Foreign Policy Blogs

Iraqi Defense Minister Khaled al-Obeidi’s convoy tours the front line in the Samarra desert, Iraq, earlier this month. (Associated Press)

Written by Miles Kopley

Since it was wrestled away from Iraqi forces in a startling June 2014 offensive, the ancient city of Mosul has been crucial for the Islamic State. It remains the largest city held by the group in Iraq, even as other cities such as Tikrit and Ramadi have been liberated by the Iraqi Army, backed by coalition forces. In recent months, Mosul has become increasingly vital to the military presence and economic viability of the group in the region. A lone defensive bastion in the Nineveh Governorate amidst a series of ISIS military losses, Mosul suffers from meager supply lines and the city’s crumbling infrastructure.

Although it’s a tall order, one that has already proven to be a challenge for an anti-ISIS coalition skeptical of itself, the retaking of Mosul would spell the beginning of the end for the Islamic State presence in Iraq. The defensive and economic benefits of capturing Mosul have been apparent since the Islamic State first began operations against Iraqi troops in 2014.

Shortly after taking the city, ISIS looted approximately $480 million in banknotes from financial institutions, providing an important funding boost to the expanding organization. It established extensive convoy routes spanning from the city to its self-proclaimed capital of Raqqa in Syria, providing economic and military relief to the insurgents and remaining civilians. It maintain Mosul’s local oil industry, pumping it from nearby wells and shipping it to destinations all over the region. The roughly half-million citizens who remained within the city faced increased taxes on agricultural land and additional duties on imports.

The defensive capabilities Mosul offers to the surrounding territory compounds the economic assets the city grants the Islamic State. Indeed, the Islamic State has extensive forward positions nestled in villages, valleys, and open fields surrounding the city, a system of fortifications that gives it added strength in holding the city.

In the past few months, however, the accomplishments of the Islamic State in Mosul have been largely dashed by coalition efforts. Oil revenue across the Islamic State has been halved by airstrikes targeting critical infrastructure. Mosul’s main supply route to Raqqa was severed last November, putting increased pressure on the city’s residents and forcing them to face frequent fuel shortages and electricity blackouts. Banks were extensively bombed in January, resulting in monetary losses ranging into the millions. The group has already lost approximately 45 percent of its territory in Iraq since the height of its power, and Mosul seems to be the next target in line for coalition efforts.

The Iraqi Army captures Mahana village just 60 kilometers from ISIS-held Mosul.

Yet, while coalition airstrikes have made significant headway, forces on the ground have had mixed results. Currently, the United States only has two hundred Special Forces troops dedicated to the ground offensive in Mosul, leaving most of the large-scale operations to the Iraqi Army.

Skirmishes between Peshmerga and Iraqi Sh’ia forces threaten the alliance they have built against the Islamic State, and complicated their plans to advance on the city. Splintering of troops along ethnic and communal lines has also led to miscommunication and mistrust among individual units, further damaging relationships. The Iraqi Army has also stated that it would need a force five to six times their current size in order to mount an effective attack on the Islamic State.

If the Iraqi Army and coalition forces are capable of freeing the city, however, a drastic chain of events could follow. Virtually all of Iraq’s oil fields are located in the Nineveh Governorate, where Mosul lies. If lost, the few convoy routes the group has would be severed, impacting the oil trade within the group’s territory and on the black market, and permanently reducing their financing capabilities. Losing the city would also mean the loss of the largest defendable position in the region, as well as any military support it could offer to combatants on other front lines.

With so much at stake for the Islamic State in Mosul, there has never been a better time—or chance—for coalition forces wrestle it back. Taking back Mosul would mean the recovery of one of the country’s largest economic centers: a key victory for Iraq and coalition forces and a disastrous defeat for the Islamic State.

The post The Fall of ISIS Begins with Mosul appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Following the disappearance of three shareholders and two staff members from a bookstore in Causeway Bay, Hong Kong, Swedish diplomacy has unwillingly been drawn into the international spotlight. One of the missing bookseller’s, Gui Minhai, was given Swedish citizenship in 1996 after studying in Sweden in the 1980s. Despite Gui having requested in a video posted by China’s official media that Sweden did not intervene in the affair, the Swedish government could not ignore the incident because of diplomatic protocol.

The Swedish Foreign Ministry has also made clear that it does not accept China’s response to the situation. A consular official from the Swedish Embassy has voiced its government’s annoyance at having a request for contact with Gui turned down. The embassy has also repeatedly asked for clarification from China over the incident.

Ironically, Sweden is perceived as being one of China’s closest allies in the West. During the Cold War, Sweden was one of only a few countries that maintained a workable relationship with China; the positive tie between the two countries was probably one reasons why Gui went to Sweden to study. Although Sweden was once a European hegemonic power, it has adopted a policy of neutrality since its influence has declined.

In 1950, diplomatic relations between Sweden and China were officially established and ambassadors were exchanged. This marked Sweden as the first Western state to establish diplomatic relations with communist China. Sweden also supported the admission of China to the UN, and bilateral trading and economic relations between the two countries were built before those with any other Western country.

Today, Sweden is China’s biggest trading partner in Northern Europe, while in turn China is the biggest export market for Sweden. Recently, Sweden has strengthened its cooperation with China in the field of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). As IKEA has become an international paradigm in terms of its contribution to CSR, it has also become the role model for China’s “Opening-up Policy” and “One Belt One Road” initiative.

Another characteristic of Swedish diplomacy is its “human rights diplomacy*.” As a member of the European Union and the home of the Nobel Prize, Sweden uses “the protection of human rights” as part of its “soft power diplomacy.” It has proactively criticized human rights violations by other countries, for example, the US’ bombing of Vietnam and the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the USSR. Sweden has also been the main fund provider for the UN Human Rights Council, Refugee Council and others.

As a consequence, Sweden is seen as an appropriate location for NGOs involved in international human rights and civil society to establish themselves. More recently, the EU has included “human rights” as an important value in promoting its own external relations, and in doing so, mirrors Sweden’s strategy of “human rights diplomacy”.

There are precedents for Sweden jeopardizing its economic interests in order to safeguard its “human rights diplomacy”. For example, in 2015, Saudi Arabia cancelled the opening address at an Arab League meeting in Cairo which was to have been given by the Swedish minister of foreign affairs; it was irritated because the speech contained comments about women’s and human rights. The minister in question had earlier criticized Saudi Arabia’s lashing and jailing of a blogger for “insulting Islam”.

When Saudi Arabia cancelled the speech, Sweden immediately terminating its defense-related trade agreement with the country, which included a USD500-million-worth contract for weapons. In response, Saudi Arabia withdrew its ambassador in Sweden and criticized Sweden for interfering in its internal affairs. The tension between the two countries escalated. At the same time, the relationship between Europe and Saudi Arabia also deteriorated. However, certain EU member states, including Germany and the UK, have shown an unwillingness to go so far as sacrificing their economic interests to promote values. Sweden, on the other hand, has been able to uphold its value of human rights and earn the respect of human rights advocates.

The incident with Saudi Arabia has further links with Sweden’s foreign policy. On being appointed minister of foreign affairs, Margot Wallström announced she planned to pursue a feminist and human-rights foreign policy with an emphasis on equality. As such, Sweden recognizes Palestine as a nation and supports the state-building movement in Western Sahara, which is under pressure. Recently, Morocco (which controls the area) blocked the opening of the first IKEA store in the kingdom. A number of Swedish enterprises have since jointly urged the Swedish government to maintain an equable relationship with Saudi Arabia in order not to affect their business. This pressure has not triggered significant response domestically.

However, the Causeway Bay Bookstore saga present a different scenario as Sweden has to deal with a rising China. Beijing has posed a serious challenge to Sweden’s “human rights diplomacy.” If China provides Sweden with some room for maneuver, it is likely the issue can be solved in a restrained manner. But if it continues its present assertiveness without providing a way out for Sweden, it risks to jeopardize the long-advocated working relationship between China and Sweden.

*Human Rights Diplomacy: This recent model in Western diplomacy bears the official aim of “promoting and safeguarding human rights.” It is often used to adjust bilateral relations and economic policy in accordance with the level of human rights in the state concerned. Some states targeted in human rights diplomacy view it as a means for other nations to interfere in their internal affairs. They believe the situation in each country is different and the concept of Western human rights may not be applicable everywhere. In general, China opposes “human rights diplomacy.”

The post Causeway Bay Incident: Swedish Diplomacy under Challenge appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Social media can do a lot of good for a brand’s image. It can be a place where an audience comes together to share their love of a brand, posting pictures and stories to engage with it.

It can also rip a brand to pieces: remember #AskSeaWorld. Sea World fell under public scrutiny for their treatment of orcas, due to the success of the film Blackfish. They invited the public to ask questions online using the hashtag #AskSeaWorld. Of course, they were hoping for real questions from concerned citizens.

But they forgot that they were opening up their Q&A to the world and disaster ensued. Rather than changing the conversation—their intended goal—they highlighted it and gave people a launchpad from which to collectively criticize Sea World. In fact, though the hashtag was first introduced more than a year ago, it is still in active use on Twitter today.

Another great (cautionary) example of trying to use a hashtag to reframe a narrative comes from the NYPD. During a particularly difficult time for their “brand” due to violence in the community, they invited the internet to come together and share nice stories about the NYPD using the hashtag #MyNYPD. What happened was as intense as it was predictable.

Israel—a country whose very mention can start fights on college campuses and at family dinners—decided that this was a model worth emulating. To celebrate Israeli Independence Day, Prime Minister Netanyahu hosted a Twitter conversation inviting people to ask him questions about Israel using the hashtag #AskNetanyahu. Unsurprisingly, chaos ensued.

Netanyahu tweeted from his personal handle @netanyahu and was also backed up by the more official channel @IsraeliPM. He responded to questions with text and short videos, both in English and in Hebrew. Some of the interactions were positive:

• He was asked if the dress was blue and white or black and gold. “The colors of the dress were clearly blue and white. Like my pen. Like my suit. Like our flag.”
• When asked if he was “human,” @IsraeliPM responded “01111001 01100101 01110011.”
• When asked if he would fire the person responsible for the hashtag, he responded, “Nope. Actually, I’m going to give… her a treat. You want to see her?” He then panned the camera down to show his very sweet dog sitting quietly at his side.

But of course, for every positive questioner, there were 1000 more looking to insult, provoke and ask truly difficult policy questions, ranging from Israel’s treatment of Holocaust survivors to their conflict with the Palestinians. If you search Twitter right now for the hashtag, here are the top images you will find:

Even though the Q&A component of the hashtag started—and ended—over a week ago, people are still using the hashtag to attack Netanyahu personally and Israeli policy towards the Palestinians in general. The campaign, rather than starting a positive conversation, instead served as an online space for critics. The movement was already there, and this campaign simply provided them with a gathering place.

The most retweeted instance of the hashtag, including any tweet sent by @Netanyahu or @IsraeliPM (save for the 01111001… tweet), was actually a bit of an ambush. Netanyahu received this question:

He saw the tweet, gauged that it was a real question from a real person (a journalist in fact!) and responded accordingly:

Hasan then responded:

Hasan’s response garnered over 500 retweets. What it did not garner: a response from Netanyahu. Therein lies one of the challenges of taking questions so publicly. A “real” or “fair” question can quickly turn into something the brand, organization, business or—in this case—world leader may not be prepared to answer. To me, this single interaction was more problematic for Netanyahu than any other component of the whole mess. He started a conversation that he was not prepared to finish. This made him look weak.

A town hall is a hard thing to manage. You never know what kind of questions you are going to get and once it starts, you are trapped. You cannot end it early because things are not going your way. Hosting a town hall on Twitter is like handing infinite microphones to an infinite crowd and then inviting them to pelt you with them as hard as they can.A quick search of keywords associated with the hashtag reveals the myriad hazards that overshadowed any potential political gain.

And yet it happened. And really, it’s still happening. While you probably won’t get an answer from him anytime soon, feel free to head over to Twitter and #AskNetanyahu any pressing questions you might have for him. You won’t be alone. Here is the current usage of #AskNetanyahu on Twitter.

Fun post script to the campaign: it even earned itself its very own parody handle! The fake @Ask_Netanyahu has over 3000 real followers. And it shares with its audience such nuggets as “I don’t believe in God, but God gave me the land,” “Had a long day reviewing records of newborns from Gaza’s Al-Shifa Hospital. I need to update my #KillList” and “I’ve initiated strategic long term planning consultations with George Zimmerman’s life coach.“

Follow me on Twitter @jlemonsk.

The post With #AskNetanyahu, Bibi Asks for Trouble appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Henri Ladyi works to demobilize children from militias in the DRC.

In 2003, Henri Ladyi turned his back on the endless fighting in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) when he started working at a small peace group called Centre Résolution Conflits. Twelve years later he has been called “Africa’s Schindler” for his efforts towards peacebuilding in the eastern DRC.

The vast Democratic Republic of Congo has seen many decades of suffering before and after independence from Belgium in 1960. The colony was originally a private fiefdom of Belgium’s King Leopold II. But Belgium had to take it over in 1908 from the king’s International Association of the Congo (IAC) after a public outcry. This private company had, not unlike the militias that plague the east of Congo today, achieved Leopold’s quotas on exports like rubber through a regime of forced labour, mass executions, torture and mutilation.

Belgium administered the region as a colony, but did little to develop it or create a type of civic national identity of the sort which has kept the peace in multi-ethnic countries like the United States or Great Britain. When independence came the Congo’s new politicians unsurprisingly failed to build a functional central government or control the new ‘Armée Nationale Congolaise’ (ANC). General Joseph Mobutu, who had risen through the ranks of the ANC, eventually seized power. His regime became a Western-backed kleptocracy for the duration of the Cold War. Its three decade rule, and the manner of the Mobutu’s final fall in 1997, were almost as ruinous for the DRC as Leopold II.

When conflict reached his area in 1997, Henri Bora Ladyi was a young man in the Ituri area of the DRC’s north-eastern Orientale province. The invasion had started the year before, as Mobutu’s meddling in neighboring Rwanda finally caught up with him. A full-scale rebellion against his dictatorship had begun during 1996 in the eastern border provinces of North and South Kivu. In concert with the armies of neighboring Rwanda and Uganda, rebel units swept westwards as Mobutu’s renamed Forces Armées Zairoises (FAZ) and his regime more or less dissolved.

For years the DRC’s state apparatus had been gradually ceasing to function in more and more parts of the country as the regime’s mixture of waste, incompetence and corruption undermined the formal economy. But the fall of the central government completed the country’s ruin. It set off a scramble by neighboring governments and their local allies to seize control of the DRC’s vast mineral wealth in an orgy of looting.

In the first 1996-1997 war Ituri was on the invasion path of the Ugandan army and its allies. But it also suffered from the same type of ethnic hatreds that had caused so much inter-Congolese violence, and left the fractured country prey to its neighbors. Under Mobutu, the north-eastern region had seen major outbreaks of violence between Ituri’s Lendu and Hema ethnic groups in 1972, 1985 and 1996. These earlier struggles revolved around the historically unequal land distribution between the two communities dating back to pre-Belgian times and favoring the Hema.

A politicized Mobutu-era land law passed in 1973 was also a recurring source of conflict. Under its provisions, people could purchase already-inhabited property, and then present title to the land in court two years later, by which time it became incontestable. The Lendu alleged the Hema elite used it to drive Lendus off valuable land, with the help of complicit Hema officials and forged documents. Certainly many Hema leaders thrived economically in the DRC’s chaotic economic conditions, and in the late 1990s some used their greater wealth and clout to further marginalize and exploit the Lendu.

Thus in 1998, when a second regional war began on the heels of the first, the Ituri area was still occupied by the Ugandan People’s Defense Force (UPDF). The UPDF wished to exploit Ituri’s resources of gold, diamonds, coltan, timber, and coffee. Human Rights Watch has chronicled how it used its control of the region to illegally export resources, especially gold, to international buyers. The money gained was then used to support local Hema warlords who helped in the Ugandan operation.

Elite Hema landowners, in their efforts to drive the Lendu off land they considered theirs, also called upon members of the Ugandan army to help them. Those Lendu not run off were often forced to work in the majority Ugandan-controlled mines under threat of violence. This state of affairs inevitably produced a negative reaction in response to the actions of Hema and Ugandan forces. The Lendu quickly formed their own militant groups to fight back and violence rose sharply by 1999.

Henri described the pressure put on him at the time to choose sides in vivid terms. When the Ugandans arrived in Ituri he was running a telecoms bureau in the provincial capital of Bunia, telling the BBC in Kinshasa what was happening in this eastern part of the Congo. Members of the local community would often come and use his satellite phone or other office equipment and he had a talent for making useful connections.

But the bureau itself also made him a target for Hema militants, who suspected him of passing on information about their operations to his Lendu compatriots. Henri was tortured several times by the militiamen, once having metal batons interwoven between his fingers and having his hands crushed. Even when he managed to talk his way out, his own people treated him as a potential traitor, shooting up his office and ransacking his home as warnings.

As events deteriorated his Lendu community demanded protection from its young men. Henri remembers members of his family joined Lendu militia groups and several of his relatives were killed in the violence. Political shifts meant Bunia changed hands several times, and at one point during the struggle Henri found himself press ganged into joining the ranks of the temporarily victorious Lendu militants in order to prove his loyalties.

He talked his way into job as a technician which kept him away from the frontlines, but by the spring of 2003 the tides of war had changed again. This time it was Hema fighters who were advancing on the city and they were looking for revenge. Even Henri could not talk his way out of this kind of trouble. Instead when Hema soldiers came searching to kill him, he had to flee into the bush with his young family.

Henri fled with 5,000 other refugees through the jungle towards the safety of Beni in neighboring North Kivu province. It was a week-long two hundred kilometers trek on foot and he was in an angry mood, with plans to buy weapons in the city and run them back to his brothers in Ituri to continue the struggle. But along the way an incident happened which was to change the course of Henri’s life.

At a village called Gety, militiamen held up the refugees, paranoid about traitors hidden inside their ranks. A massacre loomed over the mass of displaced people trapped there as the militants debated their fate amongst themselves. A natural leader, Henri asked to speak to their leader, despite being threatened with a machete to keep quiet. He knew already he was persuasive; unasked he took a dangerous gamble and negotiated with the militia commander for the refugees’ lives and freedom.

“As the eldest child there is no one do things for you.” Henri says with a laugh. “You learn to be the responsible one when you are very young.”

After a night of bargaining Henri got his way; the commander agreed to let the displaced civilians go. It was the start of a new direction in his life. When he arrived in Beni, instead of continuing with his plans to become a gun-runner, Henri got to hear of a church based peace group that was working with displaced people. The Centre Résolution Conflits (CRC) organization had also had to relocate twice because of the war, but was continuing to hold peace rallies and invite its congregations out to learn how they could promote peace in the region. Henri joined it, and by 2004 he had become risen to become the CRC’s director. Eleven years later and he has never looked back.

CRC’s work has lead Henri into all sorts of situations as it has developed down the years. The group retain a reputation as effective mediators, a mixed blessing in a dangerous part of a country filled with guns. In one case they were asked to negotiate between the UN and a rebel militant group holding a village hostage. The UN was threatening to storm the settlement, while the militants believed themselves possessed by spirits that made them immune to physical harm. Eventually the CRC were able to resolve the situation by negotiating safe passage for the fighters out of the village.

In another instance Henri was contacted by militia commanders with too many mouths to feed. Wishing to barter for supplies they offered to demobilize some of the child soldiers in their ranks in return for goats. A bizarre exchange rate of goats for children had to be worked out; undeterred Henri went into the bush to negotiate and a ratio of ten animals for 40 children was agreed. With the help of UK charity Peace Direct, one of CRC’s international partners, enough goats to free 100 child soldiers were sent.

As the CRC has persuaded fighters to demobilize, or let children and teenagers leave the bush to return home, its operations have had to change to cope. The CRC has faced the task of reintegrating these fighters into communities filled with their former victims and often it is no longer a just a case of overcoming interethnic hatreds. Over time many militia groups degenerated into fronts for banditry or just formed to terrorize their own areas into handing over food and other supplies.

Many ex-fighters, adults, children and youths, are psychologically scarred by the terrible things they have seen and done, and afraid of communal rejection as well as revenge attacks. Faced by a lack of support and economic alternatives in one of the world’s poorest countries, they can easily be seduced back into armed groups.

Still based in North Kivu, Henri and the CRC have piloted a number of projects designed to mitigate these problems as much as they can. As well as disarming ex-combatants and returning them home, they try to give each a skill that can make them employable. Special efforts are made to prepare communities for the return of ex-fighters, so they are not rejected out of hand. Child soldiers are returned to their families or placed with special trained foster parents and then returned to school or given a livelihood.

Similarly for women who have suffered rape or sexual assault at the hands of the various combatants, they provide trauma counseling and micro-finance to set up small businesses. The organization also run community radio stations in more than 70 places, supporting interactive clubs which broadcast discussions by the community members about local issues, including the dangers of joining militia groups.

It has been twelve years since the end of the formal end of the war that set Henri on this path and he recently celebrated another anniversary with CRC. Although his work may never quite end, the legacy as a peace-builder he leaves behind him will be a proud one.

This article first appeared in H Edition magazine and is re-published here with kind permission.

The post A New Direction: Henri’s Story appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

About two months before the NATO Summit in Warsaw, many wonder what the new strategy of the alliance in relation to Russia will look like.

Speaking at GLOBSEC 2016, a security conference in Bratislava held in mid-April, Polish Foreign Minister Witold Waszczykowski emphasized that Poland expected “presence, presence, presence” of NATO troops and bases on the Eastern flank. Other Allies, including the United States and Germany, do not deem it necessary to build new NATO infrastructure. As Jim Townsend, the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Policy, put it, “we support an enhanced presence, but we can do it without bases, bases, bases.” The current debate thus centers on the question how heavy the new NATO footprint on the Eastern flank should be.

Yet, while arguing about the differences between a persistent or permanent presence or what German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen called a “permanent rotational presence,” the Allies risk losing sight of the bigger strategic picture. The best outcome of the Warsaw Summit would be a clearly articulated common position of the Alliance that is well understood both by Russia and at home.

NATO can build on its previous efforts here. After all, reports on the disagreements among the Allies obscure the fact that NATO has been remarkably united in the aftermath of the annexation of Crimea and Russia’s continued interference in Ukraine.

On the one hand, the Alliance has embarked on the “biggest strengthening of our collective defense in decades”, as Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg underlined at the Munich Security Conference in 2016. In addition to the creation of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) and an increase in exercises as decided at the Wales Summit in 2014, the Allies have agreed to strengthen NATO’s forward presence on the eastern flank. Even member states such as Germany, often criticized as overly reluctant, have demonstrated their clear commitment to a renewed emphasis on collective defense.

On the other hand, NATO members have recently tried to reinvigorate the NATO-Russia Council and underlined that they are open to dialogue with Moscow. All members, including those long accused of blocking engagement with Russia, have finally supported this decision. NATO member states should strengthen both aspects of this renewed dual-track policy—responding to the security needs of its most exposed members, while at the same time advocating dialogue and heightened transparency to diffuse tension in their relations with Russia.

The two approaches are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, only a more visible presence will make a renewed emphasis on dialogue meaningful, signaling to Russia that NATO will not be intimidated by Moscow. And only a clear commitment to dialogue will allow all Allies to back a stronger defensive posture.

First, demonstrating that attacking one of NATO’s frontline states means an assault on all of NATO requires a multinational presence that goes significantly beyond the decisions taken at the Wales Summit. The Russian government needs to understand that it will not reach its goals by threatening its neighbors and testing NATO’s resolve. Although U.S. efforts to support the Eastern flank are crucial, it would be advisable to integrate it as much as possible under a NATO umbrella. This would not only signal the united stance of NATO, but would also be seen as less threatening by Moscow.

Moreover, the respective host countries should be supported in strengthening their own armed forces. While it makes sense that other Allies police the Baltic air space, they can expect the member states that feel particularly threatened to invest more in their own defensive capabilities, including necessary infrastructure such as airfields that multinational reinforcements would require. Among the Allies on the Eastern flank, only Estonia and Poland fulfill the NATO commitment to spend two percent of their GDP on defense.

Second, a more visible NATO presence necessitates new diplomatic efforts. Although the Alliance sees its moves as entirely defensive, Moscow will still read them as offensive and use them as a pretext for its own “counter measures” that in reality have often been long in the making. NATO should continue to propose new transparency mechanisms. It should also avoid being seen as the party rejecting dialogue, thus serving as an easy target for Russian propaganda. Even if it will not bring immediate results the reinvigoration of the NATO-Russia Council was thus an important message in itself.

NATO must also get better at getting its message across. Above all, this means that national leaders have to be more vocal and stress the differences between Russian and NATO policies. All information fact-sheets published by the NATO bureaucracy will not suffice if national politicians do not actively make the case for the new posture. In some member states, governments try to avoid a public debate on the revamped efforts, portraying them as minor adaptations.

This allows for misinformation and misinterpretations. Media reports sometimes claim that the NATO-Russia Founding Act generally rules out the stationing of troops in NATO’s “new” member states although the wording tells a different story. Few even mention that NATO publishes all its exercises on its website and invites Russian observers.

Russia, in contrast, regularly surprises NATO with snap exercises and ignores proposals to heighten transparency although numerous close encounters between the Russian military and Western military units or even civilian airliners have highlighted the danger of escalation. And while NATO members discuss the deployment of a few battalions, Russia has already announced that three new divisions will be created in its Western military district. For every NATO soldier on the Eastern flank, there will be roughly five to ten new Russian troops. This is hardly an escalation by NATO.

By avoiding public debate to explain and defend NATO’s new posture, national leaders endanger the long-term stability of the Alliance. Some opinion polls already show that the public support for the collective defense commitment is fragile. This is dangerous because deterrence only works if it is credible. But domestic support for deterrence will only be secured if the Alliance convincingly demonstrates that it is not interested in confrontation. It thus needs to offer dialogue, propose additional arms control steps, and think about a long-term perspective for NATO-Russia relations.

In the end, the question of what exactly the enhanced presence of NATO on the Eastern flank will look like is of secondary importance. What will matter most is whether the outcome will send a signal of unity and resolve, supported across the Alliance. In order to achieve this NATO needs both deterrence and dialogue. Both pillars of the renewed dual-track approach should be strengthened in Warsaw.

Tobias Bunde is Head of Policy and Analysis at the Munich Security Conference and Research Associate with the Center for International Security Policy at the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin.

This article was originally published by EastWest Institute Policy Innovation Blog

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The impeachment of president Dilma Rousseff will become a precedent setting case in the historic and legal tradition of Brazil’s democracy. Whatever side Brazilians are on regarding president Rousseff’s six month suspension and possible permanent impeachment, a response was to the crisis was necessary. After so much popular demand for change and a severe corruption scandal facing Rousseff’s party—the Worker’s Party or PT—some action had to be taken.

As of now, it is unclear whether or not Rousseff will survive the Senate trial. The accusations against her that lead to the suspension are not directly tied to the corruption scandal plaguing the PT. President Rousseff has been accused of boosting her own economic policy record by using funds from state banks to cover budget shortfalls, which may have violated fiscal responsibility laws in Brazil. Although extremely worrisome, these practices are not linked to the corruption scandal which lead to the revelations that PT party members were taking bribes from large Brazilian companies.

Indeed, the end result of her trial may result in the reversal of her impeachment as the focus of the corruption scandal was not on her personal actions, but that of PT party members. Nevertheless, the scandals have left a indelible stain on her party’s image that will remain after the Senate trial.

There are strong precedents to it. In the British parliamentary democracy system, it is a customary tradition that a minister in charge of a department affected by a scandal should step down from his or her position, even if the minister was not aware of or linked to the scandal personally. There are two reasons for this custom: to maintain accountability of a department by the top decision makers so that the public ultimately benefits, and to ensure the legitimacy of the government and their party in the future application of policy making and governing.

President Rousseff may survive the impeachment trial as the case against her is not as solid as many of the accusations rallied against her fellow party members. But the governing party will no longer be perceived as legitimate in the eyes of the Brazilian public. Rousseff’s possible success in the Senate trial will only prolong the inevitable: a loss in the next presidential elections and the implosion of the PT.

Claims that the constitutional process leading to her impeachment is tantamount to a coup, or that horrific results will come from an opposition government, or that the interim president will perpetuate Brazil’s dysfunctional political system abound . All parties should accept that if a government is not seen as legitimate by Brazilians, an immediate election should be called in. It is what a healthy democracy should demand and a positive end result of their constitutional process.

The post Challenging Brazil’s Democratic System May Make It Stronger appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

An opposition supporter holds up a giant hundred Bolivares note with the word, “Hungry” written on it during a gathering to protest against the government of President Maduro, and economic insecurity and shortages, in Caracas. (REUTERS/Carlos Garcia Rawlins)

By Matthew Barbari

Problems for Venezuela and its president Nicolas Maduro continue to mount as the country heads inexorably towards its collapse. An economic system centered around oil exports revenues, a government that can no longer provide public services such as electricity or medical care, and growing civil unrest and violence have led Venezuelans to look for an alternative to Chavismo.

Under Hugo Chavez—Maduro’s predecessor—the Venezuelan economy boomed due to the high price of oil, with barrels selling for well over $100. With crude oil accounting for 96% of the country’s exports, Chavez’s political movement relied on heavy spending on social welfare programs.

However, the government failed to improve the oil production process, leading to a lower than average export price. With the price of a barrel produced in Venezuela dropping to around $20 in February, the entire economy dropped with it. This collapse in oil prices has compounded with an incredibly high inflation rate causing supply shortages in most basic necessities.

The economic troubles have permeated through all aspects of life of Venezuelans. Massive food shortages, lack of proper medical care and constant power shortages are pushing the country close to a humanitarian crisis and are enraging even the most loyal of government supporters.

While Hugo Chavez was sufficiently charismatic to maintain public support during previous economic struggles, President Maduro is not. Increasingly fearing popular outbursts against the government and in a desperate attempt to control the crisis, he has recently declared a nationwide state of emergency.

The growing unrest has been building for some time and has led opposition parties to gain more seats in the National Assembly. There is also growing support for a recall election and a referendum to impeach President Maduro. However, the opposition is not organized in a cohesive unit against the Maduro government.

The situation has now deteriorated to the point where there is concern regarding “plausible scenarios” where Maduro’s own party or a military coup would force him out of office—triggering further civilian uprising and possibly the outbreak of a civil war.

Even though there have been gradual increases in oil prices over the past months, Venezuela has had to slow down production due to rampant power outages, failing to take full advantage of the market’s improvement. No matter the outcome of the referendum, Venezuela is heading towards bankruptcy and chaos. Hugo Chavez’s dream is turning into a nightmare for the Venezuelan people.

The post The Collapse of Chavez’s Venezuela appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Written by Loïc Burton

The Kurds are often hailed as the West’s most reliable partner in the fight against the Islamic State. From its victories in the border town of Kobani in Syria and in Sinjar in northern Iraq, the Kurds have taken advantage of the chaos in the region to get closer to achieving their dream of statehood.

On March 17, after the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)—under the umbrella of the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD)—managed a streak of military victories, Kurdish leadership declared a federal region across much of northern Syria called Rojava. This in an attempt to formalize the semiautonomous zone controlled by Kurdish forces after five years of war, while falling short of complete independence from Damascus.

As a key ally in the coalition against ISIS, Syrian Kurds are in a much stronger position to bargain for their political autonomy. However this is anathema to both the Syrian and Turkish governments. The former—reinvigorated thanks to the Russian intervention—now believes that it could regain control over all of the country while the latter fears that increased Kurdish self-governance might increase tensions with its own Kurdish restive minority.

In Iraq, Masoud Barzani, president of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, has announced his intentions of holding a referendum on independence by the end of the year—a first step toward achieving full-fledged statehood. However, some believe the referendum will be used to distract the population from more pressing problems such as the region’s flailing economy.

In February 2014, as a result of a dispute with Baghdad, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was cut off from its share of the federal budget. In June, with the emergence of ISIS, security spending skyrocketed while an influx of 2 million refugees and internally displaced persons added pressure to its infrastructure and service delivery. The final blow occurred in mid-2014 with the global drop in oil prices hitting the region particularly hard—oil revenues account for as much as 80–90% of the KRG’s budget.

In addition to these recent developments, the KRG struggles with perennial issues. In a population of 5.2 million, 1.4 million are on the government payroll Moreover the practice of “ghost-employees”—arms of the government claim more staff than they actually have to inflate their budgets—is widespread. All these factors combined create an unsustainable economic situation and threaten to stall the momentum gained against ISIS: security services are currently only paid every four months.

Looking beyond the borders of Syria and Iraq, Turkey is the most concerned about the Kurds for the reasons aforementioned. As its fight against the Kurdistan Worker’s Party—to which the PYD has close ties—in Turkey’s southeast intensifies, Ankara has bombed Kurdish fighters in Syria and allegedly tacitly helped ISIS to prevent Syrian Kurds from forming a contiguous entity along its southern border.

Turkey’s downing of a Russian fighter jet in November 2015 has put Ankara and Moscow at odds with each other. Since then, Russia has been much more inclined to support Syrian Kurds and the PYD, allowing the Rojava administration to establish its first overseas representative office in Moscow in February 2016.

Finally, the U.S. relation with the Kurds is complex: although the Kurds are reliable allies, Kurdish aspirations for autonomy complicate America’s strategic interests. Indeed, in addition to the risk of seeing the fragmentation of Iraq, American support for Syrian Kurds has increased tensions between the U.S. and Turkey—which allows the U.S. to use its military bases to conduct operations in the region.

Kurds are independent political actors whose interests are not always aligned with Washington. The coming months are essential for the future of their polity and the region as a whole.

Recommended Readings

Anne Barnard, “Syrian Kurds Hope to Establish a Federal Region in the Country’s North,” The New York Times (Mar. 16, 2016).

Zach Beauchamp, “America’s Kurdish problem: today’s allies against ISIS are tomorrow’s headache,” Vox (Apr. 8, 2016).

“Why Iraqi Kurdistan Is Struggling to Pay Its Bills,” Stratfor (Jan. 28, 2016).

The post The Future of Kurdistan: Great Decisions Spring Updates appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

A protester demonstrating against Taiwanese conglomerate Formosa during a rally in downtown Hanoi on May 1, 2016. (HOANG DINH NAM/AFP/GETTY IMAGES)

Last week, Rupert Colville, spokesman for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNCHR), called on the Vietnamese leadership to respect the right of freedom of assembly, after security officials stifled city-wide protests over an environmental disaster engulfing the country.

In a press briefing note released by UNCHR on May 13, the agency said it is “concerned about the increasing levels of violence perpetrated against Vietnamese protesters expressing their anger over the mysterious mass deaths of fish along the country’s central coast.”  

In recent weeks, Vietnamese citizens have rallied in the cities of Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, Nha Trang, Vung Tau and Da Nang over reports that at least 100 tons of fish have died along a 200-kilometer stretch of coastland in central Vietnam since April.  Many of the protesters are angry over the slow response of the new leadership to pin the blame on a unit of Taiwan’s Formosa Plastics, which operates a $10.6 billion coastal steel plant in Ha Tinh province.

Vietnamese fishermen, whose income has been severely depleted by the pollution, led authorities to an illegal pipeline thought to be responsible for the poisoning of the fish, which was traced to the steel plant.  Formosa management claims to have safely treated the discharge, and initial government findings sought to deflect the blame from Formosa to a red tide caused by an algae bloom.  Newly-elected Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc has promised a thorough investigation, vowing “We will not shield anyone found causing the pollution.”

Yet Vietnamese citizens are losing their patience, and the urge to demonstrate has been building momentum, alarming authorities. Vietnamese security apparatus allowed the first two protests on consecutive Sundays to attract hundreds of demonstrators.

Security officials cracked down on demonstrators the second week, however, using tear gas was used to disperse the crowd, and reportedly beating around  300 people and arresting others, according to the UNCHR report.  Videos and pictures circulating on Facebook also showed punches thrown and protesters being dragged off into buses.

In response to reports of demonstrators being beaten and arrested, the UNCHR issued the following statement: “We call on the Government of Viet Nam to respect the right to freedom of assembly in line with its international human rights obligations.”  This statement drew a harsh response from the permanent Vietnamese representative to the UNCHR,  Ambassador Nguyen Trung Thanh, who called the statement “inaccurate, unobjective and unverified.”  

While Article 25 of the 2013 Vietnamese Constitution ensures freedom of assembly and speech for its citizens, stating “The citizen shall enjoy the right to freedom of opinion and speech, freedom of the press, to access to information, to assemble, form associations and hold demonstrations,”  Ambassador Thanh noted that freedom of assembly must be exercised without detriment to public order “to ensure traffic order, security and safety for the people, especially the elderly, women and children.”

This past Sunday, Vietnam’s state television, and several other major state-run channels, warned potential demonstrators to ignore calls by “reactionary forces” who intend to disrupt public order, saying “their intention to abuse and disturb was revealed when many subjects called for using knives and petrol bombs to attack the functional forces and to overthrow the authorities.”   

Authorities were also quick to blame the demonstrations on an anti-government plot by a terrorist organization named ‘Viet Tan’ (Vietnam Reform). Viet Tan’s website claims it “engages in actions that empower the Vietnamese people”, with its mission to “overcome dictatorship, build the foundation for a sustainable democracy, and demand justice and human rights for the Vietnamese.”

While it is arguable whether the safety and security of the people were endangered by the demonstrations (or by Viet Tan), the state television broadcast, a shutdown of Facebook, and a heavy security presence in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City were enough to quell any significant gathering of protesters on the third Sunday of protest.  No more than 100 protesters gathered in Ho Chi Minh City, most of whom were quickly dispersed or detained.  

U.S. President Barack Obama was originally scheduled to arrive in Vietnam on May 22, a Sunday in which protests could flare again, and also the day in which Vietnam holds its election of the nation’s lawmaking National Assembly.  His trip has now been moved to the 23rd, and although his itinerary is still under discussion, events on the ground in recent weeks may give the issue of human rights more prominence.  

The post UN Calls on Vietnam to Respect Freedom of Assembly appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

(Flickr)

One might have expected British Prime Minister David Cameron, the host of last week’s anti-corruption summit in London, to have been a bit more cautious when speaking of the “fantastically corrupt” countries whose leaders were his guests. Cameron’s comments about Nigeria and Afghanistan were caught on tape as he described them—to the Queen, no less—as “possibly the two most corrupt countries in the world.”

Muhammadu Buhari, the Nigerian president, was shocked and embarrassed according to media and staff reports, but declined to ask for an apology, pointedly stressing that he would rather see recovered the many tangible assets hidden away by his countrymen in the UK.

For all the diplomatic drama—since, not to be outdone, Queen Elizabeth was caught on tape insulting the Chinese too—the anti-corruption summit moved forward with representatives of some 40 nations present and with Buhari delivering the keynote address. A final twist occurred when The Economist reported there had been speculation that Cameron’s indiscretion was actually intentional, designed to stir up additional media interest in the otherwise staid summit talks.

International cooperation in the fight against corruption

By most accounts, the summit was a good first step toward international cooperation on transparency and toward cobbling together a coordinated effort to target secretive tax havens and offshore financial arrangements tied to illegal activities. Of the 40 attending nations, ten are EU members.

These European participants are now looking to shut down the anonymous shell companies used for money laundering by developing registers of the true business owners involved. While Ireland will consider it, France, the U.K. and the Netherlands have pledged to make those registries public—albeit some of the U.K.’s overseas territories, like the British Virgin Islands, will not be forced to come clean.

Additionally, five EU nations pledged to increase transparency on corporate tax compliance, while the summit further addressed corruption in negotiating and awarding EU public contracts, protections for whistleblowers, and seizure penalties.

However, the fact that U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry managed to shift attention away from America’s notoriously secretive states of Delaware, Nevada or South Dakota prompted many to argue that the West is more interested in pointing fingers at developing countries than addressing its own shortfalls. Looking ahead, participants agreed to hold a forum next year on asset recovery, one that will focus on assistance for challenged nations such as the “fantastically corrupt” Nigeria.

Nigeria and the culture of corruption

For his part, Buhari’s remarks referred to corruption as a “hydra-headed monster” that cannot be reined in without a coordinated effort. He detailed how four different Nigerian agencies are pursuing corruption investigations in a bid to respect his campaign promises from 2015. Buhari also addressed human rights issues in Nigeria’s fight against corruption, as well as the problem of oil theft, estimated at 150,000 barrels a day. The extent of Nigeria’s problem is reflected by data provided in the annual Transparency International index, which ranked the nation at 136 of the 168 countries evaluated.

Buhari, however, has so far failed to deliver on his lofty campaign promises to root out Nigeria’s endemic corruption. After a remarkably slow start to his term, which saw the country running without an appointed cabinet between May and November 2015, Buhari came under fire for using international aid money earmarked for cracking down on Boko Haram to fund a witch hunt against opposition politicians.

Indeed, according to reports, the nascent anti-corruption campaign has been targeting political enemies of the regime, raising fears that Buhari, a former military dictator in the 80s, is returning to his autocratic ways.

Beyond the shining example Buhari set for the wider region showing that democratic transitions can indeed be possible in Sub-Saharan Africa, Nigerians are not faring any better.

The president who once claimed he could singlehandedly stabilize world oil prices is being sapped by a period of high inflation that has driven food prices higher, while the inefficient power grid and infrastructure are dragging down the embattled Nigerian economy. Improving just the grid would boost the country’s economy by a whopping 14%, but the process is stalled because of rent seeking and graft.

What’s most troubling though is the vicious circle of corruption in Nigerian society: the elites who avail themselves of the country’s assets cause the very suffering that they are then supposed to alleviate. The poverty rate among rural households has grown to some 80 % on the back of tumbling oil prices in an economy that has failed to properly diversify.

The ongoing conflicts with Boko Haram in the northeast—itself fueling, and fueled by, Nigeria’s corruption—and the unrest from Biafrans in the south contribute to the nation’s climate of instability.

Everything considered, Nigeria is one of the most revealing examples of the pitfalls of corruption, the way it warps and drags down the entire economic potential of a nation.

When coupled with incompetent leadership, the only hope for Nigerians would be for this year’s anti-corruption summit to yield practical results. A list of individuals hiding wealth in London’s ridiculously overpriced property market and laundering corruption proceeds through the U.K.’s overseas territories would be a good start, both for Nigeria and David Cameron.

The post Cameron’s Anti-Corruption Summit: A First Step in a Long Road appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

A member of the Iraqi security forces holds an Iraqi flag at a government complex in the city of Ramadi, December 28, 2015. (REUTERS/Stringer)

Written by Loïc Burton

On March 22, terror struck Brussels with a twin blast at Zaventem Airport and the Maelbeek metro station, claiming the lives of 32 people and injuring over 300. The attacks claimed by ISIS came only a few days after a suicide bombing killed five and injured 36 in Istanbul—the fourth suicide bombing in Turkey in 2016.

The latest bombings have reheated the debate within the EU about tighter border controls—possibly foreshadowing the eventual breakdown of the Schengen Agreement. In addition, the attacks have hardened Europe’s determination to combat terrorism at home, with increased monitoring of ISIS fighters returning from the Middle East and improved intelligence sharing between EU members, and abroad, whether through ramping up aircraft deployments in the coalition against the Islamic State or by supplying weapons to local actors.

Experts have argued that ISIS’s increased activity abroad is a sign of weakness rather than strength. As the so-called caliphate begins to crumble—ISIS is thought to have lost around 20% of its territory in Syria and over 40% in Iraq since its peak expansion in August 2014—the group is allocating efforts and resources toward large-scale terrorist attacks abroad in order to influence the strategic calculations of the coalition member countries at a reduced cost.

Since ISIS’s “winner’s message” of “remaining and expanding” sounds increasingly hollow, this tactical shift is one way to catch global headlines and retain its legitimacy and ability to recruit.

Although the increased operational tempo of terrorist attacks is the manifestation of the group’s faltering, the ISIS underlying ideology is not expected to wither away anytime soon. Jonathan Schanzer, a former terrorism finance analyst at the Treasury Department, argues that “defeating the formal military presence of a terrorist group will not significantly mitigate the threat of lone wolf or small independent cells that are based in the West.”

In its heartland, ISIS is definitely in retreat. According to Pentagon officials, U.S. airstrikes have killed over 25,000 Islamic State fighters and deprived the group of millions of dollars in revenue. Financially debilitated, it has halved salaries of its civil servants and is releasing hostages for sums as low as $500.

Indeed, ISIS has not scored a significant victory since taking Palmyra in May 2015. The ancient city was recaptured by the Syrian regime, supported by Russian airstrikes, on March 27, 2016, reducing ISIS’s ability to threaten Syria’s coastal regions.

In Iraq, after retaking Tikrit in March 2015 and Ramadi in December, the government in Baghdad declared on March 24 the beginning of operations to retake Mosul. The offensive to regain Iraq’s second largest city will not be easy.

After some initial success reclaiming nearby villages, progress in the military campaign was stalled. More sober prognostics have now replaced the once optimistic talks of pushing ISIS out of Mosul by the end of the year—military analysts estimate that there is little prospect of an assault on the city before 2017.

With about 10,000 fighters and almost two years to erect a multilayered defense, a force of at least 40,000 would be needed to overcome the group, according to estimates. Indeed, the current under-strength Iraqi division supported by U.S. military advisers looks woefully inadequate for the task.

Moreover, because of ethno-religious tensions, Kurdish Peshmerga seem uninterested in helping take a city that would never be part of an independent Kurdistan while Shi‘a-dominated militias—instrumental in retaking Tikrit—will probably be kept away for fears of sectarian reprisals following the conquest of the Sunni-majority city.

An important factor in the battle for Mosul is America’s involvement. The Pentagon wants to go beyond air strikes and the current deployment of military advisers and introduce additional special forces. However, this goes against Obama’s “no boots on the ground” pledge—although an increasingly tenuous promise, it rules out the deployment on the scale necessary to retake Mosul.

After attempting to train local forces—leading to the disastrous $500 million train-and-equip program for Syrian moderates that yielded little to no results—and bombing oil production facilities under Operation Tidal Wave II, the U.S. is now focusing on a leadership decapitation campaign, using special forces on the ground. In March, American forces killed Haji Iman, ISIS’s second-in-command, as well as Abu Omar al-Shishanim, the group’s “war minister.”

Secretary of Defense Ash Carter explained current U.S. strategy: “we are systematically eliminating ISIL’s cabinet,” in order to “hamper the ability for them to conduct operations inside and outside of Iraq and Syria.” Although the leadership is capable of regenerating itself and operating on the ground, taking out leaders reduces the group’s ability to conduct terrorist attacks abroad as they require a more sophisticated network and superior coordination.

Talks of a new training program—allegedly more narrowly focused—and Obama’s decision to add 250 military personnel to the 50 already on the ground in Syria are the latest development in the U.S. effort to capitalize on the momentum in  the campaign against the Islamic State. It remains to be seen whether or not these new policies achieve the desired outcome.

Recommended Readings

Max Fisher, “The Brussels attack is Europe’s new reality,” Vox (Mar. 22, 2016).

Eric Schmitt and Alissa J. Rubin “ISIS Spreading in Europe, U.S. Intelligence Chief Warns,”
The New York Times (Apr. 25, 2016).

“The last battle,” The Economist (Apr. 16, 2016).

The post The Rise of ISIS: Great Decisions Spring Updates appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

“Departure for the coffee harvest by ox cart, Vale do Paraíba, Brazil, c. 1885” (image courtesy of Instituto Moreira Salles)

Of all of the countries in the Americas, Brazil imported the most slaves from Africa and was the last to officially abolish slavery. While slavery may have been abolished officially with the signing of the Lei Áurea (Golden Law) by Princesa Isabel on May 13, 1888, forced labor, or “trabalho escravo”, took its place.  

Forced labor, which the International Labor Organization (ILO) defines as involving “degrading work conditions and the impossibility of leaving the employer owing to fraudulent debts and the presence of armed guards,” was officially acknowledged by the State in 1995.  That same year, Brazil’s Ministry of Labor initiated a Special Mobile Enforcement Group to track down companies suspected of using slave workers.

In 2002, the ILO and the Brazilian government initiated a technical cooperation project called “Combating Forced Labour”. Since then, around 50,000 workers have been freed from slave-like conditions in Brazil.

Yet there is more work to be done as the practice continues to this day. This month saw the publication of a “dirty list” by the human rights group Reporter Brazil, which named and shamed 340 Brazilian companies caught employing people in slave-like conditions between May 2013 and May 2015. The companies had previously been identified and fined by Brazil’s Ministry of Labor, which accused them of using slave labor, forced labor, and employing workers for little or no pay in degrading conditions.

Companies were associated with clothing sweatshops, farming and cattle ranching, timber and charcoal production, and construction. More than 1,500 adults and 5,500 children were released during 2014.

While Reporter Brazil used the country’s Freedom of Information Act to reveal the names of companies and individuals found by government inspectors to use slave labor, the practice of tracking down forced labor in Brazil is a dangerous one. Three Brazilian judicial officials were murdered in January 2004 while looking into allegations of slavery on ranches near the nation’s capital, Brasília.

The following month, government inspectors discovered 32 slave workers on the ranch of right-wing Senator João Ribeiro in the northern state of Pará. The officials said the captives worked seven days a week without pay and had no running water or toilets.

In 2009, the ILO estimated that between 25,000-40,000 people were being exploited in Brazil, primarily in the states of Pará and Mato Grosso. Other organizations such as The Global Slavery Index put the number much higher in 2015, at around 155,000. These workers are primarily recruited from the cities of Brazil’s impoverished Nordeste region.

Recruiters, often referred to as “gatos” (cats), lure the poor with promises of good pay for hard work, and some are told the cost of their transportation will be deducted from future wages. The workers are then transported hundreds of kilometers away to work in logging camps, or on ranches raising cattle or tending to crops. Many workers are only told once they arrive at the camp or ranch that they will now be responsible for paying the costs of their transportation, which are often inflated.

In addition, if they are held in collection points for days or weeks, all food, housing and other expenses they incur are deducted from their future wages—usually at inflated prices. And the price-gouging does not end there. Since the camp or ranch is typically isolated from nearby cities or towns and transportation is limited, employers often charge a premium for bringing such provisions as food, drink, and other essentials to the site.

When you add the inflated upfront costs to the ongoing necessities of food, drink and shelter, it is little wonder the typical worker quickly becomes trapped economically. Why does the typical worker stay when he or she realizes his predicament? Isolation, threats, violence and sometimes homicide can make it a difficult and dangerous choice.

What can be done to curb the practice of slavery and forced labor in Brazil? The government has already developed a database of offenders, yet the aforementioned mobile inspection group could be strengthened, as could the rehabilitation program for former slaves which grants them three months pay, builds job skills and offers them legal assistance.  

A national pact has also been initiated with the help of ILO. It has been signed by almost 200 hundred private and public companies since 2005, obliging them to remove from their supply chains any inputs produced with the involvement of forced labor.

The efforts of the Brazilian government to combat forced labor, 120 years after the abolishment of slavery, have to date been laudatory, but must continue and intensify.

The post Slavery and Forced Labor in Brazil appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

In most cases the scenario is similar: over the past decade, oil exporting countries used excessive revenues from oil to expand public services, or simply pursue populist policy in order to buy political stability. Once oil prices started to fall, the budgets did not shrink accordingly, which created a wide gap between the oil revenues and swelling fiscal demands.

In order to stem the rapid outflow of foreign reserves, the governments were forced to devaluate their national currencies. An unwanted consequence is almost always the rise in inflation and household prices, along with a decline in living standards and stalled economic growth.

Here are the five most affected countries by this devaluation trend.

The former Soviet republic is the first country to request a $4 billion emergency loan from the IMF and the World Bank in order to cover losses caused by low oil prices. Although the Azerbaijani government officially denied the need for a bailout, the country is in dire straits.

Income from oil and gas makes up around 75% of the country’s revenues, and the recent devaluation of the national currency manat by more than 30% incited public protests that might easily disrupt the political stability of the authoritarian regime of president Ilham Aliyev.

Venezuela has gone through an equally depressing scenario since July 2014. Although the country’s economy wasn’t sustainable even with triple digit oil prices, a prolonged period of low oil prices brought the economy close to a breaking point. Over the past two years, the national currency, the bolívar, lost more than 90% of its value. According to the IMF’s forecast, inflation will reach 720% in 2016.

Venezuela’s domestic woes are further aggravated by the government’s efforts to limit imports in order to raise enough cash to stave off default.

There is, however, an increasing danger that with a further slump in oil revenues, and with sovereign bonds yielding at around 30%, Caracas might default on its debts at some point in 2016. The real question is, how long will the Maduro regime be able to suppress the growing social discontent and increased pressures from the opposition-controlled parliament?

Africa’s largest economy was hard hit by the falling oil prices. The national currency, the naira, dropped against the dollar by 25% over the past year. On January 30, the Nigerian government requested a $3.5 billion loan from the IMF and the African Development Bank to plug its $15 billion budget gap.

The country’s oil revenues are expected to fall by 70% in 2016, while the hard currency reserves almost halved from $50 to $28 billion, and the state’s emergency fund went from $22 billion in 2009 to $2.3 billion currently.

Angola earned around $500 billion from oil exports between 2000 and 2014. But today the country’s economy is among the hardest hit in Africa. Inflation is at 14% and the national currency, the kwanza, devaluated by more than 50% since January 2015.

The country earns 75% of its fiscal revenues from oil exports, which make up around 95% of total exports. As a consequence, José Eduardo dos Santos’ regime is starting to feel the pressure from well-organized public protests that might turn into more widespread unrest if the economic situation continues to worsen.

Russia is going through some tough economic times, as the toxic combination of Western sanctions and low oil prices is devastating the country’s economy and living standards. Since June 2014, the rouble devaluated by more than 100% against the dollar. GDP is expected to shrink by 3.7% in 2016 alone.

How do these numbers affect the everyday lives of average Russians? Real wages fell by almost 10% in 2015, and the percentage of households that cannot afford sufficient food or clothing has increased from 22% to 39% over the previous year.

Although Russia is not an average developing, oil-exporting country, the severity of Russia’s economic and potential political troubles, which might come along with the low oil prices, puts the country well inside this infamous club.

These five countries are already feeling the effects of low oil prices and devaluation. And there are more candidates: Brazil, Ecuador, and even the rich Gulf countries are starting to feel the pinch, and it seems that the end to depressed oil prices is nowhere near.

This article was originally published by Global Risk Insights and written by GRI analyst Ante Batovic

The post The Five Oil Exporters Most Affected by Currency Devaluation appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Source: Reuters

Written by Shehab Al Makahleh

Turkey, long hailed as a bastion of secular democracy in the Muslim world, could be spiraling toward an all-out civil war as conflicts between Turkish security forces and Kurds as well as other ethnic minorities continue to escalate. These conflicts have been exacerbated by the catastrophic war in neighboring Syria, which has created a refugee crisis in Turkey, expanded the government’s campaign against Kurds in Iraq and Syria, and pushed Turkish officials into collusion with ISIS.

The lurch toward autocratic rule by President Recep Tayyib Erdogan has long worried regional and Western observers, with curbs on freedom of speech and political repression of the Kurds. That policy has taken a bloody turn with the repeated bombing of Syrian and Iraqi Kurds and, since July 2015, escalating crackdowns at home.

The murder in November of Tahir Elci, a leading Kurdish human rights advocate and president of the Diyarbakir Bar Association in southeastern Turkey has dramatically increased tensions inside Turkey and put the Kurdish issue—seemingly settled only a few years ago—back on the agenda.

Turkey has other problems to contend with. The Russians—playing an increasingly important role in the region—have long maintained that Turkey is receiving oil from ISIS, through official complicity, illicit criminal networks, or some combination. The Associated Press corroborated Russia’s account by stating that upwards of 30,000 barrels of oil are being extracted each day by ISIS from Syria, with much of it ending up in Turkey.

While Erdogan and his ruling party have not been sanctioned by the U.S. or anyone in the West for that matter, one can only conclude that this willful blindness means that the U.S. is fearful for Erdogan’s political stability, not to mention Russia’s ascendant position in the region.

On the economic front, Turkey has recently lost a lifeline of non-energy trade with Russia–including agriculture and textile projects, tourism and construction—that supports tens of thousands of jobs in the country. It was severed following Turkey’s downing of a Russian plane flying combat sorties in Syria, a dangerous move by the Turks that could have easily (and perhaps justifiably) led to a Russian counterattack and a larger war involving NATO.

Russia held its fire, responding calmly when many expected escalation, and instead imposed economic sanctions against Turkey. This squeeze on vital elements of the Turkish economy could give rise to further internal discontent in the country. Lest we forget, bread riots helped start the civil war that toppled Egypt’s Mubarak, and economic issues sparked the fall of Ben Ali in Tunisia.

A more subtle but no less powerful force is also at work against Turkey: regional resentment. The region has a long memory of the “Ottoman yoke” which was ended 100 years ago by the Hashemite-led Arab revolt and finally the expulsion of the Turks from Arab lands.

Turkey’s brash role in the region today—backed implicitly by U.S. and NATO firepower–is seen by some as coming at the expense of its Arab neighbors, especially as more evidence on Turkish involvement in illicit trade with ISIS grows. Turkey’s assertive role in a new regional triangular power structure with Saudi Arabia and Qatar has also created greater diplomatic isolation from much of the region.

The confluence of these internal and external factors has put unprecedented pressure on the Turkish state as a viable entity. The conflict with the Kurds seems to be tearing the nation at its seams—the very idea of the secular, pluralist state is at risk.

But other clouds—economic, diplomatic, and military—are looming over the horizon. What happens next is not entirely in Erdogan’s control. Will Russia’s military restraint hold? Will the fragile regional alliances against ISIS shift against Turkey? Will ISIS itself continue to shake the Turkish people’s confidence? Or will it be Erdogan’s own policies that ultimately undermines the Turkish state?

Shehab Al Makahleh is a journalist and co-founder of Geo-strategic and Political Studies of the Middle East Media.

The post Could Turkey Implode? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Lately, the Zika virus made its way into the spotlight with a sudden and explosive growth of micro-encephalitis in newborns across Latin America. As a result of Brazil’s climate, inadequate public health system, and poor system for sanitation and water supplies, the virus found an ideal location to develop rapidly. While Zika has a devastating effect on pregnant women, especially in the low-income population, this issue has also brought to light other prevalent concerns regarding the Olympics this summer.

Zika looms over the Brazilian population and future tourists traveling from the around the world to watch the Olympic Games. The government’s response has been slow and inadequate; the Brazilian healthcare system has been heavily underfunded in recent years, with many poor areas in Rio de Janeiro lacking even basic infrastructure. In January 2016, hospitals ran out of money to pay for drugs, equipment, and salaries. Some patients died after they were not allowed into underfunded public hospitals.

Brazilian officials expressed concerns over the possibility of visitors staying away from Rio de Janeiro out of fear of contracting Zika. The city has taken precautions to ensure that tourists and athletes of the Olympics do not feel threatened, and officials have announced that venues would be inspected on a daily basis four months in advance, aimed at eliminating any stagnant water that could serve as breeding grounds for mosquitoes.

These efforts have not been able to eliminate global concerns over the issue. With the World Health Organization declaring it a global health emergency, Brazil has already been criticized for downplaying the risks of contracting the virus at the Olympics and the ongoing Carnival celebrations, which attract 1.5 million tourists a year.

Recently, allegations of bribery against the Brazilian speaker of the lower house, Eduardo Cunha, and five construction companies involved in Olympics projects have emerged. Brazil’s attorney general, Rodrigo Janot, claimed that some construction companies, already under investigation for their ties to the Petrobras scandal, paid bribes totaling USD 475,000 to Eduardo Cunha to help secure contracts for the building of venues and other works for Olympics.

These allegations are another example of the large impact the Petrobras scandal has had on Brazilian politics and the economy. Companies involved in Olympics construction projects found themselves blocked from receiving bank loans and credit lines during the ongoing Petrobras investigation, forcing Rio de Janeiro’s city government to act as a bank and lend companies money to prevent an inevitable slowdown in construction. Despite their efforts, projects for the Olympics have already been delayed and sometimes halted, including essential repairs on sewers in Rio de Janeiro.

However, Olympic officials have denied any delays and vow that the games will be free of corruption, serving as an example of how business in Brazil can be done “above the board”.

On November 16, three days after the Paris attack, a leading French recruit for ISIS tweeted “Brazil, you are next”. Attacks by Islamist gunmen in Egypt, Mali, Paris and elsewhere in 2015 has raised the alarm for big international events like the Olympics. Brazilian security agencies have trained over 85,000 security personnel, 47,000 police officers, and 38,000 soldiers to guard the 10,500 athletes and thousands of tourists attending the 2016 Games.

However, the security forces will need to focus on more than terrorist threats for the Olympics.  Violent political demonstrations, increased levels of robberies and shootings, and a growing amount of areas that are considered dangerous have worsened the already poor security situation in the city.

Amid a deteriorating fiscal situation, the once proud member of the BRICS has gotten used to its degrading economic status. Olympics organizers have tried to cut at least USD 500 million from the USD 1.9 billion operating budget for the Games, and already laid off temporary workers. Despite their efforts, the cost recently increased with an additional USD 100 million for electricity generation, with the final budget totalling USD 9.8 billion.

Brazil might be heading towards one of the deepest recessions since 1931. The currency plunged 33% in 2015, state security forces face a budget cut of 25%, inflation has risen to at least 10%, and unemployment has been hovering around 9%.

Brazil has also faced challenges in improving its public transportation system, particularly in the critical subway extension project. If it cannot be completed on time, Rio de Janeiro will face huge traffic jams along its mountainous coastal roads and potential empty seats in the new Olympic venues. Additionally, critical levels of water pollution and delayed infrastructure project led city officials to admit that they failed to improve sewage system in lake areas and the Copacabana coastline by 80%, a promise that was made in their Olympics bid in 2009.

Even if Brazil is able to host the Olympics with all venues prepared on time, there will be bumps in the road. The combined challenges make it very difficult to believe in a positive Olympic experience for Brazil. The legacy has the potential to do serious economic and social damage, requiring a brutal prioritization and fiscal austerity from the government afterwards. Rio de Janeiro city officials’ promise of showing how business can be done in Brazil “above board” is becoming more of an illusion than a reality.

This article was originally published by Global Risk Insights and written by GRI analyst Alicia Chavy.

The post Is Rio Ready for the Olympics? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Many leaders who are currently in power were decision makers during the time the events of the Rwandan genocide unfolded. Despite peacekeepers showing evidence of what was occurring and Western leaders having full knowledge of the genocide in Rwanda, next to nothing was done to stop the violence.

The situation was ignored to such an extent that peacekeeping forces stationed in Rwanda at the time were left to fend for themselves, despite tradition, law and regulations requiring  assistance from their respective countries and the international community . The Rwandan genocide cost the world approximately two million people, distancing the lessons of the Nuremburg trial away from modern political expediency.

Debate and discussion is essential in ensuring that genocide does not become an expected byproduct of conflict in the modern world. Political motives for blurring the recognition of genocide, creating different parallel narratives, have the purpose of keeping leaders in power in places like Brussels and Washington D.C.

Governments are expected to remember the Nuremberg trials when the U.S. and the rest of the world agreed that genocide should “never again” be perpetrated while outsiders stand idly by. However, the Rwandan experience exemplifies the recent mass extinctions of small minority groups.

While group like CYCI out of Montreal, Canada seek to save individuals from their fates in troubled war zones directly, they operate outside the government’s policy goals and funding. Those groups are only successful due to the commitment of several exceptional and brave individuals who place humanity above all.

Canadian broadcaster Vision TV presented a video debate on the issue of refugees this week on the show The Zoomer. The Canadian government committed itself to assist a large number of Syria refugees. But with questions around ill-planned settlements, the lack of proper identity and security checks for the number of individuals, and the lack of specific assistance to vulnerable groups like Yazidis, Kurdish and Christian Syrians and Iraqis, a heated discussion ensued.

While the debate over Canada’s new refugee policy  is contentious, it is one that is not publicly acknowledged by most local media. Opening up the debate is the first step in preventing another genocide, followed by the acknowledgement of atrocities against minority groups currently fighting for survival in Syria and Iraq. You can watch the Zoomer debate here.

Refugees

The post The Value of Having a Heated Discussion on Refugees and Genocide appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Islamic State fighters on the border between Syria and Iraq. Photograph: Corbis/Medyan Dairieh

Mounting territorial losses and a return to terrorist tactics in Iraq, Turkey and overseas, suggests that the Islamic State’s favored strategy of moving fighters to take territory elsewhere when it comes under overwhelming pressure on one front is no longer working so effectively.

The Islamic State (IS) launched a small offensive last month against Syrian government forces inside the besieged eastern city of Deir ez-Zur. Media reports suggested that the militants had been driven back, but only after they had carried out indiscriminate killings of troops and civilians.

The failed attack comes at a time when the group is under pressure on multiple fronts as Russia, the U.S. and Iran, the major international players opposing it on the ground, have begun to support proxy forces arrayed against it more closely.

Islamic State has a sophisticated and well-run military machine for a militant group. It inherited many highly-trained personnel from Saddam Hussein’s armed forces and seized large stocks of equipment from the Iraqi army when the latter melted away during IS’ conquests of cities like Mosul or Ramadi. But it is not the strongest military power involved in the conflict and its victories have come from preparation, infiltration, nimbleness and a higher morale than its more numerous enemies.

Above all, the group benefited from the political vacuum left to by the collapse of old colonial era borders, the quarreling between Turks, Kurds and Arabs over how to reform their political communities and the mutual hostilities between Russia, Iran, America and Saudi Arabia.

Now the situation in both Iraq and Syria seems to have tilted against the group. In Syria, Moscow’s intervention seems to have injected new vigor into Damascus. Meanwhile the formal ending of a network of complex sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program has strengthened the hand of ‘moderate’ Iranian leaders who see a transactional relationship with Washington as politically possible.

That opens up avenues for future areas of cooperation such as military efforts inside Iraq, which have been weakened by the American’s refusal to operate alongside deeply sectarian Iranian-backed Shi’a militia groups doing most of the fighting. Benefiting from the release of formerly frozen funds, Teheran may now swing more of its weight behind the Iraqi government and army in the battles ahead against IS.

The group’s relationship with the leading Sunni regional powers, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, is ambiguous and also deteriorating. Although both Turkey and Saudi Arabia have backed militant jihadi groups in Syria, their proxies have clashed with IS militants repeatedly over territory.

Despite almost certain Turkish complicity in the movement of militants back and forth across the border and in the oil smuggling that funds the group, IS has repeatedly bombed Turkish territory. Up to now the Turkish government has found IS to be a useful counterweight to the Kurds and has refused to allow Kurdish forces to close off the last 60-mile long stretch of territory which is the group’s last access and exit point with Turkey. That calculation may be changing under American pressure and the gradual defeat of Turkish proxies by the Russian-backed Syrian army in the north.

Meanwhile the recent U.S. moves towards reconciliation with Iran have further disillusioned the Saudis with their American partners, but this has not meant that the House of Saud’s selective embrace of Islamic militants has grown to include IS. While Riyadh’s recent spate of executions drew international attention by including the prominent Shi’a cleric Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, the vast majority were Sunni extremists.

Riyadh has further drawn the militants’ ire by declaring the formation of a global “Islamic Alliance” to fight terrorism. While Riyadh’s major focus is still on thwarting Iranian influence in the Middle East, it also regards the Islamic State as a dangerous competitor.

Lacking outside alliances and with the geopolitical situation slowly starting to tilt against it, Islamic State’s pretensions to act as a legitimate government seem to have its days numbered. IS has already lost substantial territory to Kurdish forces in Syria and major operations in Iraq to retake Mosul will begin in 2016 according to the Iraqi government.

This comes with the caveat that just seizing the areas IS has occupied will not destroy the group itself, unless the re-conquest is also accompanied by the offer of an alternative political program for the Levant’s Sunni Arabs, particularly in Iraq. Already there are reports of security problems in Ramadi, the capital of Anbar province, which was recently retaken from Islamic State.

It was the passive support of Iraqi Sunnis in Anbar province that allowed IS to rebuild itself after its previous incarnation Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) was obliterated. IS also has deeper support there than in Syria, where it is competing with a host of other Sunni militant groups.

In Iraq, it was the sectarianism and corruption of then-Iraqi government of strongman Nouri al-Malaki that drove Sunnis into the arms of IS, presently the sole insurgent Sunni faction there. Malaki systematically froze Iraqi Sunnis out of political power and began a process of “sectarianizing” the Iraqi army, leading to its abrupt collapse when IS attacked Mosul in 2014.

If the world’s governments truly wish to see the end of the Islamic State, Baghdad’s numerous competing patrons will have to emphasise together that their support is contingent on allowing Sunnis in Iraq real representation inside the country’s political system.

The post Uprooting Islamic State? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Fauzan al-Anshori, right, an Islamic State recruiter in Indonesia, leads the “bayat”, an oath of devotion, to the leader of Islamic State. Photo: SMH/Screengrab

Should a country’s citizens be allowed to return home after fighting for the Islamic State (ISIS)?  It would seem at first a silly question to ask—why welcome home hardened fighters who have the skills and may have the determination to threaten your country’s population?  Yet according to law in a number of countries, many of these fighters are allowed safe passage home.

Some constitutional and human rights lawyers around the world argue that safe passage should be guaranteed—that every person has the right to citizenship and to remove it would in effect make a person stateless.  Some critics argue that citizenship should only be revoked under judicial review (e.g. conviction by a court of law of an act of terrorism directed at fellow citizens).  Conviction appears to be a high standard and forces the onus of prevention on local police officials. Since preventing terrorist acts is extremely difficult—why take any chances by allowing fighters to return?

Despite the opposition by lawyers, countries are starting to take action. Following the siege of a cafe in Sydney in December 2014, Australia moved to pass measures barring its citizens who join, support or train with extremist groups like the Islamic State from returning home from conflict zones.  The new laws not only apply to Australians fighting overseas, but to those who help raise money or recruit new members for extremist groups.

In Canada, in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in October 2014 at the Canadian National War Memorial in Ottawa, the country amended its Citizenship Act last May. The amendment now allows the stripping of the citizenship of dual nationals found fighting with any international terrorist organization or found guilty of terrorism, treason, or spying for a foreign government.

Austria, Belgium and Britain have also revised their laws to permit the revocation of citizenship in terrorism-related circumstances, while France is considering a change in their constitution allowing to strip French-born dual citizens of their French citizenship in certain circumstances related to terrorism. The French justice minister, born in French Guiana, recently resigned over the government’s plan. Citizens with dual nationality are being targeted largely since the 1961 UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness prohibits governments from revoking a person’s nationality if it leaves them stateless.

The latest high-profile country to reconsider its citizenship laws is Indonesia, in the wake of last month’s bombings by the Islamic State in Jakarta’s commercial district, which killed eight people and injured 30 people. Lawmakers and security officials are now busy considering the rewrite of the nation’s anti-terrorism laws, which currently permit Indonesians to return home after fighting with ISIS overseas. The fear is of returning experienced jihadis launching more sophisticated attacks than the one that took place last month, which resulted in the deaths of all four attackers.

Indonesia is now home to roughly 100 Indonesians who traveled to the Middle East to join Islamic State, and may have seen very little or no frontline combat before returning. Around 500 Indonesians have made the trip so far to join ISIS.  

The bombings and shootings in Jakarta last month were the first in Indonesia carried out by ISIS, with the last major attack by Jemaah Islamiyah militants occurring in 2009, when suicide bombers killed seven at two luxury hotels in Jakarta. Indonesian authorities are now on high alert following the publication of a new warning by Islamic State that shopping centers, offices and tourist hotspots in Denpasar and Singaraja may be the next targets.

Given the potential threat posed by some of those who left their countries to join Islamic State, immigration authorities in many countries are right to be nervous about letting potential terrorists back into their country.  Citizens in these countries are already reluctant to let in refugees from Syria and Iraq—even women and children. Yet the UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness prohibits leaving persons stateless.  

Perhaps the UN convention needs to be revised and updated to specifically address the world we live in today. To date, the 1961 convention argues in Article 9, “A Contracting State may not deprive any person or group of persons of their nationality on racial, ethnic, religious or political grounds”, whose intent is likely to protect non-violent persons from persecution. However, should those persons or groups turn violent, and threaten the state, the UN convention allows for in Article 8:

3. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article, a Contracting State may retain the right to deprive a person of his nationality, if at the time of signature, ratification or accession it specifies its retention of such right on one or more of the following grounds, being grounds existing in its national law at that time:

(a) that, inconsistently with his duty of loyalty to the Contracting State, the person

(i) has, in disregard of an express prohibition by the Contracting State rendered or continued to render services to, or received or continued to receive emoluments from, another State, or

(ii) has conducted himself in a manner seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the State;

(b) that the person has taken an oath, or made a formal declaration, of allegiance to another State, or given definite evidence of his determination to repudiate his allegiance to the Contracting State.

Given proof that a citizen has travelled to the Middle East and trained as a jihadist, and represents a threat upon returning to his/her country of nationality, it would seem that citizenship could be revoked under (a) (ii). Furthermore, many recruits to Islamic State take an oath of allegiance, and if Islamic State can be defined as a State, citizenship can then be revoked under (b).  

Of course, human rights and constitutional lawyers need to fight for the rights of the innocents, but if my quick, non-lawyer reading of the Article is correct, it would appear that those citizens who travelled to the Middle East (or other regions) to join Islamic State, who took the oath, and who potentially threaten their home countries can have their citizenships revoked. With the proliferation of fake passports, however, these non-citizens will not be left stateless, and will be free to travel to and from weak and failing states, and perhaps even home.

The post Should ISIS Fighters be Allowed to Return Home? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

U.S. President Barack Obama and Cuban President Raul Castro adjust their jackets at the start of their meeting at the United Nations General Assembly in New York September 29, 2015. REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque TPX IMAGES OF THE DAY

Written by Matthew Barbari

During his last State of the Union address President Obama made reference to his hope that the long-standing trade embargo between the United States and Cuba would end during his last term in office. “Fifty years of isolating Cuba had failed to promote democracy, setting us back in Latin America,” the President said adding further, “Recognize that the Cold War is over. Lift the embargo.”

Obama has already begun the process of normalizing relations with Raul Castro’s government. On July 20, 2015, diplomatic ties were restored and it was announced that the Cuban embassy in Washington D.C. would be reopened, along with the American embassy in Havana. However, since the embargo still holds, it seems that it will fall upon the next U.S. President to further Obama’s legacy and end the island’s economic isolationism.

Congressional approval has been the biggest roadblock in lifting the embargo. The Republican-controlled Congress opposes the change, still perceiving Cuba as an adversary and leaving little doubt that Obama will not witness the end of the embargo before he leaves office. While many other issues have been at the forefront of the ongoing Republican and Democratic primaries, Cuba is one that each major candidates has touched upon, providing their opinion on how to handle the relationship between Washington and Havana.

Republican Candidates’ Platforms

Sen. Ted Cruz and Sen. Marco Rubio,two candidates in the Republican primary, have been particularly vocal with regard to the embargo. Both Cruz and Rubio are of Cuban dissent and both have publicly denounced President Obama’s policy of normalization, calling for an end to the embargo. Cruz has called Obama’s policy a “tragic mistake,” arguing that it gives legitimacy to the Castro regime.

Cruz believes that opening trade with the island will harm Cubans that aspire for more freedoms by allowing the communist regime in Cuba to stay to place. This sentiment is shared by Rubio, a senator from Florida, the state with the largest Cuban American population. Rubio has long been a critic of the Castro regime, judging Obama’s policy towards Cuba dangerous.

For him, lifting the embargo “threatens America’s moral standing in the region.” He has also stated that if he were elected president that he would close both embassies in Washington D.C. and Havana and would instead tighten sanctions against Cuba until the Castro regime was overthrown. This puts him at odds even with Cruz who advocates for a gradual reduction of sanctions against Cuba conditional on the improvement of their human rights record.

Democratic Candidates’ Platforms

While Republicans tend to support the embargo, many Democrats have sided with Obama, viewing the embargo has a diplomatic failure and call for the relations with Cuba to be normalized. Sen. Bernie Sanders has publicly stated that he is against the embargo and for normalizing relations, while leaving the future of Cuba up to the Cuban people. He hopes that the island will eventually become a democracy and has a track record in Congress of voting for pro-Cuban legislation. In 2015, Sanders co-sponsored a bill presented to the Senate that would allow travel between the U.S. and Cuba.

The Democratic front-runner is former Secretary of State and New York Senator Hillary Clinton. Clinton has stated publicly that she too supports Obama’s call to normalize relations, despite her past record being in favor of the sanctions. She has stated recently that the embargo is an “albatross”on the U.S. in its maneuvering in Latin America and that American foreign policy no longer needs to be viewed “through an outdated Cold War lens.”

Clinton has also taken the stance that if elected she would push Congress to lift the embargo or use her executive power to reduce travel restrictions and increase trade. She claims that during her time as Secretary of State, she asked Obama to consider ending the embargo. However, the process of normalization only began after her time as Secretary ended.

Clinton has had to defend her current position on Cuba as it contradicts her past record, having supported the embargo during her 2008 presidential campaign. Even during her time as First Lady under President Bill Clinton, she was in favor of measures to strengthen the embargo such as the Helms-Burton Act of 1996. While Clinton is allowed to change her mind about policy issues, it raises the question whether she truly supports such policies or is looking to please her pro-normalization voting base in the bid for the Democratic nomination.

Regardless of candidates’ stances on the Cuba embargo, little will happen as long as Congress remains opposed to ending it. With Raul Castro set to step down in 2018, the coming years will be crucial in Cuban history. Whether we want the U.S. to be a part of it is ultimately up to us.

The post The Cuban Embargo After Obama: The Presidential Candidates’ Platforms appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

China’s African strategy

Speculations over China’s plans to set up a “logistical facility” in the East African country of Djibouti were put to rest following an announcement by the Chinese foreign ministry that the two countries have reached a consensus on the proposal. Although lacking a detailed timeline, the agreement will come as a natural conclusion to what has been an ever tightening of relations between the two countries, dating back to China’s involvement in anti-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden back in 2008.

However, unlike NATO countries and Japan who are also conducting anti-piracy missions in Djibouti, China currently has no permanent naval base in the region. According to the Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, Hong Lei, “In fulfilling escort missions, [China] encountered real difficulties in replenishing soldiers and resupplying fuel and food, and found it really necessary to have nearby and efficient logistical support.”

Djibouti was the natural choice for the Chinese given that the former French colony already hosts a number of European outposts as well as Camp Lemonnier, the U.S. expeditionary base from where drone operations in Yemen and Somalia are conducted.

In recognition of Djibouti´s geostrategic importance, the country has been the recipient of many financial blandishments from China over the past few years. These include the $590 million injection of funds for the development of its port, aimed at transforming it into a major transshipment terminal, and investment in the $4 billion railway connection between Djibouti and its landlocked neighbor, Ethiopia. It also comes on the back of a deal to set up a free trade zone for Chinese companies in Djibouti and allow Chinese banks to begin operating in the country.

While undoubtedly important, China’s first overseas military facility in Djibouti only accounts for a small piece in a much bigger puzzle being put together by Beijing. Djibouti, and its much larger neighbor to the north, Egypt, mark the final stage posts in the maritime leg of China’s ambitious One Belt One Road (OBOR) project: a vast trade route encircling half the globe and connecting China with Europe along the ancient Silk Road.

Supported by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Silk Road Fund, the overland route will see massive investments in infrastructure, stretching from western China through central Asia and the Middle East into Europe via Russia, Greece and Turkey.

For the maritime route to be successful, it will require that Chinese merchant ships are able to reach the Suez Canal unhindered after traversing the Indian Ocean. Djibouti’s position on the cusp of the Red Sea, leading into the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean, makes it a vital node in that network.

Given that investment in OBOR is expected to top one trillion dollars over the next 10 to 15 years, it is no surprise that the People´s Liberation Army has been slowly moving away from its traditional stance of protecting the homeland and towards establishing a force projection capability in line with its expanding overseas interests.

This newfound assertiveness, of which the base in Djibouti is China’s first statement of intent, is being watched with caution by Western capitals. But according to Shen Dingli, a professor of international relations at Fudan University in Shanghai, as quoted in the New York Times, it is keeping in line with the behavior of any power whose financial interests abroad are in need of protection.

“The United States has been expanding its business all around the world and sending its military away to protect those interests for 150 years,” Mr. Shen said. “Now, what the United States has done in the past, China will do again.”

However, while China is free to pursue its political ambitions, its presence will most definitely have a negative impact on Djibouti’s freedoms. Beijing’s strict policy of noninterference means that President Ismael Omar Guelleh knows that Beijing will not be critical of his bid to run for a fourth term as president this coming April.

Ever since he inherited the presidency from his uncle in 1999, Guelleh has used a combination of coercion and bribery to keep his hold on power. In 2010 he amended the constitution and scrapped term limits, reneging on earlier promises to run for no more than two terms.

Since then the country has continued its slide down the international rankings for press freedom and human rights and political instability has grown. In 2014, Djibouti suffered its first terrorist attack against Western personnel in the country, stoking fears that the presence of foreign soldiers in a poor, oppressed Muslim country could provide a fertile breeding ground for Islamic extremism. And last December, up to 19 opposition activists were killed when police opened fire at a religious procession, prompting the International Criminal Court to officially place Djibouti on its watch list.

While Guelleh has promised to transform the country into Africa’s Dubai or Singapore, feverishly courting Beijing and Washington for continued financial assistance, the upcoming presidential elections will most likely dispel the fiction that Djibouti and its people are actually benefiting from international attention.

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