Diplomacy & Crisis News

Amid multiple deadly attacks on civilians by armed groups in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), an Ebola death “unlinked to any chain of transmission” risks reversing major gains against the epidemic, which is now down to just a handful of cases, a top UN medic said on Friday. 

Thirty years ago this month, the opening of the Berlin Wall ushered in the last great diplomatic struggle of the Cold War. As cheering crowds danced atop what was left of the Iron Curtain, the fate of Germany hung in the balance. In retrospect, it is easy to see that triumphal moment as part of an inevitable march toward German reunification. At the time, however, the future felt anything but certain. 

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An alarming lack of exercise among adolescents across the world risks seriously compromising their health into adulthood, the UN said on Thursday.  

There is a clear link between the seedy underbelly of the seafood industry, and fishers’ safety, now ranked as the second deadliest profession in the world; and more must be done to ensure people dependent on this type of labour are working in safe conditions, UN partners urged on Thursday. 

The recent 35th Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit and other related summits in Bangkok fell below expectations, providing fodder to armchair sceptics who believe such summits are a waste of time. But on closer inspection, these summits can still be viewed as a glass half-full in reasserting ASEAN’s regionalism in the Indo-Pacific.

 

ASEAN centrality at its finest

The centrality of ASEAN was in all its full glory in Bangkok under the current chairmanship of Thailand. The agglomeration of ASEAN-centered multilateral summits, which were convened from 31 October to 5 November, included the principal ASEAN Summit, ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and South Korea) Summit, ASEAN-China Summit, ASEAN-US Summit, ASEAN-India Summit, Mekong-Japan Summit, ASEAN-United Nations Summit and the East Asia Summit. The primacy of ASEAN in shaping the regional affairs of the Indo-Pacific was underscored at this slew of summits, with some yielding better outcomes than others.

 

As with past ASEAN summits, the focus of the joint statements was intended to reaffirm the commitment of individual countries to fortify the centrality of ASEAN, principally through the three community pillars of political-security, economic and socio-cultural. Continuing the theme from the 34th ASEAN Summit, the focus was on pursuing sustainability of meeting needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of succeeding generations to meet their needs. These include managing existential threats not only to traditional, but also to non-traditional security such as climate change and natural disasters.

 

Efforts to re-imagine ASEAN as less elite-driven and more people-centric and people-friendly by way of promoting people-to-people diplomacy especially among youths had also intensified all through 2019.

 

Far from being seen as a proxy for the major powers, ASEAN is a useful fulcrum that manages great power relations in the Southeast Asian region. At a time when US-China trade spat shows little sign of receding, ASEAN provides a multilateral protective shield for its individual member-states through strengthening its regional institutions and fostering deeper regional cooperation both within and beyond Southeast Asia. 

 

India disappoints ASEAN

India’s decision to bow out of the mega-regional trade agreement known as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) leaves behind a big void as India is one of the world’s fastest-growing trillion-dollar economies. India’s pull-out also dashed hopes of potentially sealing the RCEP deal in Bangkok after years of laborious negotiations, including direct talks with India to allay concerns and achieve a resolution.

 

But India’s open announcement on RCEP finally gave the green light for the other RCEP member-countries to now move ahead to resolve any remaining issues and reach a deal among themselves. India may even be doing them a favour by getting out of the way so as not to be a hurdle in getting RCEP over the line.

 

Although the other RCEP member-countries would prefer India to come on board, principally Singapore which has acted as the interlocutor from the beginning and Indonesia which has strengthened its maritime relations with India, they reaffirmed their commitment to get this trade deal done, with or without India. They are looking to reach an agreement by the next round of summits in 2020, which will occur in Vietnam.

 

While the door remains ajar for India to join the RCEP in the future, this is unlikely to take place under a Narendra Modi-led BJP government due to domestic political exigencies, as evidenced by a wave of anti-RCEP protests and lobbying by local businesses. It is unlikely to occur even under a Congress government, which has sought to take credit for compelling the BJP government to pull out of the RCEP. At this point, it is a delusion to think India will join RCEP, as RCEP + India seems more and more like a pipe-dream.

 

Rebuffing the RCEP contradicts India’s ‘Act East’ Policy of engaging eastwards, particularly Southeast Asia. Had India brought the RCEP into fruition, it could have been the pinnacle of the country’s ‘Act East’ Policy. Rather, India’s ‘Act East’ Policy suffered a setback with Prime Minister Modi pulling India out of the RCEP. India will now focus more on strengthening bilateral relations with individual countries in Southeast Asia, and on prioritizing minilateralist regional organisations such as the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation.

 

It was also a missed opportunity for India not to have leveraged on the RCEP to bring closer the diverse regions of South Asia and Southeast Asia. This is because India can actually serve as a strategic gateway and act as a torchbearer of South Asian countries economically engaging Southeast Asia in a big way.

 

The disinterested United States

The absence of the US President Donald Trump from the ASEAN-US Summit reiterates the notion that he does not prioritize Southeast Asia in US foreign policy, and finds multilateralism to be unimportant. As a further affront to ASEAN, Trump dispatched a non-Cabinet member of his administration to represent him in Bangkok. As a tit-for-tat, most of the ASEAN heads-of-state chose to give the ASEAN-US Summit a miss.

 

Trump’s strategic ambivalence towards Southeast Asia, as evidenced by his no-show at two consecutive ASEAN Summits, signaled the receding US interest in the region and the reluctance to provide hegemonic leadership in the Indo-Pacific. The unavoidable outcome of American regional disengagement was ceding more geostrategic space to China. Trump’s insistence on transactional diplomacy premised on a quid pro quo has frustrated even countries, including those in the Indo-Pacific, that are sympathetic to US Interests.

 

Trump’s Bangkok absence may actually be a good thing as it has made ASEAN finally realize that engaging the US multilaterally is like flogging a dead horse. As an alternative, countries in Southeast Asia should strengthen their bilateral relations with the US. A network of overlapping bilateral linkages could provide a useful substitute to multilateral diplomacy in keeping the US engaged in the Southeast Asian region.

 

Governing conduct in the South China Sea

The ASEAN leaders accentuated the importance to finalize the Code of Conduct (COC), as the South China Sea (SCS) remains an arena for maritime contestation over disputed islands and waters. The SCS dispute remains an existential regional security matter that can destabilize the Southeast Asian region, especially if there continues to be outright naval confrontations, most notably between ASEAN members and China.

 

Notwithstanding the South China Sea fatigue, there is political fortitude among ASEAN members to keep a lid on this regional dispute before it goes out of hand as it would have dire geopolitical consequences. As such, the COC is meant to put in place a regional framework to govern the conduct of disputants in the SCS, including deescalating any conflicts diplomatically so as to keep the regional peace and stability.

 

The difficulty however is the lack of clarity on the legally-binding nature of the COC and the disagreements among claimants on how to bring the SCS dispute to a close. It remains a work in progress, but the longer the COC negotiations go on, the more likely there will be further eruptible regional flashpoints in the SCS. 

 

Expanding the Russian footprint in Southeast Asia

One other discernible positive from the Bangkok summits is that Russia has begun to take the Southeast Asian region more seriously though the auspices of ASEAN. This was evidenced by Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev attending the East Asia Summit in Bangkok, and the declaration by Russian President Vladimir Putin to pivot towards Asia in its diplomatic strategy to “Turn to the East” beyond just China.

 

Right now, Russia’s footprint in Southeast Asia is moderate and unexceptional as opposed to other big powers, but the potential is immense for deeper engagement in Russia-Southeast Asia relations. One is in the area of arms and weaponry which Russia has been exporting to Southeast Asian countries. Perhaps at some point, Russia may want to step up bilateral defense exercises with Southeast Asian countries. The other is in trade, either conducted bilaterally or multilaterally between ASEAN and the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). The EEU-ASEAN collaboration is the path forward for Russia to engage Southeast Asia in a more incisive way whilst also providing Southeast Asia with a gateway to engaging Central Asia.

 

Thailand’s growing regional stature

Hosting a plethora of summits as ASEAN Chairman reflects the rising diplomatic stock of Thailand as an important player in regional affairs, and an aspirant middle power from Southeast Asia. Concomitantly, Thailand has been beefing up its bilateral relations with the much bigger countries namely China and India and to an extent, the US which is its ally. Thailand’s foreign policy posture has rejuvenated in recent years.

 

Especially after the 2019 Thai general election, there is now some semblance of domestic political stability within Thailand, which has enabled the country to conduct a more active foreign policy in bilateral and multilateral terms. The trilateral naval exercise which was conducted recently between Thailand and the other two countries of India and Singapore is a case in point. Known as SITMEX, the main aim is to enhance maritime relations between India and Southeast Asian countries in hopes of augmenting regional security.

 

Looking ahead to Vietnam 2020

As the next chair of ASEAN in 2020, Vietnam is likely to build on the progress made in Thailand 2019, but may carve out its own imprint on regional affairs. A primary litmus test post-Bangkok summits is whether ASEAN can bring RCEP into fruition sooner rather than later. Sealing the RCEP deal would underline the centrality of ASEAN in advancing Southeast Asian affairs. With India bowing out, concluding RCEP should now be a low-hanging fruit for ASEAN in 2020 when RCEP member-countries descend in Vietnam.

 

One high-hanging fruit for ASEAN however would be to enact the COC by 2021. The task will indeed be difficult but not impossible to achieve. As Vietnam is also a claimant in the SCS and shares a land border with China, it has a vested interest to hasten the progress of the COC in 2020 so that it can be enacted in Brunei, which will be ASEAN Chair in 2021. No doubt Vietnam’s diplomatic prowess will be tested in 2020.

 

Like Thailand in 2019, Vietnam will underline the paramount importance of mainland Southeast Asia in shaping regional affairs of Southeast Asia, principally through the auspices of ASEAN. To be sure, countries in mainland Southeast Asia have begun to play a more progressive role in recent years, and this can only bode well for ASEAN, which for many years were the preserve of countries from maritime Southeast Asia.

 

Under Vietnam’s stewardship, the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation will likely be rejuvenated, and as Thailand and Myanmar are also members of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), the Bay of Bengal may well become a critical node for inter-connectivity and hive of maritime activity, and importantly, enhance regional cooperation between South and Southeast Asia.

 

Above all, the Bangkok summits have clearly demonstrated that ASEAN is greater than the sum of its parts although every individual Southeast Asian country must pull its own weight to preserve ‘ASEAN centrality’. Despite challenges confronting regionalism such as domestic politics influenced by excessive nationalism and globalization which has threatened to make borders and regions irrelevant, regional cooperation has not been hampered. It will not be smooth-sailing for ASEAN going forward, but as the recent ASEAN-linked summits have shown, the potential for regional cooperation is immense and it has intensified. Regionalism has reasserted its importance, with ASEAN being the paragon of regional cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.

The post The Highlights and Lowlights of the ASEAN Bangkok Summits appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

In the absence of a magic potion for development, the best way for a country to profoundly transform millions of lives is not to try in vain to boost growth. It is to attempt to raise living standards with the resources it already has.

In recent days, Trump’s impeachment hearings and the US president reversing US policy on the Israeli settlements have dominated headlines in the American media.  It does not matter whether you are reading the Washington Post or watching CNN.   For the American media, it does not matter what happens in the rest of the world.  Anything that involves Trump automatically becomes front page news.  But is it ethnical that the American media behaves this way?  

Mass popular pro-democracy protests in China, Lebanon and Iran have been relegated to being back-page news.  The Iraqi popular protests against an Iranian proxy government are barely even mentioned in the American media anymore.   The plight of Syrian Kurds, Yezidis and Christians living under Turkish occupation has all been forgotten about.  Never mind that no one is getting ethnically cleansed or killed over the latest Trump scandal.  Most people care first of all about what is in their backyard and not what happens on the other end of the world, even if the incident abroad by its very nature should have been a greater news story.   Sadly, the American media reflects this bias.  

Given that this is the reality, it should surprise no one that the American media did not report that 200 Hindu families were forced from their homes by Muslim assailants in the Gopalganj district in Bangladesh in the first half of November, even though there were mass protests against it.  After all, Bangladesh is not located in Europe nor North America.  It is located in a poor region of Asia, which does not really influence developments in the US. 

Therefore, the American media does not value 200 Bangladeshi Hindus being forced from their homes in the same manner that they care about the latest scoop related to Trump.  After all, he is a rich white man, not a poor brown skin Bangladeshi Hindu.  In this manner, the American media turns a blind eye to the systematic abuse of human rights by the Sheikh Hasina government against the Bangladeshi Hindu community.   By not reporting on the plight of Hindus in Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina faces very few international repercussions for her human rights abuses and this is most unfortunate.

Bangladeshi Bridges, Roads and Transport Minister Obaidul Quader built an Awami League office building on top of property seized from the local Bangladeshi Hindu community and the American media doesn’t report on this, even though people were threatened into giving away their homes merely because they were born into the wrong faith.   The Hindu community in Bangladesh has paid a price because of this.  Shipan Kumer Basu, President of the World Hindu Struggle Committee, declared: “It turns out that the Awami League wants an exclusively Muslim country. As I said before and still say, Sheikh Hasina has a secret conspiracy in order to establish Shariah law. I urge the international community to come and visit. Only then will you understand how the government plans to expel Hindus, Buddhists and Christians from the country!”  

Why doesn’t the American media care about religious freedom and human rights across the globe anymore?  Why has the US become so isolationist?  Why does everything have to be based on transactional diplomacy and oil interests in the Trump era?   “Transactional diplomacy is practiced on the basis of ‘I don’t care about human rights abuses, I don’t want to muddy things up by insisting on American values, I just want the deal I want,’” Daniel Drezner, professor of international politics at Tufts University’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in Medford, Massachusetts, told Christian Science Monitor.  Ever since former US President George W. Bush left office, America hasn’t had a leader that cares about promoting democracy and human rights across the globe.   Everything has become isolationist.  Everything has become valueless.  In the Trump era, it is all about transactions, oil and the art of the deal.  It is time that this changed.  

 

 

 

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Brain Dead or Not, What’s its value to America?

Emmanuel Macron’s views, as voiced in an interview with the Economist,  suggest that America needs to clarify what America is.  Americans will note Macron’s reference to the “brain death of NATO,” but the issue runs deeper than that one alliance.  Unaddressed, the sentiment Macron voices could raise a challenge to America’s deepest interest.

Macron does not focus on NATO per se; he says President Trump’s stance really tells Europe to “’Wake up!’”  To what?  That the European Union, if it does not think of itself as a global power, “will disappear geopolitically, or at least … will no longer be in control of our destiny.” 

What, at bottom, is the purpose of “Europe?”  Macron talks about strategic thinking, but strategy starts with the strategist’s basic goals.  Presumably he sees democracy and human rights as central values.  But is the European Union primarily a voice for rights?  Or could it be a geopolitical entity out to gain and keep worldly power?  Perhaps it’s an economic entity dedicated to prosperity, with rule of law and democracy as fortuitous knock-on benefits?  The question arises in particular because of Macron’s call for “’rapprochement’” with Russia.  Again, to what end?

This questions matter to America because, if Macron’s sentiments take root, Europe could evolve into a major pole of independent geopolitical power.  What kind of power would it be?  The answer will bear on our ability to live by our own nature and secure our own deepest interest.  

That nature and that deepest interest still get short shrift in our own discourse.  But even when we don’t pay attention, they are baked into America’s founding.  The Declaration of Independence established a “people,” separate from prior ties, identified by our holding of self evident truths on unalienable personal rights and government tasked to secure those rights.  We won’t shake that commitment, at least not without renouncing the terms of our national existence.

Right now, a core of nations exists, for whom the primacy of individual rights defines their basic political ethos.  Most of those nations, and relatively few others, are members of either NATO or other fundamental treaties with the United States.  Many are European, though right now NATO does not particularly focus on rights, partially because it includes Turkey, Hungary, and other nations backsliding from liberalism.  But the free nations form a natural core of allies who validate our foundation in rights, and form a base of support for the “interest” in liberty that lies at America’s core.  Will Europe stay in that base?

If Europe decides, from its various traditions, that “security” or “identity” or “economic growth” defines their core purpose, then Europe  starts to look like the Chinas and the Russias of the world.   Some powers, perhaps Europe but not necessarily, may care about democracy.  But any and all might hold it as second priority, or third or lower, with “sovereignty” or “order” or “peace” or “’our’ nation” first or second before it.  Today’s natural core of support will have disappeared, and America will have only realpolitik by which to choose our foreign relationships.  Any ability to embody the Declaration’s tenets will be diminished. 

America needs to cement our ties, at the deepest level with those who live in deep systemic commitment to rights and liberty.  To be clear, while the Trump administration has made noises disruptive to current alliances, our observance of our existential purpose has been shuffled for decades, ever deeper under politicians’ priorities.  As Walter Russell Mead suggests, Macron or any European might wonder how committed we are to NATO, going forward and in the recent past.  We need to focus on the tenets of the Declaration’s creed now, before the world makes embodying them even harder. 

This simple impulse could entail complex, protracted diplomatic and institutional moves.  We might initiate separate understandings among, say, NATO nations minus Turkey and Hungary plus Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Japan, Sweden and Finland.  We should find ways to grow closer to nations like Brazil, Indonesia, Ghana, and South Africa, who are working to strengthen their democratic systems, and further, perhaps, from the Philippines or Turkey if they continue to deteriorate in theirs.  Specific policies and moves cannot be prescribed right now.  But we need to start viewing our alliances and relations in light of America’s founding tenets.

President Macron is America’s ally, regardless of any personal or political stances toward any given American.  But his interview shows we cannot take for granted that even the most freedom loving nations will automatically remain our friends.  We need to clarify who we are, so when others choose their friends the free nations will stay close with us, for freedom’s sake.

The post Macron, Europe, NATO, and Maybe Us? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

A demonstrator holds a placard reading ‘New Constitution now’ during a protest against Chile’s government in Santiago, Chile [Jorge Silva/Reuters]

While Venezuelans are still suffering from the economic and political collapse of their ever diminishing democracy, the rest of Latin America has been mired in their own types of political problems. What are likely the most striking events have occurred recently in Chile. With a high cost of living and large divide between the wealthy and other economic classes, the tensions in Chilean society have boiled over. Even with the firing of the President’s Cabinet and moves to change the Pinochet era Constitution, Chilean protests rivals those of Hong Kong and Baghdad.

Known as the most stable economy in Latin America, Chileans have always lived in the shadow of the Pinochet era where the dictatorship and military cracked down on left wing political leaders by disappearing them, murdering thousands of citizens as well as an elected President and controlling the country to such a great degree, that even the modern Constitution operates in a manner to block any access to justice for victims of the regime. While Chileans always had a muted voice, it seems as if the recent protests may require more than just reforms of documents, it might need an acknowledgment of how society had laid dormant and wounded for generations. A catharsis of Chilean culture and society may be the only solution to protests that erupted after years of oppression and state run silencing of any challenges to the government. While there have been many reforms since the end of the Pinochet regime, it may not just be a youth protest, but a generational flood of pain and anger coming from a society that was crushed for the sake of economic progress in the 1970s and 1980s. Chileans did not suffer for the sake of modern inequality, the President should consider this if any solutions will be found.

In Bolivia, the long term left wing President Evo Morales has landed in Mexico where he was granted asylum. Morales was accused by the OAS of rigging the last election, and with social unrest in the country coming to a boiling point and Morales not willing to leave, by any means necessary, heavy protests ensued and the military formally advised him to leave the country, for the sake of the country. While there is a running debate by foreign political leaders as to whether or not this is a coup or a military operating to entrust the will of the people to another election, it seems that local political preferences outside of Bolivia will not deter a change of government in Bolivia. Morales’ pro-Chavista government of almost a decade and a half may present another candidate and continue the same issues faced by Bolivians, but it seems as if a new election can be held, it will release a lot of tension currently simmering in Bolivian society.

Brazil’s famous former President Lula was released from jail in a legal case that would be a complicated final exam thesis for any legal expert in Brazil and abroad. While the explanation for his release comes from an inability to apply all of his legal options before going to prison, mixed with the accusation that the judge who put the legal talons upon the former President was bias in the application of the law, Lula may still share two very different fates. Lula may be able to run for President of his PT party again in a few short years or may return to jail for another corruption charge. While the leaders of Chile and Bolivia may be looking at Brazil and making sure they do not get tangled up in their own legal issues, it is Brazil that is suffering through a process to deter corruption while facing political and economic elites that are comfortable with the status quo. In the end, voters and protestors need to choose their future wisely if they are able to achieve the change they seek in their countries.

The post Who Wants to be President? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Indian paramilitary soldiers stand guard on a road leading towards Independence Day parade venue during security lockdown in Srinagar, Indian controlled Kashmir, Thursday, Aug. 15, 2019. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi defended his government’s controversial measure to strip the disputed Kashmir region of its statehood and special constitutional provisions in an Independence Day speech Thursday, as about 7 million Kashmiris stayed indoors for the 11th day of an unprecedented security lockdown and communications blackout. (AP Photo/ Dar Yasin)

Following years of unrelenting repression and humiliation of Kashmiris, India has finally extinguished their last ray of hope by repealing Articles 370 and 35A of the Indian constitution – both of which had granted Kashmir a special status. India did so in violation of the United Nations Security Council resolutions that forbade annexation of the disputed territory and called for a “free and impartial” plebiscite to allow Kashmiris to determine their own destiny.

Kashmir’s disputed status, which is acknowledged by a series of United Nations resolutions, offers the international community a locus standi to play a role in resolving the dispute – for the sake of Kashmiris and for the peace and stability of South Asia. The disputed status also provided, along with the Simla Agreement between India and Pakistan, a bilateral framework for dialogue on Kashmir.

By excluding the international community and Pakistan from a dialogue India has slammed the door shut on a peaceful settlement of the dispute and put peace in the region at risk. Some in official Washington have spoken up, but most have said little. However, there has been extensive coverage by the American and international media censuring India’s action, especially the continued inhumane lockdown of Kashmir and communications blackout.

According to these reports thousands have been imprisoned and the rest live under an unending curfew. The United Nations, International Commission of Jurists, global human rights organizations and other international agencies also have spoken up. Even before this humanitarian crisis, gross and systematic violations of Kashmiris’ human rights by Indian regular and paramilitary forces had been going on for years, and well-documented in reports by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on Kashmir, international and even Indian human rights organizations.

The United States often is a champion for human rights – sometimes for moral reasons, sometimes for strategic ones. In Kashmir, morality and strategic considerations are indistinguishable. But Washington’s silence speaks volumes. And its support for India’s action will harden India’s attitude and polarize the region. This will serve neither the US credibility nor its interests.

India rests its claim to Kashmir on the basis of the instrument of accession signed 70 years ago, and whose legality and authenticity Pakistan does not recognize. Nations are not made of a piece of paper, and much has changed in Kashmir since. The fact is Indian military presence in Kashmir may have helped it to control the territory but has invalidated its claim to it. Now India may lose its control as well.

Moreover, India is driving Kashmiris to extreme despair, leaving armed resistance as the only way out. Meanwhile, the marginalization of Pakistan as a party to the dispute will leave Pakistan no choice but to resort to bilateral measures such as restricting the relationship. India inevitably will respond, possibly aggravating the tensions along the Line of Control. Overall, this is a lose-lose scenario for the region.

In his speech to the United Nations last month, Prime Minister Imran Khan of Pakistan said as much. “Would I want to live this humiliation? Would I want to live like that? … You’re forcing people into radicalization. When people lose the will to live, what is there to live for?”

All these various stimuli are aggravating the risk of war. If that wasn’t the case, why would the Indian Defence Minister walk back India’s nuclear no first use policy. Consequences of a war between two nuclear weapon states could only be catastrophic.

And, of course, what happens in Kashmir reverberates in Afghanistan, especially if Pakistan has to relocate its troops. The reality is, Pakistan is vital to the stabilization of Afghanistan more so with the withdrawal of US troops. Meanwhile, what India has done imperils US interests in the region in more ways than one.

The fact is the totality of United States current and future interests in the region including its geopolitical competition with China will suffer if the Kashmir dispute and the relations between India and Pakistan are not addressed. If the US is looking to India as a counter to balance China, how can it do so with a persistent risk of an India-Pakistan war?

India aspires for big power status. But India’s aspirations are not likely to succeed in a perilous security environment it has exacerbated by its annexation of Kashmir. These aspirations can only be realized in a peaceful and stable South Asia, and that would require the resolution of the Kashmir dispute.

At the same time, a moderate and stable Pakistan, enjoying peaceful relations with India will be in the best position to help Afghanistan’s own search for peace and stability, while serving its own and America’s interests. After all, for more than six decades US-Pakistan relations have yielded huge mutual benefits for both countries – longer than the US India relationship.

The United States has helped raise India’s economic, military, and diplomatic stature. This support must continue. But Washington has enormous leverage to influence India, making now the time for President Trump live up to his offer to mediate in the Kashmir dispute. The United States should make good on the President’s offer to show America’s leadership again.

After all, Kashmir is no ordinary dispute. It is about American values and interests. But it is also about a people who have lived under a complete lockdown for more than two months, their history, culture, and aspirations for freedom.

The writer,  Ambassador Touqir Hussain, is a former Ambassador of Pakistan and Diplomatic Adviser to the Prime Minister, and is adjunct faculty at Georgetown University and Syracuse University.

The post Op-ed: Kashmir: Indian actions not in the US interest appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

One must conclude that all of the government-inspired rapes that target Bangladeshi Hindu women merely because they were born into the wrong faith community constitute a form of state-sponsored terrorism.

Recently, it has been reported that a series of human rights abuses have occurred in Bangladesh.  In a recent interview, Mendi Safadi, who heads the Safadi Center for International Diplomacy, Research, Public Relations and Human Rights, stated: “The people of Bangladesh are held hostage by a cruel tyrant, who has no problem slaughtering tens of thousands of her opponents merely in order to hold onto power, detaining masses of opponents before the elections merely to prevent them from disturbing her overwhelming victory and holding hostages in prisons merely in order to prevent just voices from rising up against her.  Bangladesh in recent years has become a country that has suffered from a high number of ethnic murders, the mass rape of Hindu women and girls by mainly Muslim men and a high number of Hindus being expelled from their homes so that the Muslims can take over their lands.”  However, while international media outlets have covered Sheikh Hasina’s repression against her opponents, very few international media outlets speak out about the daily rape of Bangladeshi Hindu women and girls.    

In my new book titled Emerging from the Depths of Despair: A Memoir on Rising Above the Trauma of Childhood Rape, which I am in the final phases of editing, I wrote: “There is an international consensus that politically-motivated rape is a form of terrorism.   Rape, like terrorism, is all about obtaining power, dominance and control over the victims, thus prompting them to feel helpless and weak.  Thus, Judaism considers rape to be equivalent to murder for the very nature of that crime is that it literally slaughters the soul of the female victim.”  Given this, one must conclude that all of the government-inspired rapes that target Bangladeshi Hindu women merely because they were born into the wrong faith community constitute a form of state-sponsored terrorism.

Yet sadly, the world is silent about this horrific phenomenon experienced by Bangladeshi Hindu women.   Recently, the World Hindu Struggle Committee reported that Rekha Rani Biswas, a Bangladeshi Hindu mother of two, was murdered after being gang-raped in Faridpur by Muslim terrorists.  Her husband Goap Biswas proclaimed: “I have a son and a daughter.  How can I live with my daughter in a country where my wife was brutally gang-raped and murdered?”  However, despite the fact that it is believed that her gang-rape and murder was religiously motivated, not a single major English-language newspaper has covered what happened to her.   In fact, not a single major Bangladeshi newspaper even covered her story.   Only a few online news sites noted it.   

Rekha Rani Biswas is not the only Bangladeshi Hindu female victim ignored by the community of nations.  According to the World Hindu Struggle Committee, Haimanti Shukla, a Hindu student at the Khepurpara Government Model Secondary School in Kalapara, committed suicide after being exposed to intense sexual harassment and was once even sexually assaulted by Muslims.   One of the Muslim harassers threatened Shukla: “If you don’t marry him, they will throw acid on you and murder your father.”  The threats, the sexual assault and the sexual harassment bothered Shukla to the point that she just committed suicide.   However, her story also did not make it into the major English language newspapers or even a major Bangladeshi newspaper for that matter.  Again, only a few online news sites covered it.

In an interview, Shipan Kumer Basu, President of the World Hindu Struggle Committee, proclaimed: “These days, fathers, brothers and uncles in Bangladesh provide school girls with security.  This is because no Hindu girl feels safe on the way to school or college due to the increasing incidents of sexual harassment, rape and murder that are encouraged by the Awami League government.   In our society, girls and women are helpless, especially if they are Hindu.  Sheikh Hasina often claims that she is working for the development of women and girls.  Here is a question.  How can you call this reality the development of women and girls?  What have you done for the development of women and girls over the past 11 years?  Is this the kind of development for women and girls that you seek?   Bangladeshi Hindu women and girls don’t feel safe.  This must be changed or else Bangladesh won’t be headed in the right direction.”

 

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On October 23-24, the Russia-Africa Summit and Economic Forum took place in Sochi. Over 10 000 participants and representatives of 54 African countries took part in the event.

The participants signed more than 50 deals, at a total value of more than 800 billion rubles. Moreover, African countries received 300 cooperation offers in different fields.

The event was a signal of Russia’s willingness to participate actively in the “battle for Africa”, which is being waged by leading actors of international relations. Africa is a resource-rich continent, has considerable “political potential” in the context of voting in international organizations. In addition, the continent is ready to cooperate with many countries. As a result, Africa becomes a “welcome piece” for the United States, China, the European Union, India, and Japan.

Although the focus was on economic cooperation, the Forum became an instrument to promote the main goal of Russia in Africa. It’s political influence through the control over natural resources and military support.

The above-mentioned Summit was only the beginning since the participants agreed to hold a similar event every 3 years and cabinet-level consultations – annually. For instance, the next summit, on the initiative of Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali, may take place in Ethiopia. 

Russia-Africa Summit laid the pillars for cooperation not only at the bilateral level. As the Government of Russia and the African Union, as well as the Eurasian Economic Commission and the African Union Commission, signed the memorandums of understanding and cooperation.

Statements of support for Algeria and Sudan to normalize the situation in these countries are also signals about Russia’s readiness to intensify political participation in the region. Likewise the agreements between the International Agency of sovereign development (IASD) with the governments of Niger, Guinea, DRC for political consultations and development.

The most interesting in this context is the Final declaration of the Russia-Africa Summit.

In addition to the general phrases on the UN Charter support, expanding official and informal cooperation, intensifying contacts within the UN, BRICS and other international forums, joint efforts on terrorism and extremism, intensification of trade interests, trade intensification regulations, the document has several interesting insights. It’s worth to emphasize the following:

1. “Develop an equitable dialogue taking account of the interests of the Russian Federation and African States on the basis of a multilateral world order”.
2. “Coordinate efforts to reform the UN, including its Security Council, as well as to increase its capacity to counter the existing and new global challenges and threats”.
3. “Strengthen global governance and consider reforming the UN Security Council taking into account the geopolitical realities with a view to making it a more representative body by ensuring greater participation of African States”.
4. “Continue strengthening contacts and coordination between Russia and non-permanent UN Security Council members from among African States with a view to jointly promoting shared interests”.
5. “Develop cooperation within other international organizations and provide greater mutual support when holding elections to their governing bodies and making decisions on issues of particular importance for the Russian Federation and African States”.
6. “Intensify Russia–Africa inter-parliamentary contacts and coordinate efforts for international parliamentary events to arrive at decisions and resolutions that would benefit the Russian Federation and African States”.
7. “The principle African solutions to African problems should continue to serve as a basis for conflict resolution”.

Obviously, such documents usually have general formulations, but even these selected replicas reflect the consistent tone.

It lays in strengthening the multipolar world order with a focus on reforming the Security Council. In this eventuality, Russia could promote its own interests easier, having support from a wider range of countries, including African ones.

African countries have significant “political capital” concerning voting in international organizations. 54 countries of Africa, representing almost a third of the votes in the UN General Assembly, are a very useful resource for Russia to “push” decisions across international venues.

The phrase “jointly promoting shared interests” reflects these Russia’s aspirations to seek the support of African countries to promote its interests, form a common agenda and make use of the African political potential. Most importantly, the phrase “multilateral world order” becomes more clear in the context of intensifying cooperation between BRISC and African countries, stated at the Forum.

The declaration of the Russia-Africa Summit also contains lucrative statements for Africa. For example, the principle of “African solutions to African problems“, that is so desirable to African countries, which try to avoid the trend of neo-colonialism and have Africa’s fate in the Africa’s hands. 

And “reforming the UN Security Council […] to making it a more representative body by ensuring greater participation of African States” reflects the aspiration of African countries to become P-5 members. For instance, we could recall speeches of Presidents of Sierra Leone, Angola, Zambia at the annual session of the UN General Assembly in September 2019. The representatives have stated firmly that it’s high time to give Africa representation which continent deserves. And these are just the last striking cases, not including earlier actions and arguments.

The participants signed agreements in the military, economic, mining, energy, infrastructure, educational and scientific fields during the Russia-Africa Summit.

Below is a list of the major arrangements in each area.

The main agreements in the economic sphere:

• The Investment Company “Uralkali” agreed to finance agriculture and mining projects in Zimbabwe.
• State Development Corporation VEB.RF is ready to provide up to € 425 million for the construction of an oil refinery in Morocco.
• The company “FosAgro” plans to open a trade office in South Africa and has signed the memorandum of understanding with Kropz.
• “Uralchem” together with Grupo Opaia are going to build a complex for the production of ammonia and carbamide in Angola.
• “EFKO” Group and Egyptian company United Oil have signed a partnership agreement, the main goal is to build a joint venture on fat-and-oil products.
• Negotiations are under way with Zambia and Ethiopia concerning more intense cooperation under a debt-for-assistance scheme.

Arrangements in the energy sector:

• Russia and Ethiopia signed the cooperation treaty in the field of the peaceful application of atomic energy.
• Russian Government intends to build new power plants in the CAR.
• Preliminary negotiations are held in the field of gas energy with Uganda, as well as with Zambia on the construction of nuclear power plants.

Mining Deals:

• The JSC “ROSGEO” signed memorandums with Sudan, Equatorial Guinea, Rwanda and South Sudan on mineral exploration.
• Lukoil signed the memorandum with Equatorial Guinea on the exploration and production of fossil fuels.
• JSC “Giprotsvetmet”, REC (Russian Export Center Group) and Afreximbank signed the agreement for establishing an intergovernmental platform to implement mining projects in Africa.
• By the end of 2019, Alrosa will receive 15 exploration licenses in Zimbabwe.
• Talks are under way with Sudan (gold), Mozambique (diamonds), Congo (joint gas pipeline).

Infrastructure Arrangements:

• Russian Railways and the Egyptian National Railways signed the protocol for collaboration on the construction of railway tracks in Egypt.
• Negotiations are under way with Egypt on charter flights.
• Morocco intends to become a logistics hub for Russian energy companies, which are going to cooperate with African countries.
• Russia and Angola signed the memorandum of understanding on the development of the railway sector.
• Russia expressed its desire to set up data centers in Africa to promote its software.
• Russian Railways will participate in the implementation of infrastructure projects in Nigeria, a number of projects have already been proposed, as well as in the DRC. The countries signed relevant agreements.

Deals in the field of education and science:

• The Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) expects to set up offices in a number of African countries, primarily in Ethiopia, South Africa, Egypt and Uganda.
• Russia is considering increasing the quota of budget places in Russian universities for students from the continent.
• Russia and South Africa plan to sign the memorandum of cooperation in youth policy in 2020.
• Russian representatives presented the new dry Ebola vaccine, which was developed in Russia and could be used in Africa.
• Negotiations are under way concerning the possibility of establishing a research center for the prevention of infectious diseases, similar to one in Guinea.

Arrangements in the military field:

• $ 4-billion arms contracts were signed with 20 African countries, including Uganda, Rwanda, Mozambique, Angola.
• Russia and Niger are under the agreement for the supply of 12 Mi-35 combat helicopters.
• Russia plans to open weapons repair centers, as well as for helicopter and armored vehicles, in Angola, Uganda and Nigeria.
• Negotiations are under way with CAR (training of military personnel in Russian institutions), Namibia (armaments), Sudan (purchase of S-400 complexes), Ethiopia (possibility of building a service center for aviation), and South Africa (joint arms production).

Nevertheless, not everyone became enthusiastic over after Russia-Africa Summit.

Despite the declared “Russia’s return to Africa”, some experts (even Russian) are sure that it is just a smokescreen to promote those businesses, which have already been operating in Africa, a more introductory event after which nothing important will happen, a familiar PR action. Certainly, the main question is how all the declared goals and arrangements of the Russia-Africa Summit will be implemented.

Regardless of the other side of cooperation, Africa does not need projects that use its potential without altering the continent’s oppressive problems.

Obviously, these should be projects aimed at tackling poverty and unemployment, attracting new technologies, and ensuring sustainable development. But the formula of military cooperation in exchange for resources or political use – does not fit into this framework. 

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President Donald Trump and First Lady Melania Trump arrive in Rihad, Saudi Arabia, Saturday, May 20, 2017, for the start of their overseas visit to Saudi Arabia, Israel, Rome, Brussels and Taormina, Italy. (Official White House Photo by Shealah Craighead)

Referring to the latest crisis between Iran and Saudi Arabia, President Trump said that he is not interested in going to war with Iran. I believe him. He has not shown an interest in starting new wars (although he has been quite willing to escalate ongoing ones on occasion). The real problem here, I believe, is that he is fundamentally incompetent—whether it is a question of devising a policy that will lead to a desired outcome or a question of identifying the actual problem in the first place—and thus rarely gets what he wants, or at least what he says he wants. Look at some of the issues he highlighted during his campaign. When he had an all-Republican Congress, he could not get them to hold a vote on funding for a wall on the southern border, or to introduce an infrastructure bill, or to consider a health-care plan that would offer more and cost less than the Affordable Care Act (“Obamacare”)—all things that he had promised during the election campaign but that were not part of the Republican Party’s agenda. The federal deficit—rather than being on the path to elimination as promised—has increased to the highest level ever seen in a time of peace and prosperity ($984 billion in Fiscal Year 2019, a $205 billion increase over 2018 and double the level of 2015), and we have seen the highest trade deficit in history. While the economy, overall, has done well—continuing the general trend that began in late 2009—the segments that Trump has focused on have seen a slump. The 2017 tax bill was designed to spur investment, which would eventually generate jobs and wage increases, but the burst in investment did not occur; investment has actually declined this year owing to the trade war and general policy unpredictability. Tariffs intended to support the steel industry prompted the steel industry to generate a glut, which has forced prices back down amid stagnating demand. Coal mines continue to close, and coal’s share in the U.S. energy mix continues to decline. While unemployment is low, Moody’s Analytics estimates that 300,000 jobs have been lost owing to Trump’s trade war with China. Manufacturing has declined in recent months as a consequence of falling investment, policy-related uncertainties, and supply-chain disruptions caused by the trade war. The places hit hardest in terms of lost manufacturing jobs are Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, two of the states that had put Trump over the top in terms of the Electoral College if not the popular vote. In foreign policy, China is not reorganizing its economy on Trump’s terms; North Korea is not moving toward nuclear disarmament; and Venezuela is not changing regimes. So, how is it going with Iran? Administration officials declare Trump’s policy a success because the reimposition of sanctions has had a serious impact on Iran’s economy, but that has not produced the political effects that were intended. Instead, we face a potential crisis in the Persian Gulf, with growing aggressiveness on the part of Iran and with Middle Eastern allies that appear to be rethinking their relationship with the United States.

Much of the ongoing failure regarding Iran stems from Trump’s approach. He has managed to teach Iran’s leaders that (1) he cannot be trusted to abide by an agreement; (2) their abiding by an agreement will not save them from his retribution; but (3) lashing out does not necessarily bring punishment. This particular combination is not well designed to achieve the results sought.

Trump appears to view past foreign policy as a series of expensive, unnecessary favors done for the benefit of ungrateful foreigners. When it comes to negotiation, he hopes for a mutually agreed settlement, but he expects it to be entirely on his terms, a sort of mutually agreed capitulation with the other side cheerily accepting the position of “loser.” To achieve this he relies on threats, bluster, and intimidation, all of which amounts to a massive bluff intended to bring results cheaply. He surrounds himself with other people who deal in threats, bluster, and intimidation only to discover at times—as in the case of John Bolton, his third, and second-longest-lasting, national security adviser—that they really mean it. (Back in 2015, as the JCPOA was being negotiated, Bolton famously penned an op-ed titled, “To Stop Iran’s Bomb, Bomb Iran.”) Trump also puts great store in being unpredictable. He believes that this gives him a negotiating advantage, but his negotiating partners tend to view it as chaotic and a sign of untrustworthiness. He also has to pursue his goals alone because he continually alienates allies, but he does not seem to see this as a problem.

In the case of Iran, Trump has painted himself into a corner in a crisis of his own making. When he entered office, he objected to the Iran nuclear deal—officially called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—that the Obama administration and Iran had negotiated along with five other countries: Britain, China, France, Germany, and Russia. There were other people who objected to the agreement as well, who objected to frozen Iranian funds being released, to the agreement’s sunset provisions, or to the fact that objectionable Iranian activities not related to its nuclear program were not restrained by it. The JCPOA, however, was as much as Iran would agree to, and it did an effective job of constraining its nuclear program in thoroughly verifiable ways. Both the International Atomic Energy Agency and the U.S. Intelligence Community regularly confirmed that Iran was in full compliance. Moreover, the JCPOA did not prevent the United States or others from dealing with Iran’s other objectionable activities in other ways. Even among those who had objected to the agreement, few saw any advantage to unilaterally withdrawing from it once it was in place and as long as Iran was in compliance.

During his first year in office, Trump seemed willing to comply with the JCPOA despite his rhetoric, evidently influenced by some of the people around him at the time. Brian Hook, the State Department’s director of policy planning was given the task of negotiating with the Europeans to develop a common position on demanding further restrictions, specifically, limits on Iran’s ballistic missiles and on its support for proxies abroad, such as Hamas and Hezbollah. Then, at the end of March 2018, Iran hawk Mike Pompeo replaced Rex Tillerson as secretary of state. Nine days later, Bolton replaced Lt. Gen. H. R. McMaster as national security adviser. When French president Emmanuel Macron visited the White House in April, Trump informed him that the United States would be leaving the JCPOA unilaterally. When Macron objected that he believed that Brian Hook and the Europeans were on the verge of a breakthrough in their negotiations, Trump’s response was, “Who’s Brian Hook?” In May he announced publicly that the United States was pulling out, effectively putting an end to Hook’s efforts. Withdrawal from the JCPOA was accompanied by a sanctions strategy, introduced over a period of months, that Trump referred to as “maximum pressure,” and by threatening rhetoric that spoke of “consequences the likes of which few throughout history have ever suffered.”

Evidently, Hook’s assignment, which aimed at fulfilling Trump’s stated objective of adding restrictions to those of the JCPOA, was never at the center of Trump’s strategy, if he had one. Whether anything would have come of Hook’s efforts if he had been allowed to continue cannot be known. He had only negotiated with the Europeans on how to approach the Iranians. Nothing says whether the Iranians would have gone along with the proposals—or whether the Russians and Chinese would have backed the Iranians if they refused. The Iranians, however, are sure to interpret the abrupt end of the negotiations—and Trump’s apparent lack of awareness of them—as a sign that he was never serious about those goals and actually seeks the overthrow of the Iranian regime.

The other five signatories also objected to Trump’s unilateral withdrawal. It added no new restrictions to Iranian behavior while potentially removing those to which Iran had agreed. Since Trump reimposed economic sanctions on Iran that had been lifted as part of the JCPOA (sanctions that had originally been imposed precisely to compel Iran to negotiate an agreement, which it had done), he put the United States in violation of the agreement. He did this while making assertions of Iranian violations that no other signatory believed, undermining U.S. credibility, and he did so while demanding that Iran continue to comply with the agreement that he was now violating. He thus showed Iran both that he could not be trusted and that he was willing to punish them for doing what all sides had previously agreed that they should do. Moreover, he did all this without making any provision for the almost inevitable Iranian backlash that would follow, a backlash for which U.S. allies would blame Trump.

The usually divided Iranian officials were relatively united on how to respond to Trump’s challenge. A few reformers and diplomats argued that they had no realistic alternative to staying in the JCPOA. The larger share of officials argued that remaining in the deal could not be justified if Washington reimposed sanctions. One division did exist within the latter group. Some demanded an immediate withdrawal, while others held out for a slow, piecemeal withdrawal that might avoid provoking the Europeans and might give the Europeans time to rescue the deal. The latter group prevailed. They generally agreed at the time that Trump sought regime change and that negotiating with him while under threat would be a mistake. While Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, who is closely identified with the JCPOA, reportedly did not believe that Trump wanted war, he was less sure about the influential people around Trump or his Middle Eastern allies.

Thus Iran continued to comply with the JCPOA for a year, from May 2018 to May 2019, while demanding that the Europeans do something to bring the United States back into compliance or otherwise compensate Iran for the economic problems that the Trump administration was causing. This the Europeans proved unable to do, partly because the Trump administration was willing to sanction anyone who dealt with Iran, including allies. European corporations were unwilling to risk their business in the United States in order to keep Iran within its nuclear regime. (Since the United States did not have any trade or financial ties to Iran itself, these secondary sanctions are what made the new sanctions as effective as they have been.) During this period, the administration may have believed it had hit the jackpot, since it had been able to reduce Iran’s resources while Iran continued to live within the deal’s constraints. For Iranians, this year reinforced the lesson that restraint and compliance would not bring results.

In April 2019 the Trump administration refused to renew waivers that had permitted some countries to continue purchasing Iranian oil in a transitional period. In May Iran announced that it would engage in a schedule of planned JCPOA violations. These would be limited and reversible violations—initially, at least—that were not going to move Iran appreciably closer to a nuclear weapon. Presumably, their purpose was to shake up the Americans and/or the Europeans with the notion that the nuclear regime was about to crumble and compel them to do something to prevent that outcome. That same month, the Pentagon began preliminary planning for a large-scale deployment to the Middle East in case of conflict with Iran. More immediately, Bolton announced that a carrier task force was moving into the region because the United States had intelligence that Iran was planning attacks on U.S. forces and warned that any attack would be met with “unrelenting force.”

At the same time, Iran was beginning to act more aggressively in the Persian Gulf region to show the United States that it would not be intimidated and to create incentives for the United States to back down. Thus the behavior that had not been covered under the JCPOA grew worse as a result of Trump’s actions. This, no doubt, reflected a partial unleashing of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a group that never trusted in negotiations with the Americans, now saw itself vindicated, and would be as happy as Trump to see the JCPOA abandoned and its restrictions removed. The increased IRGC activity began with small-scale attacks that damaged foreign oil tankers in the Persian Gulf, including a Japanese tanker while the Japanese prime minister was in Tehran attempting to mediate (at Trump’s request). Although the protection of sea-lanes had long been a U.S. priority and Bolton had recently made threats, Trump now insisted that China and Japan depended on Persian Gulf oil more than the United States did and that they should bear the burden of defending it.

On June 20, in a further escalatory move, Iran shot down a very expensive U.S. surveillance drone. Prompted by Bolton and Pompeo, Trump opted to respond by bombing three missile batteries and radars on Iranian soil. Pentagon civilians and military officers had opposed the strike as disproportionate, since they estimated that it would kill about 150 people. (No one had been injured when the drone was shot down.) They also feared it could provoke retaliation and further escalation, requiring the military to drain resources from the Far East. Whether he was concerned about the disproportionate loss of life (which he now cited, having apparently disregarded it originally) or about possible escalation, Trump reversed himself and canceled the strike in Bolton’s and Pompeo’s absence, after the aircraft were already in the air. Bolton left the administration shortly thereafter.

Trump’s desire to avoid loss of life and possible war is admirable, but he had put himself in this situation with his ill-considered withdrawal from the JCPOA and his provocative rhetoric. Now, having marched to the edge and then backed off, he taught the Iranians a further lesson: their objectionable behavior might not be punished after all, as their compliance had been. To be fair, Trump did not leave Iran completely unpunished. Behind the scenes, he authorized a cyber attack that struck Iran’s ability to track shipping in the Persian Gulf. In public, however, he had stood down, and he then highlighted that fact by announcing via Twitter that he had decided to bomb Iran and then changed his mind.

At this time Trump also called for increasing multinational naval patrols in the Persian Gulf, but several European allies refused to participate in a U.S.-led mission. Not only did they blame Trump for the rising tensions, they were wary of tying themselves to his erratic and unpredictable behavior. Instead, NATO allies France and Germany sought to organize their own alternative Persian Gulf coalition.

In a particularly brazen move on September 14, Iran launched a coordinated drone and cruise-missile attack against two Saudi oil-processing facilities, shutting down about 5 percent of the world’s daily oil supply for the time being. Iran then made the improbable claim that Yemen’s Houthi rebels had launched the attack. While Iran’s responsibility was clear almost from the beginning, some Europeans were initially credulous, reinforced no doubt by the Trump’s infamous penchant for fables and their reluctance to tie themselves to whatever he might do next. The administration’s rush to lay blame quickly and without offering evidence certainly did not help matters. Although Pompeo called Iran’s action an act of war, Trump’s response was limited to a modest deployment of aircraft and missile-defense batteries to Saudi Arabia. He also ordered a new round of sanctions that effectively cut off the only remaining transactions: food and other humanitarian aid.

Beginning over the summer, France had sought to mediate between Washington and Tehran so as to deescalate the crisis. For its part, the Trump administration was sending mixed signals. Trump at times lowered his demands dramatically, saying that he was only interested in preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Objectively, this suggested a return to the JCPOA, which had achieved that goal, although it is not at all clear that he saw it that way. As Trump made those statements, Pompeo alternated between offering to talk without preconditions and insisting on a list of twelve demands that, in Iran’s view, amounted to full capitulation in all aspects of its foreign policy (although the Iranians would not have agreed with Pompeo’s characterization of that policy). Iran’s position was that it would not talk unless the United States lifted its sanctions.

On the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, shortly after the drone and missile strike had rattled everyone’s nerves, French president Emmanuel Macron succeeded in getting Trump and Iranian president Hassan Rouhani to agree to a four-point plan as a basis for a meeting that would reopen negotiations. In the view of the French, the document was designed to allow everyone involved to declare victory (including the French as peacemakers). The key points were: (1) Iran will agree never to acquire a nuclear weapon, to comply with its nuclear obligations and commitments, and to negotiate a long-term framework for its nuclear activities; (2) Iran will refrain from aggression and seek peace and respect in the region through negotiations (the French insisted that this provision covered Iran’s missile program as well); (3) the United States will lift sanctions reimposed since 2017; and (4) Iran will be free to export its oil and use its revenues as it wishes.

It is important to understand that the Iranians believed that they had already agreed to most of these conditions and had not been in violation of them when Trump pulled out of the JCPOA. The difficulties that would have followed from this accord would have flowed from differing interpretations of the facts (e.g., does support for the heinous but legal and widely recognized Syrian regime constitute aggression?).

While both sides tentatively agreed to pursue Macron’s proposal, it all fell apart in the end, when Rouhani refused to come to a secure telephone set up by the French for a call between him and Trump. For Iran’s hard-liners, Trump’s acceptance of a meeting was proof that their plan to escalate tensions in the Gulf was paying off and that it was too early to stop. Under pressure from the hard-liners for even considering talking to the American president, Rouhani would not commit to the plan unless Trump first committed to lifting the sanctions. Rouhani feared that Trump was interested only in a photo op that he could tout as a sign of Iranian capitulation—which would give Trump the foreign policy win he had been so sorely lacking—and that Trump would not comply with the plan afterward. Yet, somehow, Trump still believes that his unpredictability is an asset.

In the meantime, Middle East allies that Trump values appear to be reconsidering his value to them. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were struck by Trump’s failure to respond to Iran’s provocations and by his explicit lack of interest in defending non-American targets (although he has deployed some new units to the Gulf). Their apprehension about Trump’s reliability as an ally was no doubt reinforced when it emerged that Trump had withheld military aid from Ukraine in an effort to coerce Ukrainian actions to support his reelection efforts. Soon after that, Trump agreed to relocate U.S. troops in Syria, opening the way for Turkey to attack the Kurdish troops that had been cooperating with U.S. aims there. Apart from betraying an ally, this last move will likely ease Iran’s effort to build direct overland ties from Iran via Iraq and Syria to Lebanon.

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates began considering alternative approaches, exploring the possibility of reducing the threat by dealing with Iran. Already last summer, the United Arab Emirates announced its withdrawal from the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen and initiated direct talks with Iran to discuss maritime security and the rising tensions in the region. Since the missile and drone attack, even Saudi Arabia has shown new interest in a cease-fire in Yemen, and Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman has reportedly asked the prime ministers of Pakistan and Iraq to speak to Iran about the possibility of de-escalation. Kuwait has also reached out to Iran. Iran has said it is open to the idea. Previously, both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates had been at the forefront of those pressing the United States for a hard-line policy against Iran.

It would be interesting if Trump’s initiatives set off an independent process that brought greater stability to the Persian Gulf region. Yet this—if it turns out that way—would represent more of a foreign policy victory for Iran than for Trump. It certainly would not further his goal of building an anti-Iranian alliance in the region, and it would not build pressure on Iran to dismantle its nuclear program.

Remember, George W. Bush’s sanctions strategy did not compel the hard-line regime of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to dismantle his nuclear program. Instead, the sanctions led the Iranian electorate to throw out Ahmadinejad and replace him with the moderates led by Rouhani. The moderates then offered the United States essentially the same deal that they had offered in 2003, the last time they were in power. Bush had ignored it then, convinced that his sanctions strategy would bring more satisfactory results, if not bring down the regime altogether. If he had accepted it then, Iran’s nuclear program might have been frozen at a considerably lower level than was the case in 2015. (Iran had zero centrifuges for enriching uranium in 2003; by 2015 it had 19,000.) Now, Trump’s policy has disrupted the region and undermined the Rouhani regime, but no alternative regime is waiting behind the scenes eager to give in to Trump’s demands. The more likely alternative would be Rouhani’s replacement with a hard-line regime.

A former Pentagon official recently commented: “You saw Trump over the course of the first year become more confident in his abilities. It’s dangerous when you’re confident, but you don’t have the requisite competence to go with it.” In this case, Trump’s bluster and chaos, his provocation of Iran, his failure to honor promises, his loose use of threats that he does not intend to carry out, and his inability at this point to offer a credible diplomatic exit out of the confrontation have all contributed heavily to today’s fraught situation. The greatest danger is that the Iranian hard-liners, provoked and increasingly convinced that no one will stand up to them, overshoot, miscalculate, and press to the point of starting a new war in the Middle East, which could easily spread across borders or otherwise trigger other wars that no one wanted or planned for. If the crisis explodes, Trump will not be up to the task of dealing with it.

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The ongoing pro-democracy demonstrations in Hong Kong put the question directly to Americans: just how important is freedom to us?

There can be no mistake that the demonstrators aim for democratic rule, that they have reason to expect it, and that China denies it to them. The formal structure of the Hong Kong government, and even the 2014 offer of suffrage, control the options available to any electorate that might be tolerated, to maintain Chinese control over the territory. The protests started in June, over legislation that would facilitate criminal extraditions to mainland China. The proposed law came only a year after Hong Kong booksellers offering pro-democracy literature had disappeared and resurfaced in mainland Chinese custody. Protesters are clear in their objectives: vandalism of local Starbucks franchises aimed at pro-Beijing franchisees, not the western brand. U.S. and British flags have occasionally been waved as symbols of democracy. Not only is democracy denied to Hong Kong, but freedom of expression and human rights stand endangered, and the demonstrators know it.

Americans know it too. The question is how far we will go, what we would give up, what costs we would accept, for the sake of rights and freedom for others.

Of course we cannot force democratic reform in Hong Kong, or stop any Chinese crackdown, whether of troops and censorship or in other forms. Some might point to our ongoing assertiveness in the South China Sea, or the Trump administration’s moves against China in the form of trade measures and technology restrictions. But we undertake these for the sake of exports, job creation, property rights, or national security, Would we give up any material benefits for the sake of principle?

There have been historical cases where we sacrificed our advocacy of democracy in part because the country where it was in question seemed unlikely to sustain it, while other stakes loomed large. This does not apply to Hong Kong. The territory has a history of British administration and a lot of western-educated citizens, it is wealthy and informed, and even the hard core demonstrators speak in principled terms rather than of clan or tribal grievance. And while it is in many ways a different case, we know that Taiwan, another “second system” in the “one China” that we diplomatically espouse, has developed a working democracy. Democracy for these people is not a pipe dream that they don’t understand, it is a reasonable and normal expectation that fits with much of their modern history. What other stakes in Hong Kong outweigh democracy?

Institutionally, our answers so far are not uplifting. Tech firms have pulled apps used by Hong Kong protesters. The NBA stifled a franchise owner who tweeted support for the protests. Hollywood has long conceded its freedom of speech to make movies and sell them in China. The U.S. government, even in as unusual a form as the Trump Administration, continues our decades of swerving from trade issues to technology issues to geopolitical tension to human rights remonstrance, and back.   Yes, Congress passed Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act, but other acts passed simultaneously also addressed technology and trade matters.   The Chinese government could be forgiven for believing we care as much about our business deals as about freedom.

It may be that our decades of swerving balanced our widely varied interests. It may be that we maintained a pragmatic balance in sincere belief that Chinese development would lead to greater Chinese freedom. But today China challenges the full range of our interests, geopolitically in its Belt and Road Initiative and in the South China Sea, economically in its technology and trade practices, even in “soft power,” through its Confucian Institutes. We may need, or choose, to contest any number of these challenges. But the question will arise – to what end do we contest China?

America should declare that any balancing of interests, any willingness to collaborate for mutual benefit, occur for us against a backdrop of fundamental values. Equal endowment of all persons with unalienable rights, and governments existing to secure those rights. Chinese leaders may or may not accommodate our motives, but this is where our deepest reactions will come from. And an America premised on unalienable rights and a China espousing Confucian conformity need not be implacably hostile. Within limits, there is room for collaboration on shared interests, each side working to make their beliefs work and patiently waiting for the other to evolve. But the limits are clear: we are open to closer relations as they might grow their respect for rights and freedoms, but we will give up the benefits and accept the costs of unfriendliness the more they suppress freedom’s call. This, by the way, is not interference in Chinese internal affairs: our founding creed may tend to undermine non-democratic regimes, but asserting our nature as we shape external relations. Declaring our reasons for amity or enmity is our sovereign right. And those must be our reasons.

Will America stand up for its principles with Hong Kong? We have not had a consistent long-term policy toward China since the U.S. ping pong team went there in 1971. Now our policy must be clear, and clearly consistent with our own founding. The Hong Kong demonstrators put the question squarely to us. What will we stand for?

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Les mémoires ou travaux de diplomates français se multiplient récemment, et il faut s’en réjouir. On ne saurait trop conseiller aux étudiants de relations internationales de commencer leur exploration du monde par ces témoignages vivants, avant d’aborder la théorie.
Une vieille tradition existe, dont on retrouvera quelques morceaux choisis dans le Dictionnaire amoureux de la diplomatie, de Daniel Jouanneau, qui fut (entre autres fonctions) ambassadeur au Mozambique (1990-1993), au Liban (1997-2000), au Canada (2004-2008) et au Pakistan (2008-2011). Comment, à cet égard, ne pas citer les Souvenirs d'une ambassade à Berlin 1931 – 1938 d’André François-Poncet, qui représenta la France en Allemagne à cette époque, et dont les chroniques permettent de retracer, avec une vision inégalée, la montée du nazisme ? On peut en continuer la lecture par Au palais Farnèse : après Hitler à Berlin, c’est Mussolini, de 1938 à 1940, que le même diplomate français a tenté de comprendre, de décrypter à Rome. De grands diplomates étrangers, ministres des Affaires Etrangères, ambassadeurs ou autres, ont nourri abondamment le genre, de Henry Kissinger (White House Years) à Evgueni Primakov(Au cœur du Pouvoir), de Hans-Dietrich Genscher (Erinnerungen) à Chris Patten (First Confession: A Sort of Memoir), en passant par Dennis Ross (The Missing Peace) ou Richard Holbrooke (To End a War).
Commencer par les mémoires, c’est comprendre la réalité diplomatique de l’intérieur, parcourir des témoignages sur un pays ou une région (comme sur le Moyen-Orient sous la plume de Bernard Bajolet), saisir un éclairage sur un épisode (comme sur le dossier nucléaire iranien, raconté par Gérard Araud), parfois sur une période longue (voir le remarquable ouvrage de Claude Martin qui retrace un demi-siècle d’histoire chinoise). C’est découvrir les faits avant les résumés qui en sont fait, souvent sommairement, dans le débat public. C’est comprendre l’histoire avant d’en lire une interprétation théorique voire idéologique.
Certes, les mémoires d’un acteur sont rarement neutres. Ils peuvent mêmes se prêter « à l’égocentrisme et au potin », comme l’indique d’emblée Gérard Araud. Ils peuvent dégager un parfum désuet à force d’être subtil, au détour d’une écriture convenue. Il peut même leur arriver d’être inintéressants. Mais même ennuyeux, ils dévoilent un auteur, une machine administrative, un dysfonctionnement. Lire les mémoires de nos diplomates, c’est entendre ceux qui ont fait vivre ou rencontré l’histoire. C’est retrouver le vivant derrière la théorie. C’est préférer le terrain aux analyses de seconde main.

Since the end of the Cold War, every U.S. president has come into office promising to build better relations with Russia—and each one has watched that vision evaporate. The first three—Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama—set out to integrate Russia into the Euro-Atlantic community and make it a partner in building a global liberal order. Each left office with relations in worse shape than he found them, and with Russia growing ever more distant.

President Donald Trump pledged to establish a close partnership with Vladimir Putin. Yet his administration has only toughened the more confrontational approach that the Obama administration adopted after Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014. Russia remains entrenched in Ukraine, is opposing the United States in Europe and the Middle East with increasing brazenness, and continues to interfere in U.S. elections. As relations have soured, the risk of a military conflict has grown.

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The story of how the Tunisian revolution began is well known. On December 17, 2010, a 26-year-old fruit vendor named Mohamed Bouazizi from the town of Sidi Bouzid set himself on fire outside a local government building. The man’s self-immolation—an act of protest against repeated mistreatment by police and local officials—sparked protests that quickly spread across the country. Within a few weeks, President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali had stepped down and fled the country after 23 years in power, offering Tunisia an unprecedented opportunity for a democratic opening. A massive wave of uprisings soon swept the country’s neighbors, reaching all the way to the Levant and the Persian Gulf. 

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The Western Hemisphere faces a migration crisis on a scale similar to the European crisis of 2015, with consequences just as far-reaching.

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’automne de Politique étrangère
(n° 3/2019). Julien Nocetti, spécialiste des questions numériques à l’Ifri, propose une analyse croisée des ouvrages de Henry Farrell et Abraham Newman, Of Privacy and Power: The Transatlantic Struggle over Freedom and Security (Princeton University Press, 2098), Shoshanna Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism. The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power (PublicAffairs, 2019) et Amaël Cattaruzza, Géopolitique des données numériques. Pouvoir et conflits à l’heure du Big Data (Le Cavalier Bleu, 2019).

Pour l’expertise en relations internationales, le sujet des données est particulièrement malléable et stimulant. Les données numériques représentent tout à la fois un enjeu de sécurité et de souveraineté pour les États, un enjeu démocratique pour les populations (à travers la question des données personnelles) et un enjeu fondamental de création de valeur pour les entreprises. Début 2018, l’affaire Cambridge Analytica s’était précisément située au croisement de ces différents enjeux, venant rappeler, d’une part, les capacités de riposte des États dans la sphère numérique et, d’autre part, que la vie privée de millions d’individus pèse peu face aux stratégies commerciales des grands acteurs de l’économie numérique. Les trois ouvrages présentés ici abordent, chacun à leur manière, les défis que fait peser l’exploitation toujours plus exponentielle des données en politique internationale, pour la relation transatlantique, et pour l’avenir du capitalisme.

Concis, l’opus du géographe Amaël Cattaruzza est celui qui présente de manière la plus claire et précise l’entremêlement de la problématique des données et de logiques géopolitiques toujours plus complexes. Longtemps, les données – et plus précisément leur circulation, leur stockage, leur traitement, par des acteurs privés et par des États – ont été une composante négligée des Internet studies et de la gouvernance mondiale du numérique. Or, elles s’imposent aujourd’hui comme un enjeu fondamental en matière de gouvernance ; sur ce plan, les enjeux de la gouvernance mondiale de l’Internet, par exemple, ont trop souvent été réduits à la question de la maîtrise du « cœur » de l’Internet, à savoir les ressources critiques et le système de nommage et d’adressage. Un point fort de l’ouvrage est de se distancier d’une stricte lecture de la donnée comme contenu, pour analyser la matérialité de ces données, leur caractère physique présentant un caractère éminemment stratégique à l’heure où les États entendent concevoir des politiques numériques souveraines.

Ainsi les données sont des composantes à part entière d’une souveraineté numérique âprement débattue, en Occident comme ailleurs. La question de la maîtrise des données est devenue la condition sine qua non de l’autonomie stratégique – tant sur le plan économique et industriel que géopolitique, affirme l’auteur. L’émergence d’un discours sur la souveraineté numérique entre dans ce cadre : maintenir les données sur le territoire national, via une politique de localisation, a structuré une véritable géopolitique des centres d’hébergement de données (data centers). La question de la territorialisation des données fait l’objet d’une deuxième partie très instructive. Cette territorialisation révèle des stratégies nationales de la donnée prenant des formes différentes et nuançant partiellement le consensus issu de la mondialisation. Les États-Unis ont fait du contrôle des données l’axe prioritaire tant du redéveloppement économique structuré autour de leurs géants technologiques que de leur stratégie de sécurité. Ces deux éléments se conjuguent dans une longue tradition d’open door policy visant à l’ouverture de marchés et au maintien de la prééminence américaine. La Chine, rappelle l’auteur, se situe dans une démarche décomplexée de puissance nationale, via un effort au long cours de rattrapage technologique et une volonté de briser le monopole numérique occidental. Dans cette optique, les données doivent permettre d’affirmer la vision chinoise du cyberespace autant que servir d’« instrument géopolitique » du projet des Routes de la soie. L’Europe, elle, pâtit d’un double effet ciseau : l’hégémonie américaine et l’affirmation chinoise affaiblissent le continent qui peine à se positionner en puissance industrielle de premier plan, adoptant en conséquence une posture pour l’essentiel défensive qu’est venu illustrer l’adoption du Règlement général sur la protection des données (RGPD), voté en mai 2018.

L’ouvrage des politistes Henry Farrell et Abraham Newman ne traite pas directement des données ; plutôt, il envisage ce sujet au prisme de l’évolution de la relation transatlantique et de la notion de privacy (respect de la vie privée). Les auteurs relèvent l’évolution inexorable des notions (et des tensions autour) de privacy et du secret. Ainsi le rôle traditionnellement prêté aux États en la matière – opacité des processus de décision, collecte d’informations sur les citoyens – a-t-il vécu ou, du moins, est très insuffisant pour appréhender la complexité des mutations en cours. Plutôt qu’un Big Brother centralisé, les auteurs soulignent la menace posée par une architecture de systèmes décentralisés, certains privés, d’autres publics, certains internes, d’autres internationaux, collectant tous des milliards de données sur les individus. L’État n’est ni absent ni obsolète : il recourt aux données pour rationaliser ses services, viser des opposants politiques ou poursuivre des criminels.

L’environnement autour des États a été radicalement altéré par la surveillance décentralisée des navigateurs Internet, l’ubiquité des téléphones mobiles avec des capteurs et réseaux satellitaires qui communiquent instantanément l’information aux maisons-mères, de vastes banques de données commercialisables, et de processus d’apprentissage autonome (machine learning) qui permettent de catégoriser des données et de prédire les comportements. Puisque les États de part et d’autre de l’Atlantique cherchent à globaliser les problématiques de sécurité intérieure, ceux-ci ne recréent pas les vieilles peurs mais les transforment. Ils louent – ou subtilisent – des données commerciales, les combinant avec les leurs, et mettent en place d’énormes bases de données destinées à des acteurs privés comme Palantir qui les exploitent à des fins lucratives. La ligne de démarcation public-privé vole en éclat, et les États ne peuvent que constater qu’ils dépendent d’initiatives privées pour la collecte de données. Aux États-Unis, les campagnes électorales de Barack Obama et de Donald Trump ont recouru à des techniques de micro-ciblage fondées sur la fusion d’informations commerciales sur les comportements des consommateurs et de tendances de vote politique. Les conditions de la privacy évoluent de la gestion de bases de données publiques vers la gestion d’un accès des États à des bases de données privées. Pour les démocraties, il s’agit d’une tendance de fond particulièrement inquiétante, ce que ne manque pas de nous rappeler le propos final de l’ouvrage.

L’universitaire américaine Shoshanna Zuboff prolonge de manière plus large les réflexions décrites ci-haut : selon elle, les violations toujours plus massives de la privacy ne sont ni fortuites ni facultatives ; elles représentent une source primordiale de profit pour les entreprises les plus riches de la planète. Ces acteurs privés ont un rôle financier direct dans le renforcement et le perfectionnement de la surveillance généralisée dont ils bénéficient – ainsi que dans le maintien de la légalité de cet appareil de surveillance. La thèse centrale de l’ouvrage est la suivante : si le capitalisme du XXe siècle reposait sur la production de masse et l’amélioration des revenus de la classe moyenne, le capitalisme du XXIe siècle repose sur la surveillance, soit l’extraction de données personnelles à l’insu des usagers qui en sont à l’origine.

En se concentrant sur les cas de Google et de Facebook, Zuboff démontre que la valeur créée par les grandes plateformes numériques découle de l’exploitation de données comportementales « cachées », comme les cookies (des fragments de code contenant des informations sur l’internaute, laissés sur son navigateur via les sites qu’il fréquente). Ce sont ces cookies qui assurent un profilage fin des internautes à leur insu. Ainsi, l’exploitation des données extraites à partir des comportements passés des individus (en ligne, mais également et de manière croissante dans le monde physique) permet des prédictions de plus en plus précises de leurs comportements futurs. Dès lors, selon l’auteur, le risque pour nos sociétés est qu’il devient possible d’inciter des individus à agir d’une certaine manière, à leur insu, et donc de les façonner.

L’argumentaire de Zuboff n’échappe pas toutefois à une certaine grandiloquence, au point même que certains techno-critiques pourtant acerbes comme Evgueny Morozov considèrent l’analyse de l’auteure trop alarmiste et pessimiste. Le portrait qui est dressé de la Silicon Valley est uniformément noir, ce qui grève la portée politique de son analyse. Selon Zuboff, la Silicon Valley est sous la coupe d’une idéologie instrumentaire radicale (un chapitre est consacré à instrumentarian power) dont l’objectif est de supplanter l’individualisme libéral par une ingénierie sociale à grande échelle. Elle affirme que Google et Facebook sont devenus le « contraire de la démocratie » – la formule est presque devenue mainstream dans la classe politique américaine depuis le scandale Cambridge Analytica et les fuites de données massives et successives qui concernent Facebook. Au final, le lecteur regrettera le manque de profondeur derrière la notion de « capitalisme de surveillance », laquelle aurait sans doute mérité une analyse davantage « micro » et politique. Il n’en reste pas moins que l’ouvrage donne du grain à moudre aux nécessaires et complexes formes de régulation à inventer pour encadrer l’action débridée des géants du numérique.

Julien Nocetti,
chercheur à l’Ifri

 

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