Diplomacy & Crisis News

Summary and Key Points: Russia's ongoing invasion of Ukraine has drained its resources, leading to potential cuts in its naval fleet. The Kirov-class battlecruiser Pyotr Velikiy, one of Russia's two nuclear-powered surface warships, may soon be decommissioned due to high maintenance costs.

-These formidable vessels, designed during the Cold War to counter U.S. carriers, are the largest surface combatants after aircraft carriers.

-While the Admiral Nakhimov, the other surviving Kirov-class cruiser, is expected to return to service soon, Moscow’s financial constraints and the war’s demands raise questions about the future of these naval giants.

Each day Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine continues, the Kremlin is funneling scores of resources into fueling its offensive efforts.

Experts estimate that Moscow has lost more than half of its main battle tank arsenal, in addition to loads of munitions, unmanned aerial vehicles and other military systems.

Crippled by hefty international sanctions amidst its ongoing war, the Kremlin is looking to make cuts where it can. In April, the Russian state-run news outlet TASS reported that the country’s Pyotr Velikiy battlecruiser may soon be decommissioned due in part to excessive maintenance and repair costs.

As one of two nuclear-powered surface warship in Russia’s Navy, the Pyotr Velikiy plays a significant role in the service. Strapped for cash, however, Moscow will likely retire this colossal sized vessel.

That is a shame, at least for Moscow, as these warships are pretty powerful. 

Introducing the Kirov-class

Second in size only to large aircraft carriers, the Kirov-class nuclear-powered guided missile cruisers are the largest ships in Russia’s arsenal.

During the Cold War, the Kirov-class vessels were designed to counter American aircraft carriers. The Baltic Shipyard in Leningrad launched its warship in 1977. Four more vessels we laid down up until the collapse of the USSR. Initially, the boats were named to honor Bolshevik revolution heroes, but these names were changed to coincide with the end of the communist state.

Only two battlecruisers survived the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the financial woes of the Russian Navy- the Pyotr Velikiy and the Admiral Nakhimov. 

Both ships are massive in size and can pack a punch. When designed during the Cold War, the ships were intended to function primarily as missile cruisers. However, over the next decade, the Soviets shifted gears and wanted the vessels to prioritize anti-submarine warfare instead.

In terms of air-to-air armament, these Kirov-class ships can sport 96 S-300F, 40 4K33, and 192 3K95 short-range surface-to-air missiles in addition to six Ak-630 close-up defense systems.

These battlecruisers were also fitted with various fire control radar, air/surface search radar, and hull-mounted sonar. 

As detailed by one defense expert, “The propulsion system was a combination of nuclear power and steam turbine, with two nuclear reactors coupled to two oil-fitted boilers, which superheated the steam produced in the reactor plant to increase the power output available during high-speed running, while it also provided an essentially unlimited range.”

An Overview of Russia’s Two Remaining Battlecruisers

Both Pyotr Velikiy and the Admiral Nakhimov were expected to undergo repairs to enhance their capabilities.

However, reports now indicate that only the latter will actually make it past this phase.

As the latest move in a series of reductions to Russia’s sea-based fleet, this decision was likely influenced by the ongoing Ukraine war.

These hefty ships are pricey and Moscow could allocate resources planned for the Pyotr Velikiy to its offensive efforts in Kyiv.

The Admiral Nakhimov was supposed to return to service just two years after initially being laid up for refit back in 1997. Since the early 2000’s, a series of delays have pushed back this timeframe.

Within the last five years alone, Russian officials purported that the Admiral Nakhimov would re-enter service by 2018, 2018 and 2021. 

The Altered Fate of Admiral Nakhimov

Latest estimates indicate that the Admiral Nakhimov is expected to re-enter service with the Russian Navy over the next two years. Analysts predict that country’s sole remaining Kirov-class cruiser will serve under the Northern Fleet.

As explained by Bulgarian Military, this move will reflect “the Russian Navy’s Arctic region prioritization due to its emerging importance as a key trade route and geopolitical battleground. The Northern Fleet’s positioning also allows the warship to contribute significantly to Russia’s strategic missile defenses.”

While exact details concerning Admiral Nakhimov’s refitting remain unclear, industry experts predict the ship will feature Russia’s new Tsirkon missiles which are currently under development. Earlier this year, Putin sent a frigate to the Atlantic Ocean with this new generation hypersonic cruise missile in tow. According to Russia’s defense minister, the Tsirkon (or Zicron), is capable of overcoming all missile defense systems and can fly at speeds reaching Mach 9.0 with a range of over 1,000 km. 

While the Admiral Nakhimov’s claimed firepower would make it one of the most potent surface combatant ships globally, the Kremlin does have a history of exaggerating the true capabilities of its military systems.

This spring, Moscow deployed its top-of-the-line T-14 Armata to Ukraine. Widely touted to be the most formidable tank to ever trek across the battlefield by the Kremlin, the tank’s service in the war was short-lived.

By summertime, Moscow withdrew its Armata tanks from the conflict, despite its already dwindling available tank arsenal. Obviously, the T-14 did not perform up to standard. Once the Admiral Nakhimov re-enters service with the Russian Navy, only time will tell if the ship’s claimed capabilities are realistic. 

About the Author: Maya Carlin

Maya Carlin is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. 

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. 

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)

Summary and Key Points: The Kirov-class battlecruisers, once the centerpiece of the Russian Navy's offensive strategy, have not lived up to their initial hype. Launched in 1977, these nuclear-powered warships were designed to counter U.S. submarines and carrier groups with a formidable array of missiles and heavy armament.

-However, only four were built, and today just one remains in service while another languishes in drydock. In the era of advanced anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems, the utility of large surface warships like the Kirov-class and American aircraft carriers is increasingly questioned.

-Both nations may need to rethink their naval strategies to focus on more relevant and resilient capabilities.

Kirov-Class Battlecruisers: A Costly Boondoggle in Modern Naval Warfare

If the centerpiece of the United States Navy’s offensive strategy was the aircraft carrier, since the Cold War era, the Russian Navy’s main offensive system was their battlecruiser. Heavily armed, nuclear-powered, and seriously armored, the Kirov-class battlecruiser was to be the most important strategic asset in the Russian fleet. 

Yet, as my colleague, Peter Suciu, outlined in an article in these pages last year, the Kirov-class “never lived up to the hype.” 

Of course, one could say the same about America’s vaunted aircraft carriers in the age of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) defensive systems of the kind that both China and Russia possess (as well as their partners in Iran and North Korea).

The fact of the matter is that the era of surface warships might be at an end because of how sophisticated A2/AD has become (and how ubiquitous these systems have become). As for the Kirov-class, they struggled in ways that America’s flat tops never did. The Soviets and, later the Russians, envisaged these beasts raging across the world’s oceans in ways that sent shivers down the spines of even the Americans. 

The Kirov-Class Never Lived Up to Its Hype

Launched in 1977, the Kirov-class’s eponymously named warship was the second largest warship to traverse the oceans (next to America’s aircraft carriers). Four of these behemoths were built since then. They inspired so much fear-and-loathing among the US Navy’s brass that the Iowa-class battleships were refurbished and brought back into service in the 1980s as a counterweight to the Soviet battlecruiser threat. The Kirovs were loaded with potent long-range missiles rather than the traditional “big guns” that usually armed the decks of similar sized warships.

These warships carried an assortment of other missiles as well as torpedoes. They also housed three helicopters. 

Despite these beastly armaments, the Kirov-class lacks the staying power those other systems, such as those belonging to the US Navy, enjoy. Four warships were built between 1977-1988. 

Of those four, only two remained until 2023. The Admiral Nakhimov has been languishing in drydock since 1999! The other battlecruiser, the Pyotr Veliky, was slated to be modernized but the Russian Navy ultimately announced it was being retired last year. 

As for the Admiral Nakhimov, it has been undergoing “modernization” in port for years. There is real concern among Russia’s military planners that the warship will never leave port; that it will simply be constantly upgraded. Nevertheless, the Russians appear committed to refurbishing this weapon of war—giving it all new and deadlier weapons, to boot!

The Russian Battlecruiser and American Aircraft Carrier Aren't Useful Today

Although, this gets back to a point raised earlier: are large surface warships even relevant in today’s era of A2/AD and hypersonic weapons? 

The Americans have overcommitted to their aircraft carrier capability to the detriment of other, more relevant capabilities, such as their submarines. Meanwhile, the Russians appeared to have done something similar with their Kirov-class battlecruisers. 

In fact, the Russians should have gotten the wake-up call when their warship, the Moskva, which belonged to the smaller and cheaper Russian battlecruiser Slava-class, was sunk by the Ukrainians at the outset of the Russo-Ukraine War.  

Investing heavily into modernizing the remaining Kirov-class battlecruisers is a waste. 

Circumventing A2/AD with Distance

A similar fate which befell the Moskva could easily befall the Kirov-class, modernization notwithstanding. A better use of resource for any navy today would be to spend its money on developing effective countermeasures against drone swarms, hypersonic weapons, and massive numbers of antiship missiles. 

At the same time, being able to deploy offensive systems far beyond the range of A2/AD systems would ensure that a navy remained relevant in this age of contested environments. 

The Russians are making the same mistake that the Americans are in investing so heavily into their surface prestige weapons. These systems will not prove decisive. They are boondoggles. 

About the Author 

Brandon J. Weichert is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, as well as at American Greatness and the Asia Times. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower (Republic Book Publishers), Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

Summary and Key Points You Need to Know: The Kirov-class battlecruiser, known to the Soviets as Project 1144 Orlan, has been a significant presence in the Soviet/Russian Navy since 1980. These nuclear-powered, guided-missile warships are the largest surface combatants in the world, second only to aircraft carriers.

-Developed during the Cold War to counter U.S. Navy submarines and carrier strike groups, the Kirov-class boasts an impressive array of weaponry, including anti-submarine and anti-ship missiles, surface-to-air missiles, and advanced defense systems.

Russia's Naval Titan: The Enduring Legacy of the Kirov-Class Battlecruiser

The Kirov-class is a nuclear-powered guided-missile battlecruiser that has been in service with the Soviet/Russian Navy since 1980. The Kirov, known to the Soviets as Project 1144 Orlan (sea eagle), holds special distinction: she is the largest and heavier surface combatant warship, in service, anywhere in the world.

The only modern warships larger than the Kirov are aircraft carriers. The Kirov is the size of a World War I-era battleship – and is typically referred to as a battlecruiser because of its size and shape.

Making Waves

The debut of the Kirov, predictably, caught the attention of Western war planners. When the Kirov debuted, the Cold War was climaxing, and both global superpowers were monitoring one another’s weapon development with paranoid vigilance.

The appearance of the Kirov, the world’s largest and heaviest surface combatant warship, concerned the Americans, who felt they might be falling behind their rivals. To balance the perceived deficiency in surface warships, the US recommissioned the Iowa-class battleships – World War II-era battleships that had long since been outdated but were still massive and heavily armed and capable of delivering significant amounts of ordnance on target.

The Kirov, in turn, was developed to counter the US Navy submarines. Accordingly, the Kirov carried a large payload of SS-N-14 anti-submarine missiles – and later, the Kirov was modified to carry twenty P-700 Granit anti-ship missiles (aka SS-N-19 Shipwreck) for countering the US carrier strike groups.

In addition to the SS-N-14 and SS-N-19 missiles, the Kirov was outfitted with twelve octuple S-300F surface-to-air launchers with 96 missiles and a pair of Osa-MA batteries with 20 missiles each. One of the Kirovs, the Pyotr Velikiy, carries the S-300FM, which makes her the only ship in the Russian Navy capable of ballistic missile defense. Other weapons included on various Kirov ships include the Metel anti-submarine warfare missiles; the 3K95 Kinzhal surface-to-air missile systems; a bow-mounted RBU ASW rocket launcher; eight 30mm (1.18in) AK-630 close-in weapon systems; the Kortik air-defense system; automatic 130mm (5in) AK-130 gun system; ten 21-inch (533mm) torpedo/missile tubes (9capable of firing RPK-2 Vyuga ASW missiles on later ships) and Udav-1 with 40 anti-submarine rockets and two sextuple RBU-1000 launchers.

Russia is developing a new hypersonic anti-ship missile, the 3M22 Tsirkon, which will be deployable from the Kirov.

A Kirov-Class Comeback?  The massive Kirov measures 827 feet long with a 94-foot beam and a 30-foot draft. When fully loaded, the Kirov displaces 28,000 tons. The battlecruiser relies upon a 2-shaft CONAS and 2 KN-3 nuclear marine propulsion with two GT3A-688 steam turbines – all of which can generate 140,000 horsepower. The Kirov’s top speed is 32 knots (37 miles per hour). The Kirov’s range is 1.000 nautical miles at 30 knots, or unlimited when operating at 20 knots on nuclear power. To use the Kirov, she requires a complement of 710 sailors.

In all, four Kirovs were built, while one was canceled. Two have since retired, and one is undergoing a refitting. Admiral Nakhimov has been mothballed since 1999 but is expected to return to service at somepoint. 

About the Author: Harrison Kass

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on global affairs issues. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

All images are Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points You Need To Know: The Russian Navy's sole nuclear-powered guided-missile battlecruiser, the Pyotr Velikiy, might be decommissioned due to high maintenance costs and its deteriorating condition.

-The Kirov-class ship, part of the Soviet Project 1144 Orlan, is one of the largest and heaviest surface combatants. Initially designed during the Cold War to counter the U.S. Navy's submarine capabilities, the Kirov-class was equipped with SS-N-19 Shipwreck anti-ship missiles and an array of advanced defense systems.

-Despite its formidable armament, the extensive repairs and modernization needed to keep Pyotr Velikiy operational may lead to its retirement, marking the end of an era for Russia’s naval fleet.

Russia's Kirov-Class Battlecruiser Faces Possible Decommissioning

The Russian Navy might decommission its sole nuclear-powered guided-missile battlecruiser, the Pyotr Velikiy. According to Tass, this Kirov-class ship costs too much to maintain. The vessel’s poor condition, coupled with the repairs and modernization needed to keep it relevant, mean its demise may be approaching. 

The Kirov class was designated by the Soviets as Project 1144 Orlan (Sea Eagle). It includes the largest and heaviest surface combatant warships to sail the seas. Second in size only to larger aircraft carriers, these ships have remained an important component of Russia’s naval fleet.

Kirov ships were conceptualized during the Cold War to counter the capabilities of the U.S. Navy’s submarine fleet. Specifically, the USSR desired a battleship class capable of carrying a large payload of SS-N-14 anti-submarine missiles and later P-700 Granit anti-ship missiles. The Granit long-range anti-ship missile system (designated by NATO as SS-N-19 Shipwreck) was the primary armament of the Kirov class. 

With their multi-variant target engagement program, Granit missiles could share information while in flight. However, these weapons could not be controlled after being launched. The lead missile would always assume a high-level flight trajectory, followed by subsequent missiles at a lower level.

Kirov-Class Battlecruisers Packed a Punch

The Shipwreck missile was designed in the 1970s to replace the Soviets’ shorter-range P-70 Ametist and P-120 Malakhit missiles. Soviet officials strongly desired the missile, seeing it as a better counter to the U.S. Navy’s rapidly advancing carrier battle groups. The Shipwreck was constructed by Chelomei/NPO Mashinostroyenia. By the early 1980s, the weapon was deployed aboard the Kirov cruiser. Granit launchers were also incorporated onto the Soviet’s aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, giving it added primary attack capability.

The -300F air-defense missile complex is also equipped on Russia’s lone remaining Kirov-class ship. As detailed by Naval Technology, “The Osa-MA air defense missile system is supplied by the Znamya Truda Plant based at Saratov. The ship has two double launchers and 40 missiles. The system can operate autonomously or it can be integrated into the ship’s combat systems and download target data from the ship’s sensors. Osa-MA has a range of 1.2 to 10km at an altitude between 25m and 5,000m.”

The addition of the Kashtan air-defense missile/gun system gives the Kirov-class ship an added edge, defending against an array of precision weapons including aircraft, anti-radar missiles and air bombs, and even small naval ships. This system is able to engage up to six targets at the same time, with a gun range of 1.5 km for altitudes up to 4,000 meters. 

Russia’s Ametist Design Bureau, Izumrud JSC, and Tula Engineering Plant supply the Kirov ships’ 130mm AK-130 multipurpose twin-barrel gun. Notably, the gun can be operated remotely under autonomous control, or manually. 

Sputnik provides more detail surrounding the S-300 on the Kirov-class ship, claiming its radar can track multiple aerial targets at altitudes of 30km and ranges out to 300 km. 

“Pyotr Veliky is armed with 48 S-300F Fort and 46 S-300FM Fort-M (SA-N-20 Gargoyle) medium-range surface-to-air missiles (with effective range of up to 200 kilometers), 128 3K95 Kinzhal (SA-N-9 Gauntlet) short-range SAMs, and six CADS-N-1 Kashtan gun/missile systems,” Sputnik reports.

Initially, the Kirov was also equipped with the RPK-3 Metel (designated by NATO as SSN-N-14 Silex) and the RPK-2 Vyuga (designated by NATO as SSN-N-15 Starfish). 

The majority of these weapons systems are positioned forward, while the ship’s stern is designed to house a below-deck helicopter hangar and other machinery.

About the Author: Maya Carlin

Maya Carlin is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. 

All images are Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points You Need to Know: The U.S. Air Force faces significant challenges as it grapples with developing the B-21 Raider, a new long-range stealth bomber, amidst looming financial crises and budget constraints. The Air Force needs at least 300 B-21s to maintain effective deep strike capabilities, but is slated to receive only 100 over the next decade.

-The B-21 features advanced stealth technology, capable of penetrating contested airspace, but budget limitations and the rise of drone warfare complicate its viability.

-Augmenting the B-21 fleet with next-generation drones could enhance mission success and survival, crucial as tensions with China and Russia escalate.

B-21 Raider: Essential Investment or Costly Gamble?

The United States Air Force is in a real pickle. It’s not the only part of the US government that is facing significant problems. In fact, the whole country is about to be riven by a catastrophic debt crisis, now that America’s enemies (and friends, such as Saudi Arabia) have killed the petrodollar and begun the movement to remove the US dollar as the primary reserve currency in the world. 

It’s probable that the Pentagon doesn’t even realize how cooked its budgets are. 

Even without the pending debt crisis and subsequent financial reordering heading our way, though, the military has been struggling to deliver systems as promised—despite paying top dollar for these systems. 

One of the biggest problems facing the Air Force (and the other branches in their own way) is how to develop a platform that can reliably penetrate contested airspace belonging to a near-peer rival, such as China or Russia, without being shot down outright? 

Enter the Air Force’s newest long-range stealth bomber, the B-21 Raider. This bird has it all. It incorporates the most advanced version of stealth. Unlike previous stealth planes, this has an entirely upgraded composite skin, making it even harder to identify on radar. 

These planes move fast for a bomber. What’s more, they can deliver an assortment of lethal payloads over distant, otherwise well-defended targets. 

The B-21 Raider Has a Math Problem 

There’s just a tiny problem: the Air Force needs at least 300 of these birds in the next couple of years for it to be worth the massive investment. At best, the Pentagon will receive 100 of these warbirds over the next decade. And even then, many are understandably inquiring about whether investing this system is the most efficient use of America’s limited (and soon to be dwindling) resources.

After all, as I have argued repeatedly, we are now in the age of rampant drone warfare that undermines most concepts of warfare that so many of our leaders hold dear. 

Still, the Air Force needs a deep strike bomber capacity. It has already made the investment into these platforms. But if it is not going to get the required 300 units for this to be an effective investment, the Air Force should spend considerably smaller sums of money building next-generation drones to operate in tandem with the B-21. 

What’s more, the Air Force (along with the Army and the rest of the force) must pool their limited resources to both build offensive hypersonic weapons systems as well as viable defenses against enemy hypersonic weapons.

The idea, though, that the B-21 is a waste of time or money is ridiculous. It is without a doubt the most advanced bomber in the world. If the Americans committed to building at least 300 of these units as quickly as possible, the rest of the world would be put on notice. 

Failing that, augmenting the handful of B-21s that are being built with advanced drones will allow for the B-21 to not only penetrate the sophisticated air defenses of enemy airspace but it would also ensure mission success. 

As well as mission survival. 

Time is running out for all of these issues, though. Soon, a shooting war either with China or Russia will be upon us. Their advanced anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) and other air defense systems will deny most of the Air Force’s fleet reliable access to contested regions. 

It will, therefore, fall upon stealth systems (which even then will find it difficult to operate). But the most advanced stealth technology as found in the B-21 will be instrumental in overcoming the threats posed to US power projection platforms. 

The B-21 is a worthy investment. Now pair it with next-generation drones and listen to our enemies cry.

Author Experience and Expertise: Brandon J. Weichert

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. 

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)

Summary and Key Points: The U.S. Air Force is currently testing the B-21 Raider, a new stealth bomber designed to deliver nuclear and conventional ordnance. The Air Force is phasing out the B-2 Spirit and B-1 Lancer to make way for the B-21, raising concerns due to the untested nature of the new aircraft.

-Canceling the B-21 would jeopardize the Air Force's stealth bombing capabilities, leaving the U.S. dependent on outdated B-52 bombers.

-This would compromise the nuclear triad and reduce the strategic edge over adversaries. The success of the B-21 Raider is crucial for maintaining U.S. military strength and deterrence capabilities.

B-21 Raider: Why the U.S. Air Force Can't Afford to Cancel Its New Stealth Bomber

The US Air Force is currently flight testing their newest aircraft, the B-21 Raider, a stealth bomber capable of delivering nuclear and conventional ordnance.

The Air Force appears to be “all-in” on the B-21, opting to phase out the B-2 Spirit and the B-1 Lancer as it comes online.

The heavy commitment to a new airframe, which remains mostly untested, has raised some eyebrows and places significant pressure on the B-21 to deliver, as canceling the program doesn’t appear to be an option.

What if the B-21 were Cancelled

The Air Force is fully committed to the B-21. Actually, the Air Force seems to be skirting the “Fly Before You Buy” concept of aircraft procurement, in purchasing the B-21 upfront before the aircraft has been properly vetted.

“Fly Before You Buy is not a new concept,” Senator David Pryor said on the Senate floor in 1994. “It was first promoted in the wake of the Vietnam War after thousands of American soldiers lost their lives because of weapons that failed to perform as expected…operational testing is of little or no use if it conducted after the weapon system has been purchased.”

The Air Force Needs the B-21 Raider...Badly

The B-21 has not been thoroughly vetted yet must work as planned because the entire structure of the Air Force is dependent upon the B-21 working.

Were the B-21 cancelled for some reason, the US could potentially lose their stealth bombing capabilities. The B-2, America’s current stealth bomber, is being replaced for a reason; that reason is because the B-2’s stealth technology is already a generation-old and not as effective as when it first debuted. Soon, if not already, the B-2’s stealth may not be sufficient at all, rendering the aircraft, functionally, a non-stealth aircraft.

Without a stealth bomber in the inventory, the US would lose a major advantage over its adversaries, who fear the capabilities of the stealth bomber fleet. The mere existence of a stealth bomber offers a diplomatic and strategic edge; the capabilities are unmatched.

And were the B-21 to be cancelled, were the US left without a stealth bomber option, their nuclear triad would be compromised. True, the US has non-stealth aircraft capable of delivering nuclear ordnance, most notably the B-52 – but the non-stealth aircraft would be incapable of entering contested airspaces, where nuclear payloads are most likely to need to be delivered. The ultimate effect would likely be that the nuclear triad were reduced to a nuclear duad, consisting of just land- and sea- based nuclear options.

If the B-21 were cancelled, the Air Force would surely want to do the cancelling before the B-2 and the B-1 were taken off-line, otherwise, the US would be stuck solely with the aged B-52 fleet as the only bomber in the entire inventory.

The B-52 debuted in the 1950s, and many of the airframes are in questionable condition; B-52 flights are often grounded for mechanical reasons, and its unlikely the fleet could handle the increased burden of being the sole bomber at the US military’s disposal.

Indeed, canceling the B-21 would cause problems for the US military. Hopefully, the new stealth bomber will perform as advertised during its initial flight testing.

About the Author: Harrison Kass 

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. 

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)

Summary and Key Points: The B-21 Raider is the most advanced long-range stealth bomber globally, crucial for restoring U.S. deterrence against China and Russia.

-However, America’s current industrial capabilities and reliance on materials from China pose significant challenges.

-The U.S. Air Force needs 300 B-21 units but is slated to receive only 150 over the next decade, costing $600 million each. Given potential economic constraints, prioritizing the B-21 is critical, yet alternative solutions like stealth drone swarms might be more feasible.

-These drones could support fifth-generation fighters like the F-22 and F-35, offering a cost-effective way to maintain air superiority and meet future combat demands.

Stealth Drones vs. B-21 Raider: Exploring Affordable Alternatives for U.S. Air Dominance

The B-21 Raider is the Air Force’s newest long-range stealth bomber. It’s undoubtedly the most advanced bomber in the world. If it could be produced to the level that the Air Force (quickly) needs them to be produced at, the United States would have likely restored a key element of its failing deterrence against China and Russia. 

But America’s industrial strength today is a fraction of what it was in the Second World War. In fact, our defense industrial supply chain sources many of its materials from China. 

Between that and the broken nature of the US defense industrial base, these planes won’t be available in any meaningful number anytime soon.

Anyway, the Air Force needs at least 300 units of the B-21. 

They’re slated to receive only 150 units over the next decade. At $600 million per unit, it seems unlikely that the Air Force will ever get its desired number of 300 units—let alone 150. They’ll probably get a few to a dozen aircraft in this model over 15 years (and with serious cost overruns and additional delays). 

Will it be worth the cost? 

The B-21 is Being Given the Short Shrift 

These are the questions that military planners must now ask themselves as we stare down the face of a massive debt crisis and likely recession. Unlike 2008, there will be no bailouts to be had, meaning that when the crisis hits the wider economy it will be felt for the duration of the crisis. The military will be impacted along with the rest of the country.

Personally, I think the Air Force should prioritize this plane over almost all of its other considerations. Having 300 of these birds soon would truly deter America’s rivals. But if the Air Force cannot—and Congress won’t allow for them to—build requisite numbers of these birds, the Air Force might want to consider canceling the project now and working its lessons learned into something more affordable. 

Drone swarms are a critical feature of any future combat planning. Yet, the United States is still working on this in the concept phase. If the Air Force cannot get the number of B-21s it wants and needs to achieve a deterrent effect, then it is necessary to look at other, cheaper modalities. 

Again, the B-21 is the best vehicle for restoring deterrence but if it’s too expensive and if the Air Force won’t prioritize it, then we need something else.

The Air Force is already working on advanced drones, such as the Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) concept that Kratos is building (the XQ-58 Valkyrie). These drones will support the mission sets of America’s fifth-generation warplanes, the F-22A Raptor and the F-35 Lightning. The XQ-58 costs anywhere between $20.5 and $27.5 million per unit (significantly cheaper than the B-21). 

Creating stealth drones that are capable of swarming would be more expensive, though still less than the B-21 Raider costs.

A More Economical Solution

Building off the Air Force’s CCA concept, stealth drones could be deployed from F-22 or F-35 “motherships.” From there, these drones, armed with advanced propulsion and, eventually, artificial intelligence (AI), will augment existing air capabilities. The stealth drone swarms, at least in theory, would deliver the same kind of firepower over distant targets that the B-21 Raiders can—but at lower costs and with no direct danger to American pilots. 

Plus, building an entirely new generation of drones that are stealth capable, longer-range, and can swarm will help keep the amazing F-22A Raptor relevant (the Air Force idiotically wants to retire this great plane to make way for its ghastly sixth-generation warplane boondoggle). 

Time is of the essence. 

The world is speeding towards even greater geopolitical problems in which every technological asset that America can bring to bear will be required. Right now, the United States is going to lose that war. It needs to significantly—fundamentally—change things up. Before it’s too late. 

Stealthy drone swarms married to America’s fifth-generation warplane fleet is the surefire answer. 

Author Experience and Expertise: Brandon J. Weichert

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. 

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)

Summary and Key Points: The B-21 Raider, unveiled in late 2022, represents the future of the U.S. Air Force bomber fleet. This sixth-generation stealth bomber is progressing on schedule, a rarity in military procurements.

-With costs between $600 million and $750 million per unit, it is significantly cheaper than its predecessor, the B-2 Spirit. Currently undergoing testing at Edwards Air Force Base, the B-21 will offer unmatched range, stealth capabilities, and durability.

-Designed to deliver both nuclear and conventional munitions, the Raider will serve as the Air Force’s premier deep-penetration bomber, ensuring strategic reach and effectiveness.

-The B-21 Raider stealth aircraft is the future of the U.S. Air Force bomber fleet. The sixth-generation strategic bomber was unveiled in late 2022 and conducted its first flight late last year. 

B-21 Raider: Advanced Capabilities and On-Schedule Progress for the U.S. Bomber Fleet

The B-21 Raider is the latest-technology project, yet it is surprisingly moving along as planned. 

B-21 Raider Moving Along 

That Northrop Grumman’s B-21 Raider is progressing according to plan might sound unremarkable to someone without knowledge of military procurements, but it is in fact a surprising development. 

New military projects tend to go over budget and over the agreed timeline. Sometimes by a few years and a few billion dollars, while other times a project may lag for many years and cost hundreds of billions of dollars more than expected. 

The estimated cost of the new strategic bomber hovers between $600 million and $750 million per aircraft. That is a lot, but it is still cheaper than the B-2 Spirit, the aircraft it will be replacing, which has a price tag of $2 billion per unit. 

In total, the B-21 has been in development for close to a decade and will be the first strategic bomber to join the fleet since the B-2. 

The first B-21 Raider prototype aircraft are currently undergoing intense flight and technology testing at Edwards Air Force Base in California.

The Capabilities of the B-21 Raider 

As a sixth-generation strategic bomber in development, not a lot is known about the specific capabilities of the Raider. We know that it is going to have stealth capabilities, that it will be able to carry nuclear and conventional munitions, and that it will be the go-to deep-penetration bomber for the U.S. Air Force. 

During the unveiling ceremony of the strategic bomber, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin provided some information about the capabilities of the aircraft. 

“Let's talk about the B-21's range. No other long-range bomber can match its efficiency. It won't need to be based in-theater. It won't need logistical support to hold any target at risk,” Austin stated. 

This means that the B-21 Raider, like its predecessors, will be beyond the reach of enemy munitions. That makes it a truly strategic asset. 

“Let's talk about the B-21's stealth. Fifty years of advances in low-observable technology have gone into this aircraft. And even the most sophisticated air-defense systems will struggle to detect a B-21 in the sky,” Austin added.

Stealth doesn’t make an aircraft invisible. But an aircraft with good stealth capabilities can remain undetectable to enemy air defenses, giving it precious time to deliver munitions. 

“Let's talk about the B-21's durability. You know, we really don't have a capability unless we can maintain it. And the B-21 is carefully designed to be the most maintainable bomber ever built,” the Pentagon’s top official added. 

Good operational availability is an important aspect of a capable aircraft. What is the point of having a Ferrari in your garage if you can’t drive it because it constantly breaks down? 

About the Author 

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from the Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. 

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)

Summary and Key Points: Russia's sole aircraft carrier, Admiral Kuznetsov, has faced numerous challenges since its commissioning, reflecting the broader issues within the Russian Navy. Unlike the U.S., which mastered aircraft carrier operations during and after World War II, Russia’s land-focused military delayed serious carrier development until the 1980s.

-The Kuznetsov, built in the Soviet Union’s final days, suffers from technical limitations, including the use of mazut fuel, outdated launch systems, and poor construction quality. Maintenance issues have plagued the vessel, often requiring tugboat escorts.

-Despite its shortcomings, Russia persists with the Kuznetsov to maintain a semblance of naval capability.

From Dreams to Disasters: The Saga of Russia’s Admiral Kuznetsov

Aircraft carriers are the ultimate symbols of national power projection. The United States has led the world in aircraft carrier operations ever since the Second World War. Back then, there were multiple powers with flat tops, not just the United States. In fact, the US Navy didn’t know what to do with the aircraft carriers it had built before the tragic events of December 7, 1941—Pearl Harbor. 

It was the Imperial Japanese Navy that had pioneered the use of aircraft carriers as an offensive weapons platform. After all, the symbol of power projection back then was the battleship. But Japan did not attack Pearl Harbor with battleships. They used aircraft carriers. Similarly, the naval campaign of the Pacific Theater during the Second World War was not won by the battleship. It was won by the US Navy’s carrier force.

After World War II, the carrier remained as the pinnacle of naval power. Throughout the Cold War, American flat tops were the envy of the world. Whereas the Americans had mastered the art of aircraft carrier operations and had made the flat tops the basis of their surface fleet, the Soviet Red Navy lagged far behind the Americans. It was not until the 1980s that the Soviets even seriously contemplated building their own aircraft carrier. For decades, the Soviet Navy had made the heavy battlecruiser and submarines the basis of their navy’s power projection capabilities. 

Geography’s Influence on the Russian Navy and Aircraft Carriers

The Soviet Union and, today, the Russian Federation is a predominantly land power. Occupying a large swathe of northern Eurasia, Russia has conducted its military operations usually across the continent as opposed to across the oceans, as so many other Western powers had done. This geographical reality has informed every aspect of Russian society. It explains why Russia is has trended toward autocracy. And why it took so long for Moscow to even contemplate building aircraft carriers. 

By the time that Moscow opted to build an aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, was intended to be one of three carriers. Unfortunately for the Russians, the Cold War ended, and the Soviet Union died with it. What followed was chaos and poverty. Moscow retained control over its carrier but Russian experience maintaining a carrier—an inherently costly endeavor under the best of circumstances—was limited. 

What’s more, the carrier was an incomplete mess heap that should have probably been scrapped or sold to the highest bidder (as was what happened to the Admiral Kuznetsov’s sister ship which became China’s first carrier, the Liaoning).

The Aircraft Carrier Admiral Kuznetsov’s Technical Limitations

Run on “a goopy, tar-like substance,” called Mazut, which is a petrochemical derivative, the Russian carrier was never as advanced as its American counterparts, which ran on more efficient and powerful nuclear energy. Mazut creates an amazing amount of pollution, so much, in fact, that it poses a health risk to sailors and to the equipment on the ship employing Mazut as a fuel source. Yet, it is relatively cheap and Russia being a petro-producing superpower, never has to worry about the supply chain for this low-grade fossil fuel being disrupted.

Burning this energy, though, creates security risks as well as health risks for the ship employing it. Namely, a large smoke trail, which can be seen for many miles, billows from the warship’s smokestack, and leaves a trail that would be easy for an enemy to track. 

The carrier is an antique, too. 

It uses neither a steam powered catapult nor an electromagnetic catapult, such as does the US Navy’s new Ford-class carriers do, to launch aircraft into the wild blue yonder. Instead, a ski jump ramp is used to help deploy fighter jets from the carrier. What this means, for all practical purposes, is that aircraft deploying from the Admiral Kuznetsov must be lighter than what they normally would be—meaning those aircraft must carry less armaments than they would, if they launched from another carrier that possessed a powered catapult system.

The infrastructure within the warship itself is shotty. Built during the terminal days of the Soviet Union, engineers at the Ukrainian shipyard where this jalopy was built cut significant corners. Cheap, ineffective pipesdegrade the efficiency to transfer pressurized Mazut to the engines. This has caused all kinds of knock-on problems for the carrier. 

Then, of course, there’s the fact that the funding to maintain the aircraft carrier has been inconsistent and pretty much lacking. Thus, the carrier has been chock full of problems because of shabby maintenance schedules and inadequate parts. 

Oh, and don’t forget all the engine woes the carrier has been made to endure. It’s gotten so bad for the carrier that, for many years, the warship was forced to travel with a tugboat. There has been long period when the carrier could not leave port because of all the maintenance issues. 

A Hodgepodge of Broken Dreams & Lost Hopes

The Admiral Kuznetsov is a hodgepodge patchwork of broken dreams and lost hopes. 

The only reason Moscow keeps dumping money into the warship is because the Kremlin fears the creation of a capabilities gap in its navy. Sure, Russia’s navy has nowhere near the level of experience managing carriers that the Americans do. But they don’t have to be on par with Washington in that domain. They just need to have some degree of knowledge—especially if, inevitably, China and Russia fuse their carrier programs on some level to counter the Americans, as I fear they will eventually do. 

Those (limited) Russian carrier capabilities will be essential for helping China as much as China’s mass production capabilities will be critical for helping to establish a Russian carrier presence. 

There is no doubt, though, the Admiral Kuznetsov is truly the worst aircraft carrier ever made. Certainly, it is the most dilapidated on the high seas (or not on the seas) today. 

About the Author

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points: The Russian Navy's sole aircraft carrier, Admiral Kuznetsov, has been undergoing a troubled refit since 2018, with uncertain prospects for returning to service.

-Initially intended as a symbol of Russian naval pride, the carrier has faced numerous setbacks, including mechanical issues, fires, and corruption.

-Historically, Russia has prioritized land-based power over naval dominance, focusing on submarines and missile cruisers.

-Despite considering new aircraft carriers like the "Shtorm," financial and strategic challenges, exacerbated by the war in Ukraine, make it unlikely that Russia will soon develop a new carrier. The ongoing issues with Admiral Kuznetsov underscore the broader struggles of the Russian Navy.

The Russian Navy's Aircraft Carrier Woes: A Deep Dive into Admiral Kuznetsov"

The Russian Navy's sole aircraft carrier, Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Kuznetsov, has been undergoing a refit since July 2018. The Kremlin has announced that the warship could finally conduct sea trials sometime in the future – but whether that actually happens has yet to be seen.

The problem-plagued warship was meant to be a symbol of pride for Moscow, but it has often been the butt of numerous jokes – often with good reason. At one point, the Kremlin did consider a replacement, yet likely, the warship will never sail.

And also for many good reasons.

Russia Has Been a Land Power

It is true that throughout the Cold War, the United States Navy's aircraft carriers were used for force projection throughout the world. Nearly a dozen and half aircraft carriers played a role during the Korean War, and naval aircraft provided much-needed air support – especially in the early stages of the conflict. The carrier air wings were instrumental in destroying enemy supply depots, bridges, roads, and railways. When the tide turned in November 1950, as Chinese forces pushed Allied units south, U.S. Navy aviators covered the retreat.

More than 250,000 sorties were flown by the U.S. Navy, contributing one-third of the total air effort in the war. The case for Cold War carriers was made, especially as the U.S. Navy began the war with 15 active carriers and ended it with 38 in service.

After the war, even as the United States developed strategic aircraft, concealed intercontinental missiles throughout the Midwest, and launched a fleet of ballistic missile submarines, aircraft carriers played a crucial role in providing a defensive parameter around the United States.

"Control of the seas means security; control of the seas means peace; control of the seas can mean victory," stated President John F. Kennedy.

In the years that followed, U.S. Navy carrier strike groups have been deployed dozens of times to launch sorties around the globe. Today, the warships continue to allow the U.S. military to maintain force projection that is simply unrivaled.

The question then can be asked why didn't the Soviet Union – with its goal of spreading communism across the world – build true aircraft carriers? The short answer is that the Soviet Union, like Imperial Russia before it, was always a land-based power.

The Soviet's Failed Aircraft Carrier Ambitions

Despite it being a land-based power, there were numerous efforts to develop aircraft cruisers. Yet, the Soviet Union instead underwent a rapid modernization in the 1960s and 1970s that focused on submarines, as well as guided-missile cruisers and destroyers. Moscow saw the threat that the carriers presented, but Soviet military planners had to face the reality of its limited resources and the high cost to build and maintain carriers.

One factor was that, unlike the United States, the Soviets lacked the overseas bases to support the warships. Without foreign port facilities or the ability to resupply a carrier strike group at sea, Moscow could have truly employed the warships as effectively as the United States Navy.

It was only after Leonid Brezhnev came to power that the Soviet Union finally began to consider aircraft carriers once more. It eventually launched a total of two Moskva -class helicopter carriers, one in 1965 followed by another in 1968. The first Soviet aircraft carrier to support fighter jets, the Kiev-class, was only launched in 1975. It was a race that was already long lost, as the United States Navy's carrier efforts dated back to 1910.

The one serious attempt to build a carrier comparable to the American standards began as "Project Orel" in the 1970s, but it was scuttled over costs and disagreements within the Kremlin over the Soviet military's strategic priorities. Only in the 1980s did Moscow finally move forward with a new class of "aircraft cruisers."

In the end, just a single flattop was completed. Launched as the Leonid Brezhnev, and later as the Tbilsi, she was renamed Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Kuznetsov after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. As of July 2022 that aircraft cruiser is currently undergoing a refit, during which time she has suffered a number of misfortunes. Her sister vessel Varyag was sold to China by cash-strapped Ukraine and refurbished as the Type 001 Liaoning.

The Modern Russian Carrier

In 2018, it was announced that the Russian Navy had begun to explore options for a new aircraft carrier. According to GlobalSecurity.org, one option was focused on a conventionally powered vessel with a displacement of around 70,000 tons – slightly larger than the 58,600-67,500 tons full load Project 1143.5 Admiral Kuznetsov. Another option called for a nuclear-powered carrier, with a larger displacement. That would be bigger than the 42,000-ton French Navy flagship Charles de Gaulle – the only non-U.S. Navy nuclear-powered carrier – yet not likely as large as the 100,000-ton American supercarriers.

The new "Shtorm" aircraft carrier – a.k.a. Project 23000E – was to be included in Russia's armament program for the 2019 to 2025 period.

As the trade magazine SP's Naval Force also reported in 2018, "Project Shtorm was shrouded in mystery for several years until an initial concept was unveiled by the Krylovsky State Research Center (KRSC) back in 2015. The new super-carrier would displace close to 100,000 tonnes, 330 m long, 40 m wide and could launch 80-90 aircraft with an EMALS system."

Russian officials had suggested the carrier could be laid down between 2025 and 2030 – while a model was presented at a past Army Technical Forum. Yet, as of 2020, the project hadn't been approved and given its financial costs would likely impact other Russian naval modernization efforts.

"Considering the estimated program cost of $9 billion, it seems quite unlikely that economically weakened Russia will move beyond the design stage," SP's Naval Force added.

That assessment was made before Russia's Ukrainian folly, and notably before vast sums of money were thrown into modernizing the Admiral Kuznetsov. Given the current situation – not to mention the advancements in anti-ship weapons – it would seem unlikely the Shtorm will ever be more than a concept that failed to sail off the drawing board.

Author Experience and Expertise

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu.

All images are Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points: The Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov, plagued with endless mechanical and operational problems, has not participated in the ongoing Ukraine conflict due to prolonged maintenance since 2017.

-This Cold War-era vessel, using outdated Mazut fuel and an ineffective bow ramp for aircraft launches, highlights significant deficiencies in Russia's military capabilities. The carrier's persistent issues, including boiler failures, poor piping, and structural damage, have raised questions about the future of Russia’s naval power.

-With resources stretched thin due to the war in Ukraine, the likelihood of Russia investing in a new aircraft carrier appears low.

-In fact, this aircraft carrier has just one enemy: no willingness by Russia as of yet to scrap the carrier. 

Admiral Kuznetsov: A Symbol of Russia's Naval and Military Challenges

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has offered revealing insights into the health of the Russian military.

While Russia is often billed as a near-peer power of the United States, with a capable fighting force, the Russo-Ukraine War has laid bare the rampant deficiencies of a Russian military that has struggled to establish a foothold in the territory of a weaker neighbor.

Russia has underperformed in air, land, and sea – deploying weapons systems that have fared poorly against the Ukrainian’s low-tech defense mechanisms.

The Russian invasion has renewed focus on Russian military specifics, raising criticism about outdated tanks, undertrained troops, and a shoddy naval fleet.

One vessel is especially notable: the Russian’s lone aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov. To date, the Kuznetsov has failed to take part in ongoing hostilities – because the ship has been under maintenance since 2017, without a return date set.

The Admiral Kuznetsov has been so problematic that some observers have suggested Russia abstain from making aircraft carriers in the future.

Admiral Kuznetsov: Shifting priorities

Russia has become embroiled in a war of attrition, in what is generally considered the most viscous fighting on the European continent since the end of World War II.

The conflict, which has placed emphasis on land-based systems, caused Russia to hemorrhage tanks and soldiers – which, of course, taxes Russia’s finite resources. Paying for something like a new aircraft carrier is not a priority.

An aircraft carrier exists to project airpower flexibly without needing a fixed, land-based airfield. Sure, parking an aircraft carrier in the Black Sea could help supplement Russia’s ability to launch ground strikes on Ukraine or perhaps compete to control the air space above Ukraine. But Russia has more pressing concerns and the likelihood of investing in a new aircraft carrier right now seems low.

Besides, Russia’s current aircraft carrier has proven to be a massive headache.

Problems at Sea for Russia's Only Aircraft Carrier 

The Admiral Kuznetsov has a few problems - and that is putting it nicely for sure.

One, the Kuznetsov runs on Mazut, an outdated petrochemical that leaves a thick and hazardous exhaust fume. Whereas modern aircraft carriers are using nuclear power, and can operate indefinitely, the Kuznetsov burns fuel as if it were an automobile – imposing limits on the carrier’s range and endurance.

Relatedly, the burning of Mazut requires the fuel to be preheated and pressurized, which requires an extensive system of piping. Yet, the Russians installed low-quality pipes on the Kuznetsov. Piping failures have constantly plagued the Kuznetsov. The boat’s boilers tend to fail, too, forcing operators to alternate between working boilers, and occasionally, use just one boiler. The result has been a boat that sometimes travels as slow as four knots per hour.

The Russians recognizing that the Kuznetsov is prone to breaking down outright, always assign tugboat escorts to stick with the aircraft carrier, just in case she must be towed back to port.

Mazut, and the faults of the related infrastructure, are not the only problems hindering the Kuznetsov’s performance. The Kuznetsov employs a bow ramp to launch aircraft, which has proven outdated and limiting.

Modern aircraft carriers rely on catapults to launch aircraft. The Nimitz-class, for example, uses a steam catapult; The Ford-class uses a magnetic catapult (the EMALS). Both catapult systems can launch relatively heavy aircraft because the catapult is able to reach high speeds in a short distance. The Kuznetsov, meanwhile, does not use a catapult. Instead, Russia’s lone carrier uses a simple bow ramp. With a bow ramp, aircraft simply take off, self-powered, off an upward lilting ramp.

The bow ramp launches aircraft at a relatively slow speed – just fast enough to sustain flight. But the low speed doesn’t leave much room for error – and heavier planes, are unable to reach the speeds necessary to sustain flight from a bow ramp. The result is that the bow ramp can only launch relatively light aircraft.

And to meet the weight requirements of the bow ramp, Russian aircraft must cut down their ordnance and fuel loads. In effect, the Kuznetsov is only capable of launching aircraft that have had their range, and their ability to strike enemy positions, reduced. Since the aircraft carrier exists to project airpower, the Kuznetsov’s bow ramp detracts from the boat’s fundamental mission.

An Uncertain Future for Admiral Kuznetsov, Russia's Only Aircraft Carrier

If the Russians are ever going to make another aircraft carrier, they will need to consider what has gone wrong with – and potentially fix – the Admiral Kuznetsov, which has been docked for maintenance since 2017.

But the maintenance is way behind schedule. Fires, and in one dramatic instance, a 70-ton crane punching through the ship's deck, have added years to the Kuznetsov’s repair schedule.

Given the Kuznetsov’s checkered performance and past and given the resource commitments of the Russo-Ukraine War, the prospects of Russia building a new aircraft carrier in the near future seem dim.

About the Author: Harrison Kass

Harrison Kass is a seasoned defense writer with over 1,000 articles posted. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken. Email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. 

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)

Summary and Key Points: Russia's sole aircraft carrier, Admiral Kuznetsov, has become a symbol of persistent naval woes. The carrier, infamous for its black smoke and mechanical failures, has faced numerous setbacks, including fires, accidents, and corruption.

-In 2011, U.S. Navy officials even feared it might sink during a Mediterranean deployment. Despite plans to retire the vessel by the decade's end, its ongoing refit, started in 2018, has been plagued by delays and accidents.

-With the latest reports suggesting service resumption no earlier than 2024, Admiral Kuznetsov continues to drain resources, raising questions about its future viability.

The Costly Nightmare of Russia's Only Aircraft Carrier Admiral Kuznetsov

So many jokes could be made about the Russian Navy's flagship aircraft cruiser Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Kuznetsov - or Admiral Kuznetsov, for short - that most comedians would run out of time before they ever ran out of material.

The cursed carrier has been plagued with endless problems, and it is unclear when – or even if – the Cold War-era warship will ever return to service.

The Navy Feared Russia's Only Aircraft Carrier Could Sink

What wasn't a laughing matter is that in late 2011, some United States Navy officials feared Russia's only carrier would sink in the Mediterranean Sea as she struggled during her only fourth deployment from her northern base to reach the Russian naval facilities in Syria.

The concern was reportedly so great that the United States Navy's Sixth Fleet was even tasked with maintaining contact in case the carrier floundered.

The fears were actually well-founded, as just two years earlier Admiral Kuznetsov suffered a fire at sea while deployed to the Mediterranean, resulting in the death of a sailor onboard. In addition, the flattop – which had notoriously and routinely belched black smoke – spilled hundreds of tons of fuel into the sea while refueling.

Unlike western vessels that use gas turbines or nuclear power, the Russian flattop uses mazut as fuel, which often results in a trail of heavy black smoke that can be seen from great distances. Such a smoke signal is hardly ideal as it practically announces the location of the carrier.

Moreover, at best, the flattop's endurance is a mere 45 days, while Russia has few ports where the aircraft cruiser could operate year-round. During deployments, the carrier was often escorted with tugs in case she were to break down. Worst of all, the carrier relies on a bow ski ramp to launch fighters, and the Russian designs are ill-suited to the task.

She Made It Home to Russia (Barely)

It is hard to say for sure if the U.S. Navy's concerns were overstated – and perhaps they were meant to make the Russian warship look bad (not that much effort was required) – but in fairness, Admiral Kuznetsov did manage to make it to Syria and back to her home port at Severomorsk near Murmansk.

Yet, the problem hasn't gotten better, and after breaking down in a storm in late 2015, the carrier had to be towed back to port.

While the original plan from the Kremlin had been to retire the warship by the end of this decade, it isn't clear if she'd return to service in time to be retired.

The vessel has been undergoing a refit since 2018, and just recently, it was reported that the warship had suffered another repair delay and won't likely reenter service until 2024… at the very earliest.

A source in the Russian defense sector told state media that there have been defects in the work, and as a result, Admiral Kuznetsov will remain in dry dock for refit longer than initially planned.

The time already spent in the repair facilities hasn't really improved matters, and in some ways, those efforts have been to blame for the delays.

In November 2018, Admiral Kuznetsov was damaged when a 70-ton floating crane fell on the warship's flight deck, which tragically killed one worker and injured four more.

It was just over a year later that a fire broke out in the engine room during a welding accident; and it resulted in the death of two, while 14 more suffered injuries from fire and smoke inhalation. In addition, the actual drydock, which was vital to the repairs, was also damaged during a power outage, further delaying the refit.

Corruption has also contributed to the lack of progress on the carrier's refit. In March 2021, Yevgeny Zudin, general director of Shipyard No. 10 in Polyarny, was arrested under suspicion of the theft of 45 million rubles (approximately $600,000) that had been allocated to the repair of the Russian Navy's Northern Fleet flagship.

Given these factors, the best option would be for the Kremlin to cut its losses and deep-six this sad excuse of a warship.

For now, it is just a hole in the water that Russia keeps pouring money into with no end in sight – while the carrier is truly the biggest joke floating (or barely floating as the case may be).

About the Author: Peter Suciu 

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu.

All images are Creative Commons. 

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Washington erred in embracing Ruto—but now must double down on helping him succeed.

Some years ago, a marketing campaign for Dos Equis beer profiled a (made-up) personality, a suave gentleman whom it termed “the most interesting man in the world.” No one would call Javier Milei suave, but the tousled-haired, vulgarity-spouting President of Argentina may indeed be the most interesting man on the global scene, at least in international conservative circles.

Milei, an economist and media personality with hardcore libertarian principles, is seeking to wrench Argentina away from its longstanding commitment to big government, to which he attributes its decades of economic and social decay. While this would seem enough to keep any president busy, Milei has found time to travel the world, preaching his gospel in locales ranging from the suites of Silicon Valley tech lords to the conferences of Europe’s hard-right political parties all while engaging in tit-for-tat name-calling with Spain’s socialist prime minister.

He has stressed his strong support for the United States, Israel, and Ukraine, positions which put him at odds with most of Latin America’s other leaders. Prior to gaining office, he harshly criticized China, the Vatican, and Brazil. However, he has subsequently backed off, at least as regards the first two, displaying a measure of pragmatism that co-exists with his propensity for ideological combat. However, the evident personal antagonism between him and Brazilian President Lula da Silva has made managing relations with this key neighbor difficult.

On the Road

Despite the immensity of the challenges he faces in trying to change Argentina’s direction, Milei has set aside considerable time for international travel. Much has been devoted to seeking high-profile venues to promote his libertarian economics. He has met with the heads of Apple, Google, Meta, and OpenAI, as well as with Elon Musk, where the two “agreed on the need to free markets and to defend the ideas of freedom.”

He seems particularly welcome at conferences of international business leaders and of conservative activists. His first overseas trip was to the World Economic Forum at Davos, where he decried socialism as a “danger” to the Western world and described businessmen as “heroes” while also selling his reform plans for Argentina. His reception was such that according to the Financial Times, “the global business elite is infatuated” with him.

He followed up his Davos trip by participating in the annual Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) in Maryland on February 24, at which he was hugged by former President Donald Trump. Also present was another Latin American president inspiring global interest on the Right, El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele, as well as one of former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro’s sons, and Santiago Abascal, leader of Spain’s hard-right Vox political party.

Indeed, Spain, governed by Socialist Pedro Sánchez, seems to bring out Milei’s most combative instincts, as seen in a series of harsh exchanges with his Spanish opponents. On May 19, he participated in a mass rally in Madrid organized by Vox ahead of the European parliamentary elections. Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and Italy’s Giorgia Meloni also spoke (by video).

In his speech, Milei, in addition to accusing Sánchez of bringing “poverty and death” to Spain, denounced the Spanish prime minister’s wife as corrupt (she is embroiled in a scandal in which her husband has vigorously defended her). This came after Spain’s transport minister had suggested that Milei might have “ingested substances” during his campaign. The minister later apologized.

But whatever the provocation may have been, Milei’s personal attack on Spain’s leader while visiting his country did not go unanswered. The Sánchez government demanded that Milei treat Spain with respect and withdrew its ambassador in Buenos Aires, a move which Milei termed “arrogant.” On June 21, Milei returned to Spain to receive an award from Isabel Díaz Ayuso, the head of Madrid’s regional government and a leading figure in the conservative People’s Party. He used the opportunity to once again denounce Sanchez for his alleged ignorance of economics.

Some Pragmatism

While Milei has clearly delighted in his fight with Spain’s Sánchez, he has had to swallow hard and mend relations with some leaders with whom he has picked ideological fights in the past. While campaigning, he had said that he would not foster relations with China, merely leaving it to Argentina’s businessmen to decide if they wanted to trade with it. Early in his presidency, he insisted on Argentine authorities inspecting a Chinese deep space tracking station in the southern state of Neuquén, which had been installed during Cristina Kirchner’s administration.

However, quiet diplomacy appears to have improved relations, and critically, China, from which Argentina has borrowed extensively, appears willing to continue to roll over Argentina’s huge debt to it. There, however, are reports of a political price that Milei may have to pay in the form of an official visit to China, which is now being discussed—hardly the destination of first choice for a libertarian.

Pope Francis was another target of Milei’s pre-presidential criticism. Milei described the pontiff as a “filthy leftist.” The Pope, of course, is an Argentine and former archbishop of Buenos Aires, where he was a major figure in national life. He maintains a lively interest in his home country and often meets with leading Argentine personalities in Rome.

Since taking office, Milei has ceased his direct criticism of Pope Francis and, in fact, briefly met with him while in Rome for ceremonies marking the canonization of an Argentine saint. Similarly, the Pope avoided criticizing Milei by name. However, he has made clear his concern for Argentina’s poor, making oblique but easily understood criticisms of Milei’s policies. 

For now, however, Milei and the Pope maintain an uneasy coexistence. Francis has, on multiple occasions, expressed his desire to visit his homeland. However, given his extensive schedule of other travel, he does not seem likely to visit in the near future, something which is probably a relief to Milei.

Milei’s administration had made some effort to get along with Brazil despite the fact that he had previously called its current president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, a “communist” and “corrupt.” Also, during Brazil’s presidential campaign, he had made clear his support for right-wing then-President Jair Bolsonaro. Lula returned the favor by endorsing Peronist candidate Sergio Massa.

But Brazil is a key trading partner, and until recently, at least, Milei had kept his head down regarding Argentina’s huge neighbor. He retained as ambassador Daniel Scioli, a senior Peronist figure appointed to the job by his predecessor Alberto Fernández, and after Scioli resigned to join Milei’s cabinet, he named a senior career diplomat as his successor. Foreign Minister Diana Mondino has met with her Brazilian counterpart as well.

However, the two presidents seem incapable of overcoming the bad blood between them. Ahead of the July 8 Mercosur summit in Paraguay, Lula said that he felt that Milei still owed him an apology for his earlier remarks. It appeared that Milei would not rise to the bait, but ultimately, he responded that he had said nothing for which he needed to apologize, as his statements had been true, and that Lula had an “inflated ego.” Then, Milei decided that he would not participate in the summit and that Mondino would go in his place. 

And adding fuel to the fire, Milei accepted an invitation to speak at a “CPAC Brazil” event on January 6–7, where former President Bolsonaro also spoke. While Milei described Bolsonaro as a victim of “judicial persecution,” he avoided directly attacking Lula, avoiding a crisis like that with Spain. But for now, the chill in bilateral relations at the presidential level means they will continue to be conducted at the ministerial level and below.

Love for America (and Israel and Ukraine as well)

Milei has explicitly said that his priority is a geopolitical alignment with the United States and Israel. Such an explicit commitment puts him at odds with the broad tradition of Argentine foreign policy, which has historically been characterized by distance from and suspicion of the United States. This shift was displayed at the June 15–16 conference in Switzerland on a peace process for Ukraine, where Argentina signed the declaration looking towards peace on the basis of maintaining Ukraine’s territorial integrity. This contrasted, for example, with the stance of Brazil, which attended the conference as an observer but refused to sign the declaration. 

Earlier, he had declined an offer to join the BRICS+ grouping (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, in addition to potential new members such as Iran and Saudi Arabia). He has also expressed interest in Argentina becoming a “Global Partner” of NATO, a status that, while not creating any obligations, would make Argentina eligible to participate in training, exercises, and consultative meetings. 

Milei has shown unqualified support for Israel in its military operation in Gaza following the Hamas attack of October 7. This has contrasted with the view of most Latin American governments, which have generally insisted on an immediate ceasefire, and in the case of some, such as Chile, Colombia, and Brazil, have withdrawn their ambassadors in Tel Aviv. 

Milei’s commitment to Israel, however, goes beyond a desire to stay in tune with the United States. Although remaining a nominal Catholic, he is fascinated by Judaism and has studied with an Argentine rabbi whom he has since named his ambassador to Israel. Of course, the fact that Israel has a right-wing prime minister in Benjamin Netanyahu creates a bond. Milei visited Israel in February and was warmly received there.

The U.S. administration has been, in turn, generally supportive of Milei since he came to office, despite the fact that he had earlier dismissed President Biden as a “moderate socialist. But a socialist” (Milei’s definition of socialism often seems to embrace anyone who does not subscribe to his minimalist view of government). Biden called Milei to congratulate him on his victory, and Secretary of State Blinken has visited Argentina. When the head of U.S. Southern Command came to Argentina, Milei accompanied on her internal travel, underscoring his desire for a “strategic alliance.”

The bilateral relationship has stayed on an even keel despite the fact that prior to his election, Milei had displayed an affinity for President Trump. Trump, in turn, had effusively congratulated him on his victory, claiming it as a sign of global support for his approach to governance. The rapprochement between the Biden and Milei administrations may be in part due to Milei’s helpful positions on global issues, especially as support from other Latin American countries has often been wanting. 

But it may largely derive from the reality that it is in the U.S. interest that Milei succeeds in reviving Argentina’s economy or, at a minimum, that he avoids a crisis that would require direct American engagement. Argentina also needs the United States, the largest shareholder in the International Monetary Fund, which is massively indebted and from which it will likely seek fresh funds at some point. The Biden administration has sent senior Treasury and Commerce Department officials to Argentina for consultations and has been supportive of his painful economic reform plan.

Global Speechmaking Vs. Domestic Governance

Milei’s embrace by the global Right is, in some ways, a misreading of the man. He is a true believer in libertarian thought and passionate about economics, a subject in which he has graduate degrees from Argentine universities. The issues that currently animate the American and European Rights hold little interest to him. He does not speak of the dangers of immigration, which is not an issue in Argentina. In fact, the country faces the opposite problem, with large numbers emigrating in the face of a chronic economic crisis. Ironically, many venture to Spain, which they apparently do not find to be quite the hellscape Milei sees. 

Also, the protectionism prominent in current rightist discourse, from Trump to Le Pen, is alien to the libertarianism that Milei avows—indeed, boosting exports and attracting foreign investment figure into his plans for economic revival. And while he has taken hardline positions on crime and abortion, he rarely speaks on these issues.

His passion is shrinking the state. He has spoken admiringly of Margaret Thatcher, who is hardly a beloved figure in Argentina, where the Falklands War is remembered bitterly. His affection for the United States seems based on seeing it principally as a bulwark against global leftism. He views European social democracy through the lens of Argentina’s experience with Peronism despite the fact that the latter was a unique movement with roots also in militarism, Catholic social doctrine, and pre-World War II European fascism. This may be the ultimate source of his rather silly spat with Spain’s prime minister.

In the end, Milei will be judged by his performance in reversing Argentina’s decline. At this point, he has had some success in cutting spending and taming inflation at the price of a recession. He enjoys significant popular support for now and has been able to brush off concerns, such as those of Pope Francis, about his policies’ effects on the poor. The recent passage of legislation giving him greater authority to implement his economic plans has been an important short-term victory for him.

However, the question of whether he can engender a sustained recovery that attracts investment, creates jobs, and reduces poverty is still wide open. Meanwhile, as he wrestles with these issues, he will likely continue to take breaks to accept invitations to speak at international conferences at which he can denounce socialism and evangelize for libertarianism.

Richard M. Sanders is Senior Fellow, Western Hemisphere at the Center for the National Interest. A former member of the Senior Foreign Service of the U.S. Department of State, he served as Argentina desk officer, 1997–99, and as Director of the Office of Brazilian and Southern Cone Affairs, 2010–13.

Image: Lev Radin / Shutterstock.com.

While Washington is hosting a NATO Summit to demonstrate Western resolve, Russia and China convened a summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Kazakhstan. In an increasingly polarized world, “middle powers” such as Kazakhstan face a growing challenge to preserve their independence and avoid being drawn into an unwanted foreign orbit. Western governments can help the country and the rest of Central Asia to navigate these stormy international waters through a closer practical engagement with emerging regional players.

At the same time, the U.S. needs to realize these countries dwell in difficult regions. At the SCO summit in Astana on July 3 and 4, Kazakhstan relinquished its year-long chairmanship to China. While the SCO is widely viewed as Beijing and Moscow’s attempt to pull members away from the West, Kazakhstan used its membership and leadership in the SCO and other intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) to consolidate Central Asian resilience to outside pressures.

Kazakhstan does not have the luxury of a NATO security umbrella to defend its security. Instead, it protects its national interests through a multi-vector policy pioneered thirty years ago after its independence from the Soviet Union. This is accomplished by not aligning too closely with any single state, balancing its international connections, and engaging with numerous multilateral groups, including the SCO, the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE), the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA).

As a founding member of the SCO, Kazakhstan has tabled various initiatives, including an agreement on settling border issues and accords to combat terrorism. The current SCO agenda promotes cultural cooperation, environmental protection, and digital connectivity. Kazakhstan also pursues the “Nurly Zhol” infrastructure development program, which involves extensive railroad and highway construction to advance regional trade and investment, thus promoting greater economic integration in Central Asia.

Astana undertakes an activist approach within several IGOs as an essential component of its foreign policy. It chaired the OSCE, which involved all European and post-Soviet states. It signed the core OSCE documents, such as the Helsinki Final Act, committing the country to respect human rights, the self-determination of nations, and inter-state cooperation. It is also a recognized leader in nuclear disarmament since it has relinquished its nuclear weapons and closed the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site. The OSCE provides a valuable format for more intensive Western diplomatic and practical cooperation with all the Central Asian capitals by coordinating future initiatives that strengthen the region’s prominence, whether in nuclear security, environmental protection, or counterterrorism.

Kazakhstan chaired the OSCE in 2010 as the first post-Soviet and Central Asian country to do so. That year, the OSCE summit adopted the Astana Declaration and introduced the concept of “Eurasian security” for the post-Soviet independent states. Kazakhstan has participated in programs to strengthen border security, counter cybercrime, improve water resource management, and encourage public participation in governance. Additionally, Astana works closely with the OSCE to empower women in social, political, and economic life, including law enforcement and the judicial system. Programs for gender equality are another important arena for closer Western involvement.

Astana is at the forefront of developing cooperation between Turkic-speaking states, which is becoming a valuable regional counterbalance to Russian and Chinese influence. Several formats exist to unite Turkic countries, including the International Organization of Turkic Culture. Kazakhstan launched the Cooperation Council of Turkic-speaking States, became a full-fledged international organization, and was renamed the OTS in November 2021. The OTS also includes Turkey, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. 

Among OTS’s priorities is the development of transportation networks. The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), or the Middle Corridor, is designed to give the region greater economic clout by installing a regulatory and legal framework for the free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor. The OTS also contains a cultural and educational dimension, with Astana committed to developing a unified alphabet for Turkic countries and preparing common textbooks on history, geography, and literature. The United States and the EU need to engage much more effectively with the OTS and help raise its international stature as a contributor to regional security. A similar approach toward the CICA can broaden the partnership for security beyond the Turkic states.

The United States and EU members can benefit from enhanced diplomatic engagement with Kazakhstan and Central Asia through the OSCE and CICA. Keeping Central Asia a nuclear-free zone is important to keep tensions down. More dialogue and cooperation with the Organization of Turkic States is also needed as the Turkic world’s self-awareness is growing, including in countering religious extremism, environment, and education. Finally, just as Austria and Switzerland played a key role in reducing tensions during the Cold War, today’s global antagonists can meet in Kazakhstan on neutral grounds, as they used to do in Vienna and Lausanne in the last century. Coordination on nuclear security and the environment is crucial even as tensions are rising around Taiwan and Ukraine.

Kazakhstan is seeking greater Western involvement in all diplomatic, economic, and social domains while maintaining amicable relations with China and Russia. By actively participating in multiple IGOs together with its Central Asian neighbors, Astana exerts leverage and punches above its weight. Nonetheless, while bordering two major powers with regional ambitions, Central Asia can better enhance its security and resilience by engaging the West.

Janusz Bugajski is a Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation and author of Failed State: A Guide to Russia’s Rupture and the upcoming book Pivotal Poland: Europe’s Rising Power. Follow him on X: @JBugajski.

Image: Jane Peimer / Shutterstock.com.

Summary and Key Points: The CVA-58, a proposed U.S. Navy supercarrier designed for strategic nuclear bombing, was canceled in 1949 amidst intense inter-service rivalry and budget cuts. Dubbed USS United States, the carrier was intended to operate heavy bombers from its massive deck.

-The project faced opposition, leading to the "Revolt of the Admirals" and significant political turmoil. Ultimately, the cancellation proved fortuitous as advancements in aircraft technology allowed existing carriers to fulfill nuclear roles.

-The controversy highlighted the evolving nature of military strategy and the importance of adaptability in defense planning. The CVA-58's design influenced future supercarriers, demonstrating the complex interplay between innovation and practicality in military procurement.

The 'Revolt of the Admirals' and the Cancelled Supercarrier CVA-58

In the wake of the mushroom clouds that blossomed over the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it swiftly dawned on political and military leaders across the globe that warfare between superpowers would never again be the same. But what exactly were the implications of nuclear weapons when it came to planning military force structure?

In the United States, it was assumed that nuclear weapons would be widely employed in future conflicts, rendering conventional land armies and fleets at sea irrelevant. The newly formed Air Force particularly argued that carrier task forces and armored divisions were practically obsolete when (ostensibly) just a few air-dropped nuclear bombs could annihilate them in one fell swoop.

The Air Force touted it soon-to-be operational fleet of ten-thousand-mile-range B-36 Peacemaker nuclear bombers as the only vital war-winning weapon of the nuclear age. This logic resonated conveniently with the postwar political program mandating sharp cuts to U.S. defense spending and force structure—which the Air Force naturally argued should fall upon the Army and Navy.

The Army responded by devising “Pentomic Divisions” organized for nuclear battlefields, with weapons ranging from nuclear-armed howitzers and rocket artillery to bazooka-like Davy Crockett recoilless guns. The Navy, meanwhile, sought to find a way to integrate nuclear bombs into its carrier air wings. However, early nuclear bombs were simply too heavy for World War II-era carrier-based aircraft.

In 1945, the Navy began commissioning three larger forty-five-thousand-ton Midway-class carriers which incorporated armored flight decks for added survivability. The decks were swiftly modified to angular, effectively lengthened configuration for jet operations. Neptune P2V-C3 maritime patrol planes converted into nuclear bombers could take off from Midway-class carriers using rocket-pods but would have no way landing on the carrier deck.

Therefore, the Navy decided it needed huge supercarriers from which it could operate its own fifty-ton strategic bombers. These would displace over 40 percent more than the Midway at sixty-eight thousand tons, and measure 12 percent longer at 330-meters. In July 1948, Defense Secretary James Forrestal approved plans for five such carriers, the first named USS United States with hull number CVA-58.

The naval heavy bombers (which didn’t exist yet) were expected to have such wide wings that naval architects decided that CVA-58 would have a completely flush deck without the standard “island” superstructure carrying a radar and flight control tower. Instead, the carrier would feature side-mounted telescoping smokestacks that could be raised should smoke impeded flight operations, and a similarly retractable wheelhouse that could be extended to observe navigation and flight operations.

The ship’s air wings would include twelve to eighteen heavy bombers that would mostly remain parked on the flight deck, exposed to the elements. Four side-mounted elevators would ferry forty to fifty-four jet fighters between the hangar and flight deck to escort the bombers. Eight nuclear bombs per heavy bomber would also be stowed in the hangar. The combined ship’s company and airwing would total 5,500 personnel.

The carrier’s oddly-shaped deck included four steam catapults—two for use by bombers, and two axial “waist” catapults.

Because the ship would be effectively blind without an elevated radar and control tower, a separate cruiser was intended to serve as the carrier’s “eyes.” Nonetheless, CVA-58 still incorporated eight 5-inch guns for air defense, and dozens of rapid-fire short-range cannons.

The “Revolt of the Admirals”

Though theoretically capable of contributing to conventional strike and sea control missions, the heavy bomber-equipped CVA-58 was clearly an attempt by the Navy to duplicate the Air Force’s strategic nuclear strike capabilities.

This put giant crosshairs on the program during an era of sharp defense cuts. After all, deploying strategic bombers at sea was many times more expensive than basing them on land.

Following his reelection in November 1948, President Harry Truman replaced Forrestal—a naval aviator in World War I, and former secretary of the Navy—with Louis Johnson, who had fewer qualms about enforcing defense spending cuts.

In April 1949, just five days after CVA-58’s fifteen-ton keel was laid down in Newport News, Virginia, Johnson canceled the mega-carrier. He also began advocating the dissolution of the Marine Corps, starting by transferring its aviation assets to the Air Force.

This upset the Navy bigwigs so much that Navy Secretary John Sullivan resigned, and numerous admirals began openly opposing the termination of a project they viewed as essential to validating their branch’s existence in the nuclear age.

This “Revolt of the Admirals” developed into a crisis in civil-military relations, as the Navy’s top brass defied the authority of their civilian commander-in-chief and resorted to covert methods in an attempt to influence public opinion. The Op-23 naval intelligence unit formed by Adm. Louis Denfeld secretly circulated a memo called the Worth Paper alleging that Johnson had corrupt motivations due to being a former director of Convair, manufacturer of B-36 bombers, which were also claimed to be deficient.

The bitter inter-service rivalry, and the utility of land-based bombers versus carriers, was publicly litigated in congressional hearings. The Army also piled on against the Navy, and public opinion turned against the sea-warfare branch as Op-23’s activities were revealed.

As Gen. Douglas MacArthur would later discover, Truman had no qualms about squashing military leaders that questioned his authority. His new secretary of the Navy, Francis Matthews, torpedoed the career of several admirals that spoke against the CVA-58’s termination despite an earlier promise that those testifying before Congress would be spared retaliation.

The irony of this tempest in a teacup, which resulted in the political martyrdom of many senior Navy leaders, was how misguided both sides swiftly proved to be.

In June 1950 the Korean War broke out, and the U.S. found itself desperately short of the necessary conventional land, air and sea forces. U.S. aircraft carriers and their onboard jet fighters soon bore the brunt of the initial fighting, and continued to play a major role until the end of the conflict.

And the Air Force’s vaunted B-36s? They never dropped a single bomb in anger—fortunately, as they were only intended for use in apocalyptic nuclear conflicts.

It turned out that plenty of wars were liable to be fought without resorting to weapons of mass destruction.

However, the Navy also had cause to count itself fortunate that the CVA-58 had been canceled. That’s because in just a few years the size of tactical nuclear weapons rapidly decreased, while high-thrust jet engines enabled hauling of heavier and heavier loads. By 1950, nuclear-capable AJ-1 Savage hybrid jet/turboprop bombers were operational on Midway-class carriers, starting with the USS Franklin Roosevelt.

These were soon followed by nuclear-capable capable A-3 Sky Warrior and A-5 Vigilante bombers, A-6 and A-7 attack planes, and even multirole fighters like the F-4 Phantom II. Carriers with these aircraft were far more flexible than a CVA-58 full of B-36 wannabees ever could have been. Arguably, by the 1960s the Navy’s ballistic missile submarines would amount to scarier strategic nuclear weapons than any aircraft-based delivery system.

The schematics for CVA-58 nonetheless informed the Navy’s first supercarriers, named rather appropriately the Forrestal-class, laid down during the Korean War. But the heavy-bomber carrying United States remains notable as the supercarrier the Navy absolutely thought it needed—but which with literally just a couple years more hindsight it discovered it truly could do without.

About the Author

Sébastien Roblin holds a master’s degree in conflict resolution from Georgetown University and served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China. He has also worked in education, editing, and refugee resettlement in France and the United States. He currently writes on security and military history for War Is Boring. This article is being republished due to reader interest. 

All images are Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points: The U.S. Air Force's B-21 Raider program is advancing amidst the global race to develop sixth-generation stealth bombers. While the B-2 Spirit, B-52 Stratofortress, and B-1 Lancer remain formidable, the B-21's timely introduction is essential for maintaining long-range strike capabilities. But can the B-21 Raider overcome what some consider possible future cost issues? 

-Recent negotiations have reduced the per-unit cost, making the Raider more economically viable.

-Designed to be undetectable and equipped with modular systems for future upgrades, the B-21 is crucial for U.S. national security.

-As China and Russia advance their bomber programs, the Raider's development ensures the U.S. retains a strategic edge in aerial warfare.

U.S. B-21 Raider: Reducing Costs Amidst Global Stealth Bomber Race

The race to produce the world’s first sixth-generation stealth bomber is on. As the United States moves to introduce its B-21 Raider, China and Russia continue to develop their H-20 and PAK-DA programs. 

The United States has long fielded superior bombers. The B-2 Spirit, B-52 Stratofortress, and B-1 Lancer are still lethal aircraft, providing the U.S. Air Force with long-range strike and deterrence capabilities. But the Raider’s timely introduction is crucial, and while some analysts argue that the B-21 program is too expensive to justify, the new bomber is worth the high price tag.

Cost is Decreasing

Following negotiations between the Air Force and manufacturer Northrop Grumman, the per-unit cost of the B-21 Raider has gone down. This was first reported back several months ago. 

The service’s secretary, Frank Kendall, told the Senate Appropriations subcommittee months ago that the cost decline indicates negotiations are headed in the right direction. The Raider program was expected to cost roughly $692 million per unit in 2022 when the bomber debuted. While the Air Force has yet to announce the specific decrease in price, the service has said that lower costs will not mean lower procurement rates.

While this news is positive for Raider advocates, Northrop has yet to comment on Kendall’s remarks. The manufacturer reported a hefty charge on the Raider program toward the end of 2023, citing increased production costs and other economic disruptions. Kendall has warned that “[I]’ve seen programs get into trouble because there was too much focus on the platform and not enough on all the things that are necessary to support it,” adding that “hopefully, we will have avoided that in the case of the B-21.”

Around this time, the Pentagon’s undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment, William LaPlante, said that the Raider would be produced at an intentionally low rate in case of looming budgetary cuts. He also noted that lessons learned from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program brought about new measures to ensure lower costs and a smoother production process.

What We Know About the B-21 Raider Program

The Raider is designed to be the Air Force’s intelligence collection platform, battle manager, and interceptor aircraft. In 2022, the Raider was officially unveiled at Northrop’s production facilities in Palmdale, California.

Smaller than its Spirit predecessor, the B-21 will be more difficult for enemy aircraft and radar to detect—an essential attribute.

The new bomber is also expected to incorporate modular systems that will enable upgrades to the airframe as new technologies emerge—similar to the F-35 Lightning II.

Regardless of the Raider’s final price tag, this new bomber fleet is essential to U.S. national security. Its timely introduction is crucial, considering the progress Beijing has made toward its own H-20 stealth bomber. As U.S. defense secretary Lloyd Austin said during the unveiling of the Raider: “America’s defense will always be rooted in deterring conflict. So we are again making it plain to any potential foe that the risk and the cost of aggression far outweigh any conceivable gains.”

About the Author: Maya Carlin

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin.

All images are Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.