Foreign Policy Blogs

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The global growth of social media has been so fast, and the effect of ‘trending’ so widespread, that even this observation is outdated. (That was 137 characters, so I could also tweet it.) But while we are living in real-time—and wanting to know now—let us take a few minutes, if this article can hold your attention, and examine some ways social media is now on the front lines of many international conflicts.

In a recent PBS Newshour interview, Nick Rasmussen, of the National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC) just outside Washington DC, explained how, in the context of searching for a terrorist threat, “increasingly what ‘connecting the dots’ means to me is dealing with the huge volume of publicly available information. The work we’re doing now often doesn’t involve really sensitive intelligence; it involves looking at Twitter, or some other social media platform, and trying to figure out who that individual is behind the screen name.”

Social media started out as a technological innovation but has become a social phenomenon. Since the early 2000s Facebook has become indispensable for families and friends to stay in touch, and people and organizations with large numbers of Twitter followers are able to carve out virtual mini-media empires. Clicks and ‘follows’ are the new version of voting with your feet. The more readers or followers one has, goes the logic, the more influence one wields.

To turn it around, people who actively use social media for every day, non-political reasons are also subject to being targeted.

One of the vulnerabilities (or advantages, to a combatant wishing to recruit people) is that social media accounts usually expose users to invasive scrutiny. Facebook and LinkedIn profiles can carry enough information that, shared with the wrong person, can be used to compromise that person or uncover confidential information about his/her job. Many countries’ military members are now routinely required to not specify their location or activities.

As the years passed of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, jihadi groups increasingly began to recruit through social media. Stories now abound of young adults of Middle Eastern heritage and origin, living in western Europe and the US, who have been contacted by Islamic State through social media and convinced to move to Raqqa, the Islamic State’s purported capital. Some 60 young women from the UK, aged 20 and below, are thought in the past several years to have traveled to Raqqa.

The huge growth in cell phone cameras and the ease of posting pictures to social media has also played a role in tracking and finding various targets. Of recent note, investigative organizations were able to track operatives and military equipment in eastern Ukraine primarily through personal pictures posted to social media and publically available imaging, including open source tracking of the apparent missile launcher used to destroy Malaysian Airlines flight 17 in 2014. This has also been a method to discover the location of various actors in the labyrinthine war in Syria.

Per the previously mentioned PBS Newshour article, many Islamic State fighters simply do not disable the geo-location feature on their phones, which allows those with the right technology to track them.

Intelligence agencies of major world powers now seem to appreciate the importance of social media and its role in ‘information operations,’ a military term that infers the ability of messaging to affect the viewpoints of a target population. Just looking through listings for ‘intelligence analyst’ on several Washington DC—based job boards, foreign language specialists are widely sought for social media and social networking positions.

Of course, it is not only parties to the worlds’ trouble regions that are looking to abuse social media to their advantage. For even a longer time, social engineers and hackers have tried to gather personal information by establishing links online.

If you are uncertain about that LinkedIn invitation you just got, try to verify the person through a known contact. If you are doubtful, ‘ignore’ or ‘delete’ works just fine. If he or she happens to be a colleague whom you meet at the next social, you can safely add them, and actually have a face-to-face conversation, something social media, unfortunately, seems to increasingly discourage.

The post Social Media Now on Conflicts’ Front Lines appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Europe faces a string of political and financial events that may lead to further instability in a region already battered by the effects of multiple crises.

A lack of European tools, scarcity of national resources and the illusory but satisfying ability to treat the symptoms of an obscure disease, have distracted European political elites from a fundamental diagnosis of the shared roots of the many crises that have befallen them in the last seven years. Frustration and disenchantment have fueled the spread of radical anti-establishment parties advocating potentially destabilising populist policies. If the present political class wants to remain relevant, they need to decide whether to leap forward towards further European integration or completely reverse the course set after WWII.  Several events across may occur in European countries in the next 9 months and these will probably result in more of the electorate slipping away from established elites.

Austria was scheduled to re-run the second turn of its presidential election on October 2nd  (it has now been delayed to until at least December due to ballot irregularities). The election pits pro-Europe Green party candidate Alexander Van der Bellen in a close race against the Eurosceptic anti-immigration Free Party of Austria’s (FPO) Norbert Hofer. May’s result, which saw the establishment’s Van der Bellen narrowly defeat right-winger Hofer, was annulled on July 1st by the Austrian Constitutional Court on account of substantial electoral irregularities. Recent polls suggest that the intervening period did nothing to clarify voter preference and the race remains tight.

Should he win, Hofer has stated that he would veto the TTIP between the EU and the USA and that he may join the Austrian chancellor at EU Council meetings. The latter could be disruptive given the opposing political affiliations of these Austrian representatives.

In November, Italy will hold a referendum on a proposed constitutional reform. Following the January 2016 referendum announcement, Prime-Minister Matteo Renzi leveraged his personal popularity by staking his political career and the survival of his government on the vote. However, the No-camp has been gaining ground since the beginning of the campaign in April, matching the gains of the anti-establishment 5-star movement at municipal elections in June.

On 15 March 2017 the Netherlands will hold its next parliamentary election. For the first time since its foundation, the anti-Islam and Eurosceptic Party of Freedom (PVV) of the polemic Geert Wilders is leading in the polls. Estimates from voter surveys have given the PVV a plurality of the vote since September 2015 in response to the refugee crisis. Despite his confidence, the rise of Wilders to the premiership remains undermined by the unwillingness of other parties to join him in a coalition. Nevertheless, his victory may complicate political alliances and destabilise the political process, while giving Mr Wilders a bigger podium from which to advocate a radical agenda that includes a Dutch exit from the EU.

A month after the Dutch election, France will choose a new president in a two-round election on 23 April and 7 May 2017. Incumbent Socialist president Francois Hollande enjoys a record low 15% approval rating by the French electorate, making him very unlikely to gain the support in the first round necessary to be on the ballot in May.

Headlines have been captured by the rising popularity of Eurosceptic Front National leader Marine Le Pen whose support was not hurt by the sequence of attacks on Charlie Hebdo, the Bataclan theater and thePromenade des Anglais in Nice. On the right, Les Republicains could run either ex-president Nicholas Sarkozy or Alain Juppé, the mayor of Bordeaux and one-time Prime Minister of Jacques Chirac between 1995 and 1997.  Both may be able to beat Le Pen on the second-round election. On the left, prime-minister Manuel Valls and Emmanuel Macron, the outgoing economy minister, are the only potential alternatives tothe unpopular president, but it is unclear if they could defeat Le Pen.

Since the election in December 2015 and notwithstanding the results of another election less than 3 months ago, Spain remains in a political deadlock caused by the rise of the left-wing Podemos and the centre-right Ciudadanos parties.

Last month’s failure by Mariano Rajoy, leader of the centre-right Popular Party (PP), to gain the support of parliament to form a government has alerted Parliamentarians to the fact a third failed attempt by the end of October could lead to an election on Christmas Day 2016. This could facilitate a decrease in voter turnout, which could favour the PP. However, if this fails, the backlash from other parties could be such as to further polarise parties and extend the political deadlock.

Greece’s inability to shed the instability triggered by the 2010 debt crisis creates a rich minefield of liquidity deadlines. The last bailout (the third since 2010), worth €86 billion was agreed on 16 August 2015. Of this total, €28.9 billion have been disbursed in increasingly smaller tranches during the last year. The latest disbursement, worth €7.5 billion, was provided in June 2016. However, another promised €2.8 billion necessary to pay two €1.4 billion short term government bills scheduled to mature on 7 October and on 4 November will only be disbursed if further reform targets are reached. The viability of long term international support will be tested again before the end of the year, when the deadline for an agreementon the debt haircuts that IMF demands Euro-Zone creditors accept as a pre-condition for its participation in any future Greek bailout expires. Without such relief, the saga is likely to continue with the country facing another €10 billion in maturing debt during 2017.

None of the above events is likely to bring the European project tumbling down in the next nine months. Indeed, none of them is likely to result in a complete overhaul of the status quo. But in nine months’ time the political landscape will have become more hostile to mainstream parties, with mounting political deadlock probably matched by increased financial flight to safe haven.

This article was originally published by Global Risk Insights and written by GRI analyst Filipe Albuquerque.

The post Six Events that Will Shape Europe in the Next 9 Months appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

The Philippines is the latest U.S. treaty ally that has shown a proclivity for a more independent role for itself in the realm of international relations. This follows a trend in which Turkey has reconciled, to an extent, relations with Russia, as well as more independence shown by Japan in its own Russian affairs. The Philippines itself is not only showing its own independence with respect to Russian relations, but to Chinese relations as well.

On the macro level, ASEAN as a whole has seen its role as fulcrum to the region rise exponentially. Once derided as a “talk shop”, ASEAN itself is at the epicenter of various competing “pivots” to the region. For example, despite its own conflict with China in the East China Sea, Japan is gradually forging its own pivot to the South China Sea as well in order to better balance its historic rival.

Aside from Japan, Russia and India are also implementing their own respective “pivots” to Southeast Asia for their own respective agendas. India, still suspicious of being navally encircled by China a la “String of Pearls”, is looking to gradually increase its South China Sea forward presence. Although not technically allies, this no doubt pleases the U.S., which is really looking for other major powers to assist its own balance against China.

Russia’s game in Southeast Asia is bit more complicated. Russia’s “Asian Pivot” serves multiple purposes. First, it aims to offset decreased Western trade and investment flows due to post-Ukraine sanctions with increased economic ties to China. However, in order not to become too dependent on China, economically or politically, Russia is looking to bolster its “pivot” portfolio.

As a result, Russia is seeking to improve ties with a range of regional players, not only Japan, but Southeast Asian states Vietnam, and now the Philippines. Additionally, Russia is looking to counterbalance U.S. activities in its Eastern European and Central Asian spheres of influence with a payback of sorts with activities of its own in the U.S.’ Northeast and Southeast Asian spheres of influence.

Despite recent controversial statements by its new President, the Philippines still looks to the U.S. as a vital plank in its overall security calculus. However, it is not the only plank. Most notably, the Philippines is looking to gradually improve relations with China.

This overture towards China comes despite the recent unfavorable ruling against China by The Hague’s Permanent Court of Arbitration regarding conflicting South China Sea claims. Even though the Philippines originally initiated the case, it has chosen to take a rather mature path. This is because the Philippines is using the ruling as the start of negotiations with China, rather than as a final end.

Mirroring recent Chinese comments that South China Sea disputes form only one component of U.S.-China affairs and should not be allowed to poison the entire relationship, the Philippines has made the same argument with respect to Sino-Philippine relations. The Philippines also hopes this multi-vector foreign policy approach will give it more independence and increased leverage with both the U.S. and China in order to pursue its own interests.

In contrast to China, Russia has only relatively recently sought to improve economic relations in earnest with Southeast Asia as a whole. As the Philippines already is a member of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and is eyeing possible TPP membership in the future, Russia’s more immediate value proposition to the Philippines lies in the political and security realms.

From the Filipino perspective, it is greatly appreciated that Russia has expressed neutrality in the Philippines’ South China Sea conflict with China. Even though Russia and China have recently warmed relations considerably, they still are not formal treaty allies. This fact not only keeps the Philippines from worrying about Russian support for Chinese claims in the region, but it also gives the Philippines enhanced leverage with both China and the U.S..

This second fact is not to be taken lightly. Even though the Philippines has a 2014 Visiting Forces Agreement with the U.S., the agreement is not without controversy and the new Filipino President has promised to review it. Even though the original idea behind the agreement was to allow the Philippines to better balance China with U.S. assistance, a Russian component is unavoidable.

While it may also secretly see increased regional U.S. forces as a deterrent to Chinese ambitions, Russia’s comfort level with this presence is definitely lower than the Philippines’. Just as the Philippines is using the agreement to keep China in check, it is simultaneously using its own unease (and Russia’s too) with the agreement to help keep the U.S. in check as well. In summary, increasing multi-polarity is allowing the Philippines more wiggle room in its dealing with all major powers, akin to non-U.S. allies India and Vietnam.

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Nadia Murad escaped ISIS and witnessed the Yazidi genocide. After escaping sex slavery by ISIS, the brave survivor turned activist became a voice for the thousands of Yazidi women who are still suffering under the Islamic State.

The primary use of an army has always been to give an opportunity to protect innocent people from the worst fate imaginable. Death was not even the worst option for many of these victims. Torture, rape, humiliation and targeting of children would be the catalyst for societies to decide to defend themselves from barbaric acts that would lead to their eventual extinction.

In 2016, these actions are occurring on a daily basis, and the media gives non-stop 24 hour coverage of the most mundane of first world problems. To focus on the absurd rather than give even a few seconds to the victims of what could be argued are the worst crimes to ever be committed against human beings is simply wrong, and goes against every fibre of any society. It is not unreasonable to think that all minorities will be wiped out of the Middle East very soon, simply because of our lack of interest.

America as a modern entity was forged out of the actions they took in the first half of the 20th century, helping what they saw as other moral democracies achieve goals that were for the betterment of humanity as a whole. They did not do this perfectly, sometimes taking on shadowy actions themselves against their enemies, claiming it was for the greater good. Often it was, but with the end of the Second World War and liberation of millions of enslaved peoples, America was not perfect, but it did show a moment of greatness in the epic of human civilization.

In 2016, genocide of the type never accepted before is being placated by our barons of information. The gross language of word play on the issue of genocide is nothing new for governments. I recall the regret of many world leaders in our modern era when discussing their actions during the genocide in the Balkans and especially Rwanda.

To speak away ones obligation as a powerful nation for political expediency requires a new label for a new type of crime. Anyone who studies law knows this will never occur, but the moral outrage should be there just the same. Earning political capital off the backs of those who perished for the sake of a few votes and a reduction of first world problems should be the number one reason a politician loses their employment and credibility. It is the first thing wrong in any society, and those individuals who make games of the embarrassments of humanity will never contribute anything positive to it.

In an article published last month “What Yazidi Refugees Fleeing ISIS Want Americans to Know”, the author documents what is occurring in what is likely the lowest point in our history of human civilization. The narrative begs American citizens, and to infer as well, their President, election candidates and the rest of the civilized world to not let them perish in the most horrible of ways, to stop their extinction and to remind us all that we are of the same human family. The end of those people will become a blight on the souls of all sensible individuals for the rest of human existence. While allowing their extinction to occur is not in violation of any law for those ignoring one of the worst genocides to have ever occurred, the eradication of one of the oldest societies is a tragedy.

This is the only issue that really matters, and if a candidate is willing to address it and end this holocaust then they deserve their mark on humanity. The statement: That occurred in the generation that occupied the era of 2016, is not yet written, but it is our contribution to our ancestors and our future children. That will be our legacy, and it has already begun.

The post At the Brink of Extinction, They are Asking for America’s Help appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Printing money: our only idea?

The recent G-20 summit occurred just a few weeks after a symposium of global central bankers, which put questions of the global economy in the spotlight. However, as only a few voices note, the discourse largely glosses over the extraordinarily distorted shape of global finance and the perils that raises.

In short, the global economy has been leaning on monetary policy—the printing of money by central banks —to avoid decline. The evidence is in an unprecedented incidence of negative interest rates, particularly for trillions of dollars worth of sovereign bonds.

As national authorities have limited their fiscal spending, out of political or budgetary constraints, central banks, which create money, have pumped it in to stimulate their economies. They have bought bonds for years, and in the process they have lowered the benchmark rates on financial instruments. As economies revive, they would normally be expected to raise rates, and sell the bonds back into the markets, but that hasn’t happened.

Thus, rates go to zero—and beyond, most notoriously in the EU but also in Japan. Even in the U.S., the Federal Reserve has signaled an intention to raise its rates for years, but has only announced one hike of the Fed Funds target rate, from zero to a quarter percent. The ECB has apparently bought bonds directly from corporate issuers, essentially making loans directly to those companies, for lack of bonds to buy elsewhere.

The knock-on effects distort economies further. Pension funds’ earnings on their assets do not cover payments they will owe future retirees. To find yield, they invest in increasingly risky bonds and stocks, apparently raising the market risks to pensioners’ savings to defray the risk of benefit-payment shortfalls. Meanwhile, firms are loading up on debt, which raises their risk profiles, a notable one being the now-defaulted Hanjin Shipping, which had a debt to equity ratio of about 6 to 1.

The image that emerges is one of stagnant economies burdened by debt, as the last tool for stimulus taps out. The prospects for growth remain bleak, while the dangers of debt increase every month that borrowers’ cash flows fail to grow. The picture is global: the EU is constrained by its economic crisis, plus Brexit, plus the questions around refugee flows; the U.S., despite its mild optimism, is still jittery; China is in a deep economic adjustment; the oil economies are subject to both the competitive effect of fracking and the weakness of global demand; and export-driven economies are left with no buyers.

Even were there a general disposition to acknowledge these risks, solutions would be difficult to craft. But both the central bankers and the G-20 leaders seem inclined to talk around this scenario, though it seems implicitly understood.

Fear that was known but unaddressed while old practices continued marked the geopolitics of 1914 and the financial markets in 2007-8. Anyone in finance during the latter period may remember risk assessments that concluded with “… if that scenario happens, this deal will be the least of our problems.” On top of the risks in place and the disinclination to fix them, we now also know that nightmares can come true.

There are those who say that one never knows where growth originates, and all we can do is muddle along. Certainly the known tools for stimulating growth seem to have been exhausted, and no one can see brilliant new policy or market methods. It would seem that there is a basic problem of somehow restoring what Keynes called the ‘animal spirits’ of at least a few of the major economies. But, in any economy one can name, the social, political, and/or psychological scene is mired in negativity. Perhaps muddling through will eventually lead to stabilization and a return of confidence. For that or for quicker answers, we might start praying.

The post See No Evil? Distorted Finance and Economic Risk appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Vietnamese counterpart Nguyen Xuan Phuc witness the two countries’ officials signing a military cooperation agreement at the Government office in Hanoi, September 3, 2016. (Reuters)

New evidence appears to show Beijing restarting large-scale land reclamation in the disputed South China Sea, despite an international court ruling rejecting most of China’s claims. It suggests China had ordered barges to Scarborough Shoal and begun construction, according to a statement by Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte last Friday. In the face of Beijing’s continued actions to assert its territorial claims, other nations are partnering up to increase their military ties and defense cooperation, including Vietnam and India.

Last Saturday’s visit to Vietnam by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the first by any Indian prime minister in 15 years, resulted in Modi offering his Vietnamese counterpart Nguyen Xuan Phuc a credit line of $500 million for defense cooperation.     

The two countries are already cooperating on numerous defensive fronts, with New Delhi having earlier supplied Hanoi with another credit line of $100 million to purchase offshore patrol boats. Through the purchase of the patrol boats, Vietnam hopes to stop attacks on its fishermen—some 200 Vietnamese fishermen were attacked by Chinese boats in 2015, according to local Vietnamese government officials. India is also training Vietnamese military personnel in the operation of the Russian Kilo-class submarine.  New Delhi also spent $23 million this year to set up a satellite monitoring station in Ho Chi Minh City, which will be activated soon and linked to an existing station in Indonesia.

More significantly, Hanoi has requested to purchase the supersonic Indo-Russian BrahMos missile from India, reputed to be the world’s fastest cruise missile at speeds up to three times the speed of sound. The unit cost of the BrahMos missile is $3 million, with a range of 290 kilometers (180 miles), and can be fired from land, sea and submarine. Negotiations on the purchase are expected to conclude by the end of the year. New Delhi is also considering a proposal to offer Hanoi a battleship armed with configurations of eight or 16 BrahMos missiles each. Vietnam sits at the top of the list of countries for Indian export of the missiles, followed by the Philippines. The other 9 nations expected to purchase the missiles from India include Malaysia, Thailand and United Arab Emirates.

So why is India, which sits far from the South China Sea, involving itself in this particular maritime dispute? New Delhi has no territorial claims in the area, and defense cooperation by New Delhi with those nations who are party to territorial disputes can only anger Beijing. Jeff M. Smith, Director of Asian Security Programs at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, argues, “Policymakers in Delhi were long constrained by the belief that advanced defense cooperation with Washington or Hanoi could provoke aggressive and undesirable responses from Beijing.”    

Perhaps India’s greater involvement comes as New Delhi is growing more concerned that Beijing’s increased assertiveness in the South China Sea may extend to territory close to India. India shares a border with China, to which India deployed 100 tanks in July following an “increase in force levels” from China. China has also been busy building key infrastructure such as power stations, highways and seaports for the small island nations surrounding India. While Beijing rails against a perceived “containment” by the U.S., New Delhi may be feeling the same, as Beijing funds arch-rival Pakistan’s military and docks its submarines in Sri Lanka. 

This latest offering of military assistance by New Delhi to Hanoi is a continuation of Modi’s foreign policy of reaching out to neighbors, in an effort to contain Beijing’s aspirations to geopolitical control and military presence in the region. Last March, Modi announced the provision of military and civilian assistance to the island nations of Maldives, Mauritius, the Seychelles and Sri Lanka, including the supply of patrol vessels, surveillance radars and ocean mapping services.

Most likely, Modi no longer considers New Delhi’s restraint as effective, having seen Beijing’s threats to freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea, and the illegal construction of an artificial islands. When dealing in future with Beijing, Modi’s latest overtures toward Hanoi make it clear New Delhi has finally traded its carrot of non-interference for a stick of dynamite.  

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“I’ve been, in one capacity or another, in the intel business for fifty-two years and I don’t remember a time when we had been beset by more crises and challenges around the world, and a diversity of these crises and challenges than we have today.” –Remarks by James Clapper, March 2nd 2015.

“…unpredictable instability has become the “new normal,” and this trend will continue for the foreseeable future.” -Remarks  by  James Clapper Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Feb 9th 2016

I’ve opened with the two above quotes, not because I’ve turned into the mythological Chicken Little running around wrongly screaming that the “sky is falling”, but because I genuinely believe we are at a major cross road in national security policy. I agree with DNI Clapper. I’ve seen a lot in my life but never have I seen a time with greater threats to our national security. I’ve blogged about it before, but I believe we are currently involved in two world wide wars: an undeclared Cyber War and a global war against terrorism. The mainstream media mostly focuses on terrorists attacks in Europe and here in the U.S. Speaking before the Senate this year, Clapper reported “Violent extremists are operationally active in about 40 countries”. The 2015 Global Terrorism Index declared Boko Haram, which operates primarily in Nigeria and has pledged its allegiance to ISIS, the most dangerous terrorist group in the world.

In addition to terrorism and cyber, Russia is playing Pacman in Eastern Europe, China is now claiming much of the East and South China Seas and building “artificial islands” to back up those claims, North Korea keeps conducting provocative missile tests to include successfully firing a missile from a submerged submarine, and the fight against the Taliban in Afghanistan continues. During his aforementioned testimony before the Senate this year, DNI Clapper addressed some other potential problem areas with national security ramifications stating:

“Seven countries are experiencing a collapse of central government authority, and 14 others face regime-threatening, or violent, instability or both. Another 59 countries face a significant risk of instability through 2016. The record level of migrants, more than one million arriving in Europe, is likely to grow further this year. Migration and displacement will strain countries in Europe, Asia, Africa and the Americas. There are now some 60 million people who are considered displaced globally. Extreme weather, climate change, environmental degradation, rising demand for food and water, poor policy decisions and inadequate infrastructure will magnify this instability.”

In November we as voters must decide who the next President and Commander-in-Chief of our military forces will be. Call me old fashioned or a Geek but I believe we are doing ourselves and our nation a disservice if we don’t make an effort to educate ourselves on the key issues. In this era of “if it bleeds it leads” and/or covering major issues with controversial “sound bites” journalism, it is up to the individual to research issues in order to be better informed. Thanks to the wonders of technology, there has never been a better and easier time to do this. In my opinion, events like the Aspen Security Forum provide an invaluable service. Not only do they bring together national security leaders and policy makers in one venue but if you can’t attend they live stream these events on the web. One of my favorite moments from this year’s event and one that got the biggest laugh of the week was when Cyril Sartor, a senior CIA official, remarked: “it feels a little weird as well for a CIA officer to be live streaming on YouTube”. If you don’t have time to watch the videos they also have transcripts of the sessions on the Aspen Security Forum web sites.

I’ve already written two blogs on this year’s forum. For this last one I thought I’d share more of what jumped out at me from speakers focusing on Russia and China.

Elissa Slotkin, Acting Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs made the following key points:

– Putin is disgruntled with how the Cold War ended and is looking for ways to be a global peer competitor of the U.S. He is pushing where he thinks there’s weakness; he’s pushing to see how far he can get.
– He is using cyber as a tool of statecraft.
– U.S./NATO approach is strong and balanced. The strong means the U.S. and NATO have to have the capabilities they need in the right places to deter Russia and we have to support partners, not our allies but our partners, in building their resilience in response to Russia Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, that’s the strong.
– On the balance side, it’s absolutely holding open the idea that there are things of mutual interests that we should negotiate with and work with Russia on Iran deal, Syria, if we could possibly do it, and holding the door open for them to rejoin the family of nations in international standing, good international standing. We don’t want to be adversarial with the Russians […] we can’t stand aside while they push and illegally annex places and sow dissent in places and destabilize places.
– Pentagon looks at capabilities and intentions. In capabilities, they’ve seen significant modernization of the Russian military and seen them create a doctrine of conducting unpredictable snap exercises where they suddenly build up divisions of troops on their borders and then sometimes, as in Crimea, use that as a cover for an invasion of another country.
– They use “hybrid” techniques like cyber, their use of space, their use of propaganda and other asymmetric tools that are deniable, hard to see, and hard to identify as indications and warning the way we have in the past seen as a buildup before an invasion.
– Intent […] With Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, it was clear…going in to back up Assad, […] without any forewarning, […] sets a certain tone and it opens up certain questions about their intent. Their activities in terms of engaging in an extremely close proximity with U.S. forces, almost taunting U.S. forces, it just leaves open these fundamental questions about intent. So when you put those two together, capabilities and intent, it leads you down a road to an assessment that Putin has decided to take on a decidedly more aggressive foreign policy. And that deeply concerns us.
– Hope we have learned from Cold War not to overestimate the competitor. We were at fault for thinking that the Soviet Union was this amazing, uncrackable empire and there were many places, particularly in the U.S. government that just fundamentally did not predict the fall of the Soviets.
– We should be taking those lessons […] and applying them to Putin’s Russia today. They’re not unbeatable. They are not operating from a position of strength.

Heather Conley, a Senior Vice President, from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) made the following additional points:
– […] the piece that we are really missing […] Russia’s growing anti-access/area denial capabilities […] they are increasingly able to deny NATO and U.S. access to areas should we want to get in there. And we don’t have an answer for that right now.
– The other component that’s not quite there yet is the maritime component. We’re starting to get our hands around the increase in Russian submarine activity; anti-submarine warfare has to come back.

I disagree with Secretary Slotkin’s point about the Cold War. There seems to be this revisionist train of thought that the intelligence community over estimated the military capabilities of the Soviet Union and did not predict the fall of the Soviet Union. I spent most of my career in intelligence focused on not just the military capabilities of the Soviet Union but also trying to determine their intentions and when and under what circumstances they would flex their military muscles. I didn’t track the internal issues unless it had to do with their military spending. That did not mean that other members of the intelligence community weren’t watching what was happening in the internally in the Soviet Union.

I remember vividly the first person in the intelligence community to tell me the Soviet Union was going to fall because of their dire economic situation. This happened in the mid ‘80’s. I remember this not because of the analysis itself but because of the personality and character of the person who told me. He was the most dishonorable, back stabbing individual I ever ran into while working in the military but he was also one of the most brilliant. He had lived in the Soviet Union for a number of years so he had first hand knowledge of what he was talking about.

I don’t know if Ms. Slotkin was also implying that the intelligence community over estimated the Soviet Union’s military capabilities but I can say that intelligence estimates on capabilities were based on “close” observation of their military forces. In their book The Admiral’s Advantage , Christopher Ford and David Rosenberg remark:

“the Navy continually operated inside and among our opponent’s forces, maneuvering against real Soviet Units on a daily basis in an everyday life of war without the shooting on, above, and below the sea’s surface.”

Sometimes things got more personal. For example, in 1984, the aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk ran over a Soviet Submarine in the Sea of Japan.

I mentioned to Secretary Slotkin, that during the Cold War, President Reagan established a policy that before a proposed war plan became operational it had to be war gamed. During the games, intelligence analysts simulated command of the opposition forces. One of the main purposes of these games was to ensure the U.S. warfighters were familiar with how the Soviets would use their various war platforms in a conflict. I asked if they had conducted war games against simulated hybrid threats like those posed by Russia. She replied:

“We love our wargaming at the Department of Defense, rest assured you cannot imagine. You might even be concerned by the amount of wargaming we’ve done on these scenarios because, as the last questioner mentioned, it’s just so different for us. So we have done—this is what I’m talking about when I say contingency planning. Our contingency planning is based on a number of wargaming scenarios that showed us what we think the most likely invasion scenarios are and they’re not traditional. So, absolutely. If you’re interested in playing Team Red, we are happy to sign you up, but we have done significant wargaming on different scenarios.”

I agree with Heather Conley’s comments on the maritime component. In June of this year in an issue of U.S. Navy Proceedings magazine Vice Adm. James Foggo III outlined a new era in U.S. and Russian submarine warfare he dubs “The Fourth Battle of the Atlantic.” You can read the whole article here but one of the key points is:

“In the early 1990s, the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and commentary such as Francis Fukuyama’s landmark essay “The End of History?” led us to believe that our strategic rivalry with Russia and our need to stay one step ahead of Russian capabilities had faded. It has not. Once again, an effective, skilled, and technologically advanced Russian submarine force is challenging us. Russian submarines are prowling the Atlantic, testing our defenses, confronting our command of the seas, and preparing the complex underwater battlespace to give them an edge in any future conflict. Vice Admiral Clive Johnstone, Royal Navy, the head of NATO’s maritime forces, noted recently that his forces report “more activity from Russian submarines than we’ve seen since the days of the Cold War.” 2 Some analysts believe that even our underwater infrastructure—such as oil rigs and telecommunications cables—may be under threat by these new and advanced forces. Russian focus, investment, and activity in the undersea domain are now so unmistakable that even the head of the Russian Navy, Viktor Chirkov, has admitted that Russian submarine patrols have grown 50 percent since 2013.”

Next week I’ll conclude with some thoughts on China. As always my views are my own.

The post GailForce: Aspen Security Forum—Final Thoughts appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Chart: Sunni provinces of Iraq and Syria in Turkish and Egyptian occupation zones. Click to enlarge.

Much debate has taken place on the topic how the Islamic State should be militarily defeated, including various combinations of US, Russian, European, Turkish, Iranian and Arab powers. However, too little is being said on the political solution after the military campaign. Maintaining united Syria and Iraq may be favored by Iran wanting to extend Shi’a rule over the Middle East or by Turkey wanting to prevent emergence of an independent Kurdish state on its southern border. Experience with the post-occupation Iraq (2013-16) clearly shows how national unity governments fail to achieve political stability in countries with progressing ethnic emancipation. In this article, I would like to describe the political solution for the Sunni Arab portions of Iraq and Syria after the defeat of the Islamic State: a temporary Turkish and Egyptian occupation.

As I argued in my previous article “Partition of Syria and Iraq: Lessons from Europe”, Iraq and Syria after the Arab Spring are different places than they used to be before. Arab Spring was mostly a Sunni Arab national revolution and the Sunni-Shi’a strife became much more about ethnic identity than religious dogmas. I argued that leaving Syria and Iraq united countries would lead to further tragedies. I showed examples of failed federations in the Third World and described why existence of united Iraq and Syria are obstacles in introduction of democracy as well as further Arab integration. Therefore, there is an urgent need for partitioning Syria and Iraq along ethno-religious lines.

In another article “Sunni Areas Post-ISIS: Occupation by Sunni Powers?”, I argued that Sunni Arab populations of Iraq and Syria are unable to govern themselves in the next few years while their ruling by the Shi’a regime in Iraq and Alawi regime in Syria lead to popularity of the cancer of Islamic State among the Sunni Arabs in the recent past. I argued that global powers like the US or Russia lost their popularity in the Middle East with their military occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan, respectively. Therefore, they cannot be occupation powers in Iraq and Syria any more. I also argued why small and middle-sized countries cannot do this job after bad experience with international adventurism of their rulers like Qaddafi or Saddam. And I also mentioned why active role of Saudi Arabia and Israel are unacceptable.

Military occupation is a task that must be assigned to countries with a status of regional powers and with relatively stable political regimes and operational armies. After ruling out Saudi Arabia, the only two Sunni powers that are suitable to become occupation powers are Turkey and Egypt.

Turkish President Erdogan and Egyptian President al-Sisi stand on two opposite poles of the political spectrum in events related to the Arab Spring. Turkey was the main supporter of the revolutionary forces led by the Muslim Brotherhood while the current Egyptian regime is one of the strongholds of counterrevolution and return of the Ancient Regime. However, both Turkey and Egypt are regional powers and they are able to conduct on a responsible manner as regional powers do. Both powers have or renewed their historically good relations with the great powers—The United States, Russia and China, with another regional powers—Israel and Saudi Arabia, and their status is more or less respected by the Arab public opinion.

That is why after defeat of the Islamic State and after evacuation of Assad’s regime to the Mediterranean coast, Sunni Arab territories of Iraq and Syria should get under occupation authorities of two Sunni Muslim regional powers—Turkey and Egypt.

After July 15-16 coup attempt in Turkey, a presidential dictatorship has been installed that was previously rejected by the voters in the two elections of spring and fall 2015. Selahattin Demirtaş, leader of the pro-Kurdish parliamentary party HDP, was one of the first politicians to reject the coup and to support President Erdogan. Despite that fact, Kurdish voters became a target of oppression as their vote was the main obstacle for installing a presidential rule a year earlier. Also, hunt for sympathizers of Fethullah Gülen became a mission for the new presidential regime.

Nevertheless, the attitude of the political parties to the military coup attempt showed an unprecedented national unity among Turkish Islamists, leftists and nationalists of AKP, CHP and MHP. This unity allows for mid term political stability in Turkey. It is a guarantee for their common political interest in stability of the occupied portions of Iraq and Syria. Refocusing of the Turkish army to a military occupation of parts of Iraq and Syria could relieve Turkish population suffering under the witch-hunt against the Kurd and Gülenists.

In Egypt, the military regime is still preoccupied with eradication and elimination of the Muslim Brotherhood. This witch-hunt is accompanied with an unprecedented wave of terror and hunt for political opponents of the regime. Refocusing of the Egyptian army to a military occupation of parts of Syria and Iraq could relieve Egyptian population suffering under this terror.

Partitioning of Syria and Iraq to occupation zones ruled by regimes from the opposite poles of the spectrum of attitudes to the Arab Spring would guarantee that the Sunni parts of Iraq and Syria would not become dictatorships after withdrawal of the occupiers. Egypt would tolerate development of secular and nationalist political forces including Baathist/Assadist ones in its occupation zone. On the other hand, Turkey would attempt to restore Muslim Brotherhood in its zone. This is a prerequisite for future political pluralism in the new Sunni countries. However, eradication of relics of Islamist extremism and Jihadism would be the main task for the two occupation powers, be it linked to al-Qaeda or Islamic State, or Wahabism and Salafism promoted by Saudi Arabia.

In Syria, nine governorates can be considered predominantly Sunni Arab: Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor on the east, Aleppo and Idlib on the north, Hama and Homs in the middle and Damascus, Dara and Quneitra on the south. In Iraq, there are four old and one newly established governorates that are Sunni: Niniwe/Mosul on the north, Salahaddin and Diyala on the northeast and Anbar and the newly created Falluja (since January 2014) on the northwest. So there are 14 Sunni Arab governorates in total. They should to be split between the occupation powers—Turkey and Egypt.

Logically, an option with an equal number of governorates ruled by Turkey and Egypt, seven and seven, should be achievable. Further, northern governorates should be logically occupied by Turkey while the southern ones by Egypt. There are two dominant cities in the southern part of the Sunni Arab areas: Damascus, the Syrian capital, and Western Baghdad, a part of the Iraqi capital. Another two dominant cities with an original population of two million are in the northern part of the Sunni Arab areas: Iraqi Mosul and Syrian Aleppo. So the Turkish and Egyptian occupation zones would be equal as for the number of metropolitan areas.

Map: Occupation and Protection zones in Iraq and Syria. Click to enlarge.

The Turkish occupation zone on the north would logically include Iraqi governorates of Mosul/Niniwe, Salahaddin and Diyala and Syrian governorates of Aleppo, Raqqa, Idlib and Hama as well as metropolitan areas of Mosul and Aleppo.

The Egyptian occupation zone on the south would contain remaining two Iraqi governorates of Anbar and Falluja, and five Syrian governorates of Damascus, Dara, Homs, Deir ez-Zor and Quneitra as well as metropolitan areas of Damascus and Western Baghdad.

At the same time, it must be said that those Sunni occupation zones must exclude Kurdish and Christian portions of Diyala, Salahaddin, Niniwe, Hasakah, Raqqa, Aleppo, Idlib, Hama, Homs and Damascus governorates as well as predominantly Shi’a districts of Diyala, Salahaddin and Niniwe governorates.

Individual provincial administrations should be under direct military rule of the occupation armies. Early free elections as well as a demand that only Syrians and Iraqis should decide on their own future are unrealistic and they would result in further mass suffering. Central governments of the Sunni parts of Syria and Sunni parts of Iraq (Jezira) should be created only after several years of pacification under Turkish and Egyptian occupation authorities—something similar to post-war Germany in 1945-49 and Austria in 1945-55.

Withdrawal of the Turkish and Egyptian occupation forces could be only possible after stabilizing of the Sunni portions of Iraq and Syria and after creating of the central government of Jezira (Sunni part of Iraq) and the Sunni Syria. On these territories, two Sunni Arab states would be created: the Arab Republic of Syria with Damascus as a capital and the Arab Republic of Jezira with Mosul as its capital.

Sunni Arab refugees from Iraq and Syria to Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon and the EU would get an opportunity to to return to Turkish or Egyptian occupation zones of Syria or Iraq, as soon as the security situation allows that.

It is true that the Islamic State represents one of the worst political regimes that ever emerged in the Middle East, combining the most conservative attributes of Salafism with delusion and militancy of modern Jihadism and brutality and apostasy of Saddam’s and Qaddafi’s ideological militia, all wrapped in sophisticated mass manipulation techniques used by the totalitarian regimes of the 20th century and IT skills typical for the 21st century “Big Brother” regimes of Russia and China.

But the same Islamic State was successful in correction of historical injustices caused by the hundred years old Sykes-Picot Agreement and uniting the divided populations of the northern Mesopotamia, also called Jezira. The inhabitants of the Syrian territories of Mesopotamia—Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor—got an opportunity to reunite with their historical kins in northern Iraq under the rule of the Islamic State.

As the defeat of the Islamic State should bring a stable solution for Iraq and Syria, the population of the two provinces of Syrian Mesopotamia must be given an opportunity to decide in a referendum whether they prefer to remain part of Syria or become part of Jezira together with the Sunni territories of the Iraqi Mesopotamia

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In this virtual roundtable of six podcasts hosted by Professor Sarwar Kashmeri, the Foreign Policy Association aims to shed some light and serve as a catalyst for developing awareness, understanding and informed opinions on the key issues that face American policymakers as they seek to peer over the horizon to manage the U.S.-China relations.

In the fifth installment of the virtual roundtable, Stephen Roach—former Chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia and the firm’s chief economist, and senior fellow at Yale University’s Jackson Institute of Global Affairs—discusses the commercial and financial relations between the two biggest economies in the world.

When asked about the strategic significance of the shift in wealth from the West towards Asia—with China’s GDP overtaking that of the U.S. according to the IMF—Roach replied: “On a per capita basis there is still an enormous disparity, with China still qualifying as a high income developing economy.”

Roach counterbalanced this view, noting that: “Strategically, scale is important—China, because of its aggregate GDP, dominates many flows in finance, in trade, in the commodity markets, oil, natural gas, automobile demand. The strategic significance of China’s scale certainly cannot be minimized in Asia and in the broader global economy.”

On a slowdown of China’s economic growth, Roach explained: “There has already been a disruption: the manufacturing economy is clearly going more slowly in a weak global environment. The external demand for Chinese-made products has slowed dramatically, and the lagged impact of a stronger Chinese currency over the last ten years has taken a toll on Chinese competitiveness as has mounting wage costs of workers in export-intensive industries. That shock is already there.”

http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/wp-content/uploads/S-Roach-WCOPY-081716.mp3

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Eager to relieve discontent at home and faced with entrenched issues of governability, stretched resources and security threats from regional Islamist insurgencies, President Mahamadou Issoufou’s government signed a controversial labour agreement with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) late last year. The KSA has a dubious record of protecting the rights of migrant workers whilst Niger remains a source, transit, and destination country for men, women and children trafficked into various forms of modern day slavery, including commercial sexual exploitation, forced begging, domestic servitude and forced manual labour in sectors like agriculture or mining.

Much of Niger’s issues with slavery remain firmly domestic, including an estimated 43,000 people held in so-called descent-based slavery. Human rights groups say that this traditional practice is particularly entrenched in Niger’s Tuareg, Berber Arab and Fulani ethnic groups. However cases of forced labour or exploitation can be found across the country and are not just limited to traditional cultural practices or certain parts of Nigerien society. Such a lax domestic atmosphere around labour rights combined with weak government controls and serious issues of governability now help to foster a climate of impunity for people traffickers taking labour overseas.

Campaigners have long warned of Niger’s status as a regional source of slaves, such as the practice of ‘Wahaya’ where women or girls of slave descent are sold as so-called ‘fifth wives’ to men from local ethnic groups living in Niger and neighboring Nigeria. These fifth wives are seen by wealthy men as a status symbol, and are used for domestic and agricultural tasks and forced to have sex with their masters, who also keep any children they bear. Niger has also long been used as a transit point for sub-Saharan migrants being trafficked north to Europe or north-east to the Middle East.

However the addressing the domestic problem of slavery in Niger is being complicated by the worrying rise of new forms of exploitation and forced labour driven by demand overseas. Last autumn Niger’s Ministry of Labor, Employment, and Social Security signed an agreement with the Saudi Manpower Solutions Company (SMASCO) after talks in Niger’s capital of Niamey. The agreement covered the recruitment of workers from Niger for jobs in Saudi Arabia, including roles for housekeepers, truck drivers, gardeners, nurses and cattlemen.

This is an issue because of the frequent reports which for years have raised concerns about the mistreatment of migrant workers in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, particularly Saudi Arabia. Following negative publicity a number of countries have banned their nationals from working in the Kingdom. The Saudi record has raised alarm among migrant rights groups that Niger is simply repeating the experience of nearby Mauritania, whose government signed an agreement with the KSA to provide labour, only to be forced by adverse publicity into banning its nationals from working there after reports began to emerge of hundreds of Mauritanian nationals being mistreated or imprisoned by their employers.

While the conditions of Niger’s agreement with the KSA specified that its migrant workers are to be allowed free movement within Saudi Arabia, to keep their identity cards, and to give the female workers secure dormitories to live in, a warning by the Saudi Labour Ministry in June raises questions of how tightly the Kingdom supervises migrant workers’ employers in practice.

Dr. Mohammed Al-Falih, assistant undersecretary for inspection, warned Saudi citizens against the illegal recruitment of workers through social media, and using it for the provision of labour services or leasing of employment services to third parties. Recruitment of workers is theoretically only supposed to be done after obtaining a license from the Saudi Ministry of Labour and Social Employment. Meanwhile Saudi citizens interested in recruiting a domestic worker are only supposed to use the Ministry’s list of approved companies.

But in practice Saudi employers frequently bypass such official regulations and procedures while the idea that recruitment fees to workers are an investment to be recouped somehow has a strong cultural hold in Saudi minds. Rights groups have documented evidence of Facebook pages and groups being used for cross-border recruitment, of foreign workers transferred between employers in different Gulf countries to evade bans in their home countries on working in the KSA, and of some employers illegally renting out their workers during periods of high demand such as Ramadan.

Social media has become a particularly prominent marketplace for domestic workers over the past four years, and it has been recorded that some Instagram accounts ‘sell’ maids to other employers by arranging to transfer the workers’ visas to the online ‘buyer’. Nor is this the only dubious use of social media recorded in the GCC. In one Kuwaiti example from 2014 an Instagram account was used to post photographs of absconded maids and listed a telephone number for Kuwaiti citizens to share the maids’ pictures with one another over WhatsApp.

The account also listed instructions on how to trap the women in the country through reporting the case to the police rather than the maids’ recruitment agency. According to Kuwait’s employment laws absconding workers caught by the authorities can be forcibly returned to their sponsors or deported.

Recent reports from Mauritanian nationals to both civil society groups and their government’s law enforcement authorities highlighted the vulnerability of other West African nationals to exploitation and abuse in the KSA and indeed the wider GCC area. Yet Niger is even less governable and developed then Mauritania, ranking 188th on the UN Human Development Index, compared with Mauritania’s ranking of 156.

With many embassies reluctant to interfere in employer-employee relations abroad, and the Nigerien government’s record on the issue of slavery at home extremely mixed, Nigerien workers recruited for work in Saudi Arabia are at an especially high risk of abandonment should their employment situation turn against them.

While international attention has so far focused on maintaining Niger’s shaky democratic transition and helping President Mahamadou Issoufou’s regime contain the threat of regional Islamist insurgencies, agencies and donor governments should also investigate the situation of Niger’s workers once they start to return home at the end of their visas. Pressure should also be put on the KSA authorities to police Saudi employers more tightly. The protection of Nigeriens abroad could do a lot to improve the way the country treats its workers at home.

The post Niger Migrant Workers Vulnerable Overseas appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Clay figures in Uzbekistan

Although it hasn’t been definitively established, late nineteenth and early twentieth century British politician and statesman Joseph Chamberlain has recently been credited with coining the phrase, “may you live in interesting times.” It has long been known as the “Chinese curse” despite the fact that no such Chinese saying is known to exist. However, whether meant as a curse or a simple observation, for three former Soviet republics situated just to the west of the Middle Kingdom, the phrase has become quite appropriate over the past few weeks.

The country with perhaps the most tenuous hold on stability is Uzbekistan. After a Francisco Franco-esque deathwatch, Uzbekistan’s president Islam Karimov is dead. Although apparently rumored to have shuffled off his mortal coil for several years, Karimov fell into a coma and expired in the evening of September 2 after having been admitted to hospital in an unconscious state almost a week earlier.

As Karimov had no plan for succession in place, Uzbekistan’s quest for future leadership is shaping up to quite Shakespearean in tone. Appointed as the top communist in the then Soviet republic in 1989, Karimov became president of the newly-independent state upon the USSR’s demise in 1991. From then on he kept hold of power via rigging elections and eradicating dissent, which reportedly included boiling dissidents alive. All the while several clans from the country’s seven regions have been attempting to maneuver their way into power. Now that Karimov is no longer in the picture, the struggle is almost certain to kick into high gear.

The three main contenders in Uzbekistan’s Game of Thrones are Prime Minister Shavkat Mirziyoyev, National Security Service (SNB) head Rustam Inoyatov, and Deputy PM Rustam Azimov. Inoyatov is the muscle that has helped keep Karimov in power to this point, as his SNB has made liberal use of illegal incarceration, torture, rape, and burning of real property. However, Inoyatov is notoriously reclusive—exactly one confirmed photograph of him in the past decade is known to exist. Mirziyoyev is the longest tenured of the trio, having been in office for thirteen years. His reputation for harshness is well known, but is considered to have more brawn than brains. Azimov is considered to be the less hard-line choice, however there are rumors to the effect that he has been arrested and is therefore out of the picture entirely.

The succession crisis is being played out before the backdrop of a mass exodus of its citizenry. Thanks to Karimov’s decades of brutal religious repression, a particularly virulent brand of Islamic extremism has festered up to the surface. According to reports, hundreds of Uzbeks are believed to be fighting for ISIS in Syria, and an Uzbek citizen is one of several suspects in the attack on an Istanbul airport earlier this summer.

To the east, Kyrgyzstan has found itself at the center of an international incident. A suicide bomber drove a minivan into the Chinese embassy Kyrgyzstan’s capital Bishkek last Tuesday, killing himself and wounding three Kyrgyz nationals on staff at the embassy. Although no group has yet come forward and claimed responsibility for the incident at the time of this writing, state security services are preliminarily fingering Uighur separatists from the adjacent Chinese province of Xinjiang.

The Uighur minority in China has had a longstanding dispute with Beijing over its heavy-handed treatment of their number in Xinjiang. Although one can trace the initial dispute as far back as 60 BCE, the most immediate cause of unrest in the region dates back to 1955, when Xinjiang became an autonomous region of China. Uighurs (and the other ethnic minorities in the region) have long bristled under the rule of Han Chinese, whom they view as interlopers, and Beijing has responded by resoundingly harsh crackdowns of dissent. The conflict intensified after Mao had a falling-out with Khrushchev in 1962, and the Soviets began backing Uighur uprisings.

Kyrgyzstan has a small Uighur population (around 1.1%), but the country has encountered problems with Uighur militants crossing illegally from Xinjiang. The issue came to a head two years ago, when eleven Uighurs alleged to be members of a militant group were killed by border guards.

The bigger problem faced by the country may be that of radical Islam. Hizb ut-Tahrir, an Islamic extremist group with ties to al-Qaeda, is believed to be active in the country despite it being banned a decade ago. And, along with Uzbekistan, a suspect in the late attack at the Istanbul airport is a Kyrgyzstan native, one of possibly hundreds who have joined the fight alongside ISIS in Syria.

Kyrgyzstan’s big brother to the north is probably the most stable of the three Central Asian countries figuring in the news recently. In Kazakhstan, President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s government is certainly facing its challenges: earlier this year his government cracked down on widespread demonstrations against plans to privatize large tracts of farmland, and, a scant few weeks later, Islamic militants executed a terrorist attack in a city in the northwest.

Though many experts expect Kazakhstan as the next domino to fall into the chaotic abyss into which Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are teetering, it seems that the worst could be over for Kazakhstan. Astana hosted delegates from over four-dozen countries in a conference aimed at ending nuclear weapons. Kazakhstan seems a strange place for such a conference, until one realizes that its Semipalatinsk region was the Soviet Union’s version of a nuclear weapons firing range.

Between 1949 and 1989, the region was the site of over four hundred separate nuclear weapons tests. An area the size of Germany is contaminated by nuclear fallout, and over 200,000 people living in the region suffered varying degrees of harm to their health. In addition, as one of only four countries to give up its nuclear weapons, Kazakhstan has a degree of credibility on the issue that few other countries have.

Looking ahead there is more reason to expect Kazakhstan to maintain its relative stability. Astana will host next year the Expo 2017, which will turn around “Future Energy” and is expected to attract over five million visits from some 100 countries.

Though Kazakhstan is unlikely to be mistaken for a bastion of freedom any time soon, it is safe to say that, at least at the current juncture, it is charting its own course on the often-roiling waters of Central Asia. And, at least for now, reports of the region’s complete foundering are greatly exaggerated.

The post Living in Interesting Times in Central Asia appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

The Chinese government’s paranoia is showing again.

On August 30, China’s State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television (SAPPRFT) issued an official notice ordering all Chinese entertainment news outlets to cease programming that “promotes Western lifestyles” or pokes fun at traditional Chinese values. All programming must promote “positive energy,” according to the notice, and must comply with Chinese Communist Party ideology. Violators may be punished by having their programs suspended or their production licenses revoked (China Digital Times, Global Times, Shanghaiist, South China Morning Post, Xinhua).

This notice from SAPPRFT is only the latest in a series of anti-Western ideological measures by China’s current leadership under president Xi Jinping. Rules announced in June tightened restrictions on “foreign-inspired” TV shows, insisting that programming must promote “socialist core values, as well as patriotism and Chinese traditions.” In 2015, universities were ordered to clamp down on textbooks and other teaching materials that “promote Western values.” Chinese women have even been warned against dating foreign men because they might be spies. Noted as “China’s most authoritarian leader since Mao,” Xi Jinping has also taken China in a decidedly xenophobic direction.

While they engage in such silliness, China’s censors might wish to consider how it would look if the United States or some other Western government were to issue such a warning against the promotion of “foreign lifestyles” on TV. How would it look, for example, if the U.S. government warned against depictions of Chinese martial arts on American TV? How would it look if the British government warned against showing Bollywood films? How would it look if programming in any Western nation were banned for poking fun at itself or its traditions?

It would look ridiculous and weak, of course. No Western government would engage in such silliness, however, because Western governments are mature, legitimate world powers, not tinpot dictatorships in fear of their own extinction.

Nonetheless, China expects to be accorded “great power” status equal to the United States. A government that denounced a video game as a form of American “cultural aggression,” banned TV depictions of time travel, and censored comparisons of former president Jiang Zemin with a toad from Chinese social media wishes to be regarded as a “great power.”

China’s censorship rules have reached a “new level of absurdity,” writes China policy analyst J. Michael Cole. “The [Chinese Communist Party’s] gradual descent into regulatory madness suggests that it is losing its grip on reality and on the people whom it seeks to control.”

Wishing to appear strong and confident, China’s rulers only reveal their own weakness and fear through such absurd ideological campaigns.

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History never repeats; but it rhymes, and it often echoes. Robert Kaplan’s 1990 book Soldiers of God chronicled his experience reporting on the mujahidin (multiple spellings exist; I’ll be using Kaplan’s preferred spelling). These native Afghan militias resisted the Soviet Union’s 1979 invasion of Afghanistan and ultimately repelled it. Kaplan’s book was republished following September 11, 2001 with the subtitle “With Islamic Warriors in Afghanistan and Pakistan”. Kaplan’s examination of their brand of Islam, how it motivated their actions and their end goals, remains topical in the current climate of terrorism motivated by a violent brand of Islam. What can Kaplan’s study of the mujahidin teach us about ISIS?

The 9/11 attacks threw a spotlight on Afghanistan and the ruling Taliban regime that provided safe haven to Osama bin Laden. Before 9/11, the Taliban and Afghanistan itself received scant attention; it took terror attacks on the American homeland to bring them fully into America’s strategic sights. Similarly, Kaplan argues, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the carnage it caused was a “forgotten” war. Soviet failures there represented, in Kaplan’s view, “’premonitions” that the Cold War was in its final phase. The mujahidin, therefore—in a manner only clear in retrospect—were a bridge between America’s Cold War-era national security framework and the beginning of the age of global terrorism.

After the Soviet retreat and eventual collapse, however, America forgot Afghanistan again, to its own great loss. Kaplan’s description of the mujahidin includes elements ascribed to ISIS currently—namely an adherence to fundamentalist Islam and an adjacent willingness to fight and die on its behalf. From that point of commonality stem many differences in mujahidin ideology, tactics, and goals that make a comparison with ISIS worthwhile and instructive.

Kaplan observed mujahidin who were motivated by a fundamentalist Islam characteristic of ISIS. Where ISIS cultivates a communal religious fervor, the mujahidin were more individualistic. In Iran and much of the Arab world, Kaplan noted, prayer is often a mass activity with the “reciting of the worlds, syllable by heated syllable, begetting a collective hysteria reminiscent of the Nuremburg rallies. The cries of Allahu akbar carried a shrill, medieval, bloodcurdling ring.” These political overtones to prayer did not exist among the mujahidin to the same degree. They were defending their homeland from invaders; they were not at war against a entire foreign culture. “Afghanistan had never been industrialized, let alone colonized or penetrated much by outsiders,” Kaplan writes, and as a result “…the Afghans had never been seduced by the West and so had no reason to violently reject it.” Prayer itself was a solitary activity, not a group one.

Kaplan describes the mujahidin responding to Soviet campaigns that were wars of attrition; centered on skirmishes rather than traditional battles, and involving civilians fully. Soviet forces targeted civilians. Kaplan describes the protracted Soviet “carpet bombing” of Kandahar, and writes that Soviet mines killed approximately thirty Afghans per day throughout the conflict. Afghan forces strategized in kind. While previous conflicts from World War II to Vietnam had involved high civilian casualties, ISIS’ ability to capture large swaths of urban territory against state forces is an inversion of the mujahidin’s defensive successes against the Soviets. There are no battlefields in ISIS campaigns, and the Afghan people’s full participation in fighting the Soviets—as mujahidin fighters or as victims—foreshadowed the ISIS campaigns of the past several years.

Kaplan’s picture of the mujahidin differs from the portrait painted by the recent long-form New York Times story (“Fractured Lands”) of the long-term unemployment and political disaffection among Arab youth that provided fertile conditions for ISIS to thrive. Where ISIS both recruited in urban territory and took that territory militarily, Kaplan describes the mujahidin as “in many respects a bunch of ornery backwoodsmen, whose religious and tribal creed seemed to flow naturally from the austere living conditions of the high desert—unlike the more abstract and ideological brand of Islam of the Taliban”. Unlike ISIS, the mujahidin did aspire to create a new form of government; they were defending a way of life. Their aim was to obstruct a superpower from conquering their country long enough that it gave up trying to do so. Unlike the mujahidin, ISIS not only has to hold territory in the long term, it has to govern.

One of the benefits of looking back to history for historic parallels to current events is seeing the role that factors such as cultural distinctions, geography and demography play in world events. Islam is not a monolith. The groups that would manipulate it for violent ends are not either. Developing a security strategy against terrorism often invites an inappropriate “one-size-fits-all” mentality.

The terms “militant Islam” and “radical Islam” have been rightly criticized for unfairly staining the name of a peaceful religion with the actions of its violent fringe. Both terms could be applied to ISIS and the mujahidin—very different groups that were (in ISIS’ case, that are) not monoliths in themselves. Kaplan produced a qualitative study of the mujahidin that parallels the value of “Fractured Lands” in the depth of its detail. As an antidote to broad-brush, one-size-fits-all thinking, such studies are invaluable.

The post Can the Mujahidin Teach Us About ISIS? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Photo: PEAS

Nestled in the beautiful Ugandan hills two-hours west of the capital Kampala, sits Pioneer High School. The rural secondary school, set over 10km away from the next senior school, has a thriving student base of 472 student—54% of which are female. Headteacher Francis Kyanja sits on the steps of the staff dormitory at the highest point of the school grounds, looking back over the classrooms blocks to the rolling hills in the distance and, in the foreground, students reading and playing on the grass following a day of study. The school day here is long: lesson prep often begins at 7.30am and by the time the final bell is called at 4.30pm, teachers and students alike are ready for a hearty meal and some well-earned relaxation time.

Headteacher Francis has not only ushered a regionally cutting-edge and rigorous educational program, including history, science, arts, mathematics and religion, he was able to arrange an off-grid solar electricity system installed within the school grounds, providing electricity to the community for the first time.

In Uganda, as everywhere, it is inarguable the importance of education and the need to advance societies.

To that fact, there are bold global goals for universal education access, namely the United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals. Too often, however, education ends at primary school and millions of students are unable to continue their studies due to financial, gender or regional limitations. To help bridge that gap, UK social enterprise PEAS (Promoting Equality in African Schools) has built and manages sustainable secondary schools to allow African children receive further education that otherwise wouldn’t. The organization attempts to ensure that all of their schools are financially self-sufficient enabling them to run, independent of international aid, for the long-term.

Headteacher Francis has situated himself at an elevated position in order to gain mobile phone signal, intermittent at best in this region. He has agreed to speak with me via Skype, the first time he has ever used the platform, to discuss the impact a power supply brings to student learning.

Pioneer High School is situated in a coffee growing community, not directly in a village, and is about 50 km outside of Kampala and about 7 km away from the main road. Its purpose is to hone their students’ skills and knowledge, along with providing boarding for students. The rural area does not lend easy connection to the national grid, thus there has been no access to electricity to date. In fact the closest power line is near the main road. Francis is unaware of any future plans for extension of the transmission and distribution network, thus localized generation has smartly been turned to through a small-scale solar system. Centralized generation with high-voltage, long distance transmission lines have a place, but for small rural communities, off-grid systems are the most effective option to gain access to electricity.

Electricity is, in many ways, an additional lifeblood of an advancing community. Without electricity there are no lights, refrigeration for vaccines, charging for phones, or using computers, among the myriad of other uses in today’s world. Electricity provides a conduit to open doors instead of being trapped in the cycle of poverty. Francis noted that with the electricity, there is now the ability to connect with the outside world, as our Skype call was testament to, and to relay events domestically and globally.

As well as speaking with the Headteacher, I had the opportunity to spend time talking to two ambitious, friendly and gracious students who were excited to share their new experience. Naudrine, a confident 17 year old boarding student, wants to become either a doctor or an engineer, and her favorite subject is chemistry. She explained, as I noticed her visible happiness displayed by her facial features, how having the access to electricity and lighting provides her time to complete her studies in the evening and to prepare for class the next day. She also stated that the electricity in the school along with the fenced areas surrounding the school provide an extra sense of security.

Peter, a smiley faced 16 year old, told me his favorite subject is mathematics and desires to become a businessman. He too echoed the opening the electricity provides for night time studying, thus being able to advance his studies. He continued that the solar electric system was a living science experiment to learn from.

Both Naudrine and Peter, who have faced various challenged in their youth, were unequivocal that education and electricity have transformed their daily lives.

The system power house is about 10 meters from the school and near the solar arrays, which houses the batteries, electric box, invertors, and other technical system materials, with the conduit running to the school. The system has been designed to be expanded in the future and to reach the local area to provide new development opportunities, which students—including some members’ children—currently benefit from. The electricity would be sold to provide income to further sustain the school or offset school fees.

Currently, though, a very important additional benefit of the current electricity system is the ability to have better security, which is extremely comforting to the students who attend only day classes. There is 24 hour security for the compound and there are plans to continue the security efforts to build lights down the path from the school.

The system installed consists of advanced technology, thus onsite maintenance was necessary to be learned before the installers departed. New Age Solar Technologies (NAST), located in Kampala, designed, installed and does assist with the system when problems arise. However, NAST educated students on maintenance procedures so they now assist in keeping the system functioning to avoid any system disruptions.

Away for the school, the region is poor and households are reliant on firewood for cooking, heating and light, without access to electricity or cookstoves. Unlike other regions, charcoal is not frequently used as well.

Gathering the firewood, almost exclusively by women—young and old, takes away from time that could be used more productively. Much of the economy is agrarian based— specializing in coffee—and the flow of money is sparse and access to markets in not readily available. Moving beyond firewood collection, more time in the day could provide, for example, the ability to start a small business and bring coffee to market. Increased income can help pay school fees and sustain attaining solar lanterns and keeping them charged, enabling openings of other aspects of socio-economic growth.

As we come to the end of our discussion, Headteacher Francis talks a little about his own experience. He has worked with PEAS for 5 years and his passion for the project is clear. He has acquired various additional skills such as: leadership and administrative skills and feels touched to work with the organization that has such a great mission and vision. He says solar has given them a great opportunity to improve the community’s outlook.

Francis stated the area is thankful for PEAS providing the opportunity, for the students and himself, to have the chance to deliver secondary education and for the school to have an off-grid solar system to provide electricity to bring the associated benefits. He knows the combination will enable great benefits to the region.

After the inspiring chat, I was left with the impression that Francis, Naudrine and Peter will be able to attain their goals thanks to their ability to attend Pioneer School and having new access to electricity.

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Former Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff talks with  President Michel Temer at the Planalto presidential palace in Brasilia, March 2, 2016.

In Canada, a country considered one of the least corrupt in the world, there are several scandals taking place involving government funds going to special interest groups. The offense felt by the general public over a pay-for-play system is very apparent. A system where those with influence and money have excessive power in choosing government policies that benefits them or their organization runs against basic democratic values.

It is unacceptable that the wealthy should have special access to political leaders, when average people end up with the bill and years of burdens from bad policies. In many countries there are similar issues, and the public sentiment likely mirrors that of those in my own community. One of the worst cases of this type of corruption is currently taking place in Brazil, and their President will likely be impeached because of it.

There is not a clear legal case for the impeachment of elected Workers Party (PT) leader and Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, as the main charge over breaking budget rules is a meek accusation. The Senate hearing is using the budget rules issue as a catalyst for her impeachment, placing the responsibility of an entire corruption scandal involving mostly her PT party as well as other professional political agents on her Presidency.

With mass protests taking place against her government for the last two years and low approval numbers, the Senate seems to be making a political decision on her personally by way of scandals in her PT party. It has been predicted that her ouster as President will be successful, and the rest of her mandate will be taken up by the leader of an opposition party, Mr Temer.

President Rousseff has been fighting for her political career, claiming that this move by the other branches of government is tantamount to a coup. While the separation of powers in democracies does allow for other branches of government to check the power of the executive branch, a clear legal case might not be present in judging Rousseff’s actions personally. While there is no doubt her party is deeply involved in an atrocious corruption scandal, removing the President by means of a weak legal case may cause more political divisions than are required in this type of political scenario.

Rousseff should be aware that while the case against her is as much partisan politics as it is an unclear constitutional process, the extreme corruption that took place under the Petrobras scandal and damage to average Brazilian citizens has delegitimized her PT party greatly. Protests for Dilma and against her may take place several times before the end of the 2018 presidential term of office, but keeping her in office would be an awkward move considering many in her PT party may be removed promptly due to scandals.

Michel Temer, the current President was not elected himself, and the question of his party’s legitimacy without an election will give rise to more divisiveness in Brazil when a strong and legitimate government is needed to clean up politics and the economy.

An election is needed to confirm the right to lead in Brazil. While Temer may take advantage of his two years in power to put in austerity measures, whether they are needed or not, legitimacy in taking such actions should be confirmed by the people of Brazil. While the PT may opt for an election as opposed to impeachment, the reality is that many of the political leaders under scandal will not be returned to government.

As those of us outside of Brazil would want our pay-for-play political leaders removed from positions of power, Brazilians should be able to not only have those political leaders removed once a crime is discovered, but be able to replace them with legitimate alternatives chosen via a direct democratic method.

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(Nancy Ohanian / Tribune Media Services)

As the peak of El Niño wanes, it seems to signal the arrival of La Niña, and the impacts are having an extremely serious effect. Average global temperatures for July hit the 15th consecutive record-breaking surge: 0.87 ℃ higher than the average for the 20th century. This trend in global warming has heightened the probability of catastrophic natural disasters, challenging the risk management capability of governments.

In the Southern Hemisphere, one of the worst regional droughts in 35 years swept over southern Africa, leaving 23 million people in urgent need of humanitarian assistance, according to the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The international community, in response, pledged $2 billion worth of contributions to El Niño-affected countries. Yet, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reports that $4 billion more is needed to make up for the total damage.

Meanwhile, the flood-inducing El Niño in North America bombarded Baton Rouge, Louisiana, with 6.9 trillion gallons of rain in just one week, causing 13 deaths and $20.7 billion worth of damage to more than 110,000 homes. Battling with the worst natural disaster since the superstorm Sandy, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) urged affected residents to register for federal disaster relief funds for which more than 95,000 residents had applied as of 19th of August.

Nevertheless, FEMA’s limited resources, epitomized by the maximum grant of $33,000 per household, barely provide a safety net for the applicants. What is making the picture gloomier is the fact that only 42% of the FEMA-designated high-risk flood areas in Louisiana are insured through the National Flood Insurance Program; the number drops down to 12.5% in the neighboring vicinities.

Governments in the regions exposed to natural hazards are on the verge of failing to cope with the recent natural disasters’ enduring impacts on human life. The burdens, however, could be significantly lessened by action from the private insurance companies, namely their active engagement in the climate and natural disaster insurance industry in terms of workable Public-Private Partnership (PPP)-based arrangements.

The benefits of successful PPP in climate and natural disaster insurance are, in theory, synergetic. It ensures that governments at all levels can be certain of formal risk-transfer mechanisms upon the occurrence of contingent events, allowing for effective management of governmental budgets. In the insurance market, private insurance companies’ locally tailored products not only efficiently provide financial liquidity to insured individuals during the ex-post recovery process but also pre-emptively reduce the risks by altering these individuals’ ex-ante behaviors.

With well-functioning market mechanisms, the price (the rate) is gradually set and stabilized in a more transparent way, which incentivizes governments to set up more fairly priced policies. Partnering private insurance companies also benefit from taking advantages of the scale of PPP; it allows them to reduce operational and premium costs and to competitively enhance their capacity to deal with high volumes of client profiles and large-scale data analysis. In the end, insured individuals best-minimize their exposure to risks.  

Despite the assumed benefits, the engagement of private insurance companies with the climate and natural disaster insurance industry has, overall, been unenthusiastic. Whereas the average global weather-related losses rose by ten times from 1974 to1983 ($10 billion per year) compared with 2004 to 2013 ($131 billion per year), the average percentage for the losses that are insured dropped almost half over the last four decades. Attributing the decline to the increasing chance of being exposed to catastrophic natural disasters under intensifying climate change and urbanization, pundits propose that PPPs in climate and natural disaster insurance should be either reformed (in the case of existing PPPs) or updated to reflect the changes.

In the U.S., the debate over FEMA’s National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) reform is becoming heated prior to next year’s reauthorization of the program. In the aftermath of post-Sandy, controversies over fraudulent claims as well as partnering private insurance companies’ moral hazards of exploiting marginal profits, both policymakers and pundits are looking for solutions to reduce the program’s $23 billion deficit and to improve its efficiency.

Some of the suggested reforms are highlighted here: the introduction of risk-based rates, the provision of assistance to socio-economically vulnerable residents in high-risk areas, including the provision of the right to be informed about records held on property, the strengthening of the program’s accountability in monitoring, evaluating, and enforcing the program’s provisions, the modernization of the PPP’s outmoded bureaucratic technology, and, lastly, the sharing (diverting) of the risk through the private insurance market (including reinsurance).

All these options, however, require the market to function effectively. For instance, calibration of current government premium rates in high-risk areas to risk-adequate ones should be well-designed to offer private insurance companies incentives to attenuate their market exit, while encouraging the residents living in high-risk areas to move to safe areas. Also, the ability of the reinsurance market to assume the NFIP’s risks through the purchasing of the primary policy provider’s coverage plans should be carefully assessed.

The successful market-based modernization of some of the world’s mature disaster management PPPs such as the NFIP should bring a positive message about the role of the international insurance market; for example, in helping developing countries to minimize their climate-related risks through the use of innovative financial products like catastrophe bonds.

Although the climate and natural disaster insurance industry is still in the inchoate phase of its development in many developing countries, several pilot programs (involving trials of innovative insurance products) are being administered in areas that are susceptible to natural disasters. Microfinance is one of the products that has been designed to protect people on low incomes in exchange for a premium that is tailored specifically to their needs. Weather index insurance is another that pays out benefits based on a predetermined event index, rather than on loss itself.

The post Time for Public-Private Partnership Innovations in Natural Disaster Insurance? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

In this virtual roundtable of six podcasts hosted by Professor Sarwar Kashmeri, the Foreign Policy Association aims to shed some light and serve as a catalyst for developing awareness, understanding and informed opinions on the key issues that face American policymakers as they seek to peer over the horizon to manage the U.S.-China relations.

In the fourth installment of the virtual roundtable, Professor Toshi Yoshihara, John A. van Beuren Chair of Asia-Pacific Studies and professor at the U.S. Naval War College, discusses the U.S.-China relations in the light of the ruling against China’s claims in the South China Sea by the permanent court of arbitration in The Hague.

Asked about the significance of the ruling, Prof. Yoshihara responded “I think the tribunal’s ruling is a big deal because it sets the record straight in terms of the international law’s view of China’s claims which is that […] their historical rights in the South China Sea were superseded by the laws of the sea treaty.”

He went on to elaborate: “On the one hand, this represented a major diplomatic and legal setback for China. On the other hand, China is standing firm and has articulated that it will not back down from its claims, that it does not recognize the jurisdictional authority of the tribunal and that it will do nothing to enforce the court’s ruling.”

http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/wp-content/uploads/T-Yoshihara-WCOPY-081716.mp3

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The Good Old Days of Michel Platini (1986 World Cup in Mexico)

Astronomical amounts of money are being spent on soccer (football) transfers. These days, no one is shocked at news of multi-million dollar signings.

When he was the president of the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA), Michel Platini stood by his view that the record €94 million which Real Madrid paid to sign Cristiano Ronaldo was “a serious challenge to the idea of fair play.” “Players are not free and they don’t even belong to clubs… they belong to financial holdings, companies, or people,” describing transfer amounts in a media conference a “form of robbery.”

Current transfer fees definitely dwarf those of older generations. In 1938, when Bryn Jones left Wolverhampton Wanderers for £14,000 (about £7 million in today’s money), politicians were outraged by the money spent and the subject was debated in the House of Commons.

Sports like soccer can be seen as miniature economies.Europe is considered the largest transfer market in the world: it has the most successful, well-known clubs and the best players are attracted to its national leagues. Its transfer environment is subject to different layers of rules and regulations established by sports governing bodies. Yet, ever since oil money arrived in the soccer world, the game has gone money mad. Following Paul Pogba’s reported world record transfer from Juventus to Manchester United for US$115.90 million on August 2nd, it is worthwhile to get a feel for soccer inflation with relation to the evolution of world record transfers since 1893.

Speaking of soccer inflation, have you ever wondered how much, for instance, David Beckham’s 2003 move to Real Madrid would cost in modern-day cash? When the transfer was unveiled, the global superstar described the €35.9 million move as a “dream.” In today’s money, adjusted for inflation, it is more than €43 million. Take another example: Cristiano Ronaldo’s €94 million move in 2009 would be of an adjusted fee of €102.4 million. The Bleacher Report has compiled a list of the top hundred most expensive transfers in history with inflation in mind.

I wonder how much a legend like Diego Maradona would cost in modern day soccer. Maradona was bought by Napoli from Barcelona for US$6.5 million in 1984, which is the equivalent of the Italian side paying him almost US$19.5 million today. Comparing Maradona’s adjusted fees with those of the other super-stars of today proves that soccer inflation is running wild.  And taking into account the inflationary trend of transfer fees, we will not be surprised to see signings approaching US$250 million, or even more, in the coming decades.

It is also interesting to look more closely at how this transfer expenditure is spread throughout the big five league clubs which shows that a process of concentration of investments is taking place. While clubs that invested the most in transfer fees are logically among the wealthiest (Real Madrid, Barcelona, Manchester United, Manchester City, Chelsea, and Paris St-Germain), teams having benefited from the ten most expensive football transfers in history of soccer also belong to the small circle of financially dominant teams.

This reinforces the increasing correlation between financial resources available and results, meaning that European soccer suffers from an important economic polarization: a limited number of clubs (those with the largest incomes and/or supported by economically powerful investors) makes the most important part of transfer expenditures.

Unlike the traditional way of thinking, the soccer industry is not simply a market of pure and perfect competition. In essence, Europe is slowly embracing a system of closed leagues (at the elite level) which is also reflected in the results of UEFA competitions year after year. We should consequently consider amendments to the regulatory framework governing transfers to achieve the policy objectives of a fair play, notably with regard to contract stability, which shall have a positive effect to fight against soccer inflation.

Analyzing the workings of competition within well-defined rules (just as we see in our economy) would also make it easier to effectively combat speculation and third-parties’ involvement in soccer in so far as the sums of all transfer payments must be spread over the entire chain of clubs having contributed to the sporting development of players.

The bottom line is: rather than merely looking at soccer transfers as monetary figures, UEFA and the national governing bodies should start studying any possible factors behind the existence of monopolistic structures in the soccer industry, both at the local and continental levels.

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(Associated Press)

When the International Court of Arbitration in The Hague announced the result of the arbitration on the South China Sea dispute case, the Chinese government and the public reacted strongly. The People’s Daily proclaimed: “Sovereign territory can in no way be less, even by a little bit,” while nationalism filled the Chinese microblogging platform Weibo.

The Global Times condemned it in writings, with articles suggesting China to consider leaving the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as a fightback to its injustice, citing that if the U.S. could do so, why not China? Yet, the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China stated firmly at the press conference on July 12 that China would uphold the Convention. In fact, there will be more harm than good if China indiscreetly denounces UNCLOS.

Before discussing if China should leave the UNCLOS due to the dispute in the South China Sea, we need to recall how the Convention was created and its nature. The concepts that are well-known today like ‘territorial waters’ and ‘exclusive economic zone’, which are related to national maritime sovereignty and interest, were not formed in the 17th or 18th century. The understanding towards maritime rights was not unified among the coastal countries in Europe at the time. For instance, the Dutch International Law expert Hugo Grotius once advocated to define the limit of waters which a country could exercise sovereignty by the limit of coastal defense artillery range. Today, such a definition seems inconceivable. As for the Eastern World, the International Law is such a modern concept to this region that even until this day, there is limited understanding of it. Without the convention, pure law of the jungle would return.

After World War II, each maritime country declared their territorial waters ranging from 12 miles to 200 miles, yet the operation was very confusing. In order to reach a consensus and to avoid unnecessary conflicts, the negotiation lasted for more than 30 years involving 168 countries. Eventually, delimitation of ‘territorial waters’, ‘exclusive economic zones’ and ‘international waters’, regulations on resources rights within the boundary, dispute resolving mechanism and so on were drawn. This is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, it is hence called by many legal experts as the ‘Constitution for the Oceans’.

Of course, just like other international treaties, there had been compromises and fierce debates during the process of negotiations of the convention. The final product is not perfect, and each country is still questioning the convention due to possible interest conflicts. The U.S., one of the earliest advocate of this convention, has yet to obtain an approval from her congress to join the convention. Many congressmen were concerned that it may harm U.S. maritime interests because the convention classifies resources in the international waters as ‘common heritage of mankind’. There are also concerns that this would be exploited by the Soviet Union and its satellite countries. The attitude of the U.S. has been widely criticized by the international community, especially when she remained stubborn after the Cold War. This might be one of the reasons why China finds this convention contemptible.

Yet, the consequence of U.S. not joining the UNCLOS (and leaving some international institutions) serves as a positive reference for China. For example, in the level of international law, the U.S. accusation against China in the South China Sea ‘default’ loses its power due to its identity, and the U.S. loses many opportunities to act in the name of international law. Once China took the initiative to leave the UNCLOS, it would completely lose the moral high ground and the pivoting point for Beijing to wrestle with Washington, making it harder for China to avoid the U.S. military presence in the region.

Even worse, the withdrawal would be compared to the withdrawal of the ‘Axis powers’ from the League of Nations, which eventually leads to World War II. This definitely brings no benefit to China. Asia-Pacific countries would strengthen the promotion of “China threat theory” because of this. Other regional powerful nation who are willing to respect international law would cooperate with ASEAN countries, forcing China to adopt a passive diplomacy strategy.

Another school of thought views the contemporary international law as rules imposed by the previous winners of international politics onto everyone else. As China becomes more powerful, it can selectively obey favorable treaties and ignore the unfavorable ones. Such attitude is the basic logic of ‘status quo challenger’, which is a label China has tried to avoid being tagged. The consequence of China’s quitting UNCLOS would be worse than the consequence of U.S.’ absence from the convention as it means a denial of the international order when the UNCLOS was signed.

The international community is indeed actively avoiding any notion that indicates a sense of hitting the “restart button”. Although some countries are not happy with some terms, the current mechanism provides a lot of rooms for reservations and exemptions without getting the whole body moved. China understands this very well and has made good use of this sentiment upon joining the convention by submitting a written statement to the United Nations a decade ago stating that it would refuse to accept arbitrations for any dispute and advocated a negotiated settlement.

More importantly, the same convention brings China many significant maritime rights and interests, as well as related institutional protection. For instance, the UNCLOS provides the right of common development of resources in international waters, which protects those countries that possess relatively backward ocean mining technology, such as China. According to the convention, International Seabed Authority, which is one of the United Nations branches, is in charge of the coordination of resources development outside the exclusive economic zones. In 1991, as a signatory state of the International Seabed Authority, China was allocated 150,000 square kilometers of areas of exploration. 75,000 square kilometers of the said area’s exclusive rights of exploration and commercial exploitation priority rights was granted to China. This area, which was carefully selected by China, is a ‘treasure’ full of metal mineral resources.

China’s related rights are also protected by the convention. In 2011, China signed a contract with the International Seabed Authority and gained exclusive rights of exploration in 10,000 square kilometers seabed in the Western Indian Ocean. This has triggered India’s dissatisfaction, but China used the rights protection mechanism of the UNCLOS as a reason to refute India ‘s position. With the progress of China’s technology in offshore exploration and deep-sea mining, the maritime rights and interests gained and protected because of her membership in the UNCLOS will be fully utilized in the future. If China denounces the convention, the loss in the future deep waters mining rights would be inestimable.

In fact, even in the face of the current situation in the South China Sea, China can still make a case as a signatory state of the UNCLOS. This is exactly Chinese government’s recent official position: although the Chinese government can question the legitimacy of the arbitration result, it would be driven by ‘the maintenance of the dignity of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’ other than denying it. In return, this might help China regain the moral high ground of the international community so as to hedge the negative impact caused by the arbitration. In the early days, China condemned western concepts like ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom’, yet in recent years she knows how to ‘respect’ those words but emptying their meanings and interpret them in her own way in order to speak louder in the international community. This strategy also applies to the attitude of how China sees international law.

If China is determined to play the game by training a large number of professionals like what Japan did a hundred years ago, who handled international law with absolute academic attitude (for example, Japan’s arguments in the defense of her sovereignty on ‘Senkaku Islands ‘ were tailored with reference to international law), China would soon discover loopholes in the current system and could make good use of them for her national interests.

This is how a rising power could play the game: fairly, lawfully, reasonable, and serves the country’s interests. Perhaps the sheer force admirer might look down on this, but today’s international community is no longer in the era of muscle-power diplomacy. The so-called ‘international law’ and ‘diplomacy’ should be used at the right time and in the right context, or else they might mean very different things. These terms are indeed ingenious in its ambiguity. The commentaries that suggest China to leave the UNCLOS are doing more harm than good.

That is why even the Tai Kung Pao, a leading pro-China newspaper in Hong Kong, has published a signed article to alert relevant proposals like this. The seriousness of such irresponsible comments is apparent.

The post The South China Sea Dispute: Should China denounce the UNCLOS? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

On July 15th, the world saw the consequences of the long-lasting struggle between religious forces and the secular military contending for control of the Turkish state. In the aftermath of the failed coup, the government in Ankara reacted with a series of purges unseen in Turkey’s recent history. Initially limited to the military, the punitive measures have now reached all corners of Turkish society. So far, more than 18,000 people have been reported detained, with another 60,000 suspended from office. Judges, journalists, academics, and civil servants have been among the victims of what some describe as the “biggest witch-hunt in the history of the [Turkish] republic.”

But the upheaval has not only highlighted the fragility of Turkey’s democracy; it has also revealed how little liberal democratic countries can interfere. The declaration of the state of emergency and the escalating number of arrests and suspensions has been deplored by civil society groups across the world. Outraged academics have denounced the arrests and suspensions of their peers. Journalists have decried the fate their Turkish confreres are facing. Many expected a firm condemnation of the illiberal actions the Erdogan administration orchestrated in the aftermath of the failed coup by their governments.

Much to their disappointment, most political leaders have limited their initial comments to carefully worded, deliberately vague reminders on the importance of the rule of law and the right of due process for the culprits of the coup. The gap between the normative expectations of how much foreign governments should be opposing the Erdogan administration versus what external actors actually can achieve through diplomatic means leads to a situation where public opinion is more outspoken than their respective governments in criticizing the actions of another state.

Those outside Turkey who demand more proactive checks on Erdogan’s expanding power base tend to disregard the limits imposed upon political leaders by the single most important ordering principle of the international system: state sovereignty. State sovereignty continues to govern our world and explains why leaders in democratic countries have exercised cautious restraint when commenting on the recent events in Turkey. This oft-overlooked but fundamental principle has both internal and external dimensions, both of which constrain a larger international response.

Internally, sovereignty defines “the highest authority within the state”.[1] In Turkey, the constituted power and hence the national sovereignty lie with President Erdogan and the elected government, who enjoy the authority to enact punitive policies against the alleged plotters and to restore order within the boundaries of the Turkish state. Of course, sovereign power does not automatically legitimize any measure taken by a state. Under international law, violations of peremptory norms— including the prohibition of genocide, slavery and torture—transcend inculpability, making the allegations of torture in Turkey especially serious. However, even if these allegations turned out to be true, external actors could only challenge the means but not the ends of Erdogan’s retaliatory policy.

External sovereignty applies more broadly to Turkey’s rights as an independent state. It is defined as a form of recognition that guarantees a state’s existence in an anarchic international society. In simple terms, states act according to a principle of equality where “none is entitled to command; none is required to obey”.[2]

The UN Charter explicitly prohibits intervention “in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state” (Art. 2.7 UN Charter) unless these matters pose a direct threat to international peace and stability. This provision mandates international actors to acknowledge the Turkish government to handle the situation at its own discretion.

Moreover, whether or not a state is pilloried for its domestic politics by the international community not only depends on the acts and violations it committed, but also on the role and position it holds in the international system. Turkey remains one of the foremost allies and strategic partners of the Western world. Be it in the fight against global terrorism, as a valuable NATO member, or as key to Europe’s migration and asylum policy, Turkey is a much need ally. Member of the Group of 20, Turkey also offers a huge consumer market for outside goods and services. These factors taken together are shielding the Turkish government from any hasty and overzealous moral condemnations of their domestic policy-making.

Lastly, any effective condemnation of the Turkish government would necessitate agreement amongst the remaining actors. History has shown that in matters of state sovereignty, the international community agrees to disagree. Already, Erdogan has reached out to Putin in an attempt to improve their bilateral relationship in case relations with the West should turn sour.

It is true that the classical definition of sovereignty with its absolute claim for sovereign equality has been increasingly challenged. In a globalized world where market economies co-exist within a complex net of interdependencies and where policies, capital, and people cross borders more easily than ever before in human history, sovereignty appears to be an anachronism from another age. Yet rather than bidding farewell to the concept as such, sovereignty should be understood as a subliminal force—always somewhere in the room, but usually covered underneath alternative ordering principles. It remains largely invisible to the eye as long as politics follow a steady path and the ship sails in calm waters. Yet, once a major crisis breaks out, sovereignty comes back in the limelight to define the rules of the game.

The storm in Turkey is taking place now. Many advocates had hoped that the successive accession rounds between Turkey and the EU would help bind the Turkish state within the European value system. However, neither long-lasting negotiations nor the fact that the EU being among Turkey’s most important trading partners has prevented the Erdogan administration from unilaterally suspending the European Convention on Human Rights and announcing the planned reintroduction of the death penalty. The principle of sovereignty, which Thomas Hobbes equated with “an artificial soul … giving life and motion to the whole body”,  provided the power to ignite nationalist feelings and undo concerted action in a blink of an eye.

If there is anything to take away from the post-coup purges in Turkey, it is the inability of the international community to effectively halt an alarming process that has not yet evolved into a full-blown tragedy. Therefore, any attempt to overcome the present crisis needs to recognize Turkey as an equal and sovereign partner and should refrain from stigmatizing President Erdogan as the villain of the Bosporus.

[1] Lake, David. 2003. “The New Sovereignty in International Relations”. International Studies Review 2003 (5): 305.

[2] Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. Theories of international politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 88.

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