European Union

Plenary sessions : EU fisheries rules should be applied uniformly to all EU fishermen, so that they are treated fairly, say MEPs in a resolution voted on Tuesday. Inspection procedures, e.g. for net mesh sizes and catches, should be standardized, as should penalties for infringements, it says. Introducing an EU “core curriculum” for training all fisheries inspectors, and using compatible real-time communication technologies EU wide, would also help improve fairness, it adds.

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

Plenary sessions : The Commission should review its legislation against corruption and organised crime to better equip Member States in their fight against criminal organisations operating in the EU, say MEPs in a non-legislative resolution passed on Tuesday. MEPs call for initiatives such as EU-wide rules to seize assets from criminal organisations to re-use for social purposes and protection of whistle-blowers.

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

Plenary sessions : Plans to prolong a 10% increase in the EU contribution towards regional and social project costs in Greece until 30 June of the year after its economic adjustment programme ends were approved by Parliament on Tuesday. MEPs also approved a special provision whereby the EU would pay up to 85% of project costs in Cyprus until the current regional and social policy programming period ends in 2020.

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

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Two grand frameworks govern EU relations with African countries. The most long-standing one is the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP), updated in 2000 by the Cotonou Agreement. More recently, the Joint-EU Africa Strategy (JAES) conceived in the 2007 EU-Africa summit.

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Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

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On Monday, they came to pass: objections from Wallonia seemed to scupper CETA, the proposed EU-Canada trade deal, in an embarrassing setback both for Belgium’s federal government and the European Commission.

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The EU should tackle deteriorating security in and around Europe by helping its armed forces to work together better, as a first step in building a common defence policy, say Foreign Affairs Committee MEPs in two resolutions voted on Monday. Ideas include establishing an EU operational headquarters to plan, command and manage crisis management operations, setting a defence spending target of 2% of GDP and launching Common Defence and Security Policy training operation in Iraq.
Subcommittee on Security and Defence
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

The EU should tackle deteriorating security in and around Europe by helping its armed forces to work together better, as a first step in building a common defence policy, say Foreign Affairs Committee MEPs in two resolutions voted on Monday. Ideas include establishing an EU operational headquarters to plan, command and manage crisis management operations, setting a defence spending target of 2% of GDP and launching Common Defence and Security Policy training operation in Iraq.
Subcommittee on Security and Defence
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

On 15 September 2016, the Council adopted Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/1671[1]. 

The Council Decision extends the existing measures until 15 March 2017 and amends the list of persons and entities subject to restrictive measures as set out in the Annex to Decision 2014/145/CFSP. 

The Candidate Countries Montenegro* and Albania*, and the EFTA countries Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as Ukraine align themselves with this Council Decision.

They will ensure that their national policies conform to this Council Decision. 

The European Union takes note of this commitment and welcomes it.

[1] Published on 16.9.2016 in the Official Journal of the European Union no. L 249, p.39. 

Never has global trade been so complex and inter-dependent. So it was no surprise that the initial shock of the UK referendum result was wide-reaching, prompting policymakers and analysts everywhere to ponder the new situation.

The dust is starting to settle, and we are starting that as well as challenges, there are also ample opportunities for economic growth, competitive advantage and innovation in the market. Given the global importance of the UK’s economy, the Brexit vote has sharpened the focus on the road ahead in shaping international trade.

Like all our European partners, Iceland is working to adapt to the new realities before us. The Icelandic government is advocating a pragmatic and realistic approach that assumes relations with Britain will continue to be as strong as they have been in years gone by. There are clear reasons behind this conviction. Today, Britain is Iceland’s largest trading partner, accounting for 11% of all our exports and imports. For the Icelandic economy, the future relationship with Britain is of critical importance.

In recent times, Iceland and the UK have had similar approaches to regional economic integration. In 1970, Iceland joined the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), which Britain helped to found in 1960. And although our common journey within the EFTA turned out to be brief, with Britain joining the European Economic Community in 1973, the EFTA remains under British influence to this day: English is the working language, and pragmatism is the magic word. The four EFTA countries – Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, Liechtenstein – have cast a wide-reaching net of free trade agreements with the EU and partners around the globe, and continue to be pragmatic and flexible in expanding and deepening their network.

The course has now been set for Britain to leave the EU. This poses a challenge for Iceland’s trade with the UK in goods and services, the free movement of people and participation in various programmes and projects that have been functioning on the basis of the European Economic Area Agreement with the EU. In short, there is an urgent need to find a new contractual basis for these processes with the UK. The first priority for the Icelandic government is to safeguard our common interests and maintain our access to the British market. The first priority of the British government will presumably be to safeguard British interests and preferential access to the single market, although it’s clear that negotiations can only begin in earnest after the British government has invoked Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty.

EFTA has, in the past, often joined various EU agreements with third countries after the EU has concluded negotiations. But given the importance of our relationship with Britain, it’s not an option to sit idly by and wait for the final outcome. In this context, there are three scenarios that Iceland is working with as possible outcomes for its future relationship with Britain. The first is simply a bilateral free trade agreement, with substantial provisions for the abolition of tariffs and technical barriers to trade (TBTs), opening up trade in services and cooperation on research and development, education and culture, mutual recognition of standards, and other areas.

The second possibility is that the four EFTA countries negotiate an agreement with the UK. We already enjoy excellent cooperation and, from our viewpoint in Iceland, we see no reason to fear a conflict of interests. And should Britain at any time in the future consider re-joining the EFTA, I am confident I will not be the only Icelandic politician willing to take that into favourable consideration. But Iceland is a full member of the EU’s internal market through the EEA agreement, and for the UK to join the EEA is an entirely different matter that would entail complications of almost the same order as re-joining the EU.

The third scenario on the table is that Britain and the EU make an exit agreement and EEA countries opt into the terms not long after to safeguard their interests. It’s my firm belief that all three options should be seriously considered: there’s a great deal of uncertainty around these processes and it’s difficult to forecast what the future relationship between Britain and the EU will look like.

For Iceland, there are important aspects of our relations that aren’t directly a part of the EEA Agreement but will still be affected by Brexit. Britain will leave the Common Fisheries Policy and enter international fisheries agreements on straddling stocks in its own right. This shouldn’t change much in substance, but certain elements of Iceland’s fisheries policy may well be of interest to the British authorities now that they must establish a fisheries policy of their own – and these must be the subject of any upcoming discussions. Britain outside a common trade policy will, however, have leeway to negotiate independently on tariff reductions and market access. If the will is there and British interests permit, the UK could, for instance, be free to negotiate on full free trade in fisheries products. Maybe Britain on its own will be quicker in seizing opportunities with partners like Iceland and Norway.

It’s still too early to assess what Brexit’s regional implications will be, let alone its long-term influence on international trade structures. Whatever the outcome, 2016 has marked an important milestone, and it’s clear to Iceland that the next two years are pivotal in setting the parameters that will govern trade relations between us and our largest trading partner. Iceland will use this time well and approach the imminent tasks with a combination of pragmatism and a progressive approach, with the end goal of developing closer trade relations.

IMAGE CREDIT: CC / FLICKR – David O’Leary

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Contributions from the EU and its member states to help developing countries reduce their greenhouse gas emissions and cope with the impacts of climate change showed a sharp increase in 2015, particularly for adaptation finance. 

The total was confirmed on 24 October 2016 at a meeting of the EU Economic and Financial Committee, ahead of a UN climate change conference in Marrakesh. 

Total contributions from the EU and its member states amounted to €17.6 billion in 20151, a significant increase compared to 2014. The contributions were successfully channelled into climate change mitigation and adaptation initiatives in developing countries. 

The contribution is seen as an important step towards the implementation of the legally binding climate change agreement reached in Paris in December 2015. 

The latest figure demonstrates the EU's determination to scale up its international climate finance contribution towards the $100 billion per year goal set for industrialised countries by 2020 and through until 2025. Before 2025, the parties to the UN framework convention on climate change will set a new collective goal.

In response to the Paris conference, outcome in 2015, the member states also particularly welcome the concrete 'roadmap' prepared by developed countries, which illustrates the measures developed countries are taking to achieve the $100 billion goal. Contributions for mitigation and adaptation will be jointly mobilised from a wide variety of sources: public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources of finance and with transparency of implementation.

1 - This figure includes climate finance sources from public budgets and other development financial institutions, as reported by member states in the context of article 16 of regulation 525/2013. It also includes €1.5 billion from the EU budget and €2.2 billion from the European Investment Bank. 

The European Union deeply regrets the Republic of South Africa's decision to initiate its withdrawal from the Rome Statute. We equally note with deep concern that Burundi has formalised steps to withdraw from the Rome Statute. Until now, no State has ever withdrawn from the Rome Statute.
 
South Africa played a significant role in the establishment of the ICC and was one of the first signatories of the Rome Statue. We will continue to engage with both countries on how they can remain partners to the Rome Statute.
 
The International Criminal Court (ICC) is a key institution to assist citizens achieve justice when confronted with the most serious crimes, where this is not possible at the national level. A majority of African situations were submitted by the national authorities concerned. The Court is also involved in situations all over the world.
 
We all have a shared interest in strengthening the rule of law and working together with the ICC, including along the lines suggested by the President of the Rome Statute's Assembly of States Parties.
 
The EU and its Member States remain staunch supporters of the ICC and are committed to full co-operation on the prevention of serious crimes falling under the jurisdiction of the Court.  Where concerns are raised within the framework of the Rome Statute, we remain open for constructive discussion.

On 29 September 2016, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2016/1746[1] implementing Council Decision 2013/255/CFSP.

The Decision amends the list of persons and entities subject to restrictive measures as set out in Annex I to Decision 2013/255/CFSP.

The Candidate Countries the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, Montenegro*, Serbia* and Albania*, the EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova align themselves with this Council Decision.

They will ensure that their national policies conform to this Council Decision.

The European Union takes note of this commitment and welcomes it.

[1] Published on 30.9.2016 in the Official Journal of the European Union no. L 264, p. 30.

* - The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process. 

 On 29 September 2016, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2016/1745[1]. 

The Council Decision renews existing measures until 31 October 2017.

The Candidate Countries the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, Montenegro*, Serbia* and Albania*, the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova align themselves with this Council Decision.

They will ensure that their national policies conform to this Council Decision.

The European Union takes note of this commitment and welcomes it. 

[1] - Published on 30.9.2016 in the Official Journal of the European Union no. L 264, p. 29.
* The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

Hungarians went to the polls on 2 October to vote on the following question: ‘Do you want the European Union to be able to order the obligatory settlement of non-Hungarian citizens in Hungary without the consent of the Hungarian National Assembly?’

The referendum was supposed to give citizens a decision that will then be enacted in legislation. But the referendum could not have had such a result. The misleading phrase ‘obligatory settlement
of non-Hungarian citizens’ alludes to the resettlement of applicants for international protection, who must belong to a nationality with a minimum acceptance rate of 75%. With two legallybinding decisions taken in September 2015, the European Council had already established the mechanism. What purpose, then, did the referendum serve?

First, it had an international dimension. Hungary has consistently refused to participate in the refugee mechanism, and so the government was looking to bolster the group of like-minded states who
don’t want to be involved. But while the Hungarian government is against relocation, it’s more frustrated by the fact that such a decision could be made by a qualified majority in the first place. Like Slovakia, Hungary has brought the issue to the European Court of Justice on the grounds that the European Council decision has ignored the principle of subsidiarity. Given the pressing need to find a European solution, Hungary has little hope of winning its case, but it can continue to seek wider public support.

Domestically, the vote was a show of force in the run-up to the 2018 general election. It diverted attention from issues such as corruption, decreasing social mobility or segregation. The Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) and the centre-left Democratic Coalition (DK) argued that the referendum was a test of Hungarians’ views on EU membership. Over the last six years, polls suggest an average of 49% of Hungarians trust the EU.

But the public media seems to be preparing the ground for a battle between EU membership on one side, and security and secession on the other.

The way the question was formulated put domestic political opponents in a bind. Not to engage with it would have meant staying silent on a topic that made headlines, but engaging was problematic too: advocating a “Yes” was made to sound like openly relinquishing sovereignty.Not surprisingly, the Eurosceptic far-right Jobbik supported “No”, and the centre and the Left were
divided. MSZP, DK and three other parties called for a boycott of the vote. Only the Liberals (MLP) urged a “Yes” vote.

The Hungarian referendum was part of a quest to preserve national sovereignty, wrapped in a manipulative campaign against asylum-seekers. It was about inciting and exploiting hatred and
fear. The quest might have been legitimate, but it remains a dangerous gamble with unforeseeable consequences.

IMAGE CREDIT: Believeinme/Bigstock.com

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Diplomatic relations between the European Union and Africa have long been shaped by post-colonial continuity: Africa exports raw materials, and Europe sends back manufactured goods. Another key aspect is Europe’s role as a source of development assistance. A number of momentous events have led to a review of this relationship. One is the rise of China as Africa’s leading trade partner. But no development has shaken the foundations of Africa-Europe cooperation as much as the seismic outcome of the UK referendum on EU membership.

Much of the initial analysis of Brexit’s impact justifiably focused on doomsday scenarios invoking “disaster” or “calamity”, and the uncertainty cannot be downplayed. The framing of the concerns,
though, reflects a traditional thinking that ignores both Africa’s economic vision and British aspirations in the post-Brexit world.

The EU has long sought to continue its traditional trade relationships by signing Economic Partnership Agreements it says are “tailor-made” for Africa’s regional realities. These EPAs are an attempt to address concerns regarding non-reciprocal EU trade deals deemed inconsistent with World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules. EPAs have been pursued with Africa’s regional economic communities, but not all members of each REC have been enthusiastic. Brexit has forced some of their concerns into the open. For example, Tanzania has withdrawn from the EPA being negotiated with the East African Community (EAC), citing post-Brexit uncertainties and unequal power relations with the EU.

Aziz Mlima, Permanent Secretary of the Tanzanian Foreign Ministry, expressed concerns that ‘the EPA will not benefit local industries in East Africa. Instead, it will lead to their destruction, as developed countries are likely to dominate the market.’ This view was reinforced by Tanzania’s former president Benjamin Mkapa, who said ‘I don’t understand how such a powerful trade bloc can have a free trade agreement with the developing economies of Africa. There is no way that our small economies can have free trade with Europe.’ The reference to the nascent state of African
industries underscores Africa’s shift from dependence on rawmaterial exports to an expansion of industry. African relationshipswith the rest of the world are starting to take account of the potential
impact on this vision.

“No development has shaken the foundations of Africa-Europe cooperation as much as the seismic outcome of the UK referendum on EU membership”

Countries that approach Africa in the context of competition with other nations, such as China, are unlikely to appreciate how the continent is repositioning itself. “Agenda 2063”, adopted in 2013 by the African Union (AU), seeks to refocus the continent as a collection of learning economies operating through regional economic blocs. The policy basis is laid out in the AU’s Science, Technology and Innovation in Africa Strategy (STISA-2024) of 2014. More specific strategies include efforts to transform agriculture and master the digital revolution, building on the continent’s experiences since adopting mobile technology.

This vision provides a new beginning for Africa, and a chance to engage constructively with the rest of the world through cooperation on science, technology and innovation. The scope of such cooperation with the EU and the UK will continue to expand irrespective of the outcomes of Brexit. Indeed, the UK has pledged not only to continue to work with its EU counterparts, but also to
extend cooperation to the rest of the world. Deepening science and technology cooperation with Commonwealth countries would be a natural next step. But British scientists are being dropped from EU-funded projects, prompting calls for action to safeguard their roles. This is occurring despite assurances from the European Commissioner for Science, Research and Innovation, Carlos Moedas, of continued support for existing collaborative programmes such as Horizon 2020. The benefits of scientific cooperation will probably outweigh political considerations in the end. Science offers nations the chance to work together despite political differences. It is against such a background that new relationships between Europe and Africa could build on Africa’s innovation agenda despite Brexit. This view requires analysts to temper their gloom and explore new opportunities.

There are several approaches African nations could adopt when responding to Brexit: mapping emerging trends and opportunities, enhancing economic diplomacy with a stronger emphasis on
innovation and entrepreneurship, and reforming governancestructures to reflect new global realities. A trend to watch is how the perception of diminished capabilities on the part of the UK and the EU could lead to a renewed emphasis on science and technology. This is likely to inspire stronger sub-national innovation ecosystems, with closer links between local or city governments, universities and industry. The ecosystems can then serve as focal points for international competitiveness and sources of solutions to global challenges, stimulating technology-based start-ups as well as incentivising existing businesses to scale up so they can operate in global markets.

“New relationships between Europe and Africa could build on Africa’s innovation agenda despite Brexit”

Global financial centres such as London will be exploring how to harness the UK’s scientific excellence to foster innovation and entrepreneurship. Such shifts in British and EU approaches will
necessitate adjustments to Africa’s economic diplomacy – Rwanda, Ethiopia and Kenya have in recent years modified their foreign policies to focus on economic and trade issues. Africa’s economic diplomacy will be dramatically shaped by the Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) negotiations that will conclude in 2017. This builds on the Tripartite Free Trade Area covering 26 countries with 650 million people and a GDP of US$1.5 trillion. The CFTA will comprise a billion people with an initial GDP of $3 trillion. The foundations of the agreement include free trade, infrastructure development and industrialisation. This is a grand opportunity that will shape Africa’s relationships with the UK, Europe and the rest of the world.

Overlooking the doomsday scenarios, long-term perspectives reveal new opportunities to align UK and EU diplomacy with Africa’s economic optimism, which is increasingly guided by the desire to put innovation and entrepreneurship at the centre of the continent’s transformation. Failure to grasp this salient point will result in the squandering of a historic opportunity to reshape Africa-Europe relations in light of 21st century realities.

IMAGE CREDIT: lcswart/Bigstock.com

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Tuesday 25 October 2016
Strasbourg
18.00 Speech at the ceremony of the award of the Légion d'honneur to Joseph Daul, President of EPP

Wednesday 26 October 2016
Strasbourg
09.00 Report to the European Parliament on the European Council of 20-21 October

Today, we discussed trade policy. I will shortly pass the floor to Jean-Claude Juncker. But before I do that, let me make two remarks.

Firstly, our citizens are increasingly concerned about whether the trade deals we negotiate are in their best interests. And I am afraid that we won't be able to continue to negotiate Free Trade Agreements if we do not prove in practice that we are very serious about protecting European consumers, workers and companies.

Today we have made some progress in this regard. Leaders committed to reach an urgent agreement on the modernisation of all the EU's trade defence instruments. And we have tasked our trade ministers with breaking the deadlock.

Secondly on CETA let me just say that I remain concerned, for a good trade agreement with a close partner like Canada and for Europe's reputation. All member states but one endorsed the agreement and we will continue with the best will and full engagement of the Commission so I pass the floor to Jean-Claude. Thank you.