Diplomacy & Crisis News

Before Russia invaded Ukraine a year ago today, NATO was beset by division. As recently as 2019, French president Emanuele Macron warned that the transatlantic alliance was “becoming brain-dead.” Then-U.S. presidential nominee Donald Trump’s 2016 interview with the New York Times about Washington not protecting NATO’s Baltic states from potential Russian aggression because they weren’t “paying their bills” unsettled America’s European allies. For many years, different NATO members blasted Germany and Italy for being too Russia-friendly, with some calling the former a “shaky alliance partner” and a “freeloader.” High levels of friction between Greece and Turkey only further exacerbated intra-NATO tensions.

One of Vladimir Putin’s many strategic blunders in the lead-up to the war was his underestimation of NATO’s capacity and will to unite behind President Volodymyr Zelensky’s government. Yet Putin wasn’t stupid for making this miscalculation—after Russia illegally annexed Crimea and seized much of Donbas in 2014, Germany and others in NATO were more interested in buying Russian gas than confronting Moscow over eastern Ukraine. Given this and the aforementioned intra-NATO divisions, the Kremlin arguably had good reason to assume that Berlin and other European capitals would resist Kyiv’s calls for significant military support and refrain from imposing stringent sanctions on Russia.

One year after Russia’s overt invasion, NATO unity against Moscow has, for the most part, remained rather tight. “NATO is united on a number of key issues,” says Paula Dobriansky, a former American diplomat and national security expert. “There is a fundamental consensus among NATO members about the gravity of the threat emanating from Moscow as well as the belief that if Ukraine does not decisively prevail, European and global security would be greatly impaired.”

Throughout the past year, countries in the Western alliance have provided Kyiv with military, economic, and humanitarian support to the tune of $80 billion, with the vast majority coming from the United States and UK. Although the arms deliveries to Ukraine have not been as much as some NATO countries—such as Poland and the Baltic states—would have liked, the alliance has met most of Kyiv’s demands. To Putin’s dismay, the European Union’s unprecedented sanctions packages on Russia, the “revolution” in Germany’s defense funding and energy policy, Italy’s “divorce” from Russia, Turkey’s drone deliveries to Kyiv, and other significant actions demonstrated NATO’s determination to reach its highest level of cohesion in the post-Cold War period.

Cracks in the Alliance

Yet NATO’s unity is not airtight. Hungary, for example, has been accused of obstructing the alliance’s unity to serve Budapest’s interests in maintaining positive bilateral relations with Moscow. In addition to ideational synergies between Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and Putin’s illiberal philosophies, Hungary is highly dependent on Russian gas and oil, which helps explain Budapest’s quest for foreign policy balance as a beneficiary of both EU subsidies and hydrocarbons from Russia. Nuclear energy, banking, and tourism are other domains that make Russia important to Hungary, which for years has been the most Putin-friendly EU member.

Turkey’s decision not to impose sanctions on Moscow while significantly increasing its bilateral trade with Russia further illustrates how not all members of NATO have been on the same page vis-à-vis the Ukraine War. Unconstrained by EU sanctions, Turkey’s imports of cheap Russian oil have tripled, while Ankara has de facto helped Russia bypass Western sanctions—for example, by importing semiconductors from Europe before re-exporting them to Russia. Wolfgang Pusztai, a security and policy analyst who is a senior advisor at the Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy, noted to us that there are practical reasons for this behavior: “While it is certainly justified to criticize Turkey for this, one must also realize that Turkey is in a very difficult economic situation and has presidential elections upcoming this year.”

Then there is the debate over Sweden and Finland’s accession to NATO, which has fueled significant tension between Ankara and various Western capitals. From the perspective of the United States and most European governments, these two Nordic countries joining NATO would greatly benefit the alliance. “Russia would be forced to deploy a very significant number of troops on its northern flank to protect the strategic important harbor of Murmansk and the Kola peninsula with their many navy bases from an eventual NATO attack in the case of a Russian aggression in Central Europe,” said Pusztai. “This additional burden means a significant risk for Russia and certainly lowers the appetite for a military aggression against NATO at all.”

More broadly, activists and protestors in the United States, UK, Italy, the Czech Republic, and other NATO countries, concerned about potential nuclear war and exhausted with war fatigue amid a period of global energy crises and inflation, have held demonstrations calling for a halt to arms shipments to Ukraine. Given that these countries are democracies, politicians who share these attitudes could come to power in the near future—a factor that Kyiv can’t ignore.

Ukraine’s Dependence on Western Support

With the Ukraine War entering its second year today, NATO’s member-states and their respective populations face disagreements over the extent to which they should take risks and make sacrifices to achieve a full liberation of Ukrainian land, including Crimea. While the survival of Zelensky’s government and the existence of Ukraine as an independent nation-state were on the line shortly after the February 2022 invasion, they are not today. The war, at the moment, is over a relatively small fraction of Ukrainian territory near the Russian border. As such, European countries generally regard the stakes involved in the Ukraine War as being lower when compared to a year ago.

Anatol Lieven, the director of the Eurasia Program at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, explained to us that the prospects for sustained NATO unity against Russia’s aggression will depend on four factors: “The state of the European economy; the risks of escalation to nuclear war; potential loss of faith in eventual Ukrainian victory; and if Russia itself offers a ceasefire. Any or all of these could increase pressure for a peace settlement.”

U.S. domestic politics may ultimately end up determining NATO unity. In the words of Andrew A. Michta, the dean of the College of International and Security Studies at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, “Should the United States cut Ukraine off, the country could not sustain its defense against Russia for long, regardless of what European NATO members and other supporters of Ukraine would do.” Given that a Republican might enter the Oval Office in January 2025 and decrease Washington’s support for Ukraine (or at least attach many more strings to it), Ukraine has much at stake in the 2024 U.S. election. “West European solidarity with the United States has been partly due to the fact that America has a Democratic administration,” explained Lieven. “If the Republicans—and especially of course Donald Trump—win in November 2024, this could lead to a weakening of the Transatlantic bond and more independent action by France and Germany.”

Germany and Italy will also test NATO’s impermeability. Berlin and Rome have shown a certain level of hesitancy in providing Ukraine with full-scale support. Germany recently delayed equipping Ukraine with Leopard 2 battle tanks, sending NATO allies—many of which were bound to Berlin’s consent to send their German-produced tanks to Kyiv—into a frenzy. The reason behind this delay rests in a decades-old dilemma that Berlin’s left-wing party, currently at the helm of the government, harbors, given its historic pacific stance. Italy’s prime minister, Giorgia Meloni, on the other hand, is steadfast in sending weapons to Kyiv. But members of her coalition, such as Silvio Berlusconi and Matteo Salvini, challenge Meloni’s position daily. This, and the fact that less than 40 percent of Italians support supplying Ukraine with weapons, may very well force Meloni to backtrack her support.

Germany and Italy’s hesitant-at-times support may prove quite detrimental to NATO unity behind Ukraine if the conflict rages on as a war of attrition. How long officials in Berlin and Rome can keep voters at bay is a question that keeps many experts pondering, especially given Russia’s effectiveness in tapping into these divisions for its benefit. Moscow has a long and successful history of meddling in internal politics and interfering in the elections of countries it wishes to see under its sphere of influence. European capitals were reminded of this when U.S. secretary of state Antony Blinken sent a cable to U.S. embassies warning its diplomats that the Kremlin was funneling money to sympathetic parties across Europe.

Closing Thoughts

Looking ahead, the prospects for NATO maintaining its overall unity against Russia as this conflict rages on are bright. Yet, fissures are within the transatlantic alliance are visible, and the thirty members are unlikely to resolve each disagreement or eliminate all their sources division vis-à-vis the Ukraine War. Determined to prevent Russia’s rogue invasion of an independent European country from benefitting Moscow, Western policymakers will be tasked with managing these divisions and preventing Russia from successfully exploiting them in manners that could harm NATO’s health and cohesion. A united NATO is vital for the future of Ukrainian sovereignty. As the war continues into its second year, the Biden administration will prioritize efforts aimed at preventing member-states from going astray and working with them to maintain robust support for Ukraine.

Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics and an adjunct fellow at the American Security Project.

Alissa Pavia is the Associate Director for the North Africa Program within the Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

Image: Shutterstock.

Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine stands as the biggest shakeup in the transatlantic community since the fall of the wall. It has completely changed our world, and we must adapt. 

Vladimir Putin is denuding his conventional military force. As a result, the future U.S. footprint in Europe should not be what it was in the past, nor does it need to be as robust as was once considered prudent. It is time to start talking about what the new face of the United States in Europe should look like. 

Lord Palmerston, a ruthless and cunning old sot, zealously defended his empire without an ounce of empathy, political correctness, or scruples. Still, it’s hard to argue with his dictum: “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.” This kind of righteous, hard thinking was lost in the post-Cold War world. Instead of ensuring that politics ends at the water’s edge, modern U.S. foreign policy looks increasingly like an extension of domestic policy squabbles. 

Indeed, Joe Biden’s National Security Advisor, Jake Sullivan, has said, “We’ve reached a point where foreign policy is domestic policy, and domestic policy is foreign policy.” That is nonsense. We need a third way that structures America’s actions and commitments to match our vital interests. This is nowhere more important than in America’s European footprint. 

America’s Global Footprint

America is a global power with global interests and responsibilities. That is just a fact. But it is also true that we can’t protect all those interests and responsibilities without partnering with like-minded allies who carry their fair share of risks as well as rewards. This is confirmed by the Index of U.S. Military Strength, an objective assessment that finds our forces to be, at best, marginally suited to safeguard America’s global vital interests. 

Europe, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific are the three regions most critical to U.S. prosperity and security. If all the world were a ballet stage, we could pivot from one region to another with ease. But “pivot” is an apt metaphor, because it reminds us that it would be easy for global adversaries to knock us off balance by threatening critical areas where our presence is inadequate. The United States should have sufficient capabilities in each theater to protect American vital interests there. What each regional footprint looks like should evolve over time, commensurate with the threat and allied contributions. Being responsible in how we allocate assets is also an important part of our national security. As Rep. Chip Roy and former National Security Council staff expert Victoria Coates note, a responsible use of resources makes for a stronger military.

The United States needs the right military, right now. We need to learn the lessons of the still ongoing war in Ukraine to think ahead to where we go from here.

America’s Future Footprint 

The U.S. presence in Europe, along with material assistance from NATO allies, has enabled Ukraine to stiff-arm Russia in Ukraine. In the process, Putin has lost a mammoth amount of conventional military capability. He has also witnessed Europeans enhance their energy security by divesting from dependence on Russia.

Further, many Europeans have, with renewed vigor, committed to increasing their defense capabilities and equitably sharing defense burdens. Several NATO powers, like Poland, now not only exceed the 2 percent GDP defense spending target, but their percentage by GDP exceeds that of the United States. Some major European powers, notably Germany, continue to lag behind. But our staunchest allies are not only doing more for self-defense; they are more pro-U.S., pro-NATO, anti-Russia, and anti-China. These governments are also proving remarkably resilient, despite high inflation, energy concerns, and uncertainty over the war against Ukraine.

All these constructive outcomes occurred without U.S. “boots on the ground.” We did deploy some additional troops as trainers, for logistical support, and on some security assistance and training missions, but these are, by and large, temporary deployments—and, most importantly, there was no requirement for Americans to engage in combat.

This experience—paired with the fact, that 1) Russia’s conventional military threat to Europe has been greatly reduced, 2) it will take Russia years, at best, to rebuild this capability, and 3) Europeans are willing and, in fact, doing more to contribute to collective defense—suggests how the U.S. military footprint should evolve in the future.

Forces

Ground Forces. There ought to be only a limited need for U.S. combat forces in theater. The 173rd Airborne Brigade in Italy is primarily a rapid response for missions across Eurasia and the Greater Middle East. That makes sense. The United States should have some strategically placed rapid response forces. It’s like when you’re out of town and need money: it’s much better to be able to draw cash from a convenient ATM than to have to fly back to your hometown bank.

Washington ought to have two combat brigade equivalents in Europe for training and exercises with allies, as well as part of the forward-deployed deterrence in Central Europe. These can be rotational forces, but the presence, the footprint, should be persistent. In addition, a deployed corps headquarters that could provide the capacity to mobilize a larger conventional force, if needed, makes sense. 

Russia may indeed rebuild its conventional forces over time, but then again, our expectations for Europe’s conventional forces will evolve as well. In the future, Washington can adjust as needed, particularly if the United States retains total Active, Reserve, and National Guard land force capability sufficient to meet the needs of theater commanders. 

Air Forces. The Trump administration’s plan to rationalize and consolidate the U.S. footprint made sense. The Biden administration canceled that plan, but it deserves a relook. 

Naval Forces. The United States has an important role to play in the Mediterranean, much of it centering on assisting allies in capacity building. Yet our efforts in the region are not commensurate with America’s interests. This does not mean a lot more ships. (We do need more ships, but we need them in the Indo-Pacific. For that, we will need to build a bigger Navy.) In Europe, the United States can accomplish a great deal more by pursuing security cooperation and a diplomatic approach that takes advantage of burden-sharing and joint action.

Presence

It is not so much what and how much the U.S. military has in many strategic places, but that the United States has presence, access, and the capacity to expand or contract as necessary. Greenland and Iceland are key to safeguarding the transatlantic bridge. Great Britain and Germany are crucial logistical, training, and support nodes. Poland is vital for forward presence. Many countries—Italy, Romania, Greece, Turkey, and, potentially, Georgia—offer essential basing and access options in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.

Moreover, small U.S. contingents, such as KFOR in the Balkans, can make an outside contribution to regional stability.

Enablers

One of the lessons of Russia’s war on Ukraine is that nations that demonstrate a capacity and unshakable commitment to self-defense are much more likely to attract external support from allies in times of crisis. Thus, many European nations are seeking enablers that will enhance their capacity to protect their own populations. These include intelligence sharing, surveillance, and targeting, air and missile defense, training, and technical cooperation. 

An increasingly crucial enable will be extended nuclear deterrence. The Ukraine war reminds us how adverse nuclear-armed adversaries are to fight directly with each where there is a risk of escalation. As Russia’s conventional forces decline, its reliance on nuclear deterrence will increase. Further, China’s rapid expansion of its strategic forces is a major concern. The U.S. nuclear umbrella and missile defenses must be capable and robust. 

Partnerships 

America’s continued presence and engagement in Europe has empowered Europeans who are more pro-American and anti-Russian and anti-China, as well as governments that share concerns of many conservative Americans on domestic issues like life, education, family, religious liberty, and energy policies that are strengthening transatlantic bonds. Pivoting away from them would undermine the relationships, cooperation, and burden-sharing needed to make a smaller U.S. footprint in Europe both more durable and more effective. Strengthening partnerships ought to be a priority. 

NATO remains foundational to collective security. NATO enlargement adds partners that better allow for sharing the burden. Sweden and Finland are great examples. 

The United States can also enhance bilateral relations with countries that can deliver real benefits through burden sharing and partnership. Italy, Greece, Romania, and Poland are excellent examples. Italy, for instance, is the natural U.S. partner for leadership in the Greater Mediterranean region. 

In addition, the United States should support collective efforts to expand security and economic cooperation in Northern, Central, and Southern Europe and across the Black Sea into the Caucuses and Central Asia. 

Finally, the United States should continue to push reluctant allies, like Germany, to adapt our joint efforts to the realities of the new Europe. 

This rethinking has implications for other regions as well. For instance, if America can work with the Arab nations and Israel in building out the Abraham Accords, the United States can have a similar collective security footprint in the Middle East.

In all theaters, the U.S. needs the capacity and capability to protect its vital interests. But the global footprint we lay down ought to be designed to respond to what is going on in the world and shaped to deliver what we need to protect U.S. interests in the future. 

A Heritage Foundation vice president, James Jay Carafano directs the think tank’s research on matters of national security and foreign relations.

Image: Shutterstock.

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The Netherlands' prime minister argues that Russia’s war is a great-power conflict—with the world’s small states near its center.

Meanwhile, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi was greeting Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow.

Why the United States must find new ways to protect its airspace.

What the war in Ukraine has revealed about economic sanctions.

What the war in Ukraine has revealed about Putin’s public.

Beijing has reinforced its anti-U.S. messaging this week, but lethal aid for Moscow still seems to be a red line.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime that currently rules China maintains that Taiwan is inseparably and permanently a part of China. The White Paper published by the Chinese government in August 2022 holds that “Taiwan has belonged to China since ancient times” and “Taiwan’s status as part of China’s territory has never changed.”

The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) official line is that Taiwan’s natural status is to be ruled from Beijing, that the majority of the people on Taiwan concur, and that the only opposition comes from “outside forces and the few separatists.”

This outlook, however, ignores Taiwan’s actual history. Taiwan has mostly been outside of the control of governments based on the Chinese Mainland, and the periods of mainlander rule over Taiwan have been highly contentious.

Up to the seventeenth century, Taiwan had been home not only to Chinese settlers, but also to a non-Chinese aboriginal population, a Spanish colony, and a Dutch-run government. Chinese emperors saw Taiwan as an irritant, a haven for pirates and dissenters. The Manchu-led Qing government’s decision to annex Taiwan in 1684 largely reflected a fear that an ungoverned Taiwan would continue to serve as a base for enemies. Taiwan first became a prefecture of Fujian Province, then a province in 1887. 

This first period of Chinese central government rule over Taiwan saw frequent unrest among Chinese migrants who were unhappy with the government’s land-use policies. Mainland rule ended with Taiwanese learning that their central government had sold them out, ceding Taiwan as a prize to Japan in 1895 as part of the settlement of the First Sino-Japanese War. Abandoned by the mainland, the Taiwanese declared a Republic of Formosa and fought a brief but losing war against arriving Japanese soldiers.

Japan’s defeat in the Pacific War led to Taiwan returning to rule from the mainland, in this case, the Republic of China (ROC) under Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang (KMT) government. Under Japanese rule, Taiwan had become more economically and politically advanced than Mainland China. The new KMT government, however, subjected Taiwan to systematic looting and treated the Taiwanese as Japanese collaborators who had been indoctrinated in anti-China sentiment. Taiwanese anger built up, eventually exploding in the February 28, 1947, uprising. In retaliation, the ROC central government dispatched troops from the mainland who sought out anyone they thought might be a threat to the regime. They massacred tens of thousands of Taiwanese. 

The KMT’s defeat by CCP forces in the Chinese Civil War led Chiang and his remaining followers to relocate to Taiwan in 1949. Taiwan endured a repressive one-party dictatorship until Chiang’s son began to relax civil liberties starting in 1987. A legacy of that era is the deep divide between the longer-established Taiwanese and more recently-arrived mainlander communities in today’s Taiwan politics.

Taiwan received an artificial bump in affinity for China because of the postwar influx of about two million mainland-born Chinese. That effect, however, is fading, despite many Taiwanese nationals spending years living and working in some of Mainland China’s more appealing cities. 

Public opinion surveys on Taiwan conducted by National Chengchi University and the Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation found that in 1992, less than 20 percent of Taiwan’s population described themselves as “Taiwanese.” Between 20 and 25 percent considered themselves “Chinese,” and a solid majority saw themselves as “both Chinese and Taiwanese.” Only 15 percent hoped for Taiwan's independence, 30 percent wanted unification with China, and 35 percent preferred the status quo. Those numbers changed dramatically over the next generation, indicating a psychological break from China. In 2022, a solid majority (61 percent in one poll, 80 percent in the other) considered themselves “Taiwanese,” and only a tiny minority identified as “Chinese.” Support for unification with China dropped to 11 percent, while preference for formal independence rose to 53 percent.

Now another Mainland Chinese government causes problems for Taiwan. The CCP regime claims sovereignty over Taiwan even though, unlike the Qing government or the ROC, it has never ruled Taiwan. Beijing has decreed that non-statehood for Taiwan—despite Taiwan easily fulfilling the usual criteria of an independent country—and eventual submission by Taiwan’s people to governance by the PRC are non-negotiable. The PRC has maintained heightened and continuous military pressure on Taiwan since 2016, when President Tsai Ing-wen refused to declare Taiwan part of China. Beijing harasses governments, international organizations, and private corporations that “hurt the feelings of the Chinese people” by even minuscule gestures that implicitly violate the legal fiction that Taiwan is not a country. In some cases, such as keeping Taiwan out of the World Health Assembly or the International Civil Aviation Organization, Beijing’s obsession could cause people to get hurt.

Even after the horror show of the PRC government’s crackdown on Hong Kong’s civil liberties, PRC paramount leader Xi Jinping has continued to insist that “one country, two systems” is the model for annexing Taiwan into the PRC. Xi has reportedly ordered party ideologist and Politburo Standing Committee member Wang Huning to formulate a new phrase that Xi can claim as original. Given the CCP’s sclerotic commitment to its idiosyncratically distorted conception of the Taiwan-China relationship, anything behind a superficial adjustment of wording is extremely unlikely.

The CCP’s amnesic narrative about Taiwan’s history traps it in a circular argument. The government cannot abide Taiwanese independence because this would cause a loss of domestic legitimacy. PRC citizens would consider the “loss” of Taiwan a profound failure by the leadership. But PRC citizens feel this way because the CCP leadership has taught China’s people for decades that the party must and will annex Taiwan. Xi has even said China cannot achieve “rejuvenation” without unifying with Taiwan. 

The way the CCP currently frames the Taiwan issue is an unfortunate choice, not an inevitability. In the 1930s, for example, Mao Zedong said Taiwan should be independent.

Taiwan’s current conflict with Beijing is typical of the historical relationship, not an anomaly as claimed by PRC propaganda. In any case, Beijing’s argument that the past is determinative is unpersuasive, even setting aside the issue of Beijing describing a fake past. This is the twenty-first century, not the nineteenth. The wishes of the people who inhabit a de facto state should matter more than another state’s indirect claim to ownership of the land.

Denny Roy is a Senior Fellow at the East-West Center in Honolulu.

Image: Shutterstock.

Turkey will require billions of dollars in foreign aid to clear debris and rebuild from the recent earthquake. Though more than 40,000 victims need a generous helping hand, assistance should be monitored to make sure funds are spent as intended. Channeling assistance through international NGOs would enhance the integrity of foreign aid. Donors must make sure their largess is not stolen by the incompetent, callous, and corrupt government of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Despite that stringent construction standards were adopted after the last earthquake in 1999, Erdogan established sweeping exceptions out of fear that these standards would discourage construction and limit the country’s economic development. According to Turkish agencies, a plethora of contractors with ties to the government received amnesty. The flattened landscape in Antakya, the earthquake’s epicenter, is the consequence of Erdogan’s ill-advised amnesty policy. Corrupt business practices are widespread in Turkey. Erdogan’s government awarded government-funded infrastructure projects to cronies who cut corners on safety and environmental standards, which contributed to the high death toll in Antakya. Though the government collected large sums through an earthquake tax designed to build stronger buildings, the money was pocketed by corrupt officials. It is common practice in Turkey for businesses to pay bribes to the government in exchange for lucrative contracts.

Turkey is currently investigating about 400 contractors and has arrested 120. This roundup is a thinly-disguised effort to deflect blame by scapegoating construction companies. The investigation focuses on “small fish” instead of large construction companies with ties to the government. One of the worst offenders, for example, is Cengiz Holdings, a large construction company run by a Turkish oligarch and close friend of Erdogan. Cengiz Holdings received $42.1 billion in government contracts since Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002. It also contributed $160 million to the AKP.

The disastrous consequences of the Antakya earthquake were compounded by the government’s lack of preparedness. Rescue workers were slow to reach the scene. When they arrived, they lacked suitable equipment to identify and extract victims. Though Antakya is located in a known earthquake zone, the government failed to preposition tents, blankets, food, and water. The Turkish government has also been playing politics with earthquake relief. Soon after the disaster, countries rushed to send rescue teams. However, only “friendly” governments were allowed to assist. Cyprus offered rescue teams to Antakya, but the government refused its offer. Antakya is in Hatay province, home to many refugees from Syria and a large Kurdish population. Syrians and Kurds were bumped to the end of the queue when it came to emergency assistance. The government is loath to assist so-called oppositionists allegedly sympathetic to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) against whom Turkey has waged a counterinsurgency campaign since the 1990s, which resulted in at least 40,000 deaths. The PKK announced a unilateral ceasefire within hours of the first tremor. It was not the first time the PKK laid down its arms in service of social harmony.

Erdogan boasts about Turkey’s strong state. It may be adept at waging war, but sorely lacks the capacity to address a civil emergency. Noble Turks in Turkish civil society immediately mobilized and donated supplies to the victims. Medical personnel flocked to Antakya, setting up clinics to assist earthquake victims. Though there was little coordination with the authorities, that did not dissuade their efforts. I’m in touch with doctors from a hospital in Ankara who went to Antakya to help. Their team of twelve people found a chaotic relief effort with the government all but absent.

Erdogan himself visited the earthquake zone as anger spiked over the government’s inadequate performance. He was accompanied by a gaggle of press to report on his visit. The extensive media presence made his drop-by look like a publicity stunt, rather than a sincere effort to comfort the victims. The optics of his visit compounded the government’s credibility problem. Erdogan was attired in a luxurious cashmere coat that cost thousands of dollars. The image of an elegant Erdogan surrounded by scantily clad victims backfired. He came off as uncaring, more concerned with public relations than the suffering of victims.

The earthquake compounded a widespread perception that Erdogan has broken faith with the Turkish people. The AKP has held a stranglehold on power for more than two decades. During this time, Erdogan consolidated power by establishing an executive presidency, expanding tyrannical rule, and abusing human rights with impunity. Earthquake victims are discovering they have something in common with victims of Erdogan’s human rights abuses. Turks turned a blind eye to the country’s eroding human rights situation in exchange for prosperity. Now Erdogan’s house of cards has been shaken by the Antakya earthquake. Turkey’s economy and currency have collapsed. Its reputation as a strong state is eroded. AKP officials have floated a proposal to delay national elections scheduled for May 2023. They worry—rightfully so—that Turkish voters will punish the AKP at the ballot box. The time of reckoning for Erdogan is drawing near.

David L. Phillips is Director of the Program on Peacebuilding and Human Rights at Columbia University.  He served as a Senior Adviser and Foreign Affairs Expert at the State Department during the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations.

Image: FreelanceJournalist / Shutterstock.com

The devastation wrought by Hurricanes Irma and Maria in Puerto Rico could provide an opportunity to rebuild the island’s energy system in a sustainable way. But failing to take food security into account could leave people with plenty of power but less food.

In 2017, Hurricanes Irma and Maria devastated Puerto Rico’s infrastructure. According to government estimates, it would take $132 billion from 2018 through 2028 to repair and replace the damaged infrastructure. Progress on electric grid reconstruction and upgrading has been slower than anticipated, and the island still suffers from outages and recurring storm threats. Hurricane Fiona, which hit the island in September 2022, was estimated to have caused an additional $4 billion in damages. Simultaneously, Puerto Rico has committed to generating 100 percent of its energy renewably by 2050, as stated in Puerto Rico Energy Public Policy Act (Act 17).

Given the dire state of the island’s infrastructure, this plan could be an opportunity to leapfrog fossil fuels and rebuild in a sustainable manner. But Puerto Rico’s recovery and transition to 100 percent renewables may need to take food security into account since the energy and food systems are inextricably interdependent. For instance, electricity generation and food production can compete for land use. Likewise, natural gas is a key input to produce fertilizer, and farming equipment requires diesel to run.

Puerto Rico is a small island, heavily reliant on imports. Its agricultural base, which occupies 21 percent of its land area, only produces 15 percent of the food it consumes and but a fraction of its GDP. Furthermore, Puerto Rico’s agricultural industry is also less productive per acre than competing farms in the United States and South America. Already, agricultural land on the island has decreased steadily from 6.000 km2 in 1960 to less than 2.000 km2 in 2020. Today, about one-third of residents experience food insecurity. Puerto Rico also consumes 70 times more energy than it produces, indicating enormous new generation capacity must be brought online by 2050 to comply with Act 17 goals. Therefore, as Puerto Rico proceeds toward 100 percent renewable energy (PR100), it will be tempting and possibly lucrative to reduce domestic agriculture even further, sacrificing agricultural land for solar photovoltaic installations to generate clean, renewable energy required by law.

Preliminary results of an investigation by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) suggest that the island could theoretically meet its energy needs from renewable sources, especially offshore wind, and solar photovoltaics (PVs). But while future grid electrification could increase grid efficiency, electricity consumption is also likely to increase. This would require a further increase in total generation. Offshore wind costs more than five times as much per kilowatt to install as Solar PV and more than double to maintain. At the same time, most of the land best suited for photovoltaics also happens to be the same land best suited for agriculture. The much lower costs and coincidental land favorability of PV installations could put enormous pressure on both government and industry to favor building solar PV there and crowd out agriculture. Innovation may help: some crops may be suitable to farming and photovoltaic co-location. Through clever design and a combination of crop choice, this may partially solve two problems at once. But “agrovoltaics,” as this is known, is a nascent concept, largely unproven.

In the event of natural disasters, tragically frequent in Puerto Rico, imports may be cut off for an unknown duration. Puerto Rico was making progress towards strengthening its agricultural sector until recent hurricanes caused setbacks, with estimates indicating that around 80 percent of agricultural infrastructure lies destroyed. A safe level of domestic food production required to prevent famine could be identified and enforced. Food insecurity alone could result in social instability as has been seen recently in Indonesia and Panama. It would be irresponsible to reduce domestic agricultural output below a safe baseline for incremental, possibly short-term lucrative gains in renewable energy generation.

The tragedy of disaster recovery has unlocked substantial capital for Puerto Rico to rewrite its interdependent security in energy and food. Considering food security in this context could help to ensure the population has access to both power and food.

Ismael Arciniegas Rueda is a senior economist and Andrew Star is an engineer at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation. Henri van Soest is an analyst at RAND Europe.

Image: bobby20/Shutterstock.

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