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Since spring 2014, Ukraine suffers from a full-scale war in the Donets Basin (Donbas). For the solution of the Russian-Ukrainian confrontation, Western and Ukrainian political analysts, opinion- and policy-makers, civic activists as well as diplomats need to jointly implement an agenda of re-imagination, prioritization, pacification and re-integration. The Donbas conflict should be understood anew, approached differently, engaged with directly, and solved sustainably. It should start with clearer communication of the stakes of the Ukraine Crisis for the EU. Resulting tighter economic and individual sanctions should be accompanied with positive offers to a post-imperial Russia. For a transition period, the Donbas should be put under the control of an international administration and UN peacekeeping forces. Finally, Ukraine and the West need to find a way to secure sufficient central control over a reintegrated Donbas while formally implementing the Minsk Agreements’ political parts.

Phase One: Re-Imagination  

A communication campaign should address a widespread misperception that today’s Donbas confrontation is comparable to older territorial disputes in such “failed states” as Georgia, Azerbaijan or Moldova. The ongoing war’s repercussions beyond Eastern Ukraine demand public clarification. The Donbas war needs to become perceived as a hot conflict putting under question Europe’s security system as long as one of the largest European states remains on the brink of collapse.

The prime reasons for this risk are neither the current domestic political tensions nor grave economic difficulties of Ukraine. During the break-up of the USSR in 1989-1991, “Ukraine without Kuchma” protests of 2000-2001, Orange Revolution in 2004, or Euromaidan uprising in 2013-2014, Ukraine was shattered by tremendous upheavals. Yet, none of these conflicts seriously endangered the Ukrainian republic’s integrity. Ukraine’s economic situation throughout the 1990s or during the Great Recession of 2008-2010 was as difficult as – or more so than – today. Yet, neither of these two deep economic Ukrainian dives threatened European security.

While being laudable by itself, the West’s large-scale financial help and developmental support for Ukraine is sometimes misconceived as a (if not the) major instrument to solve the Ukraine Crisis. Yet, even graver earlier political and economic domestic dislocations in Ukraine’s recent past did not threaten the stability of its state. Western help for Ukraine should continue but not any longer be misunderstood as a substitute for actually solving the Donbas conflict.

Moscow’s shrewd combination of crude military and seditious non-military methods (“hybrid war”) is meant to subvert Ukraine as a socio-political community. The Kremlin’s premier instrument for achieving this aim is to keep the Donbas as an open bleeding wound that will eventually cause Ukraine’s state to implode. A seemingly domestic Ukrainian collapse can then be used by the Kremlin to demonstrate to Russia’s population the impotence of European integration and foolishness of post-Soviet democratization.

While this is a rational strategy in terms of short-term Russian regime stability, it is hazardous enterprise. Western public opinion shapers need to communicate better why and how Ukraine’s possible future collapse entails transnational risks. For instance, possible millions of Ukrainian refugees would be flowing into the EU. In a worst-case scenario, a malfunctioning of Europe’s largest nuclear power plant in Zaporizhia, less than 300 miles away from the current war zone, would have repercussions worse than those of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster. A public narrative emphasizing European states’ national interest in Ukrainian stability needs to replace currently widespread externalization of the Donbas war as a sad, but far away conflict with few direct implications for the EU.

Phase Two: Prioritization

A novel understanding of the all-European relevance of the Donbas war should lead the EU to put its solution higher on its foreign policy agenda, and closer in the immediate future. The current sanctions regime is not trivial, yet malapportioned. According to research results of Moscow’s Skolkovo School of Management, EU sanctions “are capable of jeopardizing Russia’s production of gas and, particularly, oil in the future.” The underlying assumption of Brussels’s approach is that strategic patriotism guides Moscow’s decision making. The West hopes that future income losses for the Russian state will lead the Kremlin to modify already today its policies towards Ukraine. Yet, the logic of Moscow’s approach to secure domestic regime stability may be different. A soon collapse of the Ukrainian state resulting from successful hybrid war – above all, in the Donbas – can be sufficient to compensate for negative political repercussions of declining future energy exports.

In other words, the West needs to more explicitly address the figurative race between domestic effects on Russia of, on the one side, Western sanctions, and, on the other side, Ukrainian destruction. If Ukraine’s negative example demonstrates in time to Russia’s population that democratization leads to suffering and chaos, the Putin System can absorb a later decline of Russian living standards that results from the EU’s current sanctions. While a poorer future Russian state may be bad, it may still be seen as better than a democratizing Russia that risks ending up in a Ukraine-like collapse. Putin’s regime will, according to this supposition, prevail in spite of notable future EU sanctions effects.

In order to counter-act this scenario, the West should develop a tougher combination of carrots and sticks. First, sanctions need to be modified so as to generate earlier effects. Among others, Russian access to Western financial markets should be further reduced, and the building of the Nord Stream II pipeline be frozen. Second, the Putin system’s integrity should be shattered via additional measures against government officials and so-called “oligarchs.” The freedom the regime’s major stake-holders (as well as their immediate family members) should be further restricted to generate more intra-systemic dissatisfaction.

Third, a forward-looking vision for improved post-conflict Russian-Western relations should be communicated throughout Russia. Western positive offers to a future less aggressive Moscow could include joint energy projects or a free-trade zone between the Eurasian and European unions. Western awards to Russia for even more comprehensive solutions to all disputed territorial conflicts from Transnistria over Crimea to South Ossetia could include an Association Agreement (including a DCFTA) with the EU, visa-free regime with the Schengen Zone, and Membership Action Plan with NATO. Think-tanks and NGOs should communicate such ideas within the Western public. After they become widely known, national governments and international organizations (EU, NATO) could be encouraged, by interested parliamentarians, intellectuals et al., to voice such proposals for a hypothetical Euro-Atlantic integration of Russia in meetings with Russian governmental and non-governmental actors. The offers should be made officially, explicitly and repeatedly to feed societal pressure for a change in Russia’s foreign political course.

Phase Three: Pacification

Once Moscow takes a more compromising position, practical solution of the Donbas conflict can start. Western experts, diplomats and politicians should thus explore the future financing, mandate and shape of an international peacebuilding operation across the entire Eastern Donbas. A temporary third-party intervention would provide a transitional stage between Moscow’s current crypto-occupation and the seized territories’ subsequent return under Kyiv control. A UN mission with up to 30,000 peacekeepers, as the core element of such an operation, could serve the Kremlin as a face-saving mechanism. Moscow would, in the UNSC, have to be approve employment of a multinational force in the Donets Basin, and could present this to the Russian public as Putin’s peace initiative.

In combination with OSCE observer and EU civil missions as well as in cooperation with the Ukrainian state, the UN troop’s primary task would be to provide for demilitarization, disarmament, demining, re-reset of local self-governance, media freedom, return of IDPs, creation of a new police force, observance of civil and political rights, as well as preparation of local elections. Armed UN detachments would have to come from non-NATO and non-CSTO countries to preempt accusations of instrumentalization. Andrej Novak (2014), Oleksiy Melnyk with Andreas Umland (2016), the International Crisis Group, Richard Gowan and Andrey Kortunov (2017), or, more recently, Alexander Vershbow, Vitalii Kulyk with Maria Kucherenko and Liana Fix with Dominik Jankowski (2018) have, among others, discussed various additional challenges of such a scheme. International developmental organizations (World Bank, UNDP, EBRD, USAID, GIZ, DFID, SIDA etc.) should become active in the occupied territories as soon as an improved security situation permits.

Phase Four: Reintegration

The principal issue for the restoration of the currently occupied territories as parts of the Ukrainian state, after transitional international administration, are the political provisions of the Minsk Agreements.

They include demands for a constitutional reform, a special “law on interim local self-government,” the creation of “people’s police units” as well as other prescriptions intended by the Kremlin to infringe upon Ukraine’s political sovereignty. In February 2015, the signed text of the so-called Minsk II Agreement had been largely pre-formulated by the Kremlin. Nevertheless, most of Moscow’s formulations were accepted by Ukraine, Germany and France under the impression of a Russia-led and victim rich military offensive by the separatists conducted concurrently with the Minsk negotiations.

Ukraine’s major stakeholders (MPs, parties, opinion-leaders etc.) reject today the 2015 agreements’ political parts. Western and Ukrainian politicians, diplomats and experts thus need to discuss, already today, a future way out of this deadlock. A possible trick to do so would be a joint Ukrainian-Western re-interpretation of the Minsk Agreements’ emphasis on exceptional standing of the Donbas. A new reading of the Minsk II’s call for a “special status” of the Donbas could mean future stronger rather than weaker control over the currently occupied territories, by Kyiv.

To be sure, the Kremlin’s goal, with Minsk II, was to increase the Donbas’s official independence, and Russia’s unofficial influence there. Yet, Ukrainian and Western diplomats could agree upon turning this purpose of the Agreement text on its head while still formally fulfilling its prescriptions. A future Ukrainian law on the Donbas could indeed proclaim a “special status” for the currently occupied territories. Yet it could, for instance, increase the power of the Luhansk and Donetsk prefects. The new political offices are envisaged by the constitutional reform in connection with Ukraine’s ongoing decentralization which, in turn, is explicitly mentioned in the Minsk Agreements. While these prefects had been originally designed to fulfill supervisory functions in a decentralized Ukraine, their prerogatives could, for the Donbas, be extended to that of temporary presidential governors within the framework of a regional interim regime. The National Guard – not mentioned at all in the Minsk Agreements – could, in a future Donbas law, be granted additional rights and obligations on the currently occupied territories. Similar further provisions could be included in a future Donbas law in order to make a constitutional reform acceptable or even desirable to the Verkhovna Rada.

Concluding Remark

This four-stage plan will hardly be to the liking of the Kremlin. If implemented consistently, it could still force Moscow to go along with it. Tightening Western sanctions will eventually lead Putin’s entourage to assent to an international administration of the Donbas, as the least embarrassing way out. Once UN troops have arrived, Kyiv could start gradually implementing a reintegration plan that does not violate the Minsk Agreements’ text, yet still re-establishes proper Ukrainian control over the Donets Basin. Only this end result will constitute a sustainable solution to the conflict.

The post Re-Imagining and Solving the Donbas Conflict: A Four-Stage Plan for Western and Ukrainian Actors appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Clément Moreau, Frans Masereel, Félix Vallotton… à partir de la fin du XIXe siècle, ces artistes utopistes et proches du mouvement ouvrier ont été des virtuoses de la gravure sur bois. Leurs œuvres dénoncent la violence sociale et témoignent des bouleversements de leur époque, de la révolution (...) / Socialisme, Culture, Art, Anarchisme, Socialisme libertaire, Histoire, Communisme, Peinture - 2018/09

In a Kabul clinic, staff struggle to help teenagers drafted by the Taliban.

>> Retrouvez l’article dont est extraite cette citation : « États-Unis : de nouvelles options nucléaires ? », écrit par Benjamin Hautecouverture dans le numéro d’été 2018 de Politique étrangère (n° 2/2018). <<

The late U.S. Senator John McCain's life was one marked by courage, empathy, pride, and determination.

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On the global scale of human suffering, Yemen outweighs all other countries. In its fourth year, the Yemen war – fueled by regional and other hegemonic powers – is nowhere near its end. Neither the coalition led by Saudi Arabia, which has been accused of war crimes, nor the Iran-backed Houthi rebels, accused of recruiting child soldiers, are close to winning this conflict.

Yemen is a humanitarian catastrophe in progress. And on the political front, the way things are evolving, the Somali model might be a fait accompli. It is hard to imagine a different fate for Yemen than that of Somalia – numerous balkanized political entities cursed with perpetual distrust and hostility.

Two-Sides of the Same

As someone whose ancestral background is deeply rooted in both Somalia and Yemen and with a keen interest in post-colonial political evolution in both societies, I can attest to the profound cultural similarities between these two countries and their peoples.

Both countries have never been left on their own in modern history. Both societies are dominated by a primitive tribal system that preserves history through oral traditions that commonly cling on to toxic narratives against other tribes. Both tend to zealously defend tribal honor or vanity even if that means sacrificing their countries’ interests. Both have religious extremist groups. Both are considered rich in natural resources though they remain two of the poorest nations in the world. In both countries, a culture of corruption is as rampant as their addiction to khat (qat), a plant with amphetamine-like stimulant potency. And the rule of law is by and large superseded by the tribal or clan social and political orders.

Furthermore, both are located in coveted strategic geographical areas. Both have separatist or secessionist movements whose claim to self-determination is based on the artificial demarcations of the British colonial power. Both nations have foreign elements that are hell-bent on advancing their own exclusive interests. And foreign interests in both countries are so camouflaged with domestic political affairs that it is almost impossible to identify which is which.

Despite these daunting similarities, I believe transformation is still possible, though it will require herculean sacrifices.

Geopolitics Rules

Geopolitical conflicts have certain distinctive characters that set them apart from conventional ones. Actors who are set to reap the strategic benefits are seldom visible in the fields. Covert actions frame or shape the overt ones. And those who ultimately show up as most equipped firefighters or the most enthusiastic life-savers are often the real arsonists.

These arsonists, who are routinely armored by credulous or greedy local citizens, are on a mission to establish favorable realities on the ground. They re-engineer the neighborhood and create an environment conducive to perpetual (but manageable) insecurity that makes the local populations in desperate dependency.

Criteria for Junglification

The Saudi-led coalition has taken a page out of the playbook used in the catastrophically failed Iraq war. The strategy was simple: invade under the altruistic pretext of coming to save Yemen. Inflict awe-striking destruction. Destroy historical sites, records, and rituals that could reinvigorate collective memory and collective identity – a sense of nationhood.

Pick a side on a sectarian divide knowing full well that in tribal societies there is nothing wholly monolithic. Support various zero-sum tactics in the hope that they will play right into the Saudi hegemonic interest in the region. Don’t worry about an exit strategy. Count on installed puppets and count on the support of the exploitable sectarian masses and their raging appetite for ethnic-cleansing.

Battle of Hodeidah

The battle to control Hodeidah is still underway, and the longer this continues, the worse the humanitarian crisis will get. After Houthis refused to adhere to the demands to disarm and hand over the Hodeidah port and evacuate the city, the Saudi-led coalition forces have launched a ferocious invasion that shook the foundation on the Houthi control of strategic geographical areas in Yemen.

Soon after, an Emirati navy vessel was destroyed, and missiles were fired at Saudi Arabia’s capital Riyadh for the first time. This forced a swift change in rhetoric and preconditions and lent the U.N. proposal a fresh appeal for both sides. 

The Hodeidah battle is broadly considered as the most significant since the fall of Sana in September 2014. For the Houthis, it is a “do or die” struggle. Though the coalition claims that the Houthis receive their weapons through Hodeidah, it has been the most important port where 70 percent of Yemen’s food and other essential supplies come through.

If this battle drags on for long, it will exacerbate an already catastrophic humanitarian situation in Yemen.

Likely Outcomes

At the deadly poker table, many continue to make their emotionless moves. There are those who are interested in sectarian supremacy, those interested in regional hegemony, those interested in lucrative mercenary projects, those interested in proxy political legitimacy, and those with the grand strategy to secure geopolitical dominance.

The likely outcome for Yemen is the Somali model – tribal fiefdoms exposed for perpetual exploitation. On July 17, a two-day pow-wow ended in Brussels. The so-called Somalia Partnership Forum brought together six Somali presidents to discuss the affairs of their single nation through a third party or representatives of 58 nations that are all presumably willing to pour more money into Somalia project than they are willing to fight poverty and homelessness in their respective countries.

So, is there an alternative?

The only means to change this imminent trajectory is to accomplish what Somalia has been stuttering and stumbling with – and at times faking it – for decades: a genuine reconciliation followed by a rigorous campaign to sacrifice claims of exclusive tribal rights for inclusive equal rights for all Yemeni citizens. This requires empowering the educated younger generation who by and large transcend the self-destructive clannish worldview of the traditionalist elders.

• first appeared on The Globe Post

The post Yemen’s Fateful Twinship With Somalia appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

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Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’été de Politique étrangère (n° 2/2018). Jérôme Marchand propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Luke Harding, Collusion. Comment la Russie a fait élire Trump à la Maison-Blanche (trad. Flammarion, 2017, 352 pages).

Le journaliste Luke Harding possède une bonne connaissance des mécanismes d’influence sur lesquels s’appuie le Kremlin. Il s’agit cette fois de déterminer si le candidat Donald Trump a bénéficié en 2016 d’interventions téléguidées visant à faire pencher la balance électorale en sa faveur. L’auteur a consulté un certain nombre de sources dignes de crédit, dont Christopher Steele (ex-MI6), auteur du rapport d’Oppo Research qui a mis le feu aux poudres. Et il s’est intéressé à l’historique des relations entre la Russie et le promoteur Trump, ce dernier ayant très tôt entrepris de rattraper ses fiascos immobiliers en sollicitant des appuis étrangers.

L’enquête résumée dans Collusion a été menée en accéléré. Elle n’en établit pas moins des conclusions crédibles : le candidat républicain a profité d’interférences (hackings, fuites, rumeurs) décrédibilisant son adversaire démocrate. Cela ne signifie pas pour autant qu’il s’agit là d’un facteur décisif, comme l’assène le sous-titre de l’ouvrage. Hillary Clinton et son staff d’apparatchiks ont commis un nombre incalculable d’erreurs, en bien des points similaires aux bévues de 2008. Ils n’ont pas non plus pris la mesure d’un outsider ayant animé plusieurs années un show TV à fortes audiences, et doté d’un bagage « spectacliste » bien plus riche que celui d’une oratrice de podiums engluée dans le politiquement correct. À ne pas négliger non plus : le jeu distancié d’Obama, générateur d’incertitudes pour une hiérarchie policière (FBI) peu à son aise dans la prospective électorale et le décodage des courants socio-culturels de fond.

Pour revenir aux manipulations russes, on observera qu’elles témoignent d’une bonne compréhension des vulnérabilités du système politique américain, déstabilisé par une crise de médias traditionnels enfermés dans l’exacerbation narcissique des « différences marginales » (Freud), et toujours pas décidés à traiter le problème de la haute criminalité financière. On notera aussi que Poutine dispose d’un pool de talents confirmés, opérant dans des milieux hétérogènes mais dynamiques, alors que les entourages de l’actuel président des États-Unis (Michael Flynn, Carter Page…) laissent transparaître de sévères déficiences. En contrepartie, on peut se demander avec Harding si les initiatives du Kremlin et de ses relais administratifs (GRU ou FSB) vont avoir les retombées présumées.

L’élection de Trump constitue un succès tactique pour Moscou. Elle intensifie la crise hégémonique à laquelle les États-Unis sont confrontés depuis l’invasion de l’Irak et le scandale des tortures. Les manœuvres défensives (dénis mensongers, tweets rageurs, dénonciations névrotiques du « quatrième pouvoir » et de ses libertés) de la Maison-Blanche ajoutent au trouble, en ce sens qu’elles ruinent le travail de re-légitimation morale mené à l’occasion du Watergate (1972-1974). On ne saurait pour autant prédire que la Russie va tirer de cet épisode des avantages durables. La divulgation des manipulations opérées en 2015-2016 a mis de nombreuses capitales occidentales en alerte. Elle a effacé une partie des gains statutaires engrangés dans la crise syrienne. Elle a exposé le fond du ressentiment rancunier qui anime Poutine et le conduit à prêter une importance excessive aux raisonnements régressifs des services spéciaux. Endosser le costume du trickster a sans doute ses charmes. Mais on ne fait pas une politique étrangère de haute volée sur de telles bases.

Jérôme Marchand

S’abonner à Politique étrangère

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El 4 de agosto, dos drones explotaron en el aire durante un discurso del presidente venezolano Nicolás Maduro en Caracas, en lo que luego fue calificado por el gobierno como un intento fallido de asesinato. A pesar de que la mayoría de las fuerzas opositoras rechazaron el ataque, el gobierno lo usó como excusa para arremeter contra la disidencia, ordenando 34 arrestos, incluyendo el del diputado Juan Requesens. Inquietantes videos circularon poco después por las redes sociales que sugieren que el gobierno drogó forzosamente y humilló al parlamentario para tratar de que confesara su participación en el complot. [Read the English version of this article here.] Para muchos, el ataque de Maduro a las libertades democráticas y la violación sistemática de los derechos humanos en el país significan que no existe otra opción distinta del uso de la fuerza para sacarlo del poder. Pero la...