Diplomacy & Crisis News

En 1941, Adolf Hitler promulguait le décret « Nacht und Nebel » (« Nuit et brouillard »), exposé minutieux d'une stratégie de la terreur visant à faire disparaître les indésirables sans laisser de trace, de sorte que leurs proches, ne sachant s'ils sont vivants ou morts, n'osent se révolter, de peur (...) / Mexique, Amérique latine, Violence, Société, Matières premières, Pétrole, Narcotrafic - 2018/04

Russian MiG-31 armed with the Kinzhal missile. Kinzhal Hypersonic missiles were once thought to be almost impossible to intercept.

New strategies to attack Ukraine’s military and civilian population has run the gambit of using the most advanced Kalibr cruise missiles, low tech drones imported from outside or Russia, Cold War ballistic missiles, and Hypersonic weapons like the Kinzhal missile. While different older and modern systems are being used to counter the attacks, the theory many had inside and outside of Russia was that the Hypersonic Kinzhal missiles would not be intercepted by any defense system available.

In the earlier stages of the war, it was the case that a Kinzhal missile hit a target in the city of Ivano-Frankivsk while Russia used electronic countermeasures to knock out much of Ukraine’s missile defense tracking capabilities. More recently however, several Kinzhal missiles were intercepted by what was likely a Patriot PAC-3 missile system, a system designed with smaller, more agile missiles specifically meant to intercept ballistic targets.

While many were surprised that the air launched Kinzhal missiles were shot down, it is not an illogical conclusion to assume a Patriot PAC-3 missile system can knock out a Kinzhal. The Kinzhal is heavily based on the ground launched missile system carried by Russia’s Iskander surface-to-surface missile system, also being used in Ukraine by Russia. While the various Iskander types can fire cruise missiles like Kalibr or fast ballistic missiles like a variant of the Kinzhal, NATO designs were created specifically to kill Kinzhal type missiles. The theory that added speed and altitude in launching a Kinzhal from a MiG-31 fighter was certainly sound, and defined the Kinzhal as being Hypersonic. While it can reach Hypersonic speeds using this technique, it does not make the Kinzhal much different than its Iskander based ancestor. In the end, the real life test of Kinzhal lead to several interceptions, with the loss of six of them in one day.

Some peculiar situations have come from the missile war in Ukraine. In a technique not seen since North Korea altered SA-2 missiles to hit ground targets during the early Cold War, Russian S-300 missiles were also adjusted to hit targets on the ground, despite it being designed solely as an air-to-air missile. While this might be a sign that more advanced missiles are running low for Russia, it is the case that NATO supplied advanced missiles are also running low, with a great deal of time needed to replenish their stocks.

Using simple drones may have been a ploy to make Ukraine waste many advanced missiles on $400 drones, and the Kinzhals and other advanced missiles may be being held back for a future attack with a dwindled missile shield. To counter the lack of stock and cost, fairly old Gepard systems were brought in to shoot down simple drones. While effective, there are not enough of them to cover the vastness of Ukraine. If Ukraine can preserve their advanced missile systems to intercept more advanced missile threats only, they can buy more time in keeping their population as safe as possible from attacks from the air.

To cover more regions of Ukraine with Gepard type protection from technically simple threats, three options exist. The first is to try and find more Gepard/Oerlikon based or NATO based systems of a similar type that have cannons linked to a radar and/or tracking system. If this was easy however, it would have likely been done already, which leads to another option. Like many Cold War Soviet equipment being dusted off and used effectively by Ukraine, the ZSU-23-4 was a Cold War system similar to the Gepard, using four 23mm cannons and a tracking system to target low flying threats. If an update of the ZSU-23-4 radar could be implemented, there is likely a tremendous amount of stock and ammo available of the ZSU-23-4 Shilka. Poland had upgraded their systems some time ago, and could act as a blueprint for a quick modernisation. A type of Shilka upgrade or App for the radar could surely save lives by shooting down terror drones purchased by Russia.

The third and last option would be to purchase the PGZ95 system from China. Since 2008, China introduced the PGZ95, but rapidly replaced many of their PGZ95 anti-air vehicles with a similar Oerlikon based system called the PGZ09. While the PGZ09 is very similar to a modern Gepard, the PGZ95s are similar to a modern Shilka, with a modern radar, and have been placed as excess stock by China’s PLA. Sourcing the PGZ95 and placing them at the front would be a simple tactical solution to the drone scourge against innocent Ukrainian civilians. While the politics of such a purchase would be a lot more complicated than the tactical reality, the current image China seeks as a peacemaker abroad, the use of the PGZ95 mainly as a defensive weapon against terror drones, and the perception of impartiality China seeks between Ukraine and Russia may make for a convincing proposal to get modern air defence on the field in Ukraine. If it saves innocent lives, these future approaches are worth a shot.

Marié à la cantatrice carioca Elsie Houston en 1928, le poète Benjamin Péret (1899-1959) n'avait pas 30 ans lorsqu'il a ressenti la morsure brésilienne : débarqué à Rio de Janeiro au cœur de l'été austral 1929, il s'est immédiatement attaché au pays et à ses habitants. C'est en pleine ébullition moderniste (...) / Littérature, Mouvement de contestation, Brésil, Amérique latine, Culture, Peuples autochtones, Personnalités - 2018/04

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At the same time that the U.S. Congress deliberated on legislation to counter China, it remained gridlocked over national debt limits. The current political acrimony adds to persistent American problems of wavering economic growth, bitter partisan feuding, and record levels of gun violence, among other long-standing issues. Meanwhile, Beijing’s demands that the United States “correct” its policies regarding China occurred alongside news that its own economy is faltering amid slowing global demand. China also continues to grapple with a worsening debt problem, a bleak demographic outlook, and high levels of violent crime. Relative political and economic weakness stands out as a striking and disturbing feature of the current U.S.-China rivalry.

The weakened state of the rival powers ill-fits the pattern set not only by the Cold War but also by all great power rivalries over the past two centuries, including the two World Wars and even the conflicts of the Napoleonic era. The state of technologies differed dramatically, of course, but they shared key social, political, and economic features. Those epic contests involved centralized, unitary states with a high degree of internal cohesion and robust patriotic popular support. Governments enjoyed strong legitimacy partly due to expanding opportunities for political participation and economic advancement. Broad popular support for the governments also owed to industrialization, which took off in the late 1700s and yielded dramatic gains in the material standard of living for many people, especially after 1850. Industrial-age warfare typically centered on strategies of mass mobilization that permitted the fielding of vast armies consisting of citizen-soldiers equipped with standardized uniforms and equipment. When these nation-states fought, they demonstrated an impressive ability to mobilize resources, involve the population, and sustain a war footing for years on end. Their militaries frequently engaged in blood-soaked set-piece battles that generated staggering casualties. The wars often wrought immense destruction and typically ended with unconditional surrender by one side or the other.

The current U.S.-China rivalry contrasts sharply with these historical experiences. Unlike their predecessors, the two countries contend amid a complex and overlapping array of threats, labor under severe resource constraints, and manifest distressing signs of domestic weakness. With a diminishing ability to meet the needs of their citizens, the U.S. and Chinese governments have inspired little patriotic enthusiasm. Neither side has mobilized their citizenry against the other, nor do strategies of mass mobilization appear plausible for the foreseeable future. Instead, the principal mode of military recruitment consists of professional volunteers and contractors. China indeed continues to rely on conscription for perhaps a third of its military manpower, but that is because it cannot attract enough qualified volunteers. Far from a minor hindrance, transnational threats and episodes of domestic upheaval appear highly menacing and routinely vie with traditional threats for the attention of policymakers. For example, U.S. military forces have struggled to counter non-state actors in the Middle East and control outbursts of domestic turmoil. Meanwhile, the People’s Liberation Arm has scrambled to protect Chinese citizens abroad from serious harm, and the country’s security forces struggle to ensure domestic control in Hong Kong, Tibet, and Xinjiang.

Grasping that the current situation bears little resemblance to twentieth-century precedents, experts have fiercely debated its meaning. Some have insisted that past patterns will hold and that the two countries are bound for conflict. Others disagree, arguing that war is unlikely and the two countries will carry out a distinct type of competition. Still others question the wisdom of competition at all given the magnitude of domestic problems confronting each rival and urge greater cooperation on shared concerns instead.

Neomedievalism

A starting point for making sense of the U.S.-China rivalry’s unusual features is recognizing that our world is experiencing an epochal transformation. In a recently published RAND Corporation report, I present evidence that the international community entered a new epoch, which I call “neomedievalism,” beginning around 2000. This new period is characterized by the attenuation or regression of the political, social, and economic dimensions of the modern era.

Politically, the centralized nation-state is in steep decline. Although what might succeed it remains intensely disputed. The decline of the nation-state has already spurred severe political crises in many countries, and the problems of a weakened state will persist even following the consolidation of new sources of legitimacy. The relatively high level of social solidarity that predominated in nation-states has atrophied, and competing sets of identities have grown more salient. Economically, neomedieval states are experiencing slowing and imbalanced growth, primarily benefiting a small minority. Neomedieval economies are also experiencing disparate growth rates, the return of entrenched inequalities, and expanding illicit economies. The nature of security threats has undergone significant change as well. Reversing trends that predominated in the past two centuries, non-military dangers such as natural disasters, pandemics, and violent non-state actors rival or outpace traditional state militaries as principal security concerns. While many of these risks are not new, they are especially menacing due to neomedieval states' weakened legitimacy and capacity. Warfare in the neomedieval age has experienced a revival of pre-industrial practices, including the privatization of militaries, the prevalence of siege warfare, the prominence of intrastate war, and the formation of informal coalitions consisting of diverse state and non-state actors.

These trends represent a “meta-history,” in the sense that they extend beyond the experiences of individual countries or leaders. As trends that define the general arc of human experience, they are unlikely to be reversed and can, at best, be delayed or mitigated. Their effects will also likely overshadow the impact of particular technologies and weapons. This is because technologies, no matter how advanced or sophisticated, cannot always solve problems that are fundamentally political, societal, and economic. The limits of advanced technology were well illustrated by the American withdrawal from Afghanistan. American forces possessed the most sophisticated equipment available to any military throughout history. However, this proved inadequate against the realities of a weak Kabul regime, an impoverished and fragmented Afghan society, a tenuous commitment from Washington, and a poorly-equipped yet resolute Taliban-led insurgency.

Why is the world experiencing such attenuation and regression? The most fundamental driver owes to the declining strength of the advanced industrial economies that created the modern industrial era in the first place. Before 1800, no industrial nation-state existed. As Western countries developed into industrial nation-states, their immense concentration of power and wealth excited admiration, resentment, and envy in states worldwide. The appeal and influence of Western nation-states reached their apogee in the 1950s and 1960s when their economies experienced a “golden age” of prosperity that fueled rising incomes across virtually all social classes. However, the situation began to change in the 1970s when the same economies deindustrialized as rising wages rendered manufacturing less competitive. Growth rates slowed, economies experienced stagnation, and inequality grew. Analysts noted a concomitant decay of key social and political institutions dating from this period.

Consequently, U.S. decisionmakers and planners should be wary of resorting to strategies and methods drawn from industrial age wars with which contemporary militaries bear a superficial resemblance. The U.S. military, in particular, will face the temptation to prescribe industrial nation-state solutions for neomedieval problems. Focusing on conventional military challenges both validates the importance of such forces and frames issues in terms that existing interests find comfortable. But policymakers should resist this temptation. The Russian military’s disastrous performance in Ukraine and America’s painful experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq provide examples of what can happen when outdated thinking dominates approaches to warfare. To avoid potentially disastrous misjudgments and miscalculations, U.S. decisionmakers and planners should consider several key points about the neomedieval era.

First, the reality of weakening states will likely be a defining feature of the U.S.-China rivalry. Nation-states are experiencing a decline in political legitimacy and governance capacity. This weakness afflicts both the United States and China, as well as virtually all countries around the world. As economic growth decelerates, the debilitation of modern states will likely worsen over time, and efforts to fully reverse the trends are unlikely to work. This does not mean strengthening state capacity is futile. Finding ways to improve state capacity and rebuild the state’s legitimacy will become central tasks in the contest. But even in the best case, the United States and China will be weaker and less cohesive than they were in the past century. All defense planning should begin with an awareness of this vulnerability and the constraints that it imposes. Weakening state capacity restricts options for building military power and waging conflict. It introduces new vulnerabilities that must be accounted for in defensive preparations as well as opportunities for offensive operations against rival powers.

Second, conventional war between the United States and China is improbable owing to their political, economic, and societal weaknesses. Despite the potential for heightened tensions, neomedieval trends render total war between the United States and China unlikely. The persistent fragility of public support, the inability to carry out a mass mobilization, and the exceeding risks and difficulties of sustaining intensive conflict have made “total war” in the mold of World War II almost impossible to wage. Moreover, war requires the rapid depletion of scarce military resources that will be difficult and costly to replace. This is an especially important consideration given the competing fiscal demands of the welfare state. That said, some sort of conflict cannot be ruled out. Should the U.S.-China rivalry escalate to hostilities, the two sides might instead fight through proxy conflicts or by provoking political unrest in the rival’s homeland. Amid such friction, the two may find their contest frequently interrupted by the imperative to reallocate scarce resources to address various domestic and transnational threats, resulting in a chronic low-intensity conflict. Under such conditions, conventional combat between U.S.-China forces, if it occurs at all, could consist of sporadic clashes between relatively modest-sized formations in different parts of the world. As ambitions of total victory over the adversary prove infeasible, political goals may instead focus on securing minor gains through temporary settlements while leaving broader issues unresolved.

Third, controlling domestic and transnational threats is becoming a higher priority than deterring conventional military attacks. Compared to the modern industrial period, states are more secure from external threats and more vulnerable to internal threats. They are more secure in the sense that weakened rivals generally lack the political will and resource base to subjugate other countries. Thus, most countries continue to face a lower threat of invasion and conquest. However, the perpetually fragile public legitimacy for governments will leave domestic politics volatile. The principal danger to states will come from internal rather than external sources. These include pandemics, terrorism, transnational crime, and political violence. Because failure to ensure domestic security directly implicates the state's legitimacy, controlling such dangers will become an urgent priority. States should allocate resources accordingly.

The great powers who most effectively grasp and adapt to the neomedieval reality may gain a crucial advantage over rivals who continue to exhaust increasingly scarce treasure in futile efforts to recreate the past. Which country is best positioned to do this?  Paradoxically, China’s more limited experience with modernity may prove a valuable asset. Beijing might grasp neomedieval trends more intuitively than Western countries, whose principal point of reference rests in a recent past in which they predominated. Yet there are compelling reasons to believe America can adjust effectively. The most important one is the country’s innate dynamism and innovation. A key reason America has succeeded so well as a nation-state has been its willingness and ability to experiment and adapt. If the United States is to maintain its position, developing strategies to lead as a neomedieval great power will be a critical step in that direction.

Dr. Timothy R. Heath is a senior international defense researcher with the RAND Corporation.

Image: Shutterstock.

It would not be unfair to label the prevailing nature of the U.S.-Sino relationship as one of “mutual distrust and recrimination.” While 2022 ended with both Washington and Beijing reiterating in official meetings—such as Joe Biden and Xi Jinping’s Bali meeting on November 14—their shared desire to keep channels of communication open, there were few practical signs of improvement in relations. In fact, both sides are pursuing policies that will deepen competition and confrontation. Although there has been sporadic talk of new “guardrails” that would establish a form of strategic stability, this aim appears diminishingly small due to each side’s perception of what is driving their competition and how that perception frames foreign policy choices and domestic politics.

For Washington, competition with China is driven by the latter’s challenge to American power and leadership, along and its (perceived) desire to change the international order. For Beijing, competition with the United States is rooted in continued American “hegemonic” pretensions to “contain” China amidst its inevitable “decline.” This fundamental impasse makes both sides increasingly perceive their relationship in zero-sum terms. Moreover, the premium placed on competition is negatively impacting both Chinese and American broader foreign and domestic policy agendas.

In this context, is there any hope for an amelioration of bilateral tensions and competition?

“Competing,” but Not Leading?

A core problem for the Biden administration is that measures taken to ensure the United States can “out-compete” China are likely to undermine the former’s capacity to achieve its objective of revitalizing American global leadership of the current rules-based international order.

For all the administration’s use of orthodox liberal internationalist rhetoric—the 2022 National Security Strategy’s assertion, for instance, of America’s continued commitment to, and reliance on, “fair and open trade” and a liberal “international economic system”—such objectives are increasingly being sacrificed on the altar of strategic competition with Beijing.

The administration’s concrete actions reflect a “security first” approach to bolster and burden-share with existing allies, such as Japan and Australia (including through the Quad and the AUKUS agreement), and attempts to forge deeper ties with like-minded actors like India and Taiwan. Simultaneously, Washington has pursued a decoupling of high-tech trade with China, including implementing overtly protectionist trade and industrial policies (such as the CHIPS Act) intended to boost American competitiveness in the context of bilateral U.S.-Sino relations.

This latter trend was reinforced by National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan’s April 27, 2023 speech at the Brookings Institution. Explicitly billed as focused on the president’s “core commitment … to more deeply integrate domestic policy and foreign policy,” the speech effectively made the case for “national security” concerns to guide economic policy. Sullivan argued that the guiding assumption of post-1945 U.S. policy (“that markets always allocate capital productively and efficiently—no matter what our competitors did”) no longer applies as the integration of a “non-market economy” (China) into the global economy has produced “dependencies” that can be “exploited for economic or geopolitical leverage” as “entire supply chains of strategic goods—along with the industries and jobs that made them—moved overseas” in the “name of oversimplified market efficiency.”.

This constitutes an effort to ensure the United States can guide the invisible hand of the market in directions amenable to geopolitical competition with China. The objective of the administration’s new policy is to identify “specific sectors that are foundational to economic growth, strategic from a national security perspective, and where private industry on its own isn’t poised to make the investments needed to secure our national ambitions,” and to apply “targeted public investments in these areas that unlock the power and ingenuity of private markets, capitalism, and competition to lay a foundation for long-term growth.”

Although this may align with the White House’s domestic political agenda of “renewing” American prosperity, it remains to be seen how this approach will enable the United States to achieve its associated objective of rallying allies and like-minded partners to the cause of combating China. This is especially important in Asia and the Pacific, where many observers have noted the shortcomings of U.S. economic and trade policy for at least the past decade. This has been especially visible around the failure to match the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), as well the lack of U.S. participation in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, or CPTPP. American schemes around investment in the region have also been long on aspiration and short on delivery. That includes both the Trump administration’s Blue Dot Network and Biden’s Build Back Better World.

The irony, as Susan Shirk has noted, is that the Biden administration’s focus on “competition” with China as the organizing principle of its foreign policy is making the United States become more like its adversary: “nationalist, fixated on security, and politicizing the market economy.” Such dynamic risks making the administration’s claims to be reclaiming a liberal internationalist vision of American global leadership based on a “rules-based order” increasingly hollow.

Preparing for “Choppy Waters” and “Dangerous Storms”

China may be more ideologically girded for such zero-sum competition, but overt competition with the United States is exacerbating existing pathologies in both its foreign and domestic policy, resulting in a variety of self-inflicted wounds. It is perhaps no surprise, for instance, that U.S.-Sino strategic competition has coincided with the rabidly jingoistic wolf warrior diplomacy that has damaged China’s standing throughout the world. Such assertive, nationalistic posturing at the very least undermined some of Beijing’s previous gains in posing as an advocate of economic globalization and “interconnectivity” during the Trump era of American foreign policy.

Of greater significance is the impact of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) greater explicit focus under Xi on security both in an international and domestic setting. This has been markedly sharpened in the past two years as U.S.-Sino ties have deteriorated. The party-state’s linkage of increased pressure in China’s external environment and its domestic security was highlighted in Xi’s report to the 20th Party Congress in November 2022, where he warned that the country was entering “a period of development in which strategic opportunities, risks, and challenges are concurrent” and the Party “must therefore be more mindful of potential dangers, be prepared to deal with worst-case scenarios, and be ready to withstand high winds, choppy waters, and even dangerous storms.” To withstand such high winds, the continued application of a “holistic approach to national security” was necessary, in which the party would have “the people's security as our ultimate goal, political security as our fundamental task, economic security as our foundation, military, technological, cultural, and social security as important pillars, and international security as a support.”

While not entirely new, this framing is notable for its explicit connection of the CCP’s “political security,” domestic “stability,” and the achievement of Xi’s great objective of “national rejuvenation.” This fundamental focus on regime security has been felt since the Party Congress in several ways.

First, the sharp about-face on Xi’s signature “zero-Covid” approach to pandemic control responded to two dynamics—increased societal dissatisfaction with draconian lockdowns and concerns of coronavirus-induced economic stagnation—that impinged directly on regime security. The about-face on zero-Covid killed two birds with one stone by removing a policy that had placed Xi “in the firing line of anti-government or anti-party movements” and creating the conditions to kick-start the Chinese economy.

Second, on the international stage, Beijing has adopted more explicit language that points the finger of blame squarely at the United States for China’s current challenges. In a discussion with Chinese commerce and industry representatives on March 3, Xi described China’s international environment as full of “uncertainties and unpredictable factors,” foremost of which is that “the Western countries led by the United States have carried out all-round containment and suppression of China.”

Third, the shift in language points toward the party’s “darker assessment of humanity’s historical trajectory” and the “hidden risks and open dangers’ posed to China’s quest for ‘national rejuvenation.”

Significantly, it has not only been the downward trajectory of U.S.-Sino relations—from U.S. efforts at high-tech “decoupling” from Chinese supply chains to the Chinese spy balloon incident that has driven this pessimistic assessment, but also Chinese perceptions of the global repercussions of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The war in Ukraine, as an analyst from the Centre for Strategy and Security at Tsinghua University argues, has not only “accelerated and intensified” American “strategic deployment” against China, but also “binds China and Russia together.”

This helps explains Beijing’s recent flurry of Ukraine-related diplomatic activities including Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s late February tour through European capitals, the release of China’s twelve-point “road map” for a negotiated peace in Ukraine, Xi’s long-delayed phone call with Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky on April 26, and the May 17 visit of China’s special representative for Eurasian affairs, Li Hui, to Kyiv.

None of these activities have achieved tangible progress toward China’s stated objective of facilitating a negotiated settlement to the conflict. However, they have served Beijing’s goal of portraying itself, in Xi’s words, as a “responsible major country” that—in a less than subtle jibe at Washington—“would not sit idly by, nor would it add oil to the fire, still less exploit the situation” for its own gains.

Despite the recent resumption of high-level contact between Beijing and Washington, including face-to-face discussions between Yi and Sullivan in Vienna on May 10–11, Beijing’s perspective remains unchanged as to who is to blame for the “downward spiral” of bilateral relations.

“The United States,” as a Xinhua commentary on the Wang-Sullivan talks stated, “claims that it is not seeking to decouple from China and has no intention of obstructing China's development” but simultaneously “squeezes” China by “imposing many rounds of chip bans on Chinese firms under the pretext of national security” and “rushing to encircle China in the Asia-Pacific by mustering such Cold-War style groupings as the AUKUS and the Quad alliances.” Ultimately, the commentary concludes, this is driven by the belief of U.S. decisionmakers that “China must be brought down in order to keep America ahead.”

The Messy World of Strategic Competition

Both Washington and Beijing, then, are firmly set on trajectories that lock in rather than ameliorate bilateral tension and competition. This poses challenges and risks for both country’s domestic and foreign policies.

In Washington, competing with China has become a partisan political sport. Amidst tense administration negotiations with Republicans to raise the $31.4 trillion debt ceiling, Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, and Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo all fronted the Senate Appropriations Committee to support the president’s FY2024 budget request. Each argued the case that it was vital for the United States to “out compete” China. The implication, as Democratic Chair of the Appropriations Committee Senator Patty Murray made clear, is that “China isn’t debating whether to pay its debts, or wreck its economy. China isn’t debating whether to invest in its future, or cut and cap the investments that keep it competitive.” While this may be a classic example of wedge politics to paint Republicans as hamstringing U.S. efforts to out-compete China, it remains to be seen whether it produces better policy outcomes.

Xi Jinping, meanwhile, continues to consolidate his revision of the Dengist paradigm of the post-Mao era by privileging security over the economy. This is apparent in China’s recent “counter-espionage” crackdown which has targeted a range of foreign companies and individuals for alleged “leaking” of information related to “national security or interests” to foreign governments or entities. This came even as Premier Li Qiang attempted to reassure foreign companies and investors that Beijing was committed to building a “first class business environment.” However, the fact that the “counter-espionage” crackdown has been tasked to Ministry of State Security head Chen Yixin leaves little doubt that this constitutes a top priority for China’s leader.

In the realm of foreign policy, too, the Sino-American fracture continues apace. At the G7 summit in Hiroshima, Biden succeeded in forging a common, in-principle aspiration amongst the grouping to ensure “economic resilience” through “de-risking and diversifying” as a means of resisting “economic coercion” by Beijing. Meanwhile, Xi’s hosting of the first China-Central Asia summit in Xi’an sought to achieve several objectives that can be seen as necessary to girding China further for competition with the United States: to kick-start the BRI after Covid-19 slowdown; to cement further economic and strategic partnerships with the Central Asian states; and to further embellish China’s posturing as an alternative source of global leadership.

The self-reinforcing logic of great power competition is one of the closest things to an empirical law in international politics, and the increasing divide between China and the United States should not come as a surprise. But the apparent embedding of such competition raises the stakes not only for Beijing and Washington themselves but also for other key actors in the Indo-Pacific—many of whom have deep strategic ties with the United States and economic interdependencies with China.

It is likely that at some stage both Beijing and Washington will have an incentive to establish some guardrails in the relationship: after all, a collision course is costly and difficult to sustain for any length of time. Yet those tend to entail trade-offs and compacts, which tend to have more fundamental impacts on smaller states. Under those circumstances, it is vital that all players in the messy strategic landscape plan for unexpected outcomes, and simultaneously seek to identify what the contours of Indo-Pacific strategic stability might look like.

Dr. Michael Clarke and Dr. Matthew Sussex are Senior Fellows at the Centre for Defence Research at Australian Defence College.

Image: Shutterstock

In discussions of artificial intelligence, commentary often focuses on how this technology may automate jobs, revolutionize war, or even lead to the collapse of humanity. However, a more immediate issue deserves serious consideration from national security policymakers. This is the potential for AI advancements—specifically generative AI—to turbocharge disinformation and flood our information ecosystem with untruths.

On the one hand, a new era of AI-powered disinformation could allow malign actors—particularly foreign adversaries—to manipulate the information environment and shape public discourse more easily, as Russia did successfully in the 2016 U.S. election. On the other hand, and perhaps more concerningly, the proliferation of content produced using this technology could erode public trust in the information we consume entirely, undermining the social fabric that holds societies together.

National security policymakers in the United States must recognize the threat these advancements pose to national and international security and prioritize addressing it. Given America’s role as a global leader in the development of AI, U.S. policymakers have a responsibility to coordinate an international response to the coming era of disinformation and work with partners to prevent the further breakdown of our shared reality that this technology threatens.

At the heart of this challenge is generative artificial intelligence. This type of AI helps create hyperrealistic content—including text, images, audio, and video—by learning from large datasets. Interest in generative AI has spiked in recent months largely because of its application in ChatGPT, a sophisticated chatbot developed by OpenAI that has exploded in popularity since its public release in late 2022.

Many people have found value in these AI tools. However, as a dual-use technology, generative AI can easily be abused. The potential harm that this technology poses, particularly to our information environment, is becoming increasingly clear. Researchers have raised the alarm for years about the risks of “deepfakes”—highly realistic, AI-generated depictions of real people doing or saying something that did not occur. Until recently, however, this technology was fairly primitive and not accessible to the general public. Today, with the proliferation of generative AI tools, it is becoming cheaper and easier to create synthetic media that seems authentic, lowering the barriers to entry for anyone who wants to spread disinformation.

This emerging crisis is closely linked with the market-driven arms race that is taking place in the AI industry. Many companies are moving aggressively to develop AI in pursuit of market dominance, despite concerns about how this technology could be abused.

With the rapid public deployment of these tools, AI-assisted disinformation is already beginning to appear online. While some cases have been good-spirited, there are multiple examples of politically motivated actors using AI technology to deceive and manipulate. AI-generated content has appeared in pro-Chinese influence operations and, more recently, in fictitious reports of an explosion at the Pentagon spread by Russian state media.

It is not hard to imagine how this technology could fuel genuine geopolitical crises and instability should it continue to advance and be publicly deployed without constraint. Consider, for instance, how the proliferation of deepfake audio and video content of U.S. political candidates during the 2024 presidential election could lead to the complete breakdown of trust in the political process and its outcome and, in turn, widespread civil unrest.

A future with AI-powered disinformation may be inevitable, but there is still time to mitigate the disruption that this technology causes.

The policymaking community in the United States is already somewhat aware of the issue. In 2021, the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence reported that AI could “increase the magnitude, precision, and persistence of adversarial information operations.” Additionally, the National Institutes of Standards and Technology (NIST) issued guidance for developing responsible AI systems earlier this year. More recently, the White House has taken steps toward developing a national AI strategy. To date, however, no enforceable action has been taken to shape or regulate the future of AI.

Although leaders like OpenAI’s Sam Altman and Google’s Sundar Pichai have called for regulation, some AI experts believe it is not feasible due to coordination problems. However, this position discounts the cases where norms and regulations born out of safety and ethical concerns have successfully regulated the development of emerging technologies. For example, the Asilomar Conference in 1975 produced guidelines for the safe development of gene editing technology, while international non-proliferation pacts have largely halted the spread of nuclear weapons around the world.

Another concern, particularly in the national security community, is whether regulating AI could harm the interests of the United States and its allies in the new era of strategic competition with China. According to some analyses, anxieties around AI are overblown and it is essential to do what it takes to win the AI arms race.

That said, safeguarding against the unfettered proliferation of AI technology would not necessarily undermine U.S. or allied interests but could, in fact, advance those interests. China reportedly relies heavily on overseas workers and technology transfer in its efforts to develop AI. Thus, regulatory or normative efforts to slow AI advances by the United States could slow those made by China as well.

In addition to recognizing the threats that AI poses to public discourse and, in turn, collective security, the national security community in the United States should consider a few specific actions.

First, the United States must address the issue at home. In the immediate term, Congress should ensure the responsible development and public deployment of generative AI tools, specifically those that empower next-generation disinformation. While compelling, a lot of what generative AI produces today is still clunky or flawed in some way. However, recent advancements are making these flaws increasingly difficult to spot. In the absence of action, AI tools capable of producing synthetic media that is indistinguishable from the real thing could soon be publicly available. Thus, enforceable standards for companies developing this technology should be put in place, building on the NIST framework, before the horse leaves the proverbial barn.

U.S. policymakers and social media companies should also work more closely together on addressing AI-powered disinformation through technical mitigations. Most importantly, the federal government should explore ways to help social media companies detect and remove synthetic audio-visual media as well as synthetic text. The U.S. Department of Defense has already started to fund technology to defend against AI-enabled disinformation, but more action is needed. Additional government funding could help develop new detection capabilities, while the development of common technical standards for companies would allow for greater transparency across platforms.

Alongside these measures, the federal government should work to increase awareness of and resilience against AI-powered disinformation among the general public. Just as cybersecurity largely hinges on individual behavior and proper cyber hygiene, strong media literacy is important for resisting disinformation. As some researchers have suggested, one way to improve resilience is to provide communities most vulnerable to information manipulation—such as members of historically marginalized groups—with tools to identify fake content. This could be done by partnering with state and local governments and by coordinating with foreign partners on best practices.

Finally, the United States must lead an effort alongside close allies to develop international standards and norms to regulate the safe development, deployment, and use of generative AI. Ideally, these would follow standards agreed upon domestically but necessarily require alignment with the international community. The European Union would be a natural partner here, having already indicated its own concern for this technology through its Artificial Intelligence Act.

Given its concerns over generative AI, there may even be potential to gain China’s buy-in on an international agreement. In recent months, the Chinese government has pursued efforts to regulate deepfake technology and require chatbots like ChatGPT to toe the party line due to concern over the chatbot’s uncensored replies.

In any case, the need for urgent action cannot be ignored. We are already seeing how this technology is accelerating the erosion of our shared reality. With generative AI expected to advance exponentially in the coming years, this trend will only get worse. And if policymakers wait too long to act, the consequences could be dire. For that reason, leaders in the United States must take this issue seriously to protect American national security as well as the security of the international system.

Tristan Paci is a research intern for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute in Washington, DC. He is a recent master’s graduate of the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, where he focused on technology policy and security in the Indo-Pacific.

Image: Shutterstock.

Depuis deux siècles, des dirigeants de toutes tendances politiques ont réclamé la diminution du nombre d'agents de l'État. Pour des raisons parfois diamétralement opposées. / France, Économie, État, Finance, Fonction publique, Histoire - (...) / France, Économie, État, Finance, Fonction publique, Histoire - 2018/04

Opposer usagers et salariés des chemins de fer n'a guère de sens quand tous vivent la dégradation du service au nom d'un désengagement public que le gouvernement veut renforcer. Et que penser des proclamations sur la sauvegarde du climat quand on torpille le rail en faveur de la route ? / France, (...) / France, Économie, Finance, Région, Service public, Transports - 2018/04

Iran’s proxies have seized power in Baghdad—and are gutting the state.

Washington needs an endgame in Ukraine.

Now at 100, Henry Kissinger remains a larger-than-life statesman, strategist, and scholar. Alongside intellectual titans such as George Kennan and Zbigniew Brzezinski, his story intertwines with post-World War II American foreign policy. A recent flurry of articles and editorials that spanned news outlets, think tanks, and policy platforms were put out to celebrate Kissinger’s centennial and commemorate his legacy.

Kissinger, despite now being a hundred, is still known for his unending intellectual curiosity and scholarly pursuits, and he constantly demonstrates his exceptional ability to adapt and delve into new subjects, keeping himself dynamically engaged with the world. Nowhere is this more evident than in his most recent book, The Age of AI: And Our Human Future. In it, Kissinger teamed up with Eric Schmidt, the former executive chairman of Google, and Daniel Huttenlocher, dean of MIT’s College of Computing, to grapple with the latest challenge to our conventional lives: artificial intelligence, or AI as it is more commonly known.

Kissinger’s expertise in global politics and security lend credibility to the book’s analysis. Overall, the tome is an attempt to articulate a framework for the transformative nature of AI and its potential to reshape the dynamics of military engagements beyond merely augmenting existing capabilities, as AI itself fundamentally alters the strategies, tactics, and doctrines employed by armed forces worldwide.

However, what distinguishes The Age of AI is its profound exploration of how AI shapes human understanding and perception. Kissinger and his co-authors propose that AI’s capacity to access realms of reality beyond human comprehension carries significant implications for our traditional notions of reason, knowledge, and choice. They contend that the technology’s subtle influence on these foundational aspects of human cognition challenges the established worldview of the Enlightenment era and necessitates a reevaluation of our philosophical and ethical frameworks.

Some critics might contend that The Age of AI is merely an attempt by Kissinger to insert himself into one of the most trending topics of our time. Such assumptions would be incorrect; in a testament to his enduring intellectual vigor, Kissinger demonstrates a remarkable capacity to understand the broader implications of profound technological development upon multiple spheres of human and political life. He regularly works with Schmidt and Huttenlocher to elucidate the transformative impact that AI-derived technologies, like ChatGPT, will have on our lives. Together, they make a compelling case, rooted in the ideals of the Enlightenment era, for comprehending and embracing the immense changes that lie ahead.

For example, in a joint Wall Street Journal piece written in February of this year, the three co-authors claim that “the essential difference between the Age of Enlightenment and the Age of AI is thus not technological but cognitive.” They go on to explain that, “after the Enlightenment, philosophy accompanied science. Bewildering new data and often counterintuitive conclusions, doubts, and insecurities were allayed by comprehensive explanations of the human experience. Generative AI is similarly poised to generate a new form of human consciousness.” Similar to their previous work, Kissinger and his co-authors conclude their essay with a poignant reminder that AI poses numerous unanswered questions, and as humans, we have yet to adapt adequately and fast enough to the challenges of this new age.

As Kissinger crosses his centennial milestone, the world finds itself in a position to evaluate and contemplate the legacy of one of the most influential American statesmen of the twentieth century. Yet, true to his nature as a scholar and deep thinker, he has refused to stay behind in the twentieth century and has instead demonstrated a commitment to staying at the forefront of contemporary conversations. Kissinger’s willingness to delve into the complex and rapidly evolving realm of AI highlights his continued intellectual vitality and his dedication to understanding and grappling with the profound challenges and opportunities presented by this transformative technology. By engaging with the AI conversation, Kissinger exemplifies his enduring commitment to knowledge, growth, and tackling the most relevant intellectual topics in our ever-changing world.

Mohammed Soliman is the director of the Cyber Security and Emerging Technology Program at the Middle East Institute. You can find him on Twitter at @Thisissoliman.

Image: Shutterstock.

Launched in 2013, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—a global infrastructure and development strategy that aims to connect Asia, Africa, and Europe through a network of land and maritime trade routes—was a significant turning point in China’s foreign policy and has become one of the most ambitious and far-reaching development initiatives in history. It is also regarded by many in the West, the United States especially, as a not-so-subtle attempt by Beijing to reshape regional political orders in its favor.

In this light of this, it is worth considering the BRI’s impact in the Middle East. The region, home to a growing middle class, is home to several key international energy and sea trade routes. China’s heavy investment in the Middle East in recent years, including through the BRI, is thus of particular concern to Washington. Reviewing how such efforts have fared over the past decade may yield some interesting insights.

Why BRI Matters to the Middle East

The BRI is primarily a series of projects (comprising both traditional physical and digital infrastructure) designed to connect and integrate cooperating partners—cities, markets, and countries—across regions. Given this, a particular partner’s degree of connectivity plays a larger role than other factors, such as regime type or market share.

For Middle East countries, favorable geopolitical location and integration into key facets of the global economy play an essential role in China’s BRI framework. Consequently, China has developed a deep commercial presence in port cities and industrial parks that link the Persian Gulf to the Arabian, Red, and Mediterranean Seas. Myriad observers regard this presence as a way for China to secure its energy supplies, expand its trade, and gain a foothold in the region.

China’s engagement in the Middle East can be attributed to two primary drivers. First, it seeks to be recognized as a great power status domestically and by other states. The Middle East is a strategically important region, and China’s engagement is seen as a way to increase its influence and stake in the global order. Second, it aimed to secure its economic interests in the region through the BRI framework and continued access to energy resources on which it is heavily dependent. The BRI is thus a means for China to increase its channels for exporting goods, reduce trade friction, improve access to natural resources, build supply chains, and generate opportunities for Chinese companies to invest overseas and sell goods and services. To that end, over the past ten years, it has integrated the BRI framework with the Middle East countries’ national development strategies.

As the BRI is a long-term initiative that will continue to evolve in the coming years, Beijing will need to carefully assess the success and impact of its projects in the Middle East to make informed decisions on how to proceed. The success of the framework in the Middle East depends on several factors, including the economic and political stability of the region, the quality of the BRI projects, and the willingness of host countries to cooperate with China. More importantly, BRI projects are essential for underdeveloped Middle East states dependent on external creditors to establish critical physical and digital infrastructures. These projects are already in operation or are entering the second and third phases of development. Unless alternative creditors support further development, countries in the Middle East will continue to depend on and work with China.

Assessing BRI Projects in the Middle East

Currently, BRI projects span fifteen Middle East nations and include major infrastructural and digital projects on land and sea. The status of these projects varies, with some being planned, ongoing, completed, halted, or canceled, providing insight into the present overall situation of BRI. Developing a deeper understanding can be challenging, however, due to 1) deliberate opacity surrounding BRI projects on both the Chinese and host regional countries’ sides and 2) the sheer scale of the initiative, which spans large swathes of continents.

This lack of transparency is a major challenge for researchers and policymakers trying to understand BRI and its implications. Nonetheless, there is still a great amount of information available to consider. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) China Connects database, for example, provides a valuable overview of China's BRI investment and lending in the Middle East. The database also includes information on  Digital Silk Road (DSR) investments, which can be understood to be the BRI’s technological component—a digital bridge-building project intended to promote a new type of globalization via digital trade, digital infrastructure, cross-border e-commerce, mobile financial tools, Fourth Industrial Revolution technologies (big data, digital currencies, cloud computing, and so on).

In any case, the IISS China Connects data demonstrates that China is investing heavily in the Middle East, with 266 BRI projects between 2005 and 2022 (see Table 1). Most of those are either ongoing or have been completed, and there are only a few projects that have been canceled or halted (see Table 2). This is a positive sign for China, showing that the initiative is gaining traction in the region.

Of note is what is being funded. The data shows that China is investing heavily in digital infrastructure in the region, which will likely continue in the coming years as Beijing seeks to expand its global reach. Chinese companies invested in 202 DSR projects (76 percent of the total investment) compared to 64 traditional physical infrastructure projects (24 percent). These investments are likely to have a major impact on the region’s economies and societies, and it will be important to monitor the impact of these investments in the coming years.

 

Breaking down by category, we see varying levels of progress. In regards to traditional physical infrastructure endeavors, out of 64 BRI projects, there are 4 planned projects, 20 projects ongoing, 37 projects completed, and 3 projects canceled (see Table 3).

 

In regards to digital infrastructure efforts, out of 202 DSR projects, there are 29 planned projects, 49 projects ongoing, 122 projects completed, and 2 projects halted (see Table 4).

Looking closer at what types of digital infrastructure projects are being supported reveals that China’s most significant investment involves transferring technology, telecom, fiber optic cables, security information system, and financial technology (see Table 5).

As for physical infrastructure, China's most significant investments are in ports, railways, Special Economic Zones, trade agreements, and Health Silk Road projects—i.e., projects related to improving public health. (see Table 6).

Drawing Conclusions

What the IISS China Connects database shows is that, out of the billions of dollars in loans and investments that China has to Middle Eastern countries since the launch of the BRI, most of these have been for digital infrastructure projects, such as telecommunications and broadband networks. This illustrates that contrary to the popular conception that BRI is wholly focused on physical infrastructure projects, there is significant demand for digital infrastructure.

That is not to say there isn’t any physical construction going on: roads, railways, and ports are certainly being built

At the same time though, the IISS database also shows that Chinese lending and investments in the Middle East have declined in recent years. This decline is likely due to several factors, including the global economic slowdown and the coronavirus pandemic.

Ultimately though, the IISS database is probably incomplete. Despite the BRI’s ambitious goals, there is little reliable information about how it unfolds. This is partly because there is no agreed-upon definition for what qualifies as a BRI project. As a result, projects that started years earlier are often counted, and the BRI banner hangs over a comprehensive and ever-expanding list of activities. By design, the BRI is more a loose brand than a program with strict criteria. This lack of clarity has made it difficult to accurately understand the BRI’s impact accurately. The result is competing interpretations of its effects: some have argued that the BRI is a major driver of economic growth and development, while others have warned that it leads to debt traps and environmental degradation.

What is certain, however, is that China is still the largest foreign investor in the Middle East, and it is likely to continue to play a critical role in the region’s development. The emphasis on digital infrastructure is something that most Western observers are perhaps unaware of and would do well to consider. In the meantime, as the BRI’s tenth anniversary passes by, China will take stock of its original agenda and make necessary adjustments to align with its current domestic and global priorities. The Middle East will remain a key region for the BRI, and it is evident that Beijing will continue its engagement for years to come.

Dr. Mordechai Chaziza is a senior lecturer at the Department of Politics and Governance and the Multidisciplinary Studies in Social Science division at Ashkelon Academic College (Israel) and a Research Fellow at the Asian Studies Department, University of Haifa. He specializes in Chinese foreign and strategic relations.

Image: Shutterstock.

How time flies in the Middle East, where a regional alliance can be formed at sunrise and then—surprise!—break up at sunset.

From that perspective, the relative durability of what became known as the “alliance of the periphery,” an informal strategic alliance between four non-Arab states in the Greater Middle East—Iran, Turkey, Ethiopia, and Israel—during much of the Cold War was significant. However, the grouping is now eclipsed by Israel’s thawing relations with its formerly most implacable foes, the Arab states.

In particular, Iran and Turkey, two prominent Muslim states, were willing to cooperate with the Jewish State when the Arab-Muslim countries and most of the Islamic world refused to recognize that Israel’s existence was quite remarkable.

Historians have suggested that Israel’s success in establishing close military ties with Iran, Turkey, and Ethiopia derived from the implementation of the so-called “periphery doctrine.” The idea was the joint brainchild of Israel’s first prime minister, David Ben Gurion, and his advisor Eliahu Sassoon, himself the first Israeli diplomatic representative in Ankara.

The two believed in forming alliances with non-Arab states and forces with which Israel had no direct conflict. This not only included Turkey, Iran, and Ethiopia, but also religious minorities, like the Christian Maronites in Lebanon, and non-Arab ethnic groups, such as the Kurds in Iraq. Cultivating a cohort of partners with shared interests would allow the Jewish State to emerge from its regional isolation.

Indeed, offsetting the diplomatic and economic boycott of the Arab World could be seen as part of a traditional balance of power strategy aimed at countering Egyptian Pan-Arabism, which had dominated the region since the mid-1950s.

Hence, while the Arabs saw Israel as a foreign intrusion dividing the Arab Middle East, the periphery doctrine promoted the notion of the Middle East as a mosaic of national, ethnic, and religious groups, including Israel.

Moreover, the fact of Turkey’s NATO membership and Iran and Ethiopia’s close relations with Washington and the West in the context of the Cold War dovetailed with Israel’s goal of thawing ties with the United States, which until the early 1960s imposed an arms embargo on the Jewish State.

Although Turkey and Iran initially sided with the Arabs and voted against the 1947 United Nations partition plan, they soon saw the Arab-Israeli conflict as limited to Israel and the Arab states rather than a pan-Islamic one. Ankara and Tehran had territorial disputes with the Arab states and considered them rivals for regional dominance.

Ethiopia, led by the “Lion of Judah” Emperor Haile Selassie (who, according to legend, was a descendant of King Solomon and Queen Sheba), established diplomatic relations with Israel that helped his country in its fight against Eritrean rebels.

Turkey recognized the State of Israel in 1949, and Iran later became the second Muslim state to do so in 1950. Before these dates, the two had even established low-level diplomatic relations with the Jewish State.

Much cooperation between Israel, Iran, Turkey, and Ethiopia occurred behind the scenes between the respective militaries and the security services that dominated politics and policymaking in Tehran, Ankara, and Addis Ababa. Nevertheless, the nexus of ties never amounted to a genuine “strategic alliance.”

Iran and Turkey regarded their relationship with Israel as a way of hedging their bets and providing them with additional diplomatic and military resources to resist the pressure from aggressive Arab nationalist states. Nonetheless, geographical proximity, economic dependence on, and religious connections to the Arab World significantly constrained the ability of Tehran and Ankara to upgrade their ties with Israel, especially during the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars.

At the same time, Gurion and his successors regarded the periphery doctrine as a temporary strategy that needed to be sustained as long as the Arab nations refused to make peace with Israel. However, the periphery could not substitute for the central tenet in Israeli policy: peace with Arab Israel’s neighbors. Nor could it be an alternative to a strategic relationship with a global power like the United States.

The periphery doctrine proved, at best, a cost-effective form of realpolitik for Israel and eventually as a strategic illusion. Israel’s close relationship with Ethiopia and Iran collapsed after the fall of their ancien régimes and the ensuing political turmoil that engulfed each country.

Nor did the occasional military cooperation with the Maronites in Lebanon or the Kurds help terraform Israel’s position in the Middle East. If anything, in the case of Lebanon, it led to the catastrophe of the Israeli invasion of that country in 1982.

In the case of Turkey and Israel, the end of the Cold War, the democratization process in Turkey, and the strengthening of the alliance with the United States after the first Gulf War opened the door to improving the ties between Ankara and Jerusalem.

But contrary to the high expectations of neoconservative strategists, the relationship between the two countries didn’t evolve into a strategic alliance.

In fact, demonstrating the continuing sensitivity of Tukey to its ties with Arab World, it was the positive atmosphere in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process in the early 1990s (the Oslo Accords) that made it possible to raise the mutual diplomatic relations to the ambassadorial level. A Turkish ambassador presented his credentials to President Chaim Herzog, on March 23, 1992, in Tel Aviv. The Israeli embassy is located in the capital city of Ankara.

However, the 2002 landslide victory of the conservative Islamist Justice and Development Party and its leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan marked a turning point in the ties between Israel and Turkey. Erdogan insisted that his policies toward the Jewish State would be directly affected by its policies toward the Palestinians.

Interestingly enough, the collapse of the alliance of the periphery was taking place just as Israel’s relationship with the Arab World was beginning to change, starting with the Israeli-Egypt peace agreement and followed by the Oslo Process and the peace treaty with Jordan.

Indeed, one of the reasons for the effort made by the United States to accelerate the Arab-Israeli peace process has been the loss of Iran and Ethiopia as strategic allies and the threat facing the Arab oil-producing states following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

From that perspective, solidifying the Arab-Israeli core to counterbalance the Iranian threat and the challenge of an assertive Turkey created the strategic environment for the signing of the Abraham Accords. Israel has expanded its ties with four more Arab countries, along with reports about the possible normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia.

These changes in the balance of power in the Arab-Israeli core may explain why Erdogan is seeking to improve relations with Israel. In the long run, the current Saudi-Iranian détente could encourage the Iranians to reassess their relationship with Israel.

Israel may have established the periphery alliance in the 1950s as a tool against its Arab rivals. But it seems that today a return to that alliance goes through reconciliation with the Arab World. Or, to put it differently, to reach the second circle in the Middle East, Israel has to make peace with the first.

Dr. Leon Hadar, a contributing editor at The National Interest, has taught international relations at American University and was a research fellow with the Cato Institute. A former UN correspondent for the Jerusalem Post, he currently covers Washington for the Business Times of Singapore and is a columnist/blogger with Israel’s Haaretz.

Image: Shutterstock.

But the two countries’ defense chiefs won’t be holding a meeting on the summit’s sidelines.

One could be forgiven for throwing up hands in despair at the multitude, severity, complexity, and convergence of threats the United States and its allies now face. From China, Russia, and Iran striving together to subvert the world order, to the worldwide rise of authoritarianism, human rights abuses and religious persecution, to fast-growing nuclear and missile threats, to a deluge of propaganda targeting the West, challenges to the Free World are formidable. Add to all this the malign acts and actors in the domains of cyber, energy, and space, along with the menace of transnational terrorism and trafficking, and the picture becomes more concerning. Renewed great power rivalry, heightened grey zone warfare, and escalating hostilities and atrocities in global hotspots call for a resolute, principled, and wise American foreign policy.

Metastasizing threats expose both the erosion of the post-World War II American foreign policy framework and the inadequacies of post-Cold War policies. Reeling from the horrors and devastation of fascism and total war, America resolved to stop expansionist aggression in its tracks and counter extremist ideologies with ideas of political liberty and human rights. During the Cold War, inspiring presidential speeches for freedom, the Voice of America radio broadcast, and U.S. leadership in democracy initiatives and international organizations existed alongside robust military alliances. But, after the Cold War, democracies let down their guard while enemies of freedom seized the day. Insufficient deterrence and resolve; modern relativism and uncertainty about what the Free World stands for and why; and the susceptibility of open, digital age societies to demagoguery and disinformation created openings for anti-democratic powers.

Today, the ideas that we will “never again” ignore intensifying dangers to our humanity and our security and that a Pax Americana will preserve the rules-based international order have been overtaken by reality. Russia’s success (along with Iran and Hezbollah) in saving murderous Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, its war of conquest in Ukraine, and China’s rapid and massive military build-up and planned subjugation of Taiwan, are among the indicators that we live in a very different world from the one envisioned when the Berlin Wall collapsed. The fact that there are now prison camps in China, North Korea, and Russia to rival those under twentieth-century totalitarianism adds to the disheartening picture. So does the fact that China is steadfastly increasing its nuclear and missile arsenal while North Korean and Iranian nuclear and missile programs are progressing alarmingly.

Furthermore, China’s seat on the UN Human Rights Council and Iran’s leadership of the Council’s Social Forum are glaring reminders of the UN’s deviation from its stated ideals. So too is the way authoritarian regimes succeed in obstructing UN penalties for each other’s extreme human rights violations and breaches of international protocols.

Authoritarian Defense Cooperation

China, Russia, and Iran provide diplomatic cover for the foreign policy misdeeds of each other and constitute an anti-Western axis. Their expansive partnerships enhance the power of all three and impair U.S. influence. They benefit from trade, weapon and technology transfers, joint military exercises, and sanctions breaches. Their militaries recently participated in a third trilateral drill in the Gulf of Oman and the North Arabian Sea. Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian recently announced that the comprehensive strategic accord forged last year between Iran and China has entered into force. China and Russia implicitly support Iran’s brutal crackdown on brave protestors, and China provides Iran with technology for repression.

Iran supplies attack drones and munitions, while China provides dual-use rifles, body armor, drones, and financial support, for Russia’s ferocious assault on Ukraine. The only “peace” China wants in Ukraine will advantage Russia and strengthen Chinese influence over Europe. Trade between China and Russia rose to $190 billion last year, and China’s imports of Russian energy have increased to $88 billion since Russia launched a full-scale war. Building on Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin’s “unlimited partnership,” Chinese defense minister Li Shangfu recently pronounced that China and Russia would “expand military ties, military-technical ties and arms trade.”

Moreover, Pentagon officials have warned that Russia is providing highly enriched uranium for China’s rapidly expanding nuclear program, that Russia and China are producing space weapons to attack U.S. satellites and bypass U.S. missile defense systems, and that China’s overall military might is on a trajectory to surpass the United States.

Russia and China’s Growing Influence in the Middle East

In backing anti-democratic forces and dictators across the region, worst among them Syria’s murderous Bashar al-Assad, Russia and Iran have pushed the Middle East backward. China, until recently, acted behind the scenes to capitalize on the growing vacuum of U.S. influence. Now it energetically concludes commercial and strategic deals across the Middle East. The recent strengthening of energy, defense, economic and technological partnerships between China and Saudi Arabia and the détente between Saudi Arabia and Iran negotiated by Beijing are on everyone’s mind. Especially bad for human rights, the Saudi-led Arab League member states agreed to a statement endorsing China’s “efforts” and “position” in Hong Kong and “rejecting Taiwan’s independence in all its forms.”

China’s peacemaker status gives it another wedge against America’s hard and soft power and another step forward in creating a China-oriented world order. China’s trade with the Middle East now exceeds that of the United States.

The deterioration of U.S. relations with regional partners and allies like Saudi Arabia and Turkey and Iran’s brazen regional provocations and steadily advancing nuclear program are signs of the times. The United States must, on the one hand, stand firmly against aggressors and atrocity committers and, on the other, cultivate partnerships with countries that, while less than ideal partners from our democratic perspective, can help deter the Free World’s gravest threats. Developing these partnerships need not preclude applying behind-the-scenes pressure regarding human rights nor making arms deals contingent upon basic alignment with American priorities.

Recalling how disparate malign forces capitalized on the conflict in Syria is helpful as we consider how to deal with emerging and converging threats today: Obama administration officials and Arab and European leaders sat idle and quiet as Assad’s brutal crackdown on peaceful protests turned into a war on civilians. They continued to do and say little after Iran and Russia entered the war on Assad’s side and Damascus’ terrible hostilities and atrocities escalated. The White House even entertained Russia’s supposed “peace plans,” which only bought Assad time and cover for more aggression.

Neglect by the United States and the international community under the Obama administration allowed Iran, Russia, and extremist groups, such as al-Nusra Front, Hezbollah, and ISIS, to grow in influence. The Trump administration focused on defeating ISIS but not on the whole confluence of threats. Instead, President Donald Trump continued the moral and strategic retreat trajectory emphasized by the simplistic mantras of avoiding “endless war” and “America First.” Thus, Russia attained power broker status in Syria and military bases from which it tested weapons now used against Ukraine. Iranian militias wreaked endless havoc in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and elsewhere. Terror groups and drug traffickers gained new footholds. Today, Syria is not just a playground for extremists; it is a narco-state.

The appalling move of many Arab League countries and some Western countries toward normalizing relations with Assad, and President Joe Biden’s apparent acceptance of that trend, reveals an ongoing deficit of U.S. leadership. Making matters worse, the Biden administration failed to build on the Abraham Accords negotiated by the Trump administration and enacted the disastrous Afghanistan withdrawal. Pivots from one region to another that forget the worldwide interconnectedness of modern threats, simplistic equations of hard power with “boots on the ground” and soft power with “cultural appropriation” gave enemies vacuums to fill.

Global Infiltration

Iran, Russia, and China are not only united against the Free World: they’ve created worldwide partnerships with dictatorships and radical forces. Take Iran’s tangled web: Putin’s Belarusan ally Alexander Lukashenko recently visited Iran, where he and President Ebrahim Raisi signed a “cooperation roadmap document.” Iran arms and sponsors Hamas, Hezbollah, Houthi rebels in Yemen, and Shia militias in Iraq. To add to the complex inter-connectedness, Iran uses Syria as a hub for weapons proliferation, relies on bad actors in the UN to relieve pressure on its nuclear program, and benefits from a flourishing arms trade with North Korea.

China’s global network, combined with China’s formidable power, is particularly alarming. Having focused more on mutually profitable economic interaction than on the dramatic rise of China’s military might and geopolitical clout, the West now faces a significant threat to the Free World’s security and way of life. Western dependence on Chinese goods and supply chains and China’s major commercial agreements and loans on every continent augment Chinese power. China has spent over $900 billion on Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) infrastructure, transportation, and mining projects in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and beyond into Europe and the Americas. Despite setbacks, the BRI has led not only to new security agreements and ports and docking rights for China’s fast-expanding navy but also to the insidious expansion of Chinese information and surveillance technology. The China-Myanmar Economic Corridor and Cambodia’s Ream military base are among new avenues for China’s imperialistic drive.

With minimal pushback until recently, China embedded influencers in Western universities who advanced anti-American goals through Confucius Institutes, sinology programs, and joint scientific research. China has benefited from decades of aggressive espionage and intellectual property theft. Thus, another hazardous confluence we must address is that between certain Western elites and the Chinese government.

Russia, China, and Iran have all dramatically increased their footprint in South America with commercial investments, arms sales, and leasing deals that may lead to military installations. They, along with Cuba, support the extremist socialist dictatorships of Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua. Russian militias and Iranian drones have helped Venezuela stamp out dissent. Venezuela even hosted Iranian, Russian, and Chinese war games in 2022. Honduras’s decision to drop diplomatic relations with Taiwan, Brazil’s enthusiasm for “deepening ties” with Beijing, and the spread of Confucius Institutes across the region, speak to China’s growing influence.

The alignment of diverse actors working against U.S. interests and the various methods they deploy compound the current challenge. Aggressors see proxy battles, cyber-attacks, energy blackmail, financial exploitation, political corruption, and criminal activity as weapons cooperating with military power. China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea pose the world’s biggest cybersecurity threats, with relentless attacks on democracies. Russia is particularly adept at using paramilitary organizations and disinformation campaigns to destabilize, divide and dominate. China plays an especially strong hand in international organizations and fora. In addition to seeking predominance in, and corrupting, the UN, the WHO, the World Bank, BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean states, Xi recently formed “Global Development,” “Global Security,” and “Global Civilization” initiatives.

The United States must capitalize on cases where China, Russia, and Iran have proven dangerous and duplicitous partners. Although more and more governments have sided with China, the Chinese people are usually leery of authoritarian power. America must again become a voice for the oppressed, a beacon of freedom, and a steadfast ally. China’s human rights abuses, especially its genocide of Uyghurs, are horrific. U.S. leaders should stress to non-aligned countries the dire human rights implications for their citizens and others of aligning with the Chinese Communist Party. The United States and its allies must accelerate defense spending, modernization, and military-strategic cooperation. They must demonstrate willingness and capacity to fight for Taiwan if necessary while at the same time working feverishly to deter and preempt China and avoid war.

NATO’s 2022 Annual Report, released this March, cites “the gravest threat to Euro-Atlantic security in decades” and “a more complex and volatile security environment.” The Baltic and Balkan states, in addition to the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea zones, will be further vulnerable if Russia prevails in Ukraine. The Russian military has indeed suffered major setbacks and rejuvenated NATO, but Moscow and its allies see that Western military assistance was incremental. Moreover, the war in Ukraine has not stopped Russia from cyberattacks, information warfare, energy blackmail, and the cultivation of compromised leaders around Europe.

The Need for American Resolve

Adversaries have tested the U.S. resolve and found it lacking. Counting on Washington’s vacillation, they think they can outlast Washington. Indeed, the American response to fast-growing, often interconnected challenges to our security and way of life is too often lumbering, insufficient and unimaginative. Since the end of the Cold War, too few U.S. leaders can or do articulate what the Free World stands for and why. Too few accept the contingencies of hard power or appreciate the wisdom of “peace through strength.” Measures to deter Russia did not prevent hostilities, atrocities, and devastation. That should inform the American and allied deterrence of China and support for Taiwan.

China is pushing the idea of a new world order, and countless countries, international organizations, groups, and entities have, in one way or another, to a smaller or larger extent, signed on. In the meantime, the United States has lost momentum while remaining a great power. America too often appears uncertain or caught off guard. China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs and increasing global human rights violations and aggression call for American foreign policy that prioritizes national security, global stability, defense alliances, economic initiatives, and human rights all at once.

It is tempting to ignore some threats for others, pivot away from some regions, or give adversaries the benefit of the doubt. But the Free World lacks that luxury, for enemies of freedom are separately and collectively relentless. Some wonder whether ambivalent and weary America has what it takes to rise to the current challenge. Post-Cold War American foreign policy has generally been reactive rather than preemptive, lacking grand strategy or inspiring rhetoric. The world suffers when American foreign policy is unwise or unreliable and would benefit from a foreign policy revival, one that builds upon America’s best post-World War II traditions and, at the same time, finds new-age solutions for post-Cold War challenges.

Anne R. Pierce is an author, commentator, and scholar of the American presidency, foreign policy, and society. With a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago, Pierce is an appointed member of Princeton University’s James Madison Society and was a Political Science Series Editor for Transaction Publishers. Pierce has written three books and contributed to three others. Her articles have been published in The National Interest, USA Today, US News, The Hill, Washington Examiner, The Washington Times, Providence Magazine, Society, Fox News, Ricochet, World and I,  USEmbassy.gov, and elsewhere.

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Spare satellites are critical for national security—or so the Defense Department believes. In recent months, space policymakers have explored creating a reserve space fleet. They argue that owning backup satellites, rockets, and remote sensing equipment—what economists call “excess capacity”—is a prudent response to growing space threats, especially from China. “It is better to have it and not need it than need it and not have it,” as the old maxim goes. However, it’s far from certain these policies achieve their desired results.

The idea behind excess capacity is simple: governments take steps to maintain larger stocks of important assets than private parties alone would create. For example, the Civil Reserve Air Fleet program, established by Washington after the Berlin airlift, allows the U.S. government to use planes owned by participating commercial airlines during a crisis. The government pays to use the aircraft and gives airlines preferential status when bidding for contracts. Undoubtedly, the program means there are more unused planes than otherwise. For those who fled on those planes during the Afghanistan evacuation, that’s a feature, not a bug.

Historically, excess capacity considerations featured prominently in naval policy. The British Navigation Acts of the seventeenth century are a prime example. A pillar of the imperial-mercantilist regime, the Acts required British goods to be shipped on British ships with British crews. This undoubtedly resulted in excess profits for shipowners at the expense of reduced trade and higher prices for consumers—including the American colonists, who eventually took such great umbrage at these policies (among others) that they separated from the mother country. But it also meant the government could prepare the navy for war faster. Given frequent conflicts with the Dutch, another great maritime power, policies ensuring an ample stock of seaworthy vessels and experienced sailors were prudent for national security.

Adam Smith, the godfather of modern economics, did the world a service by debunking the mercantilist argument that maintaining a favorable trade balance was the key to national wealth. But even he could not totally condemn the Navigation Acts. Although he recognized these protectionist measures were hotbeds of cronyism, he also believed they weakened the Dutch, making British shipping safer. Defense is “of much more importance than opulence,” Smith counseled in The Wealth of Nations. The logic of his argument is the same today as it was 250 years ago.

Similar to the Navigation Acts, the Jones Act in the U.S. reserves trade between American ports to American-made, American-owned, and American-crewed ships. There is no question this makes shipping more costly than otherwise. The justification for the law is maintaining a healthy domestic shipbuilding industry and a robust merchant marine to augment regular naval forces.

Most economists think the Jones Act is a lousy piece of legislation. But not all. Joshua Hendrickson, chair of the economics department at the University of Mississippi, has a contrarian perspective on U.S. maritime policy. Hendrickson finds merit in the classic argument that shipbuilders and the merchant marine, which “can be used for sealift and otherwise diverted or requisitioned for defense purposes,” provide a valuable service during conflicts. Hence the Jones Act should thus be interpreted as a strategic bargain between the government and maritime sectors to maintain national readiness.

Hendrickson claims Jones Act critics overestimate the costs of the law because they get the counterfactual wrong. Repealing the Act would require foreign-flagged ships to “be subject to the same tax, labor, and immigration laws as U.S.-flagged ships.” In a world of second-best policies, government-protected profits for the maritime sector are an adaptive response to the social benefits of having a ready naval auxiliary.

But many trade policy analysts deny this works in practice. Writing for the Cato Institute, Colin Grabow contends the Jones Act has instead caused “dwindling numbers of ships, mariners, and shipyards.” In other words, he claims that the law cannot be justified even on national security grounds. In place of the Jones Act, Grabow recommends establishing a civilian merchant marine reserve, subsidizing wages for merchant mariners, and using foreign mariners during wartime.

All of this is relevant to space policy. There’s growing consensus that space is a warfighting domain. Accordingly, the U.S. Space Force is considering a program called the Commercial Augmentation Space Reserves to ensure an adequate supply of space materiel. America’s armed forces increasingly rely on space-based assets, such as satellite communications networks, for force coordination and projection. What once was the realm of science fiction is now a live concern, as the importance of Starlink satellite internet to Ukraine’s defense recently showed. International rivals such as China and Russia are becoming increasingly adept at targeting space assets; as conflict looms, it’s more important than ever to ensure replacements can be mobilized quickly.

But investments in excess capacity might not be the right approach. Such investments may seem like an obviously desirable insurance policy. The problem is that humans are fallible, and sometimes policymakers act out of self-interest. Private businesses, too, regularly game the system to secure political profits. All excess-capacity policies ultimately grant such profits to privileged suppliers, who will not easily relinquish them even when required by the national interest. If the attempt to bolster supplies hollows out the industries it’s meant to protect, as Jones Act critics contend, we will get the worst of both worlds.

Government-created excess capacity has been a fact of economic and political life for centuries. It isn’t going away anytime soon. But that doesn’t mean we can wash our hands of the debate. As America confronts rising hostile powers and revanchist nations across the globe, we must determine whether these policies actually make us safer and freer.

Alexander William Salter is the Georgie G. Snyder Associate Professor of Economics in the Rawls College of Business at Texas Tech University, a research fellow at TTU’s Free Market Institute, and a Young Voices contributor.

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There is one thing on which seemingly every observer of the war in Ukraine can agree: this war isn’t ending anytime soon.

Russia’s hope—and much of the world’s expectation—of a swift victory was dashed by the stunning repulse outside Kyiv last winter. Despite combined casualties of perhaps 300,000 soldiers, both countries are still seeking victory. It doesn’t appear to be imminent for either side. Russia’s vaunted winter push was a bloody failure, while the recent Department of Defense intelligence leak included U.S. doubts about the prospects for Ukraine’s impending offensive. Vladimir Putin and Volodomyr Zelensky, politically hemmed in by their own ultra-nationalists, are both unable to make major concessions for peace right now, should either even want to.

But Ukrainian endurance for a long war relies almost entirely on outside aid. The majority of military aid—$47 billion of a total of $69 billion to date—comes from the United States. This situation is neither desirable nor sustainable for America, Europe, or Ukraine.

After fifteen months of fighting, Americans are increasingly divided about picking up the bill for this war. A Reuters/Ipsos poll has tracked a year-long decline in American public support for providing military aid to Ukraine, from 73 percent to 58 percent. With the stubborn persistence of inflation, the growing challenge of China, and a federal debt showdown in progress, American wariness about a major, long-term aid commitment to Ukraine is warranted.

President Joe Biden has provided calibrated but consistent support for Ukraine. His potential opponents in 2024 are unlikely to be as steadfast. Both of the leading Republican contenders, Donald Trump and Florida governor Ron DeSantis, view the war as a “territorial dispute” and seek speedy resolution. 

For the United States, Ukraine is not a vital national interest. Even liberal internationalists like the Brookings Institution’s Robert Kagan have conceded that the conflict “does not pose a direct threat to the ‘national interest.’” The Biden administration’s National Defense Strategy rightly labels China, not Russia, as the United States’ most “consequential strategic competitor.” For America, defeating Putin’s invasion is the right thing to do, but it is not an essential thing to do.

Ukraine is far more important to Europe, even if Russia’s manifest military incompetence means that the immediate threat to the rest of the continent is minimal. Four NATO members border Ukraine; the largest, Poland, has already seen ordnance land on its territory. But European nations remain unwilling and unable to check Russia on their own.

Although they contribute an almost identical percentage to global GDP as the United States and boast an additional 100 million citizens, European countries have struggled, collectively and individually, to meet the material demands of the Ukrainian war effort. Decades-long defense neglect has resulted in paltry munitions stockpiles. Germany and Great Britain, with two of the biggest defense budgets on the continent, face dire ammunition shortages for their own forces: each has about enough ammunition for a week of high-intensity combat.

Though total European Union defense spending surpassed €200 billion this past year, EU policymakers quickly learned that funding is moot without production capacity. The European defense industrial base comprises several dozen large firms and 2,500 smaller firms—tens of thousands fewer than the United States. The continent’s defense industrial base is shallow, unable to produce sophisticated equipment at scale. Europe, as the Ukrainians quickly learned, operates up to five times as many different versions of key weapons systems, like tanks and artillery pieces, as the United States. Europe’s target for a revitalized defense industrial base is 2030, but this is an extremely optimistic goal.

The U.S. defense industrial base has also struggled to meet Ukrainian needs, but America’s armaments producers are in better shape than Europe’s. The U.S. Army’s multi-year acquisitional contract model has driven upsurge efforts, creating a steady, augmentable, production stream. The United States entered 2023 producing 14,000 155mm artillery shells a month— 236,000 shells short of Ukraine’s monthly request. Changes in procurement policy have enabled a major expansion: 155mm shell production will increase six-fold within five years.

In the meantime, the United States has drawn on its stockpiles. While this induces a limited degree of strategic risk, the majority of these weapons and munitions were set aside for a potential war against the USSR and then Russia. If they can cripple the Russian military in Ukrainian hands, they are doing what they were meant to do.

While Europe’s defense industries begin the slow and painful path to sufficiency, European money can fill the gap, via American arms and ammunition. For example, Ukrainian tankers will soon begin training on the American M1 Abrams main battle tank. The United States has over 3,000 M1s in storage, far more than it will ever conceivably need, especially as Russia resorts to pulling T-54s and T-55s out of storage to equip its battered brigades. When Ukraine inevitably needs more tanks after the attrition from this coming offensive, European NATO members could purchase a chunk of America’s mothballed M1s and pay for their delivery to Ukraine.

For more squeamish alliance members, paying for most of the non-military aid, currently at $89 billion, is a good option. 

There is a good precedent for such an arrangement: during the First Gulf War, the United States was able to crowdsource over $50 billion from thirty-nine coalition members, though only sixteen countries had forces in the combat zone. Japan, constitutionally restricted from sending troops, paid $13 billion of the war’s cost.

In the long term, Europe needs a more robust defense industrial base and far larger munitions stockpiles. But for the immediate future, buying American can equip Ukrainian troops, attrit the Russian Armed Forces, and ensure Europe has the breathing room to rearm—as Russia surely will.

Training and logistical chokepoints have and will inevitably slow the provision of military aid to Ukraine. But greater European commitment will ensure that Western military aid to Ukraine will be politically, financially, and logistically sustainable. Germany’s recent $3 billion arms package was good news, but far more is needed. Europe is overdue to rearm and reassert itself on its own continent. Picking up most of the bill for Ukraine’s defense against Russia is a needed, and overdue, first step.

Gil Barndollar is a senior fellow at Defense Priorities and a senior research fellow at the Catholic University of America’s Center for the Study of Statesmanship.

Luke Cocchi is a research assistant at the Center for the Study of Statesmanship and a former Defense Security Cooperation Agency researcher.

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The world’s two largest economies are walking a tightrope between bad blood and good business.