Agrégateur de flux

Die EU-Erweiterung auf dem Westbalkan ist strategisch wichtig. Doch wer den Beitrittsprozess beschleunigen will, darf Demokratie und Rechtsstaatlichkeit nicht zur Nebensache machen. Ein Beitrag von Karina Mross.

Ces nouvelles inondations qui ont frappé la Côte d'Ivoire, avec un bilan de 59 morts, rappellent la vulnérabilité du pays face aux pluies torrentielles exacerbées par les changements climatiques.

Plenary session, Strasbourg

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

A report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) assesses that it is ‘highly likely’ many of recent drone incidents throughout Europe were ordered by Moscow as part of a wider hybrid campaign against NATO.

The investigation focuses on incidents taking place between August 2024 and February 2026, including incursions into the airspace of thirteen individual countries. All but one of these nations, the exception being Ireland, are members of NATO. 

Among the incursions documented in the report are those which targeted U.S. Air Force sites in the UK – which The Aviationist covered in depth across three articles – as well as the incident over the French Navy ballistic missile submarine base at Île Longue.

This report assesses that it is highly likely the Kremlin conducted a coordinated Uninhabited Aerial Vehicle (UAV) campaign over Europe between August 2024 and February 2026, spanning a dozen NATO states and Ireland.

It is also likely that Russian-linked vessels and the shadow… pic.twitter.com/pGRtWRHPtE

— IISS News (@IISS_org) July 2, 2026

By corroborating the various reports of drone incursions with data relating to ships that are known or suspected to belong to Russia’s shadow fleet, the IISS has named several vessels in particular that it believes were responsible for launching and/or directing the drones. 

It notes that the cargo vessel Hav Dolphin (IMO 9073854), investigated by both Germany and the Netherlands after drone incursions in the spring of 2025, was in fact docked in Hull, UK, while British and American authorities were dealing with the drone sightings over military sites in November 2024. 

Suspected drone carrier / cargo ship HAV DOLPHIN entered Baltic Sea via Kiel kanal, last port Antwerp. Stated destination Vasa, FI

The Russian crewed ship is suspected if being behind drone flights over military installations in NW Germany a few months ago. pic.twitter.com/i4QfsyLyzi

— auonsson (@auonsson) August 24, 2025

At the same time, the tanker Seasons I (IMO 9308950) travelled eastbound through the Straits of Dover and routed approximately parallel to the southern coast of East Anglia where RAF Lakenheath, RAF Mildenhall, and a number of other sensitive U.S. and UK military facilities are located. 

Positions of selected Russian shadow-fleet tankers around Germany and the UK, 26 November 2024 | Source: The International Institute for Strategic Studies

Comment from anonymous U.S. officials at the time of the incursions suggested that the drones were of a sophistication beyond what would be expected for commercially available civilian drones. As we noted, the incursions over these important U.S. bases came just days after then President Joe Biden gave Ukraine the long awaited all-clear to use long range missiles to strike targets deep inside Russian territory. 

Selected reported UAV sightings in Europe by location and site, August 2024–February 2026 | Source: The International Institute for Strategic Studies

In its executive summary of the lengthy report, the IISS argues that while not every UAV incident during this period is likely to have been linked to Russia, “the aggregate pattern of UAV sightings cannot be adequately explained by misidentification, hobbyist activity or opportunistic harassment alone.”

Careful Scrutiny

There is no smoking gun that definitively proves Russia’s involvement, and none of the nations affected in these drone incursions have yet directly pointed their finger in Russia’s direction, though IISS researchers have suggested that these countries have given their tacit approval of the report. “Every government we spoke to said they would welcome the report being published,” said Charlie Edwards, Senior Fellow for Strategy & National Security. 

Without the smoking gun, some have questioned the report’s findings. Dronewatch Europe have said: “The conclusions are striking. However, they also deserve careful scrutiny.”

“The report does not present physical evidence linking any specific drone to any specific vessel. No launch has been observed, no command links have been intercepted, no wreckage has been recovered, no credible video footage was recorded, and no telemetry or forensic data has been released tying a drone to a Russian ship.”

New IISS report revives ‘Russian shadow fleet drone’ theory, but fails to provide evidence https://t.co/aQNZoaX2O3 pic.twitter.com/efG2r4BgCD

— Dronewatch Europe (@DronewatchEU) July 2, 2026

This forensic data is, of course, difficult for a non-state actor to obtain. Primary radar data and advanced intelligence (including the use of electro-optical sensors, signals intelligence (SIGINT), and human intelligence (HUMINT)) capabilities would be of paramount importance to gathering the definitive facts in cases like this.

Whether the capable intelligence agencies – in many cases, world leading – of the nations involved have in fact collected these facts is unclear. While one could argue that the fact no country has stepped forward and set out a comprehensive case for Russia’s involvement, it is also true that doing so could prejudice some of the capabilities and/or sources of intelligence available to them. Proving Russia’s guilt in the public domain might not outweigh the value of these intelligence assets. 

The @RoyalAirForce has recently deployed its Counter-Uncrewed Aerial System to Belgium in response to rogue drones interrupting flights at Brussels Airport. This comes just a month after the system was deployed to Denmark.

The RAF’s C-UAS capability is called ORCUS, which is a… pic.twitter.com/bS6buQuCDc

— Leonardo Electronics (@LDO_Electronics) November 11, 2025

Dronewatch’s own investigation into 61 drone sightings across Europe in 2025 found that, in many cases, “reported drones turned out to be perfectly ordinary aircraft, helicopters, stars, planets or other explainable phenomena. In numerous cases there was simply no evidence that a drone had ever been present.”.

The IISS report does touch on these earlier investigations, though it argues that “In an operating environment where European detection capability was demonstrably insufficient to reliably track low-altitude, non-cooperative UAVs, a high non-confirmation rate is the expected outcome regardless of whether the sightings were genuine.”

“A high false-positive rate in public reporting is, if anything, analytically consistent with Russian operational design: engineering an environment of ambiguity in which genuine incursions are difficult to distinguish from noise is itself a feature of the campaign,” the report continues. 

Whether any of the drones were in fact linked to Russia or not, the IISS states that Europe’s counter-UAS (C-UAS) strategy has not kept up with the threat now posed by these systems: “detection is uneven, legal authorities are fragmented, response options are often disproportionate, and attribution remains too slow to support timely deterrence.”

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

BERICHT on a European Parliament recommendation to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the changing geopolitical situation in East Asia and the need for closer cooperation with like-minded partners in the region
Ausschuss für auswärtige Angelegenheiten
Adam Bielan

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP

ZWISCHENBERICHT im Hinblick auf das Verfahren der Zustimmung zu dem Abkommen über eine politische, wirtschaftliche und kooperative strategische Partnerschaft zwischen der EU und Mexiko
Ausschuss für auswärtige Angelegenheiten
Ausschuss für internationalen Handel
Borja Giménez Larraz, Javi López

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP

BERICHT über den Bericht 2025 der Kommission über die Ukraine
Ausschuss für auswärtige Angelegenheiten
Michael Gahler

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP

This ETTG policy brief analyses the state of play of EU funding to and cooperation with the United Nations system, before considering future possibilities and challenges in relation to the ongoing negotiations of the next Multi-Annual Financial Framework (MFF, 2028–34), notably the Global Europe Instrument. Although neither the MFF nor the Global Europe Instrument Regulation are expected to include concrete provisions on EU funding to the UN system, they frame the political priorities and define legal boundaries and criteria through which the EU will shape its programming and select its implementation partners. Through these parameters, the question is whether the new MFF will operationalise and ensure the Union’s strategic defence of multilateralism and partnership with the UN, alone and through Team Europe, or if the new rules instead result in a de-facto reduction of the EU’s political and financial support to the UN system.

This ETTG policy brief analyses the state of play of EU funding to and cooperation with the United Nations system, before considering future possibilities and challenges in relation to the ongoing negotiations of the next Multi-Annual Financial Framework (MFF, 2028–34), notably the Global Europe Instrument. Although neither the MFF nor the Global Europe Instrument Regulation are expected to include concrete provisions on EU funding to the UN system, they frame the political priorities and define legal boundaries and criteria through which the EU will shape its programming and select its implementation partners. Through these parameters, the question is whether the new MFF will operationalise and ensure the Union’s strategic defence of multilateralism and partnership with the UN, alone and through Team Europe, or if the new rules instead result in a de-facto reduction of the EU’s political and financial support to the UN system.

This ETTG policy brief analyses the state of play of EU funding to and cooperation with the United Nations system, before considering future possibilities and challenges in relation to the ongoing negotiations of the next Multi-Annual Financial Framework (MFF, 2028–34), notably the Global Europe Instrument. Although neither the MFF nor the Global Europe Instrument Regulation are expected to include concrete provisions on EU funding to the UN system, they frame the political priorities and define legal boundaries and criteria through which the EU will shape its programming and select its implementation partners. Through these parameters, the question is whether the new MFF will operationalise and ensure the Union’s strategic defence of multilateralism and partnership with the UN, alone and through Team Europe, or if the new rules instead result in a de-facto reduction of the EU’s political and financial support to the UN system.

The MQ-28 Ghost Bat took part in a flight with the F-15EX and a proof-of-concept FARP operation as part of the Experimental Operations Unit’s activities during Valiant Shield 2026.

The Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) released new undated photos from Exercise Valiant Shield 2026, showing that the MQ-28 Ghost Bat flew together with the F-15EX Eagle II. The milestone flight transformed into reality Boeing’s concept artworks which suggested the goal of having the two platforms work together in Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T) operations.

“An MQ-28 Ghost Bat and U.S. Air Force F-15EX Eagle II participated in Exercise Valiant Shield 2026 over the Philippine Sea, demonstrating the future of human-machine teaming in the theater,” said PACAF in a post on social media. “Uncrewed systems act as a force multiplier, extending the reach and effectiveness of human pilots.”



It is unclear if crew of the F-15EX, assigned to the 85th Test and Evaluation Squadron, took control of the MQ-28 during the flight. It should be noted that the service’s fighter jets already took control of drones during past tests, thus the possibility of the F-15EX controlling the MQ-28 should not be excluded.

An F-15EX Eagle II and an MQ-28 Ghost Bat fly together during Valiant Shield 2026. | Source: PACAF

Moreover, in the press release announcing the MQ-28’s involvement in Valiant Shield last month, PACAF said “the uncrewed MQ-28 will fly in concert with crewed fighter platforms, providing a critical opportunity for the joint force to refine tactics, techniques, and procedures for this next evolution of airpower.”

Take a peek into the future.

With the F-15EX’s future manned-unmanned teaming capabilities supported by an advanced cockpit system, communication networks and two-seat configuration, the superior fighter could serve as a battle manager and joint all domain command and control. pic.twitter.com/07oRhGdIjV

— Boeing Defense (@BoeingDefense) September 4, 2025

The MQ-28 was deployed to Rota, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, for the duration of the exercise. The specific aircraft is a production representative airframe, which is equipped with an Infra-Red Search and Track (IRST) system.

Artist concept of a Boeing F-15EX flying in formation with four MQ-28s, back when it was still known as the Boeing Airpower Teaming System (ATS) aircraft. | Source: Boeing

While at Rota, the MQ-28 also took part in a proof-of-concept Forward Arming and Refueling Point (FARP) operation for Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) on June 28. The operation was supported by a HC-130J Combat King II and Airmen assigned to the 79th Rescue Squadron, alongside members of the Royal Australian Air Force and the Experimental Operations Unit (EOU).

The involvement of the EOU is notable as it was activated in June 2025 at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, to accelerate the introduction of CCA. The role of the EOU will be to develop the initial tactics, techniques and procedures needed to ensure CCAs are integrated in the fleet and tactically viable for future conflicts.



The unit recently conducted a round of testing with the YFQ-44A at Edwards Air Force Base, California. The service said the unit “executed a series of sorties that refined core operational and logistical procedures for deploying and sustaining CCA in a contested environment.”

With PACAF confirming the involvement of the EOU, it is likely the participation to Valiant Shield 2026 was part of a new round of testing which used the MQ-28 as surrogate for the FQ-42 and FQ-44. The Air Force recently awarded production contracts for the two CCAs.

A U.S. Air Force HC-130J Combat King II and Airmen assigned to the 79th Rescue Squadron, alongside members of the Royal Australian Air Force and the Nellis Air Force Base-based Experimental Operations Unit, conduct a proof-of-concept Forward Arming and Refueling Point operation for Collaborative Combat Aircraft with the MQ-28 Ghost Bat in Rota, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, June 28, 2026, in support of VALIANT SHIELD 2026. | Source: U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Austin Salazar F-15EX Visits Kadena Again

The same F-15EX which flew with the MQ-28 also arrived at Kadena Air Base, Japan, on June 29, 2026, accompanied by two F-15E Strike Eagles. The visit, whose duration is unknown, might have happened after the flight with the MQ-28, as Valiant Shield officially ended on July 1.



This is the second time an F-15EX is deployed to Kadena as the base prepares to receive its permanently assigned Eagle IIs. As we reported in the past here at The Aviationist, the base is transitioning from the F-15C/D Eagle to the new F-15EX Eagle II.

The 67th Fighter Squadron will be Kadena’s first operational F-15EX unit, followed by the 44th Fighter Squadron. A total of 36 new fighters is expected to be delivered there starting next year, according to Air Force Secretary Troy Meink.

A U.S. Air Force F-15EX Eagle II assigned to 85th Test and Evaluation Squadron, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, lands at Kadena Air Base, Japan, June 29, 2026. | Source: U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Gracelyn Hess

“The F-15EX represents the next chapter of airpower at Kadena,” said U.S. Air Force Brig. Gen. John Gallemore, 18th Wing commander. “Our Airmen have the opportunity to train with the aircraft, build confidence in its capabilities and ensure we’re ready to project lethality and integrate into operations as we continue providing combat power in support of a free and open Indo-Pacific.”

Valiant Shield

Valiant Shield is a biennial, multinational, joint exercise focused on integrating the joint force in a multi-domain environment. The exercise brings together forces from the U.S. Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, Army, and Space Force, alongside regional allies and partners, to train across a vast geographic area in the Pacific.

First established in 2006, Valiant Shield has evolved into one of the largest and most sophisticated military exercises in the Pacific. This reflects the growing emphasis on joint and combined operations in response to an increasingly contested security environment.

A U.S. Air Force F-15EX Eagle II and F-15E Strike Eagles assigned to the 85th Test and Evaluation Squadron, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, fly in formation after receiving fuel from a KC-135 Stratotanker assigned to the 909th Air Refueling Squadron over the Pacific Ocean, June 29, 2026. | Source: U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Dwane R. Young

“Valiant Shield demonstrates our enduring commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific,” Adm. Steve Koehler, commander of U.S. Pacific Fleet. “Exercising advanced multidomain capabilities with our allies ensures we continue to seamlessly innovate and operate together, project combat power together and prevail over any challenge – together.”

The exercise typically features a wide range of assets, including fighter aircraft, bombers, aerial refueling tankers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms, naval surface combatants, submarines, amphibious forces, and advanced command-and-control systems. “This routine training fosters real-world proficiency in sustaining joint forces through detecting, locating, tracking, and engaging units at sea, in the air, on land, and in cyberspace in response to a range of mission areas,” explains PACAF.

Since 1993, the Sámi have been the only recognized Indigenous people within the European Union. However, their official engagement with European politics has been limited. This has recently begun to change, as the EU’s ongoing Arctic pivot has drawn Sámi political actors to Brussels. Using the English School approach, this case study traces the evolution of Sámi–EU relations from the early 1990s to the present to explore and analysis the mechanisms of engagement the Sámi have used to gain access to high-level European decision-making and what the EU itself should hope to gain through stronger ties with this Indigenous people. The analysis of these events reveals a growing political relationship between the Sámi and the EU. However, shifting political conditions and the absence of a formal European-level framework for Indigenous Peoples’ Rights, constrain the potential for more equitable relations both within the European sphere and Arctic.

Since 1993, the Sámi have been the only recognized Indigenous people within the European Union. However, their official engagement with European politics has been limited. This has recently begun to change, as the EU’s ongoing Arctic pivot has drawn Sámi political actors to Brussels. Using the English School approach, this case study traces the evolution of Sámi–EU relations from the early 1990s to the present to explore and analysis the mechanisms of engagement the Sámi have used to gain access to high-level European decision-making and what the EU itself should hope to gain through stronger ties with this Indigenous people. The analysis of these events reveals a growing political relationship between the Sámi and the EU. However, shifting political conditions and the absence of a formal European-level framework for Indigenous Peoples’ Rights, constrain the potential for more equitable relations both within the European sphere and Arctic.

Since 1993, the Sámi have been the only recognized Indigenous people within the European Union. However, their official engagement with European politics has been limited. This has recently begun to change, as the EU’s ongoing Arctic pivot has drawn Sámi political actors to Brussels. Using the English School approach, this case study traces the evolution of Sámi–EU relations from the early 1990s to the present to explore and analysis the mechanisms of engagement the Sámi have used to gain access to high-level European decision-making and what the EU itself should hope to gain through stronger ties with this Indigenous people. The analysis of these events reveals a growing political relationship between the Sámi and the EU. However, shifting political conditions and the absence of a formal European-level framework for Indigenous Peoples’ Rights, constrain the potential for more equitable relations both within the European sphere and Arctic.

BERICHT über den Bericht 2025 der Kommission über Moldau
Ausschuss für auswärtige Angelegenheiten
Sven Mikser

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP

Farmers planting paddy in Helambu, Sindhupalchowk. Their farming is dependent on precipitation and snow-fed rivers in the region. Credit: Bhagirathi Pandit

By Tanka Dhakal
KATHMANDU, Jul 3 2026 (IPS)

Monsoon season in South Asia, including Nepal, is a period of frequent rainfall, extreme heat, and a busy time of the year for farmers. Most farmers in Nepal depend on monsoon rain to plant paddey, the main source of food.

Puspa Subedi, a farmer from Pokhara‑31, Talbesi, Kaski, in Gandaki Province, is ready for the rice‑planting season.

“In our area, we primarily grow raithane (a local breed of rice), which is more resistant to drought than hybrid species, so we are less concerned about the forecasted dry monsoon,” he said. “Drought does impact our production, but the effect on farmers who are planting hybrid seeds would be more dire.”

Subedi, the coordinator of Sundaridanda Community Seed Bank in Kaski, where they conserve 53 local species of rice seeds, mentioned that monsoon drought is a major concern for most farmers in Nepal.

According to the regional seasonal weather forecast, the Hindu Kush Himalaya (HKH) region, also known as the ”Third Pole’, is heading toward a dry monsoon, which will impact agricultural activities in the region, including Nepal. The recently published HKH Monsoon Outlook 2026 projects lower‑than‑normal rainfall and above‑normal temperatures in countries across the region, including Nepal, India, Bhutan, and Pakistan. Scientists warn that intense rainfall in short bursts, rising temperatures, and increasing water stress could make this monsoon particularly dangerous.

“The outlook points to a drier monsoon overall, but that does not mean lower risk,” said Manish Shrestha, a hydrologist at the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD). “Short, intense rainfall events can still trigger serious hazards.”

The map shows the seasonal mean anomaly for the 2026 monsoon in the HKH region. Source: HKH Monsoon Outlook 2026.

This week the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) said that El Niño conditions are developing and are set to influence global temperature and rainfall patterns, increasing the risk of extreme weather over the coming months. This weather phenomenon generally brings a dry monsoon to Nepal. Unusually warm ocean waters in the tropical Pacific were fuelling the development of El Niño, which was set to influence global temperature and rainfall patterns and increase the risk of extreme weather over the coming months.

“The science is clear: El Niño is arriving on our doorstep in the coming months with 90% certainty.  The world must treat it as the urgent climate warning it is. El Niño conditions will pour fuel on the fire of a warming world.  Impacts will hit even harder, travel even farther, and cross borders with devastating speed.  The only effective response is climate action equal to the crisis – ending the addiction to fossil fuels, accelerating the shift to renewables, protecting the most vulnerable, and delivering early warning systems for all,” said UN Secretary-General António Guterres.

Impacts on agricultural 

The regional forecast expects the combination of erratic rainfall and rising temperatures to increase both drought and flood risks during the season. Long dry spells may be followed by sudden heavy downpours, creating conditions for flash floods and landslides, particularly in mountain areas. Monsoon drought directly impacts farmers, while rainfall‑induced floods may also affect frontline communities, including farmers.

The outlook warns that higher temperatures and lower water availability can lead to heat stress in crops and livestock, “reduce yields, and shorten growing seasons, particularly in the already marginal mountain farming system.” High temperatures can also cause the loss of soil moisture by intensifying evaporation.

In Nepal, and in most places in the HKH region, farmers depend on rain‑fed and snow‑fed water sources for agriculture. Last winter, snow persistence across the region was observed to be below the long‑term average – and with rising temperatures, “river flows, groundwater levels, and spring water availability may decline substantially during or after the monsoon season”, the regional weather outlook notes.

Lower snow persistence further weakens the region’s natural water buffer, making river systems and groundwater recharge more sensitive to rainfall variability. “Lower snow persistence means the region is entering the monsoon with a reduced seasonal water buffer,” said Sarthak Shrestha, co‑author of the outlook.

Farmers are already experiencing water stress, which is affecting their farming calendar. Farmers in Helambu‑7, Sindhupalchowk, are struggling to get water from a local community‑based informal irrigation system that is river‑fed. Tilak Bahadur Pandit, a local farmer, says he and his neighbours are already late in planting paddy due to water scarcity.

Source: Lenssen, N. J. L., L. Goddard, and S. Mason, 2020: Seasonal Forecast Skill of ENSO Teleconnection Maps. Credit: WMO

Dry monsoon doesn’t mean no disaster

As below‑normal precipitation is forecast, it is not expected to reduce disaster risks. Scientists warn that short bursts of intense rainfall, rising temperatures, and growing water stress could make the season increasingly dangerous.

“Even in a weaker monsoon, short periods of intense rainfall remain a major concern,” said Shrestha, a hydrologist at ICIMOD. “Communities and authorities need to closely follow short‑term forecasts and advisories.”

Experts say that drought and flood risks are interconnected and can no longer be managed in isolation. The latest State of the Climate in Asia report by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) also notes that across Asia and the Pacific, rising heat is increasing multi‑hazard risks, intersecting with food systems and public health while placing new pressures on livelihoods.

Arun Bhakta Shrestha, Senior Adviser at ICIMOD, says, “Early warning systems, short‑term forecasts, and locally driven preparedness need to work together to address increasingly complex hazards.”

The WMO on Wednesday (June 2)

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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Réfugiée somalienne installée au Minnesota depuis plus de trente ans, Maryam pensait avoir trouvé la sécurité aux États-Unis. Mais la crise du fentanyl lui a enlevé son fils de 21 ans, mort d'une overdose en 2019.