The National Interest

Wallace C. Gregson

EMALS, Indo-Pacific

The United States must eliminate any worries about revealing EMALS and AAG technologies and share the production and implementation with its allies.

Liberal democratic countries are stirring. On September 15, 2021, the leaders of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States announced the establishment of AUKUS, “an enhanced trilateral security partnership.” On January 6, 2022, Japan and Australia signed a defense pact, making Australia only the second nation to have such an agreement with Japan. On January 7, Japan time, the United States and Japan convened the 2022 U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee. Among many other remarkable items is this paragraph:

The Ministers committed to pursue joint investments that accelerate innovation and ensure the Alliance maintains its technological edge in critical and emerging fields, including artificial intelligence, machine learning, directed energy, and quantum computing. The Ministers concurred to conduct a joint analysis focused on future cooperation in counter-hypersonic technology. They also welcomed the framework Exchange of Notes on Cooperative Research, Development, Production and Sustainment as well as Cooperation in Testing and Evaluation, based on which the two sides will advance and accelerate collaboration on emerging technologies. [Emphasis added] They stressed collaboration on streamlined procurement and resilient defense supply chains.

The sincerity of this pledge to advance and accelerate collaboration will be tested soon. Japan is interested in the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) and Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) system. It’s now a proven technology on the U.S. Navy’s newest carrier, CVN 78, the Gerald R Ford. It’s also said to be approved for sale to one U.S. ally in Europe. Japan is keenly interested in railgun and directed energy weapons, and is aware that China is about to commission a new carrier with electromagnetic launch and recovery technology. 

We’re off to a good start on developing operational naval interoperability. The United Kingdom devoted the maiden voyage of its new aircraft carrier, HMS Queen Elizabeth, and its accompanying multinational escorts as Carrier Strike Group 21 (CSG-21), to working with allies and partners from Great Britain to the Middle East to East Asia. Its “F-35 Lightning II” air group included a U.S. Marine Corps F-35B squadron and a Royal Air Force F-35B squadron. (The “B” model is the short takeoff and vertical landing version of the F-35). While in the Mediterranean the Queen Elizabeth brought Italian F-35B fighters aboard, proving that multinational operations from one carrier are effective across language barriers. The Queen Elizabeth deployment was not just a global demonstration. While in the Middle East, CSG-21’s air wing participated in combat missions against ISIS.

In Asia, CSG-21 participated in multinational exercises involving six different navies—the U.S. Navy, the British Royal Navy, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force, the Royal Netherlands Navy, the Royal Canadian Navy, and the Royal New Zealand Navy. 

Two U.S. carrier strike groups drilled with the United Kingdom’s CSG-21 and a Japanese big-deck warship in a major naval exercise in the waters southeast of Okinawa, Japan. A total of seventeen surface ships, including four aircraft carriers, operated together in the exercises. 

The two U.S. carriers employ conventional catapults and arresting gear, while the Queen Elizabeth uses a “ski jump” bow for launch. The Japanese ship, the JS Izumo (DDH-183), a “straight deck” without catapults, ski jump, or arresting gear, was recently modified with a new deck coating to support F-35B operations. U.S. Marine Corps F-35Bs embarked on Izumo to assist in verifying the modifications and to participate in the exercises. Japan is buying both the F-35A and F-35B aircraft and returning to the ranks of nations deploying aircraft carriers. 

Naval task forces, especially those that include one or more aircraft carriers, are ideal air, land, and sea power and influence projection formations. Nothing else provides such presence, wide-area engagement, surveillance, and maritime domain awareness. Recent deployments involving Great Britain’s new carrier alongside U.S. and other allied ships provided powerful demonstrations of presence and power. The United States can build on this recent multinational effort through the creation of standing multinational maritime task forces that can accept many allied participants. Joint and combined theater commands, in both Northeast and Southeast Asia, would support these task forces and enhance readiness and influence across all participating forces.

The United States must also look to near-term enhancements to its allied naval capabilities. One such enhancement should be incorporating the Electromagnetic Launch System and its accompanying Advanced Arresting Gear throughout allied forces. Launch and recovery cycles of all types of aircraft, manned and unmanned, tankers, surveillance planes, and stealth fighters are accelerated with less stress on the airframes will realize greater range and a wider assortment of capabilities across all aviation components. These systems, adapted for smaller decks currently thought capable only of rotary-wing or STOVL (short takeoff and vertical landing) aircraft, will enhance capability across the force, adding to allied interoperability and effectiveness. With modernized launch and recovery systems among allied forces, individual aircraft can access any flight deck, an essential capability in any emergency.

Imitation is often part of international competition. So is demonstration and intimidation. This naval competition is no exception. China’s newest carrier under construction is likely to employ electromagnetic systems to support aircraft launch and recovery. It’s a good bet that the People’s Liberation Army Navy will showcase this achievement near Japan and Taiwan to demonstrate its superiority, and as a counter to the USS Ford before it can deploy to the region. That’s no small matter as the United States competes for influence in the Western Pacific. China is already marketing its version of EMALS to clients like Pakistan and others. U.S. allies are watching. Will the United States respond?

If the United States can’t restrain the proliferation of this type of technology, it must move the goalposts, developing and improving common alliance capabilities at unmatched speed. The United States must eliminate any worries about revealing EMALS and AAG technologies and share the production and implementation with its allies. Rapid implementation of these systems across U.S. and allied fleets, and the development of operational concepts to take maximum advantage, are essential.

Wallace C. Gregson served as a former assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs (2009-11) and is currently a senior advisor at Avascent International as well as senior director for China and the Pacific at the Center for the National Interest. Gregson last served as the Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific; Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific; and Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Bases, Pacific, headquartered at Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii. He is a senior advisor to General Atomics Electromagnetic Systems.

Image: Flickr.

Ahmad Hashemi

Democracy, Middle East

Iran needs to choose whether it wants to remain an expansionist Persian-Shiite empire or transform into a multi-ethnic democracy where Persians and Shiites have no claim over other ethnic, racial, and sectarian groups.

Though Iran has attempted to move towards democracy in fits and starts since the Constitutional Revolution of 1905, any genuine advance forward has been met with unending opposition, mainly originating from influential landlords, conservative circles, traditional Shiite clerics, and other significant social forces. The uncomfortable reality is that despite being a century into its transformation, there are myriad factions, including a large number of ethnic Persian figures and political parties, that have indicated a willingness to give up on the prospect of democracy in exchange for the preservation of contemporary Iran as the successor to the Persian empire of old.

Iranian officials have time and time again stated that they are the last guardians of the Persian empire, and that Iran’s destiny is intertwined with that of the Islamic Republic. During the anti-regime protests in November 2018, the Iranian regime went as far as cautioning the public that people need not protest, as doing so would bring about the country’s collapse and enable external its enemies to “Syrianize” Iran.

Strange as it may sound, this motivation to preserve traditional social structures transcends contemporary political divides. Various opposition forces also hold similar opinions: when the  2019 protests in Iran reached an unprecedented and worrying level—according to a Reuters report, more than 1,500 protesters were killed—the Persian-dominated Freedom Movement of Iran warned that “the collapse of Iran is imminent,” expressing concern that the fall of the regime would coincide with Iran’s collapse. Some secular Persian ethno-nationalists, such as the dissident politician and former minister of information and tourism under the shah of Iran, Daryoush Homayoun, have clearly indicated that they are willing to bear arms and fight on the side of the current Islamist regime if that is what it takes to hold together the Persian empire. The issue is serious enough that scholar Brenda Shaffer, who has extensively written on Iran and its ethnic groups, has contended that “Iran faces the democracy conundrum: in multi-ethnic states where one non-majority group prevails over others, democratization entails risk of loss of empire.”

A significant number of ethnic Persians, including members of the former regime of the shah, who fled the country after the Islamic Revolution of 1979, support the idea of a unified Persian empire at the cost of denying basic rights to the non-Persian half of the population—even if that means condoning the nuclearization of Iran, supporting Iran’s designated Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force, and glorifying its deceased commander, Qassem Soleimani. According to a report in the Washington Post, Ardeshir Zahedi, the last ambassador of Iran to the United States and the former son-in-law of the shah, “sometimes spoke favorably of the new regime, defending the country’s nuclear program and praising Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani.”

The Iranian regime is well aware of both this complex situation and the desire, particularly prevalent among Persians, to preserve “the empire” and rule over non-Persian ethnic groups in Iran and potentially even beyond. This expansionist ideology, commonly referred to as Iranshahr, is often exploited by the regime to justify its military adventurism abroad and suppress domestic dissent voices, especially among non-Persian ethnic groups, who have stronger reasons to push for democracy.

Secular Iranshahri Persians Support the Islamist Regime

Why do many secular Persian ethnonationalists support the current clerical regime in Iran? The honest answer is that they are deeply concerned over the prospect of Iran disintegrating outright due to deep ethnic inequalities within the country. Ironically, however, Persian nationalists hide this fear when sharing their opinions with Western pundits. Take, for example, AEI scholar Michael Rubin, who has repeated the same argument of ethnic Persians in his writings—including in a recent article with a rather clear title: “Iran Will Not Fracture on Ethnic Lines Like Ethiopia.”

Rubin, though, cannot really be blamed: he, like most other U.S. analysts, policymakers, and DC think-tankers, is not familiar enough with the nuances of Iran’s domestic dynamics and gets his “facts” about Iran from the very same Persian ethno-nationalists who have every reason to present a distorted and biased view on the country’s complex ethnic composition and its implications for the future.

Consider this: because of ethnic inequalities within Iran, Persians are generally more affluent, better-educated, and better-organized. Consequently, they are overrepresented in Iranian diaspora, academia, media outlets, and think tanks. For instance, the Iranian-American journalists and think-tankers who conduct research activities related to Iran at major Washington DC think tanks or media outlets are almost exclusively either ethnic Persians or Persianized Iranians. The latter generally have sympathetic views on Persians and usually harbor unfavorable opinions on non-Persian ethnic groups in Iran because they are insecure about any concept of Iranian “nationhood” which is not exclusively based on the Persian identity.

A holistic approach to future developments in Iran should contain a more balanced view on Iran’s ethnic and other complex domestic dynamics. The Persian factor, too, is equally important. If Persians were to gradually come to embrace an inclusive, decentralized democratic structure for the future of Iran, then democratization efforts would gain momentum. If not, then the disintegration of the country would become a likelier possibility.

Contrary to what experts like Rubin argue, it is not outside of the realm of reality to anticipate that Iran could collapse as a result of what some might call a semi-apartheid system—in place since 1925—and split the country into its constituent ethnic units, including Azerbaijanis, Arabs, Kurds, and Baluch. It is important to recognize the diversity within Iran. Yet, instead of recognizing its multi-ethnic composition, the Islamist regime has further tilted towards Persian ethnonationalism over the last two decades, unofficially embracing the Pahlavi-era doctrine of “One Nation, One Language, One Supreme Leader, One God.”

Secularization Further Stokes Ethnic Awareness

Recent developments, such as the rise of global identity politics; an international resurgence of ethnonationalism; and the inception of the internet, social media, and other platforms have all contributed to a revival of ethnic identities in Iran. Moreover, Tehran’s Islamization policies have largely backfired among the youth, and as a result, ethnic nationalism has gained momentum within the country. Contrary to most Muslim-majority nations, enthusiasm for Islamist ideology in Iran has been declining for the last two decades. Ethno-nationalist movements are on the rise, and Azerbaijani, Kurdish, Arab, and Baluch groups are demanding equal economic opportunities and cultural and linguistic autonomy.

Iran needs to choose whether it wants to remain an expansionist Persian-Shiite empire (Iranshahr), or transform into a multi-ethnic democracy where Persians and Shiites have no claim over other ethnic, racial, and sectarian groups.

As the regime’s domestic legitimacy is steadily declining and its long-term survivability is in doubt, it remains to be seen what path awaits Iran.

Ahmad Hashemi is a Research Fellow at the Hudson Institute. Follow him on Twitter @MrAhmadHashemi.

Image: Reuters.

Wes Martin

Azerbaijan-Armenia, South Caucasus

Only through breaking Armenia’s dependency on Russia—through renormalization with Azerbaijan and Turkey—will the region’s true economic potential be unleashed.

On January 14, 2022, Turkey and Armenia will begin talks aimed at reopening Europe’s final Cold War-era closed border. The historic move, supported by the West, promises to fundamentally reconfigure the South Caucasus—and Russia’s sway within it.

Blocked borders, jagged pipelines, and irrational freight routes speak to the region’s limitations, all of which have played to the former imperial power. Russia prefers these countries to be at odds as it hands Moscow economic and political leverage while stifling solidarity against it.

Should the countries remain at odds, a landlocked Armenia will suffer under the weight of regional isolation. To the west lie the closed border with Turkey and the freight lines to Europe. To the east lie the equally sealed border with Azerbaijan and the gateway to central Asia. Yet the primary rationale for keeping both borders closed has disappeared: the occupation of almost one-fifth of Azerbaijan—according to the UN Security Council—since the 1990s.

As the USSR crumbled, the neighbors fell into conflict over the mixed region of Karabakh. The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War reversed most of Armenia’s land grab. Since then, Baku has favored open borders and logistics lines. So too has Turkey, who closed its border in solidarity with ally Azerbaijan after the first war. With the status quo altered and some necessary space between the conflict, now there is an opening for change.

Without open borders, the region’s economic potential remains locked. But if open borders and restored rail lines become a reality, Armenia could create the fastest freight line between East Asia and Europe.  An alternative route would also weaken East Asia and Europe’s reliance on Russia. Cooperation in the South Caucasus also fuels greater prosperity and helps the region stand on its own feet.

But there are other barriers to overcome. It is not simply solidarity with Azerbaijan that has structured Turkey’s relations with Armenia, but a contested history. At its core is the killing of 1.5 million ethnic Armenians during World War I. Since then, Armenia has characterized said acts as genocidal but Turkey disputes the label despite recognizing atrocities were committed by the Ottoman empire. It remains a thorny issue between the two nations.

As for Azerbaijan, wounds are still raw in Armenia since the closure of the 2020 war. Being the victor of the 2020 conflict, it may be easy for Baku to talk up renormalization in its wake. Selling a radically different future from the moral puncture of defeat—with former foes establishing trade and diplomatic relations—is another matter.

Given the discontent now playing out within Armenia, the difficulties are clear. Detainees released from Azerbaijan—which the government had lobbied for—were condemned by the speaker of the house as being deserters and traitors, sparking protests from the parents. Many are looking for someone to blame, scapegoats permitted.

Before he became prime ministership, Nikol Pashinyan had championed himself as a reformer following the 2018 protests against a corrupt ruling elite. Those he had toppled led the counter-offense after defeat in the war, staging an unsuccessful coup. They were the militaristic parties that had ruled Armenia for much of its independence and had shunned compromise to resolve the long-frozen conflict. Many were themselves from Karabakh and based their legitimacy—often to deflect from accusations of graft or incompetence—on the struggle for the territory.

Having survived the junta’s unsuccessful coup d’etat, Pashinyan is now talking up cooperation with Armenia’s former enemies. This has again earned him another chorus of traitor. Yet despite the pressure he is experiencing, he must remain steadfast. He won a renewed mandate postwar to chart a different path from the discredited elite of the past: turning away from Russia and toward the West.

If anything, however, Russia’s grip has tightened over Armenia’s sovereignty, with Moscow’s peacekeepers stationed in Karabakh. This growing dependence was neatly delineated by the recent upheaval in Kazakhstan. As part of the Russian-controlled Collective Security Treaty Organization, Pashinyan sent Armenian troops to quell the protests.

This rankled a domestic population who did not see Russia’s sweep to its aid in a time of need. It was also viewed at odds with the prime minister and his supporters’ politics. The Kazakhstan protests his troops helped quell differed little from the 2018 Velvet Revolution that had swept him to power. But power politics prevailed over values. Pashinyan had little choice but to follow orders. Only through breaking Armenia’s dependency on Moscow—through renormalization with Azerbaijan and Turkey—will that change.

The first president of an independent Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, spoke of compromise following the first Karabakh war to stabilize the region and entrench national sovereignty. He was toppled by the same forces that now threaten Pashinyan. But the current prime minister must hold out. Economic prosperity not only for Armenia, but for the whole region—and then throwing off the Russian yoke—will be the reward.

Colonel (Ret.) Wes Martin has served in law enforcement positions around the world and holds an MBA in International Politics and Business.

Image: Reuters.

Peter Suciu

Inflation,

Many Americans haven't seen an annual inflation rate this high in their entire lives. 

Russia is massing troops on the border with Ukraine, China is expanding its presence in the Indo-Pacific Region, North Korea is testing hypersonic weapons, and COVID-19 shows no signs of going away. Yet, for most Americans, the most worrisome threat is the record inflation that is increasing household expenses and eating into wages. The 7 percent increase in the inflation rate over the course of 2021 marked the largest annual increase in inflation in nearly four decades.

Americans saw prices for the basic necessities they rely on rise at a dramatic rate in 2021. While the government's efforts to provide stimulus aid and ultra-low interest rates motivated Americans to spend, supply chain woes resulted in such high demand for goods that prices increased at a record pace.

The U.S. Department of Labor reported on Wednesday that the core inflation rate, which excludes volatile goods such as food and gas, jumped by 5.5 percent in December, the highest in decades. According to the Associated Press, overall inflation rose 0.5 percent from November to December. The only good news was that the increase was down from 0.8 percent in October.

Economists have warned that because inflation pressures show no sign of easing, inflation is unlikely to fall back to pre-pandemic levels in the near future. While Americans are feeling it the most, the nineteen countries that use the euro had the largest increase in the annual inflation rate since the Euro was adopted.

Taxpayers Protection Alliance (TPA), a group that advocates on behalf of taxpayers and consumers, has slammed the Biden administration, calling inflation a hidden tax on the American people.

"Between the energy crisis, supply chain issues, concerns about the economy, and latest job reports, it's time for Washington to wake up," the TPA said in a statement. "They ought to reverse course and stop the reckless government spending packages, like Build Back Better, that are still being discussed in Congress. The Biden Administration should immediately drop tariffs across the board and Congress should rein in the administration's ability to unilaterally hike tariffs in the future."

The White House has argued that Build Back Better would reduce the cost of living, especially for many low-income families, and ease inflation over the long run. However, the key Democratic holdout, Sen. Joe Manchin (D-W.Va.), has continued to express concern that the bill would only increase inflation.

"Another month of record-breaking inflation. In just one year, there has been a 7 percent increase across the board, with many categories of goods and services well into the double digits," Patrick Hedger, executive director of Taxpayers Protection Alliance, said via an email. "Americans are feeling it each month when they go to buy necessities like groceries and gas. Small businesses are feeling the economic pinch when purchasing supplies. Economists predicted this, and unfortunately for the American people, they were right. Meanwhile, Democrats in Washington are desperate to blame anything else besides their policies for this predictable disaster."

The economy of 2022 is starting to look a lot like 1982’s economy, but it's not certain that Joe Biden can turn things around as President Reagan did. 

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He regularly writes about military small arms, and is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com.

Image: Reuters.

James Clark

Cold War, Global

Some mistakes are costlier than others.

Here's What You Need to Know: The Cuban Missile Crisis was just the most visible instance of the United States and the Soviet Union going to war. Here are a number of others that are less well known.

In October 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union came to the brink of nuclear war during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The standoff occurred over the installation of nuclear missiles on Cuba, just 90 miles from the states. Though the stalemate ended after 13 grueling days, it was neither the first or last time the two world powers would very nearly come to blows.

In the following years, until 1991 when the Cold War officially ended with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, America’s military and its Russian counterpart incited mass panic and narrowly avoided World War III no fewer than five times.

While some of these incidents sound like they’re plucked out of “Dr. Strangelove,” they’re real.

Between fried computer chips, playing the wrong tape, or misinterpreting a signal, it’s a wonder that we’re still here.

Here are five times that a dumb mistake nearly ended the world in giant ball of nuclear fire.

That time someone accidentally triggered the Emergency Broadcast System

In 1971, though Cold War tensions had simmered, compared to their high point in the early ‘60s, the war in Vietnam was still in full swing, which explains the mass confusion that occurred on Feb. 20, 1971, when the Emergency Broadcast System was accidentally triggered at 9:33 a.m.

For the next 40 minutes, regularly scheduled programming was put on hold as listeners and broadcasters anxiously waited to hear an announcement from the White House. Fortunately, it was a mistake, there were no nuclear missiles hurtling toward the United States, or hostile military forces advancing on U.S. territories.

The error highlighted some problems with the Emergency Broadcast System’s safeguards and procedures. Roughly 20% of the outlets followed the correct procedures and cleared the air, the rest either started to, but stopped, or just ignored the alert completely. After operators at the National Emergency Warning Center in Colorado realized their mistake, they sent cancellation messages; however, they failed to use the correct codeword — “impish” — so that slowed things down a bit.

In 1979 the U.S. military thought its own training simulation was real and almost started World War III

Referred to as “the training tape incident,” on Nov. 9, 1979, the computers at North American Aerospace Defense Command, NORAD, showed a massive nuclear strike aimed at U.S. command posts and nuclear forces. Launch control centers for America’s nuclear warheads received preliminary warning that the United States was under attack and fighter planes were prepared to intercept enemy bombers: World War III had begun.

Except it hadn’t. A realistic training tape was accidentally inserted into the computer that ran the nation’s early-warning programs. Fortunately the mistake was discovered within minutes after the raw data from satellites and early-warning radar systems showed no inbound missiles or enemy bombers.

Then, less than a year later, there was another computer glitch

On June 3, 1980, U.S. military command received a warning that the Soviet Union had launched a nuclear strike. Same as before, the military scrambled interceptors, missile launch crews were put on red alert, and bombers were readied. There’s no way it could be another mistake, right? Wrong.

Fortunately, a threat assessment conference was immediately convened and again scoured the raw data, discovering no missiles had actually been launched. Turns out, a single computer chip on the monitor had failed and caused random numbers of attacking missiles to appear on the screen.

A Russian commander avoided the end of the world by not telling his superiors about a possible nuclear attack

At midnight on Sept. 26, 1983, a Soviet missile detection bunker went into a panic when an alarm sounded, signaling that United States had launched five intercontinental ballistic missiles toward Russia.

In reality, the warning was a false alarm caused by the the Soviets mistaking a glint of sunlight off clouds near Montana as a missile launch. Though protocol demanded that the bunker report any signs of a missile launch to Soviet high command, Lt. Col. Stanislav Petrov knew the satellites were prone to errors and reasoned that an actual preemptive nuclear strike would involve hundreds of missiles, not five. Given the high tensions in both the Soviet Union and the states, Petrov’s decision to follow his gut and not report it may have averted a nuclear holocaust.

Speaking of tension, a few months later the Soviet Union thought a NATO training exercise was a preemptive strike

Though it was not widely known at the time, in November 1983, the United States and the Soviet Union came closer to starting World War III than at any time since the Cuban Missile Crisis. During a NATO war game in Europe, dubbed Able Archer 83, the U.S. military moved 19,000 troops to the area, relocated its command elements, and raised its alert status — all steps that would typically be taken in a time of war.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union was losing its mind on the other side of the iron curtain. According to documents declassified decades later, relations with the Soviet Union were “on a hair trigger.” The Soviet military was on high alert, its nuclear arsenal was readied, and units in East Germany and Poland had fighter jets prepared for takeoff, due to concerns that NATO’s war games were a ruse ahead of a preemptive strike. The country remained at that readiness level until the training exercise ended on Nov. 11 of that year.

This article by James Clark originally appeared at Task & Purpose. Follow Task & Purpose on Twitter.

Image: Flickr.

Stavros Atlamazoglou

History, Asia

In 2012, Sergeant First Class Eugene Ashley Jr. was inducted into the Special Forces Regiment’s Hall of Fame as a Distinguished Member.

Here's What You Need to Remember: To be sure, the Vietnam War offered plenty of opportunities for moments of unfathomable bravery, and Ashley’s actions on that fateful night 53 years ago make up for just one story of valor.

Some 53 years ago, in a faraway Special Forces camp in southeast Asia, Sergeant First Class Eugene Ashley Jr achieved immortality during one of the fiercest battles of the Vietnam War.

Ashley joined the Army in 1950. After finishing boot camp and Advanced Infantry Training, Ashley went to Germany. When the Korean War broke out in 1953, Ashley deployed in Korea with the 187th Regimental Combat Team. Then, for a brief period, Ashley got out of the Army and was placed in the Inactive Reserves. A few months later, he reenlisted and was assigned to the 82nd Airborne Division. Up to that point, Ashley had trained in numerous military occupational specialties, including as an infantryman, ambulance driver, anti-aircraft ammunition handler, heavy weapons specialist, and parachute rigger; he had also held leadership positions at the squad and company level.

 In 1966 he decided to make the jump to Special Forces and graduated from the Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC) a year later. Upon completion of training, Ashley was assigned first to the 7th Special Forces Group and later to the 3rd Special Forces Group. In 1968, he deployed to the Republic of Vietnam with Charlie Company, 5th Special Forces Group.

Ashley’s arrival to Vietnam coincided with the Tet Offensive, which began in January 1968 and would last till September. During Tet, the NVA and Vietcong took US and South Vietnamese forces by surprise and attacked several large cities throughout South Vietnam, including the capital Saigon where they briefly penetrated the US Embassy.

Once in country, Ashley found his way to the large Marine Corps base at Khe Sanh, which was under siege by the North Vietnamese. Although the majority of the NVA and Vietcong attacks during the Tet Offensive were quickly dealt with, the siege of Khe Sanh continued for months. Carrying morbid similarities with the Siege of Dien Bien Phu, where the French were defeated by the Vietminh in 1954 and were forced out of Indochina, the fighting at Khe Sanh drew international attention.   

Close to Khe Sanh was the Lang Vei Special Forces Camp, which was just a mile-and-a-half from the border with Laos. Green Berets stationed in Lang Vei were no foreigners to NVA attacks. Artillery and sniper fire was a pretty common occurrence even before the Tet Offensive. But what was coming next was not common at all.

On the night of February 6, the NVA launched a tank assault on the Special Forces base. Radioing Khe Sanh for assistance, the Marines there couldn’t believe that NVA armor was within the Lang Vei perimeter—this was the first time the NVA had used tanks in force. During the initial hours of the battle, Ashley coordinated airstrikes and mortar and artillery fire in support of his fellow Green Berets in the camp. Then, seeing that reinforcements from Khe Sanh weren’t going to reach the overran camp in time, Ashley and other Green Berets took matters into their own hands.

Ashley hastily organized a relief force comprised of Special Forces operators and partner forces and led them to the nearby camp. In the ensuing hours, Ashley would lead five assaults against NVA tanks and heavy infantry. Time after time, Ashley led by example and destroyed numerous enemy positions. The fifth assault, however, would be his last.

Ashley’s Medal of Honor citation offers a glimpse of his actions on that fateful night.

“During his fifth and final assault, he adjusted airstrikes nearly on top of his assault element, forcing the enemy to withdraw and resulting in friendly control of the summit of the hill. While exposing himself to intense enemy fire, he was seriously wounded by machinegun fire but continued his mission without regard for his personal safety. After the fifth assault he lost consciousness and was carried from the summit by his comrades only to suffer a fatal wound when an enemy artillery round landed in his area. Sergeant Ashley displayed extraordinary heroism in risking his life in an attempt to save the lives of his entrapped comrades and commanding officer. His total disregard for his own personal safety while exposed to enemy observation and automatic weapons fire was an inspiration to all men committed to the assault. The resolute valor with which he led five gallant charges placed critical diversionary pressure on the attacking enemy and his valiant efforts carved a channel in the overpowering enemy forces and weapons positions through which the survivors of Camp Lang Vei eventually escaped to freedom. Sergeant Ashley’s conspicuous gallantry at the cost of his own life was in the highest traditions of the military service, and reflects great credit upon himself, his unit and the United States Army.”

To be sure, the Vietnam War offered plenty of opportunities for moments of unfathomable bravery, and Ashley’s actions on that fateful night 53 years ago make up for just one story of valor.

In 2012, Sergeant First Class Eugene Ashley Jr. was inducted into the Special Forces Regiment’s Hall of Fame as a Distinguished Member.

This article first appeared at Sandboxx.

Image: Wikipedia.

Charlie Gao

Sniper Rifles, United States

Sniper rifles are a relatively stagnant technology, and it should come as no surprise that all rifles on this list look relatively alike.

Here's What You Need To Remember: The primary innovations in the field of long-range shooting have come in bullet and optic technology rather than in the rifles themselves, so the race to win a contract often comes down to who can provide the better after-purchase support, and who can build the rifle to accept the latest hot cartridge that a military may want.

The modern sniper rifle rose to prominence in the 1980s as a critical tool for counterterrorist teams and continued to prove itself on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan. Advancements in optics, bullet, and manufacturing technology have allowed sniper rifles to reach out to further than ever before, so fielding a modern sniper rifle is important for many militaries. Here are some that could be considered the best.

1. L115A4

Accuracy International (AI) is considered to have pioneered the modern sniper rifle with their Precision Marksman (AI PM) rifle in the 1980s, which was adopted by the British Army as the L96A1. AI has provided sniper rifles to the British military since. The latest one is the L115A4, a variant of the AI AX rifle that retains some features from the earlier L115A3, the AI Arctic Warfare Super Magnum.

The L115A4 features the usual laundry list of features that are standard for a modern sniper rifle. Adjustable stock in length and height, sub-MOA accuracy, chambering in heavy cartridges like the .338 Lapua.

The primary improvements on the earlier L115A3 are the addition of a new keymod mounting system on the handguard for reduced weight and the addition of a spirit level at the rear of the receiver right above the bolt. Spirit levels are common aftermarket accessories for precision rifles as cant can cause a significant deviation in shot trajectory. The integration of a level into the rifle itself is likely a welcome addition for the military sniper.

Other variants of the AI AX chassis are used by the USMC as the Mk13 Mod 7 and by other militaries.

2. McMillan TAC-50

While most .50 anti-material rifles such as the M107 or M82 aren’t precise enough to be true sniper rifles, the TAC-50 is an exception. With half-MOA accuracy with proper ammunition, the TAC-50 is known for being the rifle used to achieve the longest sniper kills in the world, with Canadian snipers using the weapons making shots at over 3.5 kilometers.

The TAC-50 is also used by the Navy SEALs under the designation Mk 15.

3. Remington MSR

The Remington Defense MSR won the US Special Operation Command’s Precision Sniper Rifle contract. Like most other rifles here, it’s a multi-caliber rifle capable of shooting calibers up to .338 Lapua and features plenty of rail space for accessories and an adjustable and folding stock.

It beat out the Sako TRG-42, Accuracy International AX338, Barrett MRAD, and Blaser R93 for the contract, though the exact reasons why have yet to be revealed. The MSR is slightly more modular compared to the TRG-42 and AX338 as it accepts any AR-15 pistol grip, though it shares this feature with the Barrett M98B.

4. Sako TRG M10

Another rifle that competed in the PSR contract, the Finnish Sako TRG has seen better success in being adopted across Europe. The rifle is a known favorite of elite Russian units, who prefer it to domestic Russian rifles.

As with the other rifles on this list, the TRG M10, features sub-MOA accuracy, adjustable stocks, and detachable magazines.

5. Barrett MRAD

While the MRAD lost the PSR contract, SOCOM later decided to purchase the MRAD anyways under the new moniker of Advanced Sniper Rifle, or ASR. The primary difference between the ASR contract and the earlier PSR contract is the addition of a new caliber, the .300 PRC, which has superior ballistics in some ways compared to earlier dedicated sniper cartridges.

Norway, New Zealand, and Israel all use the MRAD as well.

Sniper rifles are a relatively stagnant technology, and it should come as no surprise that all rifles on this list look relatively alike, with free floated barrels, negative space rails, detachable magazines, and folding/adjustable stocks. There are plenty more rifles not on here that have seen more limited adoption that look very similar, including the B&T APR, PGM 338, IWI Dan,  and OBR SM Tarnów Bor.

The primary innovations in the field of long-range shooting have come in bullet and optic technology rather than in the rifles themselves, so the race to win a contract often comes down to who can provide the better after-purchase support, and who can build the rifle to accept the latest hot cartridge that a military may want.

Charlie Gao studied political and computer science at Grinnell College and is a frequent commentator on defense and national-security issues. This article first appeared in 2019.

Image: Wikimedia.

Richard Douglas

Syrian Civil War, Syria

Depending on how one interprets the United States’s actions in Syria, this is either part of a tradition of proxy wars between these countries, or a one-sided conflict between the United States and Russia.

Here's What You Need to Know: The United States has only provided indirect support to various factions through weapons, logistics, and military support. Russia ostensibly entered the war strictly to fight ISIS, but these claims have been criticized by many, including the U.S. government.

As the Syrian Civil War reaches its eleventh year, Bashar al-Assad is still in power as president of the Syrian Arab Republic. Syria has been backed by Russia since 2015, while the United States has provided logistical and military support to various groups fighting Assad’s regime since 2013. Commentators have been calling this conflict a proxy war for years, arguing that both countries are vying for control of the Middle East. While it is true that U.S. and Russian influence and interests have shaped this conflict, a counterargument is that these vary and sometimes America’s actual level of involvement in the conflict is overstated. The Syrian Civil War is one of the most complex and important conflicts of the twenty-first century that could not possibly be explained thoroughly in just a few pages. However, a brief explanation of what is going on in Syria can help readers begin to make up their minds about whether or not the Syrian Civil War is a proxy war between the United States and Russia.

For a decade now, Syria has been engulfed in a bloody civil war that has directly or indirectly involved many world powers. It is an extremely complex war and many Americans have little to no idea about what is actually happening there. But it’s important to be at least passingly familiar with what’s going on to understand the nature of American and Russian involvement in the conflict, and why some people refer to it as a proxy war. In 2011, the Arab Spring led to an armed revolt in Syria, escalating into open conflict between the Syrian Arab Republic (Syrian government) and the Interim Government (Syrian Opposition: various groups fighting the government that do not necessarily have any alliance with each other, and are in fact sometimes openly fighting one another). This political turbulence resulted in a region in northeastern Syria known as Rojava declaring themselves an autonomous region. This extreme destabilization in Syria made it the perfect place for the Islamic State, also known as ISIS, to gain a stronghold. So by the time the United States and Russia got involved, the conflict had already developed into a four-sided conflict, with each faction having a network of supporting countries and organizations with various and sometimes conflicting interests.

Meanwhile, tensions between the United States and Russia were heating up as a result of the Ukraine Crisis and Syria was the perfect place for tensions to flare up in the form of a proxy war. A proxy war, for readers who don’t happen to know, is when two rival countries fight each other indirectly by providing support to opposite factions in a different war, usually, one happening in a smaller country where the countries fighting the proxy war have colonial interests. There were many proxy wars fought between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War including the Congo Crisis, Korean War, Vietnam War, Cambodian Civil War, and Angolan Civil War. If the Syrian Civil War is a proxy war between the United States and Russia, it is just the latest in a long tradition of such wars.

Russia has been directly involved in the Syrian Civil War since 2015, and unlike America, they have directly entered the war. The United States has only provided indirect support to various factions through weapons, logistics, and military support. Russia ostensibly entered the war strictly to fight ISIS, but these claims have been criticized by many, including the U.S. government. The U.S. government insists that Russia has launched targeted airstrikes at non-Islamic State groups that oppose Assad’s regime.

Russia has a vested interest in keeping Assad’s regime in power because stability in the region is important to Russian interests. Syria is the home of Russia’s only remaining military base outside of the former Soviet Union. This is a naval port called Tartus, and this port helps ensure that Russia has access to the Mediterranean Sea. It’s one of Russia’s most strategically important military outposts. 

Additionally, Russia has an interest in containing U.S. influence in the region. Tensions between the U.S. and Syria have been high for years, even before the civil war. In 2002 Syria was added to the U.S.’s “Axis of Evil” list that included North Korea, Cuba, Libya, Iraq, and Iran. Regime change in Syria could lead to a new regime that is friendlier with the U.S. This would both give the U.S. more influence in the Middle East, and it could potentially threaten Tartus.

The United States has been indirectly involved in the conflict since 2013, after conflicting reports that Assad was using chemical weapons on his own citizens. Like Russia, The U.S. ostensibly entered the war to fight ISIS. However, the U.S. has stayed in the region after ISIS’s declared defeat, and has provided support to Rojava and other groups that oppose Assad’s regime. The United States has a vested interest in forcing regime change in Syria, as the stability of the Syrian Arab Republic is strategically important for the United States. Forcing a regime change in Syria can contain Russian involvement in the Middle East, thereby increasing American influence in the region.

That said, those same sources calling the Syrian Civil War a proxy war also admit that the United States does not necessarily appear fully committed to forcing regime change in Syria. These sources argue that the United States became less interested in the war after they declared victory over ISIS in 2017. The Trump administration had little desire to stay in Syria after ISIS was defeated, despite the conflict raging on. Former President Trump’s eventual decision to leave Syria was met with criticism from the left and right and even spurred General Mattis to resign as Secretary of Defense. Critics say that the United States abandoned the Kurdish forces who had been some of America’s strongest allies in their fight against ISIS. Former President Trump’s decision to abruptly withdraw troops from Syria left these Kurdish forces vulnerable to a Turkish invasion, which some are calling a genocide.

A decade into the conflict, the Syrian Civil War still has no end in sight. The complexity of the war and strategic importance of Syria has attracted the influence of many foreign interests, particularly the United States and Russia. These rival countries are considered to support different sides in this war, eliciting memories of Cold War-era proxy wars. Depending on how one interprets the United States’s actions during this war, this is either part of a tradition of proxy wars between these countries, or a one-sided conflict between the United States and Russia. Regardless, the Syrian Civil War is not going to end anytime soon, and it will go down as one of the bloodiest and most brutal conflicts of the twenty-first century.

Richard Douglas writes on firearms, defense and security issues. He is the founder and editor of Scopes Field, and a columnist at The National Interest, 1945, Daily Caller and other publications.

This article first appeared in April 2021 and is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters.

Richard Douglas

Espionage, United States

The United States and the Soviet Union had to think outside the box during the Cold War and from that, we got some fascinating technology.

Here's What You Need to Remember: The Cold War delivered some fascinating technology and one of the most intriguing eras in American history.

The Cold War is widely regarded as the “golden age” of spycraft and espionage, and for good reason too. As tensions rose between the United States and the Soviet Union, there was a race to highly advanced technology for the time period. As a result, new technological heights were being reached at an astounding rate. Massive nuclear devices and space travel come to mind but there were new methods of gathering intel and taking out targets being developed as well.

The United States had to get creative (and maybe a little weird) with its gadgets to maintain cover and secrecy. Perhaps the strangest was the Rectal CIA Toolkit.

Many smirk as soon as this tool is mentioned, but the truth of the matter is that it could be a true lifesaver. The purpose was to be a discreet kit that could help agents escape if they were discovered and captured. Inside the capsule was an assortment of tools like miniature saw blades and chisels designed to cut ropes. Many even included drill bits.

On the darker side of things, agents were provided a couple of different ways to terminate their own lives. It must be understood that not only was it a matter of national security, but also a way to avoid the horrors that awaited agents thrown into captivity. The method made most popular by Hollywood was the faux tooth that contained a cyanide capsule. Bite down hard enough and it was all over. Along the same line was a pair of glasses that ended things the same way. A poison pill was hidden in the temple tip. All the agent had to do was casually remove his glasses and bite down on the end.

When going on the offensive agents could keep a blade hidden in the unsuspecting places. Even a trained eye could miss it. A single coin would never draw attention in a pocket full of change, even if the person was patted down and searched. An agent could split a coin revealing a razor-sharp knife ready to use on an unsuspecting target.

As for gathering intel? The CIA had several answers for that too, but two stand out from the rest. Like virtually every tool used in the Cold War, the Shoe Transmitter had the express purpose of being unnoticeable. Inside the heel of the shoe were a transmitter and microphone. Intelligence officials could listen in on everything being said to American diplomats outfitted with the shoe. Some cold war antics became somewhat outlandish as well with a strange device called a pigeon camera. It is exactly what it sounds like too. This camera was strapped to a pigeon to gather intel, its primary function was to obtain aerial footage of locations that were critical to informed espionage.

The United States and the Soviet Union had to think outside the box during the Cold War and from that, we got some fascinating technology and one of the most intriguing eras in American history.

Richard Douglas writes on firearms, defense and security issues. He is the founder and editor of Scopes Field, and a columnist at The National Interest, 1945, Daily Caller and other publications.

This article was first published in April 2021 and is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters.

Sebastien Roblin

THAAD, Europe

Eurosam will have to contend with the more established THAAD system and the temptation to buy American to score points with Washington

Here’s What You Need to Remember: A European counterpart to THAAD would be useful and desirable in many quarters, particularly to counter new threats from Russia and Iran

Ballistic missiles are making a comeback in the twenty-first century because they give countries like China, Iran, North Korea and Russia the ability to strike targets hundreds or thousands of miles away without having to expose vulnerable warplanes to interception. The precision allowed by modern guidance systems allows even non-nuclear missiles to deliver highly-deadly attacks against airbases, fuel and ammunition depots, and even moving aircraft carriers. 

Therefore, the ability to intercept ballistic missiles is also growing in importance. But surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) designed to shoot-down aircraft struggle to hit missiles flying many times faster and higher. And the further a ballistic missile can go, the faster and higher it must fly, and the harder it becomes to intercept. 

The United States has developed a spectrum Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABMs)s, from the Patriot PAC-3 MSE which can intercept tactical ballistic missiles, the high-flying THAADS and naval SM-3 Block II missiles which can counter short to intermediate-range systems, and GMD interceptors in Alaska that can tackle intercontinental-range missiles.

Several European countries have caught up with lower-tier ABMs by developing a versatile SAM of which arguably exceeds the Patriot missile in capability—and may evolve a similar capability to THAADs.

The Aster missile—named after the Greek word for “Star”—was conceived in the 1990s by Eurosam, a consortium of MBDA and Thales, to defend warships from enemy aircraft and sea-skimming cruise missiles at short range. Today, Aster missiles can be found in the launch cells of warships including the Royal Navy’s Type 45 destroyers and France’s Horizon-class frigates.

In the 2000s, Eurosam began developing an enlarged Aster missile with four times the range to provide area air defense. This new Aster 30 not only supplements the short-range Aster 15 variant at sea, but is also deployed on a land-based launcher, the SAMP/T (French: “Surface-to-Air Medium-Range/Land-based”), replacing dated I-Hawk and Crotale SAMs

The latest Aster-30 Block 1NT model can intercept aircraft up to seventy-five miles away, and can fly fast and high enough (maximum 65,000 feet) to intercept tactical and short-range ballistic missiles, as well as low-flying drones, cruise missiles and aircraft.

How SAMP/T Works

A SAMP/T battery has three truck-mounted elements: an Arabel multi-function radar, a command-and-control vehicle, and four or six launch vehicles each carrying eight boxy vertical launch canisters with a missile inside ready for launch. The road-mobile battery takes forty-five minutes to set up on average, with launchers often dispersed a few miles away from the radar. A single battery can be manned by as few as fourteen personnel.

The three-dimensional X-band Arabel radar completes one rotation per second and is frequency-agile, allowing it to resist jamming and other electronic countermeasures. It boasts 360-degree coverage, meaning it can defend against attacks from any angle, can track up to one hundred targets and direct up to sixteen missiles simultaneously to engage them.

Though Arabel’s basic search radius of thirty-seven miles is unimpressive, it can use a Link-16 datalink to connect to another radar—say, a longer-range ground-based radar, or an orbiting AWACS aircraft—to “focus” its scan, allowing it to double its range to seventy-five miles versus high-flying targets. However, due to the constraints imposed by intervening terrain, the maximum engagement range for low-flying targets remains thirty-one miles for aircraft and twenty-one miles for missiles.

The SAMP/T battery’s command unit transmits coordinates from the radar transmit to the missile launchers. Each truck can launch all eight of its 4.9-meter-long Aster-30 missiles in just ten seconds. Within four more seconds, the missiles’ solid-fuel rocket boosters accelerate the half-ton missile to Mach 4.5—nearly a mile per second—before being jettisoned as a second-stage booster activates.

Initially, the Aster is guided by an internal inertial guidance system, but the command vehicle transmits updates on the target’s position via an uplink, allowing the supersonic weapon to adjust its trajectory should the target change course.

As the Aster closes in on its target, it begins using an active Ka-band AD4A doppler radar seeker in its nose for guidance. Four side-facing gas thrusters perform ultra-rapid “side-strafing” corrections to ensure a near-perfect intercept. Though Aster missiles have directly impacted their targets in tests, they also carry a small thirty-three-pound proximity-fused warhead for added punch. 

You can see the engagement process visualized in this video.

In around a half-dozen tests, Asters have shot down a diverse spectrum of targets including supersonic sea-skimming cruise missiles, jet-powered drones, and high-flying Israeli Black Sparrow ballistic target missiles designed to emulate a Scud-B.

Aster Versus Patriot

The Italian Air Force currently deploys three SAMP/T regiments with two batteries of six launchers each, mounted on Atra 8x8 trucks. In 2016, Rome deployed two units to Turkey to provide air defense coverage of its border with Syria.

The French Air Force has seven squadrons of “Mambas,” each including two batteries with four launchers each. Five batteries are deployed to defend key French air bases from attack—notably including Saint-Dizier-Robinson, which hosts France’s Rafale nuclear strike squadrons. The remaining two batteries are reserved to support French ground forces deployed abroad.

The Aster 30 seems to straddle the capabilities of both the Patriot anti-aircraft PAC-2 and shorter-range missile-defense oriented PAC-3 missiles in one package. According to one survey of contemporary air defense missiles, the SAMP/T is less expensive at $500 million for a battery and $2 million per Aster-30 missile. By comparison, a PAC-2 and PAC-3 reportedly costs around $800 million to $1 billion per battery, and $2 or $3 million per missile.

On the downside, the SAMP/T seems more dependent on external radars to allow it to “see” far enough to exploit its maximum range, and it has a slightly shorter maximum engagement range than the PAC-2.

Already Romania, Poland and Sweden have considered the SAMP/T—and chosen to buy Patriot systems instead. One factor may be that the latter is combat-tested and the Aster is not. But more importantly, these buyers may feel that Patriot missiles come with the added value of currying favor with Washington, thereby “buying” a security guarantee from the United States.

So far, the SAMP/T’s sole export order has come from Singapore, which reportedly received three batteries and 300 Aster missiles in 2018 and 2019. Motivated by the use of Aster missiles by the Singapore Navy, the Singapore Air Force has networked its SAMP/Ts with longer-range American AN/FPS-117 and Swedish Giraffe radars, demonstrating how the Aster can be mated with more powerful sensors.

Currently, Canada and Switzerland are weighing purchasing the Aster versus the Patriot. Azerbaijan is also rumored to have purchased land-based Asters, and Turkey has reached a preliminary deal to study license-building the Aster missile, but whether the financing and political goodwill to make it happen is difficult to foresee following Ankara’s purchase of Russian S-400 air defense systems.

Eurosam is working on an Aster Block 2 missile designed to fly nearly four times as high at over 230,000 feet. This new hit-to-kill exo-atmospheric interceptor would be capable of smacking down hypersonic missiles and ballistic missiles traveling at seven times the speed of sound. 

The Block 2 would amount to a European version of THAAD, except with 360 degree instead of 120 degrees coverage. Notably, Block 2 is described as capable of intercepting “3000-kilometer range missiles,” which lies at the definitional intersection of a “medium-range” and “intermediate-range” ballistic missile. Notably, the collapse of the INF treaty has lifted the ban on Russian deployment of such weapons.

Thus, a European counterpart to THAAD would be useful and desirable in many quarters, particularly to counter new threats from Russia and Iran. But once again, Eurosam will have to contend with the more established THAAD system and the temptation to buy American to score points with Washington.

Sébastien Roblin writes on the technical, historical and political aspects of international security and conflict for publications including The National Interest, NBC News, Forbes.com and War is Boring. He holds a Master’s degree from Georgetown University and served with the Peace Corps in China. You can follow his articles on Twitter.

This article first appeared in September 2019 and is being republished due to reader interest. 

Image: Reuters. 

Stephen Silver

US-China War,

If the United States is going to fight another world war, it will likely bear not much of a resemblance to the first two. That’s the premise of a new novel—and also an op-ed piece by its authors.

Here's What You Need to Remember: War with China is the most dangerous scenario facing us and the world. Absent a strategic method to manage our differences, Jim Stavridis and Elliot Ackerman’s chilling novel presents a realistic series of miscalculations leading to the worst consequences. 

If the United States is going to fight another world war, it will likely bear not much of a resemblance to the first two. That’s the premise of a new novel—and also an op-ed piece by its authors.

Retired Admiral James Stavridis and novelist Elliot Ackerman have teamed up to write “2034: A Novel of the Next World War,” which is available now from Penguin Group USA. The book’s Amazon page describes it as “a chillingly authentic geopolitical thriller that imagines a naval clash between the U.S. and China in the South China Sea in 2034—and the path from there to a nightmarish global conflagration.”

The authors of the novel have also published an op-ed in The Washington Post, titled “The Next World War Won’t Be Anything Like the Last. Here’s How the U.S. Must Prepare.”

“If you believe that future wars will be conducted like those in the past, in which the sophistication and numbers of our ships, planes and tanks are the essential metric of dominance, then the United States remains in an enviable position,” Stavridis and Ackerman write. “But the world is evolving quickly and dangerously. And in war, what is past is rarely prologue.”

They go on to state that while the U.S. maintains dominance when it comes to aircraft carriers, such warfare “is becoming antiquated and challenged by undersea threats.” The future is more likely to be dominated by drones and autonomous and unmanned military technology.

There’s also cyber warfare, as evidenced by the recent SolarWinds hack, which is also likely to play a role in warfare in the future. After the op-ed was published on Wednesday, an intelligence report appeared stating that Russia once again attempted to interference in the 2020 presidential election.

So how can the United States prepare for that sort of war?

“Our personnel needs will change in multiple ways: We will need to select, train and employ people with a Special Forces-like mentality—finding far smaller numbers of elite men and women who can integrate with the advanced technology using biotechnological breakthroughs,” the authors state. “And we must recognize that the major weapons systems of the future will largely be unmanned and often autonomous. We continue to buy and build weapons system designed for conflicts we are not likely to face again.”

2034: A Novel of the Next World War” has gained praise from none other than retired general and former Secretary of Defense James Mattis, who blurbed the book.

“War with China is the most dangerous scenario facing us and the world. Absent a strategic method to manage our differences, Jim Stavridis and Elliot Ackerman’s chilling novel presents a realistic series of miscalculations leading to the worst consequences. A sobering, cautionary tale for our time,” Mattis said, per the book’s Amazon page.

Stephen Silver is a journalist, essayist, and film critic, who is also a contributor to The Philadelphia Inquirer, Philly Voice, Philadelphia Weekly, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Living Life Fearless, Backstage magazine, Broad Street Review, and Splice Today. The co-founder of the Philadelphia Film Critics Circle, Stephen lives in suburban Philadelphia with his wife and two sons. Follow him on Twitter at @StephenSilver.

This article appeared earlier in 2021. It is being reprinted due to reader interest. 

Image: Flickr 

Kris Osborn

Avenger Drone,

Humans will maintain supervisory command and control to ensure any use of lethal force is decided upon by a human pilot.

Here's What You Need to Remember: “Military pilots receive key information about their surroundings when teamed aircraft with integrated autonomy detect potential air and ground threats, determine threat proximity, analyze imminent danger, and identify suitable options for striking or evading enemy aircraft,” an Air Force Research Laboratory fact sheet says of Skyborg.

The Air Force Research Lab (AFRL) is flying autonomous drones able to navigate uneven, rigorous terrain, independently find and transmit target specifics, perform manned-unmanned teaming missions and operate a large number of functions without needing pilot control. Newer applications of software, hardware and computing could also possibly lead to unmanned-unmanned teaming. In such an environment, autonomous drones would operate swarms designed to blanket an area with surveillance, test enemy air defenses, find targets over high-threat areas and perhaps themselves function as mini-explosives.

Thus, a growing mission would be enhanced by the service’s emerging Skyborg Autonomy Core System program, a suite of integrated sensing, computing and payload technologies engineered for greater operational autonomy and manned-unmanned systems.  Following a successful first flight in April 2021 on board a Kratos UTAP-22 drone, the Air Force Research Laboratory recently conducted a second flight with Skyborg ACS on a General Atomics MQ-20 Avenger.

The flight, which took place at Edwards Air Force Base, California, is part of a critical AFRL prototyping effort to introduce new levels of autonomy into air war. This will allow military personnel to expand the scope of their mission.

Humans will maintain supervisory command and control to ensure any use of lethal force is decided upon by a human pilot and in accordance with the military’s doctrine. However, Skyborg ACS will introduce breakthrough levels of autonomy enabling drones to perform a much wider sphere of operations without needing each individual action directed by a human. 

“Military pilots receive key information about their surroundings when teamed aircraft with integrated autonomy detect potential air and ground threats, determine threat proximity, analyze imminent danger, and identify suitable options for striking or evading enemy aircraft,” an Air Force Research Laboratory fact sheet says of Skyborg. “The program will enable airborne combat mass by building a transferable autonomy foundation for a family of layered, unmanned air vehicles.”

Skyborg ACS is enabled by advanced computer algorithms engineered to gather, distill, organize, analyze, solve problems and ultimately streamline key data points of relevance to humans. 

“Embedded within the teamed aircraft, complex algorithms and cutting-edge sensors enable the autonomy to make decisions based on established rules of engagement set by manned teammates,” the AFRL fact sheet states. 

There are plans to expand field testing and development of Skyborg ACS to further ensure the algorithm's accuracy and performance consistency.  As testing and technical maturation continue to progress, the possibilities with a technology of this kind are quite significant. For many years now, aerial drones have been able to follow GPS-determined “waypoints,” however greater autonomy will likely enable drones to independently adjust to new information such as target movements or emerging terrain obstacles. This decreases the procedural functions human pilots need to perform, therefore moving toward establishing an optimal blend of man and machine in combat.

Kris Osborn is the defense editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Master’s Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.

This article is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Air Force

Charlie Gao

Russian Air Force, Russia

Moscow has airborne units and enough transport planes to get its army around Eurasia quickly.

Here's What You Need to Remember: In order to maintain their status as the second greatest air-mobile military, Russia is still looking to upgrade and expand their fleet.

When it comes to being air-mobile, the Russian military is second only to the U.S. military. According to the 2018 Military Balance Report, Russia fields 177 heavy to medium transport aircraft. This stands in contrast to America’s 658, China’s 84, France’s 46, and the UK’s 44. Russia’s transport fleet has proven useful in recent operations in Syria, but how did such a numerous fleet evolve in a military that has a strong focus on ground warfare? What unique capabilities does it have?

One of the primary impetuses that drove the creation of a large transport fleet is the existence of the VDV, a specialist airborne branch of the Russian military separate from the rest of the ground forces. While the U.S. Marine Corps can be thought of America’s specialist rapid-deployment expeditionary force, with Marine Expeditionary Units pre-packaged and ready to deploy across the globe on a moment’s notice, the VDV operates on a similar concept. The primary plane in the Russian transport fleet is the Il-76, which was expressly designed for usage by the VDV as a transport and paradrop aircraft.

For a truly rapid-deployment role, pure “paradrop” units exist in the VDV. These units are designed to deploy an independent, lightweight mechanized infantry fighting force straight from the aircraft. The Il-76 is designed to fit three BMD airborne infantry fighting vehicles in the rear, enough to equip a single platoon of VDV. Furthermore, as the BMDs get larger, the aircraft get stronger. The one of the latest versions of the Il-76, the Il-76MD-90A, is outfitted with a stronger airframe and engines to cope with the increased weight of the new BMD-4. The traditional “assault” role of the Il-76s is evident in their original design’s provision for rear-facing 23mm anti-air guns to possibly defeat enemy fighters.

The VDV also operates in a more conventional airlift capacity for reinforcement and counterinsurgency operations, an important contingency given the massive size of the Russian Federation. In this, troops and some material can be rapidly moved by the Russian aircraft transport fleet, but they are to be used with heavier IFVs and tanks, which are moved by rail. While the Russian Air Force does field An-124 heavy transport aircraft, which is capable of moving heavy armor, they are mostly used to move supplies, and the transportation of heavy armor is relegated to ground or sea methods in the Russian military.

In contrast, the United States Air Force’s paradrop capabilities are largely restricted to infantry and light vehicles. While the M551 Sheridan had a limited capability to be deployed from a moving C-130 via a parachute, or airdropped from a C-5, the Sheridan was removed from American service in the 1990s. While there has been some effort to develop a new lightweight vehicle that could provide similar capabilities to the Sheridan, current designs seem to focus on the design being simply airmobile and not paradrop ready. The Chinese military appears to have followed the Russian example, and has developed a series of airborne infantry fighting vehicles, including mortar, anti-tank missiles, and anti-tank recoilless rifle versions. Finally, European transport fleets appear to simply focus on the resupply and infantry paradrop missions.

The future of the Russian transport fleet appears to continue along this course, giving Russia greater airlift capacity and flexibility. In order to maintain their status as the second greatest air-mobile military, Russia is still looking to upgrade and expand their fleet. At the moment that means looking for a new supplier as their previous manufacturer, Antonov, is now a wholly Ukrainian-owned firm. The new provider will likely be the firm Ilyushin as it is the sole remaining manufacturer for Russian transports.

In Antonov's future projects, there does not appear to be another heavy or super-heavy transport aircraft in the works, but rather another medium weight transport. This seems to suggest that the Russian Air Force’s transport fleet’s primary purpose will continue to deploy the relatively lightweight vehicles of the VDV, without the need for heavier single-item lift capabilities. Additionally, while the An-124s continue to be modernized by Russian firms, it does not appear that there will be a replacement for them in the near future. This means that for the foreseeable future, Russia will continue to be a major airlift power and air-mobile military, with light, ready-to-go units, similar to America’s own marines or airborne forces.

Information about IL-76 development was taken from "Источник: "Вестник воздушного флота", Хроника авиаперевозок."

Charlie Gao studied political and computer science at Grinnell College and is a frequent commentator on defense and national-security issues. This first appeared earlier in October 2019.

Image: Reuters.

Sebastien Roblin

F-16, Asia

In 2013, Pakistan purchased nine more F-16As and four F-16Bs directly from Jordan.

Here’s What You Need to Remember: In any case, the recent aerial skirmish highlights the important capabilities F-16s continue to provide Pakistan’s military, and the continuing tensions that may evoke as Pakistan aligns itself more with China, and the United States with India.

During an aerial skirmish on February 27, 2019, an Indian Air Force MiG-21 Bison was shot down by a radar-guided missile. The Pakistani Air Force (PAF) claims the kill was scored by a JF-17 Thunder, a domestically-built fighter built with Chinese assistance.

However, India subsequently revealed fragments of an AIM-120C-5 missile—a U.S.-built weapon only compatible with the American-built F-16s in PAF service. Pakistan has incentives to deny the use of F-16s, as secret end-user agreements may restrict the aircraft’s use against India—despite that being an obvious application of the venerable fourth-generation jet. India, meanwhile, claims the MiG-21’s pilot managed to shoot down an F-16.

Air Cover for the Mujahideen

Pakistan’s F-16s have been no stranger to controversy for nearly four decades.

In response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Islamabad and Washington collaborated to train, organize and arm mujahideen resistance fighters in Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan. In retaliation, Afghan and Soviet warplanes began bombing the camps—and the PAF’s Chinese-made J-6 jets proved too slow to catch them.

Thus in 1981, Pakistan convinced the United States to sell it F-16 Fighting Falcon single-engine multi-role fighters—a then cutting-edge yet inexpensive-to-operate design with fly-by-wire controls affording it extraordinary maneuverability. The agile Falcon could attain speeds as high as Mach 2 and lug heavy weapons loads, though it did have a limited combat radius (around 350 miles) and early production models lacked beyond-visual-range missiles.

Between October 1982 and 1986, a total of twenty-eight F-16As and twelve two-seat F-16Bs were delivered to Pakistan via Saudi Arabia in Operations Peace Gate I and II. These outfitted the PAF’s No. 9, 11 and 14 Squadrons which flew patrols along the Afghan border, typically carrying two advanced AIM-9L and two cheaper AIMP-9P-4 Sidewinder heat-seeking missiles.

Unlike earlier heat-seekers which could lock on to the hot tail-pipe at the rear of an aircraft, the AIM-9L “Lima” Sidewinders could engage from any angle. The AIM-9L’s ability to hit opponents in a head-on-pass would soon prove particularly effective.

Between 1986 and 1990, the PAF credited the F-16 with shooting down ten Afghan and Soviet jets, helicopters and transport planes, with many additional claims unconfirmed. Soviet and Afghan records definitively confirm only six losses: four Su-22s supersonic fighter-bombers, one Su-25 “flying tank” piloted by future Russian vice president Alexander Rutskoy, and one An-26 cargo plane.

The PAF lost a single F-16, apparently struck by a missile fired by its own wingman. The F-16 patrols reportedly deterred more extensive bombardment of refugee camps on Pakistani soil, and disrupted Soviet efforts to resupply isolated outposts.

The Nuclear F-16 Controversy

By 1990 Pakistan had already placed Peace Gate III and IV orders for seventy-one improved F-16A/B Block 15s. But in October 1990, Pakistan’s nuclear research program led the United States to impose sanctions. Thus, twenty-eight newly-built F-16s for which Pakistan had already paid $23 million apiece were consigned to the desert Boneyard facility in Arizona, where they remained for over a decade.

In the late 1990s, the Clinton administration offered to deliver the jets in return for Pakistan refraining from nuclear tests—but such was not to be. On May 28, 1998 Pakistan detonated five underground nuclear devices in response to an Indian nuclear test. It became evident that the heavy-lifting F-16s would serve as one of Pakistan’s primary nuclear-weapon delivery systems, and intelligence reports indicated that No. 9 and No. 11 squadron F-16s were modified to deliver nuclear gravity bombs on their center pylons.

A year later the two nuclear powers engaged in a limited war when Pakistani commandos infiltrated the mountainous Kargil region of India. As Indian Mirage 2000s pounded the infiltrators while escorted by MiG-29s, F-16s flew combat air patrols along the Pakistani side of the Line of Control reportedly painting the Indian jets with their targeting radars—and vice-versa—in an effort to intimidate.

However, neither air arm was authorized to engage the other, so no air battles occurred. Nonetheless, three years later a PAF F-16B shot down an Indian Searcher II drone that had penetrated deep into Pakistani airspace.

Pakistan Finally Gets More Falcons

Following the 9/11 attacks in 2001, the United States intervened against the Taliban—a fundamentalist faction Pakistani intelligence agencies had cultivated to assert Islamabad’s influence in its war-torn neighbor. Seeking to wheedle half-hearted cooperation from Pakistan, in 2006 the Bush administration finally authorized the “Peace Drive” deal (“Peace Gate” having become poisonous brand) in which the United States handed over twenty-three remaining Peace Gate F-16As and Bs, and sold nineteen far more capable F-16Cs and D Block 52s.

The $5.1 billion deal also involved modernizing Pakistan’s by-then dated F-16A and Bs with the F-16AM/BM “Mid-Life Update.” This involved stripping down and repairing the aging air frames, replacing hundreds of wiring harnesses, exchanging old monochrome cockpit displays with color multi-function displays, and installing wide-angle HUDs and a new modular, digital flight computers which added support for laser and GPS-guided bombs.

Furthermore, an improved APG-66V2 doppler radar allowed the F-16AMs to employ beyond-visual-range AIM-120C-5 air-to-air missiles with a maximum range of sixty-five miles. 600 of the radar-guided fire-and-forget missiles were also sold. Pakistan also acquired DB-110 electro-optical reconnaissance pods capable of scanning 10,000 miles of terrain per hour.

As the Taliban forces expanded across Pakistan’s Swat Valley and Waziristan province, the Pakistani military finally counterattacked in 2009. PAF F-16s flew hundreds of combat missions through 2011, first using DB-110 pods to identify camouflaged Taliban positions, then destroying them with laser-guided 500 and 2,000-pound bombs.

Islamabad’s thirst for the agile jets was not yet sated. In 2013, it purchased nine more F-16As and four F-16Bs directly from Jordan.

Today, Pakistan operates around sixty-six F-16A/Bs and nineteen F-16C/Ds in four active squadrons, including No. 9 Griffins multi-role squadron in Sargodha, the No. 19 Sherdills training and air defense squadron at Thatta, and the No. 11 Arrows multi-role squadron based at Shahbaz near Jacobabad. The last base also hosts No. 5 Falcons multi-role squadron, the only F-16C/D unit.

Besides the F-16A downed by friendly fire, Pakistan has lost six F-16As and two F-16Bs in accidents. In addition to bird strikes, engine failures, and pilot disorientation, one F-16B was consumed by fire after a collision with a wild boar during takeoff caused the nose gear to collapse!

India’s recovery of AIM-120C-5 missile fragments after the air battle on February 27 provides convincing evidence that Pakistani F-16s scored their first kill since 1990. However, India also claims an F-16 was downed by a MiG-21 using an R-73 missile. The PAF denies the claim, though its candor about F-16 involvement is suspect, while Indian media has also circulated demonstrably false “proof of an F-16 loss. The only evidence of an F-16 loss was a Pakistani ground observer who claimed seeing two jets, not one, shot down.

The mere possibility that a Falcon was downed by a 1950s-era MiG-21 should not be over-interpreted. India’s MiG-21 Bisons, though outdated, feature upgraded radars, data-links, self-defense jammers, and agile heat-seeking R-73 missiles targeted with a helmet-mounted sight. The airframe has always had a smallish radar cross-section, is Mach 2 capable, and performed well in exercises against U.S. F-15s and F-16s.

While an F-16 is superior in many respects, particularly situational awareness, an R-73-armed MiG-21 that managed to close within visual range (as ostensibly occurred) would still pose a formidable threat.

In any case, the recent aerial skirmish highlights the important capabilities F-16s continue to provide Pakistan’s military, and the continuing tensions that may evoke as Pakistan aligns itself more with China, and the United States with India. Ironically, just days before the recent skirmish, F-16 manufacturer Lockheed launched a new pitch to move F-16 production to India for a heavily modernized spinoff dubbed the F-21.

Sébastien Roblin holds a master’s degree in conflict resolution from Georgetown University and served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China. He has also worked in education, editing, and refugee resettlement in France and the United States. He currently writes on security and military history for War Is Boring.

This article first appeared in March 2019 and is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters.

Sebastien Roblin

Iran Air Force, Middle East

The actual Kowsar-88 wasn’t ready for display this August, so Tehran simply took an old, very well-known jet fighter and claimed it was a new one, in full view of domestic and international audiences that would know better.

Here’s What You Need to Remember: The Kowsar appears identical to an F-5F Tiger II two-seater jet.

In February 2017 I published an article on the Iranian Saeqeh (“Thunderbolt”) fighter. Billed as Iran’s first domestically-built jet fighter to enter operational service, the Saeqeh.

Fast forward and we are again greeted with headlines for yet another “100% indigenously made” fighter jet, this time a “state of the art” two-seater called the Kowsar. And yet it appears identical to an F-5F Tiger II two-seater jet.

If anything, it is far less original than the Saeqeh, which has airframe modifications including enlarged strakes and twin vertical tail stabilizers. The Kowsar doesn’t appear to have any external changes from the F-5F. How was this jet even worthy of the photo-op with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani in the instructor’s seat for Iranian Defense Industry Day?

It happens there really is a program to build a combat-capable Kowsar advanced jet trainer. It simply wasn’t the aircraft on display this summer.

According to Iranian aviation expert Babak Taghvaee, the Kowsar may merely be an avionics testbed—a regular F-5F fitted with new avionics (rumored to be of Chinese origin) eventually intended for use in the Saeqeh fighter, spruced up with a fresh coat of gleaming paint for the photo-op. The test-bed used may date all the way back to Iran's first attempt to reverse-engineer the F-5 in the 1990s, the Azaraksh. This was because the real Kowsar-88 wasn't ready yet.

Iran had announced back in 2013 it was developing a Kowsar-88 trainer which could also serve in the light attack role. In 2017, footage of a prototype undergoing taxi trials was unveiled which you can see here.

Though influenced by the F-5, the prototype is a different airplane and is much shorter. Interestingly, it bears a striking resemblance to the Taiwanese AIDC AT-3 jet trainer. Details are scarce, but the actual Kowsar-88 apparently would have a digital glass cockpit using three multi-function displays and uses two J85-13 turbojet engines reverse-engineered from the F-5.

The public has had short memories as President Rouhani also attended a ceremony showing off the Kowsar-88’s in July 2017. Even the most uninformed observer can compare this Kowsar to the one displayed August 2018 and see they are not the same airplanes.

According to the European Defense Review, sixteen domestically-built Kowsar-88s are planned to take over training duties currently undertaken by the more capable Saeqeh jets in the next decade. Iran will attempt to acquire additional J85 engines on the black market, but if that fails, will cannibalize the parts from twelve older F-5A and B model aircraft.

Meanwhile, Tehran reportedly plans to deploy fifty single-seat Saeqeh-1 fighters and fourteen two-seat Saeqeh-2 fighters by rebuilding additional rusty old F-5E and F-5F airframes. Depending on the status of international sanctions, Iran may also seek to procure Russian Yak-130 or Chinese JL-10 (aka L-15 Falcon) supersonic trainers.

Versatile trainer/light attack jets continue to be popular with militaries across the globe from China’s L-15, to the Nigerian Alpha Jets fighting Boko Haram, to South Korea’s FA-50 Golden Eagle, which has seen a lot of combat in The Philippines. In addition to being forgiving stepping stones for training fighter pilots to fly more demanding aircraft, advanced jet trainers can perform counter-insurgency and strike missions far more cost-efficiently than a high-performance jet fighter. Supersonic trainers with radar can also perform light air defense duties.

Of course, these are not the sort of aircraft one uses to fight off F-15 Eagles or F-22 stealth fighters, which is precisely the major threat Iranian defense have to worry about coming from the United States, Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Instead, programs like the Kowsar reflect Tehran’s plans to shore up fighter pilot training and sustain the number of operational airframes capitalizing on the raw material furnished by America prior to the Iranian Revolution if international sanctions curtail foreign procurement—as seems more likely since U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear deal.

The latest episode with the not-Kowsar fighter illustrates yet again the casual dishonesty of Tehran’s propagandists. Iranian industry wanted to display the Kowsar-88 for an expo—which does appear to be a real airplane! However, the actual Kowsar-88 wasn’t ready for display this August, so Tehran simply took an old, very well-known jet fighter and claimed it was a new one, in full view of domestic and international audiences that would know better.

The irony is that Tehran doesn’t need to be ashamed of its resourceful use of old jet fighters. In the nine-year-long Iran-Iraq war during the 1980s, Iranian fighter pilots fought one of the most intense air wars in recent history defending their home soil. Though higher-performance F-4 Phantoms and F-14 Tomcats shot down dozens of Iraqi fighters (and suffered losses in return), even the F-5s chalked up a number of kills against MiG-21 fighters and Su-20 attack jets.

Sébastien Roblin holds a Master’s Degree in Conflict Resolution from Georgetown University and served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China. He has also worked in education, editing, and refugee resettlement in France and the United States. He currently writes on security and military history for War Is Boring.

This first appeared in 2019 and is being reprinted due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters

Charlie Gao

Glock, United States

The Trump administration lowered export regulations on gun manufacturers in January 2019, so it’s probably easier for Glock, Inc. to get permission to export Glocks made in the United States compared to Glocks made in Austria.

Here's What You Need to Remember: Pistols made in the United States are not subject to the same import restrictions, so Glock began setting up to build pistols in the United States.

This year Sig Sauer, Inc. appears to be on track to supersede its German counterpart, Sig Sauer GmbH. Pistols that were previously only made in Germany are now being made in the United States. Some may wonder, will Glock head in the same direction in the future? Some Glock models are now being produced in the United States, although the majority of Glocks are still made in Austria.

Like Sig Sauer, Inc., Glock, Inc. started as the distributor of Glock pistols in the United States. However, in the 2010s, Glock wanted to break into the market for .380 Auto compact pistols. Glock had made .380 pistols for the European market before, but due to the BATFE’s “point system” that determines which pistols can be imported, the earlier .380 Glocks could not be imported into the United States.

However, pistols made in the United States are not subject to the same restrictions, so Glock began setting up to build pistols in the United States. In 2014 their efforts reached fruition, and the Glock 42, a .380, 6-round subcompact Glock, was released onto the U.S. market.

As of 2019, the facility expanded from producing the Glock 42. It currently produces models in the most common calibers for the U.S. market, though models in rarer calibers are still primarily made in Austria.

So what is the difference between the pistols?

Practically nothing. According to a 2017 article, “U.S. made” Glocks still contain many Austrian parts, with only the slide, barrel, and frame being made in the United States, on machines identical to those used in Austria. A different finish was also applied to some metal parts, due to EPA regulations preventing the use of Glock’s traditional “Tenefer” coating. However, on almost all newer Glocks, Glock has moved to a new “nDLC” coating, which presumably can be applied in both Austria and the United States. American Glocks have also different markings due to different proof houses testing the guns.

Will we see more Glocks made in the USA?

Likely yes. The Trump administration lowered export regulations on gun manufacturers in January 2019, so it’s probably easier for Glock, Inc. to get permission to export Glocks made in the United States compared to Glocks made in Austria. Austrian law requires express government approval and restricts exports to countries being sanctioned by the EU and the UN.

However, unlike Sig Sauer, Glock Inc. and Glock Ges.m.b.H. appear to be fairly closely linked. While scandals and charges of embezzlement have rocked Glock Inc, the relationship still appears to be strong. While this could change in the same manner that it did at Sig Sauer, Glock is not going through the same financial difficulties that Sig endured at the time of the breakup.

Charlie Gao studied political and computer science at Grinnell College and is a frequent commentator on defense and national security issues. This article is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters.

Stavros Atlamazoglou

Chinese Navy, Asia

Although the US military and its allies still have the preponderance of equipment, the future doesn’t look quite as good.

Here's What You Need to Know: China might be the biggest threat to US national security but it’s also the largest opportunity.

Earlier in March, the top U.S. commanders in the Indo-Pacific and Pentagon officials gave testimony in Congress about the balance of U.S. and Chinese forces in the region.

Although the US military and its allies still have the preponderance of equipment, the future doesn’t look quite as good.

Indeed by 2025, China, according to the US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), is expected to militarily outmatch US forces in the region. Some of the numbers that they provided in the House Armed Services Committee hearing are alarming.

For example, by 2025, China is expected to have approximately 100 modern multi-warfare combatant vessels, such as the Type 055 destroyer. Further, by 2025, the Chinese Navy is estimated to have over 60 submarines, 12 amphibious assault ships, and three aircraft carriers.

In comparison, US Navy forces in the region will be able to field only 12 destroyers or cruisers, ten submarines, four amphibious assault ships, and one aircraft carrier.

 

Pentagon’s projections for the military balance of power in the Indo-Pacific in 2025. The Chinese military is increasingly investing in its capabilities (INDOPACOM).

But the maritime domain isn’t the only area in which China is projected to have an edge. The projected balance in favor of China continues in the air and space domains. Again, by 2025, China is expected to have 150 5th generation fighters and more than 1,800 older generation fighter jets.

On the other hand, the U.S. Air Force would be able to launch approximately 100 5th generation fighters, such as the F-22 Raptor or F-35 Lightning Strike II. Of course, in addition to these jets, the U.S. would be able to deploy 150 older generation fighters, such as the F-16 or F-15, that are still quite a formidable foe.

Admiral Philip Davidson, the commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) said that “absent a convincing deterrent, China will be emboldened to continue to take action to supplant the established rules-based international order, and the values represented in our vision for a free and open Indo Pacific. Our deterrence posture in the Indo Pacific must demonstrate the capability, the capacity and the will to convince Beijing unequivocally, that the costs of achieving their objectives by the use of military force are simply too high.”

 

The current military balance of power. The Chinese military is getting stronger by the year (INDOPACOM).

To be sure, these are the current and projected U.S. forces in the region but the Pentagon can deploy forces from elsewhere and also rely on local allies and partners who have a vested interest in resisting a Chinese dominance, especially if that dominance is coupled with Beijing’s disregard of the rules-based system that the U.S. has helped to establish in the world after the end of the Second World War.

“As our department’s priority theater, we’re committed to upholding a free and open Indo-Pacific region where all nations, large and small, are secure in their sovereignty, can pursue economic opportunity and resolve disputes without coercion, and can exercise the freedoms of navigation overflight, consistent with an open and stable international order,” David Helvey, the acting assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific security affairs, said in his opening remarks. “It’s an order that places all nations on a level playing field and holds them responsible for preserving the principles that have benefited all of us.”

In 2000, the Chinese military had a budget of $14.6 billion. In 2021, Beijing will be spending $209.4 billion on its military.

 

What the order of battle looked like in the Indo-Pacific in 1999. The Chinese military has come a long way since then (INDOPACOM).

But China isn’t the only threat in that area of operations. When it comes to North Korea, tensions in the Korean peninsula have been on the decline since 2017. Nonetheless, the regime of Pyongyang still poses a threat not only to the region but to the continental U.S. as well, especially if it manages to create a nuclear ballistic missile that can reach the West Coast.

Army General Robert Abrams, the commander of Combined Forces Command and U.S. Forces Korea, stated that “We have not become complacent when it comes to North Korea,” he said. “We remain clear-eyed about the persistent challenges we face today and in the future. North Korea continues the development of nuclear and advanced missile systems, cyber capability, as well as other conventional and emerging asymmetric military technologies. We will continue to ensure a strong and effective deterrence posture so the North Koreans never misjudge our role, never misjudge our commitment and our capability to respond as an alliance.”

The Indo-Pacific is vitally important to the US, both in terms of the economy and national security. Currently, the region accounts for 60 percent of the world’s gross domestic product, and if current rates of economic and population growth continue, by 2031, the region will contain 2/3 of the world’s economy and population.

China might be the biggest threat to US national security but it’s also the largest opportunity. Conflict with Beijing isn’t predestined nor necessary. However, a potent US military and strong regional and global partnerships are crucial in deterring China.

This article first appeared at Sandboxx.

Image: U.S. Navy, Flickr.

Sebastien Roblin

Helicopters, Asia

The Z-19 lacks the Comanche’s most exclusive feature: the specially designed hull, sculpted and coated with expensive radar-absorbent materials to reduce its radar cross-section to 1/250th the usual size.

Here’s What You Need to Remember: It was reported in 2017 that an anonymous buyer had declared the intention to purchase at least five Z-19s. But in 2018 it emerged Pakistan rejected the Z-19 in favor of the Turkish T129 ATAK helicopter.

Developing a scout helicopter that balances agility, protection, stealth and firepower—all at an affordable price—is a tricky business. The Pentagon spent twenty-two years and $7 billion developing the hyper-advanced RAH-66 Comanche before throwing in the towel due to costs in 2004.

Less than a decade later, China debuted its own light scout/attack helicopter with stealth features dubbed the Z-19 “Black Whirlwind,” named after a hot-tempered berserker in the Chinese medieval bandit-epic The Water Margin known for wielding an axe in each hand in battle.

The Z-19 is descended from the popular French AS-365 Dauphin 2 medium helicopter, which China began license-building the twin-engine variant as the Z-9 and later evolved into armed variants. A distinctive feature of the Dauphin is that its tail rotor is fully contained within the tail in what’s known as a “fenestron.” 

Designer Wu Ximing of the Harbin Aviation Industrial Corporation used the armed Z-9W as the basis for a heavily evolved Z-19. This development path is reminiscent of the evolution from the UH-1 Huey first into a field-modified armed gunship, and then into the dedicated AH-1 Cobra attack helicopter.

Though a Z-19 prototype was lost in an accident in 2010, Wu’s new design was unveiled to the public just two years later and soon entered limited PLA service. 

The basic Z-19 weighs only 2.5-tons empty, and its two 848-horsepower WZ-8A turboshafts can drive it to speeds of 435 miles per hour and range up to 435 miles. Like the Cobra, the Z-19 has a narrow hull and a tandem two-seat cockpit for a pilot and gunner. Survivability features include light armor plating and bulletproof canopies, crash-resistant seats, self-sealing fuel tanks and three shock-absorbing landing gears.

To fulfill its scout role, the Z-19 has a sensor turret in its nose combining an electro-optical/infrared system, a laser-targeter/rangefinder, and day/night TV cameras which make it night- and all-weather- capable. Later, some Z-19s have been equipped with millimeter-wavelength electronically scanned array radar domes mounted on top of the four-bladed main rotor, much like the radar on the AH-64D Apache Longbow. A Z-19 so equipped can potentially duck behind terrain while its radar scans the area.

For armament, the Z-19 has two wing stubs each with two hardpoints. These can accommodate extra fuel tanks, heavy HJ-8 wire-guided anti-tank missiles (akin to the TOW), and rocket pods either carrying eighteen 57-millimeter, or seven 90-millimeter rockets for blasting personnel or light vehicle targets. Though lacking an integral cannon, the Z-19 can also carry .50 caliber or 23-millimeter gun pods. You can see a Z-19 with a mixed payload here.

Z-19s have also displayed quad racks for two lighter types of missiles. The fifty-eight-pound Blue Arrow-9 anti-tank missile is a smaller variant of the laser-guided HJ-10 (dubbed the Chinese Hellfire) with a range of six kilometers. The second is the Tian Yan-90, a short-range heat-seeking air-to-air missile designed to shoot down other helicopters and drones.

Intriguingly, the Z-19 seems to share a few stealth features in common with the Comanche. Its fenestron tail rotor is designed to dampen noise, and its engine exhausts are designed to channel heat in such a way to reduce infrared signature. This could help it survive as most short-range anti-aircraft weapons like the man-portable Stinger missile or even vehicle-mounted SA-9 or SA-13 systems rely on infrared guidance. The chopper also has its own self-defense electronic warfare suite and an infrared countermeasure system.

Of course, the Z-19 lacks the Comanche’s most exclusive feature: the specially designed hull, sculpted and coated with expensive radar-absorbent materials to reduce its radar cross-section to 1/250th the usual size. However, while radar-guided also pose a threat, the Comanche proved too expensive to fund, while the simpler Z-19 entered service, estimated to cost half the price of western peers.

But that’s not to say the Z-19 doesn’t have any shortcomings.

Under-Powered and Under-Armored?

In 2018, AVIC announced it was ready to commence mass production of an export model dubbed the Z-19E, aimed particularly its close ally Pakistan as well as Malaysia. The heavier E model (2.75 tons) has uprated 930-horsepower WZ-8C engines and can carry larger payloads, but its service ceiling is reportedly down to 12,000 feet from 20,000. It also comes with a new Apache-style helmet-mounted display.

The Z-19E doesn’t come with the rotor-mounted radar, but some sources claim the export model includes an integral 23-millimeter cannon—though such a weapon is not in evidence in any photos the author is aware of.

It’s also unclear whether any of the Z-19E’s upgrades are making their way back to the Z-19s in PLA service.

It was reported in 2017 that an anonymous buyer had declared the intention to purchase at least five Z-19s. But in 2018 it emerged Pakistan rejected the Z-19 in favor of the Turkish T129 ATAK helicopter.

According to Franz Stefan-Gady at The Diplomat “…one of the most likely reasons is gunship’s underpowered turboshaft engines, which have prevented the Z-10 and Z-19E from carrying their full weapons payload during tests.”

A military commentator on Sputnik News argued that the Z-19’s “narrow fuselage based on polymer materials, modern Kevlar armored panels defending against 12.7 mm bullets – these are suitable for a short incursion and a quick departure for home, but not for a serious military operation.”

One must bear in mind the state-owned media outlet’s job is to pan competitors and promote sales of Russia’s larger and more heavily armored helicopter gunships. However, the critics do have a point that a lightly armored helicopter could prove quite vulnerable even to relatively unsophisticated anti-aircraft weapons like heavy machine guns or rapid firing flak cannons. Reportedly, the PLA is experimenting with adding additional armor plates to the Z-19.

To be fair, the Z-19 isn’t intended to be used the way Russia’s tank-like Hind gunships is in Afghanistan, often called upon for close support to air-mobile troops assaulting fortified positions. The concept behind an armed scout helicopter like the Z-19 is to leverage its superior sensors to spy on enemy forces, and in a pinch, launch and hit-and-run attacks from relatively long distances. 

Whether the crew of even a hi-tech scout chopper can manage the risk level so neatly on a modern battlefield saturated with sensors and anti-aircraft weapons, however, is in question. The U.S. Army, for example, lost thirty-five OH-58s scout helicopter to accidents and enemy fire in Afghanistan and Iraq before retiring the type in 2017.

The scouting and light-attack role could also simply be undertaken by drones, which would be cheaper, stealthier and not put human crew at risk. But the U.S. Army’s renewed quest for a scout helicopter to replace the OH-58 shows that militaries continue to see the value in lighter armed scout helicopters to complement bruisers like the Apache and Z-10.

At last count, the PLA has 180 Z-19s in service, implying it’s deployed into nine to twelve aviation regiments. It’s been suggested (but never demonstrated) that the Z-19 could carry anti-ship missiles, and one could imagine a shipboard spinoff serving on China’s new Type 075 Landing Helicopter Docks in a similar role to the U.S. Marine’s Sea Cobra gunships.

Sébastien Roblin holds a master’s degree in conflict resolution from Georgetown University and served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China. He has also worked in education, editing, and refugee resettlement in France and the United States. He currently writes on security and military history for War Is Boring.

This article is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters

War Is Boring

Special Forces, Russia

Alpha Group is part spy network, part counterterrorism team, part general-purpose commando squad — and entirely terrifying.

Here's What You Need to Remember: Alpha Group survived the collapse of the Soviet Union and currently operates under the auspices of the FSB, the successor to the KGB. Yet its confrontation with Hezbollah during the hostage crisis in Lebanon remains one of its most widely discussed, and strikingly brutal, operations.

Russia and the Lebanese Islamic militia Hezbollah have become close allies in the civil war in Syria, with both of them supporting the regime of Syrian President Bashar Al Assad in the conflict.

Their relationship has not always been so friendly.

When members of Hezbollah kidnapped four Russian diplomats in 1985, killing one of them, Russia dispatched the KGB’s Alpha Group to deal with the situation.

Alpha Group is part spy network, part counterterrorism team, part general-purpose commando squad — and entirely terrifying.

It first gained notoriety for leading the assault on the presidential palace in Kabul during the initial phases of Russia’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Throughout the 1980s and ’90s, its members participated in several high-publicity take-downs of terrorists, insurgents and kidnappers.

When the KGB and parts of the Soviet military attempted a coup in 1990, members of Alpha Group were given the job of securing the parliament in Moscow and neutralizing then-president Boris Yeltsin.

Alpha Group survived the collapse of the Soviet Union and currently operates under the auspices of the FSB, the successor to the KGB. Yet its confrontation with Hezbollah during the hostage crisis in Lebanon remains one of its most widely discussed, and strikingly brutal, operations.

The KGB created Alpha Group — or Spetsgruppa A —in 1974 in response to the Black September attacks at the Munich Olympics two years earlier.

Eight terrorists linked to the Palestinian Liberation Front had infiltrated the Olympic Village, killed two Israeli athletes and took several others hostage. West German police botched a rescue attempt at a NATO airport hours later. Nine more Israelis died there, along with five of the terrorists and a West German police officer.

Alpha Group formed in the fiasco’s aftermath. But the group quickly took on a broader role than mere counterterrorism.

When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Alpha Group and the KGB’s Zenith Group, another special forces unit, led a contingent of 700 troops in the assault on the Tajbeg Palace in Kabul, according to David Cox in his book Close Protection: The Politics of Guarding Russia’s Rulers.

The commandos entered the country under the auspices of protecting the Russian embassy. The assault on Tajbeg Palace on Dec. 27, 1979 was the first phase of the Soviet invasion. Afghan president Hafizullah Amin was hosting a party at the palace that evening. Numerous civilian guests and palace residents, including women and children, were present when the assault began.

A special forces officer who participated in the raid told the BBC in 2009 that the officers in charge ordered soldiers to kill everyone in the building.

“I was a Soviet soldier,” Rustam Tursunkulov recalled. “We were trained to accept orders without question. I was in the special forces — it’s the worst job.”

An Afghan named Najiba was inside the palace when the Soviets arrived. She was only 11 years old at the time. “The things I saw,” Najiba told the BBC. “My God — people on the floor. I saw a person … like a scene from a nightmare movie. Dead bodies. Lots.”

“Please try to understand that when there’s a battle going on, it’s hard to know there are children there,” Tursunkulov explained. “In any army there has to be someone who’ll do the harshest, most horrible tasks. Unfortunately, it’s not soldiers, but politicians who make wars.”

Amin’s 11-year-old son was killed in the attack on the palace, and Amin himself either died during the action or soon afterward — perhaps executed. According to Tursunkulov, the bodies of everyone killed in the palace were wrapped in carpets and buried nearby without ceremony.

Alpha Group continued to lead KGB efforts in domestic counterterrorism and counterintelligence through the 1980s. The unit targeted CIA agents and operatives and led the raid against the hijackers of Aeroflot Flight 6833 in Tbilisi, Georgia in 1983. They killed three of the hijackers and captured the rest, but lost five hostages.

It was the group’s involvement in a 1985 hostage crisis in Lebanon that earned the Alpha Group an international reputation as a vicious — but effective — counterterror unit.

On Sept. 20, 1985, the Islamic Liberation Organization, a part of Hezbollah, kidnapped four Russian diplomats in Beirut. A message from the terrorists “warned that the four Soviet captives would be executed, one by one, unless Moscow pressured pro-Syrian militiamen to cease shelling positions held by the pro-Iranian fundamentalist militia in Lebanon’s northern port city of Tripoli,” according to a contemporary report by Jack McKinney of Philadelphia’s Daily News.

Moscow initially attempted to open communication channels in hope of negotiating the release of hostages. But after the captors executed one of the Russians, Moscow sent in Alpha Group.

The remaining hostages were released within a few weeks, which came as a surprise to journalists, considering that many hostages taken in Lebanon were held for months or even years.

Brig. Gen. Ghazi Kanaan, who was the chief of intelligence for Syrian forces in Lebanon at time, was originally credited with orchestrating the Russians’ release. This account trickled out to journalists in other countries.

“Western journalists reported that the kidnappers were forced to free the hostages because a block-to-block search by pro-Syrian militiamen was closing in on them,” McKinney wrote.

However, according to Israeli sources cited in the Daily News, it was actually the KGB that negotiated the release. And in Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God, Matthew Levitt clarifies that it wasn’t just your run-of-the-mill KGB operatives. It was Alpha Group.

“In one retelling,” Levitt writes, “the KGB kidnapped a relative of the hostage-taking organization’s chief, cut off the relative’s ear, and sent it to his family. In another, the Alpha unit abducted one of the kidnapper’s brothers, and sent two of his fingers home to his family in separate envelopes.

“Still another version has the Soviet operatives kidnapping a dozen Shi’a, one of whom was the relative of a Hezbollah leader. The relative was castrated and shot in the head, his testicles stuffed in his mouth, and his body shipped to Hezbollah with a letter promising a similar fate for the 11 other Shi’a captives if the three Soviet hostages were not released.”

While the details of the various “retellings” differ, the effect is much the same. Given the fact that the Alpha Group was dispatched to Beirut, and that the hostages were released so quickly when other countries, including the United States, had failed to facilitate such prompt responses from hostage-takers in Lebanon, it seems reasonable that it was Alpha Group rather than a Syrian search that prompted the quick release.

Russia has a longstanding policy of targeting family members of terrorists. The reports of Alpha Group’s alleged actions in Beirut are consistent with this tradition.

The Beirut saga is arguably the most sensational of Alpha Group’s operations. But the unit continued to play a prominent role in Soviet and Russian military, intelligence and counterterrorism efforts.

A Lithuanian detachment of the Alpha Group attempted to quell the secession movement there in January 1991, killing 14 civilians and injuring hundreds more when they seized the Vilnius television tower.

Later that same year, Alpha Group officers stormed the Russian parliament during a coup against Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev. They were directed to capture Russian Federation president Boris Yeltsin — or to kill him if it seemed he might escape.

Twenty Alpha Group officers refused the order, delaying the mission long enough for the coup to collapse.

More recently, the counterterrorism unit was involved in ending the hostage crisis at the Beslan school in North Ossetia in 2004. During the battle between the Alpha Group and dozens of terrorists, 330 people died, including 186 children.

The Alpha Group commandos were criticized for their reckless use of excessive force at Beslan, notes Glenn Peter Hastedt in Spies, Wiretaps and Secret Operations. Russian president Vladimir Putin defended his special operators, saying they had not planned on storming the school and did so only after reports that the terrorists had begun executing the children inside.

There have also been reports of Alpha Group fighting in the civil war in Ukraine.

This article by Darien Cavanaugh originally appeared at War is Boring in 2016.

Image: Reuters.

Kyle Mizokami

Special Forces, Americas

America's super soldiers.

Here's What to Remember: Every U.S. military branch has its own elite special operations unit.

Special operations forces have been at the forefront of U.S. combat operations in the last two decades. They are nearly at the forefront of risky combat missions—and suffer higher casualties as they are often deployed to remote locations and exposed to greater risks. 

A companion article details the special operations units of the U.S. Army and the distinction between various tiers of special operations units.

In this second part, we’ll dive into the special operations units of the U.S. Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy, and look at recent challenges facing the special operations community.

The Marine Raider Regiment

 The Marine Corps historically resisted the creation of elite special operations units, instead designating some reconnaissance units as ‘Special Operations Capable’ with training for airborne and seaborne insertion. 

Today, these include four Force Reconnaissance Companies, primarily assigned to support Marine expeditionary forces, and three Divisional Reconnaissance Battalions which incorporate Deep Reconnaissance Platoon including specialized combat divers to perform beach and landing zone reconnaissance, and direct air and artillery strikes.

During World War II, however, the Marines briefly operated two unconventional Raider battalions involved in some spectacular island assaults, including an epic submarine-launched raid on a Japanese seaplane base. But the Marine brass disliked the concept and disbanded the units in 1944.

The Marines were finally compelled to form dedicated special forces battalions in 2003 by the Special Forces-loving Rumsfeld defense department. In 2015, Marine special forces battalions were then integrated into a new Raider Regiment based at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. 

The Raider Regiment counts three Raider battalions consisting of four companies. Each company has four fourteen-man teams called MSOTs. There’s also a Raider Support Group with three more battalions including specialist multi-purpose canine handlers, surveillance, and forward observers.

Raiders trainees undergo a three-stage screening, followed by a nine-month training program in skills ranging from demolitions, diving, foreign languages, close-quarters combat, and wilderness survival. Raiders have been involved in actions ranging from brutal urban warfare against ISIS in Mosul, Iraq and Marawi in the Philippines, to counter-terror actions in Mali.

Navy SEALs

The U.S. Navy’s Sea, Air, and Land (SEAL) teams have their origin in underwater demolitions teams assigned to scout out beaches and clear defensive obstacles ahead of amphibious landings in World War II ranging from Omaha Beach to the fortified island of Tarawa. 

The SEALS were officially formed in 1962 and were soon engaged in spy missions and riverine combat tasks in Vietnam, and participated in Operation Phoenix, a program to assassinate village leaders sympathetic to the Viet Cong.

Later SEAL ops include securing the governor-general of Grenada in his palace, infiltrating Iraqi-occupied Kuwait City, and taking back oil tankers seized by pirates. 

Just to begin training, SEAL candidates must demonstrate extraordinary physical endurance. The over year-long training program spans topics ranging from airborne and diving operations as well as marksmanship and demolitions.

But of those that pass the initial screening, only one out of three make it through the initial physical conditioning unit, the third week of which is known as ‘Hell Week,” in which trainees perform 20 hours of intense physical activity per day.

The basic SEAL unit is a sixteen-man SEAL platoon, which sub-divide into two squads. The Navy has roughly 3,000 Navy SEALS in eight SEAL teams, each consisting of six platoons and three eight-person special task support units.

Additionally, there are two sixteen-man SEAL Delivery Vehicle Teams equipped with specialized Mk.VIII Mod. 1 submersibles which can carry up to six SEALs for underwater insertion, and three teams operating small boats for littoral operations.

DEVGRU

The Naval Special Warfare Development Group (DEVGRU) is more popularly known by its former designation SEAL Team 6. Its operators are all experienced Navy SEALs who have undertaken an even more grueling training process with a 50 percent washout rate and occasional fatalities. 

Like the Army’s Delta Force, DEVGRU is a Tier 1 unit involved in counter-terrorism and preemptive assassination operations, famously including the killing of Osama Bin Laden in 2011. Unit members also specialize in hostage rescue and protect high-ranking individuals. 

DEVGRU is organized into four assault squadrons (Red, Gold, Blue and Silver); an over 100-strong sniper/advanced reconnaissance squadron (Black); a special boat squadron (Gray); and a training squadron (Green).

Air Force Special Operations

The Air Force has its own 15,000-person strong Special Operations Command, first formerly established in 1983. These involves a mix of aviation and commando-style units.

Special Ops air wings fly a wide range of unique aircraft which often work closely with special forces units of other branches.

Many of these fly variants of the venerable C-130 transport plane. For inserting and recovering commandos behind enemy lines there are MC-130 transport planes modified for low-altitude insertion and recovery and refueling helicopters, as well as CV-22 tilt-rotor aircraft.

To provide long-endurance precision air support, there are ponderous but deadly “Spooky” gunship transports bristling with howitzers, Gatling guns and missiles. And to impede enemy communications and remotely detonated mines, there are EC-130H aircraft with powerful jammers.

To map out just where hostiles are in the first place, AFSOCOM has a fleet of small U-28, C-145, and C-146 surveillance planes stuffed to the gills with hi-tech sensors used in low-profile spy flights across Africa and Southwest Asia alongside MQ-9 Reaper drone squadrons.

Special Tactics Squadrons

But there’s also a ground-pounding side to Air Force Special Ops in the form of Special Tactics Squadrons. These include specialists that are detached to support other special operations units.

Air Force Combat Controllers help assess landing zones and airfields in remote, and perform traffic control in these austere conditions. Two-man Tactical Air Control Parties focus on directing airstrikes in support of other ground forces. Pararescuemen, or PJs, assist in search-and-rescue missions behind enemy lines or difficult to access areas, as well as provide emergency medical care. 

There are even Special Operations Weathermen designed to assess weather conditions in the field that could impact the success of a mission.

Most STSs are grouped under the 24th Special Operations Wing, including the 24th STS, a Tier 1 unit that habitually embeds personnel with Delta Force and DEVGRU.

Challenges for U.S. Special Forces

Despite official secrecy, units like DEVGRU have been celebrated in press coverage and films like American Sniper, The Green Berets and Lone Survivor.

But as special forces undertake a large share of military efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali and Syria, they are subject to being word down with near-continuous combat deployments abroad

Furthermore, despite the axiom that one “cannot mass produce special forces,” the ranks of U.S. operatives have more than doubled in size since 2001 in an effort to keep pace with demand.

These stresses may be contributing to an institutional crisis. In the last few years, there have been several exposés of breakdowns in discipline and systemic misconduct in special forces units, ranging from the murder of a Green Beret in Mali by Navy SEALs and Marine Raiders in North Africa to reports that SEAL teams were exhibiting high rates of drug and alcohol abuse, and mishandling or even mutilating with hatchets the remains of enemy combatants.

These scandals are leading to calls within the community to acknowledge the problem and reestablish standards and norms of conduct.

Another challenge lies in the shifting priorities of the Defense Department. While SOCOM will likely remain at the forefront of future counter-terrorism/insurgency operations in Africa and West Asia, the Pentagon is reorienting itself away from such missions towards preparing for possible ‘great power’ conflict with Russia and China.

Special Operations forces may thus develop new tactics on how their unique capabilities could counter Russia’s own unconventional warfare tactics in Eastern Europe, or be employed to surveil and raid militarized islets in the Pacific Ocean.

Kyle Mizokami is a defense and national-security writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in the Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and the Daily Beast. In 2009 he cofounded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch. You can follow him on Twitter: @KyleMizokami.

This article is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Flickr.