Agrégateur de flux

Bár nem mai történet, de csak nemrégiben került eme poszt szerzője szeme elé az “Őrült úszás” nevű hihetetlen sportteljesítmény motivációs videója, amelyben jobban megismerhettük azt a két dél-afrikai úszót, Thane Williamset és Jonno Proudfootot, akik egy elképzelhetetlen kihívásokkal tarkított misszióban még tavaly 24 nap (ez alatt 155 óra konkrét úszást értsünk) alatt átúszták a Mozambik és Madagaszkár között található, áramlattól függően nagyjából 460 kilométeres Mozambiki-csatornát.

És igen, az áramlatot mindenképpen ki kell emelni, hiszen ez jelentette az egyik legnagyobb kihívást a két úszó számára: volt olyan nap, amikor az erős áramlatok miatt 1 kilométert haladtak előre és majdnem hármat oldalirányban, ezzel próbára téve az őket kísérő aprócska stábot is (amelynek amúgy tagja volt egy másik extrém sportoló, David Grier is, aki 2010-ben átevezte a csatornát, de például végigfutotta Indiát is), akiknek igen nagy kihívást jelentett az egyenes vonalon tartani a két úszót. A kitűzött napi penzumot (20 kilométer) végül majdnem sikerült is teljesíteni és szerencsére az előzetesen komoly kockázatnak tartott cápa- illetve medúzaveszély sem vált valóra, bár több izgalmas és váratlan esemény is történt az út során – például, amikor a madagaszkári parti őrség tartotta fel a két sportolót egy rövid kihallgatás erejéig.

A két úszót egy igen tapasztalt kis csapat kísérte végig az úton.

A mozambiki Nacalaból indult és a madagaszkári Mahajangába beérkezett “Őrült úszás” során a kiszáradást, a napot és az áramlatokat legyőzendő, a kora reggeli és a késő esti órákban ment főleg az úszás, de a nap végére a sportolók így is rettentően kimerültek voltak, annak ellenére, hogy nem kispályás nyíltvízi úszókról beszélünk – mindketten úsztak már a Robben-sziget és Fokváros között is és több Vasember-versenyt is teljesítettek. És a legfontosabbat még nem is említettük, a kihívás teljesítésével a két dél-afrikai fiatal pénzt gyűjtött egy gyermekekkel foglalkozó alapítvány számára. Technikailag szakaszos nyíltvízi úszást hajtottak végre, azaz kísérőik GPS segítségével minden alkalommal bemérték az úszók helyzetét, amikor azok a kísérőhajóra szálltak étkezni, pihenni, majd ugyanerről a koordinátáról folytatták később az úszást – és természetesen a szakaszos úszás szabályainak megfelelően bármilyen körülmények ellenére minden egyes nap úszniuk kellett mindenféle segítség nélkül.

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Old Fanous Ramadan, also known as Ramadan lantern is a famous Egyptian folklore associated with Ramadan. The holiday takes place from June 17 to June 17 this year. Photo Credit: Ibrahim.ID

The $80 Million Fake Bomb-Detector Scam—and the People Behind It
By Jeffrey E. Stern
Vanity Fair

Historically, advertisements that depict a product as “foolproof” are better off not being believed. But in the uncertain, dangerous and tumultuous climate of Iraq today, it’s a promise that, even if too good to be true, is easily embraced. In this article, Stern delves into the bizarre and depressing story of how Iraqi officials were tricked by a deceitful British salesman selling bomb detectors that, in the end, were nothing but a glorified golf-ball detector.

The Lonely End
by Matthew Bremner
Roads and Kingdoms

Bremner looks into the Japanese phenomenon of kodokushi, or “lonely death.” The word has become increasingly prominent in the country since 1995 — so common, in fact, that an industry tasked with the sole purpose of cleaning up homes after these deaths has begun to appear.

The Decline of International Studies
By Charles King
Foreign Affairs

“The rise of the United States as a global power was the product of more than merely economic and military advantages,” notes King. Indeed, one large, and comparatively inexpensive, factor has been education. Why, then, are federal and non-governmental international educational programs coming under attack?

Can Politico make Brussels sexy?
By Gideon Lewis-Kraus
The Guardian

In the eight years since its launch in 2007, Politico has become a media staple in the United States, turning inside-the-Beltway reporting into the “clubby and exhilarating” coverage we see today. Now, it’s expanded to Brussels. Lewis-Kraus looks into the media outlet’s new transatlantic operations.

A World Without Work
By Derek Thompson
The Atlantic

One day this list could be written by a machine — it’s certainly not inconceivable. Jokes aside, the eventual automation of numerous jobs could rattle the framework of our society. Work — how we define it and how we engage with it — is at the heart of our society, our politics. So, as Thompson asks, “What might happen if work goes away?”

Blogs:

The Case for Regional AUMFs by Michael Crowley
Much Ado about the South China Sea by Tim Wall
Pirates of the South China Seas by Gary Sands
The Systemic Deficiency in the U.S.’ Cybersecurity Mindset by Joseph Karam
In Ukraine, Peace Should First be Made with Words by James Nadeau

Earlier this year, the Obama Administration submitted to Congress a draft Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). President Obama, like President Bush before him, has claimed authorization for military activities to combat terrorism under a previous AUMF passed on Sept. 14, 2001 and dedicated to combating those responsible for the 9/11 attacks (the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were authorized under a separate AUMF). The emergence of IS and the simple passage of time prompted a re-examination of the terms of the prevailing AUMF. However, the White House and Congress each have reasons to pantomime action on an AUMF without committing to it. They reach beyond the standard legislative gridlock to matters of military strategy, preserving the president’s military authority, and simple partisan politics. Many observes see a new AUMF as unlikely politically or unnecessary constitutionally. Were it to happen, there is reason to consider framing it in a different way: on a regional basis, rather than against a specific military threat.

Start with the analysts who see a new AUMF as unnecessary. Max Boot, a conservative military historian, argues that U.S. military actions on executive authority have a long history, dating back to the early 19th Century Barbary Wars. Moreover, the Obama Administration explains that it seeks the new AUMF for reasons that are more propagandistic than constitutional; writing in Foreign Policy magazine, Micah Zenko quotes White House spokesman Josh Earnest’s argument: “It will send a clear signal to our enemies that if there is any doubt in their mind that the United States of America takes this threat very seriously, it will eliminate that doubt.”

Earnest’s quote telegraphs a larger issue: whether or not the AUMF is necessary constitutionally, the debate surrounding it highlights a political need to organize and constrain U.S. military activity. The AUMF debate may be more useful in clarifying policy as a forcing event than an actual AUMF would be in practice.

That debate has been forced, and it has pointed to the complexity of the problem. In January, Army Chief of Staff Martin Dempsey gave in interview outlining broad principles to which a new AUMF should adhere. Gen. Dempsey pointed to the need to avoid constraints on future action in a way that makes identifying and enforcing boundaries around such action difficult. While emphasizing that all military options should be preserved, Dempsey said that “In particular, it shouldn’t constrain activities geographically, because [ISIS] knows no boundaries [and] doesn’t recognize any boundaries – in fact it’s their intention to erase all boundaries to their benefit.”

What Dempsey requests is unrestricted authority to fight ISIS, a non-state actor. Congress’ war powers are designed to be administered against sovereign nations. They have changed as the nature of war has changed. Congress has declared war a total eleven times – all against sovereign nations – and six out of those 11 declarations pertained to enemy countries in World War II. There is no precedent for Congressional declarations of war against non-state actors.

A “regional AUMF” would codify the long-standing practice of executive “doctrines” governing U.S. policy towards particular regions. The Monroe Doctrine set U.S. policy in opposition to any foreign intervention into its sphere of influence in the Americas. President Jimmy Carter used his 1980 State of the Union Address to announce that the U.S. would defend its interests in the Persian Gulf by military force if necessary (the “Carter Doctrine.)” These executive statements amount to regional policies governing the use of force that were never codified by Congress, but which nonetheless influenced U.S. policy. Moreover, there is an active precedent for organizing U.S. military and diplomatic activities regionally in the way a regional AUMF would. The State Department has a Middle East and North Africa (MENA) section devoted to countries within that region. The Defense Department assigns the countries of the MENA region to its Central Command. An AUMF organized to address military threats within the MENA region – rather than against a specific actor within that region – would fall within the current logistical framework.

The idea of a regional AUMF presents a major drawback to presidents and generals alike. It infringes on the ability to “pick and choose” which conflicts in a given region merit U.S. action. However, the current debate acknowledges the need for AUMFs to be updated consistently. A three-year “sunset” clause is widely discussed as way to keep its terms from growing outdated. In that sense, each AUMF would be temporary. It would have to be: after all, ISIS did not exist three years ago. Debating new AUMF terms could (as now) lag well behind changing security needs. That may give further ammunition to those who see AUMFs as unnecessary. However, if they focus U.S. regional policy priorities and clarify objectives when America commits to using force, they are worthwhile. Given the lives in the balance on both sides of U.S. firing lines, the stakes merit more concerted attention to U.S. military strategy around the world.

Magyarország nem frontország, és a hazánkba érkező menekültek már nem az életükért futnak.

Jól agyon ajnároztuk a szerbeket a kisgyerekek vébéje után. Záporoztak a közhelyek a meccset soha fel nem adó, végsőkig küzdő szerb játékosokról, akik már 6 évesen a Realban játszanak. 

[...] Bővebben!

La loi qui organise la collecte de renseignements électroniques par les services fait l'objet de 3 recours devant le Conseil constitutionnel.

La loi qui organise la collecte de renseignements électroniques par les services fait l'objet de 3 recours devant le Conseil constitutionnel.

Azt kérdeztük Orbán Viktortól, hogy elégedett-e a dohányellátásról szóló pályázat eredményével.

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

The European Defence Agency has just launched a €1 million, 18-month feasibility study to prepare a future cooperative governmental satellite communications (Govsatcom) programme.

The study will be delivered by a consortium led by Euroconsult with Airbus Defence & Space, CGI, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Hisdesat and SpaceTec Partners working as subcontractors. This work is expected to be complemented by other studies funded by the European Space Agency (ESA). Some synergies are also expected with the work currently performed by the European Commission.

“This study will help us to find new ways to cooperate in a complex institutional setting”, EDA Chief Executive Jorge Domecq stated upon signing the study contract. “Considering that Govsatcom capabilities are inherently dual-use, one of the main objectives will be to identify an efficient, innovative and sustainable cooperation model in particular by implementing synergies with the Commission. This will certainly be reflected by a genuine governance of the system”, he added. 

“Government satellite communications are evolving, due to changes in operational requirements and to the availability of innovative and cost effective solutions serving these,” stated Euroconsult CEO Pacome Revillon. ”The international consortium combines expertise across the full satellite communications value chain, while the project governance will guarantee the independence and neutrality of the results. All partners are fully committed to delivering a study that lays the groundwork for future European capability,” he added. 

Govsatcom was identified in December 2013 by EU Heads of State and Government as one of four priorities for capability development, along with air-to-air refuelling, remotely piloted aircraft systems and cyber defence. 

Under the lead of Spain, a common staff target harmonising the needs of military users was adopted by all EDA Member States in 2014. Based on this commonly-agreed document, a preparation phase started ahead of the launch of a full-scale cooperative project. By the end of 2016, a business case including more detailed technical requirements as well as a through-life management plan should allow Member States to assess various options in terms of cooperation models and system architectures. These findings will be to a large extent supported by the outcome of the feasibility study.

 

More information:

• EDA Govsatcom capability programme 
• "Filling the gap in space capabilities", article in European Defence Matters, issue 8, p. 30

Finance minister Yanis Varoufakis, left, with Greece's negotiating team at the eurogroup

Athens’ final counterproposal to its trio of bailout monitors would re-impose many of the large-scale corporate taxes and pension contributions that creditors demanded be stripped out amid concern it would plunge Greece into a deeper recession.

According to a copy, distributed to eurozone finance ministers Thursday and obtained by the Financial Times, Athens has stuck with its demand for a one-time 12 per cent tax on all corporate profits above €500,000, a measure the government estimates will raise nearly €1.4bn by the end of next year.

In addition, it would raise employer contributions to Greece’s main pension fund by 3.9 per cent and would more slowly implement measures to raise the country’s retirement age to 67 and “replace” rather than phase out a special “solidarity grant” to poorer pensioners.

We have posted a copy of the Greek counterproposal here.

Greece’s bailout creditors – the International Monetary Fund, European Central Bank and European Commission – eliminated the one-time profits tax and the increase in employer contributions to the pension system in their offer to Athens yesterday, arguing that such heavy levies on companies would severely hit economic growth. It also pushed for more aggressive timeline for raising the retirement age and cutting the special top-up for poorer pensioners.

Still, the Greek plans contain some key concessions from the original proposal submitted by Alexis Tsipras, the Greek prime minister, to creditors in an offer made on Monday. Although legislation raising the retirement age would not be implemented until the end of October – creditors want it to kick in immediately – it accepts the 67-year retirement age should be hit by 2022. Originally, Athens was proposing 2025.

Read more

Trois temps forts cette année : les Compagnons de la Libération, l'armée du Mexique et les forces spéciales de l'Intérieur.

The UN Conference on Financing for Development in Addis Ababa in July 2015 will pave the way for the implementation of the post-2015 development agenda. The Briefing Paper series “Financing Global Development” analyses key financial and non-financial means of implementation for the new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and discusses building blocks of a new framework for development finance.
The enormous deficiencies in Sub-Saharan Africa’s (SSA) local and regional infrastructure in areas such as water, sanitation, transport and energy facilities, mean that long-term financial resources must be mobilised to ensure sustainable development. Local currency bond markets (LCBMs) are still generally underdeveloped in SSA in comparison with other regions of the developing world. Yet for all SSA countries, including the poorest economies, LCBMs could become an important means of long-term financing and reduce the financial vulnerability associated with foreign currency borrowing. LCBMs provide alternative sources of financing and reduce a country’s dependency on foreign debt. They allow for risk diversification and can mitigate the effects of external shocks. Local currency government bond markets are also important for benchmarking corporate bond markets – another way to finance companies for the long-term.
Policy recommendations for improving LCBM development in SSA
We recommend supporting LCBM development through national and regional initiatives that strengthen the institutional and regulatory environments, broaden the investor base and create more liquid secondary markets.     Authorities in SSA need to ensure favourable macroeconomic environments and develop suitable financial infrastructures.
To avoid financial turbulence, capital account liberalisation should be pursued very carefully, with LCBM development going hand-in-hand with solid financial and institutional development. SSA authorities should put into place appropriate strategies for managing debt and capital accounts in order to address capital in- and out-flows, and ensure trained personnel to implement them. Authorities should further ensure the safety of investments by guaranteeing profit repatriation. In this respect, law enforcement is crucial.
Bilateral and multilateral donors can support LCBM development by offering technical assistance to realise debt management strategies. The Debt Management Facility of the World Bank and the IMF and the Debt Management and Financial Analysis System of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) are good examples of donor support for developing countries that provide country-specific technical assistance at different levels. In SSA the African Development Bank has put in place the African Market Initiative (AFMI) which promotes LCBM development in SSA. Another fine example of donor support is the World Bank Group’s Global Emerging Markets Local Currency Bond Program (Gemloc), which promotes LCBM development in emerging market economies.
Since LCBMs can supply long- or medium-term capital for both governments and companies they have a large potential for financing the infrastructure needed in SSA and for supporting the achievement of the SDGs.

From the beginning, the European Union has been polarising in Britain. The past four decades of membership have been marked by sustained debate on the extent and shape of British participation in the European project. Some have always rejected the notion that Britain can and should integrate with the rest of Europe. Others have supported Britain’s involvement in parts of the EU, particularly in the economic sphere. Few have wholeheartedly embraced European integration to the levels historically seen in the ‘core’ of Europe.

European Council 7-8.2.2013, European Council, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

In this respect, British reluctance to sign up to different aspects of the EU has been a function of internal prevarication on setting a foreign policy that reflects Britain’s place in the world. The question of ‘Europe’ has divided parties from within and without. Consequently, the UK’s ongoing renegotiation and eventual referendum on EU membership need to be filtered through the lens of national context. Both are the result of electoral politics in Britain rather than momentous change in the EU’s design.

The Prime Minister’s renegotiation will naturally derive its objectives from domestic political considerations. The outcome of the renegotiation, however, will depend greatly on the willingness of Britain’s European partners to work with the suggestions placed before them. This external dimension – the politics at European level – is fundamental to any deal which may be agreed.

By definition, a negotiation necessitates negotiating partners. In this case, the UK government’s main interlocutors are the governments of the other EU Member States (with a role for the EU institutions as well). These governments do not all share the same interests nor have they presented a united front against Britain in its desire to change how the EU works – far from it. A number of EU countries support some of the options for reform emanating from London. At the same time, three main points on which they broadly agree might make the renegotiation more challenging than hoped.

First, they have other pressing issues on the European agenda. The sovereign debt difficulties facing Greece, garnering great attention is recent weeks, is only one of a number of serious questions preoccupying European leaders. These pressing issues may take priority over discussing the details of the UK government’s demands to amend EU rules. Considering the tight timetable the Prime Minister has set himself, the postponing of solving the ‘British question’ to a later date could make securing a deal even more complicated.

Second, Europe’s leaders are generally happy with the EU’s architectural framework and not predisposed to making dramatic alterations. Desire to weaken the integrity of the internal market by altering the rules of the free movement of persons, for example, is minimal. Nor are other EU countries keen to see the multiplication of opt-outs or special rules just for Britain. While the will exists to work with the UK government to address its concerns, any EU changes agreed are likely to be relatively modest.

Third, the countries which share the single currency may well amend the governance of the Eurozone without changing the EU treaties. It seems unlikely, therefore, that Britain can simply tack on its demands to treaty reform certain to happen. The EU treaties could eventually be updated to incorporate the Fiscal Compact and related measures, but this prospect seems years down the line. In any case, securing treaty change in time for a referendum by 2017 would be a Herculean feat.

The obstacles to securing a substantive renegotiation within the set timetable are numerous. However, the actual renegotiation is but one part of the equation in (re)shaping Britain’s relationship with the EU. How the deal is presented at home and the arguments made in the campaign are likely to be much more influential to the referendum result. The external dimension may well determine the substance of the renegotiation, but the national context, as ever, will determine the outcome of the referendum.

This article was originally published on European Futures.

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Shortened link: britainseurope.uk/20150626

How to cite this article:

Salamone, A (2015) ‘The External Dimension to Britain’s EU Membership’, Britain’s Europe (Ideas on Europe), 26 Jun 2015, britainseurope.uk/20150626

The post The External Dimension to Britain’s EU Renegotiation appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Le 18 juin dernier des diplomates et des journalistes (Le Monde, Le Figaro) ont visité l’ancien site de missiles d’Albion. Retour sur cette visite

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