Diplomacy & Crisis News

The stakes of the world’s most important energy transition.

Ukraine’s future and Putin’s fate.

Both the private and public sectors need to play a part.

Success isn’t just staying ahead of China.

The Saudi regime has long been correctly criticized—including during the recent LIV golf saga—for its abysmal human rights record, including the suppression of dissent at home and the murder of dissident Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, Turkey. And under Mohammed bin Salman’s (MBS’s) leadership, Saudi foreign policy was initially fairly aggressive—for example, its regional rivalry with Iran, sanctions against Qatar for being too friendly to Iran, and the aggressive prosecution of a regional war in Yemen against the Iran-backed Houthi rebels that has killed way too many civilians. Yet as MBS’ leadership has matured, so has Saudi foreign policy into a more pragmatic and neutral stance, resulting in greater effectiveness.

The prince has seen three American presidents who want to cut back on American engagement in the Middle East, he feels that Saudi Arabia must do more for itself and its own security. For example, MBS refused to follow the United States and the West into imposing sanctions on Russia for its invasion of Ukraine; instead, the kingdom increased its imports of Russian petroleum products. In addition, Riyadh has diversified its foreign relations in general and especially with China, the largest buyer of Saudi oil and its greatest trading partner. The fruits of better relations with China have been realized with successful Chinese mediation between Iran and the kingdom, restoring diplomatic relations. This rapprochement may also help quell or solve other conflicts between the two countries in the Middle East, especially the brutal Saudi bog in Yemen.

However, Saudis are clearly trying to broaden their foreign policy, in part, to get the United States to pay more attention to the oil-soaked kingdom. The kingdom’s officials haven’t been subtle about this blackmail, claiming they preferred the United States to be their principal ally but needed to broaden their diplomatic horizons, given the lack of U.S. commitment. They have noted that former President Donald Trump did nothing in 2019 when drone and missile attacks on Saudi oil facilities—allegedly masterminded by their then-arch foe Iran—temporarily stifled roughly half of the nation’s oil output. The Biden administration hasn’t been spared either. MBS is quite conscious of how, during the 2020 election, then-candidate Joe Biden promised to make the Saudi prince a “pariah” over the killing of Khashoggi. Two years later, the Biden administration was angered when MBS allowed the OPEC+ oil cartel to cut production, raising short-term oil prices before the U.S. midterm elections.

No one can begrudge the Saudis for diversifying their diplomatic relations, prioritizing their own national interests, and realizing that they need to do more to safeguard their own security. The region-wide benefits of easing relations with Iran in the Middle East through Chinese mediation have enhanced Saudi Arabian security and should have facilitated the much-needed reorientation of U.S. foreign policy toward the Indo-Pacific. In fact, over time, the Saudis had become too dependent on the arrangement reached during World War II between then-U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and then-King Abdulaziz bin Abdul Rahman Al Saud for the United States to defend Saudi oil fields in exchange for access to the oil.

If Saudi Arabia can be more pragmatic about its foreign policy, the United States can and should be more pragmatic about the Roosevelt-Saud arrangement, which was never an ideal arrangement in the first place—the overestimation by World War II and post-war U.S. presidents and policymakers of the importance of Saudi Arabia in the world oil markets have demonstrated as much. A more pragmatic U.S. policy needs to debunk such long-held myths about that market.

There is no doubt that Saudi Arabia is a major oil producer and exporter, and is also an influential member of the OPEC+ cartel. But it alone cannot control the long-term price of crude oil. It may have an influence on the short- and medium-term price of oil, but cheating has always plagued natural resource cartels. Many producers have an interest in saying they will abide by their official production quotas but can make more money if they secretly export above the quota. Of course, in the long run, this severely impedes the ability of any cartel to keep the price of a commodity above the natural market price.

One added reason that the United States can be more pragmatic about cozying up to Saudi Arabia—which the Biden administration, despite its initial hostile rhetoric, has been doing again—is that it is likely to be cheaper to just buy oil at the going world market price rather than to spend U.S. taxpayer dollars to try and defend something that really doesn’t need defending. Saudi Arabia, Iran, or any other producer doesn’t even need to directly sell oil to the United States; putting oil on the market from anywhere reduces the world price.

Finally, the oil market is ever-changing, and the heavy U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf area is less needed now than ever before (and even that was a collective illusion in American policymakers’ minds). The fracking revolution in the United States has again made the United States the world’s largest oil producer, greatly enhancing U.S. “energy security.”

Congratulations to the Saudis for pragmatically diversifying their foreign policy. But Washington should not succumb to MBS’s attempt to play off improved relations with other powers—for example, China and Russia—to get an increased U.S. security commitment. The United States fell for that trick during the Cold War, when non-strategic developing countries flirted with the Soviet Union to get more out of Washington. Similarly, in the current Saudi case, the United States is spending vast amounts of money defending oil that is being exported mainly to China. America can no longer afford to be everywhere in the world. It ought to emulate Saudi pragmatism, which in the present moment means transferring attention and military resources from the Middle East to the more strategically significant Indo-Pacific region.

Ivan Eland, Senior Fellow with the Independent Institute and author of several books, including, No War For Oil: U.S. Dependency and the Middle East.

Image: Courtesy of the U.S. Department of State.

China’s increased military capabilities in recent years, coupled with frequent military exercises near Taiwan, raise concern about a military invasion. Once rare acts, provocative actions such as China’s entering Taiwan’s air defense identification zone now occur frequently, in part to coerce Taiwanese officials towards policies more in their favor. War may still be unlikely, with less than a quarter of international relations experts polled earlier this year expecting war across the Taiwan Strait this year. That the United States remains a key defensive partner for Taiwan likely depresses Chinese confidence in such an invasion, with Chinese defense minister Li Shangfu stating war with America would be an “unbearable disaster” for the world.

However, does the Taiwanese public believe the United States is committed to Taiwan’s defense? At one extreme, an overly confident public may balk at increased defense spending or military reforms in the belief that these shortcomings will be covered by Washington. Meanwhile, a public with no confidence may feel its options are limited to increase defense spending, in which it cannot expect to match that of China or find a means to placate it.

Several factors presumably lead to a confident Taiwanese public. After all, the United States has a long history of aiding Taiwan’s defensive capabilities, even after the abrogation of the Mutual Defense Treaty in 1979, as the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) has provided the framework for continued arms sales and military training. Taiwan also remains strategically important as a barrier to Chinese naval expansion into critical sea lanes, and defending Taiwan serves as a deterrence against further Chinese aggression elsewhere. Moreover, not only has every president pledged support for Taiwan since the enactment of the TRA, but also a broad bipartisan consensus exists alongside an  American public that appears increasingly sympathetic to efforts to bolster Taiwan’s defense capabilities.

However, there are many reasons for the Taiwanese to be less optimistic. The United States maintains a deliberate policy of strategic ambiguity regarding its commitments to Taiwan in part to deter actions from either side of the strait that would alter the status quo. Despite beliefs that President Joe Biden may have been signaling a shift in policy with a firmer commitment to Taiwan’s defense, White House officials clarified no intention of such. Nor have criticisms of strategic ambiguity, including suggestions that the policy has “run its course” and fails to restrain China, led to its revision.

Likewise, even if the Biden administration and members of Congress were sincere in their statements about defending Taiwan, the potential costs of a military conflict with China would be significant, especially after decades of Beijing investing in military modernization, making any intervention on behalf of Taiwan beyond arms sales much more difficult. Simulations also suggest the difficulty that the United States could defend Taiwan. Simulations by the Center for Strategic and International Studies found the United States able to defend Taiwan, but with tens of thousands of U.S. casualties and associated equipment losses, opening questions as to whether Washington and the broader American public are ready for such a commitment. Related, while the United States repeatedly references commitments to Taiwan, where this falls within the broader priorities of U.S. foreign policy is less clear.

To identify Taiwanese public concerns, I surveyed 1,105 Taiwanese via a web survey (implemented by Macromill Embrain) from May 25 to June 5, using quota sampling for age, gender, and region. I asked respondents: “How confident are you that the U.S. would defend Taiwan if China were to start a war against Taiwan?”

Overall, only 35.47 percent of respondents stated they were fairly or very confident in U.S. defensive commitments. However, confidence largely divides on partisan lines, with 73.65 percent of supporters for the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) fairly or very confident, compared to only 15 percent and 18.98 percent of supporters of the two main opposition parties, the Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) respectively. Additional analyses found that, despite assumptions to the contrary, concern about a potential Chinese invasion did not correspond with levels of confidence, while the partisan divisions remain statistically significant after controlling for age, gender, income, education, and general views of both the United States and China. The results suggest that, despite strengthening informal relations, including “the most comprehensive trade agreement” since 1979, and reiteration by the Biden administration of commitments, the Taiwanese public remains skeptical of this commitment.

One interpretation of the partisan divergence would suggest that the DPP base, in part responding to elite cues from party officials, has engaged in wishful thinking, overconfident about the depth of American defensive commitments and the appeal to protect democracies in light of recent efforts to strengthen bilateral ties. Another interpretation would suggest that KMT and TPP supporters are more likely to view American commitments as cheap talk, however well-intentioned, in the absence of incurred political and economic costs to defend Taiwan and that the United States, acting in its own national interests and constrained by a loss-sensitive public, would fail to meet expectations. Unfortunately, my survey did not unpack confidence further in terms of specific actions (e.g., providing additional arms, and coordination of air and naval forces), but the results may suggest how strategic ambiguity contributes to divergent perceptions in Taiwan.

While the United States remains Taiwan’s strongest security partner and the only one to provide arms sales, ultimately Taiwan’s defense requires both external assistance as well as broad investment in domestic production and reforms in training and personnel. Last year, efforts to address the former were clear as Taiwan increased its defense budget by 13.9 percent for 2023. However, my survey found a divided public on this increase as well, with 44.62 percent believing it was about the right amount, 35.48 percent too much, and 19.91 percent too little. Again, views diverged sharply on party lines, with a majority of DPP supporters (59.14 percent) thinking the current about was about right, compared to 59.38 percent of KMT supporters and 43.07 percent of TPP supporters stating it was too much, likely in part a function of lower expectations of conflict or that such spending may exacerbate miscalculations on China’s part. Regarding training and personnel, the expansion of military conscription currently maintains broad public approval. However, its effects may be limited without a shift in training towards increasingly technology-dependent specialized knowledge.

Timothy S. Rich is a Professor of Political Science and Director of the International Public Opinion Lab at Western Kentucky University. His research focuses on public opinion and electoral politics, with an emphasis on Taiwan and South Korea.

Image: Shutterstock.

De droite comme de gauche, les gouvernements latino-américains acceptent depuis longtemps de conditionner leurs politiques sociales au maintien d'un verrou fiscal. Lorsque l'économie est florissante, des marges de manœuvre apparaissent néanmoins. Lorsque la récession menace, et que la pauvreté (...) / Amérique latine, Amérique du Sud, Finance, Fiscalité, Néolibéralisme, Économie, Amérique centrale, Inégalités, Socialisme - 2018/04

America and China are reshaping the Burmese civil war.

Putin has created a rupture that will be difficult to repair.

Western sanctions have isolated Russia from its usual Western trading partners, necessitating its move into new markets. This primarily includes countries and regions where governments have not participated in the sanctions against Russia. Amidst this endeavor to diversify its economic relations, Moscow has demonstrated a keen interest in Africa, where it increasingly seeks to involve itself in a number of industries.

For Western policymakers and observers, the dynamics of Moscow’s engagement with Africa is notable; partially for geopolitical concerns, partially for economic competition considerations, and partially because they help highlight what many in the West believe is a policy failure: the inability to inflict more severe economic damage on Russia is in part driven by the fact that the rest of the world was not willing to follow the West’s lead.

How and What Does Russia Invest in Africa?

In an interview late last year, Russian academic Natalia Piskunova indicated that Russia’s policymaking process regarding African investment is divided into two levels: what the Russian state does and what private Russian businesses do.

According to Piskunova, in the years before 2010, when Moscow started showing more open interest in Africa, Russian companies with interests in the African market such as Rusal, Rosneft, and Lukoil unsuccessfully lobbied for government support for their operations on the continent. It was only after the Russian government gradually began showing interest after 2010 that the state and companies began cooperating more.

Russian companies, regardless of whether they are private, state-owned, or have a level of state participation, receive assistance from the Kremlin in the form of subsidies and tax-free agreements. Aside from making up for lost time, this support enables Russian business interests to better establish themselves and expand operations. This is worth noting, as Moscow is particularly interested in some specific key fields and industries.

Logistics, Finance, and Sanctions Evasion

Many African ports are essential in terms of international trade logistics, including those in North Africa (Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria), East Africa (Kenya), and Southern Africa (South Africa). Likewise, African airports, particularly regional airline hubs such as Cairo, are also helpful for Moscow, as Russian businesses and tourists make use of flights to Africa. One example is Ethiopian Airlines, which renewed its flights to Russia in August 2022. This access is important for Russia because the EU has closed its airspace to Russian-owned and-registered planes.

On a more cynical level, Africa’s trade infrastructure also serves an avenue for evading sanctions. These countries do not support Western sanctions and, unlike the European Union, have not prohibited Russian ships from using their ports. Russian ships can thus undergo repairs in these ports if necessary and pay for such services. As China and India account for 40 percent of Russia’s oil exports and the Red Sea is a significant transit route for oil tankers, port access in the Red Sea’s littoral countries—Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, and Djibouti—is also crucial. In addition, the Port of Cape Town in South Africa is useful for Russian oligarchs—they avoid having their luxury yachts seized by docking them in countries that have not joined the sanctions.

On the financial side, the largely state-dominated banking sector on the continent can help Russia conduct international banking and financial transactions in the face of sanctions elsewhere. African finance uses China’s UnionPay payments system, which is essential for Russia given that Visa and Mastercard have left the Russian market.

Russia’s political and military backing of various regimes on the continent also grants it an additional financial boon: access to gold from Sudan and diamonds from the Central African Republic. These resources are essential for the Russian budget, making the country’s economy more resilient to foreign sanctions, especially since gold and diamonds are not as easily frozen and seized as other financial assets.

Extractive Industries: Mining, Agriculture, Oil & Gas

For the Kremlin, African gold and diamonds are not just financial assets. Russia’s mining industry, which has considerable expertise, has found considerable success in the continent and plays a major role in Moscow’s policymaking.

In Angola, the Russian company Alrosa, the world’s largest diamond miner, is one of the owners of Catoca, the world’s fourth-largest diamond mine. The country is important to Moscow because of its copper reserves, which are crucial in producing machinery and high technology, especially considering the fact that Russian copper ore is hard to extract. There are concerns that the sanctions against Russia and Alrosa may disrupt mining operations through a lack of spare parts and machinery. Meanwhile, in Guinea, Rusal, one of the world’s largest aluminum companies and owned by sanctioned Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska, owns Dian, the world’s largest bauxite deposit. About half of Rusal’s aluminum ore bauxite production comes from its mining operations in Guinea.

Africa is also rich in “rare earth” minerals, which are essential in the production of hi-tech devices (such as smartphones and monitors), energy conversion systems (wind turbines, photovoltaic panels, and electrical machinery), and military equipment (lasers and radar). While the West, particularly the United States, has been wary of exploiting these elements owing to environmental considerations, the Russians and the Chinese have made inroads in Africa to secure these vital resources. As a result, Russia has leverage with the West, as the technology needed for transitioning to a green economy relies on these minerals. Even Russia’s Wagner Group, a private military outfit with Kremlin ties, frequently provides security to African governments in exchange for access to natural resources. It will most likely be compensated for its collaboration with the military junta in Mali, for example, through access to uranium, diamond, and gold mines.

Russia’s agriculture and fertilizer industry also enjoys success in Africa, granting it much policymaking heft in Moscow. The Russian Ministry of Agriculture views African nations as worthy agricultural partners. Its importance is reflected in its leadership: the ministry itself is headed by Dmitry Patrushev, the son of Nikolai Patrushev, who is the secretary of the Russian Security Council.

Relatedly, Russia is a major partner of the continent in terms of food and fertilizer exports. Food accounts for 40 percent of the consumer basket in Africa, which is directly impacted by the war in Ukraine, as Russia and Ukraine account for nearly 30 percent of global wheat exports. More than 50 percent of wheat imports in Burundi, Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania, Sudan, and Somalia come from Russia and Ukraine. In addition, in 2021 Russia, was the leading exporter of nitrogen fertilizers, the most used fertilizer on the continent, and the second-biggest exporter of potassic and phosphorous fertilizers, accounting for 14 percent of global exports.

Somewhat unexpectedly, Russia’s oil and gas industries are not as successful in Africa as elsewhere owing to political security considerations. This is because oil and gas operation processes—extraction, refining, transportation, etc.—require specialized facilities, which themselves require significant capital and time to develop. For example, Russian energy giants such as Gazprom and Rosneft returned to Libya after leaving the country owing to NATO’s 2011 intervention there. Yet while countries such as Libya appeal to Russia as an investment destination, Moscow also views security and political stability as preconditions for the influx of capital, thus putting certain limits in place.

Nuclear Energy

In contrast to the oil and gas industries, Russia’s nuclear industry has recorded successes in Africa. Rosatom, a state-owned nuclear energy company, is active in constructing nuclear power plants and helping African nations address their energy supply needs. In both economic and political terms, nuclear power plant projects are suitable investments for Moscow, as they create a dependency on its nuclear expertise and materials.

After a delay of several years, in July 2022 the concrete was poured for Egypt’s first nuclear power plant, which Rosatom will build in the town of El-Dabaa. The project was agreed to in 2017 by Russian president Vladimir Putin and Egyptian president Abdel Fattah el-Sissi, and is “the largest Russian-Egyptian cooperation project” since the 1950s. Although South Korea has introduced sanctions against Russia because of the Ukraine invasion, a state-owned Korean company, Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power, will provide turbine-related equipment and construction services at the El-Dabaa plant.

Other countries are also potential partners for the Russian nuclear energy industry and Rosatom going forward, as the continent’s growing population forces it to address the issue of energy supply, with potential clients including South Africa, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Ghana, Zambia, and Rwanda. It is worth mentioning that South Africa planned to build more nuclear plants, with Russia’s Rosatom as one of the bidders. One project was announced by former South African president Jacob Zuma, only to be canceled by his successor, Cyril Ramaphosa, in 2018 for being too expensive. In 2017, the South African High Court declared the contract between South Africa and Rosatom on increasing nuclear capabilities at South Africa’s only nuclear power station, Koeberg, to be unlawful.

Defence Industry

Speaking of creating dependencies, Russia’s defense industry plays a prominent role in Moscow’s economic collaboration with Africa. Between 2015 and 2019 the Russian government signed nineteen agreements related to military cooperation with African governments, focusing on weapon sales. Russia’s presence in the African arms market is expedited by the fact that many national army arsenals come from the Soviet Union when Moscow was a major weapon supplier to the continent. In addition, Russia does not place conditionalities on arms transactions framed around human rights and governance standards. From 2017 to 2021, Moscow provided almost half of Africa’s imported military equipment (44 percent), followed by the United States (17 percent), China (10 percent), and France (6.1 percent). Algeria, Angola, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Ethiopia, Morocco, and Uganda are among the largest buyers of Russian weaponry.

It remains unclear how much the war in Ukraine, Western sanctions, and disruptions in global supply chains in recent years have and will further impact Russian arms exports to the continent, in terms of both delivering new equipment and providing maintenance for old equipment. Russia does appear willing to fight for its markets, however. In August 2022, it held its “Army 2022” military exhibition with visitors from seventy-two countries, during which Putin said it was ready to share its weapons with its allies in Latin America, Asia, and Africa.

Other Interests: Tourism and Pharmaceuticals

A number of other industries factor into Russia’s relationship with African countries, though with mixed results.

Tourism is one of the winners. Consider, for example, Russian tourism in Egypt. Before the Ukraine war, tourists from Russia and Ukraine made up around 40 percent of beach holidaymakers in Egypt. However, at the start of the war, hotel occupancy rates in Egypt’s Red Sea resorts dropped by 35 to 40 percent. That fall is now being reversed: in August 2022 Egypt was the second most popular destination for Russian tourists, after Turkey and ahead of the United Arab Emirates. In terms of wealthier Russian tourists, from the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in late February 2022 to December 2022, premium travel from Russia to Egypt went up by 181 percent. This suggests that Egyptian tourism has profited from the war in Ukraine, to the extent that Egypt is considering introducing the Russian payment system Mir in Red Sea resorts.

Russia’s pharmaceutical industry has seen less success. A good example of this is Moscow’s attempts to promote its Sputnik V vaccine against COVID-19 on the African continent through so-called “vaccine diplomacy,” which largely failed. This was owing to issues with vaccine efficiency, high prices, and delayed deliveries—as well as the fact that the World Health Organization has not approved it.

The Consequences of War

Given that African nations are still developing and that Russia’s primary economic goal in the short and medium term is withstanding the impact of Western sanctions, there is a limit to Moscow’s economic engagement with the continent. However, Russia and African nations will use any opportunity to boost economic ties.

Overall, Russia’s turn towards the Global South, including and especially Africa, may turn out to be one of the most defining legacies of the Ukraine war. The Global South countries may not wield the financial heft of the Western economies, but their landmass, population, and resources make them important partners for non-Western powers like Russia and China. This is something that Western policymakers ought to keep in mind.

Dr. Vuk Vuksanovic is a Senior Researcher at Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP) and an associate at LSE IDEAS, a foreign policy think tank within the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). Follow him on Twitter at @v_vuksanovic.

This article is based on a report he authored for the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA).

Image: Shutterstock.

One of the United States’ most pressing interests in the Middle East is maritime security, particularly in the Strait of Hormuz, in which oil tankers move approximately 17 million barrels of oil daily. To protect this vital interest, America has consistently maintained thousands of U.S. troops and military installations in the Persian Gulf. But an increasing Chinese naval presence in the Gulf has some in Washington speculating that Gulf states are shifting away from the U.S. sphere of influence and towards Beijing’s. According to this argument, China will attempt to assert its newfound dominance in the Gulf—similar to its attempts in the South China Sea—and threaten U.S. maritime energy access in the region, causing enormous damage to the U.S. economy.

Yet rather than viewing it as a threat, Washington should recognize there are benefits to Chinese involvement in the Middle East. These include regional stability, as already evidenced by China’s facilitating recognition agreements between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The Middle East also has the potential to become a financial and military liability for Beijing, which could give the United States a leg up in its current Sino-American rivalry.

For one, if China were to become entangled in Middle Eastern conflicts, this would drain resources and reduce its ability to challenge American power on other fronts. For instance, China has invested close to $200 billion in Latin America, which extends its ability to influence regional politics. It has been pressuring South American nations—Argentina in particular—to permit the construction of military bases. But if China were to become preoccupied with problems in the Middle East, it may force them to deprioritize these other projects. 

Beijing is already moving in this direction. For example, China’s domestic persecution of Muslims has spawned dozens of militant Chinese Muslim groups in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. There have been bombings in Afghanistan and Pakistan targeting Chinese nationals, and ISIS is putting China in its crosshairs. Moreover, China has also built a naval base in Djibouti—with other potential base sites in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives—and deployed thousands of special forces in Syria. For extremist groups like ISIS, these are rich potential targets.

Simultaneously, concerns about China wielding its newfound regional influence to harm American economic interests—especially when it comes to energy affairs—don’t carry much weight. Because of the United States’ firm integration into world trade, any harm to American regional maritime or energy security would damage other international actors that China is trying to strengthen relations with. Directly threatening America in this way is thus antithetical to China’s own goals. Barring the collateral damage, such moves would also invite retaliation. The United States has considerable influence over the South China Sea, its regional states, and other areas vital to Chinese influence and trade. If Beijing were to exercise its influence in the Middle East in such a way that directly harmed U.S. economic interests, Washington could easily counter back.

There are some proactive measures the United States can take if it wishes to maximize costly risks to China. To start, Washington could reduce the common interests between China and the region’s inhabitants while still leaving plenty of room for Chinese overreach. For example, acknowledging China’s peacekeeping efforts in a positive light would remove mutual animosity towards the United States as a shared interest. With America no longer decrying Chinese peacekeeping efforts, fewer actors will see cooperating with China as a way of “defying” America. The United States should also focus on scaling down its extensive military presence in the Middle East, leaving gaps that Beijing may try to fill. This way, Chinese interests and forces end up becoming salient targets for militant jihadists in the face of an increasingly distant America. 

The United States should reconsider its current attitudes toward China’s expansion in the Middle East and take it for what it is: a chance to let China make costly mistakes. Washington needs to acknowledge that not everything China intends to do in the region will threaten U.S. interests. Not only that, but some of China’s initiatives may bring about stability in places that America has historically failed to stabilize. All the while, this approach can give Washington a leg up over its rival by keeping Beijing’s hands full. Only in well-defined instances where U.S. interests are directly threatened should Washington act decisively. Otherwise, all the United States needs to do is cautiously observe events unfold and avoid premature intervention.

Simeone Miller is a Middle East security analyst and a current graduate student in the Social Sciences and Globalization MA program at California State University, San Bernardino. He has previously worked as a researcher at the Center for the Study of Hate and Extremism and a Marcellus Policy Fellow at the John Quincy Adams Society.

Garrett Ehinger is a China analyst who holds a bachelor’s in Biomedical Science with a minor in Mandarin Chinese from Brigham Young University in Idaho. He is currently a master’s student at the University of Utah studying public health. He has studied Chinese culture and language for over a decade.

Image: Shutterstock.

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Unless its wildfires cause the skies in New York City to turn the color of a sci-fi dystopia, Americans tend not to think much about Canada. But you know who has not forgotten about our neighbor to the north? China’s ruler, Xi Jinping.

As part of China’s unfriendly competition with the West, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) chairman appears to have overseen a far-reaching and complicated effort to advance Beijing’s interests through direct interference in Canada’s 2019 and 2021 federal elections.

Those elections were conducted amidst a hostage crisis. In 2018, China kidnapped two Canadian nationals in response to Ottawa’s decision to detain the chief financial officer of Huawei at the Trump administration’s request. Public reporting suggests the People’s Republic of China’s covert operations were aimed at defeating anti-Chinese candidates for office, “grooming” future political stars in the Vancouver municipal elections, and securing a government led by Justin Trudeau—but a weakened one, reliant on minor parties for confidence and supply (as it happened, the actual result).

The rest of the world only knows about these distressing allegations due to an anonymous source in the Canadian intelligence services, whose identity and true motivations remain unknown. But if these allegations are even remotely true, it would do more than merely rock the Trudeau government; it would be yet another data point that China is embarking on a full-spectrum drive against the democratic West, including by targeting Western publics. To put it mildly, more than Canadian interests are at stake in getting to answers.

At first, it seemed as if we all might soon get clarity. The prime minister ordered two closed-door probes into Chinese chicanery, and then appointed an independent special rapporteur to conduct his own review and make a determination on whether to hold a public inquiry. This is a robust process where a commission is imbued with authoritative power (including subpoena authority and the ability to call witnesses) to pursue a mission of public enlightenment on a thorny and vital issue. Given that the most troubling allegations of Chinese interference seemed to hew in the direction of benefitting Trudeau’s Liberals, such an approach seemed amply warranted and was generally expected.

Despite not having a parliamentary system, we Americans know the value of such independent commissions. After the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington, President George W. Bush and Congress agreed to empanel a bipartisan commission to ferret out answers as to how such a horror could have happened. A body so composed and with such a writ, backed by the ability to take testimony and issue subpoenas, was the right call. The 9/11 Commission proceeded to ultimately put together both the definitive history of the attacks and a series of substantive recommendations for precluding future mass casualty terror in America. More than Americans benefited from this process—the entire civilized world was better informed about the Al Qaeda threat as a result.

Bush could have taken a different path—indeed, the president was initially resistant to an independent review. The White House could have insisted on an executive branch investigation instead, perhaps headed by a luminary and family friend such as James A. Baker III. The administration could have assured Congress that Baker would issue regular public reports and hold public hearings, notwithstanding his lack of power to issue compulsory process or to compel testimony.

This hypothetical Baker review could have been couched as being necessary to preserve executive privilege and to avoid the unnecessary difficulty of discussing classified information in a public forum. Such a review would have undoubtedly come under intense criticism, and even if it had reached the same conclusions as the 9/11 Commission, likely would never have achieved purchase as an authoritative account.

Such a “family friend review” is precisely the approach that the Canadian government initially took—with possibly even worse results than might have met a hypothetical “Baker inquiry.” Trudeau appointed David Johnston as special rapporteur. Johnston is a former governor-general, ski-trip companion and friend of Trudeau’s father, and recent associate of the Pierre Trudeau Foundation, an entity which—astoundingly—has just been embroiled in a CCP-backed donation scandal. Nor did Johnston take steps to improve this appearance of bias. Instead, he employed as his right hand a lawyer with a donation history to the Liberal Party, secured crisis management services from the same company assisting former Liberal minister of parliament Han Dong (who was named in one of the more salacious allegations of this l’affaire Cathay), and appears to have failed to interview former Conservative leader Erin O’Toole until after he had already principally drafted his initial report on the crisis.

That report, issued at the end of May, more or less dismissed the public allegations, exonerated the Trudeau government of direct knowledge or wrongdoing, and concluded, despite conceding that Chinese interference existed, that the government should not open a public inquiry into China’s attack on Canada. (Johnston cited the difficulty of discussing classified information in such an inquiry.) By declining to ask for a public inquiry, Johnston ensured that he would remain in control of the government’s public-facing review of China’s election interference. Unsurprisingly, Johnston’s report was quite expectedly received as if the rapporteur was merely providing top cover for the government.

The opposition parties in Parliament—including the left-wing New Democracy Party that holds the balance of power—reacted fast and furious. Johnston was hauled into Commons for a three-hour grilling—which suggested a potentially serious gap between the facts about Chinese targeting of the Tories in 2021 and the content of his report. The Commons also passed a non-binding motion that he be replaced and a public inquiry be opened. Polling found that nearly 60 percent of Canadians disagreed with Johnston on the question—the public demanded a public inquiry.

Johnston and Trudeau initially resisted the backlash, but ultimately, the special rapporteur resigned on Friday. The next day, the government signaled that it was now open to a public inquiry. Chinese political espionage against Canada may yet get the public airing and exacting review that it deserves. And the American people will also benefit from such a course.

Perhaps Xi views Canada as a proving ground for tactics that might be wielded in the 2024 U.S. presidential election, or as a soft underbelly into Five Eyes, or simply as a democratic roadblock to his dream of creating a “Community of Common Destiny for All-Mankind.” The United States needs to know—preferably without relying on decontextualized leaks from our intelligence partner spilling over onto the pages of the Globe and Mail and filtering down into the American media ecosystem.

The scale, scope, and intentions of the Chinese government’s covert electoral operations against our ally’s political system matter, both in terms of truly understanding Beijing’s ambitions and figuring out how to re-establish deterrence against such operations there, here, and throughout the Western democracies. A public inquiry—a “9/11 Commission” for Canada—will have the salutary side effect of helping the American people know what they are up against as they politically organize and associate with one another throughout civil society.

Because we can be sure of one thing: what happens to Ottawa will not stay in Ottawa.

Zac Morgan is an attorney specializing in First Amendment and campaign finance law. He previously worked for the Institute for Free Speech, and currently serves as counsel to Commissioner Allen Dickerson of the Federal Election Commission.

The views expressed in this article are his own and do not express an official view of the U.S. government.

The U.S. Marine Corp’s Force Design 2030 (FD2030), the service branch’s restructuring plan to prepare for a future conflict with near-peer adversaries, includes Littoral Regiments. These could possibly pose a threat to any aggressor’s actions in limited areas of the Western Pacific. They theoretically extend American striking power into areas where our enemies hope to dominate and use as access points into open ocean areas critical to America and its allies.

A legitimate threat is something our enemies will not ignore in a conflict. They will target and strike Littoral Regiments deployed on the small islands that threaten the enemy’s access to the region. Once the regiments’ equipment is destroyed, the enemy can cut off and bypass the island, leaving the Marines to “die on the vine” like Japan’s powerful base at Rabaul in World War II. Therein lies the undiscussed challenge facing Force Design 2030 and the Littoral Regiment concept: how to survive and sustain the regiments against a well-armed, air and missile-equipped enemy.

In today’s world, a threat can be found and struck rapidly from afar. So the regiments must either enjoy significant integrated air and missile defense support or adopt a maritime equivalent to artillery’s “shoot and scoot” tactics. That is, insert quickly, target and shoot and then deploy rapidly to another location. Otherwise, the regiments will suffer the same fate as America’s Wake Island defenders and Japan’s Rabaul and many of its island garrisons in World War II.

A recent exercise at Twentynine Palms, California, reportedly has shown the regiments have a reasonable capability to withstand a combined arms assault. However, has anyone simulated the most likely enemy response to a Littoral Regiment attack, a retaliatory air and missile strike? What air and missile defenses will the regiments enjoy? If China is the enemy, expect those attacks to involve precision strikes U.S. forces have not experienced in years, if not ever. What tools does the regiment or Joint Task Force Commander have to address that problem? Hardening against attacks from above takes time and expense, neither of which exists in abundance once the conflict starts. Dispersal and constant shifting of positions around the island seem wiser, particularly if the regiment adroitly executes camouflage and deception.

Many of the Marines will survive those strikes, but the same cannot be said for the equipment. Without missiles, radars, and other combat systems, the regiment becomes an impotent maritime force that must be reinforced, reconstituted, and logistically supported. Near-peer state opponents have the technology to isolate and re-strike the regiments as required to conduct that state’s operational and strategic objectives. An isolated garrison that can neither strike nor impede enemy operations will be bypassed, monitored and occasionally struck again for training if not operational purposes. That is the fate of unsupported Littoral Regiments that stay in place.

This is not to say such regiments may have no impact or purpose. Their deployment during a crisis could strengthen the deterrence of any U.S. and allied actions. It could also complicate the aggressor’s operations and plans. Suddenly, its access outward may be constrained and the regiments’ presence at or near maritime chokepoints enhances the U.S. and allied ability to enter areas the aggressor hopes to restrict to its own use. However, combatant and Marine commanders need to consider the likely enemy actions against those regiments if the aggressor chooses to launch a war. Island garrisons are only as valuable as their ability to impede enemy operations and that necessitates supporting them against enemy action.

So far, the Navy has not properly supported the Marines Force Design 2030. Proposing a fourteen-knot modified merchant ship does not an amphibious maneuver force make. Instead, naval planners should be working with the Marines to address the regiments’ mission challenges and requirements. The concept is potentially attractive if it addresses all the operational requirements needed for success. Rapid movement and re-deployment will be essential. The Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) largely are an open-ocean warfare disaster waiting to happen, but they should be considered for the rapid transport mission the Marines need. In World War II, the U.S. Navy modified obsolete destroyers to serve as high-speed amphibious transports. The forty-five-knot Independence-class LCSs can transport the Marines and helo-transportable equipment to and from deployment sites. The heavier equipment will require a platform with greater lift, either an air cushion vehicle the LCS can transport or a seaplane. The Navy-Marine team should examine both if their leaders are serious about the Littoral Regiment concept.

Seaplanes may offer a better solution. They are faster and offer more flexible deployment options. Unfortunately, none with appropriate capabilities are in service now but the Special Operations Community is examining the development of kits to make some C-130 aircraft into ad hoc seaplanes. What will work for special operations forces will work for the Marines. The Littoral Regiments’ radars and other equipment can be transported in C-130s. If shoot and scoot are what one needs, seaplanes are a better option than any ship.

Force Design 2030 has sacrificed the Marine Corps’ overall broad mission capabilities, promising to transform the Marine Corps into an innovative and relevant twenty-first-century warfare force. Making that promise reality will require a great deal more study and thought that has appeared so far in public discourse. The enemy gets a vote in war and so far the FD2030 concept and debate have ignored that potential vote. Neither the Marine Corps nor this nation can afford that oversight to continue.

Looking beyond its combat concept, America also cannot afford FD2030’s impact on the Marine Corps’s broad overall combat capabilities. History has not been kind to single-mission forces and the narrowing of Marine Corps mission focus and capabilities comes at the expense of the missions at which it excels, rapidly responding to the needs of Americans in danger or populations hit by natural or manmade calamities. The Navy-Marine Corps team owes the American people a better plan than that presented in FD2030.

Captain (USN) Carl O. Schuster is a career naval officer who served on a variety of U.S. and allied warships before transferring to intelligence at mid-career. He has extensive experience as a planner at the amphibious group to the theater command level and finished his career as the director of operations at the U.S. Pacific Command’s Joint Intelligence Center.

Image: Courtesy of the U.S. Marine Corps.

Political gridlock is often the result of brutal polarization, ineptitude, or a combination of both. Those following Lebanon understand this reality more than most, especially following the Lebanese parliament’s failure to elect a president for the twelfth time since former President Michel Aoun vacated the post at the end of his term in October 2022. The vote, held on June 14, further illuminates in stark terms the small Mediterranean country’s ongoing political nightmare—one that will prove critical to resolving in the near term amidst what can reasonably be described as a fairly modest step forward in the recent vote.

While a “modest step forward” should be expressed with a particularly grainy piece of salt, the advancement of former finance minister and current senior International Monetary Fund official Jihad Azour as a counterweight to the Hezbollah and Amal-backed Suleiman Frangieh marks a crucial moment in the search for a new Lebanese president. The vote resulted in fifty-nine votes for Azour and fifty-one for Frangieh. The remaining votes included blank ballots, protest votes, or votes for smaller candidates such as General Joseph Aoun and Ziad Baroud, ultimately operating as spoilers to any 65-vote threshold required for a second-round victory.

Still, the outcome is significant, even if it did not produce a new president. Azour enjoys the unique and surprising support of every major Lebanese Christian party—a notoriously fractured voting bloc that includes notable heavy-hitters like the anti-Hezbollah Lebanese Forces, the formerly Hezbollah-aligned Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), and the newly pro-reform Kataeb party. These stakeholders, alongside many of the independent members of parliament (MPs) and some smaller parties, form the backbone of Azour’s leading vote total in the parliamentary session. As a result of the final count, the pro-Frangieh camp’s walkout broke the quorum and close the session after the vote.

Kataeb leader Samy Gemayel described the session and walkout in stark terms, arguing “What happened today was a real uprising of Lebanese MPs… who said no to diktats and threats.” He added, “Today it was obvious that those who ran out of parliament after the first round are those who lost.” Unsurprisingly, the Hezbollah/Amal camp aimed to frame the session as a victory for their bloc, with Amal MP Ali Hassan Khalil claiming “any kind of imposition of a candidate on us will not achieve any results. Dialogue is the only way to elect a president. We have emerged politically victorious.”

It should not be lost on any observers that neither bloc will allow a second-round vote or admit they are aiming to dictate the outcome of the presidency on their own terms. Frangieh is a non-starter for the Christian parties, and unrealistic without FPM support. At present, FPM chief Gebran Bassil does not support Frangieh’s candidacy, and his party will mostly follow his lead in this regard. That being said, Bassil has made clear that support for Azour is not entrenched, just as other Christian leaders continue to re-iterate their differences with FPM while citing a “convergence” around the presidency at this time.

Thus, the Christian parties are trying their hand at particularly bold political gamesmanship. The bloc surrounding Azour—and especially FPM—likely view his candidacy as a mechanism for forcing genuine negotiations around a true consensus candidate for the presidency. Bassil gave an interview shortly after endorsing Azour that confirms his thinking in this regard, expressing that “if we are invited to an election session, we can vote for [Azour]. But will this make him president? If the other side does not agree on him, unfortunately, no.” He went on to say that “we should keep having intensive talks to reach a consensus.”

One can be excused for viewing Bassi’s comments as altruistic. The senior politician and former FPM golden boy was once believed to be a shoo-in for the presidency, widely thought to be Aoun’s natural successor given FPM’s political strength before the recent parliamentary elections. Rather, a long career of energy-sector corruption and sanctions, alongside a close and potentially harmful Hezbollah alliance, caught up with him. He is widely regarded as one of the most hated politicians in Lebanon today.

Regardless, Bassil understands the political game being played. He likely expected Hezbollah to support his nomination upon Aoun’s departure—something that was simply never going to happen given the sanctions issue. Rather than risk a political liability in Bassil, Hezbollah opted for what they believe is a less controversial candidate in Frangieh. This ultimately pushed Bassil away, broadening a rift in the alliance that had been developing since last year—largely over the role of the cabinet and government without a presidency.

Bassil could still be aiming for the presidency in his recent moves, although this approach is likely folly for the reasons already stated. Still, his call for talks and signals to the Hezbollah camp expressing his flexibility is probably not lost on the Lebanese armed group. Ultimately, Bassil’s rhetoric is up to interpretation at present—whether he is still gunning for the presidency or trying to play dealmaker to clean up his image with the Lebanese populace and international community remains to be seen.

Ultimately, the makeup of Lebanon’s political system makes it nearly impossible for one political bloc to impose a candidate. This requires true dialogue that either bridges the divide between the two core political blocs or manages to pull in the necessary spoilers needed to reach sixty-five votes, although the latter option fails to address the quorum issue. This dynamic is unlikely to be resolved soon and will probably and unfortunately require international influence to resolve.

Whether or not new regional dynamics play a role here remains to be seen. The French play a major role here, and the Saudi crown prince’s visit to Paris on June 16 included talks on Beirut and calls to resolve the presidential impasse. Additionally, the Iran-Saudi Arabia deal brokered by China is thought to be an opportunity for resolving Beirut’s political impasse. Yet while this is certainly a reasonable analysis of the situation, the deal has yet to foster any noticeable progress in Lebanon today, especially relative to Syria and, to a lesser extent, Yemen. Still, Tehran and Riyadh likely did discuss Lebanon’s political troubles in great detail during the Saudi foreign minister’s historic visit to Iran on June 17.

Should the historic rivals truly hope to expand on their historic deal, all roads could lead to Beirut. But no one should count their bets on this outcome yet, leaving Lebanon and the Lebanese stuck in their ongoing political stalemate for the foreseeable future, even after some consolidation around two core candidates that constitute a small advancement in 2023.

Alexander Langlois is a foreign policy analyst focused on the Middle East and North Africa. He holds an M.A. in International Affairs from American University’s School of International Service. Follow him at @langloisajl.

Image: Shutterstock.

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