The National Interest

Aaron Crimmins

Ransomware, United States

The nature of cyber threats is to evolve constantly. To effectively combat them, we must as well.

In the first year of his presidency, Joe Biden has made strong efforts to fulfill his campaign promise to get tough on national cybersecurity. This pledge came both as a natural accompaniment to his campaign agenda of renewing American infrastructure as well as a way to differentiate himself from the former administration. To those in the cybersecurity field, President-Elect Biden’s messaging on cybersecurity was encouragingly robust following his election. Looking back on almost a year of the Biden administration, those encouraging pre-inauguration overtures have begun to bear real fruit. Importantly, the president has pushed for an effective means to improve the nation’s cyber fortitude to combat one of today’s most onerous and widespread cyber threats: ransomware.

The Biden administration hit the ground running and quickly began working to combat ransomware. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas issued a call for action to tackle ransomware more effectively in February, setting off a cascading series of initiatives in the following months. In March, DHS launched a series of sixty-day sprints to streamline and standardize the federal response to ransomware and cyber criminality. The U.S. Secret Service held a virtual cyber incident response simulation with state and local governments, and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, along with the Treasury Department, engaged the cyber insurance industry on the future of their collaborative response to the ransomware threat. The U.S. Coast Guard trained to synchronize its own incident response plans with that of individual states, and many Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) symposia were held on cybercrime and ransomware.

In collaboration with European partners, the Treasury Department has sought to streamline information sharing dedicated to disrupting and deterring ransomware ecosystems that are often used to launder and hide illicitly obtained funds. The Treasury Department has also targeted the safe harbors ransomware criminals and syndicates rely on. Ransomware payments, denominated in cryptocurrencies, topped $400 million globally in 2020, to say nothing of the downstream economic losses from downtime, data-loss, and rebuilding efforts. The Treasury’s offensive includes more aggressively monitoring cryptocurrency exchanges such as the Russian SUEX-OTC, a broker said to have facilitated transactions for at least eight ransomware variants. The Treasury sanctioned SUEX-OTC in September in an international effort to go after the financial enablers of ransomware gangs, according to Deputy Treasury Secretary Wally Adeyemo.

The cryptocurrency-tracking firm Chainalysis said in a blog post that SUEX is among the most active of a small group of illicit services that handle most money laundering for cybercriminals.

Chainalysis said SUEX has been laundering money from another shady cryptocurrency exchange, BTC-e, which U.S. authorities had previously shut down. BTC-e's operator was extradited to France and sentenced to five years in prison in December for financial crimes. This was the first time such actions were taken against a cryptocurrency exchange. With expanding international campaigns targeting cybercrime, it is not likely to be the last time.

In October, the Biden administration again stepped up its international efforts to fight ransomware. The White House led an international counter-ransomware event with over thirty partners meant to accelerate cooperation in addressing ransomware’s impact on the financial and critical infrastructure sectors. Specific efforts included campaigns to encourage network resilience, including voluntary cyber performance goals, classified briefings for critical infrastructure executives, and collaboration on international industrial control systems cybersecurity. Industrial control systems, being the breed of computerized infrastructure that controls power grids, manufacturing plants, and nuclear centrifuges, play an enormous role in both civilian and military cybersecurity. A well-timed ransomware attack on such systems could bring industrial states to their knees in moments.

An October 13 fact sheet produced by the White House put it bluntly:

Responsible states do not permit criminals to operate with impunity from within their borders. We are working with international partners to disrupt ransomware networks and improve partner capacity for detecting and responding to such activity within their own borders, including imposing consequences and holding accountable those states that allow criminals to operate from within their jurisdictions.

This strong statement, in the context of renewed international collaboration in cyberspace between the United States and its partners, was likely meant to serve as a warning to Russia and other adversarial cyber actors that there will be material consequences for facilitating international cybercrime syndicates, including those focused on perpetrating ransomware attacks on the West.

Following these efforts, in April the White House launched a follow-on industrial control system cybersecurity initiative linking the federal government and the private critical infrastructure community. This initiative has led to over 150 privately owned electricity utilities initiating plans to upgrade cybersecurity technologies. Additionally, this effort is being expanded into the natural gas and water utility sectors.

In early November, the Department of Justice issued a statement regarding an indictment against Russian and Ukrainian nationals on ransomware-related charges. Yaroslav Vasinskyi and Yevgeniy Polyanin were both indicted for perpetrating a series of ransomware attacks using the REvil software against a Miami-based IT management company, Kaseya, and JBS Foods, a global agriculture and meat processing company. The indictment, arrest, and extradition of these criminals were made possible in large part due to international collaboration and intelligence sharing with European partners. When Vasinskyi attempted to cross into Poland from Ukraine, he was arrested. Polish authorities are currently holding Vasinskyi pending extradition to the United States. Attorney General Merrick Garland also announced that the Justice Department had seized $6.1 million of ransom payments that the REvil group had obtained through its exploits.

Biden’s headlining legislative achievement thus far has been the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA). The landmark bipartisan law devotes about $2 billion to cybersecurity infrastructure. Half of this grant is to go to state and local level government entities in order to improve and harden their cyberinfrastructure and capabilities. This alone is poised to make dramatic improvements in how the ransomware threat is addressed. Any security system, cyber or otherwise, is only as strong as its weakest link. This billion-dollar grant is aimed at forging stronger links at all levels of government, especially the thus-far overlooked state and local offices. Ransomware attacks are often tailored to hit an organization at a choke point so as to inflict maximum damage and increase the likelihood that the organization will pay the ransom. This provision of the IIJA may become a direly needed deterrent in the federal government’s ransomware prevention strategy.

Biden’s IIJA also devotes $100 million over four years to a DHS rainy day fund to be used when the agency declares a “significant incident.” A ransomware attack on a critical government infrastructure node would certainly qualify, giving the government a new and versatile tool in combating the threat. This would allow the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) to allocate aid to the public and private sectors and facilitate collaboration between them. Biden’s White House likely learned this bridge would be critical to the cybersecurity challenge after the 2014 Sony Hack, which occurred while Biden was vice president. At the time, then-President Barack Obama publicly gave little aid to the private company, citing a reluctance to use government power to come to the aid of private firms. This public-private collaboration funding comes on the heels of CISA’s August formation of The Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC). The JCDC is the first and only federal cyber entity that proactively scopes out the threat environment through partnership with the private sector and federal cyber capabilities.

Another $500 million is reserved for the Energy Department and the Environmental Protection Agency for two programs, one for rural and municipal utilities security and another for power grid security improvements.

The Biden administration’s overall strategy against ransomware and international hackers relies on international collaboration with partners and allies. European and Israeli counterparts have already begun to play important roles in data sharing and criminal apprehension methods. The Biden administration is overseeing and guiding an expedited development of agreements concerning how the rules-based-order coalition will define acceptable practices in the financial and cybersecurity sectors. The next steps, should American leadership persist, must not be to assume progress made will keep the coalition ahead of its adversaries. The coalition must continue to apply pressure and challenge itself to maintain a constant, if not accelerating, pace of progression. Agreements should continue to be made, evolve, and become more strongly codified. Additional measures will need to be taken domestically as well. DHS representatives, speaking on November 17 to Congress’ Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, & Innovation and the Subcommittee on Intelligence & Counterterrorism said: “Additional legislative steps and new authorities are necessary to understanding the full scope of the ransomware problem [...] Together we must stand united to support the adoption of, and adhere to, international cyber norms and condemn countries who violate these norms or harbor cyber criminals, or support their criminal activities.” The nature of cyber threats is to evolve constantly. To effectively combat them, we must as well.

Aaron Crimmins is a cyber strategy and governance consultant and writer based in San Diego, California. He tweets @00crims.

Image: Reuters.

Rainer Zitelmann

Germany, Europe

Will the coalition of such unequal partners—SPD and Greens, on the one hand, FDP on the other—survive for four years?

On Wednesday, December 8, the German Bundestag elected Social Democrat Olaf Scholz as Angela Merkel’s successor as chancellor. He received 395 votes out of a total of 707 and heads the new coalition government of three parties: The Social Democrats (SPD), the environmental party The Greens, and the pro-market FDP.

Three Partners Who Don’t Really Fit

The three coalition partners do not actually fit together. The two left-wing parties, the SPD and the Greens, would have preferred to govern together with Germany’s third leftist party, Die Linke (the former communist party that used to govern the GDR). This was not possible because the three parties did not win enough votes to secure a combined majority in the German parliament. The FDP would have preferred to govern with the centrist CDU/CSU. However, the CDU/CSU posted the worst result in its history and is currently leaderless.

Germany’s new coalition government is comprised of three very unequal partners. The SPD and the Greens campaigned for massive tax increases for the rich, while the FDP called for tax cuts for all. The result: nothing will change. The SPD and the Greens blocked tax cuts, the FDP blocked tax increases.

In many other areas, too, the parties’ completely different policy agendas ended up neutralizing each other. Take tenancy law, for example: The SPD and the Greens wanted to massively curtail landlords’ rights and ban rent increases. The FDP would have liked to liberalize tenancy law. The result: German rental law will remain unchanged—with just a little bit of tinkering around the edges. The free-market FDP on the one hand and the two left-wing parties on the other have effectively canceled each other out. The FDP has managed to impede many socialist-leaning policies, and for that the free-market-oriented voters will be grateful. Moreover, the FDP has pushed through its picks for two key ministries: The Ministry of Finance will be headed by the FDP’s Chairman Christian Lindner, while the Ministry of Justice goes to Marco Buschmann, who is widely regarded as an outstanding lawyer. This is reassuring for the German business community, which supported the FDP, while the staffing of other ministries is a cause for concern:

A New Direction for Germany?

The ministries of economics and foreign affairs will be headed by the Green Party’s dual chairpersons. Annalena Baerbock is set to take on the role of foreign minister, an appointment that could cause irritation in many countries. She can hardly deal with her opposite numbers in other countries as an equal. During the election campaign, it emerged that she had garnished her curriculum vitae, which included a number of falsehoods. In addition, she published a book during the election campaign that turned out to contain large sections of plagiarized text—she eventually had to withdraw the entire book, and it will no longer be printed. This had severely damaged Baerbock’s credibility and ended up costing her party a substantial number of votes.

The Greens are committed to a “hypermoral” foreign policy, which is likely to lead to problems with China and Russia, in particular. With regard to Russia, however, the SPD, which has spoken in favor of a Russia-friendly policy, will probably prevail. The situation is different with regard to China. The Greens don’t care about Germany’s economic interests. This could lead to a new approach toward China and a departure from the policies pursued by Merkel, who recognized the importance of healthy relations with China. Even before Baerbock’s appointment as foreign minister, she called for a ban on imports from the Chinese region of Xinjiang and refused to rule out a boycott of the Winter Olympics in China, which angered the Chinese.

The Greens have no concept of realpolitik; they want to gear German foreign policy to morality and ideology. One of their key demands is that Germany should have a “feminist foreign policy.”  The three parties’ coalition agreement explicitly specifies a ‘feminist foreign policy,’ whatever that is supposed to mean.

One can only hope that Chancellor Scholz will succeed in limiting the potential damage that Foreign Minister Baerbock could do and will set the main outlines of foreign policy himself.

What About NATO's “2 Percent Target?”

And what about Germany’s NATO commitment to spend two percent of GDP on defense? The SPD and the Greens oppose this target, while the FDP supports it. The parties have agreed the following compromise: “We want Germany to invest 3 percent of its GDP in long-term, integrated and comprehensive international action, thus strengthening its diplomacy and development policy and fulfilling its commitments to NATO,” reads the coalition agreement on page 144 under the heading “Multilateralism.” Sure, 3 percent sounds more than 2 percent, but the 3 percent includes all sorts of other spending, such as development aid.

Continuing the “World’s Dumbest Energy Policy”

Robert Habeck, co-leader of the Green Party alongside Baerbock, will lead the Ministry of Economics with responsibility for climate policy. Habeck is a philosopher and the author of numerous children’s books but has proven in several interviews that he doesn’t know the first thing about economics. The Greens want to subordinate all economic policy to the fight against climate change. This year, the last three German nuclear power plants will be taken offline and, over the next few years, they will be followed by all coal-fired power plants—without any other energy sources lined up to replace them! Even today, as a result of this policy, Germany has the highest electricity prices in the G20. The paradoxical result of this policy is that Germany will probably need to import even more nuclear power from France and other countries because the country can no longer supply itself with energy. The Wall Street Journal branded this the “World’s Dumbest Energy Policy”—and the Greens want to head down this wrong path even faster.

How Stable Is This Coalition?

Will the coalition of such unequal partners—SPD and Greens, on the one hand, FDP on the other—survive for four years? One point of conflict could be migration policy. Like Merkel, the SPD and the Greens want to base German migration policy primarily on moral principles. Merkel opened Germany’s borders in 2015—and was supported by the SPD and the Greens.

The FDP also wants immigration but wants to restrict migrants’ access to Germany’s welfare system and wants to prioritize migrants who will benefit Germany economically, in particular skilled workers. As all polls show, FDP voters oppose an open-borders policy. If the FDP surrenders to the demands of the Greens and the SPD on immigration, it could lose alienate large sections of voting base—again. At the same time, the SPD and the Greens are under pressure from their own representatives in the German parliament, the Bundestag, many of whom are very, very far to the left of the political spectrum. The SPD’s new secretary-general, Kevin Kühnert, is a hardline socialist who gained notoriety for proposing the expropriation of companies such as BMW and for saying that only the state should be allowed to rent apartments. Kühnert is known for preferring to work with Die Linke and rejecting everything the FDP stands for politically. Even though Scholz says he hopes to govern with the FDP beyond its initial four-year term, his party and the Greens think differently: In four years, they would prefer to form a coalition with the Die Linke, as they already have at a regional level in many federal states.

Rainer Zitelmann is a German historian and sociologist and the author of twenty-five books, including The Power of Capitalism.

Image: Reuters.

Kris Osborn

Mi-28, Russia

The use of drones for manned-unmanned networking could reduce sensor-to-shooter time and make the Mi-28 even more dangerous.

Here's What You Need To Remember: The Russian paper also makes vague references to the Mi-28's communications systems and “network-centric” capabilities and its ability to enable aircraft to “interact in a group.”

A Russian newspaper claims the country’s new combat helicopter gunship contains breakthrough technology to the point wherein its weapons, drone connectivity, communications networking, sensors and long-range targeting enable it to attack successfully from “outside of the enemy’s effective air defenses.” 

Called the Russian “Night Hunter,” the new Mi-28NM is built with modernized engines, a new fuselage and an auxiliary power plant able to support next-generation onboard networking and electronic warfare systems. 

“The Mi-28NM’s onboard armament allows it to detect and destroy enemy targets round the clock and in any weather conditions while operating outside of the enemy’s effective air defenses,” Vitaly Shcherbina, the Chief Designer of the Combat Helicopters Program at Rostec, reportedly told TASS.

Shcherbina also explained that the layout of the chopper’s fuselage has been newly configured to integrate new targeting sights. The report also makes unspecified statements about the aircraft’s defensive aids suite, claiming it can defeat an enemy's “ground and airborne air defense systems.” It does not seem at all clear what this might mean, as it seems extremely unlikely that even an extremely advanced helicopter with a new generation of sensors and countermeasures would be able to all air defenses, given that helicopters fly at lower altitudes and have structural limitations regarding how stealthy they can be.

Also, perhaps of greatest significance, the Russian paper also makes vague references to the helicopter’s communications systems and “network-centric” capabilities and its ability to enable aircraft to “interact in a group.”

While the report offers little to no actual technologies or weapons applications in a discernable or clear way, it does make reference to the often emphasized sphere of networking concepts. “Network-centric methods of weapons’ control on the battlefield,” the article claims, can reduce latency, expedite targeting and “get information on the enemy and friendly forces in a secure jam-resistant mode.”

There are several interesting aspects to this, including the use of drones for manned-unmanned networking and, in a fashion quite similar to U.S. conceptual thinking about networks, massively reduce sensor-to-shooter time. This reference to networking and group or “meshed” information sharing across multiple combat “nodes” in real time closely mirrors cutting edge U.S. thinking on modern war, a circumstance which leads one to wonder if Russian innovators are truly gaining breakthrough traction with new, secure networking technologies or simply copying the current U.S. strategy.

The answer to this may reside amid a series of unknowns, such as the actual specifics of the new weapons, countermeasures and networked sensors incorporated into the new Russian helicopter. Perhaps Russia is emulating or seeking to replicate U.S. strategic and tactical thinking. But is the technology truly there to bring it to operational effect ahead of the United States? 

Kris Osborn is the defense editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a master’s degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.

This article is being reprinted due to reader interest.

Image: Wikipedia.

Robert Farley

Chinese Military, Asia

Watch out Taiwan.

Here's What You Need to Remember: Today, China has developed the means to neutralize many, if not most, of Taiwan’s defensive advantages.

Over the past decade, virtually every aspect of China’s military arsenal has grown more lethal. This improvement has necessarily affected the military balance with Taiwan. With tensions between China and the United States growing, Taiwan’s position has become even more precarious. President Xi Jinping has recently signaled a more hardline attitude on reunification with Taiwan, suggesting that it’s past time to re-evaluate the military balance between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China.

Here are five of the most menacing systems that China could use in the event of war with Taiwan.

Su-35

The recently acquired Su-35 is the premier air superiority aircraft in the PLAAF’s arsenal. China has acquired two dozen of the multi-role fighters in the last two years, which offer the PLAAF a mature platform for undertaking long-range air operations against Taiwan, or any other foe. In addition to its formidable air-to-air profile, the Su-35 also has sophisticated strike capabilities, and an effective range that would allow it to threaten targets across the theater.

The PLAAF has many other aircraft that can perform strike and air superiority missions over Taiwan, and eventually, the J-20 may supersede the Su-35 as the most important formidable aircraft in China’s arsenal. For now, however, the Su-35 presents a major problem for Taiwan’s air force to solve.

S-400

In 2018 China began to accept delivery of the Russian S-400 surface-to-air missile system. One of the most lethal SAM systems in the world, the S-400 has a maximum range of up to 400km, which extends over Taiwan. As some analysts have noted, this does not represent a “shut down” capability with respect to Taiwan’s use of the air, as the effectiveness of the S-400 at long range is limited. However, it does deeply complicate Taiwan military use of the air, and has the potential to completely disrupt any commercial use of Taiwanese airspace. It also helps provide a degree of overlapping air cover with PLAN assets attempting to interdict air and sea transit from Taiwan. This could prevent the transit of military equipment and other critical supplies to the island in times of war. The defeat of the S-400 might well require large-scale strikes onto the mainland, which the Taiwanese military would struggle to undertake, especially if subjected to heavy missile and airstrikes.

Ballistic Missiles

China’s vast arsenal of short and medium-range ballistic missiles, employed with precision, can inflict catastrophic damage on Taiwan’s military infrastructure. This includes especially Taiwan’s airbases and ports, which would likely come under immediate attack from Chinese missiles. The most lethal missile in China’s arsenal, from the point of view of Taiwan, is a problem the DF-16, which has a range of 1,000km and can deliver a 1500kg warhead with a circular error probability of 10 meters. The DF-16 also has terminal maneuver capabilities, making it difficult for ABM systems to intercept.

Taiwan has indigenous and foreign anti-ballistic missile systems, but how they will hold up against repeated salvos is an unanswerable question. Taiwan’s air defense network will also have to manage cruise missile and manned aircraft sorties. Taiwan can further harden airbases and can disperse infrastructure, but Beijing probably has enough missiles to make this only a short-term answer.

Type 075 LHD

The Type 075 offers the PLAN its first large flat deck amphibious warship. Big amphibs, pioneered by the United States during the Cold War, enables sophisticated amphibious assaults against defended targets under medium threat conditions. At 40,000 tons, the Type 075 will be similar in size to the largest American amphibs, but will not share the air defense and strike mission that those ships have undertaken (China does not yet possess a VSTOL jet fighter).

Although the first ship has yet to see service, reports suggest that China is building three Type 075s. The exact configuration of the class remains uncertain, but analysis suggests the ability to carry more than two dozen attack and transport helicopters. The U.S. Wasp class, of similar dimensions, can carry upwards of 1,600 troops and a variety of landing craft. This is sufficient to employ a form of vertical envelopment (aerial assault designed to compromise a defensive position) against Taiwanese defenders. These helicopters also mean that it can defend itself from submarine threats. In the future, China might try to acquire more lethal, long-range aircraft to populate the decks of these ships.

Type 071 LPD

In the mid-2000s, the PLAN decided to radically increase its amphibious assault capabilities through the purchase of a class of amphibious transport docks. Of roughly the same size as the San Antonio class LPDs of the U.S. Navy, the Type 071 can carry eight hundred troops, four helicopters, and a variety of small amphibious assault vehicles. Although the ships have only minimal defensive capability (plus a 76mm gun that could conceivably be used in an emergency gunnery support context), they can make 25 knots, and offer the PLAN a capability that it has never enjoyed throughout its 70-year history. In combination with the Type 075 LHDs, and with the offensive capabilities needed to suppress Taiwanese defenses, the Type 071s pose a formidable threat to Taiwan’s beachheads. As of January 2019, the PLAN possesses six LPDs, with another two on the way.

Parting Shot:

For a very long time, Taiwan could leverage technological superiority to enhance its primary defense over China; the vast distance between Formosa and the mainland. Today, China has developed the means to neutralize many, if not most, of Taiwan’s defensive advantages. It is also in the process of developing a naval expeditionary force that can deliver a substantial number of troops and vehicles to Taiwan’s shores. Unless something about the equation changes, China’s military advantage over the RoC will only grow.

Robert Farley, a frequent contributor to TNI, is a Visiting Professor at the United States Army War College. The views expressed here are his personal views and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defense, the U.S. Army, the Army War College, or any other department or agency of the U.S. government. This article first appeared last year.

Image: Reuters.

Kris Osborn

U.S. Army,

While Army weapons developers are exploring and preparing for the full range of combat contingencies, the service clearly seems to see multi-domain advantages in both Europe and the Pacific. 

As the Army prepares to “field” prototype robotic combat vehicles to operational units next year, it is no surprise that service officials say the fast-evolving program is intended to support deterrence and combat operations in Europe and the Pacific. 

At some point next year, the Army will send prototypes of its Robotic Combat Vehicle-Medium (RCV-M) to operational units for soldier-centric “touchpoint” assessments, war preparation drills, and evaluations in combat scenarios.  The Army’s RCV-M is a roughly fifteen-ton tracked, armored vehicle armed with cannons, anti-tank weapons, and advanced sensors to test enemy defenses, move to contact, attack mechanized formations and engage in “multi-domain” networked warfare. 

While Army weapons developers are exploring and preparing for the full range of combat contingencies, the service clearly seems to see multi-domain advantages in both Europe and the Pacific. 

“Continuing to modernize the Army will enable American land power dominance to meet the demands of strategic competition and great power conflict presented by threats in the Indo-Pacific and European theaters,” Lt. Col. Brandon Kelley, Modernization Team Lead for Army Public Affairs, told the National Interest.  

Closing to contact with an enemy across the European continent would benefit greatly from forward-operating armed robotic platforms. Naturally, given the carefully upheld doctrine that humans must be “in the loop” regarding and possible use of lethal force, the robots would not fire upon enemy targets autonomously but when directed by humans performing command and control.  The impact of these robotic vehicles will be optimized by the Army’s manned-unmanned teaming technologies which enable manned platforms to operate at safer standoff ranges while forward-operating robotic weapons and sensors attack at the edge of combat. 

Unmanned armed robotic vehicles could breach, test or attack the perimeter of an approaching enemy mechanized formation to send back reconnaissance footage, operate aerial drones over enemy territory, fire weapons against enemy tanks, and even control other air and ground drones. 

One of the largest elements of this may fall into the area of the much-emphasized “multi-domain” concept, as the robots could greatly optimize their combat utility by sharing information in real-time with drones in the air. They could send ground-target specifics to armed aerial drones in position to strike or conversely receive target coordinates from an overhead drone in position to see advancing enemy troops. 

As they are unmanned, the RCVs will not need a lot of heavy armor and can therefore be configured at a lighter weight to enable fast-moving, expeditionary operations able to carry a large payload of weapons, ammunition, and supplies to forward units under fire. 

“The Army remains focused on building a multi-domain force by divesting legacy equipment that does not support future warfighting, to fund modernization of our land force capabilities,” Kelley said. 

Kris Osborn is the defense editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Master's Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.

Image: DVIDS

Ethen Kim Lieser

economy, Americas

Since most retirees won’t be able to get their hands on the maximum Social Security benefit, they will likely need to have other sources of income.  

When it comes time for retirees to start claiming Social Security benefits, a good rule of thumb often touted by financial planners and experts is to wait as long as possible.

And if a person looks at the numbers, it is easy to see why this particular advice is so rampant. For those seniors who need to start collecting Social Security benefits at age sixty-two—the earliest age to do so—know that the maximum amount will be $2,364 in 2022. However, if a person is able to wait until age seventy to file, he or she would be eligible for the absolute maximum amount, which currently comes in at $4,194.  

“Workers planning for their retirement should be aware that retirement benefits depend on age at retirement,” according to the Social Security Administration’s website. 

“If a worker begins receiving benefits before his/her normal (or full) retirement age, the worker will receive a reduced benefit,” according to the website. “A worker can choose to retire as early as age sixty-two, but doing so may result in a reduction of as much as 30 percent.” 

$4,194 a Pipe Dream? 

But should retirees really expect to bag that nearly $4,200 per month in Social Security benefits? According to The Motley Fool’s personal finance writer Christy Bieber “for most people, benefits will fall far short of the maximum because their wages over their career will fall far short of the maximum taxable wage.”  

“See, Social Security benefits are determined based on a recipient’s average wages during their 35 highest earning years (after their wages during their career are adjusted for inflation),” she said in her analysis. “But only wages up to the wage base limit count in determining each person’s average wage.”  

To qualify for that maximum amount, “you would need to earn at least the wage base limit each year. In 2022, the wage base limit is $147,000. That’s much more than most people earn,” Bieber added. “And you’d have to earn the inflation-adjusted equivalent of that amount for a full 35 years, which even fewer people do—even if some people hit the limit during a few years of their career.” 

Tapping Into Other Sources 

Since most retirees won’t be able to get their hands on the maximum Social Security benefit, they will likely need to have other sources of income.  

“For most people, it’s important to replace at least 80 percent of pre-retirement income, while Social Security is designed to replace around 40 percent,” according to Bieber’s analysis. “If you assume you’ll need to replace about 40 percent of your salary upon retirement, you can work backwards from there to estimate how large your retirement nest egg must be.”  

“If you anticipate withdrawing around 4 percent of your retirement savings in year one and then adjusting upwards by inflation, you’ll be able to determine your nest egg size by multiplying the amount of income your account must produce by twenty-five,” Bieber said in her analysis.  

Ethen Kim Lieser is a Washington state-based Science and Tech Editor who has held posts at Google, The Korea Herald, Lincoln Journal Star, AsianWeek, and Arirang TV. Follow or contact him on LinkedIn.  

Image: Reuters

Kris Osborn

Zumwalt-class Destroyer, United States

The Zumwalt's mobility and low profile on radar could help it become the first platform to field the Navy's new hypersonic missile.

Here's What You Need to Know: The Conventional Prompt Strike hypersonic missile is expected to deploy aboard the Zumwalts by 2025.

The Navy plans to arm its Zumwalt-class destroyers with a first-of-its-kind Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) hypersonic weapon able to destroy high-value targets in very key spots around the world from tactically advantageous maritime attack locations. 

Arming destroyers with hypersonics is a key part of the Pentagon’s plan to increase strike range, attack flexibility, and ability to strike at unprecedented speeds. A destroyer at sea armed with a long-range hypersonic weapon would be in a position to adjust its point of attack quite easily and reposition as needed. During a maritime warfare engagement, for example, a Zumwalt destroyer could theoretically adapt to new intelligence information and change attack locations or add new target information as required by the mission.  

The Navy plans to arm the Zumwalt-class destroyers with the emerging CPS were explained in an interesting October 2021 Congressional Research Service Report on Hypersonic Weapons, which says the service expects to deploy the weapon by 2025. The Zumwalt-class destroyers are an interesting first choice to be the first place to integrate the CPS given that the ship is engineered with an entire suite of next-generation technologies intended to change the paradigm for maritime warfare.  

One key advantage of the Zumwalt-class is its unprecedented degree of mobile, onboard electrical power. The ship’s electric drive is powered by an Integrated Power System and the platform operates with a 78 Megawatt on-board generator. The extra expeditionary power could help power up and even propel or launch hypersonic weapons from the deck of the ship. It is also likely that a variant of the CPS will be configured to fire from deck-mounted Vertical Launch Systems (VLS) which extend around the periphery of the ship.  This is done by design to enable a ship to preserve its functional offensive firepower in the event that some parts of the ship are damaged in an attack. A concentrated block of condensed VLS next to another might enable an enemy to disable a ship’s firepower with a single strike on a small area of the ship deck. 

The Zumwalt-class is also powered by an elaborate Total Ship Computing Environment consisting of millions of lines of code. The advantage is greater integration, information sharing, and mission coordination between otherwise segmented parts of the ship. Fire control computers, for example, can quickly link to pools of data accumulated by targeting sensors, radar, or other kinds of command and control systems. 

Yet another reason why the Zumwalt-class may have been chosen to fire the CPS hypersonic weapon could be related to its stealth properties. A surface warship with a much smaller and therefore less distinguishable radar signature might be better-positioned to maneuver into new attack positions without being detected by an enemy.  Attack location flexibility is a significant advantage for ocean warfare as enemies often immediately seek to counterattack to the point of incoming fire. A maritime platform, however, can fire and then maneuver immediately to prevent its attack location from immediately being vulnerable.  A stealthy ship might help obscure a point of attack to an even greater degree, therefore increasing survivability. 

Kris Osborn is the defense editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Master’s Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.

This article first appeared in November 2021 and is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: U.S. Navy

Kris Osborn

U.S. Navy,

Any great power confrontation in the Pacific would rely heavily upon the U.S. Navy’s ability to project and sustain power from the sea. The ESB platform designs and technological configurations seem to have been evolved in part for this reason. 

The U.S. Navy is taking decided measures to improve the mission versatility and lethality of its Expeditionary Sea Base (ESB) ships, a move intended to greatly fortify the services Pacific posture and readiness for maritime warfare. 

The Navy has started construction on its fifth ESB, the future USS Robert E. Simanek, a ship intended to support forward operating aviation, deliver special operations, and at-sea command and control. The ship class has been modified in recent years to support an expanding sphere of combat missions, including greater support and logistical help for forward-deployed forces on the edge of combat. 

“ESBs are optimized to support the core capabilities of aviation facilities, berthing, special operations, equipment staging support, and command and control operations,” Tim Roberts, Strategic and Theater Sealift program manager, Program Executive Office (PEO) Ships, said in a Navy statement. The future USS Robert E. Simanek is being built by General Dynamics National Steel and Shipbuilding Company.

The ESB class is being increasingly tailored for mobile “sea basing” for strategic reasons connected to the U.S. Navy’s growing Pacific emphasis. The sheer maritime expanse of the Pacific is filled with dangerous flashpoints such as the South China Sea, Senkaku Islands near Japan, and of course Taiwan. Any great power confrontation in the Pacific would rely heavily upon the U.S. Navy’s ability to project and sustain power from the sea. The ESB platform designs and technological configurations seem to have been evolved in part for this reason. 

“In 2019, the Navy made the decision to commission all Expeditionary Sea Base ships to allow them to conduct a broader and more lethal mission set, compared to original plans for them to operate with a USNS designation,” the Navy statement explains.  

The U.S. has forces in Japan and South Korea, but any kind of effective rapid-reaction force, supported by close-in command and control, would rely heavily upon maritime presence. An ESB, therefore, could function as a communications hub for maneuvering surface and air drones, surface ships, and sub-hunting helicopters. As platforms able to launch helicopters, ESBs could move into position to support amphibious forces both during attack and after landing by carrying supplies, surveilling the surface with sub-hunting sonobuoys, and even performing MEDEVAC missions as needed during an amphibious attack. Sailors, Marines, or soldiers injured in an amphibious assault may have few options when it comes to receiving care, as hospital ships may be ill-equipped to operate closer to shore. With substantial berthing capability, ESBs could launch helicopters to pick up injured servicemembers and then potentially stabilize or treat them aboard the ship. 

The evolution of ESB is consistent with the Marine Corps' broader strategic shift back to its maritime roots following fifteen years of predominantly land-based counterinsurgency missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. With a “sea-basing” mission focus, ESBs could operate as a key “node” within a dispersed, expansive area of operations spread across hundreds of miles of ocean territory. 

Kris Osborn is the defense editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Master's Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.  

Image: DVIDS

Charlie Gao

Su-25, World

The comparison misses some of the nuances of how they are employed.

Here's What You Need to Know: Russia's Su-25 continues to undergo modernization.

The Su-25 is one of the most visible signs of the Russian Air Force’s might. Since its debut during the Soviet-Afghan War in the 1980s, the Su-25 has seen service in every conflict involving Soviet or Russian forces, from Chechnya to Georgia to Syria.

Observers have often compared it to the A-10, but that comparison misses some of the nuances of how they are employed. Regardless, the Russian defense ministry plans to keep the Su-25 around in the foreseeable future. But how does it plan on accomplishing that goal?

The development of the Su-25 roughly mirrors that of the A-10. The Soviet Air Force saw the need for a survivable low-level attack aircraft to supplement its current attack fleet. Before the Su-25, Soviet attack aircraft relied on speed for survivability. Aircraft like the Su-17, Su-22, MiG-23BN, and MiG-27 all had only one engine and no armor (the latter being redesigns of the MiG-23 airframe for ground attack).

Combat experience in Afghanistan showed that such configurations were vulnerable to ground fire when conducting missions at low altitude. Armor and two engines needed to be added to improve survivability at the cost of speed.

Enter the Su-25, an aircraft built from the ground up to conduct ground attacks at low altitudes and speeds. It featured significant armor on the bottom and the front of the aircraft and had two heavy duty engines for increased survivability. The design featured straighter wings than those used on fast jets, allowing for better maneuverability and increased lift at the lower speeds the Su-25 was expected to operate at.

A laser designator/rangefinder similar those used on the MiG-27 was installed in the nose to allow for use of laser-guided missiles. However, the Soviets’ thirty millimeter rotary cannon the GSh-6-30 had problems on its mounting on the MiG-27, so Sukhoi opted to put the simpler, lower-rate-of-fire Gsh-2-30 on the Su-25 instead. Regardless, the primary weapons the Su-25 was expected to employ in support of ground forces were the rockets and bombs on its wings, not the cannon.

The main problem with the Su-25 is that while it had a decent complement of weapons for air-to-ground attack in the 1980s, it was being left behind in the dust by newer developments in weapons such as the Vikhr anti-tank missile. The ECM systems also were becoming antiquated.

As a result, attempts to modernize the Su-25 were made. The first was the Su-25T, a version that focused on improving the anti-tank capability of the Su-25. To accomplish this, the Su-25T mounted the Shkval and Mecury electro-optical systems that allowed the plane to detect and track targets from much longer ranges, providing functionality similar to that given by Western targeting pods. These systems were controlled through a monitor in the cockpit, mirroring the ground attack MFDs in the A-10C.

The Su-25T could also fit a much wider fit of weapons, including the Vikhr anti-tank missile that could be carried in two six-packs on each wing and the advanced R-73 anti-air missile. However, the Su-25T project was canceled after only a few examples were produced due to the great cost of electro-optical systems installed.

Thus the regular Su-25 would continue to serve in Chechnya and Georgia under the same configuration as in the 1980s. While there was the short-lived Su-25TM line that also featured advanced avionics, the primary upgrade “route” for the Su-25 would be found in the Su-25SM.

Su-25 Modernizations:

The Su-25SM was conceived as a way to modernize the Su-25 without being as complex as the earlier attempts. The key feature was the integration of an onboard radar and a vastly improved avionics fit. The onboard radar, while not nearly as powerful as those on dedicated fighters, allows the Su-25SM to shoot the R-77 and R-27 air-to-air missiles.

But the greatest improvement was the “Bars” navigation system that includes a digital moving map and a satellite navigation receiver. With these features, the Su-25SM is able to get to the target, get off the tarmac faster, and generally just perform better and more efficiently as the workload of the pilot is reduced.

Other upgrades included an anti-surge system for the engines, which expanded the envelope in which the pilot could safely employ various weapon systems without worrying about the gasses affecting the engine and a new radar warning station (L-150 Pastel).

As Su-25SMs are being produced, Russia is looking to the future with the Su-25SM3 upgrade. This can be seen as a further iteration on the same improvements featured on the Su-25SM. Survivability and anti-missile countermeasures are improved by the addition of UV missile launch detectors in the Vitebsk-25 SEAD/ECM set and an updated version of the L-150 Pastel. The targeting package in the nose is further improved in the SOLT-25 module which adds thermal imaging and improved zoom.

Also added is the new SVP-24 “Gefest” precision dumb-bombing system. The Gefest uses precise information about the flight characteristics and position of the aircraft to set a computer calculated release point (CCRP) for a bomb, which can allow it to deliver a bomb onto a specific grid with good accuracy. While Russian media has hyped this system up to allow for dumb bombs to “be as effective as” precision bombs, this is only really true on static targets and ignores the other benefits PGMs have in hitting moving targets.

With the Su-25SM3 upgrade, the Russian Air Force finally has a solid kit that could upgrade their fleet of vintage Su-25s to a modern standard. Compared to the A-10C, the Su-25SM3 is faster and has the advantage of having its targeting system being stuffed into the nose, as opposed to relying on an external pod. However this also means that the targeting system has a more limited range of motion as its looking out of a small window in the nose.

The level of integration of electro-optical PGMs is probably less mature as well as the A-10C has been using similar systems for almost twenty years now and was originally built to utilize the electro-optical Maverick missile. Conversely, the Su-25 always focused more on laser-guided munitions. EO munitions have the advantage of being fire and forget, once the electro-optical seeker is locked on the target, the missile will guide regardless of the motion of the plane. With a laser, the plane must guide the missile in with a laser designator and keep flying towards the target until it hits.

Overall, while the planes are broadly similar, one can see how the strengths of each plane diverge when looking into which subsystems are more developed. The A-10, which focuses on the gun and delivery of electro-optical PGMs, versus the Su-25, which focuses on accuracy of “dumb” bombs and rockets from the wings and laser-guided weaponry.

Charlie Gao studied political and computer science at Grinnell College and is a frequent commentator on defense and national-security issues.

This article first appeared in 2018.

Image: REUTERS/Vasily Fedosenko

Trevor Filseth

economy, Americas

Musk primarily objects to a tax credit of $12,500 for any American who bought an electric vehicle that had been constructed by unionized workers and had its battery made in the United States.

The $1.9 trillion “Build Back Better” legislation, which was narrowly passed by the House in November and now awaits the approval of the Senate, has been lauded as a major achievement by many progressive Democrats. Among its other useful provisions, the bill would establish a program of universal pre-kindergarten education, extend the monthly “Child Tax Credit” payments for an additional year, make a variety of investments in green energy, and make efforts to lower the cost of prescription drugs.  

The Biden administration has pushed for the bill’s passage by Christmas. Noticeably, it has been uniformly opposed by Republicans and has drawn criticism from conservative Democrats, including Sens. Kyrsten Sinema (D-Ariz.) and Joe Manchin of (D-W.Va.). Neither lawmaker has indicated how they will vote on the bill if it is brought before the Senate, although Manchin has expressed public reservations about its current spending level. 

On Monday evening, the bill received another opponent: Tesla and SpaceX CEO Elon Musk, who urged Senate Democrats to “can” the legislation at a meeting of the Wall Street Journal’s “CEO Council.” 

“Honestly, I would just can this whole bill. Don’t pass it,” Musk said at the virtual meeting. “That’s my recommendation.” 

The provision within the bill that Musk primarily objected to was a tax credit of $12,500 for any American who bought an electric vehicle that had been constructed by unionized workers and had its battery made in the United States. The construction of Tesla batteries took place in California until 2015 when it was moved to Nevada; however, the Tesla workforce is not unionized, meaning that new Tesla buyers would not qualify for the credit. 

Musk decried the credit as a wasteful and inefficient government subsidy. “I am literally saying get rid of all subsidies,” he clarified. 

Musk’s critics have noted that the bill, which increases taxes on the wealthiest Americans, could increase his tax liability by as much as $10 billion. “Eventually, they run out of other people’s money,” Musk complained on Twitter in October, “and then they come for you.” 

Musk also noted that American billionaires’ wealth combined could not come close to fixing the federal deficit, and suggested that attempting to raise taxes on billionaires could stifle innovation. In his remarks to the CEO Council, he reiterated his view that the government’s role was to “get out of the way” of innovation in the private sector. 

Musk is one of a handful of the world’s richest people, although his net worth fluctuates based on the value of Tesla stock, which makes up the vast majority of his wealth. 

Trevor Filseth is a current and foreign affairs writer for the National Interest. 

Image: Reuters

Charlie Gao

Missiles, Americas

And why was it phased out?

Here's What You Need to Know: Though no longer displayed at trade shows, the weapon remains an interesting predecessor to modern micro munitions.

As Western militaries shift back into a conventional focus after spending more than a decade fighting insurgencies, they are bringing along some tech developed for counterinsurgency that has applications in a peer or near-peer conflict. One important innovation that is looking to change how air-to-ground support can occur is the development of a new class of “micro precision munitions”: guided rockets, bombs, and missiles that weigh around 20 kg or less. The GBU-44/B Viper Strike was one of the first of this new class of weapon. But does it have a future?

At the beginning of the Global War on Terror, the smallest precision munition available to aerial platforms was the AGM-114 Hellfire. As a result, the MQ-1 Predator with Hellfires became an ubiquitous light close air support (CAS) platform. But in this role the limitations of the Hellfire became clear. While it was light, the Hellfire was overkill for many point targets it was fired on. The High Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT) warhead also was found to have a lackluster anti-personnel effect due to being optimized for taking out Soviet tanks, rather than infantry formations. On the other hand, the Hellfire’s warhead was too powerful for other precision targets, especially in urban environments.

The need for a better UAV munition drove the development of the first micro munitions. One of the very early ones was the GBU-44/B Viper Strike, an adapted version of the Brilliant Anti-Tank submunition. The Brilliant Anti-Tank was originally meant to be carried by a missile and dropped over formations of Soviet armor to destroy them, while ignoring “lower” priority targets such as trucks. As such, it already had advanced sensors and guidance on board, making it easily adapted for the micro munition role.

To make a BAT submunition into a GBU-44/B Viper Strike, the original BAT seeker was removed and the Alternate Semi-Active Laser (ASAL) seeker was installed in its place, which made it fully laser-guided as opposed to the IR seeker on the BAT. GPS capability was also later added to the seeker, which allowed the GBU-44/B to be fired from increased standoff to glide to the target. The directional microphones on the BAT wingtips were also removed and replaced by simple rods. Finally, the “precursor” warhead of the BAT was removed, as the GBU-44/B was not designed to strike heavy armor.

The resulting weapon was half the weight of the Hellfire and could be used on the lighter RQ-5 Hunter UAVs. It also had a smaller blast radius, enabling safe use close to enemy troops. The GBU-44/B was actually the first weapon used from an Army UAV in combat.

But lethality was a problem for the GBU-44/B and led to its eventual withdrawal from usage. Probably due to the small warhead, USSOCOM phased out usage of the weapon due to “failure to achieve lethality performance”. Northrop Grumman sold the design to MBDA in 2012. The Army retired its fleet of Hunter UAVs in 2015.

MBDA still markets the GBU-44/B under the name “Viper-E”, but it’s weapon probably won’t generate any sales. The latest press releases about the weapon are over six years old, and it is no longer displayed at trade shows. But it remains an interesting predecessor to modern micro munitions, having proved that the concept has value and can be effective on the battlefield. 

Charlie Gao studied political and computer science at Grinnell College and is a frequent commentator on defense and national-security issues.

This article first appeared in March 2020.

Image: MBDA

Caleb Larson

Missile Defense, Americas

A new missile radar system will help mitigate the threat of hypersonic weapons against the American homeland. 

 The Missile Defense Agency, responsible for the nation’s missile defense, has announced the completion of construction on the Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR). Based in Alaska, the LRDR is a flexible multi-mission radar array that is among the most powerful in the United States. 

“Once fully operational, LRDR will provide unparalleled ability to simultaneously search and track multiple small objects, including all classes of ballistic missiles, at very long ranges, under continuous operation,” the Missile Defense Agency explained in a press statement. 

“Its discrimination capability will allow it to identify lethal objects, such as enemy warheads, and differentiate them from non-lethal decoys,” per the statement. “This will increase the defensive capacity of the homeland defense interceptor inventory by conserving the number of Ground-Based Interceptors required for threat engagement. Highly adaptable, LRDR will address hypersonic missiles in future configurations.” 

Hypersonics 

Several countries besides the United States have hypersonic weapons in development, notably Russia and China. And while the United States has robust missile detection and countermeasure infrastructure, the equipment is a relic of the Cold War and not optimized for hypersonic threats but rather for supersonic ballistic missiles. 

“Today marks an extremely important milestone for U.S. homeland defense,” Missile Defense Agency Director Vice Adm. Jon Hill said. 

“The Long-Range Discrimination Radar has finished construction, and we can now begin the testing phase that will lead to the full operational use of this vital system,” Hill said. “LRDR will allow Northern Command to better defend the United States from ballistic and hypersonic missile threats.” 

Flexible Tracking 

The LRDR is flexible and capable of more than just tracking hypersonic weapons. For example, the MDA specifies that the radar array can also be used to track satellites in orbit around the earth and is capable of “detecting, tracking, and identifying active or inactive satellites, spent rocket bodies, and fragmentation debris.” 

From the LRDR’s vantage point in Alaska, the radar can cover vast parts of the Pacific Ocean and, in theory, monitor launches from North Korea and potentially China.   

Though installed, the new array is not yet operational, but first must undergo testing and further evaluation. Once the MDA completes testing in 2023, the organization will hand over operational control to the U.S. Space Force. 

The Long-Range Discrimination Radar will not replace other missile tracking infrastructure already in place in the United States but will instead complement existing arrays. And while the ongoing pandemic slowed the array installation, the project is now full steam ahead—and upping the United States’ antimissile defenses in a big way. 

Caleb Larson is a multimedia journalist and defense writer with the National Interest. A graduate of UCLA, he also holds a Master of Public Policy and lives in Berlin. He covers the intersection of conflict, security, and technology, focusing on American foreign policy, European security, and German society for both print and radio. @calebmlarson 

Image: Reuters

Kris Osborn

B-21 Raider, United States

Despite the fact that the B-2, B-52, and B-1 have been upgraded to remain viable in a new threat environment, the need for an entirely new platform cannot be understated.

Here's What You Need to Remember: Senior U.S. Air Force leaders have for many years now expressed grave concern about a massive “bomber deficit” in the force. There simply have not been enough bombers, say Air Force leaders.

A new generation of stealth technology, unprecedented sensing and computing, long-range precision cruise missiles, air-dropped bombs and an ability to strike undetected against the most advanced air defenses in the world: These are all potential attributes of the now-on-the-way Air Force B-21 bomber. 

The new platform, which will form the bulk of the U.S. Air Force’s future bomber force cannot come soon enough. Testing, assessments and preparations have for quite some time been underway at Edwards Air Force Base in California, in anticipation of some of the aircraft’s first test flights. At least two B-21s are reported to have been built or under construction. 

The Air Force-Northrop Grumman program has gone better than expected, inspiring many service leaders and members of Congress to not only push for accelerated delivery and production of the new bomber but also to massively increase the planned number of bombers. 

The need for the new bomber is quite pressing in many respects, the principal reasons being the advanced technological capacity of enemy air defenses and the age of the current bomber fleet. Not only that, senior U.S. Air Force leaders have for many years now expressed grave concern about a massive “bomber deficit” in the force, a circumstance that puts the United States at risk. There simply have not been enough bombers, say Air Force leaders. 

Equally key variables include the age and size of the B-2 fleet. Many remember that plans for the B-2 bomber were abruptly truncated years ago, resulting in a small force size of twenty B-2s. Since emerging during the Cold War years, the B-2 is now thirty years old. While looking in retrospect at the exact reasons for the B-2 production stop may be difficult three decades later, it may have been due in large measure to decisionmakers operating with a short-term threat outlook. The belief that the collapse of the former Soviet Union greatly reduced the need for stealthy B-2 bombers contributed to the small fleet size. Years later, the opposite has become true given the resurgence of a Russian threat and emerging Chinese threat. It should be said that the B-2 bomber is now quite different than it was years ago, and is still being upgraded. The modern B-2 is not only getting new Defensive Management Sensors that enable it to find and therefore elude next-generation air defenses but is also receiving one thousand-fold improved computer processing and upgraded weapons. 

Then there is the question of the B-52, yet another older airplane sustained into the modern era with a massive amount of unanticipated upgrades including an internal weapons bay, new communications system and a re-engining, not to mention an entirely new weapons arsenal. 

What all of this amounts to is that, despite the fact that several legacy bombers have been upgraded to remain viable, relevant and lethal in a new threat environment, the need for an entirely new platform cannot be understated. 

Kris Osborn is the defense editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Master’s Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.

This article is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters.

Kris Osborn

Robotic Combat Vehicles,

The Navy’s new Ship-to-Shore connectors are engineered to carry a seventy-ton M1 Abrams tank from ship to shore, so there is no reason why they could not transport several fifteen-to-twenty ton armed Robotic Combat Vehicles to follow on and support an amphibious landing.

The Army’s Pacific-theater multi-domain land-air-sea task force seeks to refine technologies and concepts of operation. In particular, they are aiming to conduct joint operations with breakthrough levels of connectivity, high-speed data-sharing, and cross-service attack formations. The Army is also preparing to send new Robotic Combat Vehicle (RCV) prototypes to operational units for assessments and evaluations in combat scenarios. Considering these things, wouldn’t it make sense for them to integrate? 

The Army’s multi-domain task forces in the Pacific are specifically formed to address anticipated threats in the region with a mind to connecting ships, helicopters, ground soldiers and even armored vehicles to one another amid changing combat circumstances. Why not add fifteen-ton robots to the equation? If lethal force is managed by humans performing in a command and control capacity, that is. This kind of networking can introduce an entirely new sphere of potential combat tactics in an island-hopping, coastal land-sea type of combat environment such as in the Pacific. Perhaps an exchange of gunfire on the surface of the ocean is fortified by suppressive fires, rockets or even artillery from an island within range of fire. Perhaps an island-based “firebase” of some kind has been set up to attack ships at sea?  Why not use multi-domain capable platforms to send armed robots in to destroy the firebase? 

Thinking of this very scenario, there seems to be no reason why fifteen-ton armed Robotic Combat Vehicles could not travel on a U.S. Navy amphibious assault ship in support of a ship-to-shore attack mission. While not built to swim like an amphibious assault vehicle, fifteen-ton tracked robots could operate as deployable, unmanned mini robot tanks able to reinforce an amphibious landing into hostile territory with supportive fires, ammunition delivery, and reconnaissance support for attacking Marines. 

Thinking in terms of logistics, there are several key reasons why this is possible. The Navy’s new Ship-to-Shore connectors are engineered to carry a seventy-ton M1 Abrams tank from ship to shore, so there is no reason why they could not transport several fifteen-to-twenty ton armed Robotic Combat Vehicles to follow on and support an amphibious landing. They could certainly transport on an amphibious assault ship and potentially deploy alongside Marines in a ship-to-shore attack. 

There do not seem to be any logistical barriers to this type of equation, particularly given that the Pentagon continues to make rapid progress with its Joint All Domain Command and Control program which is establishing common technical standards and IP protocol such that air-sea-land platforms from different services can share data with one another in real-time across the force. 

Such an approach would likely prove to be of great consequence in a Pacific war scenario such as in the South China Sea or areas around the Taiwanese or Japanese coastline. Part of the advantage of these RCVs is that they are armed, equipped with advanced computing and sensor technology while also lighter weight and more expeditionary than a manned combat vehicle. 

With this in mind, isn’t the Marine Corps/Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) program being designed for this kind of specific scenario? The new LAW is being built to “island hop” and deliver Marines and weapons platforms from land to sea and back to land quickly as combat conditions require. Amphibious assault vehicles, ship-to-shore landing craft, and the LAW are now being integrated into one another as connected combat platforms able to support these kinds of multi-domain missions. 

Kris Osborn is the defense editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Master's Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.

Image: DVIDS

Charlie Gao

Submarines, Asia

Practice makes perfect.

Here's What You Need to Know: MPA can deploy sonobuoys, floating sensors that either detect noises or send out pings to find submarines.

With things heating up in the South China Sea (SCS), much attention has been paid to the ships and submarines that could potentially square off against each other in the region. This ignores a key asset of most navies that is already on the “front lines” and shaping military interactions—Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA). Skillful use of these aircraft may determine how an engagement plays out, or it could prevent one from happening in the first place.

MPA have been around almost as long as combat aircraft. Navies quickly realized the potential of aircraft when it came to patrolling the sea, as they could move far more quickly than boats and had the significant advantage of altitude.

But modern MPA use advanced sensors to detect to see far more than what can be seen with the naked eye—Magnetic Anomaly Detectors (MADs) can detect underwater submarines, and radar systems are used to detect ships that might just be specks on the horizon. Infrared/thermographic cameras allow MPA to identify vessels even at night.

MPA can also deploy sonobuoys, floating sensors that either detect noises or send out pings to find submarines. ELINT sensors can detect the radar emissions of enemy MPA or ships. All of these sensors means that MPA are incredibly useful in peacetime as well as wartime.

One way they could deter potential escalation is through detecting potential violations of EEZ or civilian ships in contested waters ahead of time through the use of radar and infrared. Since modern MPA have all-weather detection capability, they can watch for fishing vessels day and night, and give a navy an advanced warning of such violations so they can be headed off before a more violent encounter up close.

MPA also can provide critical information in tracking enemy submarine posture. While this is a more intensive and not “guaranteed” way to track submarines—as the battle between submarine stealth and submarine detection is ongoing—determining the patrol routes and positions of enemy submarines is critical information. Such intelligence may allow nations to avoid potential losses to convoy raiding (if it occurs) and set up anti-submarine warfare plans before the event of war.

In their traditional role in the detection of surface ships, MPA are critically important in the SCS region. Due to the relatively short distances between islands, MPA flying out of Japan or Taiwan could potentially track the movement of ships from base to base in China.

Basic MPA surveillance radars like the Seaspray 5000 have publicized ranges of around 200 nm. The more advanced AN/APS-115 and AN/APS-137D(V)5s mounted on Japan, and Taiwan's P-3C MPA undoubtedly have better performance. Even with a 200 nm range, an MPA flying over the East China Sea could easily track ships moving south along China's coast.

This could yield significant strategic intelligence on the development and deployment of Beijing’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). In addition, the ELINT suite onboard these aircraft could provide insight into the capabilities of Chinese radars.

However, MPA still face considerable limitations from the human component. Crews get tired and need to be rotated out, and MPA—like other aircraft—are expensive to fly and operate. Therefore, the future will see navies using UAVs to accomplish the MPA mission, assisting manned MPA and also surveying without them independently.

The U.S. Navy has already made significant steps in this direction with the acquisition of MQ-4C Triton UAVs, which can augment the P-8A in surveillance and patrols. As multiple UAVs can accompany a single manned aircraft, the amount of area patrolled can increase drastically with the integration of UAS, bringing even more benefits.

Most militaries in the region appear to have recognized the importance of MPA in securing their maritime borders. While not in the SCS, Japan's Defense Forces have one of the best MPA fleets, the star of which is their purpose-built Kawasaki P-1, which boasts advanced sensors and even artificial intelligence to reduce the crew workload.

Taiwan is also no slouch, acquiring twelve American P-3C Orions MPA in 2017. Other militaries in the region (such as Vietnam, Singapore, and the Philippines) field lighter MPA, mostly converted civilian light propeller planes as opposed to heavier purpose-built aircraft. While these converted aircraft are sufficient for tracking surface ships, purpose-built aircraft are far superior for tracking submarines, due to features like the extended tail on the P-3C, which houses the magnetic anomaly detector.

China's premier MPA is the Y-8Q, which is a rough analog to the P-3C in function. Like the P-3C it has a distinctive tail boom for detecting submarines, and a powerful surface search radar in a radome under the cockpit.

Charlie Gao studied political and computer science at Grinnell College and is a frequent commentator on defense and national-security issues.

This article first appeared in 2018.

Image: U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Andy A. Anderson

Charlie Gao

Nuclear Weapons, Europe

The Soviets developed the 2A3 in response to American nuclear artillery.

Here's What You Need to Know: The entire concept quickly became obsolete.

In the 1950s, both NATO and Warsaw Pact doctrine focused on the employment of tactical nuclear weapons. Truly strategic nuclear weapons and the doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD) were at their infancy at the time, so nuclear weapons were seen as a tactical as well as a strategic tool.

As a result, both the United States and the Soviet Union developed a multitude of battlefield nukes, from the tiny Davy Crockett nuclear recoilless rifle to the M65 Atomic Cannon. The Soviet Union responded in kind, beginning the development of their own massive atomic howitzers and even mortars.

The largest of these pieces was the massive 406mm Soviet 2A3 “Kondensator.” But in the end, this piece was a failure. It was mechanically complex and obsolete by the time it was adopted.

Why did the Soviet Union produce these massive white elephants? Can anything be learned from the folly of the 2A3? Why was the caliber so huge compared to American guns?

The story of the 2A3 begins in 1954. The United States had rolled out the 280mm M65 atomic cannon just a year before, and the Soviets needed to catch up. Their response came in two forms, the 406mm howitzer (2A3/Object 271) and a 420mm mortar (2B1/Object 273).

The initiative to develop these two weapons was approved by the Council of Ministers in April 1955. The first ballistic test barrel was completed later that year, and in December 1956 the first prototype was created by mating the gun with the chassis. The design was paraded on Red Square in 1957.

The chassis for the 2A3 was derived from the T-10 heavy tank with additional hydraulic shock absorbers to absorb the massive recoil force of the 406mm projectile. Despite these measures, the 2A3 would travel a few meters back with every shot, and inevitably something would break and minor repairs would have to be conducted.

Aiming the gun was largely achieved by rotating the chassis, although small precision adjustments could be made with a limited electric traverse mechanism.

The reason for the massive caliber of the cannon was simple: Soviet engineers at the time weren’t sure if they could construct compact nuclear ammunition, so a large caliber was specified to make the design of the nuclear projectile easier.

The final projectile design weighed 570kg and could be launched out to a range of around twenty-five kilometers, just a few less than the M65 Atomic Cannon and far less than modern conventional artillery. The whole vehicle weighed around sixty-five tons.

As a result of this massive weight, the 2A3 was incredibly slow and faced significant mobility challenges; it couldn’t travel across most bridges and its massive size meant that it couldn’t really travel through cities or even under some low hanging power lines.

The range was also found to be lacking relative to nuclear rockets or modern tactical missiles. As a result, production of the 2A3 was cut off after only four units were produced in favor of newer nuclear rocket such as the Luna (FROG-7). These missile systems were far more mobile and compact relative to the massive 2A3 and had almost triple the range at seventy kilometers.

The Soviets developed the 2A3 was a response to American nuclear artillery. Unfortunately, as its development dragged on the entire concept became obsolete.

Perhaps what can be learned is that in making “big” guns and rockets, it’s always best to keep an eye on upcoming technologies that could fundamentally alter the battlefield such guns might fight on.

The Soviets would continue developing tactical nukes for use in artillery, but later shells utilized miniaturized warheads that allowed nukes to fit in compact projectiles in the Soviet-standard 152mm and 203mm calibers. Likewise, the United States also made nuclear shells in the 155mm and 203mm calibers after abandoning the 260mm M65 cannon.

Charlie Gao studied political and computer science at Grinnell College and is a frequent commentator on defense and national-security issues.

This article first appeared in 2019.

Image: Wikimedia Commons

Peter Suciu

Hypersonics,

Northrop Grumman recently completed its critical design review of the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor which could help achieve this goal.

Here's What You Need to Remember: A concern for the United States is that it is now trailing its near-peer adversaries in the development of hypersonic weapons. China recently tested a hypersonic missile, while Russia has conducted multiple tests of its Tsirkon hypersonic missile over the past year.

Northrop Grumman announced this week that it had recently completed its critical design review of the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS) prototype for the U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA). The defense contractor said this review established the company’s technical approach for precise, timely sensor coverage to defeat ballistic and hypersonic missiles.

With the upgrade, the HBTSS satellites will be able to provide continuous tracking and handoff to enable targeting of enemy missiles launched from land, sea, or air. The HBTSS satellites serve as a critical part of the Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR) multi-layered constellation of satellites. That constellation can sense heat signatures to detect and track missiles from their earliest stages of launch through interception.

Northrop Grumman’s HBTSS satellites were also designed to track threats with near-global reach when prompted by other OPIR systems, which would be well before they come into view of U.S. ground-based defenses.

“When it comes to national safety, there’s no room for error,” Sarah Willoughby, vice president, OPIR and geospatial systems, Northrop Grumman, said in a release. “This critical design review puts Northrop Grumman on track to deliver a vital component of our missile defense architecture to keep the U.S. and its allies safe against hypersonic threats.”

Combating Hypersonic Threats

Hypersonic missiles have been seen as a potential gamechanger because they would be difficult to track and even more difficult to counter.

“In the early stages of a conflict, hypersonic weapons can be used to take out high-value targets such as air defense systems, command and control centers, and supply depots to cripple any offensive capabilities,” said Tushar Mangure, defence analyst at data and analytics company GlobalData, in an email to the National Interest.

“Among the various technologies required to counter this, the U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is aggressively working on developing a HBTSS and Northrop Grumman’s prototype will play a vital role in ensuring US supremacy in the missile defense arena in the coming decades,” Mangure wrote. “The HBTSS will be part of a space-based multi-layered satellite network for missile detection and tracking.”

A concern for the United States is that it is now trailing its near-peer adversaries in the development of hypersonic weapons. China recently tested a hypersonic missile, while Russia has conducted multiple tests of its Tsirkon hypersonic missile over the past year.

The development of HBTSS satellites could help address the threat – even if it couldn’t actually stop it from coming.

“The lead that China and Russia have in hypersonic technologies is of serious concern to the U.S.,” Mangure wrote. “While arming the services with a hypersonic weapon is important, the U.S. has factored in the need to defend against these incredible weapons. Considering the speeds at which these weapons travel, trying to detect, track and intercept hypersonic weapons is a difficult task. Such multi-layered space-based sensors are expected to solve those issues, but there’s a long way to go before these weapons can be intercepted.”

Additionally, HBTSS satellites will likely be just one part of a larger effort in countering hypersonic missiles.

“The Space Development Agency (SDA) is also developing low-orbiting satellite constellations capable of detecting missile threats beyond the purview of traditional sensors,” Mangure wrote. “SDA is working with MDA to integrate the HBTSS into its missile tracking layer. A combination of medium and wide field of view sensors will be critical in tracking hypersonic missiles.”

Northrop Grumman had previously received a $153 million contract from the MDA for the Phase IIB portion of the HBTSS program. The defense contractor is reported to be on schedule to deliver the HBTSS prototype in 2023. After the HBTSS prototype is delivered, the company will conduct an on-orbit test to demonstrate its ability to continuously track and rapidly process its observations of hypersonic threats, as well as its ability to effectively hand off the information so the missile is intercepted.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He regularly writes about military small arms, and is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com.

This article was published last month and is being reposted due to reader interest. 

Image: Reuters

Kris Osborn

U.S. Air Force, United States

The Air Force is paring down its fighter fleet to save costs. Where does that leave its aging fleet of F-16s?

Here's What You Need to Remember: The future fighter force strategy is aimed at pivoting the Air Force away from a largely 1980s-era legacy aircraft to a modern group of fighter jets that can outmatch and destroy enemy fifth-generation aircraft and air defenses operated by major “peer” adversaries such as Russia and China.

The Air Force’s sixth-generation stealth fighter will replace its F-22 Raptor fighter jets. The F-15 EX Eagle II will bring a weapons load in support of air combat. Additionally, F-35 fighter jets will replace hundreds of legacy fourth-generation fighter jets while various F-16 Fighting Falcon jets will be upgraded with new technology to absorb missions that don’t require a fifth-generation fighter. 

These developments comprise the fundamental essence of the Air Force’s plan for its future fighter force structure, a strategy that seeks to adjust the current number of 7 different fighter fleets down to four-plus-one.  

“We are sitting on seven fighter fleets and it’s expensive, so we are getting down to four fleets. We’ve brought on more than three hundred F-35s and they are now the second-largest fleet in our fighter fleet,” Lt. Gen. David Nahom, the Air Force’s deputy chief of staff for plans and programs, recently told The Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies.  

The specifics of the four-plus-one plan include the addition of the sixth-generation aircraft, continued development of the F-35 fighter jet as the cornerstone of the force, adding the F-15EX Eagle II to the mix and upgrading the F-16 Fighting Falcons. That’s four types of aircraft with the “plus one” portion being a reference to the A-10 Warthog. Nahom explained that the F-22 Raptor jets will continue to be upgraded with new software, weapons and sensors so that they can fly for several additional decades—or at least until sufficient numbers of the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) sixth-generation aircraft arrive.

“NGAD will ensure air dominance, yet the F-22 will remain a dominant platform. We will continue to upgrade it, yet there will come a time when we will need a new platform,” Nahom said.

As for the F-16 Fighting Falcons, Nahom explained it will remain crucial for homeland defense and other missions which do not require fifth-generation aircraft. The Fighting Falcons will be getting new active electronically scanned array radars and function as a multirole fighter jet in missions that, as Nahom put it, the Air Force doesn’t “need a high-end platform for.”

Fundamentally, the future fighter force strategy is aimed at pivoting the Air Force away from a largely 1980s-era legacy aircraft to a modern group of fighter jets that can outmatch and destroy enemy fifth-generation aircraft and air defenses operated by major “peer” adversaries such as Russia and China.

“Our fighter force was designed for a Soviet force,” Gen. Mark Kelly, the commander of Air Combat Command, said at the 2021 Air Force Air, Space & Cyber Conference. “We are behind and our current incremental rate of change is insufficient. Fighter Roadmap is a change in investment priorities required for a peer fight. The fighter force will again need to flex from its original design to defeat a peer threat. We need to face the realities of a new threat environment and that requires the fighter force to change.” 

The evolving plan seems to signify that the arrival of multirole fighter jets such as the F-35 stealth fighter jet means that fewer aircraft designs will be used to accomplish a wider range of missions. The F-35 jets are arriving in larger numbers. These jets can perform air-to-air attacks, long-range targeting and sensing, air-dropped bomb runs, and close air support missions. The NGAD sixth-generation aircraft, while expected to function as a high-speed, stealthy air-dominance platform to out-perform an F-22 Raptor, may also incorporate certain multirole capabilities. This means that hundreds of older F-15 Eagles and F-16 Raptors are likely on the fast track to the aircraft boneyard.  

Kris Osborn is the defense editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Master’s Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.

This article first appeared in October 2021 and is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters.

Peter Suciu

S-500, Eurasia

Both countries are expected to purchase the missile defense system. 

Here's What You Need to Remember: It could make sense that China would have interest in such a platform as it continues to assert its position in the South China Sea. Where things get a little complicated is that India could be the first potential buyer for the S-500 “Triumfator-M.” Yet the fact that potential adversaries China and India have both expressed interest doesn’t seem to be a serious reason for concern for Russia at this point.

While Russia and China are not officially allies, the two nations remain partners when it comes to military hardware. Even as China has built up its domestic arms industry, Beijing has continued to turn to Moscow for aircraft engines and air defense systems.

That partnership is poised to continue. China and some former Soviet states could be among the first buyers of the advanced S-500 anti-aircraft missile system.

The mobile surface-to-air missile/anti-ballistic missile system was developed by the Almaz-Antey Air Defence Concern to replace aging A-135 missile systems currently in use. The S-500 is considered a step up from the S-400 Triumf, but would supplement that platform rather than replace it. It has a range of around six hundred kilometers and is reportedly able to target hypersonic cruise missiles as well as stealth aircraft. Analysts claim the S-500 could even target satellites in low-earth orbit.

It could make sense that China would have interest in such a platform as it continues to assert its position in the South China Sea. Where things get a little complicated is that India could be the first potential buyer for the S-500 “Triumfator-M.” Yet the fact that potential adversaries China and India have both expressed interest doesn’t seem to be a serious reason for concern for Russia at this point.

“We consider India, as well as China and all the states that we have long-standing, partner and predictable relations with as prospective buyers of this latest system,” said Dmitry Shugayev, Director of Russia’s Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation, in an interview with RBC media on Tuesday, according to a report from state-owned media outlet TASS.

India has been a longstanding strategic partner of Russia, Shugayev added. New Delhi has long employed Russian-made hardware including tanks, small arms, and aircraft. Its current naval flagship of the Indian Navy, INS Vikramaditya, is also a former Soviet aircraft cruiser that was sold to New Delhi in 2004.

India also purchased the S-400 Triumf.

“We have concluded a contract for the S-400 and they will receive the first battalion set of this system by the yearend [sic],” said Shugayev. “That is why it is quite logical that they will display their interest in the foreseeable future and request the S-500 from us as well.”

Even as Russia is lining up potential foreign customers, it could be some time before any of the advanced air defense systems are exported. Russia is expected to begin exporting the S-500 surface-to-air missile system after the required number of systems is actually delivered to the Russian troops. In September Reuters reported that Russia completed tests of the S-500 surface-to-air missile system and has started supplying it to the armed forces.

“Time will show when this happens,” said Shugayev. “We will examine potential requests individually in each specific case.”

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He regularly writes about military small arms, and is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com.

This article was originally published last month and is being reposted due to reader interest. 

Image: Reuters.

Peter Suciu

Submarines, Eurasia

The remaining Antey-class submarines will undergo an upgrade that will extend the service life by a decade.

Here's What You Need to Remember: The submarine Irkutsk, which was commissioned in December 1988, is now the first to undergo the modernization to 949AM version at the Zvezda shipyards in the Russian Far East.

During the Cold War, the Soviet Navy operated a sizable submarine force. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Russian Navy fell into hard times and that included its fleet of submarines. In recent years, Moscow has committed to building new subs, while modernizing the older boats.

Among those aging submarines that have gotten a new lease on life are those of Project 949 Granit and Project 949A Antey (NATO reporting names Oscar I and Oscar II). A total of twenty of the nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines were originally planned with the first commissioned in 1980. Since then six were canceled—including four that were never laid down. Two of the canceled boats had their respective parts used in the construction of newer submarines, while the hulls have remained intact and construction could be restarted in the future.

Four of the aging boats have been retired, while the 949A boat Kursk was lost in an accident in the Barents Sea in August 2000, killing all 118 personnel on board.

Modernization Efforts

The remaining Antey-class submarines will undergo an upgrade that will extend the service life by a decade. The submarine Irkutsk, which was commissioned in December 1988, is now the first to undergo the modernization to 949AM version at the Zvezda shipyards in the Russian Far East.

“The modernization of the [underwater] cruiser will make it possible to extend its service life by at least ten years and expand the Pacific Fleet’s combat potential,” Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said at the ministry’s conference call on Tuesday, TASS reported.

During the refit, the nuclear-powered submarine Irkutsk (K-132) will be outfitted with the latest missile, torpedo, and radio-technical armaments and advanced communications systems to boost its combat efficiency. Among the planned upgrades will be the addition of a universal launch complex system that will enable the submarine to carry and launch Tsirkon (Zircon) hypersonic missiles.

While work on the boat has been slow going, the participants in the Defense Ministry’s conference call reportedly address the problems in the work to put the submarine into operation, including the timeframe of the necessary sea trials after repairs and modernization. Irkutsk is currently scheduled to be handed over to the Pacific Fleet in 2022.

A second submarine of the class, Chelyabinsk has been laid up since 2008 but could be the next to be upgraded.

More Power Boats

The Russian Navy Main Command had previously announced plans to have seven Project 949A and Project 949AM Antey subs in service with the Northern and Pacific Fleets by the end of 2023. As noted, the modernization will greatly improve all of the Antey-class submarines strike capabilities. This would include the capability for each boat to carry forty-eight Kalibr-PL missiles, as well as Oniks or Tsirkon hypersonic missiles.

While the efforts to modernize the aging submarines are still only slowly moving forward, each could be a formidable platform when—perhaps if—the modernization is actually completed.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites. He regularly writes about military small arms and is the author of several books on military headgear including A Gallery of Military Headdress, which is available on Amazon.com.

This article was originally published last month and is being reposted due to reader interest. 

Image: Reuters