Agrégateur de flux

Provides an overview of Sao Tome and Principe, including key events and facts about this oil-rich island nation - one of Africa's smallest states.

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The EU-CELAC Summit takes place on 10 & 11 June 2015, in Brussels. 33 states - forming the Community of Latin America and Caribbean - are coming to Brussels to meet the EU-28 at the level of Heads of State or government. They will discuss issues such as trade and development and common challenges such as fight against crime and climate change. 

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Ha a magyar kormány lépéseket tenne a halálbüntetés visszaállítására, akkor az egyértelműen az európai kötelezettségek megsértésének minősülne – közölte az EP petíciós bizottságának ülésén az Európai Bizottság első alelnöke. Frans Timmermans ennél bővebben nem kívánt reagálni sem a magyar kormányfő múlt heti kijelentésére, sem pedig a bevándorlásról szóló kérdőívre.

Why did the EU Commission take so long to launch investigations into member states’ tax rulings? Is its strategy to go only after small countries, such as Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Ireland? Will the instruments available to it suffice? And if not, what would it take to do away with unfair tax competition? These questions were raised by MEPs in Tuesday’s Special Tax Rulings Committee debate with competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager.
Special Committee on Tax Rulings and Other Measures Similar in Nature or Effect

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

Why did the EU Commission take so long to launch investigations into member states’ tax rulings? Is its strategy to go only after small countries, such as Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Ireland? Will the instruments available to it suffice? And if not, what would it take to do away with unfair tax competition? These questions were raised by MEPs in Tuesday’s Special Tax Rulings Committee debate with competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager.
Special Committee on Tax Rulings and Other Measures Similar in Nature or Effect

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

The call is often from a worried teacher. They are noticing changes in students from immigrant backgrounds. Before, they defined themselves by nationality, as Kosovars, Bosnians or Turks, now they say they are Muslims. Before, they took part in art classes, now they insist their religion prohibits art. Then there’s a second change: these young men and women start to talk of a war against Islam that targets Muslims – targets them.

When I listen, I remember myself as a 16-year-old, the daughter of a diplomat from a secular family, coming back to my home country, Yemen, after four years in Morocco. It was 1982 – a period that saw the mushrooming of Islamist ideology in North Yemen. I was fascinated by a religious group led by a charismatic young woman of 17. The group met in the schoolyard. I would later learn it was part of a strong Islamist movement that saw Salafists work hand-in-hand with the Muslim Brotherhood.

“My father was not my father anymore; he was an enemy of Islam, I was told”

The sessions were fascinating. Our leader explained about the love of God. The moment we enter into Islam, she said, all our sins are washed away and we become equal. The fate of those who are not Muslims was never mentioned. She told us that we could be better people if only we embraced the message of Islam – the true Islam, not the corrupted form of our society. For a teenage girl, lacking direction, the message was mesmerising, and I embraced it wholeheartedly.

The changes in me were gradual. It started with language. Instead of greeting others with “good morning” or “good evening”, I used only the salute of Islam: “assalamu alaikum”, peace be upon you. Later I would learn that this salute is only reserved for Muslims. “Do not use it with non-Muslims”, I was told.

My days took on a rigid religious structure: prayer, Quran recital. It was strict, but simple and reassuring. “You have to wear the hijab”, I was told. “Hell will be filled with women hanged by their hair because of the way they seduced men by their beauty”. I was used to walking with my hair open. I covered up nevertheless. I did not like it. It suffocated me. But I did it – if this is the price for God’s love, how could I object?

“Militant radicalisation feeds on non-violent Islamism”

I was told all those around me including my practicing mother were living in Jahiliyya – “the state of ignorance and false belief that prevailed before the time of Islam”. I was told that painting, sculpture, art and music were all part of Jahiliyya and prohibited by Islam. I started to feel uncomfortable. I grew up surrounded by art and was fascinated reading about it in the encyclopaedia my father gave me when I reached 13. I was told that, like the companions of Mohammed, I had to renounce my parents and their society. I was told I belonged to a “chosen group” made supreme by adherence to the real Islam.

The more I embraced their message, the more I was drawn away from my father – an intellectual, a philosopher. He was a man of wisdom who taught me about life, philosophy and religion through poetry, books and critical thinking.  My father was not my father anymore; he was an enemy of Islam, I was told. He objected to my wearing of the hijab. He objected to what I started to tell him about Islam and the world. He was telling me this is fundamentalism, and I was starting to be angry with him. When I told my group about our fights, they repeated the message about the companions of Mohammed and how sometimes they had to fight their own fathers, brothers and uncles, even on the battlefield.

I started to be separated from my surroundings. Our meetings were no longer in the school, but in houses of young members of the movement. Older women were talking to us now.  They were telling me killing is OK. I was given a booklet about the life of Khaled Eslamboli, the army officer who planned the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981. Eslamboli was treated as a “hero of Islam”. Sadat was a Pharaoh who made peace with Israel, who worked with Jews intent on destroying Islam.

It was not just the militant dimension of their message that finally made me realise that something was fundamentally wrong with this group, it was the gender aspect. It was when I was told a saying of the Prophet about a woman who ignored her husband to visit her sick father. I was told the Prophet said, “the angels are cursing her, for she defied her husband’s order”. Later I came to understand that the Prophet might not have said this at all.

“Violence is often the last step of the radicalisation process”

I left our meeting that afternoon knowing I would never return. Who should be cursed here, I asked myself, the woman who wants to visit her sick father, or this husband who has no mercy in his heart?

It was with a sigh of relief that my father witnessed the end of my short flirtation with Islamism – taking off my headscarf was its first sign.

I was lucky. I was raised in a context that provided me with the tools to question everything I was told, not to take things at face value. Others are not so lucky and become entangled in a web of radicalism.

I am sharing this personal story with you because it connects with the phone calls I receive nowadays from Swiss teachers, overwhelmed with changes they are witnessing in their students. It connects with the questions raised by European and North American policymakers on how to tackle militant Islamism. Those policymakers often seem content with policies that address the security dimension of radicalisation, focusing on violent Islamism but ignoring its non-violent version. When they attempt to chart preventive or de-radicalisation policies, they conclude that working with “non-violent extremism” can be the best antidote to violent extremism.

I strongly disagree with this approach, because Al Qaeda and the so-called Islamic State are simply violent manifestations of that non-violent Islamism.

As a scholar, my research has always touched on Islamism. I researched the Arabian Peninsula’s social and political structures. I travelled the region for a book on authoritarian Arab states and women’s rights. I researched Sharia Councils in the UK. The more I learned about Islamism, the more one crucial message became evident: militant radicalisation feeds on non-violent Islamism – tackling the first requires confronting the second.

I tend to distinguish between two types of Islamism: societal and political.

Societal Islamism refers to those puritanical religious movements which concern themselves with changing social behaviours to conform to their rigid world view. They call for an Islamic mode of life, to separate its followers from wider society and often refrain from politics. The Salafi Islam of Saudi Arabia and Deobandi Islam of South Asia belong to these movements.

Political Islam, on the other hand, is a modern ideology that seeks political power as a means of transforming society. Its goal is revolutionary change compelled by a vision of a puritanical society governed by the law of God. In this state, identity and citizenship are defined by religious affiliation and observance.

There are different types of political Islam. Movements, such as the Islamic State, Boko Haram and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, seek to create this vision of society through outright violence. Others – such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat-e-Islami – use an incremental approach. Violence is still socially acceptable, but the strategy is gradual Islamisation through the education system, the mosque and the media. It is no coincidence that every time Islamists enter a government the first ministry they insist on having is education, and the first measure involves moulding the curriculum around their ideology.

Sometimes the two types of Islamism intertwine to become indistinguishable. Both embrace the ultimate objective of an Islamist state that implements what they consider the laws of God. Both call for a state run by a chosen supreme group of Muslims. Both actively promote concepts of military and missionary Jihad against enemies of Islam – the West included. Both emphasise control over women in their preaching of an ideal Islamist world.

I was drawn to both societal and political Islamism. The first paved the ground for the second. Societal Islamism sought to systematically separate me from my diverse Muslim North Yemeni society. It immersed me in a religious teaching that gradually turned political – the ultimate aspect of which was violence, that “it is OK to kill the enemies of Islam”.

My story took place in the ‘eighties, decades before the Iraq War and the War on Terror, which some point to today to explain the radicalisation of young migrants. It would be difficult to blame Western foreign policy for my fascination with Islamism. Nor did I come from a poor or marginalised background. I was upper-middle class, educated and privileged, but I was also young and searching for my identity.

Many of those radicalised in the West today are second, or third, generation migrants with Islamic heritage, or converts to Islam. They may face marginalisation and racism, identity crises, or the urge to rebel against family and society. However, the main driver of radicalisation is the ideological message of societal and political Islamism. It provides new recruits with direction, structure and identity. It empowers them with images of supremacy and domination.  Violence is often the last step of the radicalisation process.

Taking on militant Islamism requires policies that confront its societal and political messages in schools, mosques and religious classes. In charting these policies, it makes sense to avoid alliances with societal or political Islamist movements, however “non-violent” their message.

 

IMAGE CREDITS: CC / FLICKR – Brett Davies

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François Hollande est en visite officielle au Qatar et en Arabie saoudite. Le développement d’une diplomatie envers les pays du Golfe, parfois critiqués pour leurs atteintes aux droits de l’Homme et à la liberté d’expression, peut-elle être problématique pour la France ?
C’est une question qui revient très fréquemment avec une opposition parfois un peu manichéenne entre Realpolitik et droits de l’Homme. Cette question ne concerne pas uniquement les États du Golfe mais de nombreux autres pays avec lesquels la France entretient des relations sans avoir le même système politique. La France est sensible aux questions des droits de l’Homme mais ces dernières ne peuvent pas constituer l’ensemble de la politique étrangère française. La France, tout comme n’importe quel autre État, ne peut pas entretenir de relations diplomatiques et commerciales uniquement avec des pays qui seraient des démocraties certifiées observant une application totale des droits de l’Homme. Il apparait impossible de demander à un pays membre du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies de n’avoir des relations qu’avec ses égaux. A partir du moment où la France a une industrie d’armement, l’exportation est une nécessité. Par ailleurs, on ne peut pas dire qu’il y ait un lien direct entre le statut des femmes dans les pays du Golfe et la vente de Rafale. Le refus de vendre des Rafale n’améliorerait pas sensiblement la situation des femmes et leurs droits. D’ailleurs, si la France ne les vendait pas, ce serait les États-Unis qui se précipiteraient sur le marché.
Il faut bien sûr être conscient de la situation et l’évoquer. On ne peut pas négliger les rapports annuels d’Amnesty International ou de Human Rights Watch, mais l’époque où les pays occidentaux faisaient la leçon aux autres pays est révolue. C’est désormais plus dans le dialogue que les choses se font et il est nécessaire que les sociétés bougent en interne. Un chef d’État n’est pas un responsable d’ONG. François Hollande doit prend en compte la dimension des droits de l’Homme, notamment parce qu’elle fait partie de l’ADN français, mais il ne peut pas uniquement tenir compte de cela.

La France est par ailleurs invitée, le mardi 5 mai, à participer à un sommet extraordinaire du Conseil de coopération des États arabes du Golfe, une invitation considérée comme un privilège. Selon vous, comment interpréter cette invitation ?
Effectivement, on voit qu’il y a un raffermissement des liens avec l’Arabie saoudite qui se fait sur un schéma plus général. François Hollande, en arrivant au pouvoir, estimait que Nicolas Sarkozy avait trop privilégié le Qatar et souhaitait rétablir, non pas la priorité, mais un équilibre entre le Qatar, l’Arabie saoudite et les autres États du Golfe. Il a effectivement opéré ce rééquilibrage, tout en conservant des liens avec le Qatar. Cette situation est par ailleurs facilitée par la réconciliation en cours entre le Qatar et ses voisins du Golfe, le Qatar étant moins offensif qu’auparavant sur la question du soutien aux Frères musulmans ou encore sur la mise en accusation du général Al-Sissi en Egypte. On observe également que sur le dossier syrien, les Saoudiens et les Qataris ont une approche de plus en plus commune. Par ailleurs, ce rapprochement entre la France et les États du Golfe intervient aussi sur un fond plus général dans la mesure où ces derniers ont apprécié la fermeté dont Paris a fait preuve vis-à-vis de Téhéran dans la négociation 5+1 sur le programme nucléaire. La France est apparue comme étant plus intransigeante et plus désireuse d’obtenir un accord solide, tandis que les Américains ont été soupçonnés de vouloir un accord à tout prix et non pas un accord qui soit réellement capable d’empêcher l’Iran d’accéder à l’arme nucléaire. Tous ces éléments participent au rapprochement de la France et des pays du Golfe, non seulement sur le plan stratégique, mais également sur le plan économique car de très importants contrats civils d’équipements sont en négociation. On ne peut donc pas uniquement résumer la relation entre la France et les pays du Golfe à la vente de Rafale, pour spectaculaire qu’elle soit. Elle est beaucoup plus large que cela.

Cette visite de François Hollande intervient dix jours avant sa rencontre avec Barack Obama, les 13 et 14 mai. Les États-Unis et la France sont-ils en concurrence d’influence au Moyen-Orient ? La France bénéficie-t-elle de l’amitié des pays du Golfe, au détriment des États-Unis ?
Il est vrai que les pays du Golfe, dans l’ensemble, ont une déception par rapport aux États-Unis. Ils ont le sentiment d’une perte de crédibilité de la garantie américaine, notamment dans sa dimension stratégique. Les pays du Golfe, à tort ou à raison, ont estimé que les États-Unis avaient trop vite abandonné leur soutien à Hosni Moubarak – allié de longue date – au profit des Frères musulmans et qu’ils avaient été trop critiques du renversement des Frères musulmans par le général Abdel Fattah Al-Sissi le 3 juillet 2013. Toutefois, c’est surtout la volonté américaine de rapprochement avec l’Iran qui les inquiète le plus. Les pays du Golfe ont le sentiment qu’un accord ne conduira pas Téhéran à adopter un comportement plus modéré dans la région mais débouchera au contraire sur un Iran plus rassuré, qui pourrait avoir une volonté d’affirmation de sa puissance. De plus, des déclarations de dirigeants iraniens disant que l’Irak, la Syrie et le Yémen font partie de la sphère d’influence de Téhéran ont beaucoup inquiété les pays du Golfe. Enfin, le refus américain face à la volonté française d’opérer des frappes aériennes sur la Syrie après l’usage d’armes chimiques par le gouvernement Assad a ajouté à ce trouble. La France y est vue non pas comme une superpuissance – ce qu’elle n’est pas -, mais comme une puissance qui peut peser sur de nombreux dossiers.
Ceci étant, si la France n’a pas la capacité de prendre le relais de l’influence américaine dans le Golfe, elle peut en revanche répondre aux attentes de ces pays en leur offrant une sorte d’assurance complémentaire. Le signal envoyé à Barack Obama est qu’il n’y a pas de relation de dépendance absolue entre les États-Unis et les pays du Golfe, que ces derniers peuvent trouver d’autres partenaires et qu’il n’existe pas de monopole stratégique américain dans la région.

Le 263e numéro du magazine de l’armée de Terre est maintenant en ligne. Il revient sur la vie des unités et leurs activités.

General : The EU's cohesion strategy helps poorer regions catch up with richer ones by stimulating growth and employment. When European governments started to cut back spending due to the crisis, the EU's cohesion funding helped to support critical investment, according to the European Commission's sixth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion. The Parliament's regional development voted on its position on 4 May. Check out our chart to learn how the funding helped to make a difference.

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

Date de publication: Jeudi 07 Mai 2015Couverture: Type de publication: EtudeAuteurRésumé long: Présentant une comparaison inédite des systèmes français et allemand d’apprentissage, cette étude formule des propositions pour amener davantage de jeunes vers l’apprentissage, augmenter la capacité des entreprises à les accueillir et à les former dans de bonnes conditions.

Du 5 au 25 avril 2015, le centre de formation à la survie et au sauvetage (CFSS) a mené un stage équatorial au profit du groupe aérien européen (GAE) avant de réaliser son stage annuel de survie à Cayenne, en Guyane.

Jorge Domecq, EDA Chief Executive, today met with the Luxembourgish Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence Etienne Schneider to exchange views on the preparation of the European Council in June 2015, Luxembourg’s Presidency of the Council of the European Union and Luxembourg’s participation in EDA projects.

“The example of our future Luxembourg Governmental Satellite perfectly illustrates how public and private actors can work together for their mutual benefit and how defence spending can contribute to economic growth and job creation. The Luxembourg GovSat will be operated by a joint-venture company in Luxembourg, which brings together the government and the world-leading satellite operator SES established in the Grand-Duchy to launch a communication satellite with military frequency bands for the use of the Luxembourg government and its defence. This public-private partnership is one example illustrating how defence spending can benefit even a small economy without a significant armaments or specific defence industry of its own. As the EDA does, we promote working closely together with the private sector and looking whenever possible for economic opportunities for local companies, even SMEs, when planning for defence projects”, said Etienne Schneider, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Defence and Minister of the Economy.

Full support

”Luxembourg will take over the rotating Presidency of the Council of the European Union in the second half of 2015 - right after the June European Council on defence. Based on the excellent cooperation between the Agency and the Luxembourg Ministry of Defence, I have today assured Minister Schneider of our support in any defence related Presidency initiative. In particular, EDA will support a seminar organised on public-private partnerships as part of our endeavour to set up incentives for more cooperation in the development of European defence capabilities”, stressed Jorge Domecq during his visit in Luxembourg.

The visit in Luxembourg also allowed for meetings at the European Investment Bank and at the NATO Support and Procurement Agency. It is part of a series of visits by Mr. Domecq to all EDA Member States following his appointment as EDA Chief Executive and ahead of the Ministerial Steering Board on 18 May 2015. So far, Mr. Domecq visited Spain, Lithuania, Latvia, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Germany, Portugal, the Netherlands, Ireland, France, Romania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Croatia, Estonia, Poland, Slovenia, Greece and Cyprus. Upcoming confirmed visits are Finland, Sweden and Italy. 

More information

• News "Defence cooperation talks in Cyprus" (23 April 2015)
• News "Chief Executive meets Hungarian Minister of Defence" (23 April 2015)
• News "EDA Chief Executive visits Athens" (22 April 2015)
• News "Jorge Domecq in Poland for defence discussions"(20 April 2015)
• News "Jorge Domecq meets Estonian Minister of Defence" (20 April 2015)
• News "Meeting with Croatian Defence Minister in Zagreb" (17 April 2015)
• News "Slovenia welcomes Jorge Domecq" (15 April 2015)
• News "EDA Chief Executive visits Czech Republic" (13 April 2015)
• News "Jorge Domecq in Bulgaria to discuss defence cooperation" (8 April 2015)
• News "EDA Chief Executive travels to Romania" (8 April 2015)
• News "EDA Chief Executive meets French Minister of Defence" (30 March 2015)
• News "Jorge Domecq exchanges views with Irish Minister of Defence Simon Coveney T.D." (25 March 2015)
• News "EDA Chief Executive visits The Netherlands" (23 March 2015)
• News "Discussions on European defence in Portugal" (19 March 2015)
• News "Jorge Domecq meets German Secretary of State" (19 March 2015)
• News "Belgium and EDA discuss future defence cooperation" (18 March 2015)
• News "Jorge Domecq in the UK for cooperation talks" (25 Feb 2015)
• News "Latvia and EDA discuss cooperation opportunities" (19 Feb 2015)
• News "EDA Chief Executive visits Lithuania" (17 Feb 2015) 

Hybride Bedrohungen erfordern eine hybride Sicherheitspolitik

Minden jel arra vall, hogy beköszöntött a tavasz az európai gazdaságban. A feladatunk most az, hogy tartóssá tegyük a kikeletet – közölte Pierre Moscovici, az Európai Unió gazdasági és pénzügyi biztosa abból az alkalomból, hogy kedden bemutatta az utóbbi évek legoptimistább gazdasági előrejelzését. Brüsszel radikálisan lefelé módosította az idei évre szóló görög növekedési prognózisát, ami óhatatlanul hatással lesz a folyamatban lévő tárgyalásokra és az államadósság fenntarthatóságának megítélésére is.

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In 2003, EU-China relations were upgraded to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. Over ninety dialogues and working groups feed the work of annual EU-China Summit.

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Opinión - 4/5/2015
Miguel Otero Iglesias
Hoy el eje político de la Unión Europea está entre el voto cosmopolita, que está a favor de una mayor integración, y el nacionalista, que repudia al extranjero.

If Russia does not apply the Minsk ceasefire deals in full and return Crimea to Ukraine, the EU should step up sanctions and consider the possibility of providing Ukraine with defensive arms, say Foreign Affairs Committee MEPs in a resolution voted on Monday. Returning Crimea is vital to the EU’s long-run cooperation with Russia and EU countries must also step up their own defence capabilities, says the text, which looks at Black Sea Basin military changes since Russia illegally annexed Crimea.
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

If Russia does not apply the Minsk ceasefire deals in full and return Crimea to Ukraine, the EU should step up sanctions and consider the possibility of providing Ukraine with defensive arms, say Foreign Affairs Committee MEPs in a resolution voted on Monday. Returning Crimea is vital to the EU’s long-run cooperation with Russia and EU countries must also step up their own defence capabilities, says the text, which looks at Black Sea Basin military changes since Russia illegally annexed Crimea.
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

„Was wissen wir über den Mord an Boris Nemzow beziehungsweise was können wir wissen?“ – lautete eine der zentralen Fragen, die Prof. Dr. Martin Schulze Wessel, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Dr. Markus Ehm, Leiter der Verbindungsstelle Moskau der Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung, Dr. Uwe Halbach, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, und Prof. Dr. Dirk Uffelmann, Universität Passau, unter der Moderation von Dr. Margarete Klein, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, am 22. April 2015 aus unterschiedlichen Perspektiven diskutierten.

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP