, Research and Energy
Committee on Security and Defence
Antonio Decaro, Aura Salla, Sven Mikser

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

A háborús népességpusztulás és nemzethalál kategóriájában a világrekord minden bizonnyal a XIX. századi Paraguayhoz köthető, melynek férfilakossága szinte felfoghatatlan arányban, minimum 70 százalékban veszett oda a napóleoni ambícióihoz ragaszkodó elnökük szolgálatában. (Egy későbbi, 1886-os népszámlálás adatai szerint a 30 évnél idősebb felnőttek között három nő jutott egy férfira.) A latin-amerikai országot letarolták és teljesen megszállták az ellenséges seregek; mint az ismert, ugyanez történt Szerbiával is az első világháborúban – azzal a fontos különbséggel, hogy a végső vereséget sikerült elkerülnie (ami magyar szemszögből mondjuk azért nem volt kifejezetten szerencsés). Ezzel magyarázható, hogy az említett gyászos dobogón is „csak” a második hely jutott számára – öt szerb férfiból átlagosan kettő élte meg a háború végét.

[...] Bővebben!

Global warming is linked to increasingly dry conditions and devastating wildfires across the UNECE region covering Europe, North America, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Credit: Unsplash/Caleb Cook / Source: UN News

By Cian Delaney
BRUSSELS, Belgium, Nov 7 2025 (IPS)

President Prabowo Subianto welcomed his counterpart Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva of Brazil to Jakarta recently to strengthen ties between the fast-growing economies.

The timing is significant. The meeting was just weeks before Brazil hosts the COP30 climate change talks in Belém, a bustling port city at the mouth of the Amazon River.

Like Brazil, Indonesia is home to expansive rainforests that attract intense international scrutiny because of their rich biodiversity and globally-important role as carbon sinks. And like Brazil, Indonesia has implemented new policies designed to boost biofuel use.

The leaders, who agreed to expand cooperation as two of the world’s largest biofuel producers, contend that the energy sources are needed to reduce reliance on imports and cut emissions.

But Indonesia has been down this road before.

Cian Delaney

In the mid-2000s, booming international demand for highly versatile palm oil—a key ingredient for biofuels—led the country to clear millions of hectares of rainforest and peatland to make way for vast plantations.

The gold rush for the oil displaced indigenous communities, smallholder farmers, and destroyed vital ecosystems that critically endangered species like orangutans, Sumatran tigers, and the Javan rhinoceros depend on to survive.

In Borneo alone, far from reducing carbon pollution, slash and burn agriculture caused the largest single-year global emissions increase seen in 2,000 years, according to NASA.

Falling demand and the introduction of conservation measures helped slow deforestation over the subsequent decade, however, the Subianto-Lula meeting reflects a troubling resurgence of biofuels as a global commodity.

Brazil will ask the international community at COP30 to sign a pledge calling for a quadrupling of so-called “sustainable fuels”—biofuels chief among them—over the next decade.

The proposed pledge rests heavily on a new International Energy Agency (IEA) report that shows a fourfold increase can be achieved through innovative fuel developments and a doubling of biofuel use. In the fine print, however, the IEA notes that no additional land should be needed to meet the goal.

Brazil’s COP30 pledge makes no such distinction—raising concerns that growing demand will incentivize deforestation and heighten competition for land that is already scarce.

In August, Brazil lifted a soy moratorium that environmentalists credit for the significant conservation gains made over the past two decades to make way for more cultivation.

There is also the question of food.

Globally, about 90 percent of biofuel production relies on food staples. In 2023, the biofuel industry used around 200 million tonnes of corn, 8 million tonnes of wheat, 40 million tonnes of vegetable oil and enough sugarcane and sugarbeet to make 50 million tonnes of sugar.

By one estimation the energy stored in these crops could satisfy the minimum caloric requirements for 1.3 billion people, while it takes nearly 3,000 litres of water to produce enough biofuel to drive a car only 100 kilometers.

Biofuels also have serious implications for the atmosphere. Litre for litre it is estimated that, when the full impact of land use change caused by biofuel production is accounted for, they emit an average of 16% more carbon than the fossil fuels they replace.

But transitioning away from biofuels cannot ignore social and economic realities on the ground. Indonesia’s new policies, for example, stem from the country’s palm oil surplus and a need to maintain rural employment.

In response, Indonesian NGOs have increasingly been advocating for a holistic solution that would put caps on expansion, improve traceability, and invest in community-based governance, including a decentralized energy system.

At the beginning of the year, Indonesia formally joined the BRICS, an influential bloc of developing nations that make up almost half of the global population and conduct nearly a quarter of all trade.

The countries also account for 51 percent of emissions. In recent years, the bloc has made statements that suggest climate change is its top foreign policy priority and last July committed to increasing peer-to-peer climate finance.

If Indonesia and its new partners are serious about building a new kind of economy that works for the Global South without undermining progress made toward cutting emissions, they will need to match their lofty rhetoric with tangible action. Starting an honest conversation about biofuels in Belém would be a good place to start.

Cian Delaney is Campaign Coordinator, Transport & Environment

IPS UN Bureau

 

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