European Union

Plenary sessions : "Release journalists being held without compelling evidence of criminal activity", MEPs urge the Turkish authorities in a resolution voted on Thursday. Since the failed coup d’état on 15 July, the Turkish government has arrested at least 99 journalists and writers, revoked the press credentials of at least 330 journalists, and closed the offices of more than 100 media outlets, leaving over 2,300 media workers without jobs.

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

Plenary sessions : The Iraqi operation to liberate Mosul from jihadi group ISIS/Daesh was backed by MEPs on Thursday. They called on Iraqi authorities to make every effort to protect civilians, hospitals and schools, as they progress towards Mosul. Daesh atrocities and genocide against Christians, Yazidis and other minorities should be referred to International Criminal Court, added MEPs.

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

Plenary sessions : The Iraqi operation to liberate Mosul from jihadi group ISIS/Daesh was backed by MEPs on Thursday. They called on Iraqi authorities to make every effort to protect civilians, hospitals and schools, as they progress towards Mosul. Daesh atrocities and genocide against Christians, Yazidis and other minorities should be referred to International Criminal Court, added MEPs.

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

On 9 November, the Subcommittee will exchange views on the Transatlantic Security Partnership from the Canadian perspective with Daniel J. Costello, Ambassador of Canada to the European Union. Canada is one of the nations in NATO leading the implementation of defensive assurance measures on Europe’s Eastern flank.
Further information
Draft agenda and meeting documents
Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

In the hours after the dramatic news of the UK’s vote to leave the EU, Federica Mogherini, the EU High Representative, had a decision to make. She was due, days later, to publish the Union’s new “Global Strategy’” for foreign and security policy – the first since Javier Solana published the initial European Security Strategy thirteen years ago.

Her decision to go ahead was not an obvious move. Some may have thought it was yet another instance of the EU’s detachment from political reality. Indeed, in the months leading up to the UK’s referendum, many of us in the High Representative’s office thought that we would delay in the event of a Leave vote. As the devastating news of Brexit hit home, I assumed it would all be called off – and this was Mogherini’s first inclination. Yet as the hours went by, it became clear that the months ahead would see the EU all-consumed by Brexit, and the magnitude of the earthquake risked being so great that the Global Strategy, known as the EUGS, would probably have been dropped if it were delayed.

Mogherini felt that scrapping the EUGS would have done a grave injustice to the Union, given the depth and breadth of its internal crisis. The EUGS has been the outcome of almost two years of EU-wide strategic reflection that has seen the active involvement of all member states and EU institutions, along with the broader foreign policy community. The process involved input from academics and students, human rights NGOs, defence industryassociations, think tanks, trade unions, business associations and religious organisations. As Mogherini put it to me on 24 June, ‘the work is done’. And after all, isn’t it an act of political responsibility, precisely at such times of crisis, to show the world that Europe can still be united?

“Scrapping the EUGS would have done a grave injustice to the Union, given the depth and breadth of its internal crisis”

The content of the EUGS was never going to change because of the UK’s decision to leave the EU. The first purpose of the strategy was to engage in a broad strategic reflection, an extensive and in-depth process that achieved unity among all players. What we must do in the Middle East and Africa, in Latin America, or at the United Nations; what we should aim to achieve on defence, trade, development, climate or migration; this has not fundamentally changed. The second purpose of the EUGS was to outline our common action. And this is the most important reason why the
EUGS could not be postponed. It had to be published to start the engine on implementation, with or without the UK.

There is no doubt that Brexit has altered our capacity to deliver. By losing the UK, the EU has lost one of its largest member states, perhaps the one with the most global outlook, be it in terms of trade, development, defence or diplomacy. The UK’s diplomatic network, defence capabilities, development budget and outward-looking trade agenda have been critical assets of Europe’s projection abroad. But likewise, without the EU, the UK has lost the ability to magnify its global voice and priorities. Successes such as the Paris climate agreement, the Iranian nuclear deal, reconciliation between Serbia and Kosovo, or the work towards a national unity government in Libya are all examples that have seen the EU, and the UK within it, occupy centre stage. Perhaps even more importantly, both the EU and the UK have already suffered a major blow to their respective soft power capabilities. The EU, which for decades has prided itself on its power of attraction, has repelled one of its largest member states. The UK, which has long prided itself on its openness, multiculturalism and tolerance, is now seen as a country stuck in a time warp, lured by the illusion of retrenchment and the return to a grandiose past that cannot be rediscovered. The extent to which these perceptions reflect reality is of secondary importance. In today’s world, perception is as important – if not more so – than reality.

“The time has come to discover the extent to which the UK was the real block to deeper security and defence integration, or whether other member states hid behind the British”

Others may argue that without the UK, the EU will finally be able to press the accelerator on integration in a number of key areas, most significantly security and defence. There are a number of issues on which the UK has acted as a brake in recent years. These include the establishment of a permanent headquarters and common financing for Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations, permanent structured cooperation between groups of member states on security and defence, and the institutionalisation of deeper defence cooperation. Whereas the UK has cooperated on defence with other member states, notably France, it has resisted doing so within an EU framework. More broadly, it has opposed moves that would question national sovereignty on defence matters or rival NATO’s role in collective defence. The time has come to discover the extent to which the UK was the real block to deeper security and defence integration, or whether other member states hid behind the British. The onus is on the remaining 27 member states to demonstrate how far they are now willing to go.

Both the EU and the UK will, in any case, have an interest in developing a structured relationship on the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the CSDP, among other areas. Back in the early 2000s there was a lively debate regarding the participation of non-EU NATO members, such as Norway and Turkey, in the CSDP. The debates revolved not only around their participation in CSDP missions and operations, but their involvement in decision-shaping (not decision-making). After the 2004 enlargement, those ideas and plans were shelved. But there is no reason why some
of them could not be dusted off today. This would benefit both the EU and the UK, and could offer a model for other non-EU European partners too. In other words, the blow to the EU and the UK’s standing in the world can be tempered over time – if Brexit is well managed.

The interests and goals that the EUGS set out remain vital after Brexit. The EU has more, not less, of a duty to keep its citizens secure, free and prosperous, and to do so by being united and engaging responsibly in the world. If the EU and the UK succeed in developing a structured relationship on foreign and security policy, both will gain, and the prospects for successful implementation of the EUGS will grow. In many ways, now is when the real work starts.

IMAGE CREDIT: Gajus/Bigstock.com

The post Facing the world, together and apart appeared first on Europe’s World.

https://tvnewsroom.consilium.europa.eu/uploads/council-images/thumbs/uploads/council-images/remote/http_7e18a1c646f5450b9d6d-a75424f262e53e74f9539145894f4378.r8.cf3.rackcdn.com/nato-logo_thumb_169_1384260613_1384256867_129_97shar_c1.jpg

The "European Union-NATO Declaration on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)" and the "Berlin Plus" arrangements are the basic documents for the EU-NATO strategic partnership.

Download this video here.

After decades of debate on where – and whether – to expand airport capacity in south-eastern England, the UK government announced two days ago that it would favour building a third runway at Heathrow Airport. This option, highly criticised on environmental grounds (notably due to the air pollution caused by road transport to the airport) has been presented by Prime Minister Theresa May as key to show the world that the UK is ‘open for business’ after Brexit.

Brexit is not just a handy justification for expanding Heathrow: it will also make it easier, although still highly complicated, to build the third runway. While political obstacles to expanding Heathrow remain –  from local authorities affected and divisions within the Conservative Party – Brexit is likely to remove the principal legal obstacles to the plan.

Three important hurdles to Heathrow expansion stem from EU law, and all three could be eased or even removed after Brexit, once the ‘Great Repeal Bill’ is enacted.  Plans for this ‘Great Repeal Bill’ were presented last month in the run-up to the Conservatives Party Conference as a legal copy-pasting exercise aiming to “end the authority of EU law by converting all its provisions in British law on the day of exit from the bloc.” This focus on ending the authority of EU law over the UK appears to indicate a choice for a ‘Hard’ Brexit, out of the European Economic Area. Such a Brexit would give the UK the opportunity to rewrite broad swathes of its (formerly EU-based) environmental legislation.

The first obstacle to expansion takes the form of EU air pollution targets. These have been at the heart of the rival case from Gatwick Airport. While the latest Heathrow plan argued expansion would not increase pollution due to efforts to increase the use of public transport, Transport for London and the then-Mayor of London Boris Johnson appeared less-than-convinced. Critically, once the ‘Great Repeal Bill’ is passed and EU law is ‘copy-pasted’ across to UK law, it will be much easier to weaken existing targets. This is because it is difficult to dismantle policy in the EU — a political system in which decisions require large majorities to be made — which means that decisions, once made, tend to stick. This makes the EU particularly suited to addressing major environmental challenges as it provides legal certainty allowing public and private actors alike to plan ahead. Conversely the UK is characterised by sharp changes in policy directions from one government to another. Concerning the environment, Heathrow’s expansion is a case in point: it was supported under Labour, shelved under the Coalition government, and put back on the agenda by Theresa May’s government.

But would the UK government really weaken current air quality rules? While the move may prove unpopular – and, as EU targets already fall short of most recent World Health Organisation targets, would increase health hazards linked to air pollution – outside of the EU the government would be free to weaken these pollution standards. And even if bluntly easing the pollution standards proved too unpopular, the ‘Great Repeal Bill’ offers further opportunities to pave the way for the third runway.

A second obstacle to Heathrow’s expansion is EU planning law.  Land use planning is one of the least Europeanised area of UK environmental policy, which means that the UK government has retained a high degree of initiative. Recent UK governments have used that control to gear planning regulation towards increasing competitiveness and development and not environmental protection. European legislation on Environmental Impact Assessment and Strategic Environmental Assessment has offered some safeguards which could now be weakened, despite a number of international agreements, as these lack the ‘bite’ of EU legislation. EU law binds member states: not complying with the law opens countries to law suits in both domestic and EU courts, as well as potential fines and levy imposed by the European Court of Justice.

A third obstacle to Heathrow’s expansion is thus the very nature of EU legislation and the legal remedies it opens for civil society to hold governments accountable, as exemplified recently by Client Earth with great success against the UK government concerning its clean air plans for London. The decision to expand Heathrow will face multiple legal challenges, many focusing on whether the expansion breaches environmental law.  But after Brexit, meeting environmental targets and respecting environmental rules will become a moral, not legal duty. Removing the ‘EU’ nature of the air pollution or planning standards would effectively close down a legal remedy route for civil society which had allowed holding the UK government accountable.

In conclusion, Brexit and the proposed ‘Great Repeal Bill’ could make the arduous journey toward Heathrow expansion easier for the UK government. Transferring EU policy into UK law makes it both easier to repeal and safer to ignore. But Brexit is not yet around the corner – why then, announce a decision to expand now? By doing so, the May government ensures Heathrow’s most vocal opponents can still use the strength of EU environmental law to attack the decision. In an interesting twist of fate, key opponents to Heathrow’s expansion such as Zac Goldsmith (who stepped down as an MP in protest of the decision) or Boris Johnson, strongly supported the Leave camp. A Hard Brexit, which appears increasingly more likely, will eventually remove the strong EU rules and legal remedies that may help Heathrow expansion opponents block the plan. Hence in order to defeat the third runway expansion, it is now in the interest of key ‘Leavers’ to make sure Brexit and the ‘Great Repeal bill’ is not enacted before all legal challenges against the expansion are exhausted. Sometimes, taking back control is not all it is cracked up to be.

The post Heathrow expansion in the shadow of Brexit appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

To receive the Brussels Briefing in your inbox every morning, sign up here. You must be a registered user of the Financial Times. To register click here.

Without much fanfare – without even a press conference – Margrethe Vestager on Wednesday slipped out one of the most important decisions of her time as competition commissioner. Known for her flinty approach to the likes of Apple and Google, Ms Vestager showed a different side: restraint. And this was no ordinary antitrust case. It was Gazprom.

Read more

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

On 27 October 2016, the Council added 10 persons to the list of those targeted by EU restrictive measures against the Syrian regime for being responsible for the violent repression against the civilian population in Syria, benefiting from or supporting the regime, and/or being associated with such persons. 

This decision follows the Council conclusions of 17 October 2016 and the European Council conclusions of 20-21 October 2016. 

The persons added to the list include high-ranking military officials and senior figures linked to the regime. This decision brings to 217 persons the total number of persons targeted by a travel ban and an asset freeze for the violent repression against the civilian population in Syria. 

In addition, 69 entities are targeted by an asset freeze. More broadly, sanctions currently in place against Syria include an oil embargo, restrictions on certain investments, a freeze of the assets of the Syrian central bank within the EU, export restrictions on equipment and technology that might be used for internal repression as well as on equipment and technology for the monitoring or interception of internet or telephone communications. These measures were last extended on 27 May 2016 and are in place until 1 June 2017.

The EU remains committed to finding a lasting solution to the conflict in Syria, as there is no military solution to the Syrian civil war. The EU is determined to save lives and continues its intense humanitarian diplomatic effort to deliver aid to Aleppo and wherever needed, and to evacuate the wounded.

The legal acts adopted by the Council, including the names of the persons concerned, are published in the Official Journal of 28 October 2016. The decision was adopted by written procedure. 

The EU-Canada Summit will take place on 30 October 2016 in the Justus Lipsius building in Brussels. The Summit will start at around 10.30 and the press conference will be at +/- 12.15.

Procedure

• If this is your first registration, please make sure you have a recent ID-size photograph in JPEG format (.jpg) and the number of your passport or identity card ready before starting the online process.
• You will receive an acknowledgement of receipt by email. Please read it carefully as it includes the list of original documents you will be asked to provide when collecting your badge. Depending on your profile, the requested document will include: Passport or ID card, press card and/or a letter from your editor-in chief as well as the signed original of your authorisation for security screening (only for media representatives of Belgian nationality or resident in Belgium). The press centre may contact you to request additional information if necessary. No accreditation badge will be issued if you cannot provide all required documents.
• Under certain conditions it is possible to organise a group registration/collection of badges for journalists working for the same media. Select group registration at the beginning of the accreditation process and follow the instructions.
• Trainees with media organisations who do not possess a press card are not entitled to request accreditation

Journalists holding a 6-month badge (30.06.2016 - 31.12.2016) do not need to register

6-month badges can be collected at the accreditation centre of the LEX building during summits. Please ensure that you have all the required documents when collecting your badge.

Collection of badges

Accreditation badges must be collected in person from the LEX building (145 rue de la Loi, Brussels)  

• Sunday 30 October from 07.00 to the end of the press conference

For more details on the European Council meeting, see the meeting page.

AMENDMENTS 248 - 508 - Draft report Implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) and of the EU and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy met in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic on 25-26 October. Ministers assessed the state of play of the implementation of the CELAC-EU programmes and actions adopted by the Heads of state and government Summits. They adopted a document describing the results of EU-CELAC cooperation in sectors covered by the EU-CELAC action plan adopted by the Summit of 2015, and drawing conclusions and recommendations for future action.

The decision of the British people to leave the European Union is not a catalyst for questioning European integration. It is another marker – a very significant one – in a series of events that have cast doubt on the concept and practice of European integration, which has enabled prosperity, security and the advancement of the continent since the Second World War.

Ever since France and the Netherlands voted against the draft European constitution, there have been increasing signs of “Europe” losing its appeal; claims that the project is exhausted; demands that it be replaced by other models.

This is also evident in the growing number of election victories for Eurosceptics and anti-EU parties within the founding states of the Union. Some of these parties have won seats in the European Parliament. Public support for the EU, regularly recorded by Eurobarometer, is falling in almost all of the 28 member states. Pro-EU sentiment remains high only in a few candidate countries, such as those of the Western Balkans.

Despite its progress in strengthening democracy, empowering the European Parliament and bolstering the subsidiarity principle, the Lisbon Treaty – this last attempt to create an EU based on firm ideals – did not bring a true fresh start or fuel enthusiasm for Europe.

On the contrary, Europe’s responses to major crises over the last few years – the global economic crisis, the eurozone crisis, the unresolved refugee crisis – have been hesitant. Citizens’ confidence in the EU, and its ability to control Europe’s fate, has been shaken.

Some member states’ solution was to return to policies that serve only the national interest and disregard European standards and European solidarity. As a result, the European Commission and the Parliament have lost much of their authority and ability to act.

It would be too simple and superficial to look at personal factors – in some cases, weak leadership at an EU and national level – as the primary or lone cause of this trend. Stellar names and visionary personalities – think Jacques Delors, Sicco Manshold or Sir Leon Brittan – are no longer on the European stage. Even the leadership of the German-French axis, which was predominant during the era of Konrad Adenauer and Charles de Gaulle or Helmut Kohl and François Mitterand, has grown weaker (although this axis remains essential).

European ideals are fading away and the desire for unlimited national autonomy has been revived. But the reasons for these changes must be analysed very carefully, not simply reduced to obvious factors such as the growing Brussels bureaucracy, its alienation from the people and its unrealistic decrees.

The reasons include the so-called “democratic deficit”. Many EU citizens feel powerless. They no longer expect political processes to solve their daily problems – especially in those areas administered by Brussels. This residual feeling intensifies when populist forces, such as those pushing for Brexit, blame Europe for all problems – old and new, related and unrelated.

However, it is debatable whether the unease many European citizens feel towards national and EU/European policies could be overcome simply by strengthening national sovereignty at the expense of EU (or even pan-European) bodies and institutions. Many of the causes of this unease have an authentically national origin – a fear of the future due to an increase in social inequality, environmental degradation or threats to public safety and security, regardless of whether they are real or only perceived. Slogans such as “More Europe” or “Less Europe” are, therefore, not useful for getting to the heart of the issue.

In fact, a sensible combination of national and EU/European measures is needed to restore Europeans’ confidence in their joint project – for overall prosperity and safety. National and supranational measures are necessary to secure our common social model, the European welfare state. Only a strong EU/European can protect people in Europe from the consequences of unrestrained globalisation. And member states have to ensure social justice within their own borders. There is no alternative.

The call for more autonomy and civic participation requires not only national but pan-European action. The democratic deficit exists not only at a European level – the EU institutions certainly need a surge of democratic ideas and practices – but within many of the member states. The limitations of a dismal representative democracy come to light when they only partially portray the will of the people.

If it is possible to address the needs and concerns of citizens, then it is also possible to continue with EU integration in the best interest of European family of peoples. National particularities and diversities – a firm characteristic of Europe – must be taken into account much more than is the case now.

But a reinvigorated EU, under this banner of diversity, can remain the Union of the four fundamental freedoms and its other accomplishments – the achievements that defined its historical cause and will define the lives of its people now and in the future.

The post EU Reloaded? appeared first on Europe’s World.

Nothing defines “British exceptionalism”, a recurrent theme of the UK’s European Union membership, like the decision to leave the Union. The implications of Brexit for the British healthcare sector, employment policies and social assistance schemes have been much discussed. But what about the impact on the other side of the negotiating table? Could the EU, liberated from its “reluctant partner”, proceed more rapidly towards a more social Europe – or will the EU’s social policy begin its disintegration?

Throughout the British referendum debate, depictions of the European impact on Britain’s welfare state were tainted by inaccuracies and outright lies. One was the assertion that immigrants abuse freedom of movement within the EU to scrounge off the UK’s generous benefits system. This simplistic view can easily be contested: the data has consistently suggested that, over time, European immigrants have paid more in taxes than they have received in benefits. Yet although not at all evidence-based, the argument shot to the top of the political agenda, with David Cameron proposing a four-year ban on EU migrants receiving inwork benefits and a ban on “exporting” benefits for children living outside the UK.

But what about the underlying assumption that social policy decisions – including the allocation of benefits – should be free from EU interference? The development of the welfare state has been linked historically with ideas of national identity and citizenship. Proponents of this rather old notion of a self-sufficient nation state consider EU membership, and the grounds it offers for the enjoyment of social benefits, as a threat to sovereignty. For the British, the repatriation of welfare policy was seen as the way to reclaim an important part of national sovereignty. Even though the EU has limited formal competence in the field of social policy, many British citizens felt left out of decisions affecting the UK’s welfare system. Alienation from the European project is not unique
to British people – so an important challenge for post-Brexit EU social policy is to reconsider ways in which EU citizens could meaningfully participate in and help make decisions that directly
or indirectly affect their social wellbeing.

“The EU should clarify the set of social rights standards to be respected by all member states, serving as a real guarantor of minimum social protection”

Recent social policy changes in the UK have followed the general European trend – responding to the financial crisis by introducing austerity measures that entail cuts in social benefits and assistance. At the same time, industrial closures and job losses resulted in the casualisation of wages and working conditions. The real wages of the average British person have fallen by about 10% since 2007, with the burden of austerity felt most by vulnerable populations, multiplying the disadvantages to which they were already exposed. These developments were particularly decisive for the outcome of the UK referendum, as the areas with the biggest falls in average wages had the strongest anger towards the EU. In other words, the EU’s attempts at financial recovery alienated the very sections of the British population that might have been expected to support the European project. These people felt the EU didn’t live up to their expectations of it as a protector of social rights, which begs the question of what “Social Europe” really means, and how it can now ensure a minimum level of social protection for all EU citizens.

In the aftermath of Brexit it would be simplistic to expect that the EU, without its reluctant British member, could rapidly deepen social policy integration. The UK was by no means the only member state opposing integration initiatives, especially when it comes to EUwide transfers or solidarity mechanisms. To address member states’ reluctance to share the burdens of multiple economic and social crises across the continent, the EU has to listen seriously to their claims of national sovereignty over social welfare. Paying attention to concerns about sovereignty doesn’t mean pandering to them, but rather having the openness to rethink the ways in which the EU can guarantee member states’ real and equal participation in and co-determination of social policy decisions. Exclusive meetings of a limited number of leading states, like the one that took place immediately after the Brexit vote, are not the way forward. On the contrary – when it comes to the regulation of provision of public services such as social assistance or healthcare, the Union must ensure transparency and the level of consultation necessary for the genuine involvement of state officials, citizens and stakeholders in EU decision-making. Only by providing a democratic forum for discussion of social policy will the choice for membership be more attractive than the choice for exit.

For the EU to regain its lost legitimacy in the area of social policy, it can’t pretend its influence is restricted to its competences. The EU must openly address the knock-on effects of its economic
policies on the welfare state. This doesn’t mean that labour costs or pension schemes should be strictly separated from budgetary coordination, but that when confronted with an economic decision
that has direct or indirect consequences for social policy, the EU should accommodate concerns beyond efficiency. These include objectives such as equity, accessibility and quality of social
services for all citizens. The Union has to emphasise the qualitative difference between economic and social policy, and control the risk of the blind subordination of EU social policy to the market.

“For the EU to regain its lost legitimacy in the area of social policy, it can’t pretend its influence is restricted to its competences”

Initiatives such as the introduction of a European Pillar of Social Rights are definitely a positive sign, but rather than simply multiplying the existing regulatory framework of EU social policy, the Union should strive to specify and operationalise the existing elements of the European social constitution – for example, through the introduction of a basic, common unemployment insurance.
Through comprehensive and consistent secondary legislation and jurisprudence, the EU should clarify the set of social rights standards to be respected by all member states, serving as a real
guarantor of minimum social protection. Fostering the European social model with decent working and living standards for all EU citizens is the only way to fight inequalities and the downward spiral of Eurosceptic populism.

IMAGE CREDIT: cylonphoto/Bigstock.com

The post Europe cannot ignore the social impact of economic “recovery” appeared first on Europe’s World.

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

AMENDMENTS 1 - 247 - Draft report Implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

1.      We, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) and of the European Union and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, met on the occasion of our first Inter-Summit meeting, held in the Dominican Republic on the 25th and 26th of October 2016. 

2.      We underscore the importance of our partnership and reiterate our commitment to all the bi-regional declarations adopted in the Summits of our Heads of State and Government since Rio de Janeiro in 1999. These declarations reflect our common vision on important matters. 

3.      We recall the mandate received from the Heads of State and Government in their Political Declaration “A partnership for the next generation” adopted in June 2015, to commit to a comprehensive and inclusive exercise of reflection on the future of the bi-regional relationship in order to deepen our long-standing strategic, bi-regional partnership based on historical, cultural and human ties, international law, full respect for all the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, all human rights and territorial integrity as well as on common values and principles, and mutual respect and interests. We reiterate our rejection of coercive measures of unilateral character with extraterritorial effect that are contrary to international law and we reaffirm our commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes. 

4.      We endorse the conclusions and recommendations emanating from the “Assessment of programmes and actions adopted by the Summits”, which have constituted an important input in our reflection. This evaluation has proven to be a positive contribution in the identification of successful bi-regional initiatives, areas of our relationship where more efforts need to be made and suggested changes in our working methods, which will lead to more concrete and valuable results. These recommendations should be considered in the further implementation and development of the CELAC-EU Action Plan. We also agree to enhance coordination between the cooperation programmes and the CELAC-EU Action Plan. 

5.      We agree to build on the conclusions of our discussions on the assessment of the programmes and actions adopted by the Summits, strengthening the bi-regional dialogue and deepening mutual relations, financing for development and climate change, during this first Inter-Summit meeting to consolidate a more ambitious, strategic and balanced association on the basis of clearly identified common interests, which shall be the framework of our future bi-regional relationship. 

6.      We are convinced that together we can play an important political role to jointly address ongoing and new global challenges. We commit ourselves to a reinvigorated and more frequent political dialogue based on common bi-regional objectives. We commend the bi-regional dialogue in the lead up to the major international conferences, summits and special sessions on issues of global concern, in particular the Third International Conference on Financing for Development, the United Nations Sustainable Development Summit (2015), which adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the 21st Session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC COP 21), the UN General Assembly Special Session on the World Drug Problem (UNGASS 2016) and the UNGA High Level Meeting on Addressing Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants (2016). We commit to further working together, as applicable, to achieve our common goals in the multilateral fora, including in the UNFCCC COP 22 to be held in Marrakech in November 2016 and the Open Government Partnership Summit to be held in Paris in December 2016. 

7.      We welcome the dynamism of our long-lasting economic ties, while acknowledging the need to give new impetus to our economic partnership. We recall our earlier commitments in Santiago de Chile and Brussels, to promote sustainable development and inclusive economic growth in our respective regions, including through increased and diversified investments. We recognize that economic growth within a policy framework of environmental and social responsibility is essential to achieve sustained and inclusive development. Our countries share the common challenge of enhancing productivity growth and would gain from cooperating more closely in this field. We propose to create an enabling environment encompassing all aspects of bi-regional relations related to productivity, as defined in paragraphs 45 to 49 of the EU-CELAC Brussels Declaration adopted in 2015. Therefore, we mandate the CELAC-EU Senior Officials to carry out consultations at different levels with the business sector and other relevant stakeholders to identify objectives and modalities for a possible CELAC-EU partnership in this field and report to the next Summit. 

8.      We acknowledge the need for open, constructive dialogue and closer collaboration in tax matters, recognizing the need to address tax evasion, base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS). We also acknowledge that this dialogue should be reinforced between all parties and we take note that some countries have already undertaken commitments in accordance with standards monitored and assessed by the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes (Global Forum). 

9.      We stress the need to enhance bi-regional cooperation, using all available instruments in an integrated manner. The new challenges linked to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda should be taken into account in the design and implementation of the CELAC-EU Action Plan. We therefore mandate the CELAC-EU Senior Officials to conduct a reflection and consultation process on this issue with all relevant partners and to present initial results before the end of 2016 with a view to submitting its outcome to the Summit in 2017. Given the importance of ODA as a lever for effective implementation of the SDGs, this reflection should include the issue of graduation in order to properly reflect the realities and challenges of the populations of Latin American and Caribbean States and its potential side effects in our bi-regional cooperation.

10.  We recognize the need to promote broad participation of all sectors of society and relevant organisations and engagement in the advancement of the bi-regional relationship. We also wish to ensure the adequate representation of youth and women, and to identify ways of making our partnership more effective, visible, participatory and inclusive with a view to enhancing the achievement of our common strategic objectives. 

11.  We welcome the signature of the Agreement establishing the EU-LAC Foundation as an international organization of intergovernmental nature as an important instrument of our bi-regional relationship. We recognize the voluntary basis of financial contributions reflected in the Agreement and encourage all countries to promote financial, legal and political support for the EU-LAC Foundation in fulfilling its mandate. 

12.  We welcome the results of this first Inter-Summit meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs which contributes to boosting the strategic partnership. As decided by our Heads of State and Government at the 2015 EU-CELAC Summit, we will hold regular Inter-Summit Ministerial meetings with the aim of ensuring a comprehensive follow-up of Summit decisions and sustain regular high level dialogue between our two regions. 

13.  We commend the Dominican Republic for the organization of this Ministerial Meeting, which enriched the bi-regional agenda and was instrumental in achieving substantial progress, paving the way for the next CELAC-EU Summit to be held in the second semester of 2017 in El Salvador.

Plenary sessions : Parliament demanded more funds, to help young people into jobs, boost economic growth and assist third countries with a view to mitigating the migration crisis, in a plenary vote on Wednesday. MEPs reversed all the Council’s proposed cuts in the draft EU budget for 2017. They expect some of the additional funds needed to come from new appropriations to be obtained through the mid-term revision of the EU’s long-run budget, the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF).

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP