The National Interest

Trevor Filseth

Nuclear Weapons, Belarus

Belarus will hold a constitutional referendum later this month that includes a vote on whether to make it legal to host Russian nuclear weapons.

Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko said on Thursday that he was willing to host Russian nuclear weapons on Belarusian soil if the Eastern European country faced an external threat.

Lukashenko’s offer comes as roughly 150,000 Russian troops have gathered on the Russo-Ukrainian border, raising fears that the Kremlin plans to invade Ukraine. Although Belarus is not directly involved in the confrontation between the two countries, tens of thousands of Russian troops are currently engaged in military exercises near Belarus’s border with Ukraine. Some experts in the West have warned that Russia could use Belarus as a staging area to invade Ukraine from the north, as the country’s capital, Kyiv, is less than one hundred miles from the Belarusian border.

Lukashenko previously said that Belarus would remain neutral in any potential conflict, and would only become involved if Belarus was attacked.

“If necessary, if such stupid and mindless steps are taken by our rivals and opponents, we will deploy not only nuclear weapons, but super-nuclear and up-and-coming ones to protect our territory,” Lukashenko said, according to Belarus’s state-run Belta news agency.

However, Lukashenko also that the weapons would not be “needed here for a hundred years” as long as Belarus was not threatened by any unfriendly countries, according to CBS News.

Belarus does not currently possess any nuclear weapons. It briefly inherited a handful of nuclear warheads after the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, but returned them to Russia as part of the Lisbon Protocol in 1995. 

There is also no legal basis for the deployment of foreign nuclear weapons within Belarus – a fact that Lukashenko has noted in the past. However, Belarus is holding a constitutional referendum later this month that includes a vote that would make it legal to host Russian nuclear weapons.

More importantly for many Belarusians, the constitutional referendum could also extend Lukashenko’s presidency. It would allow him to serve until 2035 if successively re-elected in 2025 and 2030.

Lukashenko, who has ruled Belarus since 1994, faced international criticism in 2020 after claiming victory in an election widely alleged to be fraudulent in the West. That election spawned a year-long protest movement demanding his resignation, which was ultimately put down in mid-2021 through a crackdown by security forces. 

That crackdown led to a wave of European sanctions on Belarus, pushing Lukashenko to forge closer ties with the Kremlin.

Trevor Filseth is a current and foreign affairs writer for the National Interest.

Image: Reuters.

Kevin Ryan

Ukraine Crisis, Europe

Even if he successfully attacks Ukraine and occupies territory, Putin will not have moved one step closer to achieving his stated “core demands.”

Vladimir Putin has lost; he will not achieve any of his core demands vis-à-vis the United States or NATO. Now he must decide whether he is a bully or a bluffer.

Putin made several demands in the initial “security guarantee proposals” he sent to the United States and NATO in December 2021. The proposals, written by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs staff responsible for these “official documents,” were perhaps done in haste to meet a timeline that was short and hurried.

On February 1, 2022, at a news conference during Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orban’s visit to Moscow, Putin clarified his three core demands for the West: “prevention of NATO’s expansion; commitment not to deploy offensive weapon systems near Russian borders; return of [NATO] Bloc’s European military infrastructure to 1997 levels when the NATO-Russia Founding Act was signed.”

In classified notes that were made later leaked to news media, the United States and NATO responded to these demands by refusing to limit NATO from any enlargement or expansion. They made clear that the West will not return to the situation that existed in 1997, before even Poland or the Baltic states were members of NATO. In response to Russia’s aggressive posturing along Ukraine’s border, the United States and NATO have actually increased the number of troops in Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and the Baltics, all of which border Russia or the Black Sea. Selected NATO countries have continued to ship more weapons to Ukraine.

In his latest response to the United States and NATO on February 17, Putin fumed, “Russia's ‘red lines’ and fundamental security interests, as well as Russia's sovereign right to protect them, continue to be ignored.”

Putin warned, “In the absence of the readiness of the American side to agree on firm, legally binding guarantees of our security from the United States and its allies, Russia will be forced to respond, including by implementing measures of a military-technical nature.”

No one should doubt that Putin has amassed enough military force on Ukraine’s border to follow through on his threat to attack Ukraine. But the fact is that even if he successfully attacks Ukraine and occupies territory, Putin will not have moved one step closer to achieving his stated “core demands.” Ukraine, or whatever is left of it, will be even more vehemently anti-Russian, a stone in Russia’s boot. The United States and NATO will undoubtedly add more troops to NATO members bordering Russia and seek to help Ukraine recover and improve its military forces. And NATO will remain open to new members.

Russia will have spent treasure and blood but gained none of the things that Putin has clearly said are his goals. And the people of Russia will be savvy enough to recognize his failure, however he tries to sell it. They will add his failure in Ukraine to his other failures to end Russia’s corruption or improve Russians’ living standards. Putin will wear the moniker of bully or bluffer, depending on what he does in Ukraine. But either way, he has lost.

Retired Brigadier (retired) General Kevin Ryan is a Senior Fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center. He is founder of the U.S.-Russia Elbe Group and served as U.S. Defense Attaché to Moscow.

Image: Reuters.

Richard Douglas

Firearms, United States

Ruger’s SP101 is a small, durable, and elegant-looking revolver that’s great for concealed carry, personal defense, or even home defense.

Here's What You Need to Know: The SP101 is small enough to fit in your pocket and designed for ultimate concealability and easy storage. Weighing in at around twenty-five ounces, it is a bit heavy for its size. However, this heft does help to mitigate some of the recoil.

Ruger’s SP101 is a small, durable, and elegant-looking revolver that’s great for concealed carry, personal defense, or even home defense. It’s available in a variety of calibers, including .357 Magnum, .38 Special, .327 Federal, and .22 LR. Throughout my years of owning this little revolver, I’ve never had any failures whatsoever. It’s incredibly reliable and built for years of consistent service.

The SP101 features a triple-locking cylinder, locked into the front, bottom, and rear of the frame to ensure dependability and positive alignment. There’s also a transfer bar safety, which will prevent any accidental discharges during concealed carry. The SP101 is very easy to take down for cleaning or maintenance, and requires no special tools to do so.

It comes with a sleek, brushed stainless steel finish for extra aesthetic appeal. While it’s not quite as nice as what you might find on a Smith & Wesson revolver, it’s still very high-quality. The SP101 also features a cushioned rubber grip with either a black synthetic or hardwood insert, depending on which model you choose. It feels nice in your hand, and there’s no exposed metal in the backstrap to further ensure a secure, comfortable grip. It’s great for me, but if the grip doesn’t quite meet your standards, the frame easily accommodates custom grips as well.

Most SP101 models come with a five-round capacity, apart from the .22 LR model (which comes with an eight-round capacity) and the .327 Federal (six-round capacity). You can shoot the revolver in double-action or single-action by manually cocking the hammer. I’d recommend shooting in single-action for a quick, light pull that breaks around 4 lbs, as the double-action pull can be long, gritty, and quite heavy, breaking around ten to eleven pounds.

This revolver comes in several different barrel lengths, including 2.25-inch, 3-inch, and 4.2-inch. It’s small enough to fit in your pocket and designed for ultimate concealability and easy storage. Weighing in at around twenty-five ounces, it is a bit heavy for its size. However, this heft does help to mitigate some of the recoil.

Just like the Taurus 380, it’s relatively soft shooting despite its small size. The .357 loads are much more snappy than .38 loads, but the combination of the revolver’s heavier weight, solidity, and cushioned grip make the recoil much more manageable than most snubnose revolvers.

As far as accuracy goes, you’ll have the best chance at hitting your target from short distances. Shooting in single-action helps with accuracy, as well. In fact, when I switched from double-action, I was able to cut my five-shot groups in half! My average grouping in single-action was just 1.5 inches from twenty-five yards, using various .38 Special loads. Getting small groupings from close distances (up to thirty yards) is easy, but anything further requires a bit of practice.

It comes standard with some basic sights, lowered to reduce the chances of snagging on your clothes when you draw the revolver from the concealed carry position. Both are adjustable for windage and elevation and set within the frame.

The MSRP of the Ruger SP101 is between $719–$769, depending on which model you choose, but you can usually find them online for around $550. It is a higher-than-average price, but extremely durable, soft shooting, and an excellent choice for anyone who needs an easy-to-conceal revolver for personal or home defense.

Richard Douglas writes on firearms, defense and security issues. He is the founder and editor of Scopes Field, and a columnist at The National Interest, 1945, Daily Caller and other publications.

This article first appeared in April 2021 and is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Wikimedia.

Trevor Filseth

Donald Trump, Middle East

It is not the first edited video depicting Trump that Iran has released. 

The official website of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, published an animation depicting the assassination of former President Donald Trump on Wednesday. The video’s release came shortly after the second anniversary of Iranian general Qassem Soleimani’s death in an airstrike ordered by Trump.

The video, titled “Revenge is Definite,” shows a similar airstrike taking place at Mar-a-Lago, Trump’s current residence in Palm Beach, Florida.

The video depicts a ground drone infiltrating the residence with the assistance of an Iranian hacker who deactivates a series of security cameras. The mansion is then surveyed by an aerial vehicle described as an “AC-130,” although the Iranian air force does not operate the Lockheed/Boeing C-130 Hercules or its AC-130 gunship variant. The Jerusalem Post noted that the heads-up display depicted in the video is nearly identical to a display seen in the video game Call of Duty 4: Modern Warfare, suggesting that it could have been lifted from that game.

The drone then moves to a golf course where the video’s animated version of Trump—complete with a red “MAGA” hat—is playing with a group of associates. One of the people accompanying Trump is then sent a text message informing him that “Soleimani’s murderer and the one who gave the order will pay the price.”

The ground drone helps guide an aircraft that resembles a Shahed Saegheh drone toward Trump’s golfing party. Finally, a red button is pressed, and a picture of Soleimani comes into focus.

Khamenei and a number of Iranian-affiliated media outlets have made repeated promises to take revenge against Trump for his role in Soleimani’s killing. On January 22, 2021, an image, also titled “Revenge is Definite,” depicted Trump golfing as the shadow of an Iranian aircraft passed overhead.

A second video published on the website of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi showed alternating cuts of speeches made by Raisi and Trump. The video, which was titled “Hard Revenge is Certain,” also showed photos of Soleimani and ended with a title card that described the general as a “#Hero.”

At the time of the killing, Iranian officials and state media described the assassination as an “act of war” and promised to avenge Soleimani’s death. There has been an escalation in attacks against U.S. military targets in Iraq and Syria in the two years since his death. During his lifetime, Soleimani led the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force, a military unit tasked with aiding Iranian-backed militias elsewhere in the Middle East.

Trevor Filseth is a current and foreign affairs writer for the National Interest.

Image: Reuters

Anastasia Kapetas

Nuclear Proliferation, United States, Australia

Australia has said that it doesn’t want to develop either nuclear weapons or an indigenous nuclear fuel cycle, but other countries will be asking whether that will remain true over time.

If the architects of the AUKUS pact and its headline initiative to supply Australia with nuclear-powered submarines imagined it would be seen as proliferation neutral, the reality might not be so straightforward. The announcement was extremely sketchy on many critical details, particularly from a non-proliferation perspective.

Of course, how nuclear non-proliferation issues are addressed isn’t the sole test of this deal, but it will be part of managing its future trajectory. It’s notable that the State Department doesn’t seem to have been in the loop on negotiations. It has carriage of US non-proliferation commitments, so some of the proliferation consequences may not have been front of mind.

Prime Minister Scott Morrison has said the deal will comply with Australia’s international non-proliferation commitments. That’s true, as there’s a massive loophole in Article III of the United Nations Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that exempts naval reactors from nuclear safeguards. However, the non-proliferation community has long seen the loophole as a major threat to one of the treaty’s key aims—to limit the production and use of highly enriched uranium (HEU), which can be used to make nuclear weapons.

Morrison’s statement is less certain when it comes to transfers of Tomahawk cruise missiles to the Royal Australian Navy’s Hobart-class destroyers and Australia’s commitments under the Missile Technology and Control Regime.

This non-treaty association of states aims to limit the risks of nuclear proliferation arising from the sale and transfer of nuclear-capable delivery systems. In the past, the US has backed the MTCR with stringent sanctions for non-compliance.

The last time a country transferred missiles with a range of more than 600 kilometres to another country (not counting US sales of Polaris, Trident and Tomahawk missiles to the UK) was in 1988 when China sold 3,000-kilometre-range missiles to the Saudis. The backlash was immediate and helped consolidate MTCR norms. The Tomahawk family of missiles has at least a 1,000-kilometre range and can be configured for either a nuclear or conventional payload. Some analysts suggest that the transfer of Tomahawks to Australia may erode the MTCR norm of denying transfers of missiles with ranges over 300 kilometres.

There could also be implications for negotiations on the proposed fissile material cut-off treaty, historically supported by Australia, which aims to strictly limit the amount of fissile material that nucelar-weapon states can manufacture. Negotiations are locked in a stalemate, largely thanks to Pakistan. Nonetheless, the treaty’s goals have broad international support and the manufacture of more weapons-grade uranium to power Australia’s submarines will likely also set those goals back.

There seems to be an emerging consensus in the global arms-control community that the AUKUS submarine deal could have a hugely negative effect on non-proliferation norms and practices. Depending on how Washington responds, this could have an impact on how the program unfolds.

Hans Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, says that the deal ‘will further intensify the arms race in the region and dynamics that fuel military competition’. Pointing to the sparse strategic rationale offered so far, he adds, ‘Other than fielding more and better weapons, does anyone have a plan?’

Similar views have rippled across non-proliferation and arms-control circles, driven by fears that the deal will set a precedent ushering in a dangerous era of loosened nuclear restraints.

Daryl Kimball, director of the Arms Control Association, points out that if Australia gets a HEU submarine like the US Virginia class, it will be the first non-nuclear-weapon state to have such a capability.

What will Washington say to other allies, such as Israel, that might want the same technology? What normative leverage will the US have if China and Russia decide to proliferate naval reactor technology and long-range nuclear-capable missiles, or if other nations—let’s say Jair Bolsonaro’s Brazil—seize on this precedent as an excuse to develop HEU for naval purposes?

Others have pointed out that the deal could be inconsistent with the US–Australia 123 agreement on nuclear transfers, as well as the US Nuclear Non-proliferation Act and Atomic Energy Act. If that proves correct, there’ll need to be a legislative component to make the deal legal from the US side.

All of this depends on the nature of the technology transfer on naval reactor design and HEU enrichment—whether it’s a ‘black box’, with no Australian involvement in the nuclear side of the submarine project, or if Australia will have to develop some capability on reactor repair, fuel manufacture, storage and refuelling to accommodate a wartime scenario where total dependence on the US might not be feasible.

In either case, Australia will probably need to modify its safeguard agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency, given all the questions this deal raises about how the American HEU nuclear fuel cycle will extend to Australia.

Australia has said that it doesn’t want to develop either nuclear weapons or an indigenous nuclear fuel cycle, but other countries will be asking whether that will remain true over time.

Verbal assurances won’t be enough, argues Kimball. He and other arms-control advocates suggest that the US needs to develop legislation ensuring that Australia won’t use this agreement to develop an indigenous enrichment capability.

The non-proliferation community, and other nations, could decide to lobby for another legislative requirement—that the Australian naval reactors be designed for low enriched uranium (LEU) rather than HEU.

HEU is anything above 20% enrichment, but US naval reactors on submarines and aircraft carriers use fuel that is 93–97% enriched weapons-grade uranium.

Transferring HEU technology to a non-nuclear-weapon state is seen as a grave proliferation risk, because it could enable that state to move closer to a nuclear weapons breakout capability without penalty and because it increases the risk of nuclear theft by non-state actors for use in a basic gun-type nuclear device.

The international community went through this issue with Brazil from the late 1970s, when the military junta developed HEU for use in naval rectors, and probably for nuclear weapons. After sanctions and the signing of a special Brazil–Argentina nuclear non-proliferation agreement, Brazil has been developing nuclear-powered submarines with France, which are believed to be LEU fuelled.

There’s been a push in the US Congress to phase out HEU in US naval reactors, consistent with domestic legislation on non-proliferation and Washington’s international non-proliferation commitments.

In 2020, the House Armed Services Committee, controlled by the Democrats, called for continued study into the use of LEU in the next generation of US submarines.

The Republican-controlled Senate Armed Services Committee disagreed and recommended banning the use of public funds to explore the option. It cited a 2016 JASON defence advisory panel report which found that the use of LEU reactors wasn’t feasible in current submarine designs. Using LEU requires bigger reactors as around 4.7% more enriched uranium is needed than for HEU. Submarines using LEU must be refuelled every one to three years. The Virginia-class HEU fuel lasts for 33 years—the life of the submarine.

But the JASON report also recommends a compromise, using what it calls LEU+. This is 25% enriched uranium, technically HEU but well below the enrichment level needed for nuclear weapons. It would provide roughly the same performance as higher enriched HEU.

The first opportunity to use LEU or LEU+ would be in the Virginia class’s replacement, the SSN(X) or Improved Virginia class, to be designed before 2030.

There are many reasons Australia might want to explore LEU+ as well as working towards best-practice nuclear safeguards. A deal that was meant to demonstrate unified resolve to China has generated considerable blowback, opening up divisions in NATO and the Five Eyes and generating distrust of Australia’s motives—all of which adversaries will be quick to exploit. Working to ameliorate the non-proliferation harms of this deal could help manage some of these effects.

And continuing to discourage a proliferation-permissive environment by upholding global rules is definitely in Australia’s interest, especially in a geopolitical environment where potential adversaries are fielding ever-increasing numbers of weapons.

The US and Australia both recognise the importance of strengthening global rules and the institutions that allow existential nuclear-proliferation issues to be mediated. Conventional nuclear and military deterrence might make state adversaries think twice before using nuclear weapons, but it’s of little use in stopping acquisition and the attendant risks of catastrophic miscalculation.

The article was first published by The Strategist.

Anastasia Kapetas is the national security editor at The Strategist. Image: US Navy/Flickr.

Image: Reuters

Sebastien Roblin

History, Asia

The CIA considers the case unsolved. But we all know who did it—and why.

Here's What You Need to Remember: Unlike other North Korean terrorist incidents, the agents responsible for the Gimpo bombing have never been caught and the CIA described the bombing as “unsolved” in a 1988 intelligence document. 

Given the intense passions and rivalries that sports events are known to inspire, it should surprise no one that they so frequently become theatres on which domestic and international political conflicts are liable to play out—sometimes with explosive consequences.

That was certainly the case on September 14, 1986, when a bomb placed in a trash can exploded in the entry to Gimpo International Airport as it was receiving athletes from around twenty-five countries just five days before the tenth Asian Games. Between 1958 and 2001, Gimpo served as Seoul’s primary international airport.

The blast shattered the terminal’s large glass panes (as you can see in this photo) and killed an airport electrician and a family of four who had just bid goodbye to a departing relative. It injured a further thirty-six persons.

The Asian Games, begun in 1951, have taken place at four-year intervals since and are the world’s second-largest multi-sport event, behind only the Olympics. Seoul had previously been slated to host the sixth Asian Games in 1970 but was forced to cede the role due to threats from North Korea.

Now a significantly more modernized, and gradually democratizing Seoul would have a second shot as a host in 1986. Seoul had its sights on an even more prestigious prize: hosting the 1988 Olympic Games. The same facilities could even be used for both events! But Seoul would have to prove that it could manage its responsibilities hosting a sprawling international sports event smoothly—and that North Korea would not find some way to derail everything.

Fundamentally, Pyongyang refused to see its southern neighbor as a legitimate state and placed enormous symbolic weight on curbing its participation in highly public international sporting events.

Not only was Pyongyang boycotting the 1986 Asian Games, but it also didn’t want anyone else to attend either. Most of North Korea’s Communist-aligned allies in Asia, like Vietnam and Cambodia, complied with the boycott—save for the most important of all, China. That defection stung Pyongyang and amounted to a diplomatic victory for the South.

Pyongyang had just three years earlier come very close to blowing up South Korea’s president during a visit to Rangoon, Burma (Yangon, Myanmar today) in October 1983. Due to an error in timing, a bomb planted in the roof of a sacred mausoleum instead killed twenty-one attendees, including much of the South Korean cabinet

But since then, relations seemingly had begun to improve, with Pyongyang allowing the first-ever reunion between family members separated between the divided Koreas in 1985.

The Gimpo airport itself had a history intertwined with past conflicts in Korea. Built on the western outskirts of Seoul during the Japanese occupation of Korea from 1935-1942, Gimpo was the scene of repeated air battles and aerial bombings in the early weeks of the Korean War as it was air-evacuated by South Korea in June 1950, then captured and used as a base for North Korean piston-engine Yak-7 fighters and Il-10 attack planes. Recaptured in September, it became a major hub for U.S. transport and fighter operations for the remainder of the Korean War, known as Kimpo AFB or K-14.

In 1958, Gimpo was re-designated as an international airport, and rapidly became Seoul’s primary air transit location while older, flood-prone Yeouido airport was demolished. 

The attack on Gimpo was held culpable for decreasing international attendance of the Asian Games, with hotels reporting only 94,000 foreign checks ins out of a projected 160,000, resulting in financial difficulties. 

However, it didn’t prevent the tenth Asian Games from being generally perceived as a success, paving the way for Seoul’s participation in the 1988 Olympics, which would coincide with its full transition to democratic elections.

Unlike other North Korean terrorist incidents, the agents responsible for the Gimpo bombing have never been caught and the CIA described the bombing as “unsolved” in a 1988 intelligence document.

However, it’s a stretch to say there’s much doubt as to North Korea’s culpability in the attack. The following year, two North Korean agents planted a bomb on Korean Air flight 858, killing all 115 aboard. Both agents were subsequently captured. While one managed to commit suicide, the other eventually confessed they had been instructed to perform the bombing to cast a shadow over the 1988 Olympics.

 A lot has changed in the last three decades since. As Gimpo struggled to cope with the mounting volume of international travelers to South Korea, it was eventually replaced by an airport in Incheon for international arrivals, though Gimpo still handles domestic flights.

South Korea and North Korean teams have also played together in multiple sporting events, starting with a joint World Table Tennis team in 1991, and culminating in unified Korean teams in the 2018 Winter Olympics in Pyeongchang, South Korea. 

Unfortunately, North Korea has repeatedly rebuffed overtures from South Korea’s president Moon for deeper improvements of relations, while discussions between Washington and Pyongyang appear to be on a negative trajectory. But hopefully, we have seen the last of sports-event terrorism on the Korean Peninsula.

Sébastien Roblin holds a master’s degree in Conflict Resolution from Georgetown University and served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China. He has also worked in education, editing, and refugee resettlement in France and the United States. He currently writes on security and military history for War Is Boring.

This article is being republished due to reader interest. 

Image: Reuters.

Sebastien Roblin

V-280 Helicopter,

Unmanned vehicles are the way of the future.

Here's What You Need to Remember: If more advanced algorithms for operating in a combat environment can be developed, an autonomous option could make employing a tiltrotor on riskier attack or reconnaissance missions more appealing without having to worry about losing a human crew alongside the expensive aircraft.

In December 2019, Bell had its V-280 Valor tilt rotor demonstrator aircraft perform an entire test mission drive driven according to computer algorithms—almost without any human inputs.

To be exact, the V-280’s software individually performed all of the tasks that might be expected of it in a routine non-combat mission without human input, but a human operator was onboard and the helicopter during the transitions between each tasks. Those tasks include:

1) Taking off vertically in “helicopter” mode, with the V-280’s propellers tilted upward to serve as rotors.

2) Transitioning the rotors to horizontally oriented “airplane mode” with greater speed and fuel efficiency.

3) Cruising towards multiple waypoints in horizontal flight mode.

4) Loitering by flying in circles above a waypoint.

5) Tilting the rotor back to vertical and landing helicopter-style at a destination.

If further tests are undertaken—none are presently schedule—they would likely seek to seamlessly integrate those tasks in one continuous autonomous flight operation.

What’s especially striking is that the tech demonstrator isn’t even primarily intended to serve as an unmanned system. It’s competing with the Sikorsky-Boeing SB>1 Defiant compound-rotor helicopter in the Army’s Future Vertical Lift competition, particularly the Future Long Range Assault Aircraft program which seeks a successor to workhorse UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter used both for cargo missions and to deliver troops into combat. 

FVL is one of the Army’s priorities in its Big Six modernization program to reequip its forces for twenty-first century warfare.

Like for the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle intended to replace the Army’s M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles (recently canceled but likely be rebooted soon), Bell’s tests suggest that unmanned capability may increasingly become a standard feature in platforms that aren’t even primarily intended for use as drones.

Despite being more expensive and historically crash-prone, tiltrotors ideally combine the maneuverability and vertical takeoff and landing abilities of a helicopter with the superior speed, high-altitude performance and fuel efficiency of a fixed-wing airplane. You can see a V-280 in both flight modes here.

The V-280 takes its name from its cruising speed of 280 knots (320 miles per hour), nearly twice maximum speed of an average military helicopter. It also boasts a vastly greater combat range of 520 to 920 miles, depending on loadout.

By contrast, the V-280’s competitor, the SB>1 is a more compact helicopter with compound rotor blades stacked on top of each other. Compared to the V-280s, it’s projected to cruise a bit slower (250 knots) and significantly less far (280 miles), but in theory would be more maneuverable in tight quarters and cost less to procure and operate.

However, the V-280 began test flights on December 2017, whereas the first SB>1 flight only took place on March 21, 2019 due to technical problems. Meanwhile, the V-280 has chalked up 160 flight hours.

Yet while Bell’s enthused about how well advanced the unmanned flight testing had proceeded, Army aviation modernization director Brig. Gen. Wally Rugen reportedly threw cold water on the notion that unmanned operation would show up in early FVL aircraft according to Breaking Defense.

“It’ll be a very tall order to get it into Increment 1,” he said, referring to the initial batch of production FVL aircraft due in the early 2030s. “We’ll have it in another spiral [upgrade cycle] for sure.”

After all, it’s one thing to fly unmanned on a routine delivery mission. It’s another to perform complex combat tasks such inserting into or extracting personnel from constricted landing zones possibly at night or in inclement weather, evading enemy fire and sensors, searching an area on a rescue or reconnaissance missions, and attacking targets with weapons. If desired, such capabilities would require far more advanced algorithms.

There may even be reservations about entrusting living soldiers for transportation to a fully autonomous aircraft.

So what exactly would be the concept of operations behind an optionally unmanned V-280? Unlike many unmanned systems which are cheap enough to be treated as relatively expendable, a high-performance tilt-rotor transport simply can’t be sacrificed like cannon fire. 

Nonetheless, an unmanned tiltrotor might be used to perform routine cargo delivery missions to forward outposts without having to keep a rescue crew on standby in the event of an accident or combat loss.

If more advanced algorithms for operating in a combat environment can be developed, an autonomous option could make employing a tiltrotor on riskier attack or reconnaissance missions more appealing without having to worry about losing a human crew alongside the expensive aircraft.

Thus, Bell’s achievement with the V-280 helicopters is an indicator as to how unmanned capability is growing ubiquitous in modern military systems—but also the limitations and technical problems that will need to be addressed before autonomous systems can begin replacing traditionally manned combat platforms such as helicopters, tanks and submarines.

Sébastien Roblin holds a Master’s Degree in Conflict Resolution from Georgetown University and served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China. He has also worked in education, editing, and refugee resettlement in France and the United States.

This article first appeared in 2019. It is being reprinted due to reader interest.

Image: Flickr 

 

Vincenzo Caporale

Belt and Road Initiative, Southeast Asia

Commentators and China watchers have gotten accustomed to generalizing Chinese investments as a malicious attempt to trap smaller nations through debt. Southeast Asian countries have more leverage and negotiating power than is acknowledged.

In December, China and Laos inaugurated the $5.9 billion highspeed rail (HSR) that linked China’s southern Yunnan province and the Laotian capital, Vientiane. Eventually, the Chinese and Laotians hope to connect much of the region by extending the rail to Thailand and Malaysia. It is a massive undertaking for an underdeveloped nation with a high debt to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ratio like Laos. As a result, the project has been decried as another example of China’s “debt trap diplomacy”—predatory lending to small and underdeveloped countries to ensure deferential concessions to China when the loans are not paid back on time or in full. However, this antiquated view does not represent reality as countries in Southeast Asia have more leverage and negotiating power than is commonly understood.

To begin, China does have a history of predatory lending to underdeveloped countries through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). As Mark Green warns, “China’s efforts to use its [BRI] to broaden its geopolitical and economic clout risk saddling developing countries with unsustainable debt while increasing their dependency on China.” A four-year study by researchers at AidData found that 165 countries owe debts exceeding $385 billion to China. More striking, they discovered that forty-two countries had debt exposures to China exceeding 10 percent of their GDP.

As a result, we have seen countries defer to Chinese geopolitical interests as we did when Cambodia blocked the 2012 Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) meeting communique because it indirectly mentioned Chinese aggression in the South China Sea or when China utilized the significant debt it owns in Djibouti to establish its first foreign military base there.

The prime example of Chinese debt-trap diplomacy is Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port Development Project. After the port’s completion, it became famous for being a failure. Although it sits near one of the busiest sea lanes globally, only thirty-four ships in total docked there in 2012. As a result, Sri Lanka struggled to keep up with the interest and payments and was saddled with debt. As repayment, the newly elected Sri Lankan government in 2015 handed over the port and 1,500 acres of land for the next ninety-nine years. More than just the port, this gave China strategic footing in the Indian ocean.

Yet, cases like the Sri Lankan one, although worrisome, have created a false set of assumptions that all Chinese investments are predatory and, more importantly, the receivers of the investment are helpless. The situation is more complicated.

Laos exemplifies the complexity of the relationship between China and the countries it invests in. On the one hand, Laos has an unhealthy economic dependence on China: as of 2021, “Laos overall level of debt exposure to China is equivalent 64.8 percent of its GDP.” Laos also had to sell a part of its national security grid to China due to its dependence on its northern neighbor.

Yet, at the same time, this most recent HSR project demonstrates that recipients can engage with China on projects of vital importance without accepting predatory terms. The new rail line will serve as a lifeline for Laos, a landlocked country with one of the most underdeveloped transportation networks in the region. With the train crossing over rough terrain through 167 bridges and seventy-five tunnels at a speed of 160kph, it will radically connect the country. For example, the northern leg of the line from Boten to Vientiane that traverses mountains normally would take two days. With the HSR, it is cut down to only three hours. The potential future payoffs of this project are also enticing as there are plans to extend the line through Thailand and Malaysia. It will connect Laos with essential regional supply chains.

Moreover, the project languished for five years because Laotian negotiators held out for better terms. As  journalist Murray Hiebert remarks in his book, Under Beijing’s Shadow, “Beijing and Vientiane wrangled for years over the conditions of the project and China relented on several of its initial demands, even though Laos held a relatively weak hand.” Initially, Laos was going to take out a $7.2 billion loan from the Chinese EXIM Bank for the project. After the Laotian parliament and international banking institutions like the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank criticized the deal, the Laotian government took only a $500 million loan. As a result, China took a much larger stake in financing the project. Regarding the interest rate, Laos renegotiated the interest rate down from 3 percent to 2 percent. Finally, China wanted fifty-five yards on each side of the rail tracks to set up businesses, and eventually, it agreed to only sixteen yards.

It is important to note that these concessions weren’t due to Chinese benevolence. Without a doubt, a part of Laos’ leverage in this situation was that Beijing highly valued this project due to its importance for China’s regional connectivity objectives. But overall, countries like Laos, which are now economically stronger and have more options than before, have more leverage today than they had in the past. First, consider that Southeast Asia is one of the fastest-growing regions in the world. In 2019, the region averaged 5.4 percent growth and was responsible for 7 percent of global exports. For its part, Laotian GDP growth was 6.5 percent.

Secondly, and partly as a result, the region is attracting more investor interest than before. The emergence of great power competition between China and the United States and its allies has only intensified foreign direct investment in the region. In 2021, Japan, the European Union, and the United States were the largest investors in the region—not China. In other words, Southeast Asian nations have other options than China.

Like other Southeast Asian nations, Laos has recently begun balancing its economic over-dependence on China. In terms of developmental aid, Japan—if counted with the Asian Development Bank, in which Japan is the largest shareholder and investor—is the largest donor to the region. In 2016, Japan launched the Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (EPQI)—an infrastructure investment initiative positioned as an alternative to China’s BRI—and in early in 2021, Japan and Laos affirmed plans to pursue a strategic partnership. Thus, further opportunities for Laos to engage with Japan should continue to present themselves.

Laos is also increasing its relations with other powers like the United States. In 2012, Hillary Clinton became the first U.S. secretary of state to visit the country since 1955. In 2016, the two countries set up the U.S.-Laos Comprehensive Partnership, including a trade and investment framework agreement. Between 2013 and 2019, trade has increased threefold, and the United States Trade and Development Agency is inspecting the viability of a 20-megawatt solar project in the country.

Laos is engaging with smaller countries as well. After Joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2013, Laos signed bilateral trade agreements with over fourteen countries. One of those countries, Vietnam, has a history of close ties with Laos given their geographic proximity and similar governments and economic systems. Between 2016 and 2020, Vietnam was Laos third-largest investor—with investments growing by 35 percent since 2010, and in 2020 Vietnam had a total investment capital of $143 million spread across nine projects, marking a 130 percent increase year over year. These investments included major infrastructure projects such as airports, roadways, and a new National Assembly building. Vietnam also expanded its bilateral free trade agreement originally signed in 1998. Similarly, Laos has increased its engagement with South Korea, which is already the fifth-largest investor there. Earlier this year, South Korean foreign minister Chung Eui-yong visited Laos—marking the first visit by a South Korean foreign minister in over twenty years—to discuss ways to increase South Korean investment there.

Laos is not the only example of a Southeast Asian nation engaging with Chinese investment from a secure negotiating position. Malaysia also successfully renegotiated nearly all of its BRI projects after Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad was rushed back to power in a 2018 election. Mahathir’s election and the subsequent renegotiation of Chinese-related projects came after the previous administration was found to have corruptly accepted BRI projects at inflated prices in return for China bailing out the state’s investment fund. Likewise, Vietnam rejected all Chinese bids on its own crucial connectivity project, the North-South Expressway, after a domestic backlash against Chinese influence in the country bubbled up..

Despite this reality, commentators and China watchers have gotten accustomed to generalizing Chinese investment in Latin America, Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia—depicting it all as a malicious attempt to trap smaller nations through debt. Of course, much of Chinese investment is predatory and should be noted as such. However, aside from a few examples like Cambodia, Southeast Asian countries have more leverage and negotiating power than is acknowledged. U.S. strategists can’t accurately depict and predict Chinese strategy and motivation without the subtlety of fine distinctions in analyzing Chinese actions. Laos and the HSR project illustrate the nuance of Chinese investment and recipients’ relationship to it.

Vincenzo Caporale holds a master’s degree in International Relations from the University of Cambridge. He is currently a feature writer at the Borgen Magazine and focuses on development and geopolitics in Southeast Asia. You can reach Vincenzo or follow his work on Twitter @VincenzoCIV

Image: Reuters.

Daniel L. Davis

Battle of Stalingrad, Europe

Because the city bore the name of the leader of the USSR, Joseph Stalin, Hitler took particular interest in capturing the city as a personal hit on the Soviet leader.

Here’s What You Need to Remember: Though Stalingrad carried significant military importance, the psychological importance both leaders placed on the city elevated it to a level of importance above perhaps even the capital city of Moscow. The price both armies were willing to pay to possess it transcended military utility and entered fully into the category of obsession.

Since July 2012, the world has watched in horror as the once-beautiful and vibrant Syrian city of Aleppo has been transformed into a perpetual battlefield. Those killed in Aleppo, as well as throughout the rest of Syria during the civil war, are reported to be approximately three hundred thousand. During the U.S.-led war in Iraq from 2003–11, one study reported that 405,000 Iraqis were killed as a direct result of combat, and from 2001–15, an additional 91,991 people were killed due to war in Afghanistan, for a three-country total, over a fifteen-year period, of 796,991. As staggering as the death toll in these wars have been, it pales in comparison to what remains the world’s most barbaric city fight, the Battle of Stalingrad, in which an incomprehensible 1.9 million German and Soviet soldiers and civilians are estimated to have been killed in six months.

In June 1941 Hitler ordered a surprise invasion of the Soviet Union, and for most of the next year the German army routed the Soviet troops, capturing thousands of square kilometers of their country in the process. In August 1942 the German VI Army had pushed all the way to the banks of the Volga River, near the industrial heartland of the USSR. Once captured, the Nazis could sever the Volga, and potentially destroy Moscow’s ability to continue fighting. All they had to do was take one more city. Stalingrad.

The prewar population of Stalingrad was four hundred thousand. It was home to a key river port as well as numerous important war and civilian industries. Because the city bore the name of the leader of the USSR, Joseph Stalin, Hitler took particular interest in capturing the city as a personal hit on the Soviet leader. Stalin likewise placed great importance on holding the city to prevent Hitler from capturing the city carrying his name.

Though Stalingrad carried significant military importance, the psychological importance both leaders placed on the city elevated it to a level of importance above perhaps even the capital city of Moscow. The price both armies were willing to pay to possess it transcended military utility and entered fully into the category of obsession.

Initially the Germans made substantial and rapid progress in conquering the city. The Nazis attacked the city and its defenders with almost uncontested bombardment from the sky, tanks, artillery, mortars and other heavy weapons. By early September 1942 the Germans were still making progress, but the rate of advance had slowed considerably. As a result of the enormous bombardment, the city and its buildings had been pulverized into one giant heap of rubble. The Russians began to develop defensive tactics that took advantage of the wrecked buildings, which ironically gave them advantages.

Nevertheless, by November the relentless German assault had pushed the Soviet line almost all the way to the Volga River. Both sides had endured hundreds of thousands of casualties at this point, and the barbarity of the fighting on both sides of the line had transcended all bounds of human behavior. Right and wrong, morality, and honor among combatants had ceased to exist. The battle had literally descended into an animalistic struggle to survive.

The 2001 Hollywood movie Enemy at the Gates depicted a duel between a specific German and Russian sniper. Snipers had become one of the most feared opponents for both sides. Due to their ability to fire from long ranges, soldiers never felt they were safe and often were shot even in areas they thought to be secure.

One particular Russian sniper, Anatoly Chechov, said of the time he took his first human life. “I felt terrible. I had killed a human being.” But after time and the knowledge of how German troops had killed many of his countrymen, Chechov said when interviewed during the battle, “I started to mercilessly fire on them. I've become a barbaric person, I kill them. I hate them.” To give just a glimpse into the hell of the world that was the battle of Stalingrad, consider these few stories from both countries’ perspectives.

As described in detail in the excellent book by Michael K. Jones, Stalingrad: How the Red Army Survived the German Onslaught, on September 14, 1942, the Germans had pushed almost all the way through the city to the Volga, a mere two hundred yards from their objective. The Russians were on the verge of defeat. Because the German Luftwaffe had air supremacy in the skies, it was near suicide for any reinforcements or resupply to be ferried over the Volga during daylight. But because the Soviet commander of the Thirteenth Guards Division believed that the Russian defenders near the river’s edge would not hold out until nightfall, he ordered his division to cross anyway, believing the battle and perhaps the war was on the line.

Gen. Alexander Rodimtsev led his troops onto the barges and started across the river. According to eyewitness accounts, the general’s boat was hit with a German bomb before reaching the far shore, killing most on board—but miraculously, he survived. Most of his men were not so lucky. Several eyewitnesses described the scene.

Albert Burkovski, one of the few Soviet defenders still holding on the Stalingrad side of the river, described the approach of the Thirteenth Guards Division troops. “We were lying on the ground. Everything was on fire,” he said. “The boats were being bombed and shelled. I saw a big barge – full of soldiers, with their big coats, grenades, sapper’s spades, ammunition and machine guns – go down right before my eyes.” Another defender, Ivan Schylaev, described a similar horrifying scene.

“There was a flash of flame, dark smoke enveloped the ferry, an explosion was heard, and immediately afterwards, a drawling scream. . . . The ship was maneuvering, then a sheet of fire erupted on the upper decks; the force of the explosion shook the Volga. When it was over – and the smoke had cleared away – there was nothing, just waves where the ferry had been. The scene froze our blood.”

As Michael Jones noted, the Red troops shouldn’t have been able to hold the line. “The Germans occupied the high river embankment and brought overwhelming firepower to bear on the advancing Russians,” he wrote. “It did not seem possible that they could succeed – and yet they did. In ferocious hand-to-hand combat, Rodimtsev’s soldiers recaptured a key building from the Germans and secured the river crossing.” (For a graphic depiction of this action, see this excerpt from the 2013 Russian movie Stalingrad.) The view from the German side was even more horrific.

In a WW2History.com interview, German survivor Helmut Walz described the dehumanizing effects inflicted on him during the house-to-house fighting in Stalingrad. Walz was in the midst of an assault on a certain Russian-held building when he came face to face with an enemy soldier. He said he raised his weapon to shoot, but all of a sudden, “I saw little stars in front of my eyes. I looked to my right, and I ran my left hand over my face and a jet of blood comes out and my teeth flew out of my mouth.”

He thought, “Now it’s all over,” and expected the Russian soldier to finish him off. But then one of his friends came to his aid and “crushed the head of the Russian who had shot me. He crushed his head despite the steel helmet he was wearing, right into the middle of his face. That made such a cracking noise, I can still hear it today.”

But his horror for the day wasn’t finished. As his friend bandaged Walz’s wounds, Walz looked up and tried to warn the friend that another Russian fighter was right behind him. But it was too late. Shots rang out and his friend’s helmet “flew through the air and then I looked at him and I saw how he was shot in his head and how his head split. That’s the first time I saw a brain. On the left-hand side and on the right hand side there were parts of the brain, and in the middle there was water. No blood, but water. And he looked at me and he was standing on the soil with his wound.”

Scenes like those of the Thirteenth Guards Division and Helmut Walz were repeated a thousand times over during the six months of the battle for Stalingrad. I fought in high intensity combat during my twenty-one-year military career, as well as participating in counterinsurgency operations against guerrilla foes. Yet without equivocation I confess that I cannot fathom, cannot even truly imagine, what the living hell of Stalingrad combat must have been like. It is frightening to consider how remorseless and vicious men can become when stripped of their humanity.

The carnage of the Battle of Stalingrad finally came to an end in February 1943, when the German Sixth Army Commander, Gen. Friedrich Paulus, surrendered the remaining ninety thousand troops of his army to the Soviet Forces. After the Red Army stopped the Nazis at the Volga, they would push the Germans back, relentlessly, for the next two years, culminating with the destruction of Berlin, the death of Adolf Hitler and the end of the war.

Of the ninety thousand Germans that went into Soviet captivity, fewer than six thousand would live to see their homeland again, and those didn’t come until the mid-1950s. However bad and inhumane we believe the wars in the Middle East have been—and they have been horrific, especially for the poor civilians caught in the middle—they are a mere shadow of wars past.

May those shadows never return.

Daniel L. Davis is a widely published analyst on national security and foreign policy. He retired as a Lt. Col. after twenty-one years in the U.S. Army, including four combat deployments, and is a Foreign Policy Fellow for Defense Priorities and a member of the Center for Defense Information's Military Advisory Board. Follow him on Twitter @DanielLDavis1.​

This article is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters

Leon Aron

Kazakhstan, Central Asia

Will Kazakhstan be the setting for the second edition of the Crimea-Donbass script?

Here’s What You Need to Remember: Putin’s preference is almost certain to wait and see if President Tokayev can quell the unrest with the assistance of the “peacekeepers” from the Collective Security Treaty Organization.

The unrest in Kazakhstan spells trouble for Moscow. Until now a reliable authoritarian ally, it provided Moscow with a safety barrier against the perennially unstable Central Asia — all the more needed now with the Taliban’s takeover in Afghanistan. Still more disturbing for the Kremlin is the specter of a pro-democracy “color revolution” on its borders.

With 18 million citizens and a territory of a million square miles, Kazakhstan is too big for an outright takeover, but a plausible target for a limited annexation. Kazakhs had never had their own state, Putin averred. Instead, he continued, the country was “created” by President Nursultan Nazarbayev (who ruled the Central Asian nation between 1991 and 2019) “on the territory where no state ever existed.” Besides, Putin said in June 2020, if this or that former Soviet republic had “entered” the Soviet Union and had been given “a huge quantity of historically Russian lands,” it should have exited the USSR with its original lands instead of “dragging with it the presents from the Russian people.” Putin did not name the offenders but, alongside Ukraine, Kazakhstan could be Exhibit A. Its six northern provinces, where most of the country’s three-and-half million ethnic Russians live, border Russia and could be considered part of the “historical” Russian south-east, southern Urals, and south-west Siberia.

But the immediate “official” pretext for a limited invasion is most likely to be a claim that the ethnic Russian minority was endangered by the turmoil: a Crimea-Donbass scenario, with Islamic “religious extremists” in Almaty replacing the “Russophobic Nazis” in Kiev as an imminent danger to the lives of Russia’s compatriots.

Busy at the moment with the martial drama he is enacting on the Ukrainian border, Putin’s preference is almost certain to wait and see if President Tokayev can quell the unrest with the assistance of the “peacekeepers” from the Collective Security Treaty Organization, a military alliance of Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

Yet the temptation to boost his much advertised image as protector of all Russians no matter where they live and, even more so, of an in-gatherer of “historic Russian lands,” lost in the Soviet collapse, may prompt a second edition of the Crimea-Donbass script. Stay tuned!

Leon Aron is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI).

This article was first published by AEI.

Image: Reuters

Warrior Maven

Mobile Battery Packs, United States

Lithium-ion batteries, well known for their widespread use in commercial items such as laptops, are virtually indispensable to the military.

Here's What You Need to Know: Desert heat, incoming enemy fire or hot flames emerging from an IED explosion or weapons attack could cause Lithium-ion batteries to malfunction, burst into flames...or even explode.

Soldiers are taking enemy fire in 120-degree desert heat, carrying up to 100-pounds of gear and conducting attack operations at night are totally reliant upon battery-powered weapons, sensors and computers -- a potential scenario inspiring current Army Research Laboratory work to engineer longer-lasting, more-stable and, of critical live-saving significance, less flammable Lithium-ion batteries.

Current Lithium-ion batteries, well known for their widespread use in commercial items such as laptops, are virtually indispensable to the military; they are used for a wide range of combat essential technologies, including computers, night vision, laptops, laser illuminators, radios, gun sights, night versions of gun sights, GPS units and navigational systems. However, despite their utility and crucial role supporting warfare, existing Lithium-Ion batteries are extremely heat-sensitive and subject to explosion in certain combat circumstances.

Simple desert heat, incoming enemy fire or hot flames emerging from an IED explosion or weapons attack could cause Lithium-ion batteries to malfunction, burst into flames...or even explode.

For this reason, the Army Research Office and Georgia Tech are now experimenting with new materials with which to power batteries, which can both hold more Lithium and also vastly increase safety for soldiers at war. This is because new materials, such as polymer substances now being experimented with by the ARL, can not only increase battery density for power longevity, but also reduce the possibilities that battery components, such as its electrolytes, will vaporize and explode in flames.

Mobile battery power emerges from the flow of electrons from one electrode, or solid electric conductor, to another within the battery. This includes one negatively charged electrode - the anode -- and one positive electrode called the cathode. Materials called electrolytes are placed in between the anode and cathode electrodes, helping to facilitate the chemical reaction necessary for the cathode to receive the flow of electrons -- generating electricity.

"We are looking at polymeric flexible electrolytes, which could replace more dangerous liquid electrolytes. A polymer is a solid which, if you were to puncture... water and air will go in. You do have an ignition source but you do not have a readily flammable solvent," Dr. Robert Mantz, division chief, electrochemistry, Army Research Office, an element of U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command’s Army Research Laboratory, told Warrior in an interview.

The current ARL work, given this, is focused upon identifying materials and electrolytes able to produce more energy per unit, function as a better performing battery and, as Mantz put it, be “inherently more safe.”

"In most systems, carbonates are used as electrolytes. Their low viscosity and transport are faster as a liquid, but once you generate heat carbonates want to boil and generate gas. Carbonate starts coming out, which is gaseous and very flammable. Water and material react and serve as an ignition source," Mantz explained.

A wire running through the battery facilitates the flow of electrons between the cathode and anode where, Mantz added, two types of chemical reactions occur - reduction and oxidation. These reactions, as explained in an interesting essay by the Australian Academy of Science, includes the flow of electrons between the anode the cathode. Oxidation is the loss of electrons created by a chemical reaction at the anode, resulting in the generation and release of negatively charged electrons and positively charged Lithium ions.. (molecules or atoms).

“Oxidation happens at the anode, and the cathode is where reduction occurs and where the lithium would be reduced. LI\ithium starts as cation (positively charged ion) and is reduced at the Cathode,” Mantz said.

At the cathode, another chemical reaction occurs simultaneously that enables the electrode to pull positive Lithium ions from the electrolyte.

An essay by the U.S. Department of Energy explains this process by stating ...“the movement of the lithium ions creates free electrons in the anode which creates a charge at the positive current collector (cathode). While the battery is discharging and providing an electric current, the anode releases lithium ions to the cathode, generating a flow of electrons from one side to the other. When plugging in the device, the opposite happens: Lithium ions are released by the cathode and received by the anode.” (U.S. Dept. of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy)

The flow of electrons takes place between electrodes, (anode and cathode) which can be various kind of metals or materials with conductive properties. Some batteries have used Zinc as an anode and silver as a cathode, according to the Australian essay. Some common cathode materials include Lithium Manganate, Lithium Nickel Colbalt Aluminum Oxide and Lithium Colbaltate, according to an essay from Battery University.

The electrodes are stacked up in pairs throughout the battery, called cells, which are separated by the electrolytes. The anode, called the negative electrode, and the cathode, or positive electrode, are successively stacked together throughout the battery.

“The difference in standard potential between the electrodes kind of equates to the force with which electrons will travel between the two electrodes. This is known as the cell’s overall electrochemical potential, and it determines the cell’s voltage,” the Australian essay states.

From the anode, an electron flow travels through an external wire, while positively charged Lithium ions are generated to travel through the electrolyte solution. At the anode, negatively charged electrons and positively charged ions are generated by a chemical reaction, driving a flow of negatively charged electrons through a wire in the battery. These negatively charged electrons need to be neutralized, or reduced in a capacity, by the positive ions in the electrolyte materials, enabling the cathode electrode to receive the electrons -- and generate electricity.

Electrolyte possibilities, now being worked on by ARL scientists, can be liquid, gel or solid substances, inspiring the current experimentation with polymer materials.

What all of this amounts to is a chemical process, involving two simultaneous chemical reactions, through which batteries generate and store electricity. Simply put, the ARL is experimenting with how different kinds of electrolytes, including solid materials such as polymers, can extend, improve and further protect soldier missions.

"Polymer electrolytes are solid at room temperature and are a unique class of electrolytes. They have pores, so they are conductive,” Mantz told Warrior.

An interesting essay from Battery University further explains how temperature rises in Lithium-ion battery cells can “approach the melting point of Lithium, causing thermal runaway, also known as ‘venting with flame.’” An overheated anode can generate needle-like structures call dendrites which can “short out” a battery by puncturing the electrolytes.

This technical advancement, should it come to fruition, introduces new strategic advantages. Naturally, longer lasting electronics, weapons and sensors not only increase forward-operating attack missions but also safeguard soldiers from enemy attack. It goes without saying that soldiers under enemy fire would instantly be extremely vulnerable should they lose electrical power, especially when carrying potentially flammable batteries.

Lithium-ions have been the preferred materials for years, in part because “Lithium is the lightest of all metals, has the greatest electromechanical potential and provides the largest specific energy per weight,” the Battery University essay states.

There is not a specific timeframe regarding when this emerging battery technology will be operational, yet ARL scientists do explain the program is making rapid progress.

This article by Kris Osborn originally appeared in WarriorMaven in 2020.

Kris Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army - Acquisition, Logistics& Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.

Image: Reuters

Trevor Filseth

United Nations,

Eight countries in total lost their right to vote in the UN General Assembly. 

United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres announced on Tuesday that the Islamic Republic of Iran and seven other countries have lost their right to vote in the UN General Assembly because of their failure to pay annual dues to the intergovernmental organization.

The secretary-general claimed that eleven of the UN’s member states were behind on their payments. Of the eleven, eight were stripped of their voting rights, including Sudan, which has been rocked by protests following a military coup in October, and Venezuela, which has faced an ongoing political crisis over the past decade. The five other countries stripped of their ability to vote were Antigua and Barbuda, the Republic of the Congo, Guinea, Papua New Guinea, and Vanuatu.

UN members that fail to pay their obligations for two consecutive years lose their voting rights unless it can be shown that the failure to pay is “due to conditions beyond the control of the member.” The latter clause allowed the remaining three countries on the list—Comoros, Sao Tome and Principe, and Somalia—to retain their votes.

The sums owed are not substantial for any of the countries. Venezuela owes the UN roughly $40 million, Iran is $18 million behind on payments, and Sudan only owes $300,000. The remaining countries owe $75,000 or less.

Iran lost its voting rights for the first time in January 2021. After lodging a protest and engaging in negotiations, the country’s voting rights were temporarily restored in June under the condition that Tehran would make a minimum payment on its dues.

The Iranian government has attributed its inability to pay to “the oppressive and illegal U.S. sanctions” that have prevented it from accessing billions of dollars in foreign accounts. Iranian officials have claimed that the country intends to resume “full and timely payment of membership dues” when its economic situation improves.

The UN’s annual operating budget is roughly $3 billion, with a separate peacekeeping budget of $6.5 billion. The dues collected from member states provide the funds for these modest budgets. Each country’s dues are calculated by considering factors such as population, gross domestic product, and size.

Trevor Filseth is a current and foreign affairs writer for the National Interest.

Image: Reuters

Peter Jennings

Russia Ukraine, Eastern Europe

Yes, it’s great that ‘America is back,’ but what exactly are we all going to do about these pushy dictators?

Here’s What You Need to Remember: We need a confident America operating with a sense of its own power and purpose.

This week US President Joe Biden faces the first big test of his administration’s global authority. America’s credibility as an ally is on the line, as is Biden’s ability to shape a shared NATO approach to Russia and to back up diplomacy with believable military options.

The challenge to American power comes from Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, a ruthless exponent of brinkmanship. The immediate focus is on Putin’s build-up of about 100,000 troops on the Ukraine border, poised for a potential invasion to counter Russia’s invention of a ‘threat’ from Kyiv.

The stakes are, in fact, bigger for Putin. He is reasserting a Russian claim to a sphere of influence over former states in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. If Biden concedes to Putin’s claim, American credibility and power fade, but nothing yet in Washington’s approach shows a resolute plan of action.

This should matter profoundly to Australia because, to be blunt, we are as reliant on American power as the Europeans are. And Chinese leader Xi Jinping is learning from Russian risk-taking. The strategies Putin uses to threaten Europe could well be used by Xi to threaten Taiwan, coerce Southeast Asia and weaken Australia, Japan and America’s Pacific allies.

It might be claimed that Biden’s first big international test was withdrawing from Afghanistan, but that was a self-inflicted wound. Biden himself determined when and how quickly it would happen. America’s actions were not shaped or constrained by allies, the Afghan government or the Taliban, or informed by concerns about what would happen in Kabul once the troops had left.

Russia’s threat to invade Ukraine, reassertion of Soviet-style dominance in Belarus and Kazakhstan, and attempts to weaken NATO’s position provide altogether a different challenge to Biden’s authority. Putin is challenging America’s capacity to lead an ever more fractured Europe in the defense of its own security interests.

Russia’s assertion of a role for itself as a global power is based on Putin’s allegation that the US broke a commitment made in 1990 at the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall not to expand NATO eastward, closer to the Soviet Union. The US secretary of state at the time, James Baker, told the New York Times this week, ‘I may have been a little bit forward on my skis on that’, but negotiations with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev agreed that a unified Germany would be in NATO. A ban on states joining NATO was never agreed. Russia does, indeed, have legitimate security interests, but that doesn’t mean the interests of bordering countries are dispensable.

NATO now includes the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (1999); Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia (2004); Albania and Croatia (2009); Montenegro (2017); and North Macedonia (2020). This has drawn NATO closer to Russia’s borders, but was the result of countries seeking security with the democratic West against an aggressive Moscow.

Putin’s contemporary claims that NATO missiles and military exercises threaten Russian security and that Moscow must control its ‘near abroad’ neighbors to ensure its own security simply divert attention from Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and proxy conflict in Ukraine’s eastern provinces.

So to the current military standoff on the Russia–Ukraine border. Maintaining 100,000 personnel on a war footing over winter is costly and can’t be sustained for long. I argued recently that Putin may have no intent to mount a full-scale invasion of western Ukraine. A hard-fought military occupation would rapidly bankrupt Russia and, over time, damage Putin’s domestic political standing. He has many options short of war including using cyberattacks to shut down Ukraine’s electricity grid. What’s clear is that the threat of Russian military action has spooked Biden, whose initial reaction was to tell Putin in their virtual summit in December, ‘If Russia further invades Ukraine, the United States and our European allies would respond with strong economic measures.’

Removing the threat of a US military response to Russian aggression gives Putin an option to press for further concessions. Even before negotiators arrived in Geneva for the first of three separate meetings with the Russians this week, Secretary of State Antony Blinken was foreshadowing possible US concessions including ‘arms control, where we have successfully engaged with Russia …; various confidence-building measures; greater transparency; risk reduction’.

Possible measures for negotiation include reducing NATO exercises and withdrawing US missiles from Poland. The American demand, Blinken stressed, was Russian reciprocity, in particular de-escalation of the Ukrainian situation. ‘It’ll be very difficult to make actual progress if Russia continues to escalate its military build-up and its inflammatory rhetoric.’

The possibility of reducing NATO exercises echoes former president Donald Trump’s unilateral concession to North Korea in 2018 to end key US – South Korean defensive exercises on the Korean peninsula. The North was delighted and offered nothing in return.

Rather than focusing on concessions, the US should look to make Putin’s goal of intimidation more difficult. Why not locate some US special forces trainers in Ukraine, as the US has done with Taiwan?

The Biden administration’s response to developments in Kazakhstan is even more puzzling. Let’s be clear: deploying thousands of Russian special forces to Almaty is not necessary for crowd control. This is a reassertion of Russian power over a ‘near abroad’ client state.

Yet the response of a senior Biden official at a White House press briefing was to say: ‘What is happening in Kazakhstan is not in any meaningful way about us.’ Once again Putin gets a pass from the White House for his bad behavior.

This week of negotiations may strengthen a US position as the reality hits that Russia is looking for opportunistic advantage. NATO can’t agree to rules about military exercising and positioning that weaken America’s ability to defend Europe. Nor will France and Germany step into that gap.

We need a confident America operating with a sense of its own power and purpose. Putin plays his weaker hand much more decisively. After one year in office, Biden needs a national security approach with less windy talk about the importance of allies. Yes, it’s great that ‘America is back’, but what exactly are we all going to do about these pushy dictators? The answer involves a harder focus on the sources of American strength and a greater willingness for collective military action, not to go to war but to deter risky adventurism by reminding authoritarian countries that there are necessary limits to their international bullying.

Peter Jennings is the executive director of ASPI and a former deputy secretary for strategy in the Defence Department.

This article was first published by The Australian and the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

Image: Reuters

Daniel L. Davis

Korean War, North Korea, South Korea, United States

The Battle of Taejon had been a tactical loss for the United States, but it had been a strategic victory that prevented the North to win the war in July 1950.

Here’s What You Need to Remember: The cost to the Americans had been considerable. After having already been mauled in the series of withdrawals from Osan to the Kum River, the 24th Infantry lost almost 1,000 more men killed, nearly 230 wounded and another 2,400 missing. One of the missing had been the division commander.

Barely two weeks after their June 25, 1950 surprise attack against South Korea and their American allies, the North Korean Army, under its commander Kim Il-Sung, had achieved stunning success. They had blown past all the South Korean frontier defenses, captured the capital of Seoul, and most alarming, had routed the American Army in a series of battles from Osan to the Kum River. If the city of Taejon were to fall as rapidly as the previous towns and cities, Kim might drive the U.S. troops into the sea at Pusan and win the war.

The North Koreans realized what was at stake and sought to move on Pusan with haste before too many U.S. troops arrived. They attacked the Kum river with two full divisions, the 3rd and 4th Infantry Divisions. After three days of relentless attacks, 24th Infantry Division commander Maj. Gen. General William Dean and his outnumbered American defenders were pushed back from the Kum river and into Taejon—and again surrounded.

Dean was a veteran of World War II and knew Taejon’s urban terrain did not favor the defense, but he had no choice. Unlike previous rounds of the fighting, the Americans would not be able to attempt an immediate breakout of the encirclement as they had done previously, because doing so would have strengthened the communist troops’ position and risked losing Pusan as well.

More to the point, Dean’s boss, Eighth Army Commander Lt. Gen. Walton Walker, ordered Dean to hold Taejon until at least 20 July: the 1st Cavalry Division and 25th Infantry Divisions were madly trying to establish strong defensive positions north of Pusan along the Nakdong river, where the terrain was more favorable for the defender. But they needed time to prepare fortifications before the North Korean armor arrived.

On 19 July, Kim’s lead troops penetrated into the city itself and began attacking American gun emplacements, destroying all food, water and ammunition storage sites they could find, and setting fire to many of the city’s old wooden structures. The battlefield was turning into an inferno. Dean had been ordered to hold the city at all costs until the next day, and he took the charge seriously: he refused to move his headquarters out of the city where it would be safer, choosing instead to endure the same hardships he was asking of his men. That decision would bolster his troops—but cost him dearly.

The situation for the Americans went from bad to worse, as elements of a third North Korean division soon joined the fight on the 19: the 105th Armored Division. Not only were the U.S. soldiers at a disadvantage owing to their unpreparedness to fight, they also suffered because many of the Korean residents of Taejon were sympathetic to the North Koreans and informed them where many of the U.S. fighting positions were.

The loss of men, equipment, and ammunition began to take a fatal toll on the Americans. Much of the 19 and 20 of July, Dean’s men had to fight bloody, vicious house-to-house battles with the North Koreans, often without radios to coordinate actions. The defense began to break down in any coherent fashion and North Korean troops continued the relentless onslaught into the city, unopposed from the North, East, and West. Dean tried to personally rally his men to establish new lines of defenses at subsequent neighborhoods, but each was pushed back.

Late on the 20, Dean finally ordered the remnants of his beleaguered force to withdraw to friendly lines further to the south of Taejon. 1st U.S. Cavalry Division tanks moved forward to help cover their withdrawal. They were too late, however, for the survivors of the 34th RCT, as their fifty vehicle convoy out of the city was ambushed by Kim’s troops and almost all were destroyed. The battle of Taejon was over and the North Koreans had won.

The cost to the Americans had been considerable. After having already been mauled in the series of withdrawals from Osan to the Kum River, the 24th Infantry lost almost 1,000 more men killed, nearly 230 wounded and another 2,400 missing. One of the missing had been the division commander.

In the confusion and chaos of the final withdrawal, Dean’s jeep got separated from the rest of his command vehicles, and he was lost behind enemy lines. For a while he fought on, destroying an enemy tank with a hand grenade with a small band of soldiers he had gathered (he would later be awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for his heroism). After thirty-five days, however, he was captured, spending the rest of the war in a prisoner of war camp.

Though the Americans had lost the battle at extreme cost, the struggle had not been without value. Owing to Maj. Gen. Dean’s tenacious leadership and the willingness of his soldiers to fight on even under the most horrifying conditions, the remainder of Lt. Gen. Walker’s Eighth Army troops were able to land at Pusan and move inland far enough to establish a solid line of defense.

As it turned out, that defense—and the casualties the 24th ID had been able to inflict on the North Koreans in the process—proved to be decisive. The Americans had a perpetual logistics lifeline at Pusan and a virtual limitless ability to continue to pour more troops and material to overwhelm Kim’s forces, who now had to sustain resupply lines hundreds of miles long. American and allied airpower began crushing those lines, depriving the North of resupply in men and material. Kim’s chance of winning the war was now permanently defeated.

The Battle of Taejon had been a tactical loss for the United States, but it had been a strategic victory that prevented the North to win the war in July 1950.

Daniel L. Davis is a widely published analyst on national security and foreign policy. He retired as a Lt. Col. after twenty-one years in the U.S. Army, including four combat deployments, and is a Foreign Policy Fellow for Defense Priorities and a member of the Center for Defense Information's Military Advisory Board. Follow him on Twitter @DanielLDavis1.​

This article is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters

Minxin Pei

Pivot to Asia,

The greatest security impact of the US strategic shift to East Asia will be felt in the Middle East, the region that relies most heavily on America for its security needs.

Here’s What You Need to Remember: In the age of the US–China cold war, America may be the indispensable power for East Asia, but not for other regions.

During the Cold War, Europe was America’s strategic priority. East Asia was largely a sideshow, even though the United States fought bloody wars in Korea and Vietnam, and also provided security for Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.

But in the unfolding new cold war between the US and China, America’s strategic priorities have flipped. Today, US security strategy is dominated by the China threat, and East Asia has replaced Europe as the principal theatre of the world’s defining geopolitical contest. And the security consequences of this shift in America’s focus are becoming increasingly visible.

Most notably, America’s adversaries are taking advantage of its preoccupation with China to test US resolve. Iran, for example, has hardened its position in the stalemated negotiations on reviving the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the 2015 nuclear deal from which US President Donald Trump’s administration withdrew in 2018. Iranian leaders appear to be betting that President Joe Biden will be extremely reluctant to resort to military force and get bogged down in a new Middle Eastern war when the US is planning for a potential conflict with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s military threats against Ukraine are apparently based on similar calculations. Putin believes that he now has a far freer hand to restore Russia’s influence in its immediate neighbourhood, because the US can ill afford to be distracted from its strategic focus on China.

The recent actions by Iran and Russia vividly illustrate America’s strategic dilemma. To increase the likelihood of a favourable outcome in its cold war with China, the US must maintain its strategic discipline and steer clear of secondary conflicts that could divert its attention and resources. Biden’s abrupt—and botched—withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 underscores his administration’s determination in that regard.

How America’s standoffs with Iran and Russia play out remains to be seen, but it’s a safe bet that the US will sooner or later encounter similar tests elsewhere. Some regional powers will be tempted to bully weaker neighbours because they think that the US pivot to East Asia will make American military intervention much less likely.

To be sure, America’s focus on China will affect different regions differently, with much less impact on regional security in Latin America and Africa than in the Middle East. In Latin America and Africa, US policy in the coming years will likely emphasise economic, technological and diplomatic competition with China. The losers will be countries where China has negligible influence or interests.

The greatest security impact of the US strategic shift to East Asia will be felt in the Middle East, the region that relies most heavily on America for its security needs. In all likelihood, focusing on China will dramatically curtail America’s role as the region’s policeman. While the US will continue to provide arms and aid to its most important allies and partners, the Middle East as a whole will have to live without the US as its security provider.

More generally, if the US maintains its strategic emphasis on China, it will unavoidably lose considerable geopolitical influence. Countries that lose American largesse will understandably feel less beholden to the US.

But the diminution of America’s global stature could also bring significant benefits—for both the US and the rest of the world. Strategic discipline would make the US less likely to wage unnecessary wars. The dark side of US unipolarity during much of the post–Cold War era has been America’s recklessness in resorting to military force. According to the US Congressional Research Service, in the three decades since the Cold War ended, the US has used its armed forces abroad every year. In particular, it has squandered an immense amount of blood and treasure in two major wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Elsewhere, America’s new geopolitical orientation will force countries that have until now counted on US protection and support to learn to fend for themselves. For example, some Middle Eastern countries have sought to rebuild ties and foster peace in preparation for American disengagement: relations between some Gulf states and Israel have improved dramatically in recent years.

In Europe, ‘strategic autonomy’ may be mostly rhetoric for now. But as the US makes it increasingly clear to its European allies that the region is a secondary priority, they will have to turn their rhetoric into action.

Former US secretary of state Madeleine Albright once claimed that the US is the world’s ‘indispensable nation’. That description has arguably been true for most of the post–Cold War era. In the age of the US–China cold war, America may be the indispensable power for East Asia, but not for other regions. As this new reality takes hold, the rest of the world will have no choice but to adapt. That could lead to more military conflict, but it could also lead to more peace.

Minxin Pei is professor of government at Claremont McKenna College and a non-resident senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. 

This article was first published by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute in partnership with Project Syndicate.

Image: Reuters

Peter Suciu

T-72B3M,

Russian personnel have been undergoing training to operate the improved T-72B3M tanks, which offer a variety of improved combat properties.

The Russian military currently maintains a small force of T-72 tanks that have been upgraded to the T-72B3M version—also known as the T-72B4. The tanks were first exhibited during the 2014 Tank Biathlon World Championships, and the initial batch of twenty upgraded tanks entered service with the Western Military District of the Russian Army in February 2017.

This week, Tass reported that a batch of thirty T-72B3M tanks arrived at the Russian Army’s 201st military base in Tajikistan as part of its rearmament with advanced weaponry in December 2021. The battalion of the advanced tanks was to boost the capabilities of a motorized infantry unit through improved maneuverability while enhancing the survivability of the tank crews.

Russian personnel have been undergoing training to operate the improved T-72B3M tanks, which offer a variety of improved combat properties.

“In the course of their training, the crews studied the combat capabilities and technical characteristics of the tank, the preparation of its armaments, sighting systems, and ranging equipment. At the Lyaur mountainous proving ground, the tank gunners and commanders conducted fire on the move against the targets located at a distance of up to 2,000 meters from the 125mm guns outfitted with the Sosna-U multichannel sight that cuts the time of detecting and striking targets,” the press office of the 201st military base said in a statement.

In addition, the driver mechanics took part in a variety of exercises including speedy maneuvers, surmounting natural and artificial obstacles, and moving backward using rear-view cameras.

Russia’s Central Military District Commander Colonel-General Alexander Lapin had previously told reporters that a set of measures was underway to further enhance the combat potential of the 201st Russian military base in Tajikistan, including its rearmament with advanced weapon systems.

The Russian Army’s 201st Military Base in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, is Russia’s largest military facility outside of its national borders. It comprises motor rifle, armored, artillery, and reconnaissance units, air defense forces; radiation, chemical, and biological protection and signal troops. Under an agreement signed in October 2012, Russia’s military base in Tajikistan will remain operational until at least 2042.

New Lease on Life

The Soviet-designed T-72 main battle tank (MBT) initially entered production in 1971 to replace the T-54/T-55 tank series that had been the workhorse of the Soviet tank forces in the latter half of the Cold War. More than 25,000 T-72s were produced including for export.

Moscow has made significant efforts to modernize its aging tanks even as it has developed more modern armored combat platforms, including the T-14 Armata. The T-72B3M is the latest iteration of the ubiquitous T-72, and it features a nearly identical layout with driver’s cab at forward hull, fighting compartment in the center, and the power-pack at the rear. The T-72B3M MBT is still manned by a crew of three, which include a driver/mechanic, a commander, and a gunner.

The middle section of the forward hull of the MBT houses the driver, while the turret accommodates the other two crew members. The T-72B3M is equipped with an advanced fire control system and a new thermal sight. In addition, the mobility and combat characteristics of the tank have also been improved to compete with the most advanced tanks worldwide. The tank is even equipped with radio systems for encrypted digital voice and data transfer, snorkels for deep fording, and a built-in blade for self-entrenching.

Despite the age of the platform, the T-72B3M is capable of engaging and destroying targets with missiles from the halt and on the move, day and night, at ranges of up to 5,000 meters with fire accuracy close to 100 percent. In addition, the tank’s automatic target tracker increases the accuracy of fire against moving targets and substantially cuts the time of preparing for fire.

It is armed with a 2A46M5 125mm smoothbore gun, an advanced version of the 2A46M cannon. It is capable of firing a range of ammunition, including armor-piercing discarding sabot (APDS), high-explosive fragmentation (HEF), and high-explosive anti-tank (HEAT), as well as 9M119 Refleks (NATO codename: AT-11 Sniper) guided anti-tank missiles. The projectiles and missiles are loaded by an auto-loader.

The upgraded T-72B3M has also received an effective protection system that boosts its efficiency both in combined arms warfare and in a variety of combat environments.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He regularly writes about military small arms, and is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com.

Image: Reuters.

Warrior Maven

West Point, United States

Fast-changing combat scenarios require strength, maneuverability and crucial judgement regarding when and how to move.

Here's What You Need to Know: While various kinds of hand-to-hand combat training have been part of West Point cadet training since the early 1900s and before, Larsen was first to introduce the integrated Combatives concept to West Point in the mid-1990s.

Weapons, firearms and lethal hand-to-hand combat are often blended together in high-risk military combat confrontations, a circumstance which many military and law enforcement entities believe now requires an emerging and distinct “close-in” fight training known as “Combatives.”

Combatives, now being taught to every cadet at West Point, is built upon the reality that large percentages of casualties in warfare take place within an immediate sphere of five feet, Matt Larsen, Director of the Combative Program at West Point, told Warrior Maven Global Security in an interview.

“Lots of people are teaching how to shoot, and lots of people are teaching mixed martial arts. Combatives is the area between those where they meet. You can’t just be trained in both…..you need to put them together. They are part of a continuum,” Larsen said.

Larsen runs the West Point program and operates a long-standing consulting practice which brings Combatives training to a range of entities including the US military, friendly foreign forces and law enforcement organizations.

While various kinds of hand-to-hand combat training have been part of West Point cadet training since the early 1900s and before, Larsen was first to introduce the integrated Combatives concept to West Point in the mid-1990s.

The training prepares for fights wherein an enemy quickly reaches for a gun or knife or attempts to take a weapon from a person they are attacking. Confrontations of this kind require an integrated approach - blending physical strength, hand-to-hand attack and close-in weapons use.

Fast-changing combat scenarios require strength, maneuverability and crucial judgement regarding when and how to move. An ability to anticipate enemy moves and counter weapons, firearms and hand-combat attacks is fundamental to the training. Learning how to learn, Larsen says, is a key to making progress.

“Fights are all about range and angle,” he added. 

Previously the West Point combatives program was run by US-based global security firm Torres Advanced Enterprise Solutions LLC (Torres AES here} from Virginia, The program was so successful that the academy hired Matt Larsen as a full time Director of Combatives training.

Larsen was an employee of Torres which in addition to combatives supports the US State Dept., DoD, DoJ and other elite US agencies offering a range of security and training services. Torres guards numerous US Embassies and DoD Forward Operating Bases around the world, works with friendly foreign governments and trains clients in a range of areas - to include cybersecurity, cyber and digital forensics, law enforcement, prison operations, government transformation, combatives, linguistics and other areas.​

Working for Torres, Larson taught Combatives and Close Quarter Battle (CQB) to US Forces in Iraq. CQB, as one might expect, took on a new urgency following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Small ground units were routinely called upon to “clear areas,” attack and engage small groups of insurgents and engage in high-stakes combat in close-quarter buildings and urban environments.

"We were glad to have Matt's expertise in bringing a unique blend of combat skill to our soldiers in Iraq. This kind of integrated "close-in" training seems to address an often unrecognized need to prepare for how fights happen," Torres CEO Jerry Torres told Maven.

The training, described by Larsen as a process rather than a particular event or tactic, operates on the assumption that many close-in fights typically involve a combination of knives, guns and a need for physical combat.

“When was the last time a group of soldiers went into a building where they could shoot everybody in there? You cannot be proficient at clearing a room unless you are proficient in hand-to-hand combat,” Larsen explained.

Grounded in what Larsen points to as a “warrior ethos,” Combatives training explores the full range of dynamics associated with close-in combat. This includes assessments of pre-combat cues, ways to quickly access a weapon, block a sudden attack and maintain the requisite level of readiness for moments when fights might erupt.

Combatives skill can not only lead to more successful attacks or warzone engagements but can also at times prevent violence from escalating to a lethal level. For instance, what are someone’s options at a security checkpoint when an intruder causes problems? Larsen asked.

“If you do not have hand-to-hand combat skills, your only option is lethal,” he said.

Having trained police forces and US allies such as Kuwaiti special forces, Canadian special forces and British infantry, Larsen says global urbanization is creating a growing need for “close-in” combat skills.

There are also, quite naturally, many key applications of Combatives for police forces and other law enforcement entities.

“31-percent of police are killed from within five feet. 38-percent of the fatalities do not involve marksmanship,” Larsen said.

This article first appeared on Warrior Maven in 2018 and is being republished here due to reader interest.

Image: U.S. Army Flickr.

Trevor Filseth

Nord Stream 2, Europe

The pipeline may provide Russia with significant leverage over America's NATO allies. 

In a floor vote on Thursday, the U.S. Senate failed to adopt Sen. Ted Cruz’s (R-TX) bill to impose sanctions against Russia’s Nord Stream 2 undersea natural gas pipeline.

Fifty-five senators voted in favor of the proposal, including all but one Senate Republican and six Democrats, while forty-three Democrats and Republican Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.) opposed it. Although it secured a majority, the legislation fell five votes short of the sixty votes required to pass.

While Senate Democrats expressed their disapproval of the Russian government’s activities, the opponents of Cruz’s bill justified their votes by citing the existence of similar legislation proposed by Sen. Robert Menendez (D-NJ). Menendez’s bill would not immediately act against the pipeline but would sanction it and other Russian entities if the Kremlin launched a military intervention in Ukraine.

Opponents of the bill also cited the potential for divisions with America’s NATO allies, who largely share Washington’s foreign policy priorities but would benefit economically from cheap Russian gas.

Sen. Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH) argued that the legislation could “drive a wedge” between the United States and Europe. Shaheen claimed that sanctions could be particularly damaging to the United States’ relationship with Germany, where the pipeline is located.

Although the Biden administration has not opted to sanction the pipeline, it has vocally opposed it, arguing that it may provide Moscow with leverage over Europe’s foreign policy. U.S. allies in Eastern Europe have also opposed the pipeline, in part because its construction excludes them from transit fees for shipping gas through their territory in existing pipelines.

In advocating for his bill, Cruz claimed that Ukraine would “risk … getting wiped off the map altogether” if the pipeline went into effect.

The undersea pipeline was constructed between terminals in the Russian city of Vyborg and the German city of Greifswald via the Baltic Sea. The pipeline was built at a cost of roughly $11 billion and was completed in late 2021. However, it has not yet gone into operation due to delays in regulatory approval. If no sanctions are forthcoming from the United States, it is predicted that the first gas shipments will begin in mid-2022.

Trevor Filseth is a current and foreign affairs writer for the National Interest.

Image: Reuters

Vanessa Geidel

Security, East Asia

While Scholz has not been an outspoken critic of Beijing, Germany’s new foreign minister, Annalena Baerbock, has made strong statements critical of China.

Here’s What You Need to Remember: If Scholz’s SPD could govern alone, we would likely witness a continuity of Merkel’s policy in the region.

After 16 years of Angela Merkel’s leadership, a tight race on election night and almost two months of coalition negotiations in Germany, the Social Democratic Party, or SPD, returned to power with Olaf Scholz the new chancellor. With the Greens and the Free Democratic Party, they’ve formed the Ampelkoalition (traffic light coalition)—the federal republic’s first ever three-party governing arrangement.

The new chancellor is widely expected to largely continue Merkel’s legacy, but the coalition agreement outlining policy plans for the next four years signals changes in German’s approach to the Indo-Pacific.

Since the September election, two important announcements were made regarding future German activity in the region. In November, the chief of the German Navy, Vice-Admiral Kay-Achim Schönbach, said he would send vessels into the Indo-Pacific every two years with the intention of increasing cooperation with Japan, Australia and the US, and to advocate for peace, free navigation and maintenance of the rules-based international order in the South China Sea. The announcement came during a visit to Tokyo by the German frigate Bayern on its seven-month voyage through the region.

In September, the German Air Force will participate in Pitch Black, a multinational exercise hosted by the Royal Australian Air Force and scheduled to take place over northern Australia. Germany plans to send six Eurofighters, three refuelling tankers and three transport aircraft, a significant step up in its Indo-Pacific participation.

While the navy and air force plans were put in place under Merkel, the new coalition has signalled its wish to increase Germany’s presence in the Indo-Pacific.

If the Scholz government stays true to that promise, then we’re likely to see Germany engage with more confidence, bluntness and interest to intensify cooperation with regional nations.

The coalition agreement aims to strengthen cooperation on multilateralism, democracy, climate protection, trade and digitalisation, and to expand cooperation between the EU and ASEAN. The agreement specifically seeks increased cooperation on multiple levels with Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea as values-based partners.

The agreement also seeks a stronger strategic partnership with India and says Germany wishes to address the impacts of climate change and to ‘stand up for those affected by rising sea levels’.

If the coalition contract is to be taken at face value, German engagement with Beijing may be blunter than that of past administrations.

The agreement sets out a China policy driven by values and not afraid to criticise Beijing’s internal affairs and geopolitics. The agreement opposes Beijing’s ‘one-China’ policy and strongly supports democratic Taiwan’s inclusion in international organisations. It takes the position strongly that all changes to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait must happen peacefully and with mutual agreement. The new government wants China to return to the ‘one country, two systems’ principle for Hong Kong and it has undertaken to address human rights violations in Xinjiang against the Uyghur and Kazakh minorities.

This approach to China contrasts with the coalition contract at the start of Merkel’s final term in 2018. That deal chose to not address China’s human rights abuses in detail and only briefly mentioned its growing geopolitical importance. The 2018 contract favoured trade and investment for Germany’s economic benefit. Merkel’s stance on China was at times considered too lenient and she appeared reluctant to make concrete statements condemning Beijing.

The 2021 agreement repeatedly uses the term ‘Indo-Pacific’, which was not mentioned in the 2018 agreement, as Germany adopts new terminology championed by India, Australia and the US.

Indications are that the Scholz government will not be shy about stepping on Beijing’s toes. While some media outlets have suggested that the agreement signals a ‘break with China’, Chinese government mouthpiece Global Times has downplayed the potential impact on relations. It says the ‘landscape of China–Germany cooperation will not change’ as ‘Scholz’s party has always advocated for dialogue with China’. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian has already warned Germany that issues such as Xinjiang, Hong Kong and Taiwan are ‘all China’s internal affairs’.

While Scholz has not been an outspoken critic of Beijing, Germany’s new foreign minister, Annalena Baerbock, has made strong statements critical of China. Baerbock, who was the Greens’ candidate for chancellor, has described China’s Belt and Road Initiative as ‘hardcore power politics’ and has urged a ban on products from Xinjiang, saying Europe must make sure that ‘products from forced labour do not come onto our market’. Since becoming foreign minister on 8 December, she has spoken out against previous styles of German diplomacy, stating that ‘eloquent silence is not a form of diplomacy in the long run, even if it has been seen that way by some in recent years.’ She aims to establish a values-driven relationship with China based on ‘dialogue and toughness’.

This week, Baerbock made her first official trip to the US, meeting with Secretary of State Antony Blinken. She stressed the importance of the German-American relations, stating that Europe has ‘no partner stronger than the US’.

How much Germany’s Indo-Pacific policies of the next four years end up reflecting those outlined in the coalition agreement remains to be seen. If Scholz’s SPD could govern alone, we would likely witness a continuity of Merkel’s policy in the region. A significant deciding factor will be how much room Scholz will grant Baerbock to implement her own policies. If she is able to develop freely in the role, then Beijing can expect some difficult years ahead with Berlin.

Vanessa Geidel is a coordinator in ASPI’s professional development program. 

This article was first published by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

Image: Reuters

Peter Suciu

Tu-160M, Europe

The Tu-160M retains many of the design elements of the original aircraft, but features numerous advancements and new hardware.

Russia’s Tupolev Tu-160 “White Swan” (NATO reporting name “Blackjack”) was the last strategic bomber designed for the Soviet Union. The legacy airframe, which first entered service in 1987, remains the largest and heaviest bomber ever built.

As part of the Russian Air Force’s Long Range Aviation branch, efforts have been made to keep the active fleet flying. Upgrades to its electronics system and other modernization efforts have been ongoing since the early 2000s, and in 2015, Moscow announced plans to resume production of an upgraded version of the White Swan.

The first of those new production models has reportedly performed its debut flight.

“On January 12, the first newly-built Tu-160M strategic missile-carrying bomber performed its debut flight from the aerodrome of the Kazan Aviation Enterprise, a subsidiary of the Tupolev Company [part of the United Aircraft Corporation within Rostec],” the press office of the state technology corporation Rostec announced according to a report from Tass.

The newly-built strategic bomber performed its maiden flight, which lasted about thirty minutes, at an altitude of 600 meters. During the flight, the crew was able to inspect the aircraft during various aerial maneuvers.

Significant Improvements

The Tu-160M retains many of the design elements of the original aircraft, but features numerous advancements and new hardware. It remains the largest and heaviest Mach 2+ supersonic military aircraft ever built and is second in overall length to the experimental XB-70 Valkyrie.

“The new aircraft has 80 percent of its systems and equipment modernized,” explained United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) CEO Yury Slyusar.

The upgraded White Swan, which remains outwardly similar to the American Rockwell B-1 Lancer, will reportedly be able to carry new emerging weapons.

“Today we see considerable prospects for the Tu-160 platform: its further development will make it possible to use it for new, including breakthrough weapons,” explained Russian Industry and Trade Minister Denis Manturov.

The Tu-160M is now designated to strike enemy targets in remote areas with nuclear and conventional weapons. Whereas the U.S. Air Force’s B-1 is a bomber in the classical sense—meaning it flies to targets to deploy its bomb load—the Tu-160 was developed to operate as a stand-off weapons platform, where missiles would be launched from its bomb bay doors.

After deploying its weapons load, the “White Swan” would speed off at Mach 2+. The White Swan was also the only Soviet-designed bomber not to carry any defensive weapons, which is why even today it is routinely escorted in patrol missions by fighter aircraft such as the MiG-31.

Moscow has strived to tout the long-range capabilities of the Tu-160, and in September 2020 two crews onboard one of the bombers broke a record for the longest non-stop flight for the aircraft. It was in the air for more than twenty-five hours, and covered a distance of more than 20,000 kilometers. Perhaps Russia will seek to best its record with a new model Tu-160.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He regularly writes about military small arms, and is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com.

Image: Reuters.