Diplomacy & Crisis News

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’été de Politique étrangère (n° 2/2019). Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos propose une analyse de l’ouvrage dirigé par Carl LeVan et Patrick Ukata, The Oxford Handbook of Nigerian Politics (Oxford University Press, 2018, 832 pages).

Cette somme volumineuse et indispensable analyse toute la complexité du géant de l’Afrique, troisième pays le plus peuplé de la planète d’ici 2050. Le Nigéria, premier producteur de pétrole du continent, est souvent vu comme une économie mono-dépendante de ses ressources en hydrocarbures. Pourtant, l’essentiel de la richesse nationale provient désormais d’activités qui ne sont pas liées à la rente pétrolière : une révolution depuis le boom des années 1970. La chute des prix du baril et la crise de 2015 n’y ont pas été pour rien. Mais la résilience de l’économie tient aussi à la débrouillardise de la population. Ainsi, les commerçants locaux sont réputés pour leur capacité à prendre des risques, y compris dans la diaspora. Ils ont par exemple été parmi les premiers Africains à s’établir en Chine pour s’y approvisionner à bon prix. Ce sont donc les Nigérians qui ont débarqué en Chine, plutôt que les Chinois qui ont entrepris d’arroser le marché nigérian de produits de mauvaise qualité.

Le secteur formel de l’économie, en revanche, stagne dans un pays où le nombre de travailleurs syndiqués est tombé de 1,9 million de personnes en 1988 à 1,8 en 2005. Dans un État rentier, la fonction publique vit pour l’essentiel des revenus de l’extraction d’hydrocarbures. Elle demande donc peu aux citoyens en termes de paiement d’impôt, de civisme et d’obédience idéologique. Le Nigéria est en quelque sorte l’archétype d’une économie libérale par défaut d’État, un des pays où la part des revenus fiscaux dans le produit national brut est la plus faible : 6 % en 2017, moins de 5 % si l’on exclut les taxes sur la production pétrolière. En retour, les citoyens n’attendent pas grand-chose du gouvernement pour fournir des services de base et rendre des comptes sur l’usage de la manne pétrolière.

Endémique, la corruption continue donc de prospérer, malgré le retour à un régime civil qui a mis fin à l’opacité des dictatures militaires au pouvoir jusqu’en 1999. Caractérisé par des fraudes électorales et de nombreux assassinats, le jeu politique se révèle de plus en plus mafieux au fur et à mesure qu’on descend au niveau des 36 États de la fédération. Dès les années 1990, certains envisageaient de supprimer les échelons intermédiaires de l’administration territoriale et de ne garder que les collectivités locales pour raccourcir les circuits financiers et réduire les possibilités de détournement des fonds du pouvoir central. Mais les réformes n’ont guère abouti. La démocratie parlementaire marche mal : entre 1999 et 2015, seuls 1 005 projets de lois sur 3 759 ont été adoptés par l’Assemblée nationale, dont 244 finalement ratifiés par la présidence.

Les militaires, eux, n’ont jamais complètement renoncé à influencer le jeu politique. Depuis 1999, deux des quatre présidents étaient des généraux à la retraite : Olusegun Obasanjo puis Muhammadu Buhari. D’anciens militaires ont aussi occupé des sièges de députés, la présidence du Sénat et des postes de gouverneurs d’État, comme Murtala Nyako, Jonah David Jang ou Olagunsoye Oyinlola. En 2015, l’armée devait même dicter le calendrier des élections : il fut retardé pour lui laisser le temps de reconquérir les dernières portions du territoire aux mains de Boko Haram. L’affaire réveilla de mauvais souvenirs, car le premier à demander un ajournement des opérations de vote était le responsable de la sécurité auprès de la présidence, le colonel Sambo Dasuki, lui-même membre de la junte à l’origine de l’annulation du résultat des élections de 1993, un scrutin considéré parmi les plus démocratiques qu’ait jamais connu le pays.

Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos

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We have not yet begun to fight!

The Trump Administration’s August 5 designation of China as a currency manipulator marks a new crossing of policy lanes in US-China relations.  In the many facets of that relationship and the rising tension between the two, America needs a clear understanding of our objectives and priorities.  

Followers of trade policy know that matters of tariffs, quotas, and other “strictly trade” measures are usually kept separate from issues of monetary policy, at least formally.  Currency levels inevitably affect trade and at times academics, politicians, companies, and officials question whether a country deliberately depreciates its currency for trade reasons.  Japan in the 1980s faced this suspicion.  But whatever the reasons, governments tend not to play currencies and trade measures against each other explicitly.  

China’s central bank allowed the Yuan to drop through a market benchmark, apparently in response to President Trump’s announcement of a new round of tariffs.  The administration’s “manipulator” designation, symbolic in economic terms, signals that the U.S. sees the linkage, and will engage China on that basis.

As policy measures cross into each others’ old lanes, who will link more issues together, and to what end?  Is America out to counter China’s initiatives by exacerbating strains on the Chinese system?  It seems not, given reports of the Trump Administration’s internal instructions for the August trade talks. But Chinese leaders could see an existential threat even if a U.S. administration only wants them to enforce patent rights.  Is China’s harassment of an American diplomat in Hong Kong a linkage that reflects this fear?  Conversely, might the Chinese think we attach lower priority to, say, political repression, than we actually do?

In recent history we seem to have tolerated “a degree of intellectual property theft and unequal market access in the belief that China was making some progress toward market principles and the rule of law,” and a hope that that would lead in the direction of more democratic practice.  Today, Xi Jinping’s consolidation of governing power has dashed that logic.  Xi also exhibits geopolitical ambition in the Belt And Road Initiative’s investments in Eurasian nations; militarization of islands in the South China Sea; even cultural influence campaigns.  U.S.- China relations are entering a new mode.   

Reviewing a broad backdrop of many issues and several decades, the observer can see U.S. priorities careening between human rights, economics, and geopolitics.  China can always justify aggressive geopolitics toward us, as we might always swerve toward confrontation, but need never take our concern for rights and democracy to heart, as we always veer back to economics.  Chinese leaders could all too easily see the swings as fecklessness masking hostile underlying motives: our protests over rights as interference to weaken them internally; our economic pragmatism as serving capitalist exploitation; and our security posture as hegemonic.  

In the coming transformation in Sino-American relations, policymakers must clarify our essential purposes.  Doubts about American goals, and even America’s nature, are rising.  The post-modern age’s bewildering developments complicate the task. Coherence in national priorities becomes more difficult just as it becomes more important.  

Amb. William Burns, in his diplomatic memoir The Back Channel, notes how “Shaping the principles of policy debate … is often the first step toward winning it.” Principles need not be controversial, but clarity is “critical to shape our approach and tactical choices,” especially as new issues, new technologies, and new developments keep changing the tactical landscape.

America has clear core principles, and today’s transitions give an opportunity not only to apply them, but to remind ourselves of our priorities.  Principles for an approach to China might follow lines like:

1. The sanctity of individual rights and government’s first duty to secure them form the core of America’s values.
2. Our friendship with China or any other actor will grow as they develop toward that principle, and wane as they diverge from it. China’s compatibility with us is their sovereign choice.
3. Security for the U.S., beyond safety of Americans and our essential functions, includes a primary interest in security for nations that embody our core values, and an interest in societies that are developing toward freedom.  
4. Free enterprise and attendant rights are integral to individual liberty.
5. Economic well-being, for the U.S. and globally, is a major goal of U.S. policy because it supports freedom and its development.

Note that it is China’s choice to move toward or away from us.  And, although the divergences run deep, even a neo-Confucian governing doctrine could admit of a modus vivendi with us.  Meanwhile, the U.S. gives explicit voice to where we stand, guides our own actions by that principle, and affirms our nature to ourselves and the world.

The post The Trade Bone’s Connected to the Yuan Bone … appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

As the United States matures as a global power, how should America assert itself in the world?

The United States is the world’s preeminent superpower and barring some unpredictable catastrophe that fact is not going to change over the short term. For the United States to maintain its leadership role over the long term, however, America’s approach to foreign affairs and international engagement will need to respond both to a changing security landscape and the gradual economic rise of other powers. Just as the United States understood its role in the world differently after the First World War, the Second World War, and following the Cold War, the United States should work to preemptively understand the consequences of the continued Eastward movement of the world economy’s center of gravity and the continually changing nature of asymmetrical security threats. While that guidance might seem so obvious as to be meaningless, the challenge comes in understanding those changes in light of America’s relative decline when compared to more rapidly growing powers. The United States has long been an economic powerhouse, but America’s short history combined with its unparalleled dominance over the global economy following the Second World War has led to distorted expectations for the certainty of outright American hegemony. None of this is to say that the United States is in absolute decline (which is to say that the United States would be getting weaker when compared only against itself) or that America is not capable of sustaining a major international presence long into the future. Instead, it is to suggest that for the United States to maintain its top-tier power and influence over the decades to come it should seek to rebalance its international activities toward more up-stream and cost effective approaches towards global engagement while gradually (yet strategically) trimming the fat off of America’s bloated international military presence. 

Perhaps the first and most obvious consideration is that reducing American military presence does not necessarily mean a policy of isolationism, or even reduced American influence in the short term. After all, if a short term reduction in America’s military spending only served to foster uncertainty or instability that forced the United States to return to, or perhaps even exceed, current military expenses the whole merit of the idea would be wasted. Instead, the United States could look to trim some of its most excessive deployments, curtail the raw production of military goods (which would not necessarily mean dramatic cuts in funding for R&D), and exert a more watchful eye over ongoing military actions to ensure that there is no unwarranted mission slip. 

Perhaps the most obvious, or at least historically peculiar, example of America’s international military presence is the continued stationing of forces through Western Europe. There is little historical precedent for that sort of military basing, even among close allies, and as conditions have shifted from the Cold War era, so too should America’s approach. While the move to withdraw forces from Europe might be seen as a symptom of weakening American commitment to NATO (especially in light of current conditions), there is nothing that would prevent the United States from simultaneously managing its resources more frugally while maintaining an unquestioned commitment to all of NATO’s key provisions. In the same sort of way, other opportunities for rebalancing American deployment could come about on the Korean Peninsula if the idiosyncratic relationship between President Trump and Kim Jong-un continues to gradually ease tension there. It might even prove to be the case that as a consequence of gradually reducing America’s military presence in tense, yet peaceful, regions, those regions might become less tense with time as potential rivals feel more stable in their security environments.

Of course, an undertaking like this would not only require a focused diplomatic effort to effectively communicate, but it would also require a reinvigorated State Department and a strong commitment to effectively use America’s soft power. These would be fundamental elements of any effort to ensure that American power matures gracefully. Unless we are willing to assume that American allies impacted most by the suggested rebalancing would simply ignore their security responsibilities (something that seems unlikely in light of America’s many capable allies and a careful approach to military withdrawal), close diplomatic relationships with our allies would prove both more important and more effective when called upon. American allies might even be more easily persuaded to join the United States when military force is needed if they can feel confident that the American diplomatic service has consistently been involved and that the potential diplomatic options have been exhausted. In modern instances where the United States has worked closely with its allies on military action, most notably the Persian Gulf War, those partnerships frequently proved successful in accomplishing their military objectives while avoiding mission creep. 

Unfortunately, when the United States has not carefully considered diplomatic and intelligence options and has failed to work with international partners, American military action has proven more costly and less effective. There is little doubt that America’s actions in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Afghanistan have had serious unforeseen consequences that brought about increased regional instability, to say nothing of reduced American influence. While some might suggest that comparing American unilateral action in these wars to America’s multilateral approach in past conflicts like the two World Wars, and even the Persian Gulf War, is disingenuous to the extent that the nature and scope of the threat is so different, it might be worth considering instead what that means for what sorts of ills that America can actually solve internationally. In order for the United States to remain a global superpower and a reliable and effective military partner over the long term, it must avoid the classical historical blunder of over-extension that helped bring about the collapse of empires as ancient as Rome and as modern as the Soviet Union. The United States has been in more than twice as many wars since the end of the Cold War than it had during an equal length of time during the Cold War era. This is a remarkable statistic given that one could easily argue that the threat during the Cold War surpassed the threats that exist today, and Sun Tzu, author of the Art of War, warned us that “There is no instance of a nation benefitting from prolonged warfare.” This sort of effort would begin with a careful and honest assessment of the costs and benefits of America’s ongoing military action, and would continue into the future by ensuring that decisions to use military force incorporate the American congress and international partners.

It is important to emphasize that the United States could, and absolutely should, maintain the ability to quickly respond to changing security environments and maintain a steady and active presence in all sorts of international affairs. These efforts would include maintaining a forward presence in particularly troubling or symbolically complicated regions of the world. It is also important that the United States remains on the cutting edge of all aspects of military technology, including cyber threats, in order to remain on top of the global pecking order. While, in general, this paper does make the argument that the United States would stand to benefit over the long term from more frugal commitment and use of military force, the end goal of those adjustments would be to maintain American strength, both domestically and abroad, over the long term. Streamlining America’s military presence would simultaneously allow for more full-throated commitment to truly vital interests, and could result in savings that would benefit the strength of America’s economy- which, at the end of the day, is a key factor in ensuring that the United States would be able to organize a sufficient military response to a major threat like war with another global power. Towards this end, the United States should work to adjust its long term strategic approach not only to a post-Cold War world, but to the eventual (potential) ascent of other players on the global stage to peer status. 

A nation whose foreign policy has long been guided by notions of its exceptionality might find its greatest test in its ability to mature gracefully.

—

Peter Scaturro is the Director of Studies at the Foreign Policy Association. The opinions expressed here do not necessarily represent the views of the Foreign Policy Association.

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What to make of the new political realities in Ukraine? Both, the presidential and parliamentary Ukrainian elections of 2019 delivered historic results. Ukraine never had a President with so much electoral support (73%), and so little connection to the country’s old political class. Moreover, independent Ukraine never had a parliament with as dominant a party as Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s “Servant of the People” whose faction will command more than 250 of the 450 seats. The two elections were a perfect storm that swept away the majority of previous politicians and top bureaucrats in the presidential office, national government, Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Council), and general procuracy.

Regress or Reset?

Such a high concentration of power, in the hands of the “Servant of the People” party, as a result of Zelenskyy’s landslide victories in the presidential and parliamentary elections is being assessed very differently by various observers, in and outside Ukraine. Many intellectuals in Kyiv warn against the authoritarian and security threats that such one-party dominance could entail. They fear – within what one could call the “post-Soviet” or “Thermidorian paradigm” – a political development in Ukraine that will follow that of other former republics of the USSR.

Authoritarian regression has been the rule rather than the exception in much of the post-Soviet space from Belarus to Kazakhstan. Many thus worry that a kind of Thermidorian Reaction could undo most of the gains of the Euromaidan Revolution. Ukraine could also become a typically post-Soviet dictatorship or again a Russian colony – or both.

In a more favorable perspective, Ukraine’s novel political landscape can also be contextualized within the logic of the Westminster model or so-called pendulum democracy with its “winner takes it all” idea. This approach to democratic rule partly rejects division, balance and checks of power. The Westminster paradigm instead emphasizes clarity of public responsibility, as well as a sharp differentiation between the roles of a country’s ruling majority party, on the one side, and opposition forces, on the other.

Ukraine’s elections have now delivered a result where all executive and most legislative power rests in the hand of only one party. What is left under yet incomplete control by the otherwise hegemonic “Servant of the People” party are constitutional amendments that need a two-thirds majority of votes in parliament. A change of Ukraine’s basic law thus still demands collaboration of some MPs not elected with the support of Zelenskyy’s party.

Such a, for Ukraine, largely novel constellation implies enormous opportunities and risks. Zelenskyy’s overwhelming dominance in the executive and legislative branches of power provides him, for the coming years, with many instruments to swiftly implement his ideas – whatever they are. It also puts responsibility for Ukraine’s future successes and failures squarely into his and his followers’ hands. That reminds of a situation after a House of Commons election in the United Kingdom, in the past.

The Major Challenge for Zelenskyy

Unlike in the British proto-typical constellation, however, Zelenskyy’s absolute majority in parliament and staff in the executive is, to considerable extent, made up of newcomers with no previous experience in public office. This problem, in fact, is reminiscent of his own lack of exposure to national politics, public administration and international relations. The parliamentary and ministerial novices will moreover will be operating in an under-institutionalized and highly “monetized” political environment. They will make and implement decisions under a – mildly speaking – incomplete rule of law. They will also encounter many political and personal challenges – among them seductive offers from Ukraine’s notorious “oligarchs” – that they may not be prepared for.

Against such a background, the main question for the coming years will be less whether Ukraine becomes again authoritarian or/and Moscow-controlled – as some alarmist commentators warn. Rather, the principal question will be whether “habitual elite continuity” – once formulated as Ukraine’s key domestic political challenge, by German political scientist Ingmar Bredies – will reassert itself or not. Ukraine experienced considerable change among the holders of its highest public offices not only as a result of this year’s elections. This had happened repeatedly before, after previous elections or after the popular uprisings of 1990, 2004 and 2014, i.e. the so-called revolutions on the granite, in orange, and of dignity. In spite of frequent and sweeping fluctuation in the upper echelons of political power, the habitus or behavior of the Ukrainian elite did not change much, over the last 30 years, however.

Instead, Ukraine’s parliament, among other institutions, has been characterized by habitual elite continuity, i.e. a stunning stability in the patterns of political conduct by Ukraine’s MPs. They have shown a surprisingly continuous inclination to engage in informal exchanges, bribe-taking, outright nepotism, little disguised favoritism, secret deal-making and far-reaching clientelism. These pathologies, to be sure, are also present in the operation of advanced democratic systems. Yet, they have been – since 1991, if not before – far more prevalent in Ukraine and in most other post-Soviet republics than in Western states.

The main question thus is whether Zelenskyy’s landslide can finally disrupt these behavioral patterns. Will Ukraine’s almost three decades old habitual elite continuity be finally broken, with this new exchange in the composition of its political class? Or will private interests again be able to infiltrate political decision making, as it happened after earlier replacements of deputies and ministers? What instruments can secure a truly sustainable break in Ukraine’s political class behavior, and magnify the already sweeping change in the composition of the parliament?

Urgent Tasks: Deputies’ Salaries, Rule of Law, Gender Equality

First and foremost, the new MPs need to get salaries that will make their possible bribe-taking morally more hazardous than it currently is. As of mid-2019, Ukrainian parliamentarians earn, per month, about 28,000 Hrivnas or approximately 1,000 US-Dollars in cash. In addition, they receive a number of additional privileges that improve their material situation somewhat. To be sure, the overall package of monetary and non-monetary remuneration makes Ukraine’s MPs relatively well-off people, within the overall Ukrainian socio-economic context.

However, Ukraine’s capital Kyiv where the MPs are supposed to live most of the time is more expensive than the rest of country. Kyiv city has salary-, service- and price-scales of its own. The current MP reimbursements may be enough to survive for single MPs who do not have any larger family obligations. Yet, the current pay makes it difficult for those with financial responsibilities for children, parents or other relatives to take up a seat in the Verkhovna Rada – while only living on their official income as parliamentarians.

Even for those without greater family obligations, the current parliamentary moneys system is dysfunctional. In the best case, it limits the MPs’ lifestyles to one of constant counting of expenses for food, transportation, clothing etc. In the worst case, it creates a situation in which MPs feel ethically justified to take side-payments so as to be able to use Kyiv’s restaurants, taxis, and other services that their peers in business corporations, international organizations and foreign embassies use on a regular basis.

To overcome this situation, Ukraine could – with reference to its Association Agreement with the EU – adopt the EU’s formula for salaries paid to the members of the European Parliament. The MEPs receive about a third of the salary that the highest judges of the EU’s courts are paid. For some time already, Ukraine’s top judges receive, by Ukrainian standards, extraordinarily high salaries (though, in absolute terms, not as high as EU judges). If Ukrainian MPs would receive about a third of the salaries of Ukraine’s highest judges, this would apply the EU formula, significantly increase their monthly remuneration, and make their interaction with business-people, Kyiv’s diplomats, and foreign politicians more relaxed. Such a deal would also provide a justification for withdrawing immunity from MPs and increasing penalties for bribe-taking as well as other misbehavior by Ukraine’s new parliamentarians.

Second, there have been statements of the new president and his team on the possibility of early local elections. It is plausible to argue that a deep change in Ukrainian public administration would need a swift exchange also of local elites. Many current deputies and administrators on the regional and sub-regional levels are corrupt. Yet, for oblast and local elections to be effective as a mean to secure change on the regional and municipal levels, it is necessary to attain, at least, some improvement of the rule of law. New committed teams in the prosecution office and various anti-corruption bodies need to be appointed.

Furthermore, the role, function and reimbursement of oblast, rayon and communal administrators and deputies need to be adjusted. The official salaries of mayors, for instance, are lousy while members of city councils do not get any reimbursement for their work time. As on the national level, such framework conditions naturally lead to corruption – independently from possibly good intentions that citizens may have when becoming public executives or people’s deputies. New elections by themselves will not change this.

Third, many Ukrainian governmental bodies suffer – especially when it comes to their top positions – from more or less egregious gender imbalance. This is not only fundamentally unjust in view of the fact that more than 50% of Ukraine’s population are women. Organizational research has found that collective bodies, whether private or public, function better when, at least, one third of its members are female – a scale still not reached in certain Western institutions too. The argument about bringing more women into government is thus not only about equality, but also about the effectiveness of ministries, parliaments, services or parties.

The composition of the Rada, to be sure, has changed for the better as a result of the last elections. Yet, the share of women among parliamentarians only increased from 12% in the last Supreme Council to 19% in the new one. Worse, almost all parliamentary parties are headed by men. Zelenskyy himself is male – as are his first major appointments, like the Chairperson of the Office of the President of Ukraine, Andriy Bohdan, or Secretary of the Council for National Security and Defense of Ukraine, Oleksandr Danyliuk.

Given this circumstance, there are thus good reasons to sharply increase the number of women in top positions not yet filled – whether within the executive, legislative or judicial branches of government. Currently, there is a high overrepresentation of men on those posts that have already been distributed or taken. This includes seats in parliament, ministerial positions, heads of services, or leading party functions. It may thus be even necessary to simply stop, for a while, appointing any men to top offices. Only in this way, there may still be a chance to reach, at the end, the above-mentioned recommended share of one third among Ukraine’s crucial decision makers in various state organs. Given the high number of well-educated, emancipated and career-oriented women in Ukraine, this should not be a problem.

Getting to the Roots of Post-Soviet Problems

The already accomplished sweeping change in the composition of Ukraine’s political class this year may be deceptive. Zelenskyy’s stunning electoral triumphs over the last months could suggest to him and his team to go ahead and start reforming this or that part of legislation, the economy, foreign affairs, cultural matters etc. However, first things come first.

Numerous new laws, resolutions and policies need to be implemented to make Ukraine’s state better work. Yet, the responsible decision formulating, making and executing bodies in all three branches of power as well as in local administrations are still hampered by deep structural defects with regard to the formation and remuneration of their personnel. Unless these basics are changed radically, the outcomes of the work of Ukraine’s state organs may remain as wanting as they have been so far.

By resolutely getting to the core of Ukraine’s post-Soviet issues, Zelenskyy can, moreover, provide a model for other former republics of the USSR. With regard, for instance, to gender balance in state organs, most post-communist countries still lack far behind Western countries. A deep transformation in the composition and functioning of the political class of as large a country as Ukraine could – in distinction to earlier progress in, among others, the three Baltic countries – not be easily ignored by politicians and intellectuals in the successor states of the outer and inner Soviet empire. Western embassies and donors should, therefore, insist on Kyiv’s completion of the current reset in the make-up and structure of the Ukrainian political class.

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Publié dans : TheConversation.fr
Si le Proche-Orient regorge hélas de drames et de tensions – du Yémen à l’Irak ou à la Syrie –, deux dossiers engagent aujourd’hui plus particulièrement la stratégie américaine et les équilibres internationaux. Le premier est, bien entendu, celui de la relation avec l’Iran, qui fait l’objet de toutes les spéculations, de toutes les escalades verbales, et pourrait servir de détonateur à tous les scénarios. Le second est celui de la Palestine, dont la dangerosité vient à l’inverse de l’absence d’engagement américain, dans un discours pétri d’arrières pensées bien plus que de coups d’éclat.Dans les deux cas, un jeu de dupes et de miroirs semble s’être engagé entre les différents acteurs du pouvoir américain eux-mêmes, entre différents protagonistes régionaux, et se répercute sur la stabilité régionale comme globale. Du traitement de ces deux dossiers, ni la politique étrangère, ni les politiques étrangères arabes, ni le jeu des autres puissances ne sortiront indemnes.La politique étrangère américaine : faire et défaireL’issue de la stratégie – ou de l’absence de stratégie – actuellement engagée par Washington en Iran et en Palestine déterminera, en grande partie, la crédibilité internationale des États-Unis, au-delà de la région, et au-delà de la période de l’administration Trump. D’abord parce que ce sont les États-Unis qui défont aujourd’hui ce qu’ils ont fait eux-mêmes : il sera donc important de voir si les dégâts seront réparables à l’avenir, ou pas.C’est l’Amérique – celle de George Bush senior puis de Bill Clinton – qui a rebondi sur le processus d’Oslo au début des années 1990, pour aboutir à la poignée de main Arafat-Rabin de 1993, et qui a ensuite fait pression sur les acteurs (certes en vain) pour poursuivre les négociations, en y engageant ses diplomates les plus chevronnés. C’est l’Amérique désormais qui fait disparaître toute référence à un État palestinien, en confiant le dossier au gendre du Président, qui ignore tout de la négociation internationale.Jared Kushner, le gendre du Président, lors d’un sommet sur la Palestine, le 25 juin 2019, à Barheïn. Shaun Tandon/AFPC’est encore l’Amérique – celle d’Obama – qui a ramené l’Iran à la table des négociations pour aboutir à un accord sur le contrôle du nucléaire, en juillet 2015, et faire souffler un vent d’apaisement sur une relation ô combien conflictuelle depuis 1979. C’est l’Amérique de Trump qui a déchiré cet accord, et renoue avec une rhétorique de confrontation. Quoi que l’on pense de l’accord de 2015, quoi que l’on pense des ratés et retards d’un processus israélo-palestinien considéré comme moribond, le dialogue continuait, l’Amérique revendiquait encore un rôle d’arbitre impartial, même si peu y croyaient. Elle n’y prétend même plus aujourd’hui.Guerre des camps au sein de l’administration américaineEn tombant le masque, l’administration Trump prend un risque multiple. Celui de renoncer à sa position surplombante, pour descendre dans l’arène et voir inévitablement émerger d’autres puissances s’opposant à sa vision : Moscou s’y est déjà engouffré.Celui également de mettre ses propres alliés en situation difficile : progresser par le non-dit vers un rapprochement entre l’État hébreu et les monarchies du Golfe (et leurs alliés comme l’Égypte) est une chose, leur demander de cautionner publiquement l’abandon de la cause palestinienne en est une autre.À lire aussi : Quel rapprochement possible entre Israël, l’Arabie saoudite et Abu Dhabi ?Celui enfin d’enflammer la région, si l’une de ces deux situations bascule dans le chaos : qu’une étincelle mette le feu aux poudres dans le Golfe, ou qu’éclate une nouvelle intifada, ou de nouvelles violences autour de la question palestinienne, et il sera difficile à l’Amérique de reprendre pied.Enfin, il est désormais visible que plusieurs camps s’affrontent dans le processus décisionnel américain, qui tablent sur l’amateurisme ou l’absence de réel intérêt du Président Trump sur ces dossiers pour avancer leurs pions. Une course s’est engagée entre ceux qui souhaitent limiter les tensions, et ceux qui comptent bien les précipiter.Stephen Walt✔@stephenWaltPeople who say "Kushner's 'peace plan' won't work" are missing the point. It wasn't supposed to work--if that means facilitating a just & lasting peace. Its purpose was to buy time, kick dust, shift blame, & thereby facilitate permanent Israeli control of W. Bank.8347:42 PM - Jun 25, 2019Twitter Ads info and privacy533 people are talking about thisSi le Président semble n’avoir aucun autre agenda précis que de se mettre en scène en « deal maker », soufflant le chaud et le froid à la recherche, comme en Corée du Nord, de quelques rebondissements spectaculaires, d’autres ont une vision. Elle peut consister à promouvoir le changement de régime en Iran, quel que soit le prix régional à payer – comme pour son conseiller John Bolton. Ou encore à gagner du temps sur la question palestinienne, et faire le jeu du premier ministre israélien actuel, comme le craignent certains analystes aux États-Unis mêmes. L’issue de cette confrontation sera cruciale pour l’avenir de la politique étrangère américaine.L’effacement des politiques étrangères arabes
Lire la suite dans : TheConversation.fr

Congress members celebrate as Brazil’s pensions reforms cleared their first legislative hurdle after years of wrangling © Reuters

Pension reform is something that has a great effect on the future of Brazilians, Latin Americans and to be honest the rest of us as well. Brazil was always a unique case, a country that built an administrative centre in the middle of the country in the 1950s that is populated by mostly government administrators with fairly good pension packages. The citizens of Brasilia did not initially come to their careers or pensions in an average process where a union fought for reforms to match wages with those of the private sector. The creation of Brasilia was a massive national project that also created the place for a public sector that really formed much of the middle class in Brazilian society at the time, existing to this day.

With the attempt at industrializing Brazil and Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s came stronger workforces, with capable union support to fight for the rights of their workers. By the 1990s and the post economic crisis of the 80s came Worker’s Party Presidents like Lula and balanced economic policy approaches with the support of unions in pushing the economy forward. While memories of those years were positive and a somewhat healthy mix of classically liberal economic policies supported by labour unions with some targeted social programs, the last few years has shown that there was corruption feeding off corruption, and it hurt average Brazilians the most. Whether it was elite members of labour unions or elite wealth, middle and lower income Brazilians were treated as an afterthought.

The debate in Brazil and the rest of the region likely follows a similar debate in your country as well. Pensions for those who were fortunate enough to be employed in the public service seemed to become very lucrative over the years. With many private sector employers cutting back or losing their businesses altogether, many became unemployed and felt that the little income they had should not go directly towards a set raise for union employers that depended on underemployed taxpayers. Public sector jobs were now out-competing benefits-wise and pay-wise with private sector employment that no longer existed due to economic disruptions over the years. The end result is that the pension packages that were lucrative and part of the labour contracts in the past still needed to be paid, but without an economy that can sustain many of those packages.

It is understood by a community that taxes should go to support everyone in a community, for schools, hospitals, police and other utilities. What percentage however is a reasonable amount to go to a pension fund from the community’s public purse? While it is well understood that public and private sector pensions should not be cut or eliminated because those employees have spent their careers depending on those future benefits, what cost should the entire community endure to pay those pensions before other necessities? Even in the case of California, Michigan and Ontario in Canada, public pension costs are forecast to be so consequential that there is no real plan to cover them without going into permanent debt. How can an elected government make the community a priority if they have an impossible political battle over pensions when making difficult policy decisions?

The case of Brazil and Latin America may have even more desperate consequences. With much of the lower income workforce being precariously linked to the national and regional social services systems and a weakened private sector middle class, there is little political strength to pressure the government and unions to take policy decisions to benefit the average worker. Even in the case of private sector union employees who lack hours or a place to work, the private sector unions have little power if there is no employment in their sector. Such a scenario occurred in the last US election, with private sector unions pulling away from their traditional Democratic roots because their members had no employment to effectively support their union movement. While is it extremely difficult to reform contracts and take money from the pockets of active union members, it might be that the resolution of this issue determines the future health of a community.

The post Pensions for Some, but Not for Others appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

The main UN platform following up on Member States’ actions to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) continued its work Monday taking up the issue of finance, including examining ways to better align and distribute funds for development at national, as well as global levels.

Nelson Mandela was an “extraordinary global advocate for dignity and equality” who anyone in public service should seek to emulate, Secretary-General António Guterres said marking the International Day that honours the iconic anti-apartheid campaigner, and South Africa’s first democratically-elected President. 

In today’s Daily Brief: the DR Congo Ebola outbreak is officially declared a Public Health Emergency; UN Youth Envoy briefs Security Council; an ‘exciting and potentially defining’ moment for Sudan, says UN adviser; more cooperation’s needed to secure arrest of war crimes fugitives; and politicizing the migrant ‘crisis’ in Hungary

After visiting refugee camps in Jordan, UN-backed schools in Gaza, municipalities in Kosovo and Youth Councils in Denmark, the UN’s Youth Envoy visited the Security Council on Wednesday with a simple message from the field that “young people care about peace”.

Cool heads are needed in both Beijing and Washington.

The second worst Ebola outbreak of all time, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), was officially declared a Public Health Emergency of International Concern on Wednesday, with the head of the World Health Organization calling for countries to ‘take notice and redouble our efforts”.

Expressing deep concern over how migration and migrants themselves are being politicized and scapegoated in Hungary, an independent United Nations human rights expert on Wednesday urged the Government to immediately end its “crisis” approach to the issue. 

Long deemed strategically irrelevant by the United States, the EU is poised to become a major geopolitical power. Washington should take note.

A new book looks at why the U.S. military keeps trapping itself in endless conflicts.

Almost four decades after the first U.S.-Pakistani mission in Afghanistan, Islamabad risks getting caught in the crosshairs of great-power politics again. Only deft diplomacy will save it.

In a ruling delivered on Wednesday, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ordered Pakistan to review a death sentence handed down in the case of a former Indian Navy officer accused by Pakistan of spying, finding that the country’s authorities acted in breach of the Vienna Convention, which lays out rules for diplomatic relations between countries.

The decline in U.S. soft power didn’t start with Trump, but he accelerated it this week with his racist tweets.

It won’t bring the regime in from the cold, but it will save lives.