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President Trump’s economic policy has disrupted global trade by imposing high tariffs and generating sustained uncertainty for partners. The European Union is among the most exposed actors. To assess its strategic options, this policy note interprets this trade policy as an interactive reform process rather than a coherent economic doctrine.

That tariff policy follows a non-linear pattern, characterised by abrupt shifts, shifting coalitions of domestic winners, and limited reliance on institutional expertise. Rather than reflecting a stable economic strategy, tariffs function as a tool of political realignment and bargaining leverage. This dynamic creates persistent analytical uncertainty, complicating the response of allies and markets.

By following a reform-process approach, the note identifies the political logic, distributional effects, and structural weaknesses of the tariff strategy. Understanding these features will help assess and inform the EU’s policymaking strategy and frame the broader policy discourse in an unstable trade order.

Read here in pdf the Policy paper by Angelos Karayannopoulos, Junior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP.

Introduction

Emanating from this uncertain landscape, policies associated with “Trump Tariffs” have been challenging to analyse, as they represent a rather ongoing process.

The Trump Administration 2.0 trade policy has been defined by uncertainty. Uncertainty was first generated in the first months of the Administration by the unprecedented shift in the global economic order, adopting a protectionist-leaning trade policy that questioned the very foundations of the world trade system. Along the way, uncertainty was fuelled by repeated, often contradictory announcements, delays in implementing decisions, revisions, ongoing negotiations, and relapses in escalations of aggression vis-à-vis trade partners and competitors. Emanating from this uncertain landscape, policies associated with “Trump Tariffs” have been challenging to analyse, as they represent a rather ongoing process.

Several studies have tried to estimate the economic implications. According to modelling by Yale’s Budget Lab, the tariffs implemented through October 2025 are projected to result in a short-term increase in consumer prices of approximately 1.3%. Furthermore, it is anticipated that annual GDP growth will decrease by approximately 0.5% between 2025 and 2026. The impact of these tariffs varies across sectors, with prices for clothing, leather goods, and metals rising by 28% to 40%. In the long term, the economy is forecast to be approximately 0.4% smaller, equivalent to about $125 billion annually. By the end of 2025, unemployment is expected to increase by 0.3 percentage points, with a further 0.7 percentage point increase by 2026.

Figure 1: U.S Average Effective Tariff Rate Since January 1, 2025

Source: The Budget LabSource: The Budget Lab analysis. Created with Datawrapper

Although this process appears to have entered by October 2025 a more structured phase, where actors involved already expect at least minimum consequences from the new era of US-led trade protectionism, it is necessary to put this process into a frame in which we can better analyse the associated consequences and response strategies from actors directly affected. Regarding the EU, the European Commission had initially drafted a €26 billion counter-tariff package but froze it amid a temporary 90-day truce announced by Washington. The “Turnberry deal” that followed capped US tariffs on most European exports at 15 per cent, half of what had been threatened, but kept the 50 per cent duties on steel and aluminium firmly in place. Brussels framed the compromise as “the best possible under the circumstances”, though few viewed it as a victory. France’s then Prime Minister called it “a dark day for transatlantic trade”, while Germany and Italy quietly accepted it as damage control. The asymmetry of the arrangement, Europe cautious, Washington defiant, seems to reflect a broader strategy within Trump’s circle, which leverages uncertainty and unpredictability.

Equally salient is the tariff regime’s standing under the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Several measures are plainly inconsistent with US obligations under WTO rules, and that institutional mismatch matters for two reasons. First, it signals to other actors that rules can be subordinated to unilateral leverage, thereby amplifying global uncertainty. Second, it also opens a parallel front of response, allowing partners to challenge the policy through WTO litigation, to coordinate pressure via new coalitions, or even to pursue alternative rule-making outside the traditional multilateral framework.

By breaking from previous tariff norms, the US signals both a shift in bargaining strategy and an intention to reshape the underlying logic of global trade engagement.

So while many viewed the Turnberry deal as a setback for Europe, its more profound significance is that it represents a fundamental rupture in the post-war global economic order, one whose elements remain blurry and purpose ambiguous. This rupture challenges the post-1945 framework of multilateral trade rules, embedded reciprocity, and predictable dispute-resolution mechanisms that have historically underpinned transatlantic commerce and investment flows. By breaking from previous tariff norms, the US signals both a shift in bargaining strategy and an intention to reshape the underlying logic of global trade engagement.

Understanding this rupture and its purpose, however, first requires taking a step back: how did this policy come about in the first place? Who supports this policy, whose interests are at stake? How, then, is this reform of the fundamental trade dogmas evolving, and what lessons can friends and foes acquire from this process? Answering these questions is critical because reforms of this magnitude cannot be assessed solely through economic metrics; they are embedded in complex political dynamics, institutional constraints, and the distributional consequences that define domestic and international legitimacy. It is not easy to assess both the US emerging context and the EU’s response strategy without first answering these fundamental questions. Failing to identify actors, coalitions, and underlying motivations risks misinterpreting both the policy’s logic and its potential outcomes.

It is thus crucial to frame the new tariff policy within a reform-process approach, assessing not only the policy instruments themselves but also how they were conceived, communicated, and implemented. Viewing the policy in this way allows for a nuanced understanding of how reforms evolve under uncertainty.

Reform Assessment 

Characteristics 

Like taxes, tariffs redistribute economic resources across sectors, firms, and households, creating both beneficiaries and those who bear direct or indirect costs. […] Its success thus depends not only on technical design but also on credible leadership and public trust.

Changes in tariffs resemble tax reforms, and tax reforms are “inherently difficult and a politically charged process”[1]. Like taxes, tariffs redistribute economic resources across sectors, firms, and households, creating both beneficiaries and those who bear direct or indirect costs. They are not neutral interventions; instead, they restructure incentives, alter market signals, and can produce knock-on effects across supply chains and consumer prices. This kind of reform encounters resistance from entrenched interests, including both domestic producers and import-dependent industries, which may lobby vigorously to protect their positions. Its success thus depends not only on technical design but also on credible leadership and public trust. In the US, where trust in public institutions stands at around 34% (OECD, 2024), this creates an additional obstacle: low confidence in governance amplifies scepticism, encourages political polarisation, and increases the likelihood of compliance gaps or public backlash. Consequently, any attempt to impose fundamental tariff reforms must begin with precise attention to both policy design and the clarity of its stated purpose. Clear objectives are essential to overcoming institutional friction and aligning stakeholders around a shared understanding of the reform’s objectives.

Donald Trump’s electoral victory in November 2024 reshaped the political landscape, creating the conditions for a new wave of policy experimentation. Among these, tariff reform emerged through a “window of opportunity”[2] in which public dissatisfaction with globalisation (problem), protectionist ideas (policy), and a nationalist political climate (politics) converged.

Donald Trump’s electoral victory in November 2024 reshaped the political landscape, creating the conditions for a new wave of policy experimentation. Among these, tariff reform emerged through a “window of opportunity”[2] in which public dissatisfaction with globalisation (problem), protectionist ideas (policy), and a nationalist political climate (politics) converged[3]. These “windows” are critical junctures in reform theory, representing periods when political, societal, and economic conditions align to allow for initiatives that entrenched interests might otherwise block. Trump, acting as a “policy entrepreneur”, seized this moment with a symbolic solution of high political appeal but low economic coherence, illustrating how political incentives often outweigh technocratic rationality in such contexts. Policy entrepreneurs are actors who mobilise attention and resources to attach specific policy ideas to these moments, shaping both the content and timing of reforms in ways that resonate with their political base. Such reforms rarely succeed. Trump Tariffs, too, seem unlikely to achieve the economic goals the Administration attaches to them in the short- to medium-term. Still, they serve as a strategic move to generate negotiation leverage. 

Figure 2: Trump’s Window of Opportunity

 

 Source: Author’s illustration, based on Kingdon (1984) and Aberbach & Christensen (2014).

 

The reform’s uncertainty stems from a lack of a coherent strategy understood by both experts and the actors involved. Uncertainty in this context arises from both the ambiguity of stated goals and the erratic sequencing of policy measures, leaving stakeholders unable to anticipate outcomes or plan accordingly. In his political economy framework, Rodrik (1993) emphasises that “identifying who benefits and who bears the costs is essential while assessing a reform”[4]. Without this mapping, policymaking risks misallocating support, generating opposition, and undermining credibility. For tariffs, this translates into narrow, fragmented domestic coalitions: producers of protected goods may celebrate immediate gains, while consumers, downstream industries, and exporters face hidden or delayed costs. When this distribution is unclear, reforms are often blocked, diluted, or derailed entirely, as competing interests contest both the measure’s legitimacy and its impact.

Trump’s policy design and objectives appear less economic than political, aimed at creating leverage in international trade negotiations and consolidating support from key domestic actors.

Furthermore, economists tend to attribute deviations from efficiency to vague “political motives”[5], thus overlooking the complex political dynamics that actually shape reform adoption and durability. In this case, however, Trump’s policy design and objectives appear less economic than political, aimed at creating leverage in international trade negotiations and consolidating support from key domestic actors. In other words, tariffs act less as calibrated economic instruments and more as signals to allies, competitors, and the domestic base, serving as a deliberate policy to structure perceptions and incentives rather than to correct market failures.

…“bring back manufacturing” can therefore gain traction not because it resolves a clearly defined economic problem, but because it fits a political narrative, is available at the right moment, and mobilises relevant constituencies.

These characteristics reflect what Aberbach and Christensen (2014) describe as a “high-ambiguity reform model”, often referred to in the academic literature as the “garbage-can” model of policymaking. The term is not normative but technical, denoting decision-making processes in which problems, solutions, and political attention move in parallel rather than sequentially. In such environments, solutions are often pre-packaged, and policy choices emerge when these elements temporarily coincide. A measure such as “bring back manufacturing” can therefore gain traction not because it resolves a clearly defined economic problem, but because it fits a political narrative, is available at the right moment, and mobilises relevant constituencies. This places the reform closer to a symbolic or narrative-driven act than a carefully calibrated economic intervention. Tariffs, in this sense, function performatively, shaping public discourse, signalling resolve internationally, and activating domestic coalitions even when their economic effects remain uncertain.

Altogether, the US Administration appears to clearly follow a highly “interactive model” of reform, in which policies evolve during implementation and are prone to being shaped by reactions from key stakeholders[6]. And this is a key understanding for friends and foes: in this interactive framework, policymaking is iterative rather than linear. This means that initial designs are adjusted in response to feedback from markets, industry lobbies, unions, or foreign governments. Here, the stated goals are vague but politically salient: restore domestic manufacturing, reduce trade deficits, decouple from China, and negotiate better deals with strategic partners. However, consistent with interactive models, implementation has been non-linear, marked by continuous redefinition, resistance, and episodes of market turbulence. Internationally, such unpredictability pressures partners to return to the negotiating table, potentially increasing the US’s bargaining power, as observed in engagements with the EU, among others. Domestically, however, outcomes are uneven. The interactive process produces winners and losers who may not align neatly along predictable lines, leaving policy outcomes contingent on power, influence, and negotiation skill. Who, then, are the key actors shaping this interactive process? Understanding their networks, incentives, and access to the administration is critical to forecasting the trajectory of Trump’s trade policy.

Actors and coalitions

Tariffs activated interest groups according to their economic and political leverage. Table 1 outlines the key leading actors and stakeholders in this process, illustrating their positions and the tensions that define the interactive model.

But who actually holds influence over the President? To understand the political motivations behind this reform, it is necessary to identify and monitor the coalition driving it.

Table 1: Key Actors and Coalitions Overview

Category Group/Actor Interest/Position Relevance Winners Certain US manufacturers (e.g., steel, aluminium) Support protectionist policies to reduce foreign competition Gain temporary market advantage; politically vocal Certain labour unions (e.g., UAW) Tentative support; hope to preserve jobs in targeted sectors Provide political legitimacy to tariffs Losers Consumers Face higher prices and a reduced variety of goods Broad-based economic impact, especially on low-income groups Retailers (e.g., Walmart, Amazon) Disrupted supply chains; higher costs Large employers and lobbyists are against tariffs Automotive industry (e.g., Ford, GM) Costlier production due to tariffs on parts Influence industrial policy and public debate Farmers Victims of retaliatory tariffs on exports Politically sensitive group Key Stakeholders Financial Sector (e.g., investment banks, Wall Street) Oppose trade instability; favour predictability and open markets Indirect but consequential influence through market reactions and lobbying E-commerce platforms (e.g., Shein, Temu) Affected by the de minimis rule changes Pushback through lobbying and legal channels US government/trade agencies Set and enforce tariff policy Shape the direction of the protectionist agenda

In theory, competing coalitions shape reform by leveraging resources and legitimacy to promote solutions and influence institutional arenas[7]. In this case, traditional pro-trade voices, such as consumer groups, major retailers, and the automotive industry, have been sidelined. Instead, a new “design coalition”[8] has emerged, uniting protectionist advisors, domestic steel and aluminium manufacturers, and labour unions like the United Auto Workers. This coalition strategically framed the tariffs as a patriotic move to revive American manufacturing, aligning with Trump’s agenda. Their ability to displace established advisory bodies and bypass expert consultation equally reflects the shift toward the interactive model, one that rewards salience, symbolism, and strategic positioning over traditional deliberation. Yet, it does not guarantee success.

At the centre of Trump’s new trade coalition stands Peter Navarro, reinstated as Senior Counsellor for Trade and Manufacturing. Navarro functions less as a bureaucrat than as a strategic ideologue. His framing of “reciprocal tariffs” as a question of fairness rather than efficiency has again struck a chord with the president. In practice, Navarro supplies both the conceptual blueprint and the political language of protectionism. His constant proximity to Trump, through Oval Office briefings and media coordination, gives him unparalleled access and agenda-setting power.

Around him operates a small circle of ideologues, including Miran, whose recent work provides the intellectual scaffolding for the new tariff rationale. In his paper “A User’s Guide to Restructuring the Global Trading System” in November 2024, Miran outlined a comprehensive plan to redesign global trade rules. His approach treats tariffs not as fiscal tools but as instruments of structural correction, meant to revive America’s industrial capacity, which he argues has been hollowed out by decades of asymmetric globalisation. At the core of his diagnosis lies a perceived distortion in the international monetary order: the US dollar’s reserve status, while conferring global privilege, simultaneously undermines US competitiveness by sustaining an overvalued currency. The outcome, in his view, is a chronic trade imbalance that erodes manufacturing and widens socio-economic divides in America’s industrial heartlands.

It is worth noting, however, that Miran’s blueprint ends with a sober caveat, stating that “[t]here is a path by which the Trump Administration can reconfigure the global trading and financial systems to America’s benefit, but it is narrow, and will require careful planning, precise execution, and attention to steps to minimise adverse consequences. This disclaimer matters because the administration’s rollout shows the opposite mix, and the mismatch between a disciplined intellectual roadmap and ad hoc managerial practice helps explain why a fragile path to systemic change has, so far, become a broad avenue of organisational failure.

Going back to the actors behind the new tariff regime, implementation largely falls to Howard Lutnick, the new Secretary of Commerce. A financier by background, Lutnick serves as the operational pillar of the administration’s trade structure. Once Navarro’s concepts gain presidential approval, they are translated into policy through the Commerce Department. Lutnick oversees the tariff schedule, exemption mechanisms, and enforcement procedures. He also maintains regular contact with industrial lobbies, particularly in autos, steel, and energy, to apply pressure and align protectionist measures with domestic business interests. Less ideological than Navarro but equally loyal to Trump, Lutnick’s strength lies in execution. His role ensures that ideology becomes administrative and that campaign slogans become regulatory instruments.

Bridging these two spheres is Jamieson Greer, the US Trade Representative (USTR). A veteran of the first Trump administration, Greer now serves as the system’s legal and diplomatic interface. His office formalises tariff actions in more proper language, manages negotiations, and integrates political objectives into trade agreements. In the July 2025 deal with the EU, Greer coordinated the partial rollback of auto tariffs in exchange for European concessions on LNG imports and investment flows.

Navarro dominates moments of escalation, crafting slogans and recasting Europe as an “unfair trader”. Greer intervenes during negotiations to codify those impulses into agreements. Lutnick, meanwhile, ensures continuity by translating presidential instinct into policy routines. Together they form a vertically integrated chain of influence: Navarro provides doctrine, Greer manages diplomacy, and Lutnick enforces implementation. 

Navarro dominates moments of escalation, crafting slogans and recasting Europe as an “unfair trader”. Greer intervenes during negotiations to codify those impulses into agreements. Lutnick, meanwhile, ensures continuity by translating presidential instinct into policy routines. Together they form a vertically integrated chain of influence: Navarro provides doctrine, Greer manages diplomacy, and Lutnick enforces implementation. This inner circle has marginalised moderating voices from the National Economic Council and the Treasury, both of which were diminished in Trump’s second term. The balance of power has thus shifted decisively toward the protectionist bloc. This configuration makes further tariff escalation with the EU not only plausible but structurally embedded in the administration’s policymaking logic. In this structure, however, it is worth remembering that Trump remains the final arbiter, shaping policy-making through personal, isolated decisions, often controversial and often isolated from expert advice.

In addition, by sidelining the dominant channels of economic expertise and despite a broad consensus on the tariffs’ economic harm, this coalition has already achieved a significant political and paradigmatic shift in the US economic policymaking. 

In addition, by sidelining the dominant channels of economic expertise and despite a broad consensus on the tariffs’ economic harm, this coalition has already achieved a significant political and paradigmatic shift in the US economic policymaking. This raises questions about the policy’s stability, as in democratic settings, experts serve dual roles: they inform decisions and foster clarity in public debate[9]. Both functions have been absent here. Beyond this coalition, key actors around economic and trade policy oppose the reform, and others, including  Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent, have struggled to justify the policy or predict its distributional effects. This cleavage creates further confusion about the policy’s implications, raising questions about the polarised, highly top-down nature of the reform strategy. Moreover, reform political theory shows that this kind of exclusionary policymaking rarely delivers sustainable outcomes. In particular, citizen participation[10] and local knowledge[11] help legitimate such complex reforms, such as tariffs. In the US, due to low levels of trust, such inclusive mechanisms were more necessary but absent, with decisions driven by a closed executive circle. Taken together, the lack of deliberation, marginalisation of experts, and political opacity already undermine the reform’s legitimacy and long-term success as much as its questionable economic rationale.

Domestic and Ideological Ecosystem

Beyond the White House’s inner circle, Trump’s trade strategy rests on a broad and uneven domestic ecosystem, an assemblage of industrial lobbies, labour organisations, and ideological networks that together provide legitimacy, pressure, and political reinforcement. 

Beyond the White House’s inner circle, Trump’s trade strategy rests on a broad and uneven domestic ecosystem, an assemblage of industrial lobbies, labour organisations, and ideological networks that together provide legitimacy, pressure, and political reinforcement. This coalition functions less as a single bloc than as a layered structure in which manufacturing, energy, and conservative policy circles converge around a shared narrative.

At its foundation lie the manufacturing and energy sectors, the backbone of Trump’s tariff constituency. Groups such as the Coalition for a Prosperous America (Zach Mottl) and the Alliance for American Manufacturing (Scott Paul) have welcomed the 2025 measures as a long-overdue “reset” to restore industrial competitiveness. Steel producers were among the first to rally. The Steel Manufacturers Association (Philip Bell), the American Iron & Steel Institute (Kevin Dempsey), and major firms, including US Steel, Nucor, and Cleveland-Cliffs, all endorsed the revival of Section 232 tariffs, describing them as essential to counter global overcapacity. Their alignment with the administration has not been incidental: the sector’s strategic and symbolic role as “industrial America reborn” anchors Trump’s economic narrative. Support has also come from adjacent industries. The United Auto Workers union, representing roughly 400,000 workers, called tariffs “a victory” in the effort to reshore jobs. In contrast, construction, energy, and agricultural associations are more wary of this reform, with different interests taking different approaches towards the White House. Finally, the labour union federation AFL-CIO expressed caution, warning that “tariffs without a plan will lead to economic harm” and insisting on parallel industrial and labour-market policies.

Behind this patchwork of sectoral interests lies an organised intellectual infrastructure that sustains the administration’s economic nationalism. The Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025 serves as its doctrinal anchor, describing the trade policy central to the renaissance of the American manufacturing and defence industrial base, and advocating a tariff regime built on “reciprocity”. Similar lines emerge from another key think-tank behind Trump’s agenda, the American Compass, led by economist Oren Cass, which hailed the tariff plan as proof that “the disastrous WTO era” has ended.

A combination of actors inside and outside the government has created the coalition driving this delicate reform, which aims at changing the very foundations of the post-war economic apparatus.

Hence, we can monitor how the driving coalition’s coordination across this ecosystem unfolds through both formal and informal channels. A combination of actors inside and outside the government has created the coalition driving this delicate reform, which aims at changing the very foundations of the post-war economic apparatus. Still, the coalition remains largely fragile. Market reactions to new tariffs have been volatile, and consumer groups, investors, and US allies continue to express unease. Even sympathetic voices warn that protectionism without parallel industrial policy risks hollowing out its own social base. The architecture of Trump’s trade coalition shows adequate coherence at the top but fragmentation below, confirming the hypothesis that the system is held together less by institutional design than by political momentum.

Collective assessment

Having mapped the key actors and interests driving the tariff agenda, the next step is to consolidate this information within an analytical framework that can capture both the politics and the process. The framework developed by Marsh and McConnell (2010)[12] offers precisely such a lens. Conceived to evaluate public policy success in multidimensional terms, it moves beyond the binary of “success or failure” to assess how political, programmatic, and process elements interact over time. Rather than treating outcomes as fixed, it sees them as fluid, being constantly shaped by institutions, coalitions, and shifting perceptions of legitimacy. This approach is beneficial for analysing reforms like Trump’s tariff programme, whose logic is as much political as it is economic.

In this model, political success reflects a policy’s ability to generate and sustain support among key constituencies. Tariff reform meets this criterion only partially. It resonates with Trump’s electoral base by framing trade as a question of sovereignty and fairness, yet polls show declining approval among moderates and business-oriented Republicans. Programmatic success, in turn, refers to the policy’s effectiveness in achieving its stated goals and addressing the problem it was designed to solve. Here, the record is weaker: the tariffs have increased costs and uncertainty, while their contribution to reshoring remains limited. Implementation thus becomes crucial, weighing as both a technical and a political variable in our assessment. In a context of multiple rates, country-specific carve-outs, and intricate rules of origin, customs administrations face heavy demands that strain their systems. Where capacity gaps exist, complexity invites uneven enforcement, discretionary arbitrage, and, in extreme cases, rent-seeking; incoherence thus mutates into additional risk. Finally, process success measures the quality of governance, such as the degree of consultation, coherence, and institutional learning involved. By this standard, the reform fares poorly. Decision-making has been top-down, consultation selective, and interagency coordination has often been bypassed.

It reminds policymakers that responding to the tariff agenda requires considering, or even engaging with, all three fronts: political, programmatic, and procedural. 

Understanding these three dimensions helps decode the apparent contradictions of the tariff regime. It reveals how a policy can be politically salient yet analytically fragile, adequate in narrative terms, but deficient in design and execution. For international observers and engaged partners, especially within the EU, this framework also has a strategic value. It reminds policymakers that responding to the tariff agenda requires considering, or even engaging with, all three fronts: political, programmatic, and procedural. In other words, in a comprehensive counter-strategy, purely economic arguments will remain inadequate. Recognising that Trump’s trade policy functions as an ongoing political process rather than a fixed economic doctrine will thus allow European actors to perceive it more accurately and, therefore, craft adaptive responses and measures that are less vulnerable to sudden shifts in US strategy. In this sense, the framework is not only diagnostic but also prescriptive, providing the conceptual discipline needed to command policy strategy in an inherently volatile policy environment.

Table 2: Assessment of Trump Tariffs’ Success

Dimension Assessment of Trump’s Tariffs Process Success Weak: Top-down, opaque, lacking consultation and public engagement Programmatic Weak: unclear goals, rising costs, retaliation risks Political Moderate: energises base, builds new coalition, frames foreign competition as a national threat

Based on: Marsh & McConnell (2010): “Towards a framework for establishing policy success”[13]

Conclusion

Internationally, tariffs function more as a negotiating instrument than a coherent trade policy; domestically, they operate as a narrative device, reinforcing Trump’s political messaging about restoring manufacturing and protecting American jobs.

The US tariff reform has been designed and implemented in ways that reform theory suggests are unlikely to succeed. Setting aside the risks it poses to the global economy, its economic rationale is weak, its objectives unclear, and its execution inconsistent. Yet these very weaknesses illustrate how power, ideology, and uncertainty now interact in the making of American trade policy, creating a coalition driving a highly disputed reform. Internationally, tariffs function more as a negotiating instrument than a coherent trade policy; domestically, they operate as a narrative device, reinforcing Trump’s political messaging about restoring manufacturing and protecting American jobs, thereby regaining economic sovereignty.

 

Recent judicial developments should also be taken into consideration when assessing the reform holistically. Lower federal courts have already found core elements of the tariff scheme unconstitutional, and the pending Supreme Court review could convert legal contestation into a decisive political variable. Judicial pushback does more than test legality; it can alter tactical choices within the administration (appeals, selective implementation, and legal workarounds), recalibrate bargaining leverage abroad, and create deadlines and windows for negotiation that political actors must account for.

The result is a system that is at once personalised and unpredictable, a policy arena that privileges immediacy over institutional coherence.

The reform process reflects elements of both the aforementioned high-ambiguity and interactive models of policymaking. As in the high-ambiguity reform model, solutions precede problems, so tariffs emerge as pre-packaged answers to diffuse labelled grievances such as economic decline, deindustrialisation and trade deficits. The interactive elements lie in how these policies mutate through feedback loops of crisis, shifted coalitions and opposition, and negotiation. Rather than linear policy design, we see a process of continuous adaptation, in which actors improvise around presidential impulses and external reactions, insulated primarily from expert advice. The result is a system that is at once personalised and unpredictable, a policy arena that privileges immediacy over institutional coherence. Or, in other words, a chaotic and conflict-prone policy environment, where outcomes are contingent on political manoeuvring rather than strategic design.

Framing this process through the proposed multidimensional framework clarifies why this reform endures politically despite its fragility. Politically, it speaks to the core constituencies and re-anchors Trump’s electoral narrative, even as broader public approval erodes. Programmatically, it remains weak, producing short-term symbolic victories but slight measurable improvement in economic performance. Process-wise, it shows minimal coordination and consultation, driven more by loyalty networks than by bureaucratic or expert procedure. Taken together, these dimensions depict a reform that succeeds in communication inside the party’s electoral base but fails as national policy.

For Europe, this analysis carries immediate strategic implications. To adapt to this new transatlantic relationship and respond effectively to future additional trade negotiations, EU policymakers must treat US actions not as static measures to be countered, but as interactive processes to be handled carefully. Tariff levels, exemptions, and bilateral deals will likely continue to fluctuate because the system that generates them is inherently unstable. Negotiators and analysts should therefore build strategies premised on volatility, crafting flexible instruments to manage recurrent shifts, such as rapid-response mechanisms, conditional retaliation frameworks, and coordinated communication channels[14]. The objective is not to mirror US escalation, but rather to remain salient within it, to anticipate rather than react.

Figure 3: Handling Unstable US Trade Policy

 

Source: Author’s illustration, synthesising insights from policy analysis and reform theory.

 

By reading US trade politics through the frameworks presented here, negotiators can better distinguish performative conflict from substantive negotiation, thereby reducing the risk of overreacting to symbolic measures.

Moreover, understanding the dynamics behind the tariff regime helps disentangle intent from outcome. Recognising that Trump’s trade policy operates simultaneously as an electoral project, an ideological statement, and a negotiating tactic could enable Europeans to prioritise engagement where material interests align and to contain disputes where they do not. By reading US trade politics through the frameworks presented here, negotiators can better distinguish performative conflict from substantive negotiation, thereby reducing the risk of overreacting to symbolic measures.

Capturing this concept is essential. Codifying the reform’s nature as a policy process reveals that it is interactive, unpredictable, and highly non-linear – qualities that ensure volatility will persist even after temporary deals, such as the July compromise. This unpredictability could also explain why criticism of the EU’s response often misses the bigger picture: the very object of that response is unstable, fragmented, and subject to sudden shifts.

Understanding trade reform in this way provides a firmer foundation for assessing policy choices in this new global economic landscape. The US is no longer operating within a stable, rules-based framework. This makes traditional forecasting inadequate. Instead, analytical capacity must now focus on process-tracking, which involves monitoring better networks of influence, institutional signals, and domestic political incentives. Policymakers should expect reversals, disputes, and evolving coalitions to shape their trajectory. Only by situating Europe’s options within this broader context of how the US trade policy is formulated can public debate and strategic planning become more coherent. In short, understanding the how of Trump’s tariff policy is now as important as understanding the what. Ultimately, this perspective not only helps interpret the current turbulence but also anticipates future disruptions in the global trade order.

[1]J. Martinez-Vazquez, Successful tax reforms in the recent international experience: Lessons in political economy and the nuts and bolts of increasing country tax revenue effort, ICEPP Working Papers, Paper 214, 2021.

[2] J. Kingdon, Agendas, alternatives, and public policies, Boston: Little, Brown, 1984.

[3] J.D. Aberbach & T. Christensen, Why reforms so often disappoint, The American Review of Public Administration, 44(1), 2014, pp. 3–16.

[4] D. Rodrik, The positive economics of policy reform, The American Economic Review, 83(2), 1993, pp. 356–361.

[5] Ibid.

[6] J. Kingdon, Agendas, alternatives, and public policies, Boston: Little, Brown, 1984. See also J.W. Thomas & M.S. Grindle, After the decision: Implementing policy reforms in developing countries, World Development, 18(8), 1990, pp. 1163–1181.

[7] K. Orach, M. Schlüter & H. Österblom, Tracing a pathway to success: How competing interest groups influenced the 2013 EU Common Fisheries Policy reform, Environmental Science & Policy, 76, 2017, pp. 90–102.

[8] L. Haelg, S. Sewerin & T.S. Schmidt, The role of actors in the policy design process: Introducing design coalitions to explain policy output, Policy Sciences, 53(2), 2020, pp. 309–347.

[9] M. Schudson, The trouble with experts – and why democracies need them, Theory and Society, 35, 2006, pp. 491–506.

[10] A. Michels & L. De Graaf, Examining citizen participation: Local participatory policy making and democracy, Local Government Studies, 36(4), 2010, pp. 477–491.

[11] F. Fischer, Citizen participation and the democratization of policy expertise: From theoretical inquiry to practical cases, Policy Sciences, 26(3), 1993, pp. 165–187.

[12] D. Marsh & A. McConnell, Towards a framework for establishing policy success, Public Administration, 88(2), 2010, pp. 564–583.

[13] D. Marsh & A. McConnell, Towards a framework for establishing policy success, Public Administration, 88(2), 2010, pp. 564–583.

[14] A more comprehensive strategy for the EU was initially proposed by T. Gehrke, in “Brussels hold’em: European cards against Trumpian coercion”, ECFR/576, 2025. Available at: https://ecfr.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Brussels-holdem-European-cards-against-Trumpian-coercion.pdf

Handicap International e.V.: München (ots) - Nach nun fast vier Jahren Bombardierungen und Beschuss wächst die Anzahl an schwerverletzten Zivilistinnen und Zivilisten in der Ukraine. Die humanitäre Hilfsorganisation Handicap International (HI) weist auf die gestiegene Zahl ...

Több rendőri egység kivonult a Nyitrai járásba, Lapásgyarmatra. Mivel kényes ügyről van szó, a rendőrség egyelőre nem ad további tájékoztatást.

L'aéroport international de Niamey a été le théâtre de violences tard mercredi soir. De fortes détonations et des tirs nourris ont été signalés cette nuit dans la zone. Le calme est revenu mais l'identité des assaillants n'est pas connue et aucun bilan n'est disponible pour l'instant. 

Une année après la prise de Goma par la rébellion de l’AFC/M23, le 27 janvier 2025, des centaines de défenseurs des droits humains vivent en déplacement, tandis que l'économie locale est asphyxiée par un système de taxation parallèle.

Le jeune écrivain congolais, Serge Mulimani Kalinda a présenté, mardi 27 janvier à Beni (Nord-Kivu), son ouvrage intitulé « Ce que la guerre n’a pas tué ».

Publié aux éditions Plume Noire au Sénégal, ce livre se veut un manifeste de résistance intellectuelle, invitant les Congolais à transformer trois décennies de souffrance en une force bâtisseuse.

Le Congo-Brazzaville a remporté la semaine dernière son arbitrage face à Sundance. Le groupe minier australien réclamait une compensation à Brazzaville après le retrait, en 2020, de son permis d'exploitation de la mine de fer de Nabeba, à la frontière avec le Cameroun. Les autorités congolaises parlaient alors « d'insuffisance prolongée d'activité ». Un argument validé par la Cour arbitrale de la Chambre de commerce internationale de Londres.

A lake in of Bayan-Ölgii Province is a water source in western Mongolia. Change in the nature of glaciers and water resources affects agriculture and livelihood of Mongolians. Credit: Pexels/ ArtHouse Studio

By Madhurima Sarkar-Swaisgood, Prangya Paramita Gupta and Parvathy Subha
BANGKOK, Thailand, Jan 29 2026 (IPS)

The International Year of Glaciers’ Preservation in 2025 was a timely reminder that the stability of Mongolia’s economy rests on fragile mountain systems that are melting faster than ever recorded. The loss reverberates across the country’s energy and agricultural systems, two development pillars that draw from the same finite resource: water.

Warming and glacial retreat

Mongolia’s average surface air temperature is already 2.3°C higher than the pre-industrial baseline, about 1.3°C above the global average. The most fossil fuel-intensive climate scenario (SSP5) indicates nearly 8°C of warming by the end of the century with the steepest increases expected in the northern and western provinces; home to the country’s glaciers.

These glaciers contribute more than 70 per cent of Mongolia’s freshwater, sustaining agriculture, hydropower, and domestic use. Since 1940, glacier volume has declined by about 28 per cent, and total glacier area has decreased by 35 per cent between 1990 and 2016, leaving only 627 glaciers covering 334 km².

Between the 1980s and 2010, Mongolia lost 63 lakes larger than 0.1 km² and about 683 rivers, many in the foothills of the Altai ranges with the highest concentration of glaciers. Groundwater storage on the Mongolian Plateau is also decreasing at nearly 3 mm per year, linked partly to reduced glacial input.

Analysis using downscaled IPCC climate projections available on ESCAP’s Risk and Resilience Portal suggests that this trend is likely to continue in the coming decades and by 2,100 many western Altai glaciers may disappear entirely (Figures 1A and 1B).

Figure 1(A and B) Change in glacier area during 1990-2010 and (B) projected change in glacier mass balance (2021-2100) in Mongolia under climate change scenarios (Source: Kemp et al (2022). Mongolia’s cryosphere. Geomorphology)

Figure 2 change in glacial mass balance in the Altai Mountain region under existing and climate change scenarios

Water, energy and agriculture: A tightening nexus

Mongolia’s semi-arid climate has always made water a strategic asset for development.

Agriculture remains the largest water consumer, accounting for roughly two-thirds of total use. Since 2008, more than 1,000 hectares of irrigated land have been added annually, driven by food and livestock-security goals.

With prolonged dry conditions (Figure 3), farmers in western and northern provinces report increasing reliance on shallow wells and groundwater pumping, while pastures dry earlier in the season. These demands coincide with a growing push to expand hydropower for domestic energy security.

Figure 3 Exposure of livestock (sheep and goats) to soil moisture drought under climate change conditions

Hydropower in transition

Hydropower accounts for nearly one-fifth of Mongolia’s electricity generation, but its viability depends on stable water flow. In the western region, hydropower provides 93 per cent of locally produced energy.

The Durgun Hydropower Plant (HPP) in Khovd Province, for example, provides over 28 per cent of regional power but operates in one of the driest parts of the country. With glacier retreat and declining summer precipitation, inflows have become less predictable.

ESCAP drought-exposure modelling shows that the western provinces already face chronic low-to-medium drought intensity, with worsening conditions under future scenarios (Figure 3).

Figure 4 exposure of hydropower plants to drought (Standardized streamflow index) under climate change scenarios in the western region (Source: ESCAP Authors)

When summer river levels fall, reservoir storage drops, hydropower generation declines and diesel generation must fill the gap raising both costs and emissions. Meanwhile, agricultural water withdrawals upstream further constrain available flows for power generation.

The result is a feedback loop: limited water cuts hydropower output, leading to higher reliance on fossil energy, which in turn intensifies warming and glacier melt.

Competing pressures in a semi-arid economy

In the Western Energy Systems, consisting of provinces closest to the glaciers, rising demand compounds these stresses. Between 2018 and 2019, electricity consumption in the region rose 5.6 per cent, driven by population growth and mining expansion.

In summer months, when electricity demand peaks for irrigation pumping and cooling, river discharge often reaches its lowest levels. This mismatch between energy demand and hydrological supply poses a systemic risk. Climate projections show that long-term discharge in key basins will decline, reducing the economic lifespan of existing hydropower assets.

Addressing this challenge requires coordinated planning across water, energy, and agriculture. Three areas stand out:

1. Water-efficient agriculture. Expanding drip irrigation, adopting drought-resilient crop varieties, and improving on-farm water storage can reduce demand during low-flow periods. Aligning irrigation schedules with projected runoff cycles would ease pressure on hydropower reservoirs.
2. Diversified renewables. Mongolia’s wind and solar resources can complement hydropower seasonality. Integrating hybrid systems with storage or pumped hydro can maintain grid stability during drought years.
3. Data-driven basin management. Glacier monitoring and real-time hydrological data should inform both irrigation allocation and hydropower operation. This shared evidence-based approach can prevent conflicts between sectors during dry spells.

Mongolia already emphasizes renewable diversification. By embedding glacier and river monitoring within sector planning, the policy can better anticipate seasonal stress rather than react to it.

From vulnerability to transformative adaptation

Glacier retreat, once viewed as an environmental concern, is now an economic one. For Mongolia, without adaptation and foresight, the combined stress of reduced meltwater, erratic rainfall, and rising temperatures could destabilize both food production and energy security.

Protecting these frozen reserves and managing the water they release means securing not only the country’s rivers but its power and food systems as well.

Resilience begins where risk meets foresight.

Madhurima Sarkar-Swaisgood is Economic Affairs Officer, ESCAP; Prangya Paramita Gupta is Disaster Risk Reduction Consultant, ESCAP; Parvathy Subha is Disaster Risk Reduction Consultant, ESCAP

IPS UN Bureau

 

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Jeudi matin, le calme semblait revenu et la raison des échanges de tirs n’était pas connue. Le pays est dirigé par une junte militaire depuis le coup d’Etat de juillet 2023.

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Dans un contexte de baisse drastique de l'aide internationale, les autorités et les Nations Unies appellent à une gestion rigoureuse des ressources pour venir en aide à des millions de déplacés internes.