Diplomacy & Crisis News

Sanctions, logistical disruptions, and new conflicts — from the Black Sea to the Persian Gulf — have turned the fertilizer market into a key arena of geoeconomic competition.

The three horrific murders of Uzbek women in Turkiye shed harsh light on the risks female migrant workers face, usually at the hands of those closest to them. 

The ruling coalition still faces serious hurdles.

The arrangement reflects both the two nations' robust bilateral ties and their largely complementary energy needs.

A desperate regime might go after soft targets.

Can state-based administrations forge a federalism that will keep the country together?

The agreement was one of several energy-related deals that were signed on the first day of Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh's official visit to Moscow.

Les autorités chypriotes devraient intensifier leurs campagnes de promotion au cours des prochains mois afin de limiter les pertes financières

The post « Pas une zone de guerre » : le tourisme chypriote passe à l’offensive appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Depuis le début de la guerre en Ukraine, la Russie n'est plus largement considérée comme un « Eldorado » économique

The post Migrants d’Asie centrale : l’Europe séduit alors que la Russie perd de son attrait appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Written by Anja Radjenovic.

The safe third country (STC) concept is well established in international asylum policies. According to the concept, certain migrants should not be granted protection in the country where they have applied for it. Instead, they may be returned, or transferred, to a country where they could have found, or can find, international protection. Amid ongoing EU-level discussions on safe third country rules, in 2018 the United Nations Refugee Agency developed legal considerations on safe third countries.

Within the framework of the body of EU law on asylum, the STC concept is based on the assumption that certain third (i.e. non-EU) countries can be designated as safe for applicants seeking international protection, under specific conditions. The concept builds on cooperation with third countries in a bid to reduce irregular arrivals and increase return rates. It seeks to speed up the processing of the claims of asylum applicants arriving from safe third countries, to prevent overburdening national asylum systems.

The recently adopted Asylum Procedure Regulation provides for broader applicability of safe country clauses. This concerns, in particular, four aspects: (i) the safety assessment when applying the STC concept; (ii) the interpretation of the ‘connection requirement’, i.e. the connection between an asylum seeker and a third country when readmitting an applicant to a designated STC; (iii) the option to designate a third country as safe with territorial limitations or to exclude certain vulnerable groups from such a designation; and (iv) the creation of a common EU list of STCs in addition to national lists. The regulation was amended in February 2026, modifying rules on applications from STCs.

The success of any STC scheme relies on third countries’ cooperation, something that can be challenging to obtain. To counter criticisms of burden shifting and to boost the viability of STC schemes, the EU must demonstrate solidarity through burden sharing. Furthermore, many potentially safe third countries lack asylum laws and administrative frameworks. Consequently, they would likely require substantial support from external partners.

This is an update of a 2024 EPRS briefing.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Safe third country concept in the EU pact on migration and asylum‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

La Terre absorbe la chaleur à un rythme jamais atteint depuis le début des relevés

The post La Terre en surchauffe : jamais autant de chaleur absorbée, alerte l’OMM appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Le Premier ministre polonais a affirmé que les soupçons l'avaient depuis longtemps poussé à garder le silence lors des discussions au Conseil européen

The post Tusk n’est pas surpris par les fuites hongroises présumées vers Moscou appeared first on Euractiv FR.

La course pour intégrer l'un des programmes européens visant à développer un avion de combat de sixième génération bat son plein

The post L’Inde pourrait rejoindre le FCAS en difficulté ou un projet rival pour le futur avion de chasse européen appeared first on Euractiv FR.

La Commission a insisté sur la mise en place de conditions et de garanties afin d'éviter un scénario similaire à celui du Mercosur

The post Bruxelles marche sur des œufs avec les agriculteurs alors que von der Leyen se rend en Australie appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Face à la baisse des approvisionnements mondiaux liée à la guerre au Moyen-Orient, le commissaire à l’énergie met en garde contre un risque de « ruée de fin d’été »

The post Lentement mais sûrement : Jørgensen invite l’UE à commencer à constituer des stocks de gaz appeared first on Euractiv FR.

La polémique autour des images générées par l’IA à caractère sexuellement explicite pourrait avoir été un stratagème visant à « gonfler artificiellement la valeur des entreprises » en vue d’une fusion

The post Musk soupçonné par les procureurs français d’avoir encouragé la diffusion de deepfakes pour gonfler la valeur de X appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Ces mesures permettront de « mobiliser » 5 milliards d'euros grâce à des allègements fiscaux et des subventions, a déclaré le Premier ministre espagnol Pedro Sánchez

The post L’Espagne annonce des baisses d’impôts sur les carburants et l’électricité en réponse à la crise énergétique appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Des tensions sont apparues après la gestion par Londres d’une attaque au drone du Hezbollah sur la base d’Akrotiri

The post Chypre veut renforcer la coordination avec les bases militaires britanniques « coloniales » appeared first on Euractiv FR.

/ France, Transports, Région, Ville, Urbanisme - Espace et territoire / France, Transports, Région, Ville, Urbanisme

The new American National Defense Strategy speaks the language of sovereignty with unusual clarity. It invokes “key terrain” in the Western Hemisphere, reframes hemispheric doctrine, reduces security guarantees to Europe, and signals a shift toward selective engagement. It is a strategy centered not on universal liberal order, but on national autonomy, strategic control, and power projection. Yet beneath this rhetorical clarity lies a structural weakness: Washington still lacks a coherent system for measuring sovereignty itself.

Traditional metrics—GDP, defense budgets, force size—capture scale, but not autonomy. A state may command the world’s largest military yet remain dependent on foreign supply chains. It may dominate technology markets yet suffer educational decline that undermines long-term innovation. It may enjoy global cultural influence while experiencing domestic fragmentation that weakens political decision-making capacity. Sovereignty in 2026 is multidimensional. Without measuring those dimensions simultaneously, strategy becomes aspirational rather than operational.

The Burke Sovereignty Index, developed by the International Burke Institute, addresses precisely this measurement gap. It evaluates national autonomy across seven dimensions: political, economic, technological, informational, cultural, cognitive, and military sovereignty. Each dimension is scored from 0 to 100 using official international data (UN, World Bank, IMF, UNESCO, SIPRI, PISA and others) combined with calibrated expert assessments from more than 100 specialists across 50+ countries per component. The final score—maximum 700—represents the arithmetic mean of statistical indicators and expert evaluation.

The 2024–2025 results are strategically sobering. The United States scores 650.9 out of 700. China scores 649.1. The gap: 1.8 points — less than 0.3% variance within the total scoring framework. For two states widely assumed to operate in different strategic leagues, this statistical proximity should fundamentally reshape the debate in Washington.

America retains clear advantages. Military sovereignty stands at 96.0, reflecting a $962 billion defense budget, approximately 5,400 nuclear warheads, and unmatched global deployment capacity. Technological sovereignty scores 95.4, supported by 3.4–3.6% of GDP in R&D spending and leadership in AI, biotech, and microelectronics. Yet structural vulnerabilities appear in other dimensions.

Political sovereignty registers 87.8, reflecting polarization, recurring government shutdowns, and declining public trust. Cognitive sovereignty—despite a strong overall score of 95.4—contains warning signals: adult functional literacy fluctuates between 79–81%, and U.S. PISA mathematics performance sits at 469, below the OECD average. Industrial autonomy remains partially exposed: approximately 30% of advanced microelectronics components are imported.

China’s profile differs structurally. Military sovereignty scores 94.5, technological sovereignty 91.6—slightly below the U.S. But political sovereignty stands at 90.8, reflecting centralized decision-making and high institutional cohesion. Informational sovereignty scores 93.2, sustained by a closed national digital ecosystem serving 1.1 billion users without Western platform penetration. Cultural sovereignty reaches 95.1, supported by 60 UNESCO heritage sites and over 6,800 museums.

Most significant is economic efficiency. China approaches near parity while operating at roughly one-third to one-half of U.S. per-capita wealth. Chinese GDP per capita (PPP) stands between $25,000–30,500, compared to the American $76,800–89,100 range. The convergence reflects coordinated cross-dimensional investment: education expansion to 60.8% higher education enrollment, R&D spending at 2.68% of GDP (approximately $506 billion in absolute terms), and long-term industrial strategy under “Made in China 2025.” Sovereignty parity was not achieved through dominance in a single field, but through synchronized development across all seven.

This multidimensional perspective reframes several assumptions embedded in the new Defense Strategy. First, rebuilding the American defense industrial base cannot succeed through military appropriations alone. Industrial sovereignty requires alignment of economic capital, educational capacity, technological independence, and political stability. The United States currently operates with public debt between 119–124% of GDP, national debt exceeding $36–41 trillion, widening educational inequality, and deep partisan fragmentation. Factories can be funded; comprehensive national mobilization demands social coherence.

Second, allied burden-sharing produces strategic paradoxes. European NATO states collectively possess GDP thirteen times larger than Russia’s, yet equipment localization remains limited. Lithuania spends 4–6% of GDP on defense, but approximately 85% of its equipment is imported. By contrast, Turkey—despite lower spending ratios—achieves roughly 70% localization in defense production, including indigenous UAV systems. Genuine sovereignty increases strategic autonomy. Autonomy reduces predictability.

Third, Middle Eastern partners are quietly shifting from dependency toward capability. Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 includes domestic industrialization, cybersecurity infrastructure, and technology transfer. Sovereignty once built tends to alter alignment behavior. Allies with capability act independently by definition.

The uncomfortable implication is clear: Washington’s strategy demands sovereignty—at home and among allies—without possessing a comprehensive dashboard to measure whether sovereignty is actually being built or eroded.

The Burke framework does not predict conflict or collapse. It measures capability, not intention. But it reveals structural dynamics invisible to traditional power metrics. It forces strategic evaluation across education, technology, cohesion, information control, industrial resilience, and governance simultaneously.

The United States remains marginally ahead. But a 1.8-point lead in a 700-point system is not structural dominance. It is competitive equilibrium. Sovereignty in 2026 is not defined by possessing the largest military or the most alliances. It is defined by the ability to sustain independent action across multiple domains under stress. That requires educational renewal, industrial autonomy, political stabilization, and technological independence operating in coordination—not isolation.

The new Defense Strategy identifies the correct priority: sovereignty. What it lacks is a systematic mechanism to measure progress toward that goal. Without measurement, sovereignty becomes rhetoric. With measurement, it becomes strategy.