Foreign Policy Blogs

In much the same way that many Western countries look set to abandon decades-old liberal consensus by electing populist parties or xenophobic leaders à la Trump in a raft of upcoming elections, Eastern European nations appear to be pivoting away from Brussels. Earlier this week, the media trumpeted that both Moldova and Bulgaria voted pro-Russian populist presidents into power, just weeks after Moscow’s shadow loomed large over Montenegro’s own elections. But is that really the case?

According to the narrative, in Bulgaria, center-right Prime Minister Boyko Borisov resigned this week after pro-Russian socialist candidate Rumen Radev romped to victory. Things played out in a similar vein in the second round of Moldova’s presidential election, which saw another Russia-friendly socialist, Igor Dodon, take the majority of the popular vote.

Both candidates ostensibly ran on a pro-Kremlin ticket, promising to seek closer ties with Moscow at the expense of the EU. These results came after Milo Djukanovic’s Montenegrin Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) was last month left severely weakened after a mixed coalition of pro-Russian and pro-Serbian parties destroyed his majority, prompting Djukanovic to stand down after more than 25 years in power.

Moldova’s Dodon campaigned on an anti-EU platform, intent on scrapping Chisinau’s Association Agreement with the EU, just four months after it came into force. After the win, Dodon promised to push for early parliamentary elections next year to force out the current government, which is in favor of closer EU integration. Radev too promised to prevent Bulgaria from becoming a dumping ground for refugees. He vowed to push for an end to international sanctions against Russia.

Both candidates framed their campaigns around a rejection of NATO, and both expressed their delight at the election of Donald Trump in the US, suggesting that the businessman’s win could help bring about a rapprochement with Moscow.

While these events appear to confirm Russia’s growing influence along Europe’s periphery, evidence suggests that this so-called pro-Moscow stance adopted by candidates in Moldova and Bulgaria is not what it seems. Despite heavy use of the EU versus Russia antinomy in both countries’ presidential races, the elections in both Moldova and Bulgaria were largely focused on national politics, not international affairs.

In Moldova, a state run by powerful oligarchs, political candidates serve their interests, not geopolitical preferences. As was the case during Montenegro’s October election, the Russia-EU debate was used in both Bulgaria and Moldova to distract voters tired of the widespread institutionalized corruption that has plagued their governments for years.

The fact remains that both Radev and Dodon tiptoed a fine line by never explicitly settling on one option and remaining sufficiently ambiguous in order to play the debate for political gain. Radev, for instance, opined at times that there was “no alternative” to the EU and NATO but that this didn’t preclude good relations with Moscow. And soon after his election, Dodon said he won’t scrap the country’s Association Agreement, insisting he only wants better ties to Russia.

The reasoning behind these about-faces is simple: Bulgaria is the EU’s poorest country in per capita output, and Moldova has long been ranked as the poorest country in Europe. Both state are aware that turning their back on the EU means the end for financial injections from Brussels. After all, Moldova received €561 million from 2007-2013 and will be receiving even more in 2014-2017. And back in September, Bulgaria was awarded €108 million in emergency funding to stem the influx of migrants.

It thus appears that their anti-EU stance amounts to little more than a cynical ploy designed to coax the EU into delivering more financial aid, while at the same time winning the approval of voters who would like to see closer relations with Russia.

In Montenegro, Djukanovic pursed a similar strategy to stay in power, positioning himself as the only candidate in the country’s recent election that could deliver closer EU integration and full NATO membership, all the while avoiding discussion of his checkered record of alleged corruption and shady dealings. As well as being a useful propaganda tool, playing the anti-Russia card might help Djukanovic extract financial or procedural advantages from EU institutions. Djukanovic has even been accused of staging a clumsy coup during the country’s elections – which his administration chose to blame on “pro-Russian nationalists”—as a way to swing international opinion in his favor.

This is just another of example of Eastern European leaders being more than wise to the fact that using Moscow and the EU as boons in their political strategies is useful politically and financially alike. Far from having strong ideological persuasions one way or the other, Eastern Europe’s leaders are more than happy to exploit the cultural divide inside their countries for short-term political gain.

While headlines paint a picture that suggests half of Eastern Europe is embracing Moscow while the other half prepares to defend itself in the face of Russian aggression, the reality is different. Instead of moving their countries either closer to the EU or Russia, the region’s leaders will likely continue to do what suits them best—walk the fine line between Europe and Russia without burning bridges, allowing them to ultimately benefit from relations with both powers.

The post Eastern Europe’s Duplicitous Tango with Moscow and Brussels appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

A new documentary series about the Cold War called Cold War Armageddon is currently being broadcast at a time when a new Cold War may emerge between the United States and Russia. The Clinton campaign pulled no punches in linking hacks to the DNC and within the U.S. Government to Russia, even claiming that President-elect Trump is directly tied to Putin himself.

While the claims about Mr.Trump’s Russia connection have quieted down since the end of the election, the espionage era of the 1980s seems to have reasserted itself to some degree in recent years. With Edward Snowden taking refuge in Russia and the Obama administration being linked to hacking even close allies, including Chancellor Merkel’s private phone, Cold War era politics seem to be familiar once again, but with a lot better gadgets.

In the series Cold War Armageddon, the evolution of the conflict between Americans and Soviets are described in great detail, with a keen focus on the effects the Cold War had on allies of the two superpowers. Intense competition in a global chess match, marked by deadly neutron bombs and mutual assured destruction also showed how leaders were measured and deliberate in their responses to their opponents. SALT I and SALT II treaty talks enabled a reduction in the most deadly of human weaponry in the late Cold War period. These treaty agreements gave rise to further agreements, capping the nuclear threat up until recently.

At the end of October 2016, news reports of the new Satan rocket, the next generation of rockets was revealed. The RS-28 Sarmat, or the Satan II is able to wipe out an area the size of France or Texas and is a further development of the multiple warhead systems that pushed logical minds to the peace table at the time. An accident with such a weapon was likely to happen, evidence of which has come out since the Cold War of several close calls during that era.

While the new Cold War may be more present as a cyber-threat as opposed to a tank melee in the near future, the goals and desired results of U.S. and Russian foreign policy abroad in places like Syria have more commonalities than differences it seems. While Ukraine remains a tense standoff that receives a lot less attention than it deserves, the fight against a common enemy may likely take place initially before the resumption of any Cold War rhetoric in 2017. Measured responses by leaders is extremely important, even more so, the decision to mire a country in a foreign conflict zone must be taken with great contemplation.

Using US-Russia relations as a way to push votes in one or another direction or simply trying to prove who the biggest kid on the block is will likely increase the chances of a more intense Cold War, but will also hinder any agreed upon solutions to other international problems.

The pre-Cold War era may be a better lesson for great powers in 2017, as the Americans, British and Soviets liberated millions of people from genocide and fought against tyranny in Europe. In 2016, that act of simple humanity is difficult to achieve. That is a good place to start new talks between the U.S. and Russia.

The post Are Cold War Politics Back? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Donald Trump and Xi Jinping. (Associated Press)

Despite Chinese Ambassador to the U.S. Cui Tiankai’s comments during an interview with CNN on Tuesday, in which he stated “we take no sides,” outside the Chinese leadership, the Chinese have indeed been taking sides.

In a survey of 3,300 respondents in China conducted by the state-owned newspaper Global Times in March, some 54% preferred Donald Trump over Hillary Clinton. Another poll in May conducted of 24,449 people by the Chinese language Phoenix TV website showed 61.5% supported Trump, with only 7.8% favoring Clinton.

Perhaps behind Trump’s initial popularity among Chinese were his isolationist foreign policy views—unlikely to stand in the way of a rising China. During an interview with The Economist in 2015, Trump brushed aside China’s construction of airstrips on reefs in the South China Sea, calling them: “very far away” and “already built.” Also, his perceived status among Chinese as a successful businessman may have also helped explain his popularity even after a number of anti-China statements, as he was seen a more pragmatic dealmaker on trade issues “election talk is just election talk,” than as an ardent human rights advocate and defense hawk like Hillary.

Yet while many Chinese distrust Hillary as an aggressive hawk, and may be happy she lost the election, other Chinese may now be rethinking their earlier support for a Donald Trump presidency as fears over a trade war grow in recent days.

One of those concerned is Chinese President Xi Jinping, who spoke with Trump on Monday to congratulate the new leader. According to the Financial Times, during the conversation Xi emphasized that cooperation between the two countries was the “only correct choice.” 

Some pundits believe Xi was advising and warning Trump to back down on his campaign rhetoric, accusing China of “raping” the U.S. and promising to impose a 45% tariff on Chinese imports. Trump has also promised to abandon the Paris climate change agreement ratified in September by U.S. President Barack Obama and Xi.

In recent days, president-elect Trump has attempted to soften some of his earlier campaign rhetoric, and may yet issue new statements to calm Beijing’s nerves. Yet the often extreme and contradictory positions taken on some issues, and his relative inexperience as a politician and diplomat have created uncertainty over his governance. In a Pew Center survey released on October 5, some 37% of those Chinese polled expressed confidence in Hillary “to do the right thing regarding world affairs”—compared to 22% expressing confidence in Trump.

To the Chinese, Hillary Clinton was the devil they know. Now Beijing and the Chinese, financial markets, and geopolitical pundits must all adjust to this new uncertainty and hope for the best.

The post Be Careful What You Wish For, China appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

(REUTERS/Gretchen Ertl)

Could President Trump’s inaugural speech have a passage on foreign policy that runs something like the following?

“… U.S. foreign policy is action taken in the name of the American people as a whole. That’s why we all want so badly for it to show America as we see it.

I’ve said my Presidency is about taking back our country, about putting it first and making it great again. Overall, the way to do that is to focus again on our amazing Declaration of Independence.

We are caught up in our arguments, but we all agree that this nation was founded on rights, and on government dedicated to serve those rights. Those principles define the nation; we take our country back when we put them back above the arguments. When we observe them, when we do what we must to defend our freedom, when we make every effort to show our deepest nature, then we are as great as America is meant to be.

So every foreign policy action must trace back to how it fits our founding principles. I will judge our foreign policy options on that basis, and I will decide, and explain our actions, in those terms.

We will not all agree on every measure: we might hate each others’ interpretation of the Declaration. But we can remind ourselves that we agree on the principles; our differences are about interpretations and means, not ends.”

Anyone might be tempted to imagine more, but if only this much is expressed, it would be a first step in building common ground. Setting the Declaration as policy criterion would also promote coherence in foreign policy, across issues and over time. Even as our doctrines and world conditions evolve, and as our politics ebb and flow, the undercurrent of America’s nature will be clear.

This language would set the terms in which we address the world in a way that keeps the basic commitment of America’s founding in view. Its implied images, whether of deep friendship, of acceptable conduct toward us, or of hostility to be resisted, fit the broad patterns of our values throughout history.

Moreover, President Trump could say these words without compromising candidate Trump’s themes. Some specific ideas may become indicators of priority rather than concrete proposals. But the greatest force of his mandate comes from a general sentiment, for old-fashioned ideas of right and good to take priority. This language, in reminding everyone of America’s underlying consensus, carries that sentiment.

President-elect Trump could also use this criterion to manage the tangled masses of expertise that will be thrown at him. He need not be expert in the field; he could take the role of questioner in chief, requiring every proposal to include an accounting of how it fulfills or supports America’s founding tenets. He wouldn’t need to ingest the nuances of our deceptively simple creed: competing proposals will have to present their interpretations, and those nuances, to him.

Language like this would tender the prospect of real public discourse. Re-voicing the basis of our founding will also remind everyone of the deep appeal of America’s nature. It’s worth hoping for.

The post Something To Hope For In An Inauguration Speech? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

(CNN Politics)

For Hillary Clinton supporters the inevitable arrival to Washington, D.C. of the man many of them see as a real-world Darth Vader feels like the tense wait prior to the landfall of a Category 5 hurricane. Liberal prognosticators, pundits and minority communities strain for any information that could provide fidelity on the trajectory of the terrifying tempest. They speculate on its likely impact on their lives and ask themselves, “Should we stay in place hoping for the best or should we get the hell out the way fearing the worst?”

Beyond U.S. borders, leaders of multilateral institutions like the United Nations, security alliances like NATO, clutch trading partners like Mexico and China are also gazing beyond the horizon nervously anticipation the storm surge and squalls that might be coming their way.

But will Trump really be the devastating hurricane that will reorder big chunks of the American and global economic and security architectures or will his impact on the status quo be more like a reshuffling of card decks via a dramatic flipping over of the entire table?

Predicting Trump’s decision-making on major foreign policy issues especially will make hurricane forecasting seem like kinder-garden math in comparison—far more abstract art than blue print interpretation. The reason for this is that like his recently vanquished democratic opponent Hillary Clinton, Mr. Trump appears to maintain “both a public and a private position” on key issues.

For example, consider his public opinion on the United Nations. In March of 2016, the then republican front-runner blasted the United Nations ideological orientation before a powerful pro-Israel lobby group. He tongue lashed the U.N system stating that, “The United Nations is not a friend of democracy…. It’s not a friend to freedom. It’s not a friend even to the United States of America, where as we all know, it has its home. And it surely isn’t a friend to Israel.”

But in 2005 he sung a far different tune about the world’s premier conflict resolution body and leader of international climate change resiliency. The occasion was his testimony before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Subcommittee where he was invited to testify as a commercial development expert regarding out-of-control renovation costs of the U.N. headquarters. In his testimony, Trump the business man remarked:

“I have to start by saying I’m a big fan, a very big fan, of the United Nations and all it stands for,” Trump told  the senators. “I can’t speak as to what’s been happening over the last number of years, because it certainly hasn’t been good, but the concept of the United Nations and the fact that the United Nations is in New York is very important to me and very important to the world, as far as I am concerned. So I am a big fan.”

So on how many other policy matters does Trump maintain a public and private positions? It might be far more than his supporters could have ever imagined. Consider that just after meeting with President Obama two days after his epic electoral victory Trump roll backed his proposal for a total repeal of Obama Care stating that there are parts of Obama’s flagship domestic accomplishment that he really likes.

He has also quietly defanged his proposal to deport 11 million undocumented people residing in the U.S. It is insightful that his First 100 Days manifesto only discusses removing the more than 2 million criminal illegal immigrants from the country and applying penalties for people trying to reenter illegally. There is no mention of a “deportation force” or much feared draconian proposals that continue to cause millions of undocumented residents considerable angst.

Further, Trump has also recently suggested that he would revise his Muslim ban so that it targets people from countries “linked to terrorism” rather using their Islamic faith as a disqualifying criterion. So are the post-election shifts in tone and substance of flagship policy propositions a harbinger of what is to come? That is hard to know, however, what is certain is that the political Right’s change candidate has already begun to defang the most controversial of his policy proposals.

Lastly, it might be premature to say that Hurricane Trump won’t be packing a big punch, however, I think it’s safe to take the shutters down—almost.

The post Will the Real Donald Trump Please Stand up appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

President-elect Donald Trump’s surprise victory places each of his foreign policy pronouncements under renewed scrutiny. His erratic campaign leaves many wondering where rhetoric will become reality. Foreign policy is no exception.

In Asia—the subject of the Obama Administration’s controversial “pivot” policy—the president-elect is already doing some pivoting of his own. South Korea was a specific target of Trump’s criticism during the campaign. America, he argued, has borne the cost and responsibility of protecting its allies for too long, and should no longer foot the bill for Seoul’s defense. Earlier this year, Trump rattled South Koreans by suggesting withdrawal of U.S. troops stationed there and bi-lateral U.S. talks with North Korea were both possibilities.

As president-elect, however, Trump has changed course. In a phone call with South Korean President Park Geun-hye just two days after the U.S. election, he said U.S. commitment to the South Korea alliance would continue if not grow in his administration.

A portion of presidential campaign rhetoric always dissolves on election night. Given Trump’s general penchant for extreme rhetoric, is he likely to walk back other campaign statements on international affairs? What does Trump’s South Korea reversal signal about the future development of his foreign policy?

Campaign reversals are nothing new, even reversals relating to South Korea. Trump’s turnaround repeats in short form a Democratic chapter in U.S.-South Korea relations. In The Two Koreas—a one-volume history of U.S.-South Korean relations following the Korean War—former Washington Post correspondent Don Oberdorfer recalls the slow death of President Jimmy Carter’s own troop withdrawal policy.

Carter pledged, early in his campaign, to withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea. Troop withdrawals had occurred after the Korean War reached a stalemate in 1953. U.S. failure in Vietnam provided a motivation for Carter to want to reduce American troop presence in Asia, but the 38th Parallel remained the most volatile Cold War flashpoint after a divided Germany.

President Carter’s policy emerged as campaign desire to make an immediate mark on pre-existing policy. In Oberdorfer’s telling, Carter’s top aides were reluctant about the form and substance of his withdrawal policy from the start. Once on the record, however, Carter was driven to pursue the policy for its own sake, and after dividing his staff and straining bi-lateral relations, he ultimately settled for a small draw-down in U.S. personnel (roughly 3,000 overall) on the Korean Peninsula. Most tellingly, when Oberdorfer questioned Carter and several of his senior aides about the policy years later, each was unable to articulate why it was conceived and then pursued so doggedly.

Oberdorfer concludes:

“In his haste and lack of finesse, an inexperienced president had transformed a general impulse to reduce U.S. military forces in South Korea into a highly controversial policy with which he was personally, and negatively, identified. Many of the American diplomatic and military officials dealing with the issue were not opposed to substantial reductions if pursued in a well-planned fashion, but they were horrified by the peremptory and damaging way the issue was pursued by the Carter White House. By refusing to heed or even hear the objections until he finally was backed into a corner, Carter undermined his own position.”

This is merely an arcane, if interesting, history lesson but for the fact that the above paragraph describes many fears about President-elect Trump’s foreign policy. He is certainly an inexperienced president – having never held an elective office—and acting with a lack of finesse was a campaign trademark. To those fearing damage—direct and collateral—from Trump’s foreign policy impulses, his about-face on South Korea was a sign that he distinguishes between ephemeral campaign rhetoric—however blunt—and nuanced realities of policy.

Where this leaves Trump on other key security issues, however, is a question the foreign policy establishment is scrambling to answer. How will Trump balance his critical statements about America’s obligations to NATO with his seeming support for Putin’s Russia? Will he be as eager for wholesale change in the U.S.-led fight against ISIS as he suggested during the campaign? In short, where will Trump stick to his hardline rhetoric, and where will be open to change?

Try as they might, no one can see around the corner into a Trump presidency. The capacity for course correction in policy he has displayed may cause some to exhale. The Carter example, however, demonstrates how easily individual political ambitions (regardless of party) can damage U.S. alliance relationships.

Will the president-elect acknowledge this reality? Time will tell. As a candidate, Trump took notions of ‘plain speaking’ politics to extremes that offended large segments of the electorate. As president, America’s well being depends on his turning over a new leaf. We can only hope more ‘pivots’ are to come.

The post What Does Trump’s “Pivot” Back To South Korea Mean For His Foreign Policy? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

“That men do not learn very much from the lessons of history is the most important of all the lesson of history.” Aldous Huxley

The Islamic world, more specifically the Middle East, is suffering from political vertigo—a state of profound disorientation. With raging wars, crumbling economies, collapsing states, and the spreading of violent extremism, the Middle East has a new normal with an unprecedented danger of multifaceted nature. The most dangerous—and arguably the least understood—is the Sunni-Shia divide.

In recent years, toxic polemics disseminated mainly by scheming politicians, ultra-conservative clerics loyal to Saudi Arabia and Iran made the dreaded full-blown Sunni-Shia civil war across the Muslim world a matter of time. And while the situation is very volatile in countries such as Lebanon, Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia (and nuclear Pakistan), Iraq, Syria, and Yemen are already burning.

Shortly after the invasion of Iraq, think tanks and pundits of neocon persuasion started to stir the pot on Sunni-Shia sectarianism. But it wasn’t till 2004 after King Abdullah of Jordan (and later Hosni Mubarak of Egypt) pushed the strategically manufactured threat that the Iran-led “Shia crescent” is hell bent to take over the Sunni world found traction. The Crescenters have become the conduits of a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The Sunni-Shia schism has intensified due to the Shia crescent paranoia that eclipsed the broad-based uprising against repression, regional power politics, and global geopolitical rivalries.

Ever since Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi overthrew a democratically elected government and ultimately turned Egypt into the standard-bearer of oppression and economic nightmare, Middle East political power vacuum was inevitable. And since Turkey has been in the fringes of Middle East politics, that cleared the space for either Saudi Arabia or Iran to step up to the role; hence the Saudi Iranian cold war.

When nations are suspicious of each other they overreact in gauging the other’s intention and objective. So, they demonize one another and eventually allow the situation to escalate beyond their control.

There is not a single verse in the Qur’an that unequivocally highlights how political power should be attained. The sectarian divide between Sunnis and Shi’is is a political divide that started upon the death of Prophet Muhammad since he has not left specifics on who should succeed him in leading the Ummah or the Muslim nation and how that individual might be deposed.

The Sunnis contend it is based on individual’s piety and the consensus of the ummah. The Shia on the other hand believe in a doctrine of Divinely ordained succession. Leading the ummah is an exclusive privilege reserved for the noble offspring of Prophet Muhammad.

Contrary to the Sunni who reject the concept of collective piety, the Shia consider the offspring of the Prophet beyond pious. They are considered infallibles and as such are granted the authority to interpret God’s message—in the Shia tradition it is the Qur’an and the moral authority of the Prophet’s direct lineage—and the custodians of Imam-ship or moral leadership.

Prophet Muhammad taught one brand of Islam or to “hold on tight to the rope of Allah” and to not cause division. Prophet Muhammad unified all false deities being worshiped by polytheists into one God and unified the faithful to become part of one ummah.

Nowadays Muslims are divided by sectarian identities—Sunnis, Shi’is, Sufis, etc. or by schools of thought or theology as in Malikis, Hanafis, Shafi’is, Hanbalis, Ja’faris, etc. The Prophet was neither Sunni nor Shi’i. He was not a hyphenated faithful; he was simply a Muslim.

Based on Pew world demographic trend, by 2050 the world population is likely to grow to 9 billion people. One third of that is projected to be Muslims. With growing trend of Sunni-Shia divide, social unrests, foreign interventions, civil wars, and extremism, the future does not look bleak; it looks horrific.

In their own special ways, both Iran and Saudi Arabia became incubators of intra-Muslim hate narratives. Anyone who listens to the hate narrative of one side would think the other is a belligerent paganist.

Over the years while there were periods of bloodshed, Muslims of Sunni and Shia sects have coexisted, intermarried, and even shared political power much more than sectarian Muslims like to acknowledge. Today, takfiris on both sides are quick to declare each other apostates.

In order to break the current trend a few things must happen. Independent-minded Muslims willing to reach across the sectarian divide must start empathetic discourse. And it is much easier for Muslims in the diaspora to spearhead such effort since they are already compelled into interdependence for civil rights representation, sharing mosques and places of worship to name a few.

Intellectual and religious scholars and sermon-givers (khateebs), especially among Sunnis, must earnestly talk about the battle of Karbala, what took place and who was to blame. After all, the massacre that took place and Imam al-Hussein’s wrongful killing is not merely a Shia tragedy; it is an Islamic tragedy and arguably the darkest moment in the Islamic history. Regardless of one’s faith, we as human-beings are hardwired to seek the truth. It is the Divine will that inspires the hearts, unless that inner truth-seeking light is deliberately blocked.

Iran and Saudi Arabia should negotiate a strategic collaboration to put out sporadically blazing fires across the region. Though both would not have any problem understanding how that is in its nation’s best interest, neither one is likely to reach out to the other. Here is where Turkey should take the lead. It can play a significant role in pulling the two sides together by appointing a seasoned representative for this critical diplomatic initiative. Iran is Turkey’s second trading partner.

Poisonous political rivalry that proclaims the other a perpetual enemy must be stopped. And each should suspend its support of proxy wars, armed militias, etc.

All three—Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey—have strategic interest in solving the bloody conundrum that is the Syrian Civil War and help prevent the next genocide. However, this would require leaders that are not handicapped by sectarian mentality and strategic myopia.

Economic and political marginalization of Shia minority communities in Sunni dominated countries is perhaps the oldest dirty secret in Islamic history. It is the repression that most politicians, religious scholars and intellectuals opted to ignore or worse remain apathetic to. And this proves profound moral inconsistency. As a ‘Sunni Muslim’ I confess this with sense of profound shame. We must change our attitude before it is too late.

Criticizing Sunnis who would condemn oppression in Syria and turn a blind eye to the oppression in Bahrain, and the Shi’is who would condemn oppression in Bahrain and ignore the one in Syria, Mehdi Hassan made this appeal: “Our concern, our empathy, our compassion has to be universal. It cannot be selective. It cannot be self-serving”.

It is incumbent upon each Muslim to question the political and strategic judgment of Saudi Arabia and Iran, neither which is ordained by God. Whose interest are they really guarding, and whose ‘religion’ are they really preserving?

I am afraid the seeds of hate that both countries have sown and the hostile environment that they have cultivated will find its way into Saudi Arabia and Iran. The current trajectory will only benefit war profiteers and extremists. So, it is existentially critical to raise a new generation of Sunni and Shia who could think beyond their biases and love beyond their differences.

The post Sunni-Shia, or Saudi-Iran Discord? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

(REUTERS/Gleb Garanich)

Former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili has resigned as governor of Ukraine’s Black Sea region of Odessa last Monday. The decision may symbolize the increasingly anti-reformist environment in Ukraine and the likely failure of promises spearheaded during the 2014 Euromaidan.

In his resignation speech, Saakashvili unabashedly accused the acting President Petro Poroshenko of backing criminal clans in Odessa and across the entire country. He also made shocking parallels by highlighting similarities between Poroshenko and former president Viktor Yanukovich, as he stated both are equally corrupt and “rob the country”. He went further and accused Poroshenko in dishonesty and sabotaging reforms in Odessa.

Saakashvili has also stated that “the last straw that broke patience” were income declarations of Ukrainian officials that were made public last week. The declarations pinpointed to large income discrepancies among major governmental officials and allegedly highlighted possible involvement in various corrupt schemes.

His claims were not groundless as Poroshenko’s declaration depicted him one of the richest man in the country along with closest political allies. Shockingly, many wealthy Ukrainian officials with millions of dollars in declarations are still seeking for social benefits from the Ukrainian state and the West for financial assistance.

The resignation speech and loud accusations came as no surprise to many reformists in Ukraine. Saakashvili has been constantly accusing the Kiev’s leadership in corruption and lack of commitment to serious reforms in the country during his ruling as a governor.

His efforts and those of the team of public affairs professionals that he brought all the way from Georgia, as well as Western educated Ukrainian and Russian nationals, were not sufficient to carry out successful reforms in Odessa.

The failure is not an isolated case but a tendency. Earlier this year Aivaras Abromavicius, the Lithuanian-born former minister of economy of Ukraine, also resigned from his position while accused the Ukrainian central leadership in corruption.

The anti-reformist sentiments have been on the rise throughout the year with central authorities posing the most of obstacles. Attacks on anti-corruptions activists are now happening with a threatening regularity. Furthermore, Saakashvili’s well-known outspokenness could have made him a target for many loyal to Poroshenko politicians who resists the course of changes.

Despite pledging for reforms and the European future made during the 2014 Euromaidan, the current reforms’ trend is going backward. The Ukrainian central authorities appear as the force unwilling to undertake serious and sweeping structural reforms. As they might affect special business and power interests or those of clans and power groups that they represent.

In effect, structural mismanagement and cronyism still dominate the country’s political system with Saakashvili’s resignation meaning that things are not going to improve at any time soon.

The country’s population still dwells in deep poverty, whereas, sufficient economic growth looms somewhere beyond horizon.

Saakashvili has realized that despite Western-backed revolution and unilateral support from all Western leaders, changing situation in Ukraine takes more steps than simply acknowledging the necessity. Overall, transforming situation in Ukraine appears as a much harder task than it was in Georgia during his reign.

Criminal clans are deeply connected with the local authorities. Thus, there is no real separation between businesses and government. Furthermore, the political structure is still heavily centralized and even governor’s chair is not enough to successfully utilize the reform’s path.

However, Saakashvili is not prepared to give up. His reforms in Georgia elevated the country’s key sectors to the completely new level and were remarkably successful. By depicting his resignation as a personal defeat by ‘black’ forces in Kiev he is hoping to continue struggle against the central authorities by joining ranks of the political opposition.

Overall, the resignation is a warning sign for Poroshenko who is still trying to project his country as moving away from troubled past and embrace the European future. As reforms are gradually dying out and key-reformists keep resigning or disappearing, it becomes clear that the Euromaidan fell short of its promises but rather replaced one oligarch with another.

The post What Saakashvili’s Resignation Means for Ukraine’s Future? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Asia Bibi was accused of blasphemy after rowing with two Muslim women in her village in Punjab in 2009. (Reuters/Mohsin Raza)

I have previously written about the archaic blasphemy laws of Pakistan and its consequences. One such consequence was the murder of Punjab Governor Salman Taseer (whose son was later kidnapped, and escaped years later); and another, was the extrajudicial killing of the Minister of Minorities, Shahbaz Bhatti. Both were killed for defending Asia Bibi.

In my previous post, I talk about how blasphemy laws have no place in Islam and how they are used in Pakistan as a political ploy to gain power, and a personal tool to usurp neighboring lands of minorities. This is what happened to Asia—she was a berry-picker who dared to drink out of the same cup as her fellow berry-pickers. Outraged, they accused her of uttering blasphemous statements about the Prophet; statements so blasphemous that her lawyers dared not repeat them in court, lest they be tried for the same crime.

In 2009, Asia was convicted of blasphemy and sentenced to death by hanging. It was her case that Mr. Taseer was serving as a mediator for—he had sought to get her a Presidential Pardon, whilst Shahbaz Bhatti sought to eliminate the blasphemy laws through the legislature. The irony is that they were dubbed blasphemers for doing so, both killed by civilians in an act of protecting Islam’s honor.

Taseer was shot by his own bodyguard, Mumtaz Qadri, a murderer who admitted to the crime, and was hailed by masses as Islam’s savior. The story goes that Taseer’s wife went from lawyer to lawyer, pleading for someone to take her case to prosecute Qadri, but was turned away out of fear. The judge who, two years later, sentenced Qadri to death, has had to flee the country after repeated death threats following his verdict.

Protesters greeted Qadri with rose petals as he was driven off from the courthouse to the jail. In March this year, five years after the first trial and after a superior court too found Qadri guilty of murder, Qadri was hung to death for the murder of Salman Taseer. 10,000 protesters blocked the Capital for days.

But what of Asia Bibi? She never did get that pardon; her case was an open one in the High Court when Taseer attempted it. After his assassination, no one braved that stance again. Her final appeal to the Supreme Court was scheduled to be heard earlier this October, but has been postponed, as one of the three judges on the bench recused himself for a conflict just days before the hearing. Although his conflict is legitimate, there is speculation that he was threatened.

150 clerics have petitioned the government to hang Asia. Hundreds of thousands have signed online petitions to save her. Meanwhile, Asia sits in solitary confinement, as although no one has been sentenced and hung in Pakistan in a blasphemy case, many have been killed by cellmates in their search for atonement. Talking to The Guardian, Asia’s husband said: “If Asia is acquitted we will never be able to return to our previous life, as my wife has been labelled an infidel and an infidel doesn’t deserve to survive in a society full of hatred,” he said. “Too many want her dead and have put a bounty on her head.”

While Asia waits for a new judge to be appointed, the problem persists. Day after day, a member of the minority community is persecuted for blasphemy and either publicly ridiculed, beaten, or prosecuted. Human Rights Watch reported that in 2014, 17 people were on death row with another 19 serving life sentences under blasphemy laws; all from the a minority community.

The Center for Research and Security Studies in  Islamabad reported 60 cases of blasphemy related extrajudicial killings between the years of 1990 and 2014. That’s more than two people killed outside of the justice system a year—and these are cases that are reported; scores of others remain unreported for fear of further bloodshed.

Although the likes of Bhatti and Taseer have been moving to change the legislation that allows such cases to exist, the problem will not end there. The 150 clerics that are demanding Asia be hung are part of the problem, and therefore, must be part of the solution. Until the masses are continually led to believe that the honor of Islam is theirs to protect, legislation will not solve extrajudicial killing.

So while Asia waits for her justice, the government needs to take multiple measures—it needs to amend the legislation, yes, but it also needs to regulate the preachers and ensure what they are professing is not hatred in the garb of religion.

The post The Blasphemy Behind Blasphemy in Pakistan appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Chinese fishing boats are bound together with ropes to thwart an attempt by South Korean coast guard ships to stop their alleged illegal fishing in the Yellow Sea off the coast of South Korea (AFP/GETTY)

Waters are heating up again in Asia, as Chinese fisherman came under fire last Tuesday some 92 kilometers (57 miles) southwest of South Korea’s Socheong Island. The incident took place near the Northern Limit Line (NLL) maritime border with North Korea, and within 5.5 kilometers (3.4 miles) of South Korea’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ).  

The warning shots came from four M60 machine guns of the South Korean Coast Guard, in an attempt to crack down on illegal fishing by the Chinese boats. According to reports in South Korean media, the Coast Guard fired shots at the sky and in the sea to ward off a group of 30 Chinese fishing ships attempting to rescue two 98-ton Chinese vessels seized by South Korean speedboats.

Despite repeated warnings to back off, some of the Chinese boats attempted to ram a 3,000-ton Coast Guard patrol ship, and shots were fired toward the ships’ hulls in response. After some 600-700 warning shots were fired by the Coast Guard during a 45-minute standoff, the Chinese fishing vessels finally sailed away, and the two vessels and 20 Chinese crew were transferred to Incheon.

The conflict follows months of escalating violence and marked South Korea’s first significant use of combative force since last month’s authorization by South Korea’s Ministry of Public Safety and Security to use martial force (including ramming). Seoul approved the authorization following the sinking of a 4.5-ton Coast Guard speed boat by two 100-ton Chinese fishing boats early last month.  

The ramming of the South Korean Coast Guard boat came days after three Chinese fishermen died in a fire, which broke out in their steering room after the South Korean Coast Guard threw flash grenades. The Chinese fishing boat had refused to stop while illegally fishing in Korea’s EEZ without a permit. Previous incidents have led to chases and escalating violence against Chinese fishermen, who frequently resist capture by using hacksaws and knives.  

And the potential for further violence grows as the number of Chinese boats fishing in South Korea’s EEZ and near the NLL expands, exceeding some 100,000 for the first time last year. As of September, 50,022 Chinese boats have been detected so far this year, with few detained.  Chinese media outlets refer to the fishermen as “Those who desperately need to make a living”. Yet these same fishermen are likely responsible for significant overfishing which has driven them into the EEZ waters of other nations.

Chinese President Xi Jinping has plenty enough on his plate, from a shrinking economy and laid-off workers from state-owned enterprises, so is unlikely to rein in the fishermen – especially after Seoul’s plans to deploy a U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery in South Korea next year. And demonstrations by tens of thousands of South Koreans in Seoul demanding the resignation of President Park Geun-hye over a corruption row are sure to distract the South Korean government and people. All of which could suggest more violent confrontations between Chinese fishing boats and the South Korean Coast Guard in the near future.

The post Seoul’s Aggressive Plan to Combat Illegal Fishing appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

President Rodrigo Duterte and People’s Republic of China President Xi Jinping shake hands prior to their bilateral meetings at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on October 20. (King Rodriguez/PPD)

Diplomatic relations between the People’s Republic of China and the Philippines have been especially sour ever since China claimed Scarborough Shoal in 2012. But now, Philippines’ President Rodrigo Duterte is exploring a new bilateral relationship with China, effectively conceding that territorial issue in the interests of setting a more independent foreign policy course in the region, much to the consternation of the United State, which regards Duterte as a loose cannon.

Duterte, for his part, has long distrusted Washington for a variety of reasons, and sees China as a bargaining chip in his contest of wills with the U.S. and local elites opposed to his rule.

Duterte selected China as the destination of his first state visit. This symbolic move received a warm welcome from China, as the Chinese ambassador to the Philippines, Zhao Jianhua implied, “The Clouds are fading away. The sun is rising over the horizon, and will shine beautifully on the new chapter of bilateral relations.” To make this even clearer, Beijing offered the Filipino delegation a $9 billion loan during the course of its recent visit.

Duterte’s four-day state visit held a full schedule. Mr. Duterte held meetings on separate occasions with President Xi Jinping, Premier Li Keqiang, and the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. He also attended the opening ceremony of the China-Philippines Economic Trade Forum together with Vice Premier Zhang Gaoli.

Is Mr. Duterte trying to end the alliance with America? Not necessarily. Although he has insulted American officials on multiple occasions, including telling President Obama to “Go to Hell”, and calling him a “son of a whore”, it is unlikely that he will abandon this longtime defense ally, a nation that also has longstanding economic ties to the country and is home to a large population of Filipino expatriates.

As Duterte’s Foreign Secretary Perfecto Yasay noted, “The president, on many occasions, has said categorically that he will only have one military alliance, and our only ally in that respect is the United States”. Officials such as Yasay have often found themselves trying to walk back their boss’s remarks since he took office.

“Only China can help us,” Duterte said during an interview with Xinhua News. And he truly believes that mending relationships with China is the right choice for his country. As much as it is about flexibility and breaking with the past, the animosity he feels towards the United States is real.

“We want to talk about friendship, we want to talk about cooperation, and most of all, we want to talk about business.”

The United States remains the largest source of foreign investment for the Philippines. With a total net flow of investment of $4.2 billion, U.S. investment to Philippines dwarfed the number from China ($0.05 billion) from 2005 to July 2016. Currently, this Southeast Asian country receives around $170 million aid from Washington annually. Yet this figure is nothing close to what U.S. has fund its strategic alliances elsewhere: Egypt and Pakistan each receives annual funding of $1.5 billion each.

This October, the U.S., the EU, and other Western investors put projects on hold in reactions to Duterte’s controversial “war on drugs”, in which killed more than 3,500 suspects within months. Several investment and trade missions from the U.S. and the EU were aborted, meaning there will hardly be any new business deals made in the near future.

The economic future for the Philippines is not promising under such circumstances. Unwilling to temper his campaign—modelled after his mayoral policies in Davao City that sharply reduced the crime rate while imposing draconian punishments on offenders—Mr. Duterte has good reasons to turn to China, one of the largest business partners for other ASEAN countries and one which is not going to harry him with diplomatic protests or human rights inquiries over his “war on drugs”.

While Beijing of course expects its payments to have real returns and not mere “goodwill” value, and also knows it too does not benefit from the island nation’s instability in the long run, the breaches in Manila’s Western diplomatic relations are too good opportunities to ignore.

Together with more than 200 business representatives, Mr. Duterte is hoping to boost Philippines economy with help from China and so far he has not been disappointed. China has promised to bring Philippines on board to its “one belt, one road” economic development project in Southeast Asia. Specifically, this visit to Beijing will bring 13 trade agreements with China, with total worth of $31.5 billion, back to Manila. Agreements of these trade deals included foreign direct investments on infrastructure, expanding Chinese tourism in the Philippines, and lifting previous import restrictions on the country’s agricultural and fishing products.

“There is no sense fighting over a body of water. It is better to talk than war.”

Relations, never very warm, worsened between the two countries after Beijing took claim of the Scarborough Shoal. Not only sending regular patrols in the troubled water, Beijing has also been building artificial islands for military purposes. The former president, Benigno Aquino III, allowed for a large U.S. military presence in his country expecting to counter China’s aggressive behaviors and to eliminate domestic insurgents. He brought the Scarborough Shoal case to the international tribunal at the Hague during his presidency, which ruled in favor of Philippines this July. In retaliation, Beijing put a ban on importing Philippine’s agricultural products, now lifted with the warming of ties under Aquino’s successor, Duterte.

Territorial claims over South China Sea. (Wall Street Journal)

Ironically, the Chinese government also warned its citizens to not travel to Philippines for its “unstable political environment”, a warning it is apparently less worried over now despite the rising body count in the “war on drugs” and continued disturbances by domestic insurgents, including the terrorist group Abu Sayyaf.

Unlike his processors, Mr. Duterte does not believe that U.S. will be the solution for the geopolitical disputes. Personal histories of him make quite clear he distrusts the U.S. for historical, personal, and political reasons. Historic, over the US’s colonial rule of his homeland, and then support for the Ferdinand Marcos dictatorship as well as the Vietnam and Iraq wars. Personal, in his negative experiences with U.S. nationals over the years and suspicion that the Americans went out of their way to protect their own at his and Davao City’s expense.

But political, perhaps, is the most influential one. As a man outside the islands’ traditional power structure for much of his career, he sees—reasonably so—people like the Aquinos, Marcoses, and the top police or army brass as aloof bureaucrats who long ignored the intercommunal violence plaguing the country while currying American patronage. In his interview with the Hong Kong-based Phoenix TV, he told the host that he and his cabinet are not optimistic about the U.S. to keep collective defense obligations. He is also considering abolishing the joint-military exercise in South China Sea with the US, indicating such actions would only “further provoke China” and “there is no need to intensify the situation”.

In response, Beijing rolled out red carpet. Chinese spokesperson Hua Chunying commented, “Duterte would make his policy in the best interests of his country and its people”.

Despite the friendly gestures he has made to China, Duterte knows where to draw the line of this negotiation. He reiterated that there is no bargaining room on the sovereignty of the disputed islands. “We will not give up anything there … You can only negotiate to prevent a war”, he told Al Jazeera in an interview before to his China visit.

However, Mr. Duterte still plans to set back the Hague ruling and start to build mutual trust on joint development of the natural resources in the region with China. Some small but significant progress was seen after the dialogue opened up. Discussion of bilateral fishery cooperation in the South China Sea is taking place and Beijing publicly announced its willingness to make arrangements to strengthen this partnership.

President Duterte has, for all his bombast against his allies, be savvy enough to send an olive branch to China to try and soften the tension between these two Asian neighbors as well while trying to shift course away from the U.S. For him, it is better to solve an Asian geopolitical problem with “no foreign forces”, only “an Asian neighbor to another”.

The post Rodrigo Duterte’s Pivot to China appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Members of the minority Yazidi sect in Iraq are demanding protection from the ISIS militants. (Reuters)

Anyone who has turned on a television news program over the last few months has likely been irritated by the non-stop mind numbing partisan bias broadcast by professional news organisations. The severe lack of any information on policy and general news in a time of deep political change globally adds to the further disservice to viewers and readers of modern journalism.

The real tragedy is that what could be considered the worst human rights abuse in the last few years has been taking place, with full knowledge of the atrocities being committed, and neither candidate has taken to openly discuss this issue in any detail.

Nadia Murad has been given a lot of attention by the UN in recent weeks. Nadia is a Yazidi survivor of ISIS. After escaping from her captors, she has chosen to become a voice to the world to help liberate her people, especially women and girls that are currently facing terrible violence.

 Cases of rape against Yazidi and other minority groups committed by ISIS are documented in horrific detail. Two cases that stood out in recent reports was a girl of nine years of age being subject to repeated rapes daily.. Another story that emerged in U.S. media was of a survivor who chose to light herself on fire so she would no longer be subject to rape, either by dying or by making herself so unappealing that they would avoid her or execute her.

In the process of liberating Mosul from ISIS, accounts of Yazidi girls being moved early on to Syria have been reported. Minorities being used as human shields have been also been  reported in several cases. While the U.S. Government had spent years doing the bare minimum to stop the genocide, the presidential campaigns—focusing often on women—have said little to nothing about helping these abused and tortured women. It could not simply be because it is 2016.

Fighting for recognition as human beings that deserve freedom from rape and torture has met a lot of resistance despite the world knowing almost everything about what has been occurring. Nadia Murad visited Canada recently to bolster an opposition party motion to help 300 rescued Yazidi girls be brought to Canada.

Despite the current government of Canada knowing full well of the atrocities and bringing in between 25,000 to 30,000 refugees on their own dime, it was estimated that they only brought in three Yazidi.

The appearance of Nadia Murad and months of pushing from local charity and action groups to save minorities in the region embarrassed the government to a sufficient degree that they finally accepted to help the first 300 girls. They were saved by Canadian organizations without any proper support.

Although the opposition parties and Canadian organizations have pushed to help Yazidis, it has been extremely difficult to get governments to even acknowledge the atrocities. At the end of the U.S. election, the president that addresses and handles this issue appropriately will have been the best choice.

A perpetuation of the status quo is a continuation of entrenching a society that does not see preventing genocide as a priority. That is the real choice for this current generation, and the best determinant of an issue that is worth a vote.

The post Nadia Murad, Genocide and the Post U.S. Election appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Hillary Clinton speaking at a rally in Des Moines in January 2016. (Wikimedia)

As the election season comes to a close, most polls indicate a relatively clear picture. Her latest email scandal notwithstanding, Hillary Clinton is very likely to emerge victorious and give Democrats a third presidential election win in a row. A campaign that has mostly oscillated between agonizing and ghastly has left virtually no room for any discussion of the candidates’ policies. Time to take a look at how Hillary Clinton might deal with climate change.

A glance at global developments reveals improving prospects. In many respects, last year’s Paris climate agreement is a success. Key player such as India, China, and the EU—as well as the U.S.—have ratified the treaty. Prices for wind and solar continue to drop, while 2015 saw renewables overtake coal as the world’s largest source of power capacity. Globally, deforestation rates appear to be slowing down. Last month, countries arrived at an agreement to phase out extremely climate-damaging hydrofluorocarbons.

Domestic politics reveal a different picture, however. Republicans will almost certainly retain control over the House, and perhaps even the Senate. While President Obama began his first term with Congress firmly under Democratic control, Clinton faces perpetual deadlock on almost all legislative initiatives.

Gridlock will have a particular effect on climate policy. Recent findings suggest that there is more polarization among the U.S public on climate change than on a perennially divisive issues such as abortion and gay marriage. Rather than a debate focussed on substance, climate change has become subject to identity politics and tribalism. The position you take on climate change is a significant part of what it means to be a Liberal or a Conservative today. Ideology is what motivates action.

As a result, there is virtually no appetite within the GOP for any initiative on climate change. In fact, the party is currently supporting a candidate who regards it as a Chinese hoax. Donald Trump has also vouched he would renege on the Paris agreement.

Such outlandishness is not confined to the Republican nominee, however. Many in the party continue to doubt the most basic facts about climate change. When Sen. Jim Inhofe of Oklahoma brought a snowball into the Senate as evidence against climate change, it was more a reflection of Republican positions than a caricature. In its stance, the GOP is somewhat of a unique case as the only major conservative party to reject climate change outright.

To that effect, realistic prospects for meaningful climate change legislation are strikingly low. Clinton is therefore likely to resort to the same sorts of measures the Obama administration grew increasingly fond of: executive orders. These can be quite effective in the short term. By contrast to legislation, executive orders can be implemented more quickly. To some extent, they also circumvent the multiple occasions in a legislative process on which lobbyists can influence the nature of a particular law.

The Obama administration’s signature executive order on climate change is the Clean Power Plan (CPP). It would require existing coal-fired power plants to reduce their emissions by 30 percent from their 2005 levels. Republicans have fought the CPP tooth and nail. The CPP has also faced legal challenges. In February, the Supreme Court issued a stay on the CPP, questioning whether the plan would require the Environmental Protection Agency to overstep its mandate. If the CPP survives, Clinton will support its implementation.

In terms of legislative initiatives, the Democratic nominee actually has some far-reaching policy ideas. Clinton has proposed to generate a third of electricity from renewable sources by 2027. By contrast, President Obama has suggested a figure of only 20 percent by 2030. In addition, Clinton wants to install 500 million solar panels by 2020, a significant increase over current installations. The campaign has also revealed a program called the Clean Energy Challenge, which would provide grants to states, cities, and communities to the tune of $60 billion over ten years. This is the backbone of her plan to make America “the world’s clean energy superpower”.

At least in policy terms, the Clinton campaign seems to take the issue seriously. Clinton’s rhetoric reflects as much. At an energy conference in 2014, she referred to climate change as “the most consequential, urgent, sweeping collection of challenges” facing the United States. Confronted with a hostile Congress, it is unclear to what extent Clinton can implement any of these policies. Yet, she has suggested she will not wait for congressional approval that will never come.

There are also other avenues to pursue. After an initial refusal to commit herself, Clinton has recently shifted towards opposing the Keystone XL pipeline, an issue of particular salience among environmentalists. She has also become somewhat more critical of fracking, a method to extract natural gas that has led the U.S. to become the hub of the shale gas revolution. Clinton has proposed a range of conditions that would severely limit the number of sites at which the environmentally questionable procedure could be practiced.

The more aggressive stance on climate and sustainable energy issues suggests that Bernie Sanders’ success in the primaries—particularly on climate issues—has driven Clinton to the left. Compared to her first presidential run in 2008, she appears to have shifted her positions on a number of issues, including the federal minimum wage, trade, and Wall Street reform.

The same is true for climate and energy. However, the line of demarcation between her and Sanders remains clear. Leaked Clinton campaign emails suggest, for example, that the pursuit of a carbon tax policy was dropped after polling revealed its unpopularity.

A Democratic transition will likely leave a large chunk of the existing bureaucracy in place. One minor measure could be to give the Special Envoy for Climate Change cabinet status. Currently a position within the State Department, such a move could elevate climate change to a matter of national concern, at least within White House.

Where does this leave us? The immediate takeaway is that meaningful action is very unlikely. With legislative action not in the cards, a Clinton presidency will be confined to making a difference on the margins. While her campaign’s white papers indicate high ambitions in policy terms, political reality will not allow her the space to put those plans into action.

Clinton’s executive power is therefore limited to symbolic action falling short of what would be necessary to turn around U.S. climate policy. What matters more than the White House now are the results of down-ballot contests. If somehow Democrats were to capture the House, the calculation would change considerably.

In the event of divided government, climate change solutions will be left mostly to the market to figure out. In the sense that climate change is the result of a market failure itself, such policy status is dangerous. It also puts the U.S. at a disadvantage.

On the one hand, America is at the forefront of technological and business model innovation. Companies like Tesla and Solar City are developing cutting-edge products in the sustainable transport and battery storage sectors. On the other hand, policy innovation is at an all-time low, at least at the federal level. It is largely up to states like California to show what good policy can do.

Against this background, it remains extremely unlikely that Hillary Clinton can make U.S. climate policy great again. In a sense, this chimes with the general assessment of a Clinton presidency: evolution, not revolution.

The post Climate Change: What Would Hillary Clinton Do? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

North Korea’s provocative behavior has reached a new and unprecedented level after its last successful nuclear test on September 9th. In the last year, a new and dreadful level of activity has characterized Pyongyang’s provocations with two nuclear tests, an intercontinental ballistic test and countless submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) tests.

Since Kim Jong-un succeeded to its father in 2012, Pyongyang has consistently accelerated the acquisition of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile capabilities in order to fulfil the pursuit of the status of Nuclear Power Nation, as reaffirmed during last Korean Workers Party Congress in May.

While the U.S. and China strongly demand the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, the end of the North Korean nuclear program and the resume of the Sixth Party Talks, there are evident signals that Pyongyang is determined to increase its military provocations as shown by the recent failed Musudan missile test on October 16th, recently reported by the United States Strategic Command.

Yet, the fast-paced level of technical sophistication in the acquisition, potential miniaturization and range-expansion of the nuclear warheads remains the biggest threats to South Korea and Japan, considered as primary targets. The U.N. Security Council remains adamant in condemning any additional transgressions of the nuclear NonProliferation Treaty, deploring all the grave violations of the previous resolutions against North Korea.

Despite the efforts of the international community to implement the economic sanctions against North Korea, Pyongyang remains determined to pursue the acquisition of nuclear weapons as main tool for regime survival, threatening the fragile balance in the Korean peninsula. The two Koreas remain technically at war, despite an armistice the 1953’s armistice, which ensured de facto the cessation of the hostilities.

Japan and South Korea are the most strategically valuable U.S. allies in the region, but also the most exposed to the threat of military retaliation from Pyongyang. While Obama Administration has emphasized its commitment in preventing Pyongyang’s full acquisition of military and nuclear capabilities, concerns over the limited results achieved by the strategic patience approach has surely affected Japan and South Korea’s perception of Washington’s recalibrating role in the region.

Earlier this year, President Park responded to Pyongyang’s escalating missile and nuclear threat with a new and more hawkish policy towards North Korea, characterized by abandoning the path of dialogue and negotiation while relying more and more on a robust deterrence and defense capabilities such as the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system.

Japan under Abe Administration has increasingly responded to the severe shifts in the regional and international scenario, embarking on a wide reform of its security posture that fostered a debate over the opportunity for marked amendments of Japan’s post-war Constitution.

Currently, Japan is expanding its engagement in promoting a new and more pragmatic role aside Washington through a proactive contribution to peace, while abiding by the commitment of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

On August 3rd, North Korea fired an intermediate-range Rodong missile that fell in the Sea of Japan, 250 km from the coast and within Japan’s Economic Exclusive Zone. Japan’s concern about the surrounding security environment and the threat posed by Pyongyang’s dreadful provocations has certainly affected the decision of Japan’s political elites to accommodate unresolved issues with South Korea in favor of a closer strategic engagement.

Japan and South Korea recognize the pivotal role of Washington as a military patron and strong supporter of a more dynamic strategic trilateral pact, able to expand the level of cooperation between Japan and South Korea. Yet, for long time their relations have been strained by a large number of tensions such as territorial disputes and the heavy legacy of the atrocities committed by the Imperial Army during the occupation of Korea.

For these reasons Seoul and Tokyo have never managed to establish a shared framework for bilateral military cooperation. Yet, North Korea’s growing military capabilities and its slow but unrelenting desire to acquire a more threatening nuclear weapon arsenal have persuaded Japan and South Korea to increase the level of pressure on Pyongyang.

Japan and South Korea have recognized the importance of establishing a new framework for regional cooperation and dialogue as stressed by South Korean Ministry of Defense.

Recently, Seoul has announced its willingness to establish with Tokyo a new framework for intelligence-sharing cooperation while increasing the exchange of data on North Korea’s nuclear and missile activities as part of the trilateral pact signed in 2014.

This could be the first step in resuming the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) proposed in 2012 through the mediation of Washington and later cancelled.

A deal following the model of the GSOMIA, not only would represent a critical breakthrough in the relations between Japan and South Korea, but it would also provide a critical tool to expand the exchange of intelligence about Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile capabilities, cyber-security and other unconventional threats.

Japan and South Korea have made important progress in solving the issue of the comfort women, ultimate legacy of Japan’s 1910-1945 colonial rule. Seoul traditionally reluctant to engage with Japan has moved to a more pragmatic position as highlighted by South Korean Defense Minister Han Min-Koo on October 14.

Moreover, once the deal is approved, Japan’s Self-Defense Forces could be deployed in supporting activities of the U.S. troops as in patrolling operations, but also assisting Washington in the event of an armed conflict, fulfilling the right of the collective Self-Defense.

The perception of Pyongyang’s nuclear threat has been one of the most critical elements of alteration of the strategic balance in the region. In the last few months, North Korea missile tests have accelerated the decision of Seoul to deploy the THAAD system creating a diplomatic fracture in the renewed entente with China.

Japan has also announced the upgrading of its missile defense capabilities in the aftermath of Pyongyang’s recent nuclear test and following the example of South Korea, it might decide to acquire a THAAD or Aegis Ashore system to boost its deterrence capabilities.

Indeed, fostering the creation of a solid trilateral security cooperation would represent an important asset for Washington’s regional strategic agenda, but also a critical starting point for the expansion of a proactive security engagement across the Asia-Pacific region at the expenses of Beijing.

While China agrees on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, the emergence of a strong trilateral security cooperation pact would seriously compromise Beijing’s influence and strategic interest not only in the Korean peninsula but also in the whole region, alimenting a new phase of harsh confrontation with Washington and its allies.

For Japan, the growing perception of isolation and vulnerability vis-à-vis the North Korea’s threat, still characterized by a vibrant anti-Japanese sentiment and the fast-paced China’s military modernization, has represented a critical element for the success of the ambitious Abe Administration’s security agenda.

While a part of the society still opposes to a marked departure from Japan’s reluctant realism, the renewed military engagement pursued by Tokyo could be seen as one pillar of an integrated strategy of cooperation with Washington and Seoul, dramatically concerned about the evolution of the security scenario in the Korean peninsula.

Of course much depends on the willingness of the future administration to resume and expand the strategic commitments in the region that have characterized Obama Administration’s agenda.

Both Japan and South Korea political elites remain wary over the possibility of abandonment in lieu of the presidential candidate Donald Trump’s grand strategy, calling for a disengagement of the U.S. military presence from the region.

In Seoul, policymakers of the ruling Saenuri party have openly discussed not only the development of an indigenous nuclear weapon program, but also of the possibility of pre-emptive strikes on North Korean facilities, jeopardizing Obama Administration’s vision for a denuclearized Korean peninsula.

Boosting deterrence has become one of the most critical issues within South Korean government and plans for developing a nuclear submarine as the ultimate tool to deter Pyongyang’s nuclear threat, have been taken into serious consideration.

Facing nuclear annihilation as often stressed by North Korean bellicose rhetoric, South Korean political elites and defense officials have shown interest in designing plans for the elimination of the North Korean leadership with surgical strikes as ultimate solution to the dreadful nuclear threat represented by Pyongyang.

An unprecedented strategic cooperation between Japan and South Korea is the direct consequence of a phase of recalibration of Washington’s engagement in the Asia-Pacific region as the end of Obama Administration approaches.

In dealing with Pyongyang, very limited results have been obtained in persuading its recalcitrant leadership to comply with norms and regulations of the international community, leaving Japan and South Korea in a difficult position to respond effectively to the emerging nuclear crisis fuelled by North Korea’s threatening behavior.

A strong security cooperation could be a critical tool for both countries to address the emerging strategic issues on the regional scenario. Yet its success might depend also on next administration’s decision to follow the path marked by President Obama towards the fulfillment of Washington’s Pacific Century, rather than embracing a new strategic orientation.

The post Japan and South Korea: Towards a Closer Security Cooperation appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

He drafted something in 1776.

In 2016, “I can’t wait for this election to be over” has become an American mantra. But the “cultural civil war […] will not go away”  Our polarized political camps have long demeaned each other; the ever-rising rancor alienates everyday citizens and exacerbates social dysfunction. We risk portraying a free society as unsustainable, at a time when our political system is losing ground to “state-directed corporatism that seems to be delivering much higher growth and much better leaders.”

America must break the vicious cycle of politics. The first step is for Americans to find instinctive grounds for common trust. In foreign policy, a nation acts as a singular entity; citizens feel their identity reflected, or tainted, in this national conduct. Today our discourse projects our dysfunction, to the world and to ourselves. Reversing the extension of internal politics into foreign policy will soften the divisions and project our values.

During the Cold War, the nonpartisan doctrine of containing the USSR filtered the effect of political differences. Regardless of partisan issues, the basic mission of foreign policy stood. Even debate over the mission revolved around Containment’s theme. It was a reasonable theme: Soviet ideology called for our demise, they could destroy us physically, and they opposed our interests in every way. It offered the contrasting image of America’s virtues. Now U.S. policy has no filter and offers no such image.

When you are lost, your best response is to trace back to first reference points.

In post-modernity’s global swirl, new channels of communication voice so many views, and cite so many rationales, to so many whose horizons were highly limited until very recently, that sense itself is difficult to establish. Orientation cannot come from organization charts, or any multi-point written rubric. Any static roadmap risks sudden obsolescence. Rather, orientation needs a first reference point and an adaptive process to check bearings by it.

America has that reference point, in the written creed of the Declaration of Independence. “Life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness” verges on cliche. But having created a nation on abstract principle, eschewing ethnicity, tradition, or church, the creed is substantive and revolutionary. Stipulating that government exists to secure those rights both supports the ideal by confining rulers to this role, and shows that the creed is realistic as well as idealistic.

These terms define the nation, committing us to foster and protect freedom’s conditions in our life, and to observe the creed in our choices. Keeping that commitment is essential to America’s legitimacy—the core of national interest.

A “zero-based” focus on that principle can generate a process to carry it into policy. As people animate any decision process and policy institution, it is through people, embedded in institutional practice, that America’s creed can become policy doctrine.

The best way to effect this animation will be to charge the corps of U.S. diplomats to know the terms, nuances, and applications of the Declaration’s founding creed. The State Department has a seat at all the interagency processes on international relations, and is not defined by particular sectors, as are, for example, Agriculture or Labor.

Our diplomats are in position to inject America’s principles into policy formation. Given deep fluency in America’s founding tenets and their implications, diplomats also can deploy the worldly knowledge gained from their foreign postings, not as the voice of foreigners’ interests, but as professionals, expert in projection of America’s nature.

A professional body, expert in the principles of the Declaration, under the authority of the nation’s elected leaders, should be formed as a parallel to the professional body of military experts. Rigorous steeping in the art of applying our abstract principles will require a thoughtfully constructed training regimen. The regimen must also impart an education in diplomatic practice, economics, history, international relations, cultures, and military affairs. Formation must also ground the diplomat in the realities of American life.

Successfully implemented, it will create an institution that all Americans can trust to represent our values. This should ease the political outsider’s alienation, and offer basic guidance to the policy insider. It will portray America’s values to the world, and showcase the value of rights.

The post On Foreign Policy, and Fixing Political Dysfunction appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Representatives of the founding nations of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) applaud as Chinese President Xi Jinping unveils a sculpture during the opening ceremony of the AIIB in Beijing. (AP/PTI)

The Philippines has grabbed headlines worldwide recently with its rapid foreign policy shift announcement and subsequent balancing act between the U.S. and China. Reasons given for the shift include Filipino unease with U.S. criticism over its domestic, anti-drug campaign (political), as well as the Philippines’ discomfort with U.S. ambiguity with respect to actual U.S. treaty obligations to firmly defend Filipino interests in the South China sea (military). However, an economic factor may have played the largest role in the shift as the Philippines has a hunger for more infrastructure investment, which China’s OBOR initiative and AIIB both look set to satisfy.

The Philippines has just put the world on notice that, henceforth, it desires to be treated as a sovereign entity and with the same respect as its treaty ally, the U.S.. Whether the Philippines’ grievance that the U.S. has actually taken it for granted in the past is irrelevant. What is relevant is that the Philippines apparently perceives this to be the truth.

This policy shift is emblematic of the quickened pace of geopolitics since the end of the Cold War and the onset of globalization. These factors, combined with the realization by all countries that a firm economic footing forms the foundation for future prosperity, has shifted the balance somewhat towards “swing” powers in their dealings with the U.S., China, and Russia. Several of these powers, notably the Philippines and Vietnam, are paying homage to India’s traditional non-aligned stance, both during and after the Cold War.

This homage takes the form of a more multi-vectored foreign policy strategy and will increasingly be a more powerful tool in the tool belts of various Asian middle powers. As U.S.-Russia and U.S.-China hostilities increase globally, this new foreign policy orientation will eventually allow middle powers maximum room for maneuverability between the major powers. Partners and allies alike of the U.S., China, and Russia will all be asking their interlocutors, “What concrete economic benefits (if any) are you offering which I can take back home and further enhance my own domestic legitimacy?”.

With respect to East Asia, both the U.S. and Russia are at an economic disadvantage compared to China, the leading trading partner for most states in the region. This makes it imperative for the U.S., especially, to have TPP ratified and come into effect. This would truly signal to China, as well as the regional states, that the U.S.’ re-balance to Asia indeed has a strong economic, and not just military, component.

Additionally, it’s hoped that TPP passage would eventually strengthen U.S. economic ties to East Asia, reinvigorating its own economy in the process. However, it has been argued that scaled-down U.S. economic cooperation with several regional states due to human rights concerns actually has given a geopolitical opening to China. Because of this, Thailand, Malaysia, and Cambodia may eventually follow the Philippines’ example and formulate a more balanced foreign policy approach between the U.S. and China.

East Asia, however, is only one component in a much larger game played by several powers to unite the entirety of Asia (in some cases with Europe and Africa as well) economically. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has recently unveiled a program detailing several competing visions of “reconnecting Asia” through infrastructure and energy development sponsored by various states.

These visions not only encompass China’s OBOR and AIIB initiatives and Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), but plans offered by India, Japan, South Korea, and Turkey as well. The ambitious scale of these plans (particularly by U.S. treaty allies Japan, South Korea, and Turkey) and the increased popularity of multi-vector foreign policies combine to serve as a warning to the U.S. to either up its economic game in Asia or risk losing even more pieces on the Asian geopolitical chessboard.

Video courtesy of CCTV English

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Across the Middle East, refugees, IDPs, and indigenous religious minorities remain at considerable risk.  The U.S. presidential election has not addressed any of these concerns, from humanitarian or geostrategic perspectives. But the new U.S. president will have to.

Military operations in northern Iraq against ISIS’s control of Mosul bring to fore the question of Iraqi Christians and other religious minorities in Syria and Iraq. The importance of these questions remained invisible in the U.S. presidential and vice-presidential debates.

The 2016 U.S. elections process has been dominated by personalities, not by issues. Donald Trump emerged as the Republican nominee by exaggeration and personal attack on his rivals—”low-energy” Jeb Bush, “Little Marco” Rubio, and so on. Trump continued this line of attack on the Democratic nominee, “Crooked Hillary” Clinton, directing attention to her at-home email server, hiding of alleged health issues, and non-progressive governments who donated to the Clinton Foundation.

Former Secretary of State Clinton has directed her attacks on his failure to release his tax returns, his apparent exemption from paying federal taxes, and his disrespect for immigrants, minorities, and women—recently illustrated by release of a crude audio recording and allegations of unwanted sexual touching by more than 10 women.

Mr. Trump has made elements of foreign policy central to his campaign. Build a wall to keep out Mexican immigrants, and deport illegal immigrants. Tighten immigration restrictions from countries with large Muslim populations, to reduce the risk of terrorism. Renegotiate trade deals—including NAFTA, with two of the U.S.’s largest trade partners. Expect more burden-sharing from U.S. allies. Respect Putin. Reject the Iran deal that intends to trade sanctions relief for promises to defer a nuclear weapons program. Defeat ISIS.  Secretary Clinton, naturally, opposes most of these goals, or has an opposite strategy to achieve them.

In the three presidential debates and one vice presidential debate, though, which included discussions of ISIS, Islam, oil, terrorism, and immigration, candidates never got to the subject of protecting religious minorities in the Middle East (or elsewhere, for that matter). When they were asked specifically in the second debate about the humanitarian crisis in Aleppo, neither discussed it all.

These issues are being debated outside the presidential race, though.  Earlier this year, the Vatican sponsored and three-day meeting on religious persecution at the United Nations in New York. This spring, the White House and both houses of Congress proclaimed ISIS activities as genocide against religious minority groups.  Secretary of State John Kerry stated that “Daesh is genocidal by self-proclamation, by ideology, and by its actions.” In May, the House passed amendments to the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act in support of local defense by Christians and others against ISIS. In September, more than 50 members of Congress spoke at the third annual In Defense of Christians (IDC) conference.

The IDC conference focused on issues like support for Lebanon and the 1.5 million refugees it hosts, Congressional resolutions in support of Iraqi and Syrian religious minorities, and the fate of Coptic Christians in Egypt. But it also raised a question that will be difficult for the next president: what Iraq should look like.

Rep. Jeff Fortenberry (R.-Neb.) introduced House Concurrent Resolution 152, supporting an autonomous Nineveh Plain Province for Christians and other minorities. This is the region from which the Iraqi Army and the Kurdistan Region’s peshmerga, with U.S. and allied support, are currently attempting to drive out ISIS. American diaspora groups like the American Mesopotamian Organization have been promoting this for some time, building not only political support in Congress but also creating the Nineveh Plain Protection Units (NPU), to fight ISIS in northern Iraq.

The difficulty for the next president will be how to approach the Iraqi Government, Kurdistan Region, and American diaspora after the liberation of Mosul and defeat of ISIS, at least in Iraq. The Kurdistan Region (KR) hosts about 1.8 million refugees from Syria and IDPs from the rest of Iraq, including many Christians, Yezidis, Turcoman, Kakai, and other religious minorities. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has protected many Christian interests in northern Iraq, but also has been criticized by Assyrian Christian/Nineveh Plain diaspora. The next president will have to answer:

Should the U.S. support independence initiatives from the KRG? The KRG has governed territory outside of its three constitutional provinces, including in the Nineveh Plain, since even before ISIS’s attack in 2014—what territories, if any, might the U.S. acknowledge as part of a Kurdish independence declaration? If necessary, should the U.S. be prepared to militarily support the peshmerga from the Iraqi Army? Turkey and Iran each have Kurdish populations of their own; how Ankara and Tehran react will matter intensely.  Syria’s Kurds get rolled into this chess game as well.

In Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq, refugees, IDPs, and indigenous religious minorities remain at considerable risk.  The U.S. presidential election has not addressed any of these concerns, from humanitarian, human rights, or geostrategic perspectives. But the new U.S. president will have to.

See also the author’s earlier post on indigenous Christian militias in he Nineveh Province, Jan 2015.

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Off the coast of Vietnam, an ocean farmer monitors Barramundi fish in an offshore net pen, where the fish are allowed to swim freely at low densities. With financing from OPIC, Australis Aquaculture LLC expanded operations to Van Phong Bay, Vietnam where it operates the world’s largest Barramundi farm, specializing in sustainable and eco-friendly aquaculture and employs one hundred local workers. (OPIC)

Many developed and developing country governments offer development assistance and loans to lesser developed countries for a variety of reasons, including efforts to win business opportunities for their national companies, to advance foreign policy goals, and for altruistic reasons. In recent years, Chinese offers of developmental assistance have drawn the most attention, not only due to their size and potential for environmental hazard, but also for their potential to influence foreign policy.  

One recent example of this influence concerns the Philippines, where Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte has decided to put aside his country’s favorable ruling on July 12 from The Hague over competing maritime claims in the South China Sea, or West Philippine Sea. Duterte’s decision to set aside the ruling, and criticize the Americans, has obviously been welcomed by Beijing. He recently returned from Beijing with an entourage of Filipino businessmen, coming away with some $24 billion of promised developmental aid and loans from China.  

Some analysts argue Vietnam may be the next Southeast Asian nation with competing claims in the South China Sea to move closer to Beijing. While not a formal treaty ally of the U.S., Vietnam has welcomed Washington’s intervention in the South China Sea, or East Sea as it is referred to here in Vietnam.

Ties between the two countries have grown under the Obama Administration, and have led to joint military exercises, cooperation on dioxin removal, the full lifting of the lethal arms embargo during Obama’s visit in May, and a port of call by two U.S. warships to the historic and strategic Cam Ranh Bay earlier this month—following a 21-year absence. All of this growing interaction is a result of Washington’s “pivot to Asia”, announced by Obama and implemented by his former secretary of state, Hillary Clinton from 2009-2013.

Of course, this pivot is part business, foreign policy and philanthropy, and one of the best tools the Obama Administration has to advance the pivot is the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). As the U.S. Government’s development finance institution, the independent agency “mobilizes private capital to help address critical development challenges and in doing so, advances U.S. foreign policy and national security priorities”. Established in 1971, OPIC provides investors with financing, political risk insurance, and support for private equity investment funds, and operates on a self-sustaining basis at no net cost to American taxpayers.

Given the uncertainty created by Duterte over the strength of Washington’s pivot to the Philippines, a visit on October 25 to Ho Chi Minh City by OPIC officials was a timely reminder of the two countries growing bonds. Leading the delegation was Elizabeth L. Littlefield, president and CEO of OPIC, who announced the agency will seek to work with Vietnam’s private sector to provide a potential $500 million worth of financial assistance to Vietnamese projects over the next three years. While Littlefield acknowledged little investment by OPIC to date in Vietnam, she said U.S. investors were particularly interested in commercially-viable renewable energy, agriculture, and information technology projects which contribute to Vietnam’s development.

Finding these commercially viable projects, especially in renewable energy space where the feed-in-tariffs (a set price guaranteed by the utility) are not yet commercially attractive, will be the challenge for U.S. investors, OPIC and the Vietnamese private sector. And most of the $12.3 billion of foreign direct investment in Vietnam is currently earmarked for the processing and manufacturing sectors.

However, the mere offer of substantial assistance will go a long way in helping cement the bilateral relations between the U.S. and Vietnam, and will help reassure Hanoi that Washington will not be pivoting away from the region—despite worries in the region over the passage of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and how the next American president will choose to engage (or disengage) with the region.

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Smoke rises during an air strike on a mountain overlooking Yemen’s capital Sanaa(REUTERS/Khaled Abdullah)

Saudi Arabia has long been accused of needlessly hitting civilian targets during its air campaign in neighboring Yemen. Most commentators have put this down to a mixture of indifference and military incompetence on the part of the Saudi armed forces.

Their capabilities against hardened fighters like the rebel Houthis were long questioned by outside observers before the Kingdom intervened in its neighbor early last year.

While the southern theatre of a large war games exercise held in 2014 featured fighting against Yemeni Shi’a rebels suggests that the Kingdom had established practical contingency plans ahead of its attack on the Houthi movement in March 2015, the Saudi coalition and their Yemeni allies have indeed proved unable to overcome the rebels.

The futile conflict has already resulted in 10,000 dead, including an estimated 4,000 civilians, while the United Nations estimates that 80% of the Yemeni population is now in need of humanitarian assistance.

But now academics from the London School of Economics, who have been working in Beirut on data from the Yemen Data Project and statistics from the Yemeni agriculture ministry, have pointed to a grim possibility about the Saudi-led airstrikes which have been battering their southern neighbor. According to a report in the Independent newspaper the air campaign has deliberately sought to undermine Yemen’s undeveloped agricultural sector in a country where more than half the population relies, in part or in whole, on agriculture and rural husbandry to survive.

The $250 million a month cost of the war effort and an oil slump have caused a hole in Saudi Arabia’s finances and created pressure on the Saudi monarchy to declare a quick victory and return home. But with the war at a stalemate the Kingdom’s military planners may be looking beyond withdrawal to creating a situation in post-war Yemen that gives them the strongest hand in the peace negotiations to come.

Riyadh has always considered Yemen to be in its backyard, and insisted that foreign countries, including the United States, follow the Saudi lead when making deals with its troublesome neighbor. Former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh was a key ally for years until his overthrow in the Arab Spring, though for now he is now fighting alongside the Houthis. But before Yemen’s fragile political order began to breakdown earlier this decade Saudi money did much to keep the country’s distorted economy afloat with subsidies.

The suspicion now is that Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies are deliberately destroying the foundations of rural life in Yemen so that whoever takes over at the end of the war finds their country faces a total reliance on food imports, the bulk of which presently come through the Gulf states. This seems part of an emerging Saudi strategy of economic warfare against the Houthis to increase the Kingdom’s leverage over its Houthi enemies, but which directly threatens a humanitarian catastrophe in the Arab world’s poorest country.

The influence welded by the Kingdom behind the scenes initially allowed it to escape much open international condemnation over the issue of its human rights violations in the Yemeni civil war. But a recent massacre of mourners at the funeral of a top Houthi leader by coalition airplanes was probably what prompted a sudden wave of missile attacks by Houthi forces against ships in the Bab al-Mandeb strait, a major shipping lane between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

The Gulf of Aden leads into the Indian Ocean and traffic along this trade route ultimately connects the Gulf region and Asia to Europe and North America through the Suez Canal. Any disruption to the passage of international shipping along it carries massive financial implications for logistics and insurance companies involved in the maritime sector, not to mention the fragile global economy.

The attack on the funeral and the Houthi response, which also included failed strikes on US naval vessels, therefore pushed the war and the Saudi handling of it abruptly back into global headlines. The unwelcome gaze of the international media may cause the Saudis to moderate their behavior while the attention lasts but it is unlikely to sway them from their aim of subordinating their southern neighbor back under Saudi hegemony.

Calls are now being made for the U.S. to increase its involvement in the conflict with the objective of bringing about a political solution that favors Saudi Arabia’s interests. While they are unlikely to be heeded by the outgoing Obama administration, the Saudis know that the president’s successor may be keener to listen. Even Obama has studiously avoided pressing the Saudis too hard on their actions in Yemen, whilst speeding up arms sales to the Kingdom and its Gulf allies.

But the U.S. and the UK should instead reconsider their unwise involvement on the Saudi side of this unnecessary conflict. As long as they back Saudi actions in Yemen, and supply the Kingdom’s forces there, these two Western countries are undermining their own credibility whenever they condemn war crimes in conflicts elsewhere. The Russian and Iranian backers of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad now have an example of hypocrisy they can point to whenever Western critics of the Syrian regime call out its nasty habit of starving besieged rebel areas of food aid for example.

The upcoming change in American administrations provides a key chance for a policy reset however. Whoever becomes the next U.S. president should review America’s current joint military operations with Saudi Arabia and cut off those related to its war in Yemen. They should also encourage the UK government to reconsider its support for the Saudi adventure and stop enabling the Saudis by supplying them with intelligence, arms and ammunition. This will likely enrage Riyadh but by putting an additional burden on the Saudi economy America will probably speed up the day the Saudi government realizes it can no longer afford to try and bomb its smaller neighbor into submission.

This article was originally published on Professor Juan Cole’s blog Informed Comment and reappears here with kind permission.

The post Why is Saudi Arabia Targeting Yemen’s Future? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

The Global Gender Gap Index examines differences between men and women in four fundamental categories: Economic Participation and Opportunity; Educational Attainment; Health and Survival; and Political Empowerment. (World Economic Forum)

The Global Gender Gap Index of the World Economic Forum ranks countries according to how well they are leveraging their female talent pool, based on economic, educational, health-based, and political indicators.

The latest Report provides a comprehensive overview of the current performance and progress over the last decade. The direction of change within countries from 2006 to the present day has been largely positive, but not universally so. Of the 109 countries that have been continuously covered in the Report, 103 have narrowed their gender gaps, but another 6 have seen prospects for women deteriorate: Sri Lanka, Mali, Croatia, Slovakia, Jordan, and Iran.

It goes without saying that gender equality is fundamental to whether and how societies thrive. Figures 31-33 (pages 38-39) in the Report confirm a correlation between gender equality and GDP per capita, the level of competitiveness, and human development. But when economists speak of the ‘gender gap,’ they usually refer to systematic differences in the outcomes that men and women achieve in the labor market. These are all economic gender gaps: differences in the percentages of men and women in the labor force, the types of occupations they choose, and their relative incomes or hourly wages.

Since the release of the first Report in 2006, an extra quarter of a billion women have entered the global workforce. But wage inequality persists with women only now earning what men did a decade ago! With the economic gap closing by just 3%, this suggests, according to the Report, that it will take another 118 years to close this gap completely.

So here is the dilemma: women are catching up with men on the educational front (if not becoming better educated than men in many fields), yet, they still on average earn less than men and are much less represented in the top deciles of the overall distribution of earnings.

The next research topics should focus on the policy means of narrowing the economic gender gap. If, as is likely, women will continue to take time off from work to care of children, that would continue to reduce both their average earnings relative to men and their representation in the top of the earnings distribution. Still, even if the average hourly earnings of women reached parity or surpassed that of men, it is unlikely (even without discrimination against women) that they will be as represented as men at the top of the earnings distribution, for while combining household with market activities hurts average earnings, it is a really strong hindrance to having enough time to make the utmost commitment to work and the needed investment in their human capital.

I totally understand the vital role of the other 3 sub-indexes of the World Economic Forum’s index (political empowerment, health, and education), but the gender gap that should get most of our attention is the economic one. The narrowing of the gender gap in recent years has taken place in an environment of sharply rising wage inequality. This will not solve our paradox: It is true that women have entered the labor market in unprecedented numbers, yet half of our global population still earns less than men and have fewer opportunities for advancement.

According to the literature, observable factors that affect pay (such as education, job experience, hours of work, and so on) explain no more than 50% of the wage gap. The most recent studies, as reported in a review by economists Francine Blau and Lawrence Kahn, found that the fraction explained is now even lower, about 33%. The reason is that the decrease in the gender gap in earnings was largely due to an increase in the productive attributes of women relative to men. The remainder of the gap (termed in the economic jargon as the “residual”) is the part that cannot be explained by observable factors. This residual could result from workers’ choices or, alternatively, from economic discrimination. Surprisingly, the differing occupations of men and women explain only 10–33% of the difference in male and female earnings. The rest is due to differences within occupations, and part of that is due to the observable factors.

It is true that discrimination has declined, but occupational disparities between men and women persist, suggesting that we should be looking for causes that are unrelated to discrimination (such as occupational choice and family responsibilities) as well as those that are related.

Seldom are the data sufficiently detailed to permit comparisons of women and men who are the same on all the variables that matter, but the more detailed the data (on the wage structure and occupational segregation), the better our aspirations for reducing the overall global gender gap. This should be the future research topic of the World Economic Forum and other international organizations, think tanks, governments, NGOs, and the private sector.

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