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The WTO reform agenda is a distraction. The real prize is dismantling MFN through plurilateral precedents. Credit: WTO

By Chien Yen Goh and Kinda Mohamadieh
GENEVA, Mar 24 2026 (IPS)

As trade ministers gather in Yaoundé, Cameroon, for the WTO’s 14th Ministerial Conference (MC14) on 26–29 March 2026, the preparatory process has produced a dense fog of competing reform proposals, draft ministerial statements, and work plans.

The facilitator-led consultations at the WTO headquarters in Geneva focused for the past few weeks on decision-making, development and Special and Differential Treatment (S&DT), as well as level-playing-field issues, while the United States, European Union and others tabled their own reform submissions.

The sheer volume and scope of this activity have muddied the picture of what exactly requires ministerial attention and decision.

This confusion, however, serves a purpose. It obscures the fact that the U.S. — which has done more than any other member to destabilise the multilateral trading system through unilateral tariffs, bilateral Agreements on Reciprocal Trade (ARTs), and paralysing the WTO Appellate Body — is not primarily interested in the reform or continued relevance of the WTO.

Its 2026 Trade Policy Agenda, released earlier this month, makes this plain: the US will push to reorient the WTO’s negotiating function by “favouring meaningful plurilateral agreements” and “urging reassessment of the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principle” so that trading nations can differentiate among partners in their liberalisation commitments.

The MFN rule is the foundational principle of the WTO that requires any trade advantage granted to one WTO member to be extended equally to all. The U.S. WTO reform paper submitted to the General Council in December 2025 (WT/GC/W/984) goes further, arguing that MFN “is not just unsuitable for this era” but actively prevents countries from optimising their trade relationships.

Outside the WTO, the U.S. is pursuing its trade interests through bilateral ARTs with Bangladesh, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia and others. Since its Supreme Court struck down the legal basis for these ARTs, section 301 of the U.S. 1974 Trade Act has been activated. But within the WTO, the U.S. priority at MC14 is more focused and consequential than the reform agenda suggests.

The immediate objective is to secure adoption of the plurilateral Investment Facilitation Agreement (IFA) into the WTO’s legal architecture under Annex 4 of the Marrakesh Agreement — despite the U.S. not having participated in the IFA negotiations and having no interest in being a party to it. U.S. Ambassador Joseph Barloon identified the IFA as one of a limited number of issues the U.S. wants decided at MC14.

Why would the US push through an agreement it will not sign? Because the IFA is not the end but the means. Its incorporation into the WTO — while its initiation, negotiation and addition have been formally contested — would establish that plurilateral agreements can be adopted and added to the WTO rulebook without the consent of all members. Once that door is opened, the principle of consensus in WTO agenda-setting and rule-making is effectively undermined.

This is precisely what the U.S. wants. Its December 2025 reform submission argues that plurilateral agreements should allow “likeminded trading partners committed to fair and reciprocal trade” to strengthen ties “within the architecture of the WTO agreements,” with benefits limited to consenting parties — that is, on a non-MFN basis.

The paper warns that without a path for plurilaterals, the WTO is “not a viable forum for negotiating.” Read together with the Trade Policy Agenda’s call to reassess MFN, the logic is clear: plurilaterals are the vehicle through which the U.S. intends to displace MFN as the organising principle of the multilateral trading system. Members that cannot or choose not to join will simply be left out.

The second U.S. priority reinforces this trajectory. Washington is pressing developing countries to make permanent the moratorium on customs duties on electronic commerce transmissions. First adopted as a temporary measure in 1998, the moratorium was last renewed at MC13 in Abu Dhabi, where members agreed it would expire at MC14 or 31 March 2026. The U.S. now wants to lock it in permanently and expand the scope of digital goods and services beyond customs authorities.

The stakes are high and direct. UNCTAD has estimated that the moratorium costs developing countries up to $10 billion annually in foregone tariff revenue, with 95 per cent of the losses borne by developing countries. For many, customs duties constitute 10–30 per cent of total tax revenue — for some, over 50 per cent.

The primary beneficiaries are the large technology firms in developed countries that dominate cross-border digital trade. Making the moratorium permanent would formalise this revenue transfer and strip developing countries of policy space to regulate digital imports as the digital economy grows.

Both these issues — the IFA and the e-commerce moratorium — involve developing countries giving up something concrete (MFN treatment, consensus-based decision-making, effective say over agenda setting, customs revenue and regulatory autonomy) in exchange for nothing.

The U.S. is not offering concessions on agriculture, S&DT, or the longstanding mandated issues that matter to developing country Members. It is not proposing to fix the dispute settlement system it broke. It is leveraging reform to extract structural concessions that tilt the WTO’s institutional machinery in its favour, while pursuing its trade interests bilaterally.

Once plurilaterals are entrenched and the moratorium made permanent, the U.S. will have a freer hand to set the WTO agenda without negotiating with developing country and Least Developed Country members. S&DT, already under pressure from demands to end self-designation and narrow its application, will recede further as a meaningful principle and integral part of the negotiations.

The reform agenda, for all its complexity, is secondary to the structural question: will the WTO remain a consensus-based institution where MFN and consensus decision-making ensure the smallest member has a say? Or will it be refashioned into a platform for variable-geometry agreements where the powerful set the terms and the rest face compliance or exclusion?

Developing countries have fought for decades to preserve a multilateral trading system in which trade could serve as a tool for their development. That system is now under direct threat — not from its irrelevance, but from a deliberate strategy to hollow it out from within.

Chien Yen Goh and Kinda Mohamadieh are trade and investment lawyers at Third World Network (TWN) based in Geneva.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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By Jomo Kwame Sundaram and Kuhaneetha Bai Kalaicelvan
KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia, Mar 24 2026 (IPS)

In mid-1971, US President Nixon ended the dollar’s gold peg at $35 per ounce, triggering de-dollarisation. The 2025 gold and silver rush followed private speculators trying to profit from central banks hedging against perceived new risks.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

De-dollarisation
Some believed that flexible exchange rates, replacing earlier fixed rates, would resolve the ‘Triffin dilemma’ of the ‘dollar system’, due to its role as world reserve currency.

Many believe OPEC was allowed to raise oil prices from 1972, on condition petroleum purchases would be settled in dollars. ‘Petrodollars’ were thus believed to be the ‘black gold’ underlying the dollar system’s survival after 1971.

Although still the dominant world reserve currency, the dollar’s role has gradually declined over the decades. Trump 2.0’s rhetoric and actions appear to have accelerated de-dollarisation.

Trump’s 2 April 2025 ‘Liberation Day’ tariffs announcement triggered even greater uncertainty and volatility in foreign exchange and other markets worldwide.

Greater policy unpredictability has caused governments and investors to explore new options. Authorities worldwide are considering and developing alternatives to the dollar system.

Besides higher inflation, Trump’s threats and actions, particularly his tariffs, sanctions and wars, have pushed investors to sell dollar assets and seek alternatives.

Various factors have significantly accelerated de-dollarisation. In the first half of 2025, the dollar fell by over 10%, its sharpest fall since the 1973 oil crisis.

K Kuhaneetha Bai

Many countries in the Global South have been purchasing gold rather than dollar-denominated assets for reserve accumulation.

Geopolitical economy commentator Ben Norton highlighted an April 2025 note by the Deutsche Bank foreign exchange research head, noting:

“We are witnessing a simultaneous collapse in the price of all US assets [including stocks, foreign exchange, and bonds] … we are entering uncharted territory in the global financial system…

“The market is rapidly de-dollarising. In a typical crisis environment, the market would be hoarding dollar liquidity…The market has lost faith in US assets. They are actively selling down their US assets.

“US administration policy is encouraging a trend toward de-dollarisation to safeguard international investors from a weaponisation of dollar liquidity.”

Western confiscations
The weaponisation of central banks by the US, Europe, and their allies has caused other central banks to seek ‘safety’ by switching from dollar assets to gold.

Increased weaponisation of the dollar and Western confiscation of others’ assets under various pretexts have accelerated this trend.

Billions of dollars’ worth of Venezuelan central bank gold, held at the Bank of England, was confiscated by the UK government during the 2019 Washington-instigated Caracas coup attempt.

After the coup failed, the Bank of England refused to return the gold to Venezuela. Trust in Western governments and central banks thus continued to erode.

Similarly, the US Fed and European Central Bank confiscated over $300 billion worth of Russian dollar-, euro- and sterling-denominated assets after it invaded Ukraine.

European authorities have since pledged to transfer these Russian assets to Ukraine rather than return them to their owners.

Western confiscations of the central bank reserves of Iran, Venezuela, Afghanistan, Russia and others have alarmed authorities and publics worldwide.

Central banks’ reserve managers have increasingly viewed gold as safe despite greater volatility. Besides serving as a hedge, the precious metal also offered lucrative speculative gains.

Mitigating risk
Many monetary authorities have reversed their earlier accumulation of dollar-denominated US Treasury bills and bonds in their official reserves.

While US government debt has continued growing, inflationary pressures have mounted, albeit episodically. Gold and silver holdings are believed to help hedge against inflation and fiat currency debasement.

Gold holdings in central bank reserves increased significantly after the 2008-09 global, actually Western, financial crisis, followed by the Western turn to ‘quantitative easing’.

For the first time in three decades, central banks’ total gold holdings in their international reserves exceeded their US Treasury bond holdings in 2025.

About 36,200 tons, or a fifth of all gold holdings, is now held by central banks, rising rapidly over two years from 15% at the end of 2023!

Meanwhile, rising gold prices drew more speculative investments for profit. But such price spikes are not sustainable indefinitely.

Once gold was seen as overpriced, investors turned to other precious metals, notably silver, and other financial assets.

BRICS’ golden hedge?
After Lord Jim O’Neill identified Brazil, Russia, India and China as significant new financial powers outside the Western sphere of influence, BRICS was formed in 2009 by adding South Africa.

BRICS now has ten members and ten partners. Together, they account for 44% of world income, measured by purchasing power parity, and 56% of its people.

Russia, China, and India have been among the largest recent buyers of gold. Other major purchasers include Uzbekistan and Thailand, both BRICS partners.

Trump 2.0 has generated significant apprehension internationally. Without BRICS’ help, his weaponisation of economic policies and agreements has accelerated de-dollarisation.

Although Trump accuses the BRICS of conspiring to accelerate de-dollarisation, their precious metal purchases make sense as a hedge for their reserves.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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