Diplomacy & Crisis News

Les océans font l'objet d'une exploitation si intense qu'elle met en péril la reproduction de nombreuses espèces. L'accaparement des eaux poissonneuses de l'Afrique par les chalutiers industriels français, espagnols, chinois, coréens, japonais ou russes menace la sécurité alimentaire du continent. / (...) / Afrique, Pêche, Mer, Commerce, Botswana, Mauritanie, Sénégal, Relations Nord-Sud, Impérialisme, Criminalité - 2018/05

Délaissées au profit des métropoles, les villes moyennes comptent leurs plaies : isolement, faibles ressources, exil des jeunes et des diplômés, chômage, pauvreté. Pour leurs élus, l'égalité des territoires prévue par la Constitution n'est plus qu'un souvenir. Comme à Montluçon, où le combat pour une (...) / France, Intégration sociale, Pauvreté, Région, Service public, Transports, Ville, Chômage - 2018/05

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia have been two of the quickest countries in the Middle East to take full advantage of the new multipolar world in which they have found themselves. Both nations have been able to successfully exploit all sides of conflicts to pursue their own interests. Riyadh in particular has forcefully and blatantly used its new and more powerful standing in the changing geopolitical environment to press its demands on superpowers with crude disregard for a quickly vanishing global hegemonic pecking order. In one of the most recent examples of this, Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman reportedly threatened “major economic consequences for Washington” if it retaliated against Riyadh’s oil cuts. Similarly, Abu Dhabi has felt emboldened enough to withdraw from a U.S.-led maritime coalition based in Bahrain due to frustration at the United States for not doing enough to deter Iran in the Strait of Hormuz.

In stark contrast to the aggressive posturing by Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, Cairo sits idly by, fumbling its way through this new reality. This difficulty is for a variety of reasons; the most prominent of which is its rapidly sinking economy. This situation, however, affords the United States a unique opportunity to assist Egypt in improving the distressed state of its people, thereby regaining much of the goodwill Washington has lost over the past few years.

Back and Forth

One of the earliest signs of Egypt’s struggle to adapt to the changing geopolitical environment came when it was revealed that President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi ordered up to 40,000 rockets to be covertly shipped to Russia. This leaked intelligence was rejected shortly thereafter by Egypt. Later, it was reported that, instead, the sale of this artillery ammunition to the United States for transfer to Ukraine was approved. But although Egypt came out strongly against the veracity of the report regarding this supposed transfer of weapons to Russia, pundits and experts in Moscow and elsewhere seemed to believe that this transfer of weapons had been a real possibility. The lack of commitment and wavering to such a sale, even before the leaks were revealed, was manifested through the canceled “Bridge of Friendship” joint naval exercise between the nations scheduled for July 2022.

This behavior differs greatly from the UAE’s, whose president Mohamed bin Zayed (MBZ) attended the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, Russia’s largest and most important business/economic summit. Anwar Gargash, a diplomatic adviser to MBZ, described the latter’s attendance as a “positive calculated risk” within the UAE’s policy of de-escalation and dialogue. Similarly, Russian interior minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev—a top Russian official who is sanctioned by the West—visited Riyadh and held meetings with his counterpart Abdulaziz bin Saud. While diplomatic engagement on the one hand and selling weaponry on the other are not in the same class, the UAE and Saudi Arabia’s cavalier attitude and ruthlessness in pursuing their own interests above all else, while giving themselves enough wiggle room and flexibility to not marry themselves to one side over the other, is evident.

Egypt, on the other hand, seems hesitant and indecisive about its own self-interest, alternating between marrying and divorcing one side over another ad infinitum. Consider that the cancelation of military exercises with Russia comes in conjunction with a strengthening of Egypt’s maritime partnership with the United States, as the U.S. Naval Forces Central Command transferred three patrol craft to the Egyptian Navy on March 21 during a ceremony in Alexandria. Yet this is also taking place while Egypt plans to drop the U.S. dollar in favor of local currencies in bilateral trade with India, China, and Russia, and amid reports that Cairo has formally applied to join BRICS.

All these dealings and heavy-footed maneuvering must be understood within the context of Egypt’s faltering economy. It was reported in late May that, due to a shortage of foreign hard currency, Egypt’s state grains buyer has deferred opening letters of credit to pay for its wheat purchases. Not much later on June 6, details emerged that Egypt has been struggling to raise cash for foreign debt repayments after it quadrupled its external borrowing over the past eight years. These repayments, which Egypt owes to the International Monetary Fund and foreign bondholders—mostly in the Gulf—amount to about $4.5 billion; more than half the annual revenue that comes in from the Suez Canal. On June 13 it came to light that Egypt is allocating $4.14 billion for its food subsidy program, which has been facing serious struggles since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Since the start of the war, Egypt’s currency has depreciated by nearly half, and foreign investors have pulled more than $20 billion out of the country.

In short, whereas its Gulf neighbors can act with fluidity between great superpower rivals without fear of serious reprisal, Egypt is forced to go all in and move with less flexibility because of its dire economic straits. Cairo’s pursuit of a multi-vector foreign policy allows for a middle road to be taken, but that can only work if the government is flexible enough to not fully commit one side over the other. A lumbering and heavy-footed state being pulled down by its economic troubles lacks such maneuverability.

Washington to the Rescue?

Up until this point, the United States has sought to pressure Egypt to act in certain ways by withholding military aid to Cairo. This policy would be effective if America were still the hegemon of a unipolar world. But in today’s multipolar world, aid can come from elsewhere, like China, with much greater ease. Multipolarity lends itself more to the carrot than the stick.

Cairo’s current troubles, however, present an opening. Sisi is already attempting to hold talks with whatever remains of his political opposition—a sign that he realizes the difficult position his country is in. Washington should take this opportunity to offer Sisi economic aid for improving the state of the Egyptian people, rather than simply threatening to withhold military aid. By helping Cairo get Egypt’s economy back on track, the United States can leverage the current moment to its advantage, rather than eventually seeing Egypt do as the Gulf states are doing, to Washington’s ultimate disadvantage.

U.S. policymakers ought to therefore consider doing so. A generous economic relief package specifically earmarked for the Egyptian people, rather than the military, along with a well-run PR campaign would not only be a major diplomatic win but would also help ensure that Cairo continues to seek assistance from the United States. Multipolarity may open up other options for countries, but it does not preclude remaining with a prior benefactor.

Sam Fouad is a Middle East analyst, editor, and a PhD candidate at The Catholic University of America. He has previously worked in communications, on political campaigns, and in a Senator’s office. His work has appeared in Responsible Statecraft, Newsweek, The New Arab, Inkstick Media, The Atlantic Council, The Globe Post, and Al Jazeera Arabic, among others. Sam holds a bachelor’s degree from Boston University and a master’s degree in international relations from UMass Boston.

Recently, Japan unveiled new export control measures for chipmaking equipment, encompassing twenty-three items across six categories, including lithography, etching, cleaning, deposition, and masking. While the specific targets of these measures were not explicitly mentioned, it is evident that China, being the largest importer of chipmaking equipment since 2020 and accounting for close to 40 percent of Japanese chipmaking equipment exports in 2021, is likely one of the intended targets.

The actions taken by Japan can be interpreted as a strategic alignment with the U.S.-led “Chip-4 Alliance,” aiming to curb China’s semiconductor industry. An important question emerges: Will these measures effectively contain China, enabling the U.S.-led chip alliances to maintain their strategic advantages, or will they trigger a new crisis for the chip industry by inadvertently providing China with an opportunity to accelerate its collective efforts toward achieving chip self-sufficiency?

Chips are pivotal to a nation’s economic growth, societal advancement, and national security, acting as the “brains” or controlling units of modern society. They are especially critical for emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and big data analytics, which are key determinants of a country’s future technological competitiveness. Moreover, chips embody military-civil fusion technologies that can be employed in the development of advanced weaponry. Consequently, mastery over chipmaking supply chains has emerged as a central point of contention in the intense competition between the United States and China, two global powerhouses in a race for technological supremacy. 

The U.S.-led restrictions on China have prompted a shift in priorities within the semiconductor industry. National security is now taking precedence over economic efficiency, which was based on the global production network in chipmaking. These restrictions, which began under the Trump administration and have been reinforced by the Biden administration, include technological sanctions and export controls that prevent Chinese tech firms from acquiring advanced chips and restrict China’s access to key technologies and personnel in chipmaking. Amid escalating economic nationalism and in response to the 2021 supply chain disruptions in the automotive industry, the U.S.-led semiconductor alliances have enacted industrial policies to ensure the security of their chip supply chains. Such steps underscore the escalating concerns not just about safeguarding but fortifying national security as nations aim to preserve their sovereignty in an uncertain global landscape where trust and compliance with a rules-based order are on the decline. The fundamental premise here is that advanced technologies and equipment in chipmaking should not be supplied to countries that could potentially employ them to challenge the democratic world.

How Far Is China from Self-Sufficiency?

Following these restrictions, China is grappling with significant “chokepoints” that are stymieing its advancement in the semiconductor industry. As a relative latecomer to the field, China is at risk of falling further behind, particularly in next-generation technologies, if these chokepoints stay in place. This “chokepoint strategy”—akin to a kung fu master quickly executing a single sword move to sever their adversary’s throat—can readily be employed in warfare or geopolitical disputes. Here, a country or organization can identify and exploit vital points or bottlenecks—like a critical resource, transport route, or technology—in the competitor’s value chain. This metaphor vividly illustrates the risk of China being stifled or strangled, thereby hindering its ability to effectively compete and keep pace with the industry leaders in semiconductors.

The crux of the chokepoint strategy is that the party employing this strategy—in the case of semiconductors the United States and its allies—has monopolistic control over these chokepoints. By exercising this control, the United States and its allies can potentially disrupt the progress of China in chipmaking.

China has recognized the threat of chokepoints in its industrial capabilities. In 2018, the nation identified thirty-five technologies/products that could be subject to chokepoints. Advanced chipmaking tools and materials were included on this list. Fast forward five years, and with the United States and its allies having tightened their control over the chokepoints in China’s chipmaking, how prepared is China for self-sufficiency?

A simple response is “not much,” despite China having made certain strides in the domestic supply chain. Chinese start-ups span nearly all subsectors, from design software and databases to manufacturing equipment and semiconductor materials. However, regarding domestic substitution, the readiness is below 5 percent in most areas so far.

To upgrade its capacity for mature processing mode chipmaking, the Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC) has invested in four additional foundries in Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, and Shenzhen since 2021. Although SMIC asserts that it can theoretically produce advanced 14nm chips using its existing DUV lithography systems, it is a considerable distance from reaching mass production. In the capital- and technology-intensive chipmaking industry, achieving mass production at a high yield rate is critical, as it can effectively lower the cost per chip. Transitioning to mass production and reaching a high yield rate requires significant time, manpower, and capital investment, provided the necessary equipment and tools are accessible.

The advanced lithography machine is a significant chokepoint in China’s chipmaking capability. In this area, domestic substitution is currently less than 1 percent. ASML, based in the Netherlands, remains the sole supplier of EUV lithography machines, which are vital for advanced chipmaking. Immersion DUV lithography machines, produced by both ASML and Nikon from Japan, are likely to be added to the export restriction list, which could trigger a significant upheaval in China’s chipmaking capability. Shanghai Microelectronics, a domestic competitor, can currently manufacture lithography machines that only support mass production of chips using a 90nm or larger processing mode.

China has made notable progress in the field of etching machines, achieving about 10 percent domestic substitution. China’s Advanced Micro Fabrication Equipment Company is the first in the country to produce etching machines for advanced chipmaking. With the use of domestically produced lithography and etching machines, and through multiple exposures, it is feasible for China to manufacture chips with a 65nm processing mode or smaller at a large scale with high yield rates. These domestically produced machines can meet the production needs of most chips used in military applications, power management, LCDs, Wi-Fi, automobiles, and a wide array of consumer electronic systems.

Electronic Design Automation (EDA) tools represent another significant chokepoint in China’s chipmaking endeavors. Under the influence of U.S. sanctions, Huawei has found itself unable to update its EDA software, despite holding permanent EDA licenses. There have been reports of Huawei developing its own EDA tool, yet its efficacy and market acceptance remain uncertain.

Semiconductor materials could potentially become chokepoints if Japan implements export control measures. Out of the nineteen core semiconductor materials, Japanese companies command a market share of over 50 percent in fourteen. For instance, Japanese companies dominate the worldwide supply of photoresist used in lithography, holding over 85 percent of the market share. Amid the Japan-Korea trade dispute in 2019, Japan, by restricting the export of three types of materials to South Korea, instigated a disruption throughout the entire semiconductor value chain. China has progressed in low-end photoresist production, but still heavily depends on Japanese imports for almost all high-end photoresists. Due to these reasons, Japan’s export control measures are interpreted as targeting China in a more systemic and precise fashion than the U.S.-imposed sanctions.

A Chaotic Future?

While these restrictions may hinder China’s progress in chipmaking, their long-term effectiveness remains uncertain. Chips are highly complex products that require deep technical expertise in both hardware and software, and they rely on a tightly woven global production network.

The sophistication of chipmaking is evident in the significant investment in research and development. In 2021 alone, the industry invested a total of $71 billion in research and development (R&D), which overshadowed the total investment by China’s “Big Fund” of $51 billion since 2014. The R&D investment has been fuelled by the global innovation ecosystem, where customer demand for high-performance chips has been a driving force behind advancements in chip design and manufacturing. Nvidia, as an example, initially focused on providing GPUs (graphics processing units) for the gaming industry but has expanded its applications to other areas. Its growth has been propelled by increasing user demand in graphics-intensive gaming, bitcoin mining data analytics, and AI training and inference tasks. The CEO of Nvidia, Jensen Huang, has expressed concerns that being unable to access the Chinese market would significantly limit their opportunities for growth as China remains its largest market in gaming and data centers.

The global production network in chipmaking is constantly evolving, with companies striving to enhance their positions by acquiring new capabilities and engaging in higher value-added activities. Throughout history, there have been three major shifts in the chipmaking industry, each involving the relocation of lower value-added segments of the value chain to emerging economies or regions. In the first shift, chip manufacturing was transferred from the United States to Japan, while the United States maintained its dominance in chip design and intellectual property. The second shift witnessed Japan retaining higher value-added segments in materials and equipment, while manufacturing and packaging were transferred to South Korea and Taiwan. In the third shift, South Korea solidified its position in memory and display semiconductors, Taiwan specialized in foundries, and China took on the lower value-added packaging and manufacturing of chips of mature process mode. Each of these shifts not only led to industry restructuring but also redefined the structure of the value chain, creating opportunities for latecomers to bridge the gap. However, it should be noted that each of these shifts was generously supported by their respective governments in terms of policy and capital.

China frequently comes under criticism for its use of industrial policy and subsidies to support its domestic technology sector. However, despite these measures, China has been unsuccessful in significantly enhancing its semiconductor sector using its industrial policy.

Reflecting on the situation, several factors have hindered China’s progress in chipmaking. Apart from a deficiency in capital and talent within the industry, the largest barrier to China’s advancement is the absence of effective synergy among its upstream and downstream players in the value chain. Chips function as intermediate goods in the production of electronic and electric devices, a sector where China has a significant global presence. To maintain their competitiveness, Chinese downstream manufacturers have favored imported chips, which are cheaper, more powerful, and more energy-efficient than their domestically produced counterparts. Similarly, design tools struggle to secure orders from local chip designers; and domestic design software and IP, equipment, and materials face obstacles in being adopted by local foundries, as they often prefer superior imported alternatives. This lack of industry-level coordination stunts technological progress and results in disjointed industrial development.

The current structure of the semiconductor value chain is highly interdependent, though value distribution is uneven. The United States holds the largest market share (47 percent), primarily in chip design and core IP. It’s followed by South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and China (as of 2021). Specialized equipment manufacturers, who operate within a niche but highly protected market, can only survive within this global network. For instance, ASML has investments from several downstream companies within the network. Despite its monopoly, ASML only garnered about 6.5 billion euros in 2022, making up less than 2 percent of the total semiconductor industry revenue. This structure of the value chain presents formidable barriers to latecomers, such as China, who are seeking to gain a foothold in the market.

Now, technology sanctions and export controls have inadvertently opened a window of opportunity for Chinese firms to catch up. In response to the chokepoint strategy, the Chinese semiconductor industry is forced to strive for self-sufficiency by fostering interdependent relationships within the ecosystem. The timing also works in favor of Chinese enterprises. Had the sanctions been imposed a decade ago, Chinese companies would have had limited technological accumulation to enable catching up. Over the past ten years, however, China’s investments in nearly every subsector of chipmaking have witnessed rapid generational upgrades within closed feedback loops, bolstered by collective investment from a wide array of players such as the government, tech companies, digital platforms, and downstream manufacturers. Thus, China is poised to stimulate a catch-up in chipmaking.

Reflections

Predicting a specific timeframe for China’s catch-up in semiconductors is challenging. However, a complete stifling of progress is unlikely. Geopolitical disruptions, coupled with technological upheavals, have led to reduced stability and predictability. Indeed, the “chokepoint strategy” carries its own set of challenges and risks. It may inhibit global cooperation and innovation and stall the overall growth of the semiconductor industry, potentially affecting Western participants. Moreover, it could provoke retaliatory actions from targeted adversaries, further destabilizing global supply chains, and potentially leading to escalating conflicts or even warfare.

For China, maintaining an open mindset in chipmaking is vital. The sector stands to benefit from the diverse inputs of all stakeholders. Furthermore, China needs to strike a delicate balance between competition and cooperation with its foreign competitors whenever possible. Regrettably, self-sufficiency often runs the risk of leading to self-isolation.

For Japan, the export control measures could potentially impact bilateral relations and may escalate trade tensions, especially considering the historical conflicts between Japan and China. Japan is a significant trading partner for China, and the Chinese market remains vital for Japanese manufacturers in semiconductors. In retaliation to Japan’s alignment with the United States in curbing China’s chipmaking, Beijing could consider restricting the export of critical minerals to Japan and Chinese consumers could potentially organize boycotts of Japanese products, as they have during previous bilateral conflicts.

Worst of all, an intensification of the chip wars could potentially lead to a complete decoupling in technology. Such technological decoupling entails not just the separation of supply chains, but also the establishment of different technological standards, innovation ecosystems, and markets by the disconnected parties. This could bear significant economic and social repercussions.

Dr. Marina Yue Zhang is an associate professor at the Australia-China Relations Institute at the University of Technology Sydney. Marina’s research interests cover China’s innovation policy and practice, emerging technologies, and network effects in digital transformation. She is the author of three books, including Demystifying China’s Innovation Machine: Chaotic Order, co-authored with Mark Dodgson and David Gann (Oxford University Press, 2022).

Image: Shutterstock.

For a moment, it seemed as though the Russian government would fall. On June 23, Yevgeny Prigozhin, the thuggish leader of Wagner Group, a Russian mercenary outfit, raged against the Russian military and threatened retaliation after it allegedly bombed a Wagner training camp. The Kremlin denied the incident—and opened a criminal case against Prigozhin for attempting to incite an armed rebellion. In response, Prigozhin launched an open war against Russia’s military leaders, seizing the city of Rostov-on-Don and vowing to march on Moscow to remove them from power.

Chaos ensued. Wagner advanced. Vladimir Putin’s plane departed from Moscow; the Kremlin’s press service insisted that the president remained behind. The roads to the capital were blocked. The Russian internet was censored. Russian military units between Prigozhin and Moscow offered little resistance, and rumors of defections flew. The vast majority of soldiers remained stationed along the battle lines in Ukraine, even as the rogue mercenary group drove by behind them. Chechen fighters loyal to pro-Putin strongman Ramzan Kadyrov appeared ready to enter the fight from the south.

Then Prigozhin blinked. He issued a statement backpedaling—declaring that he had not sought to overthrow Putin, only to “march for justice,” and claiming that he would not attack Moscow to avoid spilling Russian blood. (By this point, more than a dozen Russian soldiers had been killed during the push north, though it is clear that the offensive could have been far more violent.) Through the mediation of Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko, a deal was reached whereby Prigozhin would leave the country and enter exile in Belarus. Wagner units would return to their posts in occupied Ukraine. The crisis was defused. Putin survived. The “end of history” was once again averted.

The eleventh-hour deal came as a surprise to many Western observers, who noted that the Kremlin’s early statements seemed to reject the possibility of a compromise. Putin, who had a decades-long relationship with Prigozhin and had supported him throughout the war, could have extended an olive branch. Instead, he gave a televised address condemning Prigozhin and his followers as traitors—seemingly giving the Wagner leader no choice but to seize Moscow and overthrow the government. The agreement gives both sides an alternative.

Prigozhin’s terse statement—released on his Telegram channel—has been his explanation for why he chose to accept Lukashenko’s proposal. The reasons it lays out are entirely selfless: Prigozhin, a patriot, wished to avoid the needless loss of Russian life. It is far more likely, though, that his acceptance of the terms—even with his army on Moscow’s doorstep—was in recognition of the futility of the mission he had taken upon himself to carry out. A report from The Telegraph hinted at other motivations, including threats made against Prigozhin’s family.

In a narrow sense, Prigozhin might have succeeded in his objectives. He ended his offensive within Moscow Oblast, less than 200 kilometers (125 miles) from the capital. Russian troops remained garrisoned within the city, but their defenses would have been gravely inadequate against Wagner’s hardened and well-equipped veterans. Absent outside interference, Prigozhin could have captured Moscow in short order.

But then what? The rogue warlord’s next move would not have been at all clear. Putin, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, Army Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov, and any other Russian leaders of importance would have fled the city before Prigozhin could capture them. The Russian state has famously abandoned Moscow before; the city’s fall would not cause the collapse of the government. Even if he had wanted to extend his northern march to St. Petersburg, Prigozhin would not have had the strength. While he nominally had a total of 25,000 troops at his disposal, the convoy traveling north only contained around 5,000—hardly enough to hold Moscow, a city of 13 million, even if the population had been totally compliant. If Russian troops had arrived in greater numbers from the front lines in Ukraine, Prigozhin could not possibly have held the city, even with additional Wagner reinforcements.

More importantly, by shooting his way into the Russian capital—and then fighting to defend it against the military—Prigozhin could have caused thousands of deaths, both among the soldiers on both sides and the civilians caught in the crossfire. In doing so, he would have abandoned any pretense of acting on behalf of the Russian people, or of having the country’s best interests in mind. One of the reasons that Wagner troops were able to travel north so quickly was the lack of opposition from the Russian military or police units between them and Moscow. The military’s inaction bodes poorly for Putin, but it also gave both sides a critical opening to defuse the crisis before it escalated further. If Prigozhin had fought an open battle in Moscow—or even a battle with Kadyrov’s troops near Rostov-on-Don—a deal between the two sides would have been much more difficult to reach.

In no conceivable universe would the crisis have ended with the installation of “President Prigozhin” in the Kremlin. Putin would never have voluntarily surrendered power, and if a civil war had erupted, one side would have had two million troops of various stripes and the other would have had 25,000. It is unclear how exactly this would have proceeded, but sooner or later, it would have inevitably ended in Prigozhin’s death. Even now, as Putin reasserts his grip on the country, the Wagner leader’s ultimate fate is unclear. In the past, Putin has said that he could never forgive betrayal—a term he applied to Prigozhin’s actions on the 24th. Even in his relative safety in Belarus, Prigozhin may wish to avoid open windows for the foreseeable future.

While the Kremlin has remained tight-lipped on the Prigozhin incident, the Lukashenko deal was clearly in Putin’s interests as well. Prigozhin would not have succeeded in toppling the Russian strongman in the short run, but he has already done incalculable damage to his position. By accepting the deal, Putin has cut his losses, gained an opportunity to reassert his authority within Russia, headed off prospective challenges to his leadership, and ultimately avoided a far greater tragedy.

The most enduring consequence of Prigozhin’s actions will likely be the shattering of Putin’s carefully cultivated image of invulnerability. Russia’s state-controlled TV channels cut off coverage of the attack immediately after it began, and pro-Wagner websites were swiftly censored, but the people of Rostov-on-Don and Voronezh—two major cities with more than one million inhabitants each—watched with their own eyes as Prigozhin’s troops seized control of city military installations. Worryingly, the two cities’ inhabitants welcomed the attackers, giving them food and water and cheering for them as they passed through. As Prigozhin left Rostov-on-Don for exile in Belarus on the night of June 24, he was thronged by civilian supporters, and Russian police re-entering the city after the mercenaries’ departure were blocked by an angry crowd chanting pro-Wagner slogans. If Putin’s position remains that the Wagnerites committed an act of treason, a number of Russians appear to be comfortable with treason.

Perhaps more ominously still, Russian civilians’ sympathies for Prigozhin and the Wagner Group appeared to be shared by some Russian military units during their drive north. Elements of “Storm-Z,” a second Russian mercenary company formed by Putin allies to rival Prigozhin, spoke in support of his campaign against the “rats in the rear.” Rumors that various Russian units had joined with the Wagner Group appear to be false, but these units did nothing to stop the mercenaries’ advance, either. Ordinary Russian conscripts seem unwilling to die for Putin—a development with uncomfortable parallels in Russia’s past.

Total fealty to the ruler has long been a feature of Russian military history. The Tsar’s army experienced mutinies and desertions during the First World War, but it never attempted to overthrow him. Joseph Stalin executed dozens of high-ranking officers during his purges, and for decades afterward, the Soviet military remained totally subservient to the Communist Party; one of the reasons for the failure of the 1991 coup attempt was its leaders’ reluctance to escalate the situation after Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin simply refused to meet their demands. Putin has sought to maintain this principle. Whatever their performance issues, Gerasimov and Shoigu have been unquestionably, unflinchingly loyal, even as their troops have not.

Ironically, the prioritization of loyalty over competence in the Russian military helps to explain Russia’s disappointing performance against Ukraine—a performance that necessitated the involvement of the Wagner Group in the first place. Given a freer hand and greater resources, Wagner quickly overshadowed the Russian military in effectiveness, forcing Ukraine out of Bakhmut after a months-long battle. Perhaps it is this gap in competency, coupled with frustration at how the Army is doing things, that drove Prigozhin to rebel.

But an effective mercenary is a double-edged sword. “The mercenary captains are either capable men or they are not,” Niccolo Machiavelli wrote in The Prince, advising his sovereign against their employment: “if they are, you cannot trust them, because they always aspire to their own greatness.” Putin would have been wise to listen.

Trevor Filseth is a former foreign affairs writer for The National Interest.

Image: Wikimedia Commons.

En France, le bicentenaire de la naissance de Karl Marx revêt surtout une dimension éditoriale et universitaire. Une telle discrétion ne reflète guère la place occupée par ce pays, à la fois terre d'asile et champ de batailles politiques, dans la vie et l'œuvre du théoricien communiste. / Allemagne, (...) / Allemagne, France, Communisme, Histoire, Idées, Intellectuels, Socialisme, Marxisme - 2018/05

Ce mois de mai débutent les célébrations du 70e anniversaire de la création de l'État d'Israël. C'est l'occasion pour le peuple palestinien de rappeler la catastrophe vécue en 1948 et de revendiquer le droit au retour des réfugiés, prévu par les résolutions des Nations unies. / Israël, Palestine, (...) / Israël, Palestine, Proche-Orient, Histoire, Idéologie, Judaïsme, Mouvement de contestation, Nationalisme, Réfugiés, Palestine (Cisjordanie), Palestine (Gaza), Répression, Conflit israélo-palestinien, Palestine (Jérusalem), Palestine mandataire 1922-1948 - 2018/05

Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s trip to Beijing this month for meetings with Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping and other senior Chinese leaders mostly met the low expectations for the event. Blinken’s journey helps to rejuvenate high-level Sino-U.S. dialogue at a time when the bilateral relationship is at a nadir and might even be drifting toward war in either the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea. The meeting seemingly offers hope for recovery and stabilization of relations. U.S. president Joe Biden said Blinken “did a hell of a job” in Beijing and that “We’re on the right trail here.” Of his meeting with Blinken, Xi said “This is very good.”

Alas, there is abundant reason to be skeptical.

The modest breakthrough has landed the relationship in front of a much bigger and thicker wall. Top-level communication is necessary but not yet sufficient for repairing a damaged relationship. The damage stems primarily from policies by each country that the other loathes. The problem is that neither country may be willing and able to change these policies that antagonize the other.

China’s List of Grievances

Prior to meeting with Xi, Blinken spoke with the PRC’s highest-ranking foreign affairs official, former Foreign Minister Wang Yi. Wang provided an efficient list of China’s top grievances with the United States. As paraphrased by the PRC media, “Wang asked the US to stop hyping the `China threat’ narrative, lift illegal unilateral sanctions on China, stop pressuring China’s technology and development and stop willfully interfering in China's internal affairs.”

“Hyping the China threat” refers to the U.S. concern that China aspires to displace America as the most strategically influential country in the Asia-Pacific region. Beijing contends that the United States erroneously assumes China will naturally seek regional hegemony due to its newly-acquired relative economic and military strength. China, however, is an exceptional great power that will “never seek hegemony, expansion, or a sphere of influence,” according to the CCP government.

The second major Chinese grievance is the United States making it harder for China to acquire key leading-edge technologies, alluded to in the reference to Washington suppressing China’s “technology and development.” Chinese officials and government-approved commentators have for years accused the United States of trying to “contain” China, and recently Xi himself has openly accused Washington of “comprehensive containment, encirclement and suppression of China.” For Beijing, tech bans have become one of two spearpoints of containment. Already working to restrict China’s access to advanced semiconductors, the Biden administration is also considering a ban on U.S. companies from investing in certain technology sectors in China. From Beijing’s standpoint, this is “politicizing and weaponizing economic, trade and technological issues under the guise of national security” when “the real purpose of the US is to deprive China of its right to development.”

The third PRC grievance, “interfering in China’s internal affairs,” includes U.S. criticism of the mass incarceration of Uighurs in Xinjiang province and the dismantling of civil liberties in Hong Kong. It also includes what Beijing sees as the most pressing dispute in Sino-U.S. relations and the other spearpoint of containment: Washington’s support for the government of Taiwan. The new PRC foreign minister, Qin Gang, said in March that Taiwan is “the first red line that must not be crossed in China-US relations.” Wang Yi reportedly told Blinken, “On the Taiwan question, China has no room for compromise or concession.”

The United States is unlikely to address these PRC grievances to anywhere near Beijing’s satisfaction.

The View from Washington

China has amply proved itself an increasingly formidable potential U.S. adversary. It is undergoing a huge military modernization and expansion. It leverages its vast economic power to undermine U.S. global influence. It aspires to world leadership in emerging technologies. And it opposes important aspects of the U.S.-sponsored international order.

The Biden administration’s 2022 National Defense Strategy characterizes the PRC as “coercive and increasingly aggressive,” seeking to “refashion” the world to “suit its interests and authoritarian preferences,” to the detriment of U.S. interests. Obviously, Washington does not accept Beijing’s Chinese exceptionalism or its “will never seek hegemony” rhetoric. Rather, Washington sees the United States and China as competitors for regional and global leadership. The diplomatic aspect of this competition requires America to continue calling out aggressive and expansionist PRC behavior before the international audience, just as Beijing asserts its own counternarrative. Nor is it reasonable to expect the United States to reverse its restrictions on helping its chief potential adversary achieve global technological—and consequent military—superiority.

For Washington to stop “interfering in China’s internal affairs” in the sense of not criticizing China is an impossible ask. Shaming illiberal states for infringing on civil liberties is now a part of America’s political culture, and the CCP leadership has infamously thin skin. Bashing China is now a bipartisan sport in U.S. domestic politics, with the politicians of both major parties scrambling to appear hawkish.

Only a day after the Blinken-Xi meeting, Biden seemingly unintentionally offended Beijing by casually referring to Xi as a “dictator” who was surprised and embarrassed by the spy balloon incident. A PRC government spokesperson immediately responded that Biden’s remark was “extremely absurd and irresponsible. . . . seriously infringing on China’s political dignity, which is an open political provocation.” The White House, in turn, indicated it will not retract the statement.

Beijing demands the United States must stop selling armaments to Taiwan and cease all contact between U.S. and Taiwan government officials. The U.S. position, however, is that arms sales are justified by Beijing’s permanent threat to use force against Taiwan. A U.S. law, the Taiwan Relations Act, requires Washington to “make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services . . . to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” Neither the PRC threat nor the U.S. law are going away anytime soon. Washington also maintains that the “one China policy” is satisfied by the lack of formal U.S.-Taiwan diplomatic relations and does not preclude all contact between U.S. and Taiwan officials. In any case, members of Congress have repeatedly demonstrated that they will honor Taiwan leaders even against opposition from the U.S. executive branch.

American Frustrations

The U.S. side is similarly unlikely to get what it wants.

The most urgent American concern in the bilateral relationship is the need for crisis management. This appeared to be at the top of Blinken’s Beijing agenda.

Related U.S. concerns are perceived aggressive PRC activity toward Taiwan and in the South China Sea, which from the U.S. point of view increase the possibility of an accidental or unintended war.

Beijing could demonstrate goodwill to Washington by ceasing the hostile military signaling toward Taiwan and by quietly accepting the U.S. Navy’s “freedom of navigation operations” in the South China Sea instead of threatening collisions with U.S. ships and aircraft. This, however, is almost unimaginable.

The Chinese government has framed both Taiwan and the South China Sea as do-or-die issues: the CCP either proves its legitimacy to rule China by establishing control over “Chinese” territory coveted by foreigners or fails on both accounts. Regime legitimacy, and thus security, is on the line. So is national security, as Taiwan outside of PRC control anchors the string of islands that form choke points between China’s east coast and the Pacific Ocean. Only by owning the South China Sea can Beijing keep unwanted foreign warships and warplanes away from China’s east coast. There are economic incentives as well: the South China Sea contains fish and hydrocarbons, and if captured, Taiwan would be the PRC’s richest and best-educated province.

Most importantly, the PRC seems to know no alternative way to attempt to de-escalate tensions with the United States over Taiwan and the South China Sea other than demonstrations of military bravado.

There is no hint of Chinese willingness to accommodate the U.S. desire for crisis management. China suspended contact between the two countries’ militaries after U.S. congresswoman Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in August 2022. In May, PRC defense minister Li Shangfu refused to meet with U.S. secretary of defense Lloyd Austin on the sidelines of a conference in Singapore. Repeating a phrase PRC officials often use when discussing foreign relations, a PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson explained that the United States “must correct its mistaken actions” for military dialogue to resume.

This position resurfaced during the Biden visit to Beijing, during which China did not agree to the U.S. proposal to restart bilateral military engagement. PRC officials and commentators have elaborated that, in their view, the Americans want China to agree to allow the USA to challenge Chinese “core interests” with impunity. The PRC position is that if the USA wants to avoid crises, it should stop arming Taiwan and cease operating military units in Chinese-claimed waters and airspace.

Qin Gang said in March that the U.S. government’s “so-called `establishing guardrails’ for China-US relations and ‘not seeking conflict’ actually means that China should not respond in words or action when slandered or attacked. That is just impossible!”

Furthermore, Beijing likely sees the U.S. desire for crisis management as merely additional leverage for seeking concessions from Washington in bilateral disputes—an approach similar to Beijing canceling cooperation on climate change to express anger over particular unrelated U.S. policies.

Beijing has been emphasizing that Washington must keep the commitments Biden made during his talks in 2022 with Xi in Bali, the first face-to-face meeting between the two men since Biden’s election as president. Immediately before his meeting with Blinken, Xi said: “the two sides have agreed to follow through the common understandings President Biden and I had reached in Bali.” Qin Gang and Wang Yi also mentioned the Bali commitments.

What does Beijing think Biden promised in Bali? A PRC media report offers a summary: “The US does not seek a new Cold War, does not seek to revitalize alliances against China, does not support ‘Taiwan independence,’ does not support ‘two Chinas’ or `one China, one Taiwan,’ and has no intention to have a conflict with China, . . . the US side has no intention to seek "decoupling" from China, to halt China's economic development, or to contain China.”

Signposts of Failure

This is a signpost of impending failure. Each of these points suggests misunderstanding on Beijing’s part, to be followed by disappointment. From a U.S. perspective, Biden has kept his word. But as the Chinese should well know by now, Washington’s interpretation of what is allowable under a “one China policy” is far looser than Beijing’s. The U.S. government is clearly and openly committed to strengthening alliances to counter possible PRC military moves and is implementing an industrial policy to reduce vulnerability to China (as China is also doing in reverse). Americans would argue these are prudent defensive actions, not proof of “seeking a New Cold War.” And American officials say they are “de-risking” rather than “de-coupling,” even if the PRC insists on calling it containment.

The momentum gained through the Blinken visit to China will soon stall because the policies that drive the downturn in U.S.-China relations are likely to stay the same. Both sides think these policies are necessary to uphold fundamental national interests. The domestic politics in both countries support these policies. And unfortunately, these policies reflect a new era of great-power rivalry within the same region in which the adversarial aspects of bilateral relations are ascendant.

Denny Roy is a Senior Fellow at the East-West Center in Honolulu.

Image: Shutterstock.

With Russia’s waning momentum and influence in the wake of a slew of setbacks in the Ukraine war, concerns over an imminent Chinese attack on Taiwan have somewhat subsided. However, China’s recent charm offensives indicate its strategic calculations for an attrition war with Taiwan. To win such a war, China recognizes the necessity to accumulate as many bargaining chips as possible before entering into negotiations. One crucial aspect of this process is the restoration of its significantly damaged global reputation.

China has sought to claim the mantle of peacemaker since its reversal of the Zero Covid policy. Externally, it has actively presented itself as an unbiased alternative to the United States. After brokering an agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia, China ventured into the highly sensitive Israel-Palestine conflict. Additionally, its unexpected vote in favor of a UN resolution condemning Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, accompanied by the endorsement of French president Emmanuel Macron, highlights China’s potential mediating role in resolving the Ukraine conflict.

Internally, China is undergoing a diplomatic system overhaul. The removal of outspoken “Wolf Warrior” spokesman Zhao Lijian was followed by a carefully orchestrated visit to China by former Taiwanese president Ma Ying-jeou. Furthermore, Beijing’s propaganda efforts are toning down the domestic fervor surrounding the idea of forcibly taking Taiwan. Despite its routine boilerplates against perceived “Western smear campaigns,” China appears to be adopting a more restrained and moderate diplomatic approach, aiming to convince the world that it still prioritizes peaceful means over force in its approach towards Taiwan.

However, China’s recent diplomatic shift belies its strategic adjustment towards the self-governing island. The lessons learned from the Ukraine war have led Xi Jinping to realize that if a military juggernaut like Russia can fail to annex Ukraine, the challenge of seizing a better-defended Taiwan would be even greater for China. This is especially true considering the island’s vital geopolitical and economic significance to the United States and the Western world. Consequently, China has recognized that a swift Blitzkrieg, as Russia had envisioned for Ukraine, is less feasible in the case of Taiwan. Instead, an attrition war, whose effect was validated during the Sino-Japanese War, would be a more practical strategy for China’s current status as an economic giant. Additionally, through salami tactics, China could chip away Taiwan’s outlying islands bit by bit.

An important giveaway of China’s plan for an attrition war with Taiwan can be gleaned from its recent contact with Ukraine. Following a long-awaited phone call between Xi Jinping and Volodymyr Zelenskyy, China dispatched a special envoy with a peace plan—built on its highly controversial twelve-point peaceful proposal on Ukraine—to the battle-scarred country. However, the mediation ended up with a public rejection from Ukrainian foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba that Ukraine would not surrender territory to Russia in exchange for ending the war. While the specific details of the meeting were not disclosed, Kuleba’s remarks suggest that China’s proposal may have involved territorial concessions by Ukraine. If the land-for-peace approach proves successful in the Ukraine conflict, it is highly likely that China would employ a similar strategy in future negotiations during an attrition war with Taiwan. Nonetheless, it is important to note that the assumption of China’s ability to outlast Taiwan and its Western allies in an attrition war hinges on its integration into the global economy and a robust self-sufficiency system.

China learned a crucial lesson from the Ukraine war: in the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, the best way to minimize or avoid economic sanctions from Western countries would not be through decoupling, but rather by further binding itself to the global value chains. Germany’s opposition to banning imports of Russian gas and oil, due to its high dependence on Moscow’s energy supplies, is a prime example. The European Union also demonstrated caution when imposing sanctions on Russia in order to minimize repercussions for EU citizens and businesses. To defend itself from potential surgical sanctions that may be imposed by Western countries, China is willingly accepting economic olive branches extended by EU powers such as France and Germany.

However, China’s endeavor to leverage its gargantuan economy does not make it bulletproof to Western sanctions. To counter China’s economic coercion, the U.S.-led Western bloc unveiled its “de-risking” strategy as a precautionary response during the G7 summit, aimed at minimizing the potential costs of a sudden escalation over Taiwan. This undoubtedly intensified China’s self-sufficiency movement, prompting it to expand its envisioned sanctions-proofing system to include its neighbors.

Exemplified by its Xi’an summit with Central Asian leaders, Beijing is accelerating the formation of a G7-like alliance. This alliance aims to strengthen economic ties as well as foster a collective security consensus. In response to G7’s planned diversification of supply chains to reduce their reliance on China, the country is also diversifying sources of its self-sufficiency system as it realizes it would largely be on its own if no preparation is made to sustain its potential war economy. Central Asian nations, seeking a reliable security partner in the absence of Russia, could play a practical role in aiding China, particularly given their limited relations with Taiwan. Assurances from Central Asian leaders that they would not interfere in China’s approach to the island have solidified the scaffolding of the regional-scale self-sufficiency system that China is establishing.

Speculations about the quick decline of U.S. combat power during a confrontation with China may bolster the latter’s confidence in taking Taiwan through an attrition war. Nonetheless, the resistance from Taiwan and the backlash from Western countries cannot be underestimated. Understanding these challenges, China is bound to unite all available forces and exploit any cleavage between the United States and its allies. One particularly workable and valuable target is certain EU countries that are actively seeking economic development through cooperation with China. Macron’s advocate for “strategic autonomy” to ensure the EU has more options beyond simply aligning with the United States on issues like Taiwan is one significant achievement that China has snatched.

As China is shifting towards an attrition war strategy, it is imperative for the U.S.-led Western bloc to adapt accordingly. The “de-risking” tactic cannot fundamentally resolve the underlying reliance on China within global supply chains. Instead, the United States should rev up the development of Taiwan’s self-sufficiency system. Rather than focusing solely on marginal improvements in the already tight economic ties between Taiwan and other democracies, the U.S.-led Western bloc ought to provide Taiwan with a stronger diplomatic endorsement to spur more “swing countries” in Asia, such as Vietnam and Malaysia, to participate in the island’s self-sufficiency system.

It is anticipated that China’s economic coercion would continue to be effective in the event of a war with Taiwan. When that day comes, the reluctance of major EU powers like France and Germany to provide sufficient assistance during the early stages of the Ukraine war is likely to re-emerge. The only feasible way that Taiwan could outlast China in an attrition war relies on its endurance until a turning point where its counter-offensive achieves success is reached. But before that, it must establish a self-sufficiency system that is at least on par with, if not stronger than, that of China.

Jiachen Shi is a Ph.D. student in political science at Tulane University. He received his M.A. in international relations from the University of Liverpool. His articles have been featured in The Diplomat.

Image: Courtesy of the Office of the President of Kazakhstan.

A conversation with Stephen Kotkin.

Pour justifier leur défaite à la présidentielle de 2016, les démocrates américains ont avancé toutes sortes de raisons : l'iniquité du système électoral, les « fausses nouvelles », ou encore les Russes, accusés de collusion avec M. Donald Trump. Cette focalisation sur Moscou occulte les véritables causes (...) / États-Unis, États-Unis (affaires extérieures), États-Unis (affaires intérieures), Royaume-Uni, Russie, Armement, Élections, Géopolitique, Médias, Parti politique, Politique, Relations internationales, Stratégie, Diplomatie - 2018/05

On Friday evening Moscow time, the Kremlin—and the world—was stunned to witness what seemed like the beginnings of a coup against the government of President Vladimir Putin. The man leading the charge, Yevgeny Prigozhin, has a long history with the Kremlin. A former restauranteur, Prigozhin eventually, with the help of government contracts, built himself into an oligarch. But what he is most known for today is having founded the private military corporation Wagner Group. Since its inception in the early 2010s, it has seen action around the world, most notably in Africa and in the Russo-Ukrainian War, where it has played a large role in patching holes in sometimes weak Russian lines.

For the past few months, tensions between Prigozhin and the Kremlin—though Prigozhin has until recently been careful to critique the Russian Minister of Defense, Sergei Shoigu, and not Putin himself—have risen, with Prigozhin claiming that Shoigu was purposefully denying Wagner ammunition. On Friday, those tensions reached a boiling point as Prigozhin posted a video that he claimed showed the aftermath of a Russian missile attack on a Wagner camp (though analysts have found that, based on videos of the same camp from one day before, nothing had changed).

Within twenty-four hours, Prigozhin and his forces proceeded to leave Ukraine and reached within 200 kilometers of Moscow. As of the time of writing on Saturday evening, according to news reports and Prigozhin’s own Telegram messages Belarussian president Alexander Lukashenko has apparently negotiated a ceasefire and potential resolution. Prigozhin claimed that his forces will return to Ukraine—though what Putin has promised in return is unclear.

What really caused Prigozhin to begin his self-proclaimed “March of Justice” is likewise unclear. While he originally claimed to be only hunting Shoigu and spoke repeatedly about not being against Putin, his drive toward the Kremlin seemed to belay that possibility. After all, any attempt to kill, usurp, or otherwise remove Putin’s minister of defense by force would clearly be seen as an attack on Putin himself.

Speculations that this was all some grand, 4D-chess-style play by Putin himself to eliminate Shoigu can be dismissed. Prigozhin’s spear penetrated deep into Russia, humiliating the Russian armed forces which were either unable or unwilling, for whatever reason, to fire on his troops (with the exception of a few pilots). If Putin wished to eliminate Shoigu, firing him would have been far less of a hassle.

But where do things go from here, how does this latest incident affect both Russia’s and the West’s future? While nearly anything can happen, there are only four potential scenarios.

The Likeiest Scenarios

The first scenario can be called “the Truce Holds.” Here, Prigozhin returns to the front, possibly keeping some troops in Rostov, and resumes fighting. What happens to him in the medium and long term, however, is open to some speculation, pending further details. Likewise, the nature of the agreement between Putin and Prigozhin and what it entails has yet to be seen. Perhaps Putin agrees to fire Shoigu (which would be something of a political earthquake, as Shoigu is the only person to have served in the top levels of the Russian Federation’s government since its founding). Whatever the ultimate outcome, however, Prigozhin is unlikely to remain in Russia. He has at this point eliminated multiple Russian Air Force targets—possibly killing the pilots—and humiliated Putin’s government on the world stage. Exile of a sort seems like the likely outcome.

The second scenario, “Mop Up,” sees the truce break. Prigozhin either immediately or in the near future rebels yet again. This time, however, he is captured or killed. The Russian government then proceeds to mop up the rest of Wagner as a semi-independent force. Putin’s credibility would still take a hit—after all, a private military company he allowed to come into existence would have driven over 200 km into his own country in a coup attempt, pulled back, and attacked a second time—but he would remain in power, for now. Russia’s war in Ukraine would be hampered, however, as Wagner’s forces made up a not insignificant amount of troops there. Depending on the nature and scale of the mop-up, Russia would be forced into either a temporary or even permanent defensive posture for the remainder of the conflict. Moreover, even if Prigozhin was killed, Putin would likely not last much longer in office—having created the conditions for repeated potential coup attempts by private military forces is too great a stain on his record. He’d be quietly pushed to retire before the next presidential election.

The third and unlikeliest scenario, “President Prigozhin,” sees the truce break—but here, the Russian armed forces melt like butter as Wagner resumes its advance and storms the Kremlin. It is not an impossibility; on the open highway from Rostov to Voronezh, Prigozhin faced effectively no resistance. He also, on his now-paused march, seemingly altered his goals (or at least publicly moved closer to his private ones): in response to an address by Putin demanding that he stand down, Prigozhin said that those against Wagner “today are those who gathered around scumbags.” As it is unlikely that Prigozhin drove to Moscow for a stern talk and a handshake, in this scenario he takes the Kremlin and installs himself or a politically presentable chosen ally as the new president of Russia.

If he manages to do this smoothly—without serious opposition from the armed forces or the intelligence services, which is unlikely—it would be fairly bad for Ukraine. Prigozhin has critiqued the Ministry of Defense for a while now on their running of the war—from the refusal to transition to a war economy to a, in Prigozhin’s view, reluctance to truly fight aggressively. The Wagneritr is also significantly more ideological than Putin; whereas Putin mostly gave meandering addresses about how sinister the West is, Prigozhin would likely put in place a “positive” vision for Russia. A Prigozhin in charge, either directly or indirectly, would likely immediately put the country onto a serious war footing instead of adopting Putin’s strategy of keeping the war as far away from the population as possible.

The Worst Case Scenario

Yet what if Prigozhin makes it to Moscow but fails to secure power? Perhaps Putin escapes to St. Petersburg and vows to fight on, or perhaps the Wagnerites and the Russian armed forces begin to fight in earnest on the outskirts of the city? This development, the fourth scenario, could only be described as the “Second Russian Civil War.” It is likely that, similar to the first Russian Civil War, the combatants would not remain limited to a  two-sided conflict of government against rebels. Ramsam Kadyrov, the leader of Russian Chechnya who has until now been loyal to Putin, may sense an opportunity to truly make a kingdom for himself. Certain elements in Tartarstan or elsewhere, which have itched for their own ethnically-based states, may work for independence. China, which has had an eye on Siberian water for years, may—in the name of securing their border—move to take control of some strategic parts of Siberia.

The West, for its part, would need to consider how to proceed. A breakup of Russia into civil war would be disastrous, which is why realist thinkers like Henry Kissinger have urged the West to avoid such. A fracturing of Russia’s eleven time zones would open up a new chess board on the budding Cold War between the United States and China, exacerbating tensions and, ultimately, likely sucking Washington into conflicts there.

The United States would also likely have to reel in NATO and European allies. Questions that Washington has never had to confront will need to be answered. In the event of a Russian civil war, Ukraine would likely recapture all its territory. But what if it wants to go further: should Washington stop an angry Ukraine from performing its own “special military operation” in a shattered Russia’s frontiers? What happens if Poland, seeing Russian authority collapse, begins looking hungrily at the territories east of the Curzon line, which it lost under Josef Stalin?

Plus, there is the question of Russia’s nuclear stockpile. Russia, after all, possesses more nuclear weapons than any other country: what happens if they fall into the hands of any of the Tartar nationalists, Wagnerites, Islamic extremists, or other warlords who could emerge from the conflict?

Caution is Warranted

As of the time of writing, events appear to be defaulting toward the first scenario and least destabilizing scenario. Yet the situation on the ground is fluid—Prigozhin’s currently-declared exile to Belarus, among whatever other concessions have been promised, depends heavily on Putin keeping his word. Whether that is enough for Prigozhin is yet to be determined.

Ultimately, when coups get underway, the fog of war intensifies, making it difficult to see what will happen. In the event of “Mop Up,” the scenario otherwise most favorable for Putin, his authority may still be so weakened that someone else tries another coup in the months to come. “President Prigozhin” could see Prigozhin briefly control Russia, only to be challenged by yet someone else. And a full-scale “Second Russian Civil War” produces questions which been asked only in the nightmares of Western strategic planners. The last Russian Civil War produced the Soviet Union, after all. There is no reason to believe that this one would produce anything better.

Anthony J. Constantini is writing his Ph.D. on populism and early American democracy at the University of Vienna in Austria. Previously he received an M.A. in International Relations from St. Petersburg State University. In 2016 he was the War Room Director for the NRSC.

Image: Shutterstock.

As Prime Minister Narendra Modi completes his state visit to the United States, and after the historic conclave of the national security advisors of the United States, Japan, and the Philippines in Manila, the United States continues to develop its latticework (to use the turn of phrase adopted by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan) of “flexible partnerships, institutions, alliances and groups of countries” across the world to balance China. The challenge now facing the U.S. policy establishment, however, is how to prevent these partnerships from being derailed.

Twenty years ago, in these pages, David M. Lampton bemoaned an American tendency to conduct bilateral relations with other states on the basis of the “Christmas tree” approach: “hanging all sorts of conditions (oftentimes very minor or petty issues) as a price for other states to pay for the continuation of normal, bilateral relations.” To combine the two metaphors, a latticework approach cannot hold up if too many weights are placed on it.

The fact that a coalition of states might find extremely close alignment on a particular issue (or set of issues) and seek ways to facilitate common action does not, therefore, mean that there is complete harmony of interests or agreement on all questions. Yet over the last several decades, the United States has often operated from the premise that Washington can present partners with a laundry list of disparate preferences and demand compliance. Even two decades ago, it was clear that “a country may earnestly desire to be a partner of the United States, but this in no way means that it ceases to pursue its own national interests.” Today, when the rise of China and greater coordination among the states of the Global South offers greater hedging opportunities, other countries have options while the United States has diminished leverage.

A “latticework” approach to international affairs means that the mix of obligations and commitments to other partners will differ on a case-by-case basis. For instance, the Japan-Republic of the Philippines-United States security consultation, which Josh Rogin argues might herald the emergence of a JAROPUS coalition, is grounded firmly in the assessment of a shared threat arising out of China’s efforts to extend its maritime sphere of influence. It does not automatically follow that JAROPUS will move in lockstep with the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) partnership, even though AUKUS also exists to respond to China’s improved maritime capabilities in the Indo-Pacific basin. AUKUS implies a level of defense technological-industrial integration, for instance, that is not a step the JA or ROP parts of the JAROPUS triad are prepared to take. Nor do these two coalitions (JAROPUS and AUKUS) assume the emergence of a common security alliance with India (via the QUAD (Japan, Australia, India, U.S.) format.

It can seem very tempting to take all these developments and conclude that the end result is the creation of an all-encompassing alliance, akin to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In fact, a few years ago, my students at the Naval War College developed a timetable for the creation of an Indo-Pacific Area Treaty Organization, or IPATO. But even NATO is based on a series of limits: geographically confined to the North Atlantic area, and among states that share a vast, intertwined network of economic interests and general agreement on questions of values and governance. Yet NATO allies have often been very resistant to expanding their commitments to assisting the United States in other areas of the world.

The U.S.-India relationship shows the challenges of navigating a “latticework” relationship. When it comes to the rise of China as a regional and global challenger, the United States and India share common strategic assessments and concerns. For an America that seeks to reroute critical supply chains around a Chinese competitor, India is part and parcel of any robust Asian supply chain that bypasses China. Yet India’s strategic interests diverge from those of Washington when it comes to Russia and Iran. And on a whole host of issues related to understandings of human rights and what constitutes democratic governance, India is prepared to push back against U.S. efforts to argue that American (or Western) standards form the universal yardstick by which all others are measured. The challenge for the Biden administration, in the run-up to the Modi visit, has been whether it is possible to ringfence U.S.-India collaboration in the first two areas from the criticisms, particularly from members of Congress, about India’s divergence from U.S. preferences in the latter areas.

The “minilateralist” approach that Jada Fraser and others have discussed argues in favor of creating focused coalitions that are defined by a small set of issues. It also means that the United States has to become more comfortable with multitiered arrangements, where, beyond a small core group of allies (such as the UK, Germany, or Japan) that share an overlapping shared vision across an entire spectrum of security, political, and economic issues, the United States recognizes a larger group of associates who commit to some but not all of the obligations. For instance, Ash Jain and Matthew Kroening lay out a strategy for economic statecraft for a new democratic community of nations that brings together both a core group of U.S. allies but envisions a broader set of associated powers who partner with the U.S. on selected sets of issues. But a multilateralist, tiered level-of-association approach shifts the basis of engagement away from the broad parameters of alliance towards negotiating focused and specific agreements with other countries—laying out not only specific duties but also the benefits both parties expect to receive—and with the understanding that other issues not covered in those agreements will not alter the bargain.

Congress, in particular, never likes minilateralist, association approaches—members are loath to give up the power to insist on compliance with every possible demand or request. The Biden administration resisted those tendencies with the Modi visit, because of the strategic importance of India to the U.S. strategy for a “free and open Indo-Pacific” basin. But in the context of the strategic competition with China, a black-or-white approach to partners can backfire, especially when Beijing is willing to deal in shades of gray.

Nikolas K. Gvosdev is a professor of national security studies at the U.S. Naval War College and director of the national security program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. The views expressed here are his own.

Image: Image Courtesy of the White House/Twitter.

En décidant d'intervenir militairement en Syrie, Moscou a sauvé le régime de M. Bachar Al-Assad et lui a permis de récupérer la plus grande partie du territoire perdu. Le Kremlin cherche désormais à imposer sa vision d'un règlement politique, tout en gardant un point d'équilibre dans ses relations avec (...) / Syrie, Proche-Orient, États-Unis (affaires extérieures), Guérilla, Conflit, Islam, Fondamentalisme, Russie, Stratégie, Droit international - 2018/05

Le Parlement grec a adopté mi-janvier de nouvelles mesures d'austérité. Ce vote exigé par les créanciers a permis, après accord des ministres des finances de la zone euro, le versement de 6,7 milliards d'euros à Athènes. Les effets de ce genre de plan sur la population sont désormais mieux connus. / (...) / Grèce, Ajustement structurel, Économie, Mouvement de contestation, Santé, Drogue - 2018/05

How elites with a Cold War mindset threaten the country’s democracy.

Though the weather in the District of Columbia presented a gloomy and unusually chilly June day, the welcome for Indian prime minister Narendra Modi’s state visit was anything but. Though small groups of Sikh separatist activists and human rights protesters did appear near the White House, they were drowned out by the sizable and enthusiastic welcoming crowd of Indian-Americans assembled on the South Lawn.

The Biden administration hoped this week’s ceremonies would provide a stately capstone to over a decade of ever-closer strategic partnership between the United States and India. The hard work of cultivating New Delhi as an economic and security bulwark against China has paid off with a plethora of new joint initiatives. For Modi’s part, he successfully communicated India’s growing national and economic confidence and brushed off concerns about “democratic backsliding” by declaring that there is “no space for discrimination” in India.

The remarks from both Joe Biden and Narendra Modi following the prime minister’s welcome stressed shared, universal values, including democracy and pluralism. Ironically, the DC and New Delhi commentariat spent the last week debating the balance of hard interests that drive the “strategic partnership,” and wondering if “values” play any role at all.

Following a one-on-one conversation, Biden and Modi unveiled a number of advances in the U.S.-India strategic partnership across the board, from space exploration to semiconductors to supply chains to military cooperation. U.S. Navy vessels can obtain repairs in Chennai, Mumbai, and Goa. Both militaries will invite liaisons from each other officer corps—an outcome unthinkable during the distrust of the Cold War. Most importantly, India now has access to the coveted F414 jet engine through a coproduction agreement. Moreover, the leaders announced a $3 billion purchase of thirty MQ-9B Sea Guardian predator drones. Both deals will enhance Indian air strength and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities vis-à-vis China in the Himalayas and the Indian Ocean.

Yet, developments in defense cooperation, while significant, must be seen as incremental improvements. Not only do they build on the achievements of the Trump and Obama administrations, but the fact will remain that India still relies on Russia for between 60 to 85 percent of its military equipment. While this critical dependence is lessening, it will not disappear for some time, and the rate of its diminishment depends on the United States offering cheaper defense weapons systems and India’s sustained investment in the modernization of its own armed forces.

As others have noted, Modi positioned India as a tribune for and bridge to the “Global South.” Biden seeks to take advantage of this by supporting India’s UN Security Council membership proposal and African Union representation at the G20. Realizing the noticeable lack of cooperation from developing countries on the administration’s Ukraine policy, the White House is eager to offer greater stakes in preserving the U.S.-led international order.

Modi’s address to a joint session of Congress attempted to soften his image with progressives and tout domestic achievements to Indian voters back home. Contrary to the media portrayal of the prime minister as a right-wing populist and analogue to Donald Trump, Modi waxed on the themes of diversity, dignity, and democracy while emphasizing his efforts to expand access to healthcare, protect the environment, and accelerate “women-led development.” Topped off with a thick layer of avuncular geniality, sprinkled with folksy Hindi witticisms, and encouraged by an enthusiastic visitor gallery, Modi’s address made a resoundingly charming impression on the assembled senators and members of Congress. That is apart from a group of hard-Left representatives that boycotted the speech.

Among the good feelings on either side and Modi’s talk of a “New Dawn,” those unfamiliar with the history of Indian grand strategy might be forgiven for thinking Washington and New Delhi will eventually agree to a treaty alliance akin to Australia or Japan. Nevertheless, India is certain to continue its hallowed policy of strategic autonomy and carve out a place for itself as one pole in a multipolar order. This carving, however, will no doubt rely on American military cooperation and economic investment, just as India’s non-alignment during the Cold War did not prohibit significant Soviet arms purchases.

Envisioning the future relationship will require a willingness to overlook or manage differences without losing sight of shared interests. India obviously cannot be classed among the United States’ traditional treaty allies. Yet it does not make sense that it be counted among more authoritarian partners with fewer shared values, like Saudi Arabia or Egypt. The fact that the United States and India at least conceive of themselves as quintessential democracies is significant, even if they disagree over the meaning as such.

James Himberger is the Associate Editor of The National Interest. He can be followed at @Beaconsfieldist on Twitter.

Image: Shutterstock.

In a joint press conference with President Joe Biden on June 22, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi remarked that “even the sky is not the limit” for U.S.-India cooperation. India’s state visit is nothing short of historical, considering the widespread craze for Modi’s charisma as well as the number of agreements signed across various sectors like defense, semiconductors, critical minerals, space, climate, education, healthcare, and more. Out of all of those, the proposal to jointly produce the GE F-414 jet engines stands out. This is because only four countries—the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, and France—can make jet engines. Manufacturing behemoth China is yet to crack it. The jet engine technology is so precious that the United States has been careful to share it even with its allies. This, however, is about to change.

General Electric has signed a memorandum of understanding with India’s Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) to co-produce the GE F-414 engine for the Indian Air Force. While GE is pursuing necessary export authorizations with the U.S. government, the agreement is set to usher in a new phase of defense cooperation between Washington and New Delhi.

In the last six months, both countries have been working through the initiative for Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET) to set channels for strong private sector cooperation in technologies of strategic consequences. When Secretary of Defense Austin visited New Delhi, India and the United States also agreed on a Defense Industrial Cooperation Roadmap. The jet engine deal marks the beginning of a promising collaboration on defense innovation and technology cooperation. It is also a significant step towards settling the two fundamental differences in an otherwise thriving defense relationship. First, the United States wants to increase military sales to India, while the latter presses on technology transfers for indigenization. Second, India’s role as a maritime power has been central to U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific, while India has prioritized the land border with China. The GE jet engine deal shows how both countries can balance these mutual concerns.

From Buyer-Seller Relationship to Co-Production

Defense cooperation between the United States and India has grown exponentially in recent years. India’s elevation as a Major Defense Partner status (in 2016) and Strategic Trade Authorization I (in 2018) strengthened the foundation of the defense partnership. However, impediments such as different national bureaucratic structures, acquisition models, and budget processes held both countries back.

Until the Defense Trade and Technology Initiative could figure out the institutional nitty-gritty as a “silent enabler,” the United States supplied arms to India via Foreign Military Sales and Direct Commercial Sale mechanisms. However, a buyer-seller relationship was not feasible for India in the long term—though cutting-edge, American weaponry is costlier than French and Russian counterparts. It was a major reason India could not make big-ticket purchases from the United States and instead chose France (for the Rafale jet over F-16s, for example) and Russia (for the S-400 missile system over PATRIOT PAC-3). On the contrary, India sought technology transfers to develop its defense-industrial base. For the United States, it was difficult to divulge sensitive technologies without adequate trust in the Indian defense ecosystem.

The jet engine deal shows a modus operandi to realize the true potential of the strategic partnership. The jointly-produced GE F414 will fit into India’s advanced light combat aircraft (HAL Tejas Mk-2) and the first batch of prospective fifth-generation stealth fighters (HAL AMCA). As Indian Air Forces aim to maintain forty-two squadrons (around 756 fighter aircraft) by 2035, thousands of jet engines will enter the production line over the next decade. Through this deal, the United States has made a long-term investment in the Indian defense market.

The jet engine deal, in addition to the General Atomics UAV deal, will also advance India’s goal for military modernization. From assembling components to performing maintenance operations, Indian companies will gradually learn the know-how of jet engines. Technology transfers have a long gestation period before the receiver can independently develop some part of the system. In the next few years, India’s defense industry will absorb immense skill to build the capacity to produce high-tech systems.

If the United States and India begin more joint production projects of such scale, their military industries will be engaged for decades. The United States wants a share of India’s defense market, while India needs access to advanced military technology.

Addressing India’s Conundrum: Land or Maritime?

America’s interest lies in seeing India as the central maritime power in the Indian Ocean region. In contrast, India’s present primary concern is the volatile Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China. Though India has a development-centric approach to the Indian Ocean, a hot border has constrained New Delhi from committing desired military resources in the maritime domain. Time and again, U.S. policymakers acknowledged India’s border challenges but lacked a sustainable strategy to facilitate India’s proactive posture in the Indian Ocean.

The jet engine deal has also opened a pathway for India to mitigate the Himalayan threat while promoting its maritime assertiveness. Most fighter jets using the GE-F414 engine will be deployed at India’s land borders. Procuring MQ-9B SeaGuardians UAVs will also ramp up its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. The development comes after Washington leased two Predator drones in 2020 for surveillance after the Ladakh standoff with China.

Future areas of defense-industrial cooperation include aerial combat, land mobility systems, ISR, and munitions. Considering the regional threat environment, India will primarily use these technologies in the Himalayan theater. But this is not all. The official iCET handout refers to an “initial focus” on these seemingly land-oriented technologies, after which both would identify their operational use cases in maritime security. Furthermore, deployed U.S. ships will now be able to access Indian shipyards for service and repair. Such access to the American fleet on Indian naval facilities is unprecedented.

The United States is farsighted in realizing that New Delhi will go maritime only when the 2,167-mile Sino-Indian land border is taken care of. India’s inroads in the Indian Ocean will also directly result from its economic rise and territorial security. A strong India on the land can also commit more to external balancing in the maritime domain, which supplements America’s wider Indo-Pacific Strategy.

Setting Future Goal Posts

Though the GE jet engine deal is a significant milestone, the United States and India can do much more to enrich the partnership. Some of the future goals posts for both countries can include the following.

First, the United States should strive to become the largest arms provider to India. Russia’s ability to act as a reliable arms supplier for India has diminished due to the prolonged war in Ukraine, a bottled-up economy, and subservience to China. America can fill the vacuum created by a weak Russia. At the same time, New Delhi can cultivate the Department of Defense and the military-industrial lobbies to maintain a level-headed realist India policy in the corridors of Washington.

Second, the United States and India should build on the outcomes of the visit to negotiate a Security of Supply Arrangement and Reciprocal Defense Procurement. The former will allow India to request prior delivery of orders with U.S. firms while the latter will promote synergy in research, development, and interoperability between the two countries. These agreements will facilitate working together during unanticipated disruptions and possibly open channels for wartime cooperation.

Amidst all the Modi-mania and euphoria regarding India, the United States policymakers must apply sober thinking. The United States is accustomed to leading its allies and having partners who toe the line on almost all issues. India, however, does not like to be led by superpowers; it instead strongly pursues issue-based alignments. Yet though their strategic worldview differs, the U.S.-India bonhomie cannot be more natural in today’s strategic environment and, one daresay, shared democratic values. Washington and New Delhi must be persistent because relationships of such importance are seldom a sprint but a marathon.

Ambuj Sahu is a doctoral scholar in the Department of Political Science at Indiana University Bloomington. He was previously trained as an electrical engineer at the Indian Institute of Technology Delhi. He tweets at @DarthThunderous.

Image: Image courtesy of GE.

In Lebanon, political paralysis and the inability to uphold basic tenants of democracy have become features of the country’s system. Last week’s twelfth parliamentary attempt to choose a new president was defeated in another spectacular fashion. The powerful Shia Hezbollah and some of its allies exited the chamber, breaking the necessary quorum to keep the vote going. This made the speaker of the Parliament, Nabih Berri, close the session due to an insufficient number of members being present. This has led some of Lebanon’s political parties to argue for a new model of governance, specifically one that makes Lebanon adopt neutrality vis-à-vis all wars. Is such an idea viable?

In an interview with former minister Melhem Riachi, who is also an MP representing the Christian Lebanese Forces (LF), he shared his belief that such a proposal is not a theoretical discussion or intellectual exercise. Rather, it is a necessity to rescue Lebanon from its self-inflicted wounds. We discussed why it has been difficult thus far to elect a president and break the now eight-month deadlock.

“It is normal, very normal. Because this is not a cause, it is the effect of many causes. Especially because Lebanon is facing many problems between its communities and how people see politics. It is also under the influence of regional and international developments.”

Lebanon has always felt the burdens or potentially the rewards of regional and global decisionmaking. As the regional tensions calm down following Syria and the Arab League’s rapprochement and Iran and Saudi Arabia’s resumption of diplomatic ties, it is natural for people to ask whether these developments will have a positive impact on Lebanon’s affairs at home. One example remains the presidency. Riachi acknowledged that although the question of who will make it to Baabda (the presidential home) is not solely up to the Lebanese, this should not stop the democratic process.

“We cannot elect a new president in a purely Lebanese way. We tried hard to make it so but it was impossible. Unfortunately, this is caused by an equilibrium of power. Our camp and theirs are equal in Parliament. That is why no one can elect a president alone.” When asked if the solution will come from outside or direct negotiations between both camps, Riachi said, “The real solution must be to go and vote, and vote and vote, again.”

Riachi talked about how the source of Lebanon’s problems lies in its roots, meaning the manner in which politics has been practiced and the country’s foundations have laid the groundwork for its current failure.

“I think it’s better we find a solution in the roots. Because the problem is in the regime, the way of our democracy; it is our constitution, we need to shake it all and rebuild it again all together with the principle of subsidiarity.”

He went on to say that Lebanon must now more than ever declare its neutrality to the world and request all foreign intervention to be stopped. “We need neutrality, we need to declare it, and get everybody away from Lebanon. When I say everybody, I mean everybody.” When asked to specify, Riachi replied, “The Iranians, the Saudis, the Americans, the French, everybody who tried to influence us. Everybody must go out. Our allies, and their allies.” Unfortunately, such a proposition is not so simple to implement.

Hezbollah has long received support from Iran and its allies, which is largely responsible for making it a regional player. For decades, the Saudis have backed Lebanese Forces and other opposition parties as a counterweight to Hezbollah and Iran’s regional influence that it designated as a threat. This was always a dilemma for Lebanon. How can sovereignty be respected when internal players from all sides are recipients of foreign support that bypasses the state? It can’t. Riachi accepts this as a historical reality and recognizes the need for change.

“Everybody must be out. This is a real neutrality to keep its people here. We have a huge wave of immigration, especially from the Christian community. This is dangerous, and it is more dangerous for the Muslims. Because the Muslims cannot live here without the Christians and vice versa.”

Lebanon has faced an increase in emigration since the economic crisis began in 2019. According to a study conducted by the Lebanese American University, emigration has pushed out the middle class which was largely comprised of the Christian community. Lebanon’s system is built on the concept of confessional consensus.

As jobs became scarce and salaries fell, most Lebanese have worried about their financial security. As the crisis exacerbated, so did dependency on international aid. Remittances from Lebanese living abroad have grown annually. World Bank data shows a 27 percent increase since the fall of Lebanon’s pound (lira).

Nevertheless, there still must be a final decision taken from the Lebanese leadership on foreign policy. For too long, Lebanon has been like a gray piece on the Middle East geostrategic chess board. It belongs to no one, but everyone can use it. Changing this reality must be on top of the priorities for Lebanon’s future president and government. The question is simple: what should define Lebanon’s foreign policy in the Middle East?

Adnan Nasser is an independent foreign policy analyst and journalist with a focus on Middle East affairs. Follow him on Twitter @Adnansoutlook29.

Image: Shutterstock.

Leopard 2A6 and Leopard 2A4 suffer their first losses in Ukraine

Recent reports of the Spring Offensive in Ukraine have started off with mixed news for Ukraine. While there have been reports of some gains, the recent destruction of a dam has flooded an area south of Kherson, narrowing the territory where Ukraine can conduct their offensive. While Ukraine does have some amphibious vehicles, Russia’s numerous BMP-3s would likely be the dominant weapon in assaulting or repelling attacks in water logged regions. A ground offensive to take this now flooded territory has likely been halted, blunting the southern push against Russian fixed defences south of Kherson.

Images and video of newly supplied NATO weapons being destroyed have also appeared from the front line in Ukraine. The loss of what looks to be two Leopard 2A6s and one Leopard 2A4 was accompanied by the loss of several American made Bradley fighting vehicles. The loss of so many Bradleys will be surprising, but the loss of what was promoted as the iron fisted Leopard 2 tanks is something Russia will use to regain their reputation as a strong and capable military force.

During the 1991 Gulf War, there were very few losses of American tanks and vehicles to enemy fire. One of the most notable losses was a crew member who was killed when a Soviet made BMP-1 used its low velocity cannon designed in the 1950s to penetrate the turret of a Bradley fighting vehicle. While the Bradley is a remarkable machine, it is not invincible or as well protected as a tank. The advantage of the Bradleys were to move troops quickly to needed areas and support troops with its cannon. The Bradley’s also have two TOW missiles that can eliminate most Russian tanks, but direct fire or artillery fire on a Bradley will almost always take them out of a fight.

The Leopard 2s were always a mixed solution for Ukraine. In the past, versions of Turkey’s Leopard 2A4s were damaged and destroyed fighting militants in Syria. While the Leopard 2A6s are the most modern version of the tank given to Ukraine, they are not invincible, especially against artillery. The front of the 2A6s, while very well protected, does not extend with the same level of protection on the sides and back of the Leopard 2A6. There are only a limited number of high value weapons NATO countries can spare, and there are not an unlimited amount of Leopard 2 tanks available NATO allies can do without.

The confidence NATO has in the Leopard 2s are likely well founded, but with Ukraine now on the offensive against fixed positions, there will be big losses for the attacking side. While publicly unexpected, Ukrainian Forces have known that losses would also include some of the best weapons on the field. Heavy losses were expected, and images of burning NATO tanks should have been known to be used by Russia. The images of advanced Russian tanks exploding and losing their turrets formed much of the narrative of a weak and disorganised Russian military. Images and videos of NATO tanks perishing in much of the same manner will be used to change the narrative. The biggest loss for Ukraine will not be Leopard 2 tanks, but the will of the West to support its offensive against Russia over time.

Losing the support of NATO may come in different forms. A successful attack by Ukraine in pushing Russian forces back to the the 2014 lines may encourage many allies to push for a cease-fire, especially if weapons are depleted and local politics in ally countries turn against further combat support. As mentioned above, a change in narrative with the view of NATO tanks and equipment suffering losses to the once embarrassed Russian Army may turn ally and adversary opinions over once again as it did with Russia’s retreat from the assault on Ukraine’s major cities. Ukraine depends greatly on the morality of their cause, and NATO allies depend greatly on its popular support from their people. Losing Leopard 2 tanks in the field in horrific ways will most likely change the narrative rapidly.

Another form of lost support for Ukraine will come from a slow degradation of support for their cause within ally countries themselves. The anti-war movement in the United States seems to pass to both sides of the aisle. Scenes of a recently fallen Afghanistan are mixed with the aftermath of recent conflicts there and in Iraq as American servicemen and servicewomen are back home dealing with the after-effects of being in combat. Policies that do little to quell conflict in Ukraine also turn the public against the war. Lives could be saved if foreign drones were prevented from freely making it to Russia to be used as terror weapons. Policies should be changed to use North American energy reserves to displace the large war chest being paid for by still persistent exports of Russian Oil and Gas.

Actions by NATO allies to create the image of support hurt Ukraine’s ability to fight Russia if those actions do not lead to positive and practical outcomes. An absurd example comes by way of the treatment of Canadian NATO members who diligently have gone to Poland and Latvia to support NATO forces helping Ukraine. Canadian Forces in Europe have been ignored by their Government to the point of being a health and safety risk. Many Canadian soldiers in Poland were not given food to eat while in Poland, to the point of going into personal debt to compensate while contributing their lives to Canada, NATO and Ukraine. Canadian soldiers in Latvia were sent on training missions without protective gear, notably helmets. Their Government have ignored these issues, all while promising more Canadian Forces member’s help, money and now even a big plane. Canada said they would not meet NATOs minimum contributions as they gave more than any other nation to help Ukraine(not nearly as much as Poland), but the end result put well intentioned Canadian soldiers in danger. When assistance is given, but done to the detriment of your population who want to help, it obviously sours support for your united cause.

Ukraine’s successes or failures in pressing south to the Black Sea and fighting to re-gain territories lost in 2014 must be measured with the amount of support they realistically expect to achieve at each level of the conflict. If Ukraine can manage expectations of their successes with images of losses, they would have just managed one piece of the larger support puzzle. Objectives of success may differ in the minds of NATO allies. Accepting support from allies who’s good faith does not extend back home to their own population or troops will damage future campaigns without question. It is important to be careful in this regard.