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As the Republican presidential primary intensifies, a burgeoning contingent of right-leaning foreign policy experts has emerged to claim that President Joe Biden’s Ukraine policy is eroding America’s ability to deter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Consequently, they recommend drastically reducing, if not outright halting, American support for Ukraine’s defense. Politically, this argument is shrewd—it appeals to an increasingly Ukraine-skeptical Republican primary electorate without compromising its proponents’ credibility within mainstream foreign policy circles. Given the widespread consensus that China poses America’s most significant strategic challenge, framing a rollback of current Ukraine policy this way lends the argument an air of hard truth told by sober-minded adults. However, while certainly politically savvy, geopolitically, this line of reasoning is highly unsound.

At its core, the case for reducing U.S. support for Ukraine is based on a supposed policy tradeoff: every dollar or bullet sent to Ukraine is one less for Taiwan’s defense. Because Taiwan’s security is more strategically significant to Washington than Ukraine’s, critics claim the U.S. must realign its policy to match its priorities.

However, this argument overlooks several factors that challenge its fundamental assumptions. Notably, one doesn’t need to accept the view expressed by the Taiwanese, among others, that the United States must support Ukraine to deter China. Even setting aside concerns about U.S. credibility or resolve, there is ample reason to conclude that the critics of Washington’s current Ukraine policy are mistaken. Similarly, while the most compelling argument for assisting Ukraine is arguably the moral one, even within the framework of tradeoffs, the case for the Biden administration’s current policy is strong.

First, the defense budget does not solely consist of spending on Ukraine and Taiwan. Many other programs, some arguably wasteful, could be reduced or eliminated to increase funding for Taiwan’s defense. Furthermore, Russia is China’s most militarily capable partner and would likely be willing to supply weapons to China during any conflict over Taiwan. Therefore, providing Ukraine with the means to destroy Russian military capabilities is possibly the most cost-effective Defense Department program currently in existence, even when one looks at it through the lens of a Taiwan contingency. And while far from guaranteed, if Russia’s poor performance in Ukraine eventually results in Putin’s overthrow and replacement by a more benign Russian government, the gains to U.S. and Taiwanese security would be even more significant.

The radically different nature of the two conflicts further undermines the notion of a sharp tradeoff between arming Ukraine versus Taiwan. The Ukraine conflict is predominantly a land war fought over short distances, while a Taiwan conflict would likely be a primarily naval war fought over long distances. While reports of the depletion of American weapons reserves are worrying, the weapon systems in question are not the submarines, aircraft, anti-ship missiles, sea mines, and torpedoes crucial to Taiwan’s defense.

The U.S. military has also gained valuable information thanks to its support for Ukraine. The war has exposed inefficiencies and gaps in America’s defense industrial base—lessons better learned now than in the middle of a potential conflict with China over Taiwan. The Ukraine mission is also giving the Pentagon a chance to test new equipment and develop the logistical skills necessary for long-distance supply operations, knowledge that would prove invaluable should the United States need to come to Taiwan’s defense.

One might counter that the U.S. commitment to Ukraine will tempt China to strike Taiwan while the United States is tied down in Europe, especially if the conflict drags on for years. But attacking Taiwan while the Ukraine conflict is ongoing would be a strategic disaster for China. Beijing hopes to drive a wedge between Europe and the United States over Taiwan, and as evidenced by recent comments from leaders like French president Emmanuel Macron, they have had some success. However, a Chinese attack on Taiwan amid Russia’s invasion of Ukraine would torpedo that diplomatic effort and likely result in the two conflicts merging into one global East-West struggle. Under such circumstances, Europe would likely support U.S. efforts to defend Taiwan in return for continued American assistance in Ukraine. In short, attacking Taiwan in the context of the Ukraine war makes the emergence of a pan-Western coalition to counter China more likely, not less.

Lastly, there is an essential distinction between the current conflict in Ukraine and a hypothetical one over Taiwan that makes arguments about potential tradeoffs moot: the role of nuclear weapons. The U.S. has wisely refrained from direct involvement in the Ukraine war to avoid the possibility of a nuclear confrontation with Russia. But a serious conflict over Taiwan would necessitate significant U.S. military involvement, likely involving missile strikes on the Chinese mainland. It is illogical to conclude that Washington is correct to worry that direct military engagement in Ukraine could result in a nuclear war with Russia, but killing significant numbers of Chinese citizens does not also risk a nuclear exchange. Misconceptions about the role of atomic weapons in a Taiwan conflict have likely been reinforced by DC think tanks’ war games, which often take them off the table. But in any real-world conflict over Taiwan, the prospect of nuclear war would immediately loom over the minds of policymakers in both Washington and Beijing.

To be clear, the threat of nuclear war with China is not a reason to abandon Taiwan, just as during the Cold War, the threat of nuclear war was neither a reason to abandon Berlin. Nevertheless, the fact that hypothetical mushroom clouds loom over any U.S.-China conflict constrains the role of conventional weapons in any Taiwan scenario.

Those who worry about tradeoffs for Ukraine make the mistake of believing that the United States must exceed China’s conventional capabilities in the Western Pacific to achieve deterrence. Under this logic, it is understandable why one would be desperate to shift every weapon possible from Ukraine to Taiwan. But attempting to match China’s conventional forces this way is untenable and unnecessary.

To deter a Chinese invasion, the United States simply needs to maintain sufficient military capabilities in the region such that China cannot successfully invade Taiwan without simultaneously attacking America’s Pacific bases, particularly Guam, but conceivably Japan and the Philippines as well. Under these conditions, China will find itself confronting a sort of “Guam trigger.” Given the stated U.S. policy, Beijing must operate under the assumption that Washington would actively assist in Taiwan’s defense. If China launches an invasion without first destroying America’s military assets in the region, its ships will be left vulnerable to attack. However, if it launches a preemptive strike on U.S. forces, especially on American soil in Guam, it will experience the full wrath of a vengeful United States. Given this, China faces a choice between a failed invasion or a major conflict likely ending in atomic annihilation. Given those options, Beijing will presumably choose to maintain the status quo, achieving Washington’s goal of deterrence with limited deployment of conventional arms. China may attempt to escape this bind by adopting more restrained tactics, such as a blockade of Taiwan. But any U.S. attempt to counter such a move would primarily involve diplomatic outreach and air and sea lift, areas that are not hampered by U.S. support for Ukraine.

It is undoubtedly correct that U.S. national security officials must recognize tradeoffs, but it is equally true that they must also recognize false tradeoffs when they emerge. The idea that Washington must choose between defending Taiwan and defending Ukraine is one such false choice, and the Biden administration is wise to ignore such criticisms.

Robert Nelson is a Ph.D. candidate at Stanford University studying U.S. foreign policy. He previously served as a national security aide to Senator Chris Murphy. His Twitter handle is @RW_Nelson.

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Beijing is now the world’s largest holder of international port assets. Through a network of dozens of state-owned port operators, contractors, investment firms, and banks, the Chinese state has invested upwards of $110 billion in foreign port operation and development projects across eighty port states, a value equivalent to the total outward foreign direct investment (ODFI) stock of Israel.

Figure 1. Locations of port investments by Chinese state-owned enterprises.

Figure 2. Chinese state-owned enterprises investing in foreign ports.

These investments were mostly made in the wake of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, when demand for capital was high and the rehabilitative and mutually beneficial effects of foreign direct investment (FDI) were presumed.

However, the emergence of several troubled Chinese state-led port investments has diminished this optimism. Contentious contract renegotiations, threatened project cancellations, or outright bans on Chinese FDI signal growing unease about “handing over the keys” of one’s critical infrastructure to a foreign government. Such concerns are not unfounded. In a recently published article in the journal Marine Policy (available open access) my co-authors and I argue that the political nature of these investments vis-à-vis Chinese state ownership of the investing firms carries a unique array of economic, strategic, and political risks for the recipient port states.

First, Chinese state-led investments are uniquely susceptible to commercial failure. Overcapacity is a systemic problem in China’s industrial economy, driven by national subsidies and poor internal controls on state-led industrial development. Since 2013, Beijing’s policy on correcting overcapacity has been to offshore it to developing economies through large-scale overseas infrastructure development projects. The result has been several “white elephant”-type port development projects, driven by China’s need to relieve pressure on bloated domestic industries rather than projected commercial benefits for the recipient port state. The most well-known of these is Hambantota Port, whose annual losses of $60 million meant that Sri Lankan authorities were only able to repay the $1.5 billion in Chinese loans used to finance its development by awarding a ninety-nine-year lease to a Chinese state-owned port operator.

Second, Chinese state-led investments risk the host state becoming entrapped in China’s military disputes. As Chinese state control over foreign port assets has grown, Chinese military strategists have increasingly been positioning these assets within Beijing’s naval doctrine. Specifically, these strategists argue that foreign port assets, despite being procured under commercial pretenses, may be appropriated for military missions, ranging from general reconnaissance to serving as logistics and replenishment hubs for Chinese naval vessels. If such military uses were attempted, the host port state would be in the invidious position of either accepting Chinese military operations in its territorial waters and risking retaliation from China’s military rivals, or rejecting Chinese military operations in its territorial waters and risking retaliation from China.

Third, port states hosting Chinese state-led investments risk becoming targets for espionage. Ports are rich targets in this case, both in military and commercial terms. Militarily, espionage can reveal the movement of military hardware through the port as well as the operational characteristics of foreign or domestic navies using the port; for example, resupply and materiel requirements, personnel identities, and origins and onward destinations. Commercially, espionage can provide commercial intelligence on traded consignments and port services which can be mined to provide a competitive advantage to competing firms or identify chokepoints in the industrial strategies of port states. Chinese state actors may, working through Chinese state-owned firms controlling foreign port assets, embed surveillance equipment and personnel into those assets to pursue these military and commercial dividends.

And fourth, Chinese state-led port investments may become vehicles for economic coercion. In times of political conflict between Beijing and the port state, Beijing may instruct its state-owned port investors operating in that state to disrupt port operations, such as by diverting port traffic, halting terminal operations, withholding follow-on funding, initiating vexatious litigation, or terminating the contract. This creates pressure on port states to avoid political conflicts with Beijing to maintain the economic well-being of its Chinese-controlled ports, potentially limiting the port state’s autonomy when dealing with issues sensitive to Beijing. For example, observers have credited Greece’s 2017 veto of a European Union statement on human rights in China on China’s state-owned port operator COSCO taking a controlling stake in Greece’s busiest port the year prior.

While China’s port investments should be encouraged to the extent that they help close the international infrastructure gap, increase legitimate competition among international shipping and logistics providers, and further integrate China into the global economy, port states must remain attentive to the multifaceted risks posed by China’s unique state-led OFDI program.

Dr. Christopher J. Watterson is a Research Fellow at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London.

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Public opinion of China has shifted drastically in the past decade. A recent Pew poll found that 83 percent of Americans now hold a negative view of the People’s Republic. That’s understandable given China’s long history of predatory trade against U.S. manufacturers. But there’s also the uptick in threats against Taiwan and the recent spy balloon let loose over the continental United States. As troubling as these military and espionage threats are, however, Americans are particularly bothered by the ugly human rights abuses that Beijing continues to mete out in western China. Forced labor in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) is deeply disturbing, and Congress must now apply maximum pressure on Beijing to rescue thousands of indigenous people pressed into virtual slavery.

Americans might be surprised to learn that some of the world’s top brands—including Apple, BMW, Gap, Nike, Samsung, Sony, and Volkswagen—utilize supply chains linked to the forced labor of Uighurs and other ethnic minorities in western China. It’s estimated that more than one million people in the XUAR have already been shipped to detention camps. And tens of thousands have also been transferred to factories throughout China.

Who exactly is benefiting from this forced labor? The Coalition for a Prosperous America (CPA) recently published a list of 50 Chinese enterprises with links to forced labor in China. This includes companies that are publicly traded in China and Hong Kong as well as in global markets.

Many of these Chinese entities are also tied to U.S. capital markets and American investors. As a result, these companies expose tens of millions of American retail investors to the financial risks and moral hazards of corporate “bad actors.”

Some of the Chinese firms tied to forced labor are now included in major financial indices, including MSCI, FTSE-Russell, and Dow S&P. However, because they are publicly traded companies, these companies are also interwoven with Exchange Trade Funds (ETFs) and index funds included in the investment products of BlackRock, Vanguard, and other large Wall Street firms. As a result, millions of everyday American investors are unwittingly investing in pensions, mutual funds, and other retirement products tied to Chinese companies with links to labor abuse.

A typical example is Huafu Fashion—which sources cotton from Xinjiang. More than 20 percent of the world’s cotton is produced in Xinjiang, and the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) has identified cotton as a high-risk sector for China’s forced labor products. Huafu Fashion is a subcontractor for Adidas, GAP, Lululemon, and Target, among other notable brands.

In December 2021, President Biden signed the Uighur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA). Since then, the United States has blocked more goods from Xinjiang based on a presumption of forced labor. But while the UFLPA has increased the tools required to stop such importation, Beijing remains unmoved. That means Congress must now increase efforts to target the investor capital that funds these Chinese companies.

This is where the United States possesses enormous leverage. America’s financial markets are the single greatest means for Chinese firms to attract investment. As such, Congress could demand that the Treasury Department, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the National Economic Council identify the specific financial risks for millions of American retail investors exposed to Chinese companies traded in U.S. capital markets.

What Congress can do is set criteria for thoroughly identifying companies that source goods through forced labor. Any company that does not completely disassociate from forced labor would be excised from trading and investing in U.S. markets. This would also include any exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and mutual funds containing such entities.

Essentially, global brands will face a choice: sever ties with Chinese companies tied to forced labor or be removed from U.S. financial markets.

This is a stark, necessary effort since publicly traded companies continue to knowingly engage in forced labor through their financing and direct business operations. This is abhorrent, and they should not be permitted to raise funds or trade in U.S. markets. Congress must apply leverage and force global brands to finally divest from such brutality—or have the world divest from them.

Michael Stumo is CEO of the Coalition for a Prosperous America (CPA). Follow him at @michael_stumo.

Image: Shutterstock.

When the five Central Asian presidents appeared before President Xi Jinping at the first China-Central Asia Summit, one suspects that Xi would not need to consider his “dear friend” Vladimir Putin anymore. With the Russian army bogged down in its invasion of Ukraine, which has been going on for well more than eighteen months, Beijing has taken initiatives to fill in the power vacuum in the post-Soviet region. This summit is just one of China’s geopolitical moves.

Indeed, China and Russia are no longer the China and Russia of a few years ago. Previously, Beijing still needed to pay lip service to Moscow by connecting its massive cash cow Belt and Road Initiative with the Russia-led but financially poor Eurasian Economic Union in Central Asia. This was somewhat moot since any major agreements between China and Central Asian countries have mostly been happening on a bilateral basis anyway. But nowadays, Beijing doesn’t even need to pretend it cares about Russia’s traditional influence in its backyard.

Consider that the port city of Vladivostok, formerly part of the Qing dynasty Chinese Empire, was recently allowed by Kremlin to be used as a transit port for Chinese domestic trade, thus making it a Chinese port (kind of) for the second time. The city has long symbolized China’s century of humiliation, as its name directly translates as “control the East.”

Beijing knows how to massage the sentiments and feelings of its own people. When the grandiose Tang dynasty-style ceremony was performed at the summit, the re-emergence of China’s glorious history echoes the Chinese people’s national pride. The message being telegraphed is that China has restored its historical position, at least in the eye of the domestic public, which directly targets the party’s ultimate goal: the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. As economist Branko Milanovic posited, “being active internationally is a matter of domestic political survival and arises because of potential domestic weakness.” After all, for any and all political entities, their continuing existence is always and naturally of the utmost priority.

However, Beijing’s return to historical grandeur will not be so smooth. Putting aside the fact that Europe is moving in a similar direction as the United States in hardening its stance against China, as shown at the recent G7 meeting, changing Sino-Russian relations, which have increasingly favored China, may not be dealt with as easily as Beijing expects. Sino-Russian expert Alexander Lukin has noted that China and Russia “were historically great and independent centers of power and should not tolerate hegemonic dictate of a foreign power.” This tenet includes each other. In the long run, it may be fundamentally unacceptable to the Russian psyche and domestic nationalist sentiment if Russia were to be subjugated as the junior partner in the alliance with China.

Russia’s fear of China’s demographic expansion in the Far East is yet another issue, although research before the Ukraine invasion has largely demonstrated it is presently just a myth. Nonetheless, as Europe shuts its door on Russia’s western side and other Asian powers also unwillingly engage, China’s economic support could play a leading role in facilitating the prosperity of Russia’s eastern border areas. It is possible that if ethnic Han Chinese grow in influence in the Far East, Putin might have to consider finding ways of tightening control over there.

This may also be the fundamental, albeit concealed, reason why Kazakhstan relocated its capital from Almaty to Astana—many ethnic Russians live in northern Kazakhstan, where Astana is located, while Almaty closely borders China’s sparsely populated Xinjiang area. Ironically, Putin employed ethnic Russians to hold referendums as an excuse to invade Ukraine. In the future, the Kremlin may be alert to similar tactics from China on its own land.

That said, global influence is the natural extension of domestic strength. There are warning bells ringing for China too. Confidence in the Chinese economy from within and outside China is faltering. In addition to the country’s widely reported population decline, the unemployment rate of Chinese people aged between sixteen and twenty-four rose to 20.4 percent this April, which is much higher than in the pre-coronavirus period. As Ruchir Sharma, chairman of Rockefeller International, bluntly pointed out: “something is rotten in the Chinese economy.” Without the underpinning of economic vigor, China’s expanding external power may not be sustainable in the long term.

Dr. Jon Yuan Jiang is an independent scholar, and Mandarin and Russian speaker. He has published over seventy articles in media, think tanks, and academic journals such as South China Morning Post, The Diplomat, Lowy Institute, The Jamestown Foundation, The Canberra Times, Media International Australia, and Area Development and Policy.

Image: Photo courtesy of the Office of the President of Kazakhstan.

This week’s visit by Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Riyadh has rekindled an ongoing conversation over the Middle East, civil nuclear power, and the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). The debate has been around for decades. Every administration for the last twenty years has sought to address concerns over WMDs while wrestling with the conundrum that civil nuclear power programs can provide abundant, low-carbon energy yet also potentially lead to a nuclear weapons program.

As we come upon the twentieth anniversary of the invasion of Iraq, which was driven by false intelligence of WMDs, it is time to take stock of our policies, decisions, and any false predicates that threaten stability in this strategic region of the world. In doing so, the central question we must ask is: do current U.S. civil nuclear power policies strengthen or weaken our ability to deliver on our nonproliferation responsibilities? Our answer must be clear-eyed and strategically empathetic. We must be clear-eyed in that the United States is not the sole or dominant civil nuclear partner in the twenty-first century. We must also be strategically empathetic in that U.S. diplomacy and statecraft should account for the realistic security constraints confronting those countries pursuing civil nuclear programs.

Dictators and WMDs

This should begin with context and recent history. American forces invaded Iraq vowing to destroy Iraqi WMDs and end the dictatorial rule of Saddam Hussein. If you are Saddam Hussein, you were the one person who knew there was no nuclear WMD program. Yet you said nothing, ultimately losing your country and your life. Why did he do that? One guess is he could not let Iran know he didn’t have a WMD program. “If Iran has a weapon, I must have a weapon,” is a statement we have heard for the last ten years (particularly from Saudi Arabia), yet we do not seem to understand why this statement is made.

We have a blind spot to this mindset, and this appears to have been lost on U.S. policymakers since the invasion and to this today.

On December 19, 2003, long-time Libyan president Muammar el-Qaddafi stunned much of the world by renouncing his county’s WMD programs and welcoming international inspectors to verify that Tripoli would follow through on its commitment. Unlike Saddam Hussein, Qaddafi actually had a program, but after seeing the United States invade Iraq, he more than likely thought he would be next.

This actually would have been a positive for our nonproliferation goals had Qaddafi not been captured and killed on October 20, 2011. Whether there is a direct correlation between the United States and his death is up for debate. It was then Secretary of State Hilary Clinton who famously stated following the dictator’s death, with a laugh, “We came, we saw, he died.” Notwithstanding Qaddafi and how he died (at the hands of rebel forces, supported by a NATO-led no-fly zone), the message that was sent to the world was clear: never give up your WMD program.

This message was and is not lost on Kim Jong-un of North Korea or the mullahs of Iran. Again, we need to strategically empathize with these nations and their leaders—not to accept them or agree with them, but to understand their mindset so we can counter them effectively.

The Inconsistency of U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation

By 2008, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) kicked off its civil nuclear program after several years of consultations with U.S. experts. A key component of any nuclear deal with the United States is the signing of a nuclear nonproliferation agreement, a Section 123 Agreement. Much has been written about the 123 Agreement in general, but recent attention has focused on what has been characterized as the “Gold Standard” 123 Agreement—the type of agreement signed by the UAE. It’s important to note that this agreement was signed by UAE after the requests for proposals (RFPs) had gone out to U.S., Korean, and French vendors, but it wasn’t required as a precondition for U.S. vendors to respond. The agreement was finalized and signed by both countries in December of 2009—the same month Korea was selected as the winner of the $20 billion bid.

A couple of key points in this process are misunderstood today and require clarification. First, a signed 123 Agreement is not a prerequisite to bid or compete on a project, nor does a signed agreement guarantee the United States wins the work. There’s limited, if any, incentive for a country to consider signing a 123 Agreement if there is no viable commercial offer by a U.S. vendor. Second, the signing of a Gold Standard 123 Agreement, which is now being demanded by U.S. nonproliferation policymakers, has severely constrained our ability to compete in civil nuclear power throughout key regions of the world. The reason is that while the Gold Standard 123 (like a standard 123) prohibits uranium enrichment and fuel reprocessing, it goes beyond the legitimate intent of the original agreement, which wasn’t designed to challenge a country’s sovereignty with respect to the pursuit of civil nuclear power as granted by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

This is highly relevant because shortly after signing the Gold Standard 123 with UAE came the announcement that the Obama administration had started negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program. This produced the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), signed in 2015. Touted by the administration as the strongest nonproliferation agreement ever struck, it essentially gave Iran the right to enrich uranium (which they had been doing in violation of the NPT) and in many respects allowed Tehran a legitimate and legal path to a weapons program. That is precisely what our nonproliferation policies are designed to stop.

It is fundamentally inconsistent for us to condition nuclear collaboration with our allies on their commitment to not enrich uranium in perpetuity, yet give to Iran, this region’s greatest threat to the United States, Israel, and Sunni Arabs, the right to enrich uranium. The argument will be that the JCPOA gave us unfettered access to what Iran is doing with its nuclear program, yet this has proven to be false. Furthermore, the United States also handed the entire Iranian civil nuclear program to Russia and China. And now China is also aggressively offering Saudi a complete package of nuclear collaboration. In an almost undefendable explanation by U.S. nonproliferation experts as to why we did this, the response is that a 123 Agreement with Iran is unnecessary because the United States is not providing the civil nuclear power program. This sums up precisely the principled inconsistency of our policies and why we need real statecraft.

Working with Allies

Since the signing of the JCPOA in 2015, we have heard a consistent message from our Sunni allies: “If Iran gets a weapon, I must have a weapon.” We must understand this is not only their right to take such a stance, it is the unintended and unfortunate position that policymakers have forced them into.

In June 2022, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) released a solicitation for two large-scale nuclear power plants. France, Korea, Russia, and China all were invited—the United States was not. Why not?

While the Biden administration has offered many explanations, one that is patently inaccurate and devoid of strategic empathy is that the Saudis have refused to sign a 123 Agreement—specifically, a Gold Standard 123 Agreement. Again, to empathize with KSA, their geopolitical context, and their recent history, their position is that they can’t sign such an agreement given the backdrop of the Iranian JCPOA and Iran’s legitimate pathway to a nuclear weapons program. Moreover, the United States has maintained that Westinghouse, a U.S. nuclear power company, didn’t receive a KSA offer to bid due to the absence of a 123 Agreement. However, this explanation is weak and insufficient because, as pointed out in the UAE case, 123 Agreements follow a viable commercial offer—not the other way around.

Currently, the Saudis are working to bring the United States into a legitimate conversation about their pursuit of civil nuclear power. We have been called the “preferred nation” to work with by KSA. That’s a bold statement considering we haven’t offered a viable solution, our track record in nuclear new build is uninspiring, and we continue to watch Iran inch closer to a weapons program. But it demonstrates that we have a chance to recover and get back on track.

First, understand why KSA says what it must about its nuclear program and offer them a better deal; one that brings in commitments to allow KSA to fully utilize their natural resources in uranium, enrichment, reprocessing, etc., a standard 123 with caveats around their peaceful pursuits. In short, a security guarantee that in essence would say to Gulf Cooperation Council nations, “we will come to your collective defense if you are ever threatened by a nation or entity with a WMD capability”—a NATO Article 5 type agreement around WMD threats which is more powerful and strategic than going hands off the wheel as we do now.

The KSA deserves credit for continuing to search for a more strategic alliance with the United States. Let’s not push them into the hands of Russia and China. Instead, let’s empathize with their geopolitical position while considering our own security interests in that region of the world and look for the elusive strategic statecraft in WMD once and for all.

We should not let 123 Agreements be the sole policy agreement that defines our civil nuclear program in the Middle East when the entire kit bag of statecraft and diplomacy could be deployed.

RDML (ret.) Michael Hewitt, U.S. Navy, is co-founder and CEO of IP3 Corporation and CEO of Allied Nuclear Partners. IP3 is the lead U.S. integrator for the development and operations of peaceful and secure civil nuclear power in the global marketplace. IP3’s vision is to create thriving, peaceful environments in critical world markets through the development of sustainable energy and security infrastructure via public/private initiatives and industry-led partnerships.

Image: Shutterstock.

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