Diplomacy & Crisis News

What kind of country do Russians want to live in after the war?

Fragilisés par la chute des revenus, la concurrence des centres commerciaux et l'expansion des magasins de rabais, les petits commerces transalpins subissent une véritable hécatombe. Une situation qui n'émeut guère les concepteurs de FICO Eataly World, à Bologne : inauguré en novembre dernier, ce (...) / Italie, Alimentation, Agroalimentaire, Agriculture, Industrie culturelle, Tourisme, Loisirs, Identité culturelle - 2018/01

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Democracy was on the agenda at last week’s White House meeting between U.S. president Joe Biden and Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, with Biden calling on the two nations to support democracy “not just in our hemisphere but around the world,” and Lula affirming that the United States “can count on Brazil in the fight for democracy.”

Yet what are the United States and its allies doing to counter authoritarian aggression? The Biden-Lula meeting comes two months ahead of the Summit for Democracy, where the United States and other hosts will “reaffirm the vitality of the democratic model” to “meet the unprecedented challenges of our time.” The United States and co-hosts will also take stock of progress toward commitments they and others made during the first summit, held in 2021.

The inaugural summit provided a high-level platform for the Biden administration to repeat its rhetoric, affirming U.S. support for democracy overseas and warning of the escalating contest between democracy and autocracy.

Unfortunately, this position hasn’t always been backed by action. While the gathering highlighted the need to push back against authoritarianism, the administration undercut this aim by advancing too narrow of a solution—one focused disproportionately on supporting civil society and curbing graft without shoring up the institutions of governance that make democracy deliver.

Political parties are the most prevalent and efficacious forms of political organization and representation across the globe. Parties channel citizens’ views into platforms and are integral to democratic political competition. Victorious candidates transition their apparatus into office, making effective political parties essential to governing. 

Despite the central role parties serve in the democratic architecture of functioning societies, not a single 2021 U.S. commitment included a call to prioritize or expand support to them.

As the U.S. and allies develop commitments to announce during the summit, they have an opportunity to right-size their solution by elevating their commitment to strengthening democratic institutions generally, and political parties in particular. Doing so is in line with the stated aims of summit part deux to “reaffirm the central role of democratic institutions in delivering prosperity and safeguarding liberty.”

The following three actions—which can be adopted as summit commitments—would do well to reinforce political parties as a linchpin of liberal democracy and arguably the keystone to pushing back against domestic and foreign authoritarianism.

First, the United States and its democratic partners should expand funding to support nascent political parties that emerge from pro-democracy protest movements or respond to popular dissatisfaction with traditional parties.

From the Semilla Movement party in Guatemala to the Change Movement in Lebanon, these movements-turned-political-parties are one of the four most common types of parties today, and are increasingly prevalent in countries of strategic importance to the United States. Their leaders often win elections following a groundswell of public support and hopes for change. Yet these nascent parties face fundamental challenges in governing because they must translate loose networks of actors into a single, well-structured entity with finite views and policy proposals.

Momentum and public backing can wane as un-tested protest leaders turned government officials fail to deliver, leading to diminished support for democracy. Nurturing these parties promotes healthier multiparty competition by incentivizing out-of-touch parties to either adapt to the needs of voters or fall by the wayside (as opposed to becoming entrenched due to a lack of alternatives).

Augmenting support in the form of training and capacity building for these entities—provided they are committed to democratic practices and norms and equality for all citizens—advances the administration’s call to help so-called “bright spot” countries solidify their democratic progress. These initiatives should be complemented with debt relief and other steps to give these leaders time to show progress to their constituents.

The United States should also prioritize political party support as part of its efforts to defend, sustain, and enhance democratic resilience envisioned in the Presidential Initiative for Democratic Renewal. Specifically, support should help political parties modernize their digital operations, including harnessing technology to deliver for citizens.

Traditional parties often lag and struggle to compete with political newcomers, populists, and authoritarian-leaning actors who employ digital tools more effectively. This has contributed to the delegitimization of the critical role political parties have as institutions of democracy. Political parties must digitize operations and use digital tools and technology to better reach new audiences and communicate their platforms. Moreover, with the increased threat of digital authoritarianism, political parties need urgent support to bolster their ability to protect themselves from authoritarian powers seeking to advance their own interests by eroding multiparty democracy.

Finally, the U.S. should cultivate the political and strategic skills of political parties and their leaders. While investment in political parties’ internal infrastructure remains crucial, this is not sufficient to ensure their survival. Parties have traditionally prepared political leaders to assume a role in governing. Successful candidates and elected officials require political skills: their ability to strategize, persuade, forge consensus, secure political support for their initiatives and ultimately work within the realities of their political environment to achieve their promises. Weakness in this area impedes an elected official from delivering solutions and further weakens an already fraying support for democracy.

For example, Peru’s current state of disarray is in due part to Pedro Castillo’s lack of strategy and political astuteness, leading to missteps that alienated him from his base. Castillo is but one of many candidates who get into office only to find themselves lacking the core skills needed to govern. Political skills are essential to successful elections and office.

A second democracy summit provides an opportunity for a well-justified call to action, but is not a substitute for a strategy for defeating authoritarianism. Reversing the autocratic tide needs to start with making the financial and diplomatic commitments necessary to enable core political institutions—political parties chief among them—to deliver on the promise of democracy.

Katya Rimkunas serves as the Director for Democracy, Rights and Governance, Technical Leadership for the International Republican Institute’s (IRI) Center for Global Impact.

Patrick Quirk serves as Vice President for Strategy, Innovation, and Impact at IRI. In this role, Dr. Quirk provides the leadership, management, and vision to ensure that IRI is addressing global challenges to democracy by developing innovative and evidence-based programs, tools, and resources. He leads IRI’s organization-wide strategic planning as well as oversees institutional efforts on monitoring, evaluation, research, and learning.

Image: rafapress/Shutterstock.

Much of the debate over American policy toward Russia has concerned energy. Can Russian oil and gas be replaced in the supply chain for America’s allies? How far can the West tighten the screws on Russia’s economy? In their recent Foreign Policy piece, “The World Economy No Longer Needs Russia,” Jeffrey Sonnenfeld and Steven Tian assert that Russian energy is a marginal part of the global economy, and that shutting Russia out of global markets entirely would have minimal impact. That argument might embolden Washington but is simply not rooted in facts.

The assertion that “the world no longer depends on Putin’s oil” is either hyperbole or reflects a serious misunderstanding of oil markets. The Energy Information Agency’s (EIA) latest forecast calls for an average global production of 102 million barrels per day (mbpd) in 2023–24 and consumption of just 0.6 mbpd less. Russia’s 2022 oil production was some 11 mbpd. The loss of 11 percent of global supply with a cushion of just 0.6 percent on average would cause prices to skyrocket, severely damaging the world economy. Furthermore, EIA production estimates may be overly rosy as supply disruptions are always possible, and the reopening of the Chinese economy following the end of zero-covid policies may stoke demand.

Source: EIA

The precariousness of the supply-demand balance was highlighted by the announcement on February 10 that Russia would cut output by 0.5 mbpd. Oil prices spiked 2.2 percent since, in the words of UBS analyst Giovanni Staunovo, in the short term there is nobody to fill the supply gap created by the Russian cuts.

In light of supply tightness, oil flows have simply been re-routed. Russian exports to India and China have increased substantially, with subsequent reexport to Europe, either as crude or refined products, at higher prices. Even Saudi Arabia has been increasing imports of Russian crude for domestic use, allowing it to export more of its own product. Russian exports simply have not decreased.

The authors respond to fears of lost supply by asserting that “any lost Russian crude will be seamlessly and easily replaced within weeks.” This outright ignores the realities of global oil production. Of the sources mentioned—the United States, Venezuela, Canada, and Brazil—only the United States would seem a viable replacement. But because the expected increase of 0.55 mbpd in 2023, and another 0.40 in 2024, will produce, combined, less than one-tenth of Russian production. These numbers cannot support the assertion made by Sonnenfeld and Tian.

Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy

Canada and Brazil are likely to increase output even less. Venezuela, after twenty-three years of rule by Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro, as well as fifteen years of punishing U.S. sanctions, has seen its output plummet from 3.3 to 0.7 mbpd. The idea that it can substantially increase oil production in any appreciable amount in any policy-relevant timeframe is not believable. The U.S. Treasury’s recent granting of Chevron a six-month license to operate in Venezuela, while positive, is a drop in the bucket. Many years and billions of dollars of capital expenditure will be required to restore production.

Saudi Arabia is similarly unlikely to be able to step in. OPEC spare capacity, mostly Saudi and often estimated by politicians at 2.5 mbpd, is likely significantly less due to years of declining output and lowered capital expenditure. Based on information coming out of the kingdom and by independent experts, the number is probably closer to 0.5 mpbd. Pushing output up will require time and investment.

Moreover, OPEC’s primary desire is to maximize profit. Increasing output may run counter to this since, all else equal, rising supply means lower prices. The claim that Vladimir Putin “coerce[d] Saudi Arabia” to cut production quotas looks strange, not only because the only source cited is a Politico opinion piece written by the authors and two congressmen, but also because cutting production leads to higher prices, in line with Saudi rational self-interest.

Additionally, the argument that pausing arms transfers will pressure Saudi Arabia to ramp up production has little historical precedent. Instead, in recent years Riyadh has chosen increased cooperation with Russia and more importantly China—offering Saudi Arabia a chance to lessen the impact of U.S. pressure.

The reality of the gas market picture is also different. Sonnenfeld and Tian claim “Putin has choked off natural gas supplies to Europe” when in fact Nord Stream was operating at full capacity in the first half of 2022 and then at declining capacity for another three months before being sabotaged at the end of September. Gas flow through Ukraine was at 100 percent before dropping to 67 percent when Kyiv closed the Sokhranovka pipe. Russian LNG exports to Europe (22 billion cubic meters, or bcm, last year) continue to this day, as do flows through Turkey via Blue Stream and Turk Stream.

The statement that “Europe is now assured sufficient energy supply well into 2024 at a minimum” is not plausible, given that Russian flows will be considerably lower in 2023 than in 2022, barring a settlement of the war and a herculean effort to restore economic relations. In other words, an even greater volume of gas must be replaced this year and next. Warmer than-usual weather has helped, as Sonnefeld and Tian note, but this factor is variable and unpredictable, and should not form the basis of policy. At best, it has bought Europe some more time unless they want the process of deindustrialization to continue.

Source: Brugel - McWilliams, Sgaravatti, Zachmann

The 185 bcm of gas Europe imported from Russia in 2021 simply cannot be replaced in the short term and/or at a reasonable cost. Losses were partially offset by a 64 bcm increase in LNG imports, including an impressive 42 bcm increase from the United States. Still, the numbers cannot support the claim that “[t]he EU now purchases more LNG than it ever purchased Russian gas.”

The cost of LNG is also significantly higher than pipeline gas, with serious economic consequences—all the more so since the EU had to bid cargoes away from Asia, where LNG is already traded at a premium. This has the side effect of pricing poorer countries, like Bangladesh and Pakistan, out of the market, resulting in shortages and rationing. Given flattish domestic production, rising U.S. LNG exports will put upward pressure on the price of natural gas, which in the United States is the fuel for 38 percent of electricity and 46 percent of home heating, and is the feedstock for thousands of products from plastics to fertilizer, driving their prices up as well.

European nuclear energy, which would help alleviate part of this, has been beset by maintenance issues. While Germany has discovered a new enthusiasm for nuclear power after years of phasing it out, setting up new plants or even revitalizing old ones will take time. Likewise, not only will “renewables” not solve the problem, as asserted, but false hope in renewables is one of the major reasons Europe in general and Germany specifically is in this situation. In Germany, the share of renewables increased 364 percent from 2000 to 2020, but still account for only 18 percent of total energy supply. Additionally, renewables include biomass, such as clear-cutting forests to make wood pellets, and impose costs and problems due to their intermittency and other negative externalities for generation and the grid.

In short, there is no free ride, no magic source of energy, to power an industrial economy. 

The authors repeatedly seem to have insight into Putin’s thoughts and thought processes despite the lack of basis for such vision. Absent confirmatory actions or at least rhetoric, statements like “hoping that Europeans . . . would turn on their leaders,” “long a Putin obsession,” “miscalculations,” and “whims” are difficult to accept and do not serve as support for the proffered arguments.

The desire to punish Russia for its invasion is entirely understandable, but foreign policy must be based on the world we live in. Eliminating Russian energy would have devastating consequences for the global economy. To suggest otherwise does a disservice to those who will suffer from such policies.

Scott Semet has been working on global financial markets for over twenty-five years across the spectrum of financial services, private equity, and venture capital, including establishing and running the research department of major financial institutions. Recently, he has focused on the intersection of business, economics, and politics in Eurasia. He has an MA from Yale University Graduate School and an MBA from Columbia Business School.

Image: curraheeshutter/Shutterstock.

In addition to the Taiwanese government’s efforts to carry out reforms and increase the country’s defense budget, the growing threat from China has made Taiwanese society more mindful of its own security. Since last year, there have been several non-governmental endeavors to boost Taiwan’s civil defense. Among these initiatives, the Kuma Academy, or “Black Bear Academy,” has attracted the most attention. Co-founded by Puma Shen, a world-leading expert on misinformation, the academy is devoted to preparing 3 million Taiwanese citizens within three years in areas such as cognitive warfare, introductory modern warfare, wartime first aid, and evacuation drills. There are also several other NGOs running similar programs on various scales.

Since their inception, there have been heated debates within Taiwanese society about whether the academy and similar organizations will be able to increase public interest in self-defense. The Taiwan National Security Survey (TNSS) results from October 2020 and December 2022 reveal that local, civilian efforts like the Kuma Academy did indeed better prepare Taiwanese citizens for a conflict with China.

In the TNSS survey, citizens were often given an opportunity to specify the action they would take if Taiwan were to be invaded by China. In 2020, about 24 percent of respondents did not provide a response, while another 21 percent responded: “let it be.” When taken together, both accounted for nearly half of the population. However, things were very different in the most recent survey, conducted in December 2022. This time, when the same question was asked, the “no response” portion shrank considerably to around 15 percent, while the “let it be” group came in at 19 percent. Compared to the 2020 findings, around 10 percent of citizens moved away from these two categories. 　

Where did the 10 percent go? In short, it moved into categories that could be interpreted as displaying a willingness to resist a Chinese invasion. In the 2022 survey, the number of respondents that said they would “serve in the military” increased from 11 percent to 13 percent. Another 15 percent said they would “resist the invasion,” and another 15 percent said that they would “support the government.” In 2020, only 10 percent indicated so. These changes made up the 10 percent shift. There were other noteworthy responses in the 2022 survey. For instance, some citizens said they would “participate in local civil defense organizations” and “provide medical assistance.” If we combine them with those that expressed a willingness to support logistics in wartime, this group increased to 2 percent, compared to 0.4 percent in 2020.

All in all, the 2022 poll revealed a number of insights. First, the Taiwanese public’s willingness to defend itself is at an all-time high, jumping from 33 percent in September 2020 to 47 percent in December 2022. This reveals that nearly half of Taiwan’s citizens are willing to defend themselves. Second, in the nearly two years between the two surveys, there have not been any systematic, concrete changes in Taiwan’s defense policy, leading the authors to believe that it was efforts by organizations like the Kuma Academy that led to the outcome observed in the 2022 poll. Additionally, actions such as “helping with logistics” and “joining civil defense groups” closely resemble what the Kuma Academy and other civil defense groups have strived to teach since last year. Indeed, these efforts started to be reflected in public opinion polls in Taiwan.

Having said the above, in the same question, some citizens said that they would “hide away,” “surrender,” or “run away.” But taken together, they represented a minority in Taiwanese society. We believe that going forward, the Taiwanese public’s willingness to engage in self-defense will continue to increase. According to a recent publication, the actions a Taiwanese citizen will take in wartime are largely dependent on what they believe others will do. When more citizens express a willingness to fight, others will follow. The same is true for the contrary, however. This tendency is especially salient for those who consider themselves to hold both Taiwanese and Chinese identities. We believe this explains the ever-increasing support for self-defense in Taiwan; citizens took cues from their peers.

This survey has a number of critical policy implications for the United States. First, as the results show that Taiwanese citizens are willing to fight for themselves, it will help clear up doubts that the Taiwanese public only wants to free-ride or even entrap the United States in a conflict with China. Second, recognizing the growing threat from China, the United States will benefit from assisting local civil defense organizations, as such training raises Taiwan’s determination for self-defense and the country’s overall preparedness for war. Specifically, while recent discussions tend to focus on bilateral training between the American and Taiwanese coast guards, it would be wise to broaden the scope to include civil and other non-governmental organizations in Taiwan, such as the Kuma Academy. These exchanges could be vital for Taiwan’s ability to defend its homeland and further deter a Chinese assault. At any rate, it will be in the interests of the relevant agencies to take the lead on these efforts (if such conversations have not taken place already). Doing so will further strengthen and develop groups like the Kuma Academy, advancing U.S. security interests. Without strong U.S. and Taiwanese government support for these grassroots organizations, critical opportunities to prepare to win a conflict with China will be missed.      

Charles K. S. Wu is an assistant professor of political science at the University of South Alabama. Find him on Twitter @wupolisciusa.

Yao-Yuan Yeh is the Fayez Sarofim – Cullen Trust for Higher Education Endowed Chair in International Studies, chair of the International Studies & Modern Languages Department, and chair of the Political Science Department at the University of St. Thomas in Houston. Find him on Twitter @yeh2sctw.

Fang-Yu Chen is an assistant professor of political science at Soochow University, Taiwan. Find him on Twitter @FangYu_80168.

Austin Horng-En Wang is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. Find him on Twitter @wearytolove.

Image: JENG BO YUAN/Shutterstock.com.

“I am in Ukraine today,” President Joe Biden declared in his dramatic trip to Kiev earlier this week, “to reaffirm our unwavering and unflagging commitment to Ukraine’s democracy, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.” For most of this first year of the Ukraine war, the American public remained strikingly supportive of Biden’s Ukraine policy. But soft spots have been showing—and risk becoming cracks in the support base Biden needs to sustain that commitment.

Late 2022 polls showed 75 percent support for Russia sanctions, 57 percent for Ukrainian military aid, and only 35 percent seeing the conflict as “none of our business and we should not interfere.”

Support for military deployments to Eastern European NATO allies reached as high as 69 percent when specified “as a deterrent to keep Russia from invading those countries.” As to direct military intervention into the war itself, the public has consistently stood behind the line drawn by the Biden administration against this: in March 68 percent opposed sending troops, in August 60 percent, and in October 66 percent.

On questions geared to the then-upcoming midterm congressional elections, 69 percent were supportive of a candidate favoring continued Ukrainian military aid, while only 25 percent for a candidate advocating lifting Russian sanctions. A post-election poll showed a similar margin of 64 percent wanting their Congressional members to support Ukraine aid, while only 36 percent oppose.

Within all that, though, party differences had begun to emerge. Whereas in May only 17 percent of Republicans said Ukrainian support was “too much” support, by September this was up to 32 percent; Democrats had only gone from 8 percent to 11 percent. By January 2023, Republicans were up to 47 percent taking the “doing too much” position, Democrats only 10 percent.

Even before becoming House Speaker, Kevin McCarthy issued his “no blank check” warning. Reducing Ukraine aid was among the pledges he made to hard-right caucus members in order to become Speaker. House Foreign Affairs and Intelligence Committee Chairmen Michael McCaul and Mike Turner are playing the waste-fraud-abuse card—that they do support Ukraine, but just want more oversight on how the money is spent. Others, such as Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene, are more blatant and bombastic, posing questions like “Is Ukraine now the 51st state of the United States of America?,” even alleging an elaborate cryptocurrency conspiracy in which military aid for Ukraine actually funded Democrats’ campaigns.

And then there’s presidential politics. Questions explicitly identifying policies as Biden’s got much lower approval than those just about the policies themselves. The same poll that had only 26 percent saying reduce Ukraine aid got 53 percent disapproval when identifying America’s Ukraine policy as Biden’s. As the presidential race ramps up, this link will be made more and more. Florida governor Ron DeSantis, a leading Republican presidential aspirant, wasted no time in criticizing Biden for the trip and deriding the Russian threat as “third-rate.”

Some of the initial willingness to bear costs was a rally effect that took effect right after the Russian invasion. Over time though, cost-bearing willingness declined. In March 2022, 55 percent prioritized sanctioning Russia even if it damaged the American economy, and only 42 percent opted to limit damage to our own economy even if it made Russia’s sanctions less effective. By last month only 36 percent still supported making sanctions effective, with 59 percent prioritizing limiting our own economic costs. With the American economy still far from out of the woods and total aid to Ukraine going over $100 billion, cost-bearing willingness is understandably under added pressure.

We also see “generational laddering” with younger generations—which are becoming the largest demographic voting bloc—less supportive than older generations. On approval of sanctions, Gen Z stands at 45 percent, Millennials at 55 percent, Gen X at 76 percent, and Baby Boomers at 86 percent. On Ukrainian financial aid, 53 percent/54 percent/60 percent/75 percent. On military aid, 44 percent/48 percent/61 percent/81 percent. On supporting Ukraine for “as long as it takes,” 43 percent/52 percent/62 percent/66 percent.

The close collaboration of European allies has both satisfied the political preference for burden sharing and enhanced the strategic calculus for policy effectiveness. 86 percent of the American public stressed the importance of allies working with the United States against Russia. Support for sanctions has gone as high as 83 percent when posed as being imposed by both the United States and European allies. While Europe has done far better than anticipated in reducing its energy dependence on Russian oil and natural gas, the economic costs being borne from both sanctions and war still have been quite substantial. And as hard as NATO has been working on maintaining solidarity, issues like the German Leopard tanks and Ukrainian pressure on Britain for fighter jets are indicative of increasing differences over the optimal strategy for these next phases of the war. If European commitment wavers, the American public may question its own commitment.

Adding to these are signs of an emerging policy debate within the United States. While there were some dissenting views early on, these were even fewer than during the 2003 Iraq war. As long as the Russian strategy was proving flawed and Ukrainian military and society kept up their admirable will and extraordinary performance, U.S. and NATO policy generally seemed well-calibrated. But with the war becoming attritional and trench warfare-like, and Russia managing to contain economic sanctions and keep pouring troops in, concerns have been intensifying as to the sustainability of that strategy. The House Progressive Caucus’ October letter stressing the need to “avoid a prolonged conflict” was retracted for political reasons (coming on the eve of the midterms), but its policy argument lingers in the background. Joint Chiefs Chairman General Mark Milley publicly questioned the prospects of a Ukrainian military victory and pushed for more diplomacy. Despite White House pressure, General Milley did some “clarifying” but only partially walked his views back. A recent RAND study was even blunter: it posed the dilemma of increased assistance emboldening Ukraine to hold out on any possible negotiated settlement on the one hand, and decreased assistance prompting Russia to ratchet up its destructiveness even further.

Relatedly, what if Ukraine starts losing as Russia mounts its next offensive? We know from other foreign policy cases that the sense a policy is working inclines the public to sustain support. That the Ukrainian resistance has held up so well has made Americans feel their money is being well spent. For example, comparing polls taken in August when Russia seemed to be gaining to October ones following Ukrainian forces re-taking Kharkiv and making other military gains, the none-of-our-business view went down from 40 percent to 35 percent, and support for providing weapons went up from 51 percent to 66 percent. But while a turn in the war towards Russia winning could strengthen the policy rationale for more support, the public may see this as throwing good money after bad, and be even less inclined to be supportive.

Alternatively, what if facing defeat Russia attacks a NATO ally or goes up the escalatory ladder toward the use of nuclear weapons? Recent polling by the Ronald Reagan Foundation found 69 percent of respondents are concerned about the threat of nuclear war—the highest indication of such fear since the Foundation first asked this question in 2018. That the threat was posed as “in the next five years” helps explain why 57 percent nevertheless still favored supporting Ukraine at the moment. It’s one thing for the public to affirm support for not giving in to nuclear threats when these are hypotheticals. It’d be quite another if the threat becomes more imminent, all the more if it’s coming from a beleaguered Vladimir Putin. Putin’s recent state of his union speech, suspending even any semblance of compliance with the New START treaty, threatening to resume nuclear tests, and announcing Russian strategic systems are now on combat duty only ratcheted up the nuclear threat higher than it’s been since the war started.

The Biden administration thus cannot count on the support that has been there for its Ukraine policy to still be there in the months to come. Soft spots in what otherwise is a consensus are more politically manageable than cracks in its base. As the war enters its second year, the political and policy challenges for maintaining Ukraine’s support, let alone increasing it, are even more formidable than they were in the first year.

Bruce W. Jentleson is a William Preston Few Distinguished Professor of Public Policy at Duke University, a former State Department official, and the author of Sanctions: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford University Press, 2022).

Image: Shutterstock.

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